Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0347-2006
for
ACOS EMV-A03V1
Configuration B
from
Austria Card
Plastikkarten und Ausweissysteme GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 228 9582-0, Fax +49 228 9582-455, Infoline +49 228 9582-111
BSI-DSZ-CC-0347-2006
ACOS EMV-A03V1
Configuration B
from
Austria Card
Plastikkarten und Ausweissysteme GmbH
Common Criteria Arrangement
for components up to EAL4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Part 1
Version 0.6, Part 2 Version 1.0 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL4 and smart card specific guidance for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation, Version 2.1 (ISO/IEC 15408:1999) and including final interpretations for
compliance with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and Common Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2.
Evaluation Results:
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance Package: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL4 augmented by
AVA_MSU.3 (Vulnerability assessment - Analysis and testing for
insecure states)
AVA_VLA.4 (Vulnerability assessment - Highly resistant)
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the
evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, 20. January 2006
The President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Dr. Helmbrecht L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 228 9582-0 - Fax +49 228 9582-455 - Infoline +49 228 9582-111
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for
encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2)
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no
warranty of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other
organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0347-2006
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17 December
1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
V
BSI-DSZ-CC-0347-2006 Certification Report
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
VI
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0347-2006
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
• BSIG2
• BSI Certification Ordinance3
• BSI Schedule of Costs4
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
• DIN EN 45011 standard
• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.15
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM)
• Part 1, Version 0.6
• Part 2, Version 1.0
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
• Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance
components above EAL4 (AIS 34)
The use of Common Criteria Version 2.1, Common Methodology, part 2,
Version 1.0 and final interpretations as part of AIS 32 results in compliance of
the certification results with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and Common
Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2 as endorsed by the Common Criteria
recognition arrangement committees.
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 22 September 2000 in the Bundes-
anzeiger p. 19445
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0347-2006 Certification Report
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998. This agreement was signed by the
national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This
agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended to
include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7).
2.2 CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 was signed in May 2000. It includes also the recognition of Protection
Profiles based on the CC. The arrangement was signed by the national bodies
of Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and the United
States. Israel joined the arrangement in November 2000, Sweden in February
2002, Austria in November 2002, Hungary and Turkey in September 2003,
Japan in November 2003, the Czech Republic in September 2004, the Republic
of Singapore in March 2005, India in April 2005.
This evaluation contains the components AVA_MSU.3 (Vulnerability
assessment - Analysis and testing for insecure states) and AVA_VLA.4
(Vulnerability assessment - Highly resistant) that are not mutually recognised in
accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual recognition the EAL4-
components of these assurance families are relevant.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0347-2006
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product ACOS EMV-A03V1, Configuration B has undergone the
certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-
0221-2004. For this evaluation specific results from the evaluation process
based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0221-2004 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product ACOS EMV-A03V1, Configuration B was
conducted by T-Systems GEI GmbH. The T-Systems GEI GmbH is an
evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor and vendor and distributor is:
Austria Card
Plastikkarten und Ausweissysteme GmbH
Lamezanstraße 2-8
A-1232 Wien, Austria
The certification is concluded with
• the comparability check and
• the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on 20. January 2006.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in
the following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described and specified in the
following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0347-2006 Certification Report
4 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-24.
The product ACOS EMV-A03V1, Configuration B has been included in the BSI
list of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
http:// www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor7
of
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the above-
mentioned website.
7
Austria Card
Plastikkarten und Ausweissysteme GmbH
Lamezanstraße 2-8
A-1232 Wien, Austria
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0347-2006
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0347-2006 Certification Report
Contents of the certification results
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification of the TOE 11
3 Security Policy 12
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 12
5 Architectural Information 13
6 Documentation 13
7 IT Product Testing 13
8 Evaluated Configuration 14
9 Results of the Evaluation 15
10 Comments/Recommendations 17
11 Annexes 18
12 Security Target 18
13 Definitions 18
14 Bibliography 21
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0347-2006
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Austria Card’s ACOS EMV-A03V1,
Configuration B. (For information about the two different configurations please
read chapter 1.5 „Special configuration requirements“ of this report.)
The TOE is intended to be used as a secure signature creation device (SSCD)
for the generation of signature creation data (SCD) and the creation of qualified
electronic signatures according to Directive 1999/93/ec on a community
framework for electronic signatures [14], the Austrian [15] and the German
Signaturgesetz [16]. Note that a confirmation through the respective authorities
is required for usage under the abovementioned laws for qualified electronic
signatures.
The TOE comprises the following components:
• Integrated Circuit (IC) Philips SmartMX P5CC036V1D (hardware)
• Smart card operating system (software)
• Application for digital signature (software)
The TOE provides the following functions necessary for devices involved in
creating qualified electronic signatures:
• Generation of SCD and the correspondent signature-verification data (SVD)
• Creation of qualified electronic signatures
(a) after allowing for the data to be signed (DTBS) to be displayed
correctly where the display function is provided by the signature
creation application (SCA) as appropriate TOE environment,
(b) using appropriate hash functions that are, according to [17] and [18],
agreed as suitable for qualified electronic signatures,
(c) after appropriate authentication of the signatory by the TOE,
(d) using appropriate cryptographic signature function that employ
appropriate cryptographic parameters agreed as suitable according
to [17] and [18].
