UNCLASSIFIED
© Government of Canada. This document is the property of the Government of Canada. It shall not be altered,
distributed beyond its intended audience, produced, reproduced or published, in whole or in any substantial part
thereof, without the express permission of CSE.
COMMON CRITERIA
CERTIFICATION REPORT
SonicWall SonicOS Enhanced V6.2.5 VPN Gateway on NSA, SM,
and TZ Appliances
4 June 2018
383-4-438
V1.0
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FOREWORD
This certification report is an UNCLASSIFIED publication, issued under the authority of the Chief,
Communications Security Establishment (CSE). Suggestions for amendments should be forwarded through
departmental communications security channels to your Client Services Representative at CSE.
The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its associated certificate, has
been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility – established under the Canadian Common Criteria Scheme –
using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, for
conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
This certification report, and its associated certificate, applies only to the identified version and release of the
product in its evaluated configuration. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of
the Canadian CC Scheme, and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation report are consistent
with the evidence adduced. This report, and its associated certificate, are not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Communications Security Establishment, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this
report, and its associated certificate, and no warranty for the IT product by the Communications Security
Establishment, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
If your department has identified a requirement for this certification report based on business needs and would
like more detailed information, please contact:
ITS Client Services
Telephone: (613) 991-7654
E-mail: itsclientservices@cse-cst.gc.ca
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OVERVIEW
The Canadian Common Criteria Scheme provides a third-party evaluation service for determining the
trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT) security products. Evaluations are performed by a commercial
Common Criteria Evaluation Facility (CCEF) under the oversight of the Certification Body, which is managed by
the Communications Security Establishment.
A CCEF is a commercial facility that has been approved by the Certification Body to perform Common Criteria
evaluations; a significant requirement for such approval is accreditation to the requirements of ISO/IEC
17025:2005, the General Requirements for the Competence of Testing and Calibration Laboratories.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, the Certification Body asserts that the product complies with the
security requirements specified in the associated security target. A security target is a requirements specification
document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities. The consumer of certified IT products should
review the security target, in addition to this certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any
assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT product's intended environment, the evaluated security
functionality, and the testing and analysis conducted by the CCEF.
The certification report, certificate of product evaluation and security target are posted to the Certified Products
list (CPL) for the Canadian CC Scheme and to the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the
International Common Criteria Project).
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Executive Summary........................................................................................................................................5
1 Identification of Target of Evaluation......................................................................................................6
1.1 Common Criteria Conformance..................................................................................................................6
1.2 TOE description ..........................................................................................................................................6
1.3 TOE architecture.........................................................................................................................................7
2 Security policy .......................................................................................................................................8
2.1 Cryptographic functionality........................................................................................................................8
3 Assumptions and Clarifications of Scope.................................................................................................9
3.1 Usage and Environmental assumptions .....................................................................................................9
3.2 Clarification of Scope............................................................................................................................... 10
4 Evaluated Configuration.......................................................................................................................11
4.1 Documentation........................................................................................................................................ 11
5 Evaluation Analysis Activities ...............................................................................................................12
5.1 Development........................................................................................................................................... 12
5.2 Guidance Documents .............................................................................................................................. 12
5.3 Life-cycle Support.................................................................................................................................... 12
6 Testing Activities..................................................................................................................................13
6.1 Assessment of Developer Tests............................................................................................................... 13
6.2 Conduct of Testing................................................................................................................................... 13
6.3 Independent Functional Testing.............................................................................................................. 13
6.4 Independent Penetration Testing ........................................................................................................... 14
7 Results of the Evaluation......................................................................................................................15
7.1 Recommendations/Comments................................................................................................................ 15
8 Supporting Content..............................................................................................................................16
8.1 List of Abbreviations................................................................................................................................ 16
8.2 References............................................................................................................................................... 17
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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1 TOE Architecture ....................................................................................................................................7
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 TOE Identification.......................................................................................................................................6
Table 2 Cryptographic Algorithm(s) ........................................................................................................................8
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
SonicWall SonicOS Enhanced V6.2.5 VPN Gateway on NSA, SM, and TZ Appliances (hereafter referred to as the
Target of Evaluation, or TOE), from SonicWall, Inc., was the subject of this Common Criteria evaluation. A
description of the TOE can be found in Section 1.2. The results of this evaluation demonstrate that TOE meets
the requirements of the conformance claim listed in Table 1 for the evaluated security functionality.
