BSI-DSZ-CC-0844-2014
for
SLB96xx
from
Infineon Technologies AG
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V4.75
BSI-DSZ-CC-0844-2014
Trusted Platform Module
SLB96xx
from Infineon Technologies AG
PP Conformance: PC Client Specific Trusted Platform Module Family
1.2; Level 2, Revision 116, Version 1.2, 6 October
2011, BSI-CC-PP-0030-2008-MA-01
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented with ALC_FLR.1 and
AVA_VAN.4
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
for components up
to EAL 4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 and guidance specific for the
technology of the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version
3.1.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 28 February 2014
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Joachim Weber L.S.
Head of Division SOGIS Recognition
Agreement
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0844-2014
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0844-2014 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0844-2014
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................8
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................13
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................14
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................14
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................15
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................16
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................16
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................17
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................17
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................20
11 Security Target............................................................................................................20
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................20
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................22
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................25
CC Part 1:.......................................................................................................................25
CC Part 3:.......................................................................................................................26
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................35
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0844-2014 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● BSIG2
● BSI Certification Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN 45011 standard
● BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1]
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2]
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical
domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL1 to EAL4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher
recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined.
It includes assurance levels beyond EAL4 resp. E3 (basic). In addition, certificates issued
for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0844-2014
As of September 2011 the new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of
Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and
the United Kingdom. Details on recognition and the history of the agreement can be found
at https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of September 2011 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of:
Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved
certification schemes can be seen on the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
This evaluation contains the components ALC_FLR.1 and AVA_VAN.4 that are not
mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual
recognition the EAL4 components of these assurance families are relevant.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product SLB96xx has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product SLB96xx was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik
GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 24. January 2014. TÜV Informationstechnik
GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Infineon Technologies AG.
The product was developed by: Infineon Technologies AG.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4 Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5 Publication
The product SLB96xx has been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is
published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further
information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
Infineon Technologies AG
Alter Postweg 101
86159 Augsburg
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0844-2014 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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1 Executive Summary
The TOE is a Security IC with integrated firmware (operating system) and guidance
documentation ([9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14]), which is named SLB96xx, internally
registered under the development code v04.40.0119.00.
The TOE (SLB96xx) comprises different derivates. The hardware and the
firmware/software of the derivates are identical. The only difference between the derivates
is the temperature range, the packaging and the own intermediated IFX certificate. The
derivates are listed in the document TPM Trusted Platform Module Version 1.2 SLB9660
Errata and Updates [13]. There is no impact on the security policy of the TOE.
The SLB96xx Trusted Platform Module, called TPM or SLB96xx in the following text, is an
integrated circuit and software platform that provides computer manufacturers with the
core components of a subsystem used to assure authenticity, integrity and confidentiality
in e-commerce and internet communications within a Trusted Computing Platform. The
SLB96xx is a complete solution implementing the version 1.2 of the TCG Trusted Platform
Module Main, Specification Version 1.2 [16] and the TCG PC Client Specific TPM Interface
Specification, Version 1.21 Final, Revision 1.00 [12].
The SLB96xx is basically a secure controller with the following added functionality:
● Random number generator (DRNG)
● Asymmetric key generation (RSA keys with key length up to 2048 bit)
● Symmetric key generation (AES keys, for internal use only)
● Symmetric and asymmetric key procedures (encryption/decryption, generation and
verification of digital signatures)
● Hash algorithms (SHA-1) and MAC (HMAC)
● Secure key and data storage
● Identification and Authentication mechanisms
● Tick and Monotonic Counter
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile PC Client Specific Trusted Platform Module Family 1.2; Level 2, Revision
116, Version 1.2, 6 October 2011, BSI-CC-PP-0030-2008-MA-01 [7].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ALC_FLR.1 and AVA_VAN.4.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 7.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some
of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
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The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF_CRY Cryptographic Support
SF_I&A Authentication and Identification
SF_ACC Access Control
SF_GEN General
SF_P&T Protection and Test
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 8.1.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
SLB96xx
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW SLB96xx Security IC with integrated
firmware (operating system)
FW
v04.40.0119.00
Packaged module
2 DOC Trusted Computing Group TPM Main
Specification [16]
Version 1.2,
Revision 116
Hardcopy and pdf-file
3 DOC TCG PC Client Specific TPM Interface
Specification (TIS) for TPM Family 1.2;
Level 2 [12]
Version 1.21
FINAL, Revision
1.00
Hardcopy and pdf-file
4 DOC TPM Trusted Platform Module SLB9660
TCG Rev 116 Databook including Errata
and Updates for TPM V1.2 SLB9660
(Revision 1.3, 2013-10-25) [13]
Version 1.1 Hardcopy and pdf-file
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No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
5 DOC TPM Trusted Platform Module Version 1.2
SLB9660 Application Note Basic Platform
Manufacturer Guideline [14]
Version 1.00 Hardcopy and pdf-file
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The user identifies the evaluated TOE by the data code printed on the chip package (cf.
