BSI-DSZ-CC-0537-2009
for
Sm@rtCafe Expert
Version 5.0
from
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-326 V4.31
BSI-DSZ-CC-0537-2009
Java Card
Sm@rtCafe Expert
Version 5.0
from Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
PP Conformance: Java Card System Protection Profile, Version 1.0b,
Standard 2.2 Configuration, August 2003: DCSSI-PP/
0305
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by
ADV_IMP.2 and AVA_VLA.4
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 extended by advice of the Certification Body
for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance to the
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 17 December 2009
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0537-2009
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0537-2009 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0537-2009
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates..................................................8
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates.........................................................8
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the certification result.....................................................................................9
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................13
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................15
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................15
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................15
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................16
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................16
7.1 TOE configurations tested.....................................................................................16
7.2 Developer's Test according to ATE_FUN...............................................................17
7.3 Evaluator Tests according to ATE_IND..................................................................17
7.4 Penetration Testing according to AVA_VLA...........................................................18
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................19
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................19
9.1 CC specific results.................................................................................................19
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment....................................................................20
10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE........................................................21
11 Security Target............................................................................................................21
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................21
12.1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................21
12.2 Glossary...............................................................................................................22
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................23
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................25
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................33
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0537-2009 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● BSIG2
● BSI Certification Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN 45011 standard
● BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005)5
[1]
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 [2]
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
● Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance components above
EAL4 (AIS 34)
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 19
May 2006, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0537-2009
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) for certificates based on ITSEC
became initially effective in March 1998.
This agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended in April
1999 to include certificates based on the Common Criteria for the Evaluation Assurance
Levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7). This agreement was signed by the national bodies of Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United
Kingdom. The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) recognises certificates
issued by the national certification bodies of France and United Kingdom, and from The
Netherlands since January 2009 within the terms of this agreement.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement.
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of January 2009 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia,
Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United
States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes
can be seen on the web site: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement.
This evaluation contains the components ADV_IMP.2 and AVA_VLA.4 that are not mutually
recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual recognition the
EAL4 components of these assurance families are relevant.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product SmartCafe Expert Version 5.0 has undergone the certification procedure at
BSI.
The evaluation of the product SmartCafe Expert Version 5.0 was conducted by TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 26 October 2009. The TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification
body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
The product was developed by: Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0537-2009 Certification Report
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4 Validity of the certification result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following
report and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of functions, please
refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods may evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods can be re-assessed if required
and the sponsor applies for the certified product being monitored within the assurance
continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme. It is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5 Publication
The product SmartCafe Expert Version 5.0 has been included in the BSI list of the certified
products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]).
Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
Prinzregentenstrasse 159
Postfach 800729
81607 München
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0537-2009 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0537-2009
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Java Card SmartCafe Expert V5.0.
Parts of the TOE are the Java Card Runtime Environment (JCRE), the Java Card Virtual
Machine (JCVM), the Java Card API, the Card Manager and the Smart Card Platform.
The final product contains Java and no native applications. However, there are vendor-
specific libraries present on the card that are available to applets. These libraries contain
native code and are not part of the TOE.
The Java Card SmartCafe Expert V5.0 is intended to transform a smart card into a
platform capable of executing applications written in a subset of the Java programming
language. The intended use of a Java Card platform is to provide a framework for
implementing IC independent applications conceived to safely coexist and interact with
other applications into a single smart card.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Java Card System Protection Profile, Version 1.0b, Standard 2.2
Configuration, August 2003: DCSSI-PP/0305 [10].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the Assurance Requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ADV_IMP.2 and AVA_VLA.4.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 5.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2
and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the IT-Environment of the TOE
are outlined in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 5.3.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
SF.TRANSACTION This security function ensures the rollback process. It provides assurance in
the Java objects update in EEPROM.
SF.ACCESS_CONTROL This security function is in charge of access control for the TOE. It is in charge
of the FIREWALL access control SFP and the JCVM information flow control
SFP
SF.CRYPTO This security function controls all the operations related to the cryptographic
key management and cryptographic operations.
SF.INTEGRITY This security function provides a means to check the integrity of
checksummed data stored in EEPROM.
SF.SECURITY This security function ensures a secure state of information, the non-
observability of operations on it and the unavailability of previous information
content upon deallocation/allocation.