EWA-Canada is the CCEF that conducted the evaluation. This evaluation was completed 4 June 2018 and was
carried out in accordance with the rules of the Canadian Common Criteria Scheme.
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target, which identifies assumptions made during the
evaluation, the intended environment for TOE, and the security functional/assurance requirements. Consumers
are advised to verify that their operating environment is consistent with that specified in the security target, and
to give due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification report.
Communications Security Establishment, as the Certification Body, declares that the TOE evaluation meets all
the conditions of the Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will
be listed on the Canadian Certified Products list (CPL) and the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the
International Common Criteria Project).
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1 IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET OF EVALUATION
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is identified as follows:
Table 1 TOE Identification
TOE Name and Version SonicWall SonicOS Enhanced V6.2.5 VPN Gateway on NSA, SM, and TZ Appliances
Developer SonicWall, Inc.
Conformance Claim collaborative Protection Profile for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls (v1.0, 27-Feb-
2015)
1.1 COMMON CRITERIA CONFORMANCE
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5.
1.2 TOE DESCRIPTION
The TOE is a network appliance that acts as network gateway device that terminate Virtual Private Network
(VPN) tunnels. It can be used to provide an authenticated and encrypted path to another site. The TOE supports
authentication, and protects data from disclosure or modification during transfer. The VPN functionality is also
used to provide a secure connection between the device and the audit server.
The firewall capabilities of the TOE include stateful packet inspection. Stateful packet inspection maintains the
state of network connections, such as Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) streams and User Datagram Protocol
(UDP) communication, traveling across the firewall. The firewall distinguishes between legitimate packets and
illegitimate packets for the given network deployment. Only packets adhering to the administrator-configured
access rules are permitted to pass through the firewall; all others are rejected.
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1.3 TOE ARCHITECTURE
A diagram of the TOE architecture is as follows:
Figure 1 TOE Architecture
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2 SECURITY POLICY
The TOE implements policies pertaining to the following security functional classes:
• Security Audit
• Cryptographic Support
• User Data Protection
• Identification and Authentication
• Security Management
• Protection of the TSF
• TOE Access
• Trusted Path/Channels
• Stateful Traffic Filtering
Complete details of the security functional requirements (SFRs) can be found in the Security Target (ST)
referenced in section 8.2.
2.1 CRYPTOGRAPHIC FUNCTIONALITY
The following Government of Canada approved cryptographic algorithms were evaluated by the CAVP and used
by the TOE:
Table 2 Cryptographic Algorithm(s)
Cryptographic Algorithm Standard Certificate Number
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) FIPS 197 #5070
Rivest Shamir Adleman (RSA) FIPS 186-4 #2750
Secure Hash Algorithm (SHS) FIPS 180-3 #4130
Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) FIPS 198 #3384
Deterministic Random Bit Generation (DRBG) SP 800-90A #1887
Component Validation List SP 800-56A #1631, #1632
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) FIPS 186-4 #951, #1315
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3 ASSUMPTIONS AND CLARIFICATIONS OF SCOPE
Consumers of the TOE should consider assumptions about usage and environmental settings as requirements
for the product’s installation and its operating environment. This will ensure the proper and secure operation of
the TOE.
3.1 USAGE AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS
The following assumptions are made regarding the use and deployment of the TOE:
• The firewall is assumed to be physically protected in its operational environment and not subject to
physical attacks that compromise the security and/or interfere with the firewall’s physical
interconnections and correct operation. This protection is assumed to be sufficient to protect the
firewall and the data it contains. As a result, the cPP will not include any requirements on physical
tamper protection or other physical attack mitigations. The cPP will not expect the product to defend
against physical access to the firewall that allows unauthorized entities to extract data, bypass other
controls, or otherwise manipulate the firewall.