[13], 6.3 / 7.3) and the FW version “04.40.0119.00”, which can be read out as described in
the guidance documentation (cf. [14], Annex D).
The TOE or parts of it are delivered between the following two parties (defined in [7]):
● TOE Manufacturer (comprises all roles before TOE delivery)
● Platform Manufacturer (comprises all roles after TOE delivery)
Therefore two different delivering procedures have to be taken into consideration as
described in (cf. [15], 6.2):
● Delivery of the final TOE from the TOE Manufacturer to the Platform Manufacturer
● Delivery of documentation accompanying the final TOE from the TOE manufacturer
The internal delivery procedures of the TOE Manufacturer comprise all deliverables among
the several TOE Manufacturer sites themselves. These deliverables consist of electronic
as well as paper documents and physical items like wafers or masks. The corresponding
security procedures guarantee an integer and confidential transfer. These internal
procedures are evaluated within the ALC_DVS evaluation activity.
3 Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the enforcement of user access to cryptographic IT
assets in accordance with the following security function policies (SFP):
● TPM Mode Control SFP (MCT-SFP),
● Delegation (Del-SFP),
● Key Management SFP (KeyM-SFP),
● Key Migration SFP (Kmig-SFP),
● Measurement and Reporting SFP (M&R-SFP),
● Non-volatile Storage SFP (NVS-SFP),
● Monotonic Counter SFP (MC-SFP),
● Export and Import of Data SFP (EID-SFP) and
● Direct Anonymous Attestation Protocol SFP (DAA-SFP)
to meet the security functional requirements. These policies include different operational
roles, subjects, objects and operations which are described in [6].
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
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specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
● The TOE must be installed and configured properly for starting up the TOE in a
secure state.
● The security attributes of subjects and objects shall be managed securely by the
authorized user.
● The developer of the host platform must ensure that trusted processes indicate their
correct locality to the TPM.
● The developer of the host platform must ensure that physical presence indicated to
the TOE implies interaction by an operator and is difficult or impossible to spoof.
● The IT environment must protect the integrity of sealed data blobs.
● The IT environment must create credentials by trustworthy procedures.
● The platform part of the root of trust for measurement provides a representation of
embedded data or program code (measured values) to the TPM for measurement.
● The Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) Protocol issuer must support a procedure
for attestation without revealing the attestation information based on the DAA
Protocol.
Details can be found in the Security Target [6] chapter 4.3 and the Protection Profile [7]
chapter 4.3.
5 Architectural Information
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the SLB96xx consisting of the following hardware and
firmware components.
The hardware of the SLB96xx is based on the SLE70-Family architecture with additional
components and is manufactured by the Infineon Technologies AG.
The IC consists of a dedicated microprocessor (CPU) with a MMU (Memory Management
Unit), several different memories, security logic, shield, a timer, an interrupt-controlled I/O
interface and a RNG (Random Number Generator). Additionally, a hardware hash
accelerator and a specialized interface, the Low Pin Count interface (LPC), have been
added. This LPC interface is the main interface of the chip.
The CPU is a real 16-bit CPU-architecture and is compatible to the Intel 80251
architecture. The major components of the core system are the CPU (Central Processing
Unit), the MMU (Memory Management Unit) and MED (Memory Encryption/Decryption
Unit). The CPU control each other in order to detect faults and serve by this for data
integrity. The TOE implements a full 16 MByte linear addressable memory space for each
privilege level, a simple scalable Memory Management concept and a scalable stack size.
The flexible memory concept consists of ROM- and Flash-memory as part of the non
volatile memory (NVM), respectively EEPROM. For the EEPROM memory the Unified
Channel Programming (UCP) memory technology is used.