Figure 1 shows the TOE scope from the structural perspective. The SSCD, i.e.
the TOE, comprises the underlying hardware, the operating system (OS), the
secure SCD/SVD generation, secure SCD storage and use, and signature
creation functionality. The CGA and the SCA are part of the immediate
environment of the TOE. The CGA shall communicate with the TOE over a
trusted channel to receive the SVD generated by the TOE and to include the
SVD in the certificate generated by the CGA. The human interface device
provided by the SCA is used for the input of VAD for authentication by
knowledge. The TOE holds RAD to check the provided VAD. The SCA
establishes a trusted path to the TOE to protect the confidentiality and integrity
of the VAD. The TOE supports a trusted path and a trusted channel to the SCA
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0347-2006 Certification Report
but accepts VAD and DTBS not sent via trusted path or trusted channel.
Communication between the SCA and the TOE has to use a trusted
environment.
Other
applications
CGA
SSCD
Network
interface
Human interface I/O
TOEenvironment
Hardware
SCD storage
and use
SCD/SVD
generation
Signature
creation
Operating system
Trusted
Channel
SCA
Trusted
Channel
Trusted
path
Figure 1: Scope of the SSCD, structural view
The TOE life cycle consists of the development phase and the operational
phase. The operational phase starts after initialisation with personalisation for
the signatory's use by
1. generating a SCD/SVD pair
2. creation of the signatory’s verification authentication data (SVAD).
The main functionality in the usage phase is signature creation including all
supporting functionality (e.g., secure SCD storage and SCD use). The TOE
implements all IT security functionality, which are necessary to ensure the
secrecy of the SCD. The SSCD protects the SCD during the whole life cycle as
to be solely used in the signature creation process by the legitimate signatory.
The SVD corresponding to the signatory's SCD will be included in the certificate
of the signatory by the certificate-serviceprovider (CSP). To prevent the
unauthorised usage of the SCD, the TOE provides user authentication and
access control. The TOE will destroy the SCD, if it is no longer used for
signature generation. The life cycle of the device as SSCD ends with the
destruction of all SCD within the device.
The TOE as a multi-application smart card implements additional functions and
security features, but these are not subject of the ST [6].
The TOE provides a single physical interface over a serial connection according
to [19] which is used to transmit command APDUs to the TOE and receive the
corresponding response APDUs from the TOE as specified in [20] and in [21].
The evaluation of the TOE was conducted as a composition evaluation making
use of the platform evaluation results of the CC evaluation of the underlying
semiconductor. For this re-evaluation based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0221-2004 the
underlying hardware platform of the TOEs is changed to the Philips
P5CC036V1D Secure Smart Card Controller which was evaluated as BSI-DSZ-
CC-0293-2005 ([8], [9]) and is fully compatible to the P5CC036V0M used in the
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0347-2006
baseline evaluation. The software of the TOE has not changed and the
hardware changes are limited to changes that do not change the functional
behaviour of the TOE.
"Philips P5CC036V1D Secure Smart Card Controller" provided by Philips
Semiconductors GmbH (see [8]) was evaluated according to Common Criteria
EAL 5 augmented with a minimum strength level for its security functions of
SOF-high for specific functionality based on the Protection Profile BSI-PP-0002
[10] and as outlined in [9]. This platform evaluation was performed by T-
Systems GEI GmbH.
The embedded Software of the ACOS EMV-A03V1, Configuration B and the
overall composition were evaluated by T-Systems GEI GmbH, too. The
evaluation was completed on 20. December 2005. The T-Systems GEI GmbH
is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)8
recognised by BSI.
The concept for composition as outlined in CC Supporting Document [4, AIS 36]
was used.
The sponsor, and vendor and distributor is
Austria Card
Plastikkarten und Ausweissysteme GmbH
Lamezanstraße 2-8
A-1232 Wien, Austria
1.1 Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see Annex C or [6], part
3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level
EAL4+ (Evaluation Assurance Level 4 augmented). The following table shows
the augmented assurance components.
Requirement Identifier
EAL4 TOE evaluation: Methodically designed, tested and
reviewed
+ AVA_MSU.3 Vulnerability assessment - Analysis and testing for
insecure states
+ AVA_VLA.4 Vulnerability assessment – Highly resistant
Table 1: Assurance components and EAL-augmentation
8
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0347-2006 Certification Report
1.2 Functionality
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) selected in the Security
Target are Common Criteria Part 2 extended as shown in the following tables.