SF.APPLET This security function ensures the secure loading of a package or installing of
an applet and the secure deletion of applets and/or packages.
SF.RMI This security function ensures secure remote method invocation features,
which provides a new protocol of communication between the terminal and
the applets.
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TOE Security Function Addressed issue
SF.CARRIER This security function ensures secure downloading of applications on the card.
SF.CARDMANAGER This security function ensures the security for the card manager.
Table 1: TOE Security Functions
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 6.1.
The claimed TOE’s Strength of Functions 'high' (SOF-high) for specific functions as
indicated in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 6.1 is confirmed. The rating of the
Strength of Functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). For details see chapter 9 of this
report.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [9],
chapter 3.2. Based on these assets the TOE Security Environment is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [9], chapter 3.4 – 3.6.
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
● Configuration 1: NXP P5CD040V0B (BSI-DSZ-CC-0404-2007),
● Configuration 2: NXP P5CD080V0B (BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007),
● Configuration 3: NXP P5CD144V0B (BSI-DSZ-CC-0411-2007).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
SmartCafe Expert Version 5.0
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW Chip modules NXP
P5CD040/080/144V0B
See [13], [14]
and [15]
Modules implanted in plastic
cards
2 SW SmartCafe Expert V5.0 OS 5.0 Stored in the ROM of the chip
3 DOC User and Administrator Guidance
SmartCafe Expert V5.0 [11]
1.3 PDF-file
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE ROM code on the IC and additional mask keys are delivered to the initialisation
site. The initialisation file is then securely loaded on the Smart Card at the initialisation site.
The initialisation and the personalisation process are out of scope of this evaluation.
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The hardware product can be identified from the ATR emitted by the product after reset.
The EEPROM image data can be identified by the file name:
Chip Type EEPROM Image file
P5CD040 V102-SF-4CC-CD040-036-004-CR-211-ENC.mot
P5CD080 V202-SF-4CC-CD080-036-004-CR-211-ENC.mot
P5CD144 V302-SF-4CC-CD144-036-004-CR-211-ENC.mot
Table 3: Identification of the EEPROM Image file
The product transmits a message, the ATR, immediately after it was powered up over its
contacts, when triggered by activating the reset contact or after it was ‘selected’ in the
standardized protocol for establishing contact-less communication. During product
completion the ATR is the same in all cases and identifies the hardware component of the
product:
Chip Type ATR
P5CD040 3B F9 18 00 00 80 31 FE 45 53 46 2D 34 43 43 2D 30 31 CB
P5CD080 3B F9 18 00 00 80 31 FE 45 53 46 2D 34 43 43 2D 30 31 CB
P5CD144 3B F9 18 00 00 80 31 FE 45 53 46 2D 34 43 43 2D 30 31 CB
Table 4: ATR identifying product in completion process
In order to get the version of the TOE, the CPLC (Card Production Life Cycle) data could
be read from the card by the GET DATA command.
The TOE identifier consist of three parts of the CLPC data. The three parts are, IC
Fabricator, IC Type and the Release Level .
The GET DATA command has the following APDU format:
CLA INS P1 P2 Lc
´80´ ´CA´ `9F` `7F` `2D`
Table 5: GET DATA command
TOE ID
CHIP Type IC Fabricator IC Type Release Level
P5CD040 47 90 50 38 50 01
P5CD080 47 90 50 40 50 01
P5CD144 47 90 50 43 50 01
Table 6: TOE identifier
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3 Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues: Identification of subjects, correct
operation, control of the availability of resources, control of the sharing of data container,
restriction of the execution of native code, re-allocation of memory, cleaning of data
container after the execution of an application, access control to memory, alarm after
detection of a potential security violation, execution of operations, encryption of sensitive
data, secure management of PIN objects, secure installation of applets, secure loading of
packages, secure deletion of applets and packages, references to objects, restrictive
remote access, recovery to a consistent and secure state, quality of random numbers,
protection against disclosure of user data and TSF data.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics
are of relevance:
● Native code shall be conform to the TOE as stated in OE.NATIVE
● No applet loaded post-issuance shall contain native methods as stated in OE.APPLET.
● All the bytecodes shall be verified as stated in OE.VERIFICATION
Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and [9] chapter 4.2.