The SLB96xx uses an external clock of 33 MHz which is compliant to the definition of the
LPC interface. The PLL unit allows operating the core controller of the SLB96xx with a
multiplication factor over the divided external clock signal or free running with maximum
frequency. The checksum module allows simple calculation of checksums per ISO 3309
(16 bit CRC).
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Three modules for cryptographic operations are implemented on the TOE. The two
cryptographic co-processors serve the needs of modern cryptography:
● The symmetric co-processor (SCP) for AES hardware acceleration.
● The Asymmetric Crypto Co-processor, called Crypto2304T in the following, is used
for RSA-2048 bit (4096-bit with CRT).
● The third module named HASH provides the Secure Hash Algorithm-1 (SHA-1).
The firmware required for operating the chip includes an operating system that provides
the TCG functionality specified in the TPM Main Specification. The chip initialisation
routine with security checks and identification mode as well as test routines for production
testing is located in a separate test ROM. The firmware also provides the mechanism for
updating the protected capabilities once the TOE is in the field as defined in the
TPM_FieldUpgrade command of the TPM Main Specification. The field upgrade can only
be downloaded to the chip if it has been encrypted and signed by the manufacturer
Infineon Technologies AG.
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7 IT Product Testing
The configuration under evaluation has the identification SLB96xx (cf. [13], 6.3 and [14],
Annex D). The test configuration, in particular the test environment, is described in detail
within the documents [18], [19], [20] and [21].
The tests performed by the developer were divided into six categories:
1. Technology development tests as the earliest tests to check the technology against
the specification and to get the technology parameters used in simulations of the
circuitry (this testing is not strictly related to Security Functionalities);
2. Tests which are performed in a simulation environment with different tools for the
analogue circuitries and for the digital parts of the TOE;
3. Regression tests of the hardware within a simulation environment based on special
software dedicated only for the regression tests;
4. Regression tests which are performed for the IC Dedicated Test Software and for
the Operating System on the final product of the TOE;
5. Characterisation and verification tests to release the TOE to production:
a) used to determine the behaviour of the chip with respect to different operating
conditions and varied process parameters (often also referred to as characterisation
tests);
b) special verification tests for Security Functionalities which were done with
samples of the TOE (referred also as developers security evaluation) and which
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include also layout tests by automatic means and optical control, in order to verify
statements concerning the layout;
6. Functional production tests, which are done for every chip to check its correct
functionality as a last step of the production process (phase 3).
The developer tests cover all security functionalities and all security mechanisms as
identified in the functional specification.
The evaluators were able to repeat the tests of the developer either using the library of
programs, tools and prepared chip samples delivered to the evaluator or at the developers
site. They performed independent tests to supplement, augment and to verify the tests
performed by the developer. The tests of the developer were repeated by sampling, by
repetition of complete regression tests and by software routines developed by the
evaluators and computed on samples with an evaluation operating system. For the
developer tests repeated by the evaluators other test parameters were used and the test
equipment was varied. Security features of the TOE realised by specific design and layout
measures were checked by the evaluators during layout inspections both in design data
and on the final product.
The evaluation has shown that the actual version of the TOE provides the security
functionalities as specified by the developer. The test results confirm the correct
implementation of the TOE security functionalities.
For penetration testing the evaluators took all security functionalities into consideration.
Intensive penetration testing was planned based on the analysis results and performed for
the underlying mechanisms of security functionalities using bespoke equipment and expert
know how. The penetration tests considered both the physical tampering of the TOE and
attacks which do not modify the TOE physically. The penetration tests results confirm that
the TOE is resistant to attackers with moderate attack potential in the intended
environment for the TOE.
8 Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE: The configuration under
evaluation has the identification SLB96xx (cf. [13], 6.3 and [14], Annex D).
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [8] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used and guidance specific for the technology
of the product [4] (AIS 34).
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For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20 and AIS 31 were used (cf. [4]). As
a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report).