The following SFRs are taken from CC Part 2:
Security
Functional
Requirement
Identifier
FCS Cryptographic support
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation
FDP User data protection
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ETC.1 Export of user data without security attributes
FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes
FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection
FDP_SDI.2 Stored data integrity monitoring and action
FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity
FIA Identification and Auzthentification
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FMT Security Management
FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FPT Protection of the TOE Security Functions
FPT_AMT.1 Abstract machine testing
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
FPT_PHP.1 Passive detection of physical attack
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0347-2006
Security
Functional
Requirement
Identifier
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
FTP Trusted Path/Channels
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path
Table 2: SFRs for the TOE taken from CC Part 2
The following CC part 2 extended SFRs are defined:
Security
Functional
Requirement
Identifier
FPT Protection of the TOE Security Functions
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation
Table 3: SFRs for the TOE, CC part 2 extended
Note: Only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 5.
These Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
TOE Security
Functions
Description
SF1 Life cycle support
SF2 Identification and authentication of user
SF3 Access control
SF4 SCD/SVD pair generation
SF5 SVD export and correspondence proof
SF6 Signature creation
SF7 Secure messaging
SF8 Self test
SF9 Physical protection
SF10 Object reuse
Table 4: TOE Security Functions
1.3 Strength of Function
The TOE‘s strength of functions is rated ‘high’ (SOF-high) for those functions,
identified in the Security Target [6], chapter 6.1.11, SOF Claim. The rating of the
strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0347-2006 Certification Report
encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2) (see
Chapter 9 of this report).
1.4 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies (OSPs)
addressed by the evaluated IT product
The threats and Organisational Security Policies (OSPs) which were assumed
for the evaluation and averted by the TOE are specified in the Security Target
[6]:
Name Definition
T.Hack_Phys Physical attacks through the TOE interfaces
T.SCD_Divulg Storing, copying, and releasing of the signature creation data
T.SCD_Derive Derive the signature creation data
T.Sig_Forgery Forgery of the electronic signature
T.Sig_Repud Repudiation of signatures
T.SVD_Forgery Forgery of the signature-verification data
T.DTBS_Forgery Forgery of the DTBS-representation
T.SigF_Misuse Misuse of the signature creation function of the TOE
Table 5: Threats for the TOE
Name Definition
P.CSP_Qcert Qualified certificate
P.Qsign Qualified electronic signatures
P.Sigy_SSCD TOE as secure signature creation device
Table 6: OSPs
Note: Only the titles of the threats and OSPs are provided. For more details
please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 3.
1.5 Special configuration requirements
The TOE is intended to be used as a secure signature creation device. It is
defined uniquely by the name and version number ACOS EMV-A03V1,
Configuration B. Its implementation representation and its configuration are
specified by the Configuration List [27] in appendices of the document [26]. The
evaluated version of the TOE has the label P5CC036_2004_EEP_RC8
according to the configuration list [27].
The product is available in two configurations, "configuration A" and
"configuration B," whereby configuration A mandates the use of secure
messaging between the SSCD and the IT-environment and configuration B
supports secure messaging but also allows for operation without the use of
secure messaging in a trusted IT-environment. The TOE is the product in
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0347-2006
configuration B but configuration A has also been evaluated, see [12], [13] and
chapter 8 of this report.
In configuration A the SCA must authenticate itself to the SSCD. The product in
configuration A requires the SCA to use a trusted path for sending the VAD and
to use a trusted channel for sending the DTBS. The product in configuration A is
compliant with the Protection Profile SSCD Type 3 [11]. In configuration B the
SCA uses a trusted environment for communication with the TOE. The TOE in
configuration B supports a trusted path and a trusted channel to the SCA but
accepts VAD and DTBS not sent via trusted path or trusted channel and is not
compliant with the Protection Profile SSCD Type 3 [11]. For details about the
differences to the PP please read 7.2 and 7.3 of the Security Target [6].
The configuration is irreversibly specified during the initialisation process.
The configuration of the memory management unit (MMU) constitutes a central
part of the TOE’s security. The MMU implements memory separation of
different applications using MMU tables. Changes to the MMU configuration for
the signature application and the operating system are not allowed, changes to
the MMU configuration for other applications have to be applied according to
the rules described in the document Secure Patching, Version 1.1 [30]. The
separation of applications without application-specific executable code is
covered by this certification process but the functionality "application separation
for executable code" is not covered.
Therefore both changes to the executable code of other applications as well as
changes to the MMU tables of other applications are not covered by this
evaluation. (The term “other applications” is used to denote applications located
in a dedicated file (DF) which are different from the signature application located
in the signature application’s DF). The evaluation results are restricted to chip
cards containing the TOE as well as other applications which have been
inspected as part of this evaluation. These applications are listed in table 7
below. During the evaluation, tests have been performed to demonstrate that
the applications listed do not have any negative influence on the signature
application.
