TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V.
Headoffice:
Westervoortsedijk 73
NL-6827 AV Arnhem
P.O. Box 2220
NL-6802 CE Arnhem
The Netherlands
Location Leek:
Eiberkamp 10
NL-9351 VT Leek
P.O. Box 37
NL-9350 AA Leek
The Netherlands
info@nl.tuv.com
www.tuv.com/nl
Tel. +31 (0)88 888 7 888
Fax +31 (0)88 888 7 879
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. is a
registered company at the Dutch
Chamber of Commerce under
number 27288788
VAT number: NL815820380B01
IBAN: NL61DEUT0265155096
Version
2016-2
®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
Certification Report
Mercury ePassport v1.16
Sponsor and developer: Infineon Technologies AG
Am Campeon 5
D-85579 Neubiberg
Germany
Evaluation facility: Brightsight
Delftechpark 1
2628 XJ Delft
The Netherlands
Reportnumber: NSCIB-CC-16-95781-CR
Report version: 1
Project number: NSCIB-CC-16-95781
Author(s): Wouter Slegers
Date: 14 February 2017
Number of pages: 12
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.
Page: 3/12 of report number: NSCIB-CC-16-95781-CR, dated 14 February 2017
®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
CONTENTS:
Foreword 4
Recognition of the certificate 5
International recognition 5
European recognition 5
1 Executive Summary 6
2 Certification Results 7
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 7
2.2 Security Policy 7
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 7
2.4 Architectural Information 8
2.5 Documentation 8
2.6 IT Product Testing 8
2.7 Re-used evaluation results 9
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 9
2.9 Results of the Evaluation 9
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 10
3 Security Target 11
4 Definitions 11
5 Bibliography 12
Page: 4/12 of report number: NSCIB-CC-16-95781-CR, dated 14 February 2017
®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. has the task of issuing
certificates for IT security products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the
Interior and Kingdom Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TÜV Rheinland
Nederland B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a license is
accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 General requirements for the accreditation of
calibration and testing laboratories.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. asserts that the product or
site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that
the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common
Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification
document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation,
the intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the evaluation
assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the (site) security
target.
Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.
Page: 5/12 of report number: NSCIB-CC-16-95781-CR, dated 14 February 2017
®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
Recognition of the certificate
Presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement and SOG-IS logos on the certificate
would indicate that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and the
SOG-IS agreement and will be recognised by the participating nations.
International recognition
The CCRA has been signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC. Starting September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide mutual
recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance levels up to
and including EAL2+ALC_FLR. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification
schemes can be found on: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The European SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) version 3 effective from April
2010 provides mutual recognition of Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation
level for all products. A higher recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (resp. E3-basic) is
provided for products related to specific technical domains. This agreement was initially signed by
Finland, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy
joined the SOGIS-MRA in December 2010. The current list of signatory nations, approved certification
schemes and the list of technical domains for which the higher recognition applies can be found on:
http://www.sogisportal.eu.
Page: 6/12 of report number: NSCIB-CC-16-95781-CR, dated 14 February 2017
®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the Mercury
ePassport v1.16. The developer of the Mercury ePassport v1.16 is Infineon Technologies AG located
in Neubiberg, Germany and they also act as the sponsor of the evaluation and certification. A
Certification Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the IT
security properties of the product for their particular requirements.
The TOE is a contactless chip of an ePassport including the Mercury ePassport application. It is based
on the requirements from the ICAO for machine readable travel documents, i.e. [ICAO_9303_10] and
[ICAO_9303_11].
The security IC hardware is a M7892 D11 device certified under BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-v2-2016. It also
contains firmware and asymmetric cryptographic libraries (ACL). Besides the hardware platform, the
TOE contains the Mercury OS and the Mercury ePassport application (v1.16) that are placed on the
hardware platform.
Depending whether BAC or PACE is used, the TOE is compliant with [PP-BAC] respectively [PP-
PACE].
The TOE has been evaluated by Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands. The evaluation
was completed on 13 February 2017 with the approval of the ETR. The certification procedure has
been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the
Area of IT Security [NSCIB].
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the Mercury ePassport v1.16, the security
requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the product is
intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the Mercury ePassport v1.16 are advised
to verify that their own environment is consistent with the security target, and to give due consideration
to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR]
1
for this product provide sufficient
evidence that it meets:
• the EAL4 augmented (EAL4+) assurance requirements for the evaluated security functionality
when BAC is used. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of
security measures).