● The components ALC_FLR.1 and AVA_VAN.4 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: PC Client Specific Trusted Platform Module Family 1.2; Level 2,
Revision 116, Version 1.2, 6 October 2011,
BSI-CC-PP-0030-2008-MA-01 [7]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.1 and AVA_VAN.4
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The following cryptographic algorithms are used by the TOE to enforce its security policy:
Purpose Cryptographic Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits
Standard of
Application
Key Generation RSA P1363 [22] |Modulus| = 512,
1024, 2048
TPM [16]
Authenticity RSA signature generation /
verification
(RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5)
PKCS#1 [23] |Modulus| = 512,
1024, 2048
TPM [16]
Authentication HMAC with SHA-1 RFC2104 [24],
FIPS180-2 [25]
|k| = 160 TPM [16]
Key Agreement RSA decryption
(RSAES-OAEP)
PKCS#1 [23] |Modulus|=512,
1024, 2048
TPM [16]
Integrity HMAC with SHA-1 RFC2104 [24],
FIPS180-2 [25]
|k| = 160 TPM [16]
Confidentiality AES in CBC and CTR mode FIPS197 [26], NIST
SP800-38A [27]
|k| = 128 TPM [16]
RSA encryption / decryption
(RSAES- OAEP,
RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5)
PKCS#1 [23] |Modulus| = 512,
1024, 2048
TPM [16]
MGF1 PKCS#1 [23], TPM [16] |k| = 160 TPM [16]
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Purpose Cryptographic Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits
Standard of
Application
Cryptographic
Primitive
SHA-1 FIPS180-2 [25] None TPM [16]
Deterministic RNG DRG.3 AIS20 [28] None TPM [16]
Trusted Channel Transport Session TPM [16] n.a. TPM [16]
OIAP TPM [16] n.a. TPM [16]
OSAP TPM [16] n.a. TPM [16]
DSAP TPM [16] n.a. TPM [16]
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality (Part I)
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
According to [16] the algorithms are suitable for key generation, authenticity,
authentication, key agreement, integrity and confidentiality. An explicit validity period is not
given.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But Cryptographic Functionalities with
a security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 100 Bits'
of the following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general
context).
Purpose
Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
in Bits
Security Level
above 100 Bits
Comments
Authenticity RSA signature
verification
(RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5)
PKCS#1 [23],
ADV_TDS_TPMFU
[29]
|Modulus|
= 2048
yes TPM-Field
Upgrade
Key Agreement HMAC with SHA-256 RFC2104 [24],
FIPS180-2 [25], NIST
SP800-108 [30],
ADV_TDS_TPMFU
[29]
|k| = 256 yes TPM-Field
Upgrade
Integrity HMAC with SHA-256 RFC2104 [24],
FIPS180-2 [25], NIST
SP800-108 [30],
ADV_TDS_TPMFU
[29]
|k| = 256 yes TPM-Field
Upgrade
Confidentiality AES in CBC mode FIPS197 [26], NIST
SP800-38A [27],
|k| = 128 yes TPM-Field
Upgrade
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Purpose
Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
in Bits
Security Level
above 100 Bits
Comments
ADV_TDS_TPMFU
[29]
Table 4: TOE cryptographic functionality (Part II)
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a
re-certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process.
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CRT Chinese Remainder Theorem
DRNG Deterministic Random Number Generator
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
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EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
HMAC Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
IT Information Technology
ITSEC Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PLL Phase Locked Loop
PP Protection Profile
RSA Rivest, Shamir, Adleman Public Key Encryption
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on
well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a
TOE type.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied
by guidance.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 4, September 2012
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 4, September 2012
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
in the BSI Website
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0844-2014, Version 1.1, 02 December 2013, SLB96xx
Security Target, Infineon Technologies AG (public version)
[7] PC Client Specific Trusted Platform Module Family 1.2; Level 2, Revision 116,
Version 1.2, 6 October 2011, BSI-CC-PP-0030-2008-MA-01
[8] Evaluation Technical Report 0844, Version 4, 24 January 2014, TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
[9] TPM Main Part 1 Design Principles, Specification Version 1.2, Revision 116, 1
March 2011, Trusted Computing Group Inc.
[10] TPM Main Part 2 TPM Structures, Specification Version 1.2, Revision 116, 1 March
2011, Trusted Computing Group Inc.
[11] TPM Main Part 3 Commands, Specification Version 1.2, Revision 116, 1 March
2011, Trusted Computing Group Inc.
[12] PC Client Specific TPM Interface Specification (TIS) for TPM Family 1.2; Level 2,
Version 1.21 FINAL, Revision 1.00, May 2011, Trusted Computing Group Inc.