Application Name AID (Application
Identifier)
Short Description
EMV Maestro A0000000043060 International EMV application, Version 2.1
EMV MasterCard A0000000041010 International EMV application, Version 2.1
EMV ATM Maestro D0400000190001 Domestic EMV application, Version 2.1
EMV POS Maestro D0400000190002 Domestic EMV application, Version 2.1
EMV ATM MasterCard D0400000190003 Domestic EMV application, Version 2.1
EMV POS MasterCard D0400000190004 Domestic EMV application, Version 2.1
Quick (IEP) D040000001000002 Domestic Paymentsystem, Version 2.1
ATM D040000004000002 Domestic Paymentsystem, Version 2.1
POS D040000003000002 Domestic Paymentsystem, Version 2.1
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0347-2006 Certification Report
Application Name AID (Application
Identifier)
Short Description
RFU D040000002000002 Domestic Paymentsystem, Version 2.1
Retail D04000000B000002 Domestic Loyalty, Version 2.1
Bank_Data D04000000C000002 Domestic Loyalty, Version 2.1
Shopping D04000000D000002 Domestic Loyalty, Version 2.1
Digital ID D0400000190010 Domestic Paymentsystem, Version 2.1
Digital Signature (SSCA) A0000001184543 Signature Application
Encryption Application A000000118454E Encryption Application, Version 1.10
DF_UNI_Ausweis D040000015000001 Domestic Loyalty, Version 2.0
DF_UNI_Kepler1 D040000013000001 Domestic Loyalty, Version 2.0
DF_UNI_Kepler2 D040000013000002 Domestic Loyalty, Version 2.0
DF_Mensa D040000014000001 Domestic Loyalty, Version 2.0
DF_KEP_SIG A000000118040000 Domestic Loyalty, Version 1.32
DF_Ausweis D040000015000001 Domestic Loyalty, Version 1.3
DF_Schüler1 D040000013000001 Domestic Loyalty, Version 1.3
DF_Schüler2 D040000013000002 Domestic Loyalty, Version 1.3
DF_Verkehr A000000118010000 Domestic Loyalty, Version 1.3
DF_Partner A000000118020000 Domestic Loyalty, Version 1.3
DF_Schülerdaten A000000118030000 Domestic Loyalty, Version 1.3
DF_Schul_SIG A000000118040000 Domestic Loyalty, Version 1.32
Table 7: Optional applications on ACOS EMV-A03
1.6 Assumptions about the operating environment
The following constraints concerning the operating environment are made in the
Security Target, please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1:
A.CGA Trustworthy certification-generation application
The CGA protects the authenticity of the signatory’s name and the
SVD in the qualified certificate by an advanced signature of the
CSP.
A.SCA Trustworthy signature creation application
The signatory uses only a trustworthy SCA. The SCA generates
and sends the DTBS-representation of data the signatory wishes
to sign in a form appropriate for signing by the TOE.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0347-2006
1.7 Disclaimers
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
ACOS EMV-A03V1, Configuration B
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Name Form of
Delivery
1 HW/SW Philips SmartMX P5CC036V1D with Austria Card ROM
Mask AC000004.hex dated 19.12.2003
Smart card with
ROM code
2 SW Digital Signature Application according to Specification
of the generic Secure Signature Application for ACOS
EMVA03, Version 1.7 [24].
The application is configuration B. There is another
configuration possible (Configuration A, see [12]). The
configuration of the application (and thus the TOE’s
configuration) is determined during production and
cannot be changed afterwards. The user is informed of
the type of TOE delivered.
EEPROM
3 Doc Administrator Guidance - Evaluation of ACOS
EMVA03V0, Version 1.20 [23]
Copy or pdf
4 Doc User Guidance - Evaluation of ACOS EMV-A03V0,
Version 1.10 [22]
Copy or pdf
5 Doc Specification of the generic Secure Signature
Application for ACOS EMV-A03, Version 1.7 [24]
Copy or pdf
6 Doc Delivery & Operation, Version 1.20, Austria Card
GmbH, 23.06.2004 [25]
Copy or pdf
7 Doc Commands for ACOS EMV-A03, Version 1.2 [28] Copy or pdf
8 Doc ACOS EMV-A Init-Pers-Concept, Version 3.04 [29] Copy or pdf
Table 8: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE’s evaluated configuration contains other applications which have been
listed in table 7, see chapter 1.5. According to the configuration list [27] the label
of the evaluated version of the TOE is P5CC036_2004_EEP_RC8.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0347-2006 Certification Report
3 Security Policy
The TOE is the composition of an IC, IC Dedicated Software and Smart Card
Embedded Software and will be used as a secure signature creation device
(SSCD) for the generation of signature creation data (SCD) and the creation of
qualified electronic signatures. The security policy is to provide protection
against
• physical attacks through the TOE interfaces,
• storing, copying, releasing and deriving the signature creation data by an
attacker,
• forgery of the electronic signature, of the signature-verification data, or of the
DTBS-representation,
• repudiation of signatures,
• misuse of the signature creation function of the TOE.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
4.1 Usage assumptions
Specific usage assumptions were not addressed by this product evaluation.
4.2 Environmental assumptions
The following assumptions about physical and connectivity aspects defined by
the Security Target have to be met (refer to Security Target [6], chapter 3.1):
• The CGA protects the authenticity of the signatory’s name and the SVD in
the qualified certificate by an advanced signature of the CSP(A.CGA).
• The signatory uses only a trustworthy SCA. The SCA generates and sends
the DTBS-representation of data the signatory wishes to sign in a form
appropriate for signing by the TOE (A.SCA).