• The firewall is assumed to provide networking and filtering functionality as its core function and not
provide functionality/services that could be deemed as general purpose computing. For example the
firewall should not provide computing platform for general purpose applications (unrelated to
networking/filtering functionality).
• The authorized administrator(s) for the firewall are assumed to be trusted and to act in the best interest
of security for the organization. This includes being appropriately trained, following policy, and adhering
to guidance documentation. Administrators are trusted to ensure passwords/credentials have sufficient
strength and entropy and to lack malicious intent when administering the firewall. The firewall is not
expected to be capable of defending against a malicious administrator that actively works to bypass or
compromise the security of the firewall.
• The firewall firmware and software is assumed to be updated by an administrator on a regular basis in
response to the release of product updates due to known vulnerabilities.
• The administrator’s credentials (private key) used to access the firewall are protected by the host
platform on which they reside.
• It is assumed that the TOE is connected to distinct networks in a manner that ensures that the TOE
security policies will be enforced on all applicable network traffic flowing among the attached networks.
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3.2 CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE
The scope of the evaluation is limited to secure management of the TOE and Stateful Traffic filtering functions.
The TOE incorporates CAVP-validated cryptography and was not subjected to CMVP (FIPS-140) validation.
The following features/functionality is excluded from this evaluation:
• Although SonicWall SonicOS Enhanced v6.2 supports several authentication mechanisms, the following
mechanisms are excluded from the evaluated configuration:
o Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS)
o Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP)
o Active Directory (AD)
o eDirectory authentication
• Command Line Interface (CLI) (Secure Shell (SSH))
• Application Firewall
• Web Content Filtering
• Hardware Failover
• Real-time Blacklist (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP))
• Global Security Client (including Group VPN)
• Global Management System
• SonicPoint
• Voice over IP (VoIP)
• Network Time Protocol (NTP)
• Antivirus
A separate evaluation of the TOE determined that this product satisfies the requirements of the collaborative
Protection Profile for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls version 1.0 and the extended package for Virtual Private
Gateway version 2.1. Results for this evaluation can be found on the Canadian Certified Products list.
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4 EVALUATED CONFIGURATION
The evaluated configuration for the TOE comprises:
The TOE firmware (SonicOS Enhanced V6.2.5.0-51n) executing on the following supported hardware
platform(s);
NSA 2600 NSA 3600 NSA 4600 NSA 5600 NSA 6600
SM 9200 SM 9400 SM 9600 TZ 300/W TZ 400/W
TZ 500/W TZ 600
With support from the operating environment for;
• Audit Server (rsyslog 8.24.0) with StrongSwan v4.3.2-1.1ubuntu1 IPsec VPN client
4.1 DOCUMENTATION
The following documents are provided to the consumer to assist in the configuration and installation of the TOE:
a. SonicWALL™ TZ300 / TZ300 Wireless Quick Start Guide 232-003785-50 Rev A Updated - January 2017
b. SonicWALL™ TZ400 / TZ400 Wireless Quick Start Guide 232-003783-50 Rev B Updated - February 2017
c. SonicWALL™ TZ500 / TZ500 Wireless Quick Start Guide 232-003781-50 Rev A Updated - January 2017
d. SonicWALL™ TZ600 Quick Start Guide 232-003779-50 Rev A Updated - January 2017
e. SonicWALL™ NSA 2600/3600/4600/5600/6600 Getting Started Guide 232-003419-51 Rev A Updated –
March 2017
f. SonicWALL™ SuperMassive™ 9200/9400/9600 Getting Started Guide 232-000344-50 Rev A Updated –
February 2017
g. SonicOS 6.2 Administration Guide 232-002365-02 Rev D Updated - November 2017
h. SonicOS 6.2.5/6.2.7/6.2.9 Log Events Reference Guide P/