8
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 25, Version 8, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 9, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+ (CCv2.3 & CCv3.1)
and EAL6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 35, Version 2, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and
CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 36, Version 4, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
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[13] TPM Trusted Platform Module SLB9660 TCG, Rev 116, Databook Including Errata
and Updates for TPM V1.2 SLB9660 (Revision 1.3, 2013-10-25), Version 1.1, 06
August 2013, Infineon Technologies AG
[14] TPM Trusted Platform Module, Version 1.2, SLB9660 Application Note Basic
Platform Manufacturer Guideline, March 2013, Infineon Technologies AG
[15] Development and Production, Version 3.7, 28 January 2013, Infineon Technologies
AG
[16] Trusted Computing Group TPM Main Specification, consisting of [9], [10] and [11]
[17] TCG PC Client Specific TPM Interface Specification (TIS) for TPM Family 1.2; Level
2, Version 1.21 FINAL, Revision 1.00, May 2011
[18] Confidential partial evaluation report on the assurance classes ATE and AVA
according to AIS 14 and as Annex of the Evaluation Technical Report [8]
[19] Confidential partial evaluation report on the assurance classes ATE and AVA
according to AIS 14 and as Annex of the Evaluation Technical Report [8]
[20] Confidential partial evaluation report on the assurance classes ATE and AVA
according to AIS 14 and as Annex of the Evaluation Technical Report [8]
[21] Confidential partial evaluation report on the assurance classes ATE and AVA
according to AIS 14 and as Annex of the Evaluation Technical Report [8]
[22] IEEE P1363-2000, Standard Specifications for Public Key Cryptography, Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (reaffirmation PAR is actual running)
[23] PKCS #1, RSA Cryptography Standard, v2.0, 01 October 1998, RSA Laboratories
[24] RFC 2104, HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication,
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2104.txt
[25] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-2, Secure Hash
Standard (SHS), 1 August 2002, Information Technology Laboratory National
Institute of Standards and Technology
[26] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, 26 November 2001,
Announcing the ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES), National Institute of
Standards and Technology
[27] NIST Special Publication 800-38A, 2001 Edition, Recommendation for Block Cipher
Modes of Operation Methods and Techniques
[28] Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema, AIS 20,
Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3.0, 15 May 2013, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in
der Informationstechnik
[29] TPMv12 Field Upgrade, Doxygen documentation, Version 778, 11 October 2013,
Infineon Technologies AG
[30] NIST Special Publication SP 800-108, October 2009, Recommendation for Key
Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0844-2014 Certification Report
C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal
high-level design presentation
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the
TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through
security objectives.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
“Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0844-2014 Certification Report
D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0844-2014
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product SLB96xx (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an approved
evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM),
Version 3.1 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance to the
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 28 February 2014, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria
assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support (ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.4, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.1, ALC_FLR.1, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1) are fulfilled for the development and
production sites of the TOE listed below:
The following table outlnes the TOE deliverables:
No. Site Task within the evaluation
1. Agrate
DNP Photomask Europe S.p.A.
Via C. Olivetti 2/A
20041 Agrate Brianza
Italy
Mask house site
Phase 1
2. Augsburg
Infineon Technologies AG
Alter Postweg 101
86159 Augsburg
Germany
Development
Phase 1
3. ASK-intTag LLC
1000 River St.Building 966
Essex Junction, VT, 05452
USA
Phase 3
4. Infineon Technologies India Private Limited
Kalyani Platina, Sy. No. 6 & 24
Kundanahalli Village
Krishnaraja Puram Hobli
Bangalore, India, 560066
Development
Phase 1
5. Bangkok
SMARTRAC TECHNOLOGIES Ltd.
142 and 121 and 115 Moo,
Hi-Tech Industrial Estate
Tambon Ban Laean,
Amphor Bang-Pa-In
13160 Ayutthaya
Thailand
Inlay antenna mounting site
Phase 3
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No. Site Task within the evaluation
6. Corbeil-Essones
Altis Semiconductor S.N.C.
Boulevard John Kennedy 224
91105 Corbeil-Essonnes
France
Production site
Phase 3, 4 and 6
7. Corbeil-Essones
Toppan Photomask, Inc.
European Technology Center
Boulevard John Kennedy 224
91105 Corbeil-Essonnes Cedex
France
Mask house site
Phase 3
8. Bucharest
Infineon Technologies AG
DC Bukarest
Novopark Blvd.