5 Architectural Information
The TOE consists of the 5 components:
● Java Card API (JC-API)
● Java Card Runtime Environment (JCRE)
● Java Card Virtual Machine (JCVM)
● Card Manager (CM)
● Smart Card Platform (SCP)
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Figure 1 TOE Limits (dotted and straight red line): SCP (Smart Card Platform), IC (Integrated
Circuit), OS (Chip Operating System), DS (Chip Dedicated Software). Contrary to the Java Card
System Standard 2.2 configuration native Applications are not part of the product except vendor-
specific libraries.
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7 IT Product Testing
7.1 TOE configurations tested
The tests are performed with the composite smart card product. The physical format of the
test configuration for TOE testing is either
● a card which is usable for all directly testable requirements, which are tested through
System Tests. Each of these system tests has one or more Java Card applets that are
contained in one or more Java packages. Note, that applets are not part of the TOE
and therefore out of scope. The hardware platform was always the NXP P5CD144V0B.
● an emulator which is required for test cases that could not be tested directly. All
indirectly testable requirements are tested through Module Tests.
As the initialisation and the personalisation process are out of scope of this evaluation, the
TOE was always tested in its usage phase.
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7.2 Developer's Test according to ATE_FUN
Developer’s testing approach:
● All TSF as specified in the functional specification with related sub-functions and
subsystems are tested in order to assure complete coverage.
● The overall approach is to test all testable statements stated in the functional
specification including different aspects of the commands as security functional effects.
Each TSP enforcing subsystem and internal interface of the high level design has tests
mapped.
● Test procedures are implemented in accordance with functional specification and the
high level design in order to verify the TOE’s compliance with its expected behaviour.
● All test cases were run successfully on this TOE version.
Amount of developer testing performed
The developer tested the nine TSF of the TOE
● with system and module tests, grouped into several logical and/or functional units, so
called test packages.
● at the level of testable statements as given in the functional specification.
● at the level of the subsystems and interfaces as given in the high level design.
Overall developer testing results
● All testing strategies of the TSF passed all tests of individual test scenarios so that all
TSF were successfully tested against the functional specification and the high level
design.
● The developer’s testing results demonstrate that the TSF perform as specified.
● The developer’s testing results demonstrate that the TOE performs as expected.
7.3 Evaluator Tests according to ATE_IND
Approach
● Examination of developer’s testing amount, depth and coverage analysis and of the
developer’s test goal and plan for identification of gaps.
● Examination whether the TOE in its intended environment, is operating as specified
using iterations of developer’s tests.
● Independent testing was performed by the evaluator at the ITSEF with the TOE
development environment using script based developer test tools with automated
comparison of expected and actual test results
● The evaluator verified the developer’s test results by executing all tests in the
developer’s test documentation and verifying the test log files for successful execution.
TOE test configurations
● TOE smart cards and test cards
● TOE test images tested on a hardware simulator
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Subset size chosen
● During sample testing the evaluator chose to repeat all developer functional tests at the
Evaluation Body for IT Security in Essen that cover all TSF.
● During independent testing the evaluator tested all TSF explicitly with evaluator tests
including simulator test cases so that all TSF could be covered by at least one test
case in order to confirm that the TOE operates as specified.
Security functions tested
● SF.TRANSACTION
● SF.ACCESS_CONTROL
● SF.CRYPTO
● SF.INTEGRITY
● SF.SECURITY
● SF.APPLET
● SF.RMI
● SF.CARRIER
● SF.CARDMANAGER
Verdict for the activity
● During the evaluator’s TSF subset testing the TOE operated as specified.
7.4 Penetration Testing according to AVA_VLA
In the following the evaluator’s penetration testing efforts are summarized according to [2].
Approach
● Examination of developer’s vulnerability analysis and the developer’s rationale for why
the vulnerabilities are not exploitable in the intended environment of the TOE.
● Examination whether the TOE, in its intended environment, is susceptible to
vulnerabilities not considered by the developer by considering current information
regarding obvious public domain vulnerabilities.
● The evaluator performed penetration testing based on the developer vulnerability
analysis. The penetration testing was performed at the ITSEF with the TOE
development environment using script based developer test tools with automated
comparison of expected and actual test results.