Furthermore, the Security Target [6], chapter 3.3 defines three Organisational
Security Policies that state that the CSP uses a trustworthy CGA to generate
the qualified certificate for the SVD generated by the SSCD (P.CSP_Qcert), that
the signatory uses a signature creation system to sign data with a qualified
electronic signature that is based on a qualified certificate and that is created by
an SSCD (P.Qsign), and that the TOE implements the SCD used for signature
creation under sole control of the signatory (P.Sigy_SSCD). Please refer to the
Security Target [6], chapter 3.3 for more detail.
4.3 Clarification of scope
Additional threats that are not countered by the TOE and its evaluated security
functions were not addressed by this product evaluation.
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5 Architectural Information
The TOE (ACOS EMV-A03V1, Configuration B) is intended to be used as a
secure signature creation device comprising an integrated circuit (IC) with an
operating system (OS) and a signature application. An overview of the
architecture is given in section 2 of the Security Target [6]. A top level block
diagram can be found in figure 1 of this report and in chapter 2 of the Security
Target [6]. The TOE is the composition of an IC, IC Dedicated Software and
Smart Card Embedded Software. A top level block diagram of the hardware IC
including an overview of subsystems can be found within the TOE description of
the Security Target of the chip [8].
6 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to
the customer (see also table 8 of this report):
• Administrator Guidance - Evaluation of ACOS EMV-A03V0, Version 1.20,
Austria Card GmbH, 28.07.2004, [23]
• User Guidance - Evaluation of ACOS EMV-A03V0, Version 1.10, Austria
Card GmbH, 26.07.2004, [22]
• Specification of the generic Secure Signature Application for ACOS EMV-
A03, Version 1.7, Austria Card GmbH, 16.09.2004, [24]
• ADO_DEL.2, ADO_IG.1, BSI-DSZ-CC-0220 and BSI-DSZ-CC-0221,
Version 1.20, Austria Card GmbH, 23.06.2004, [25]
• Commands for ACOS EMV-A03, Version 1.2-Release, Austria Card GmbH,
31.03.2004, [28]
• ACOS EMV-A Init-Pers-Concept, Version 3.04, Austria Card GmbH,
Revised on 27.07.2004, [29]
7 IT Product Testing
The developer tested all TOE-relevant interactions with both RSA and ECC key
pairs. The test team defined all necessary test cases with respect to standards
the implementation has to adhere to and with respect to the Common Criteria
evaluation. Testing was divided in two parts: Every single command was tested
with all possible valid and invalid test cases first. Then test scenarios were
created where all commands were tested in different combinations. The test
cases are implemented by scripts and run against the TOE.
In all, the developer tests covered all security functions. Where possible, the
tests were performed at the APDU level, ensuring a coverage of at least all FSP
interfaces. Since there is a direct mapping between APDUs and subsystems,
the testing depth is on HLD level. In addition there are module tests. Usually
they are performed by the programmers.
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Evaluator testing consisted of both tests at the APDU interface and of tests
using a simulator (or emulator), where necessary. The APDU tests have been
carried out with the emulator, SO28 and test cards (modules). All tests that
made use of the signature key pair have been executed with both an RSA key
pair and an ECC key pair.
All tests have been carried out on the emulator first. Characteristic parts of the
final test suite have been executed against test cards. Following test cards have
been used for these tests:
• configuration B with an RSA signature key pair,
• configuration B with an ECC signature key pair.
The security functions tested included every security function but SF9 (Physical
protection). SF9 has not been tested explicitly, since SF9 requires no direct
interaction between chip and operating system software: If the chip identifies an
attack, the chip provides its security functionality without any further
requirements.
Every APDU of the operating system has been tested. To cover the security
aspects not already tested by the operating system focused tests, additional
tests have been prepared. The evaluators also performed tests that verified that
the additional applications do not have an negative influence on the signature
application. The evaluators have tested the TOE systematically against high
attack potential during their penetration testing. The tests have been carried out
on a PC with card reader equipped with special test software capable of
performing cryptographic calculations, a digital oscilloscope and special
analysis tools and covered the resistance of the RSA-CRT and ECC
Implementation against Side Channel Analysis.
For the re-evaluation, tests have been performed that proof the correct
integration of the software with the new hardware platform, the continuing
resistance against side channel attacks, and the functional correctness of the
cryptographic function’s implementations.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is delivered in state initialised and is of configuration B. It is defined
uniquely by the name and version number ACOS EMV-A03V1, Configuration B
and is referenced by a label according to the configuration list [27] which is
P5CC036_2004_EEP_RC8. There is also a configuration A of the product
available that has been evaluated in a different evaluation. See also [12] and
[13]. The configuration of the application (and thus the TOE’s configuration) is
determined during production and cannot be changed afterwards. The user is
informed of the type of TOE delivered. The evaluation results are restricted to
chip cards containing the TOE with applications that have been inspected
during the evaluation process and that are listed in table 7 of this report. See
also chapter 1.5 of this report.
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), [7] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as
relevant for the TOE.
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components identical
with EAL4. For components beyond EAL4 the methodology was defined in co-
ordination with the Certification Body [4, AIS 34]).