• the EAL5 augmented (EAL5+) assurance requirements for the evaluated security functionality
when PACE is used. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of
security measures) and AVA_VAN.5 (Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4 [CEM], for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, version 3.1 Revision 4 [CC].
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the Mercury ePassport
v1.16 evaluation meets all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates
and that the product will be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list. It should be noted that the
certification results only apply to the specific version of the product as evaluated.
1
The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not releasable for public review.
Page: 7/12 of report number: NSCIB-CC-16-95781-CR, dated 14 February 2017
®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the Mercury ePassport v1.16, from Infineon
Technologies AG located in Neubiberg, Germany.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
Hardware M7892 D11 platform (See [HW-ST])
Hardware identification data 7633A301254EA097A6D57CFE3BD53A19
Software Mercury ePassport application afe6cd4c5de77b1d03d6315c11a3cbbe
Mercury OS c64640b66754c86185cbe70b274e193f
Mercury pre-personalized file system 466d5bc7f87e18d513104a2832b28fba
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided together with the TOE. Details can
be found in section 2.5 of this report.
For a detailed and precise description of the TOE lifecycle refer to the [ST], chapter 1.4.5.
2.2 Security Policy
As an ePassport implementing the specification from ICAO for machine readable travel documents,
i.e. [ICAO_9303_10] and [ICAO_9303_11], compliant with [PP-BAC] and [PP-PACE], the TOE
security features in its operational use are:
• Only terminals possessing authorisation information (the shared secret MRZ optically retrieved
by the terminal) can get access to the user data stored on the TOE and use security
functionality of the travel document under control of the travel document holder,
• Verifying authenticity and integrity as well as securing confidentiality of user data in the
communication channel between the TOE and the terminal connected
• Averting of inconspicuous tracing of the travel document,
• Self-protection of the TOE security functionality and the data stored inside.
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
Detailed information on the assumption and threats can be found in the [PP-BAC] and [PP-PACE]
section 3 “Security Problem Definition” respectively. Detailed information on the security objectives
that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment can be found in section 4 “Security Objectives” of the
[PP-BAC] and [PP-PACE].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
Note that all TOEs compliant to the BAC protocol critically depend on the objectives for the
environment for the inspection systems to be followed.
Page: 8/12 of report number: NSCIB-CC-16-95781-CR, dated 14 February 2017
®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
2.4 Architectural Information
The logical architecture of the TOE can be depicted as follows (based on [ST]):
M7892 D11 Hardware (BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-v2-2016)
Mercury OS
Mercury ePassport Application
BAC PACE
FW and assymmetric cryptographic libraries (BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-v2-2016)
Lifecycle
management Mercury Pre-
personalized file
system
TOE user
guidance
Figure 1. Logical architecture of the TOE.
The TOE has the following features (please note that this list is not exhaustive):
• Communication: ISO/IEC 14443 Type B (contactless)
• BAC mutual authentication scheme with session key agreement according to [ICAO_9303_11]
• PACE mutual authentication scheme with session key agreement according to [ICAO_9303_11]
• Commands for personalization of the ePassport
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Identifier Version
Mercury: ePassport Data Book V1.25
Infineon Technologies Mercury ePassport User Guide V2.3
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
For the developer tests two types of test were used: white box (WB) testing and black box (BB)
testing. The WB testing is performed on the same product as the TOE although, more functionality is
available i.e., it is more open (EAC, more life cycle states, etc.). The BB testing is performed on the
TOE. The actual TOE is used to test all that is specific for the TOE (correct functionality available, life
cycle management conformant with the ICAO specifications, etc.).
For the evaluator tests, due to the high coverage by the developer, a limited set of independent tests
confirming presence of security features and absence of unwanted functionality were performed.
Page: 9/12 of report number: NSCIB-CC-16-95781-CR, dated 14 February 2017
®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
2.6.2 Independent Penetration Testing
The penetration tests are devised after performing the Evaluator Vulnerability Analysis. The reference
for attack techniques against which smart card-based devices such as the TOE must be protected
against is the document "Attack methods for smart cards" [JIL-AM]. Additional guidance for testing
was provided by the certification body in the form of a number of questions regarding the TOE. The
vulnerability of the TOE for these attacks has been analysed in a white box investigation conforming to
AVA_VAN.3 for BAC functionality and AVA_VAN.5 for PACE functionality.