TOE test configurations
● TOE smart cards produced from TOE ROM mask
● TOE test images tested on a hardware emulator
Penetration testing performed
● Effectiveness of the TSF
● Secure use of the TOE
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● Penetration tests of vulnerabilities identified by the developer
Security functions penetration tested
● SF.TRANSACTION
● SF.ACCESS_CONTROL
● SF.CRYPTO
● SF.INTEGRITY
● SF.SECURITY
● SF.APPLET
● SF.RMI
● SF.CARRIER
● SF.CARDMANAGER
Verdict for the sub-activity
● During the evaluator’s penetration testing based on the developer vulnerability analysis
the TOE operated as specified.
● The vulnerabilities discussed in the developer vulnerability analysis are not exploitable
in the intended environment for the TOE.
● The TOE is resistant to attackers with high attack potential in the intended environment
for the TOE described in the developer vulnerability analysis.
8 Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
SmartCafe Expert Version 5.0
in the configuration as identified in chapter 2.
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL4
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
● The following guidance specific for the technology were used:
● Functionality classes and evaluation methodology of deterministic random
number generators
● The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
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● Application of Attack Potential to Smart Cards
● Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices
● Smartcard evaluation guidance
(see [4], AIS 20, AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 36, AIS 37).
The ETR [7] builds up on the ETR-for-Composition document of the evaluation of the
evaluation of the underlying platform certification [12][13][14] supplemented by a recent
Re-Assessment [15][16][17].
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the class ASE
● All components of the EAL 4 package as defined in the CC (see also part C of this
report)
● The components ADV_IMP.2 and AVA_VLA.4 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Java Card System Protection Profile, Version 1.0b, Standard 2.2
Configuration, August 2003: DCSSI-PP/0305 [10]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ADV_IMP.2 and AVA_VLA.4
● The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function: high
● SF.CRYPTO (random number generation according to [AIS20] class K3)
● SF.INTEGRITY
In order to assess the Strength of Function of SF.CRYPTO the scheme
interpretations AIS 20 (see [4]) were used.
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The rating of the Strength of Functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for
encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). This holds for:
● the TOE Security Function SF.CRYPTO (3-DES, RSA, AES)
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this evaluation
(see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But Cryptographic functions with a security level
of 80 bits or lower can no longer be regarded as secure against attacks with high attack
potential without considering the application context. Therefore for these functions it shall
be checked whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system.
Some further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-
02102' (www.bsi.bund.de).
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The cryptographic functions: 2-key Triple DES (2TDES) and RSA 1024 provided by the
TOE have got a security level of maximum 80 Bits (in general context).
10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE
The operational documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the
usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered.
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4])
12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
3DES Triple-DES
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
API Application Programming Interface
ATR Answer to Reset
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CM Card Manager
CPLC Card Production Life Cycle
DES Data Encryption Standard
DS Dedicated Software
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
G & D Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
HW Hardware
IC Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
JCRE Java Card Runtime Environment
JCVM Java Card Virtual Machine
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OS Operating System
PP Protection Profile
ROM Read Only Memory
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SCP Smart Card Platform
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
SW Software
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC Part 3 to
an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a
category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for enforcing a
closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used as the basis
for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing the minimum
efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security behaviour by directly attacking
its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function
provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE security by attackers
possessing a low attack potential.
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SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the
function provides adequate protection against straightforward or intentional breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a moderate attack potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function
provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or organised breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a high attack potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated administrator and user
guidance documentation that is the subject of an evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and firmware of the
TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed, protected and
distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a TOE and
are subject to the rules of the TSP.
13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.3,
August 2005
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE.8
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically updated list
published also on the BSI Website
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0537, Version 3.0, Status 27.08.2009, Security Target
SmartCafe Expert V5.0, Giesecke & Devrient (confidential document)
8
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 1, 2 December 1999, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie
für deterministische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 25, Version 6, 7 September 2009, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen
including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 6, 7 May 2009, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte
Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 32, Version 1, 2 July 2001, Übernahme international abgestimmter CC-Interpretationen
ins deutsche Zertifizierungsschema.
• AIS 34, Version 2, 24 October 2008, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for
EAL5+
• AIS 35, Version 2.0, 12 November 2007, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite)
including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 36, Version 2, 12 November 2007, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document
and CC Supporting Document
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[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 2, Date: 2009-10-14, BSI-DSZ-CC-0537,
TUVIT (confidential document)
[8] Configuration list for the TOE, Version 1.4, Date: 2009-08-27, Giesecke & Devrient
(confidential document)
[9] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0537, Version 1.0, Date: 27.10.2009, Security Target
Lite SmartCafe Expert V5.0, Giesecke & Devrient (sanitised public document)
[10] Protection Profile Java Card System Protection Profile, Version 1.0b, Standard 2.2
Configuration, August 2003: DCSSI-PP/0305, Sun Microsystems Inc.