As the evaluation of the TOE was conducted as a composition evaluation, the
ETR [7] includes also the evaluation results of the composite evaluation
activities in accordance with CC Supporting Document, ETR-lite for
Composition: Annex A Composite smart card evaluation [4, AIS 36].
The ETR [7] builds up on the ETR-lite for Composition documents of the
evaluations of the underlying hardware "Philips P5CC036V1D Secure Smart
Card Controller" ([9]). These ETR-lite for Composition documents were provided
by the ITSEF T-Systems GEI GmbH according to CC Supporting Document,
ETR-lite for Composition ([4, AIS 36]).
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components identical
with EAL4. For components beyond EAL4 the methodology was defined in co-
ordination with the Certification Body. For smart card specific methodology the
scheme interpretations AIS 25, AIS 26 and AIS 36 (see [4]) were used. For
specific methodology on random number generator evaluation the scheme
interpretations AIS 20 and AIS 31 (see [4]) were used.
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL4
augmented and the class ASE for the Security Target evaluation) are
summarised in the following table.
Assurance classes and components Verdict
Security Target evaluation CC Class ASE PASS
TOE description ASE_DES.1 PASS
Security environment ASE_ENV.1 PASS
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
PP claims ASE_PPC.1 PASS
IT security requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements ASE_SRE.1 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Configuration management CC Class ACM PASS
Partial CM automation ACM_AUT.1 PASS
Generation support and acceptance procedures ACM_CAP.4 PASS
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Assurance classes and components Verdict
Problem tracking CM coverage ACM_SCP.2 PASS
Delivery and operation CC Class ADO PASS
Detection of modification ADO_DEL.2 PASS
Generation log ADO_IGS.1 PASS
Development CC Class ADV PASS
Fully defined external interfaces ADV_FSP.2 PASS
Security enforcing high-level design ADV_HLD.2 PASS
Implementation of the TSF ADV_IMP.1 PASS
Descriptive low-level design ADV_LLD.1 PASS
Informal correspondence demonstration ADV_RCR.1 PASS
Informal TOE security policy model ADV_SPM.1 PASS
Guidance documents CC Class AGD PASS
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM.1 PASS
User guidance AGD_USR.1 PASS
Life cycle support CC Class ALC PASS
Identification of security measures ALC_DVS.1 PASS
Developer defined life-cycle model ALC_LCD.1 PASS
Well-defined development tools ALC_TAT.1 PASS
Tests CC Class ATE PASS
Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS
Testing: low-level design ATE_DPT.1 PASS
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
Independent testing - sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
Vulnerability assessment CC Class AVA PASS
Validation of analysis AVA_MSU.3 PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_SOF.1 PASS
Highly resistant AVA_VLA.4 PASS
Table 9: Verdicts for the assurance components
For this re-evaluation based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0221-2004 the underlying
hardware platform of the TOEs is changed to the Philips P5CC036V1D Secure
Smart Card Controller which was evaluated as BSI-DSZ-CC-0293-2005 ([9], [8])
and is fully compatible to the P5CC036V0M used in the baseline evaluation.
The software of the TOE has not changed and the hardware changes are
limited to changes that do not change the functional behaviour of the TOE.
The evaluation has shown that:
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• the Security Functional Requirements specified for the TOE are Common
Criteria Part 2 extended
• the assurance of the TOE is Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL4
augmented by AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4
• the TOE fulfils the claimed strength of function SOF-high for the functions as
outlined in chapter 1.3. The underlying hardware had been successfully
assessed by T-Systems GEI GmbH.
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to ACOS EMV-A03V1,
Configuration B as outlined in chapter 8 of this report and that is produced and
initialised in an environment that was subject to an audit in the cause of the
evaluation.
The documentation (see chapter 6 of this report) has not changed from the
baseline evaluation.
The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification or assurance continuity of the
modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the
evaluation of the modified product does not reveal any security deficiencies.
10 Comments/Recommendations
The operational documentation (refer to chapter 6 of this report) contains
necessary information about the secure usage of the TOE. Additionally, for
secure usage of the TOE the fulfilment of the assumptions about the
environment in the Security Target [6] and the Security Target as a whole has to
be taken into account. Therefore a user/administrator has to follow the guidance
in these documents.
The user of the TOE has to be aware of the existence of two configurations.
The name and version number of this TOE ACOS EMV-A03V1, Configuration B
but there is another configuration available, see [12], [13] and chapter 1.5 of this
report. The configuration of the application (and thus the TOE’s configuration) is
determined during production and cannot be changed afterwards. The user is
informed of the type of TOE delivered, see User Guidance [22], chapter 4.1.
If a new application is not only restricted to a new data structure in a separate
DF but also introduces new executable code, the MMU tables will probably
have to be changed. The functionality “application separation for executable
code” is not covered by this certification process. Therefore the evaluation
results are restricted to chip cards containing the TOE as well as the
applications which have been inspected during the evaluation process.