In total 2 perturbation and 1 side channel tests were performed at AVA_VAN.5 level.
2.6.3 Test Configuration
Testing was performed on the final version of the TOE in its evaluated configuration.
2.6.4 Testing Results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its ST and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e. from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
The algorithmic security level exceeds 100 bits for all evaluated cryptographic functionality as required
for high attack potential (AVA_VAN.5).
The strength of the implementation of the cryptographic functionality has been assessed in the
evaluation, as part of the AVA_VAN activities. These activities revealed that the remaining security
level exceeds 100 bits after the best attack. So no exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the
independent penetration tests.
2.7 Re-used evaluation results
This is a new composite certification: direct re-use has been made of the certification of the underlying
hardware platform (including crypto library). No evaluation results have been re-used.
There has been extensive re-use of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the software component
of the TOE using site certificates. Sites involved in the development and production of the hardware
platform were re-used by composition.
No sites have been visited as part of this evaluation.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number Mercury ePassport v1.16.
2.9 Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR]
2
which references the ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the Mercury ePassport v1.16, to
be CC Part 2 extended
3
, CC Part 3 conformant, and to meet the requirements of EAL 4 augmented
2
The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not releasable for public review.
Page: 10/12 of report number: NSCIB-CC-16-95781-CR, dated 14 February 2017
®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
with ALC_DVS.2 (when used with BAC) and EAL5 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
(when used with PACE). This implies that the product satisfies the security technical requirements
specified in Security Target [ST].
The Security Target claims ’strict’ conformance to the [PP-BAC] (when BAC is used) and [PP-PACE]
(when PACE is used) registered and certified by BSI.
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 contains necessary information about the usage of the
TOE.
Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the countermeasures against attacks,
depend on accurate conformance to the guidance for the administrator (personalizer) and the user
(inspection system following the ICAO guidelines).
There are no particular obligations or recommendations for the user apart from following the user
guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant details with respect to the resistance
against certain attacks.
In addition all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he
should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from
the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the implemented cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. To fend off attackers with high attack potential appropriate cryptographic algorithms with
adequate key lengths must be used (references can be found in national and international documents
and standards).
3
The TOE is a composite TOE with a certified hardware platform. Claiming CC Part 2 extended is
because the underlying platform claims CC Part 2 extended
Page: 11/12 of report number: NSCIB-CC-16-95781-CR, dated 14 February 2017
®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
3 Security Target
The Security Target [ST] is included here by reference.
4 Definitions
This list of Acronyms and the glossary of terms contains elements that are not already defined by the
CC or CEM:
BAC Basic Access Control
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
MRZ Machine Readable Zone
NSCIB Netherlands scheme for certification in the area of IT security
PACE Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PP Protection Profile
TOE Target of Evaluation
Page: 12/12 of report number: NSCIB-CC-16-95781-CR, dated 14 February 2017
®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report:
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I version
3.1 revision 1, and Part II and III, version 3.1,revision 4, September 2012.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, version 3.1,
Revision 4, September 2012.
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report Mercury ePassport v1.16 EAL4+ (BAC) and EAL5+
(PACE), Version 7.0, Issue 9 February 2017.
[HW-CERT] Certification report BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V2-2016 for Infineon Security Controller,
M7892 Design Steps D11 and G12, V1.0, 20 December 2016.
[HW-ETRfC] Evaluation Technical Report for Composite Evaluation, v1, 2 December 2016.
[HW-ST] M7892 Design Steps D11 and G12, revision 1.7, 16 November 2016.
[ICAO_9303_10] International Civil Aviation Organization, DOC 9303 Machine Readable Travel
Documents Seventh Edition – 2015, Part 10: Logical Data Structure (LDS) for
Storage of Biometrics and Other Data in the Contactless Integrated Circuit (IC).
[ICAO_9303_11] International Civil Aviation Organization, DOC 9303 Machine Readable Travel
Documents Seventh Edition – 2015 Part 11: Security Mechanisms for MRTD's.
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.2,
August 10
th
, 2015.
[PP-BAC] BSI-CC-PP-0055: Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application”,
Basic Access Control, Version 1.10, Issue 25.03.2009.
[PP-PACE] BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011-MA-01: Machine Readable Travel Document using
Standard Inspection Procedure with PACE (PACE PP), Version 1.01, Issue
22.07.2014.
[ST] Security Target Mercury ePassport v1.16, version 2.0, dated 2017-01-13.
(This is the end of this report).