Dimitrie Pompei Nr. 6
Section 2, Bucharest
Romania
Development site
Phase 1 and 2
9. Chanhassen
Smartrac Technology US Inc.
1546 Lake Drive West
Chanhassen, MN 55317
USA
Inlay antenna mounting site
Phase 3
10. Dresden
Toppan Photomask, Inc
Rähnitzer Allee 9
01109 Dresden
Germany
Mask house site
Phase 3
11. Infineon Technologies
Dresden GmbH & Co. OHG
Königsbrücker Str. 180
01099 Dresden
Germany
Production site
Phase 3, 5 and 6
12. Galway
HID Global Ireland
Teoranta
Pairc Tionscail na Tulaigh
Baile na hAbhann
Co. Galway
Ireland
Inlay antenna mounting site
Phase 3
13. Graz
Infineon Technologies Austria AG
Development Center Graz
Babengergerstr. 10
8020 Graz
Austria
Development site
Phase 1 and 2
14. Grossostheim
Infineon Technology AG
Kühne & Nagel
Stockstädter Strasse 10 - Building 8A
Distribution
Phase 4
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0844-2014 Certification Report
No. Site Task within the evaluation
63762 Grossostheim
Germany
15. Hayward
Kuehne & Nagel
30805 Santana Street
Hayward, CA 94544
USA
Distribution Center
Phase 4
16. Klagenfurt
Infineon Technologies Austria AG
Lakeside B05
9020 Klagenfurt
Austria
Development site
Phase 1 und 2
17. Kulim
Infineon Technologies
(Kulim) Sdn. Bhd.
Lot 10 &11,Julan Hi-Tech 7
Industrial Zone Phase II
Kulim Hi-Tech Park
09000 Kulim, Kedah Darul
Aman
Malaysia
Production site
Phase 3 und 4
18. Manila
Amkor Technology
Philippines
Km. 22 East Service Rd.
South Superhighway
Muntinlupa City 1702
Philippines
Module mounting site
Phase 4
19. Manila
Amkor Technology
Philippines
119 North Science Avenue
Laguna Technopark, Binan
Laguna 4024
Philippines
Module mounting site
Phase 4
20. Morgan Hill
Infineon Technologies
North America Corp.
18275 Serene Drive
Morgan Hill, CA 95037
USA
Inlay testing site
Phase 3
21. Munich
Infineon Technologies AG
Am Campeon 1-12
85579 Neubiberg
Germany
Development site
Phase 1 and 2
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No. Site Task within the evaluation
22. Saitama
Toppan Printing Co., LTD.
Ranzan-Machi
6-2, Hanamidai
Hiki-Gun, Saitama 355-0204
Japan
Inlay antenna mounting site
Phase 4
23. Regensburg-West
Infineon Technologies AG
Wernerwerkstraße 2
93049 Regensburg
Germany
Module mounting and distribution site
Phase 3, 4 and 6
24. Round Rock
Toppan Printing Company
America, Inc.
Round Rock Site
2175 Greenhill Drive
Round Rock, Texas 78664
USA
Inlay antenna mounting site
Phase 3
25. Excel Singapure PTE Ltd.
DHL Exel Supply Chain
Richland Business Centre
11 Bedok North Ave 4, Level 3,
Singapore 489949
Distribution center
Phase 4
26. Infineon Technologies Asia
Pacific PTE Ltd.
168 Kallang Way
Singapore 349253
Module testing site
Phase 4
27. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company
Ltd.
1, Nan-Ke North Rd.
Tainan Science Park
Tainan 741-44
Production and mask house site
Phase 3, 4 and 6
28. Ardentec Corporation
No. 3, Gungye 3rd Rd.,
Hsin-Chu Industrial Park,
Hu-Kou,
Hsin-Chu Hsien,
Taiwan 30351
Wafer testing site
Phase 3
29. Villach
Infineon Technologies Austria AG
Siemensstrasse 2
9500 Villach
Austria
Development site
Phase 1 and 2
30. Wuxi
Infineon Technologies (Wuxi) Co. Ltd.
118, Xing Chuang San Lu
Wuxi 214028, Jiangsu
P.R. China
Module mounting and distribution site
Phase 4
Table 5: Addresses development/production sites
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0844-2014 Certification Report
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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