[11] User and Administrator Guidance SmartCafe Expert V5.0, Version 1.3, Date: 2009-
07-14
[12] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0404-2007 for NXP Secure Smart Card Controller
P5CD040V0B, P5CC040V0B, P5CD020V0B and P5CC021V0B each with specific
IC Dedicated Software, V1.0, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik,
2007-07-05
[13] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007 for NXP Secure Smart Card Controller
P5CD080V0B, P5CN080V0B and P5CC080V0B each with specific IC Dedicated
Software, V1.0, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, 2007-07-05
[14] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0411-2007 for NXP Secure Smart Card Controller
P5CD144V0B, P5CN144V0B and P5CC144V0B each with specific IC Dedicated
Software, V1.0, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, 2007-07-05
[15] ETR for composition according to AIS36, NXP P5CD040V0B Secure Smart Card
Controller, BSI-DSZ-CC-0404, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik,
Version 1.3, June 23rd, 2009
[16] ETR for composition according to AIS36, NXP P5CD080V0B Secure Smart Card
Controller, BSI-DSZ-CC-0410, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik,
Version 1.2, June 23rd, 2009
[17] ETR for composition according to AIS36, NXP P5CD144V0B Secure Smart Card
Controller, BSI-DSZ-CC-0411, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik,
Version 1.2, June 23rd, 2009
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result is presented with
respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3 (assurance requirements) and, if
applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the functional
requirements are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2.
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the functional
requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the assurance
requirements are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the assurance
requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect to sets of
defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
– Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance
result.
– Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the packages listed as part of
the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect to
Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
– PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.“
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CC Part 3:
Protection Profile criteria overview (chapter 8.2)
“The goal of a PP evaluation is to demonstrate that the PP is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more evaluatable TOEs. Such a PP may be eligible for inclusion within a PP registry.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation
TOE description (APE_DES)
Security environment (APE_ENV)
PP introduction (APE_INT)
Security objectives (APE_OBJ)
IT security requirements (APE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements (APE_SRE)
Table 3 - Protection Profile families - CC extended requirements”
Security Target criteria overview (Chapter 8.3)
“The goal of an ST evaluation is to demonstrate that the ST is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as the basis for the corresponding TOE
evaluation.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation
TOE description (ASE_DES)
Security environment (ASE_ENV)
ST introduction (ASE_INT)
Security objectives (ASE_OBJ)
PP claims (ASE_PPC)
IT security requirements (ASE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements (ASE_SRE)
TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS)
Table 5 - Security Target families - CC extended requirements ”
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Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in Table
1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
ACM: Configuration management
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
ADV: Development
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
ALC: Life cycle support
Development security (ALC_DVS)
Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
ATE: Tests
Coverage (ATE_COV)
Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended with explicitly
stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against identified
threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.“
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it may still
be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its underlying
security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their security behaviour can be
made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of
these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. The qualification is made in
the form of a strength of TOE security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified,
during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by other
methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flaws that
will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interfere with or
alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the presence of
security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all the TOE
deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. The developer is
required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to
make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the evaluator's
independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the
developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is
resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (for AVA_VLA.2
Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or
high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant) attack potential.”
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D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment 35
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0537-2009
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product SmartCafe Expert Version 5.0 (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been
evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 extended by advice of the Certification Body for
components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC
15408:2005).
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 17 December 2009, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria
Security Assurance Requirements
● ACM – Configuration management (i.e. ACM_AUT.1, ACM_CAP.4, ACM_SCP.2),
● ADO – Delivery and operation (i.e. ADO_DEL.2, ADO_IGS.1) and
● ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_DVS.1, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1),
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
(a) Giesecke & Devrient, Zamdorferstrasse 88, 81677 Munich, Germany
(development site)
(b) See certification reports BSI-DSZ-CC-0404-2007, BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007,
BSI-DSZ-CC-0411-2007 for the development and production sites used as part
of the composition
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the Threats, Security Objectives
and Requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [9]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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