Therefore both changes to the executable code of other applications as well as
changes to the MMU tables of other applications imply a re-certification. The
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other applications which have been inspected as part of this evaluation are
listed in table 7 of this report.
11 Annexes
None.
12 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document.
13 Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
AID Application identifier
AIS Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit, interface standard for smart cards,
see ISO/IEC 7816 part 3
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security
CA Certification authority (part of a CSP)
CEM Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation
CGA Certification generation application
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CSP Certification-service-provider
DPA Differential Power Analysis, an attack, which may compromise
cryptographic keys by analysing the power consumption of the
smart card chip
DF Dedicated file, directory on a smart card file system according to
ISO/IEC 7816
DRNG Deterministic Random Number Generator (a term used and
introduced in AIS20)
DTBS Data to be signed
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptographic
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EEPROM Electrically erasable programmable read-only memory; EEPROM
is a special type of PROM that can be erased by exposing it to an
electrical charge
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
FSP Functional Specification
HLD High-level design
IC Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
MF Master file, top level directory (root) on a smart card file system
according to ISO/IEC 7816
MMU Memory Management Unit
OS Operating System
OSP Organisational Security Policy
PC Personal Computer
PIN Personal identification number
PP Protection Profile
PROM Programmable read-only memory, a memory chip on which data
can be written only once
PUK Personal unblock key
RA Registration authority (part of a CSP)
RAD Reference authentication data
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Asymmetric crypto algorithm by R. L. Rivest, A. Shamir, L.
Adleman
SCA Signature creation application
SCD Signature creation data
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SigG (Austrian or German) Signaturgesetz
SigV (Austrian or German) Signaturverordnung
SM Secure Messaging
SO28 a packaging technology; small outline package, 28 leads
SOF Strength of Function
SSCD Secure signature creation device
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ST Security Target
SVAD Signatory’s verification authentication data
SVD Signature verification data
SW Software
TOE Target of Evaluation
TRNG True Random Number Generator (a term used and introduced in
AIS31)
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSFI TOE security functions interface
TSP TOE Security Policy
VAD Verification authentication data
13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
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SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
14 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.1, August 1999
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Part 1, Version 0.6; Part 2: Evaluation Methodology, Version 1.0,
August 1999
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0347; Version 1.1; 17.10.2005; Evaluation
of the ACOS EMV-A03V1, Configuration B; Austria Card GmbH.
[7] Evaluation Technical Report; BSI-DSZ-CC-0346 and BSI-DSZ-CC-0347;
Version 2.2; December 16th
, 2005; Product ACOS EMV-A03V1
(confidential document)
[8] Security Target Lite BSI-DSZ-CC-0293, Evaluation of the Philips
P5CC036V1D Secure Smart Card Controller, Version 1.0, 13.03.2005,
Philips Semiconductors GmbH
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[9] Certificate of the Philips P5CC036V1D with specific IC Dedicated
Software Secure Smart Card Controller from Philips Semiconductors
GmbH, Business Line Identification; Deutsches IT-Sicherheitszertifikat,
BSI-DSZ-CC-0293-2005, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik, 19.08.2004
[10] Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile (SSVG-PP), Version 1.0, July
2001; registered and certified by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI) under the reference BSI-PP-0002-2001
[11] Protection Profile - Secure Signature Creation Device (SSCD-PP) Type
3, Version 1.05, EAL 4+ BSI-PP-0006-2002T, 03.04.2002
[12] Certification Report; BSI-DSZ-CC-0346-2006 for ACOS EMV-A03V1,
Configuration A from Austria Card GmbH; Bundesamt für Sicherheit in
der Informationstechnik
[13] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0346; Version 1.1; 17.10.2005; Evaluation
of the ACOS EMV-A03V1, Configuration A; Austria Card GmbH.
[14] Directive 1999/93/ec of the European parliament and of the council of 13
December 1999 on a Community framework for electronic signatures
[15] (Austrian) Bundesgesetz über elektronische Signaturen (Signaturgesetz
– SigG) (inkl. Einarbeitung der Novelle lt. Ministerrat 10/2000), 19.
August 1999, BGBl. I Nr. 190/1999
[16] (German) Gesetz über Rahmenbedingungen für elektronische
Signaturen und zur Änderung weiterer Vorschriften vom 16. Mai 2001
(BGBI. I S.876 ff)
[17] Algorithms and Parameters for Secure Electronic Signatures, V.2.1 Oct
19th 2001, Algorithms group working under the umbrella of European
Electronic Signature Standardisation Initiative Steering Group
[18] Bekanntmachung zur elektronischen Signatur nach dem Signaturgesetz
und der Signaturverordnung (Übersicht über geeignete Algorithmen);
Vom 2. Januar 2005, Bundesnetzagentur (BNetzA); Veröffentlicht am 30.
März 2005 im Bundesanzeiger Nr. 59, S. 4695-4696;
Regulierungsbehörde für Telekommunikation und Post
[19] ISO/IEC 7816-3: 1997 Information technology - Identification cards -
Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts - Part 3: Electronic signals and
transmission protocols, International Standard
[20] ISO/IEC 7816-4: 1995 Identification cards - Integrated circuit(s) cards
with contacts - Part 4: Interindustry command for interchange
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[21] ISO/IEC FDIS 7816-8:1998 Identification cards - Integrated circuit(s)
cards with contacts - Part 8: Security related interindustry commands
[22] User Guidance - Evaluation of ACOS EMV-A03V0, Version 1.10, Austria
Card GmbH, 26.07.2004
[23] Administrator Guidance - Evaluation of ACOS EMV-A03V0, Version 1.20,
Austria Card GmbH, 28.07.2004
[24] Specification of the generic Secure Signature Application for ACOS
EMV-A03, Version 1.7, Austria Card GmbH, 16.09.2004
[25] ADO_DEL.2, ADO_IG.1, BSI-DSZ-CC-0220 and BSI-DSZ-CC-0221,
Version 1.20, Austria Card GmbH, 23.06.2004
[26] Configuration Management & Life cycle support, BSI-DSZ-CC-0220 and
BSI-DSZ-CC-0221, Evaluation of the ACOS EMV-A03V0, Version 1.10,
Austria Card GmbH, 18.05.2004
[27] Configuration list as addendum for Configuration Management & Life
cycle support, Austria Card GmbH, 14.10.2004
[28] Commands for ACOS EMV-A03, Version 1.2-Release, Austria Card
GmbH, 31.03.2004
[29] ACOS EMV-A Init-Pers-Concept, Version 3.04, Austria Card GmbH,
Revised on 27.07.2004
[30] Secure Patching, Version 1.1, Austria Card GmbH, 27.08.2004
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Caveats on evaluation results (chapter 5.4) / Final Interpretation 008
The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements
that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result
is presented with respect to Part 2 (functional requirements), Part 3 (assurance
requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL,
Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 2 conformant if the functional
requirements are based only upon functional components in Part 2
Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 2 extended if the functional
requirements include functional components not in Part 2
plus one of the following:
Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 3 conformant if the assurance
requirements are based only upon assurance components in Part 3
Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 3 extended if the assurance
requirements include assurance requirements not in Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect
to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements
(functions or assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part
of the conformance result.
Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements
(functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the
packages listed as part of the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect
to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
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CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 2.5)
"The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are
shown in Table 2.1."
Assurance Class Assurance Family Abbreviated Name
Class ACM: Configuration
management
CM automation ACM_AUT
CM capabilities ACM_CAP
CM scope ACM_SCP
Class ADO: Delivery and
operation
Delivery ADO_DEL
Installation, generation and start-up ADO_IGS
Class ADV: Development Functional specification ADV_FSP
High-level design ADV_HLD
Implementation representation ADV_IMP
TSF internals ADV_INT
Low-level design ADV_LLD
Representation correspondence ADV_RCR
Security policy modeling ADV_SPM
Class AGD: Guidance
documents
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM
User guidance AGD_USR
Class ALC: Life cycle support Development security ALC_DVS
Flaw remediation ALC_FLR
Life cycle definition ALC_LCD
Tools and techniques ALC_TAT
Class ATE: Tests Coverage ATE_COV
Depth ATE_DPT
Functional tests ATE_FUN
Independent testing ATE_IND
Class AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
Covert channel analysis AVA_CCA
Misuse AVA_MSU
Strength of TOE security functions AVA_SOF
Vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and map
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 6)
"The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that
balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of
acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate
concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of
maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from Part 3 are
included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful
and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and
components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and
STs for which they provide utility."
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 6.1)
Table 6.1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a
hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families.
Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component
where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation
assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance.
They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more
assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is
accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component
from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth)
and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 2 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no
more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance
dependencies of every component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other
combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation“ allows the
addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already
included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another
hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an
EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be
augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component“
is not recognised by the CC as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it the
obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended with
explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance Class Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 2: Evaluation assurance level summary
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 6.2.1)
"Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but
the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where
independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has
been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer,
including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the
guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could
be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE,
and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a
manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection
against identified threats.“
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 6.2.2)
"Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of
design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the
part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such
it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the
absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a
situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the
developer may be limited.“
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 6.2.3)
"Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from
positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of
existing sound development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough
investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-
engineering.“
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 6.2.4)
"Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other
resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically
feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in
conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-
specific engineering costs.“
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 6.2.5)
"Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security
engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported
by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a
TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5
assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5
requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of
specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development
and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable
costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.“
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 6.2.6)
"Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to
produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant
risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for
application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets
justifies the additional costs.“
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 6.2.7)
"Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies
the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with
tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal
analysis.“
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Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 14.3)
AVA_SOF Strength of TOE security functions
"Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted,
it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept
of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their
security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical
analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required
to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE
security function claim.“
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 14.4)
AVA_VLA Vulnerability analysis
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of
the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to
violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover
flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the
ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised
capabilities of other users.“
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of
all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance
level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified
vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found
useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.“
"Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by
the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the
TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a
low (for AVA_VLA.2), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3) or high (for AVA_VLA.4)
attack potential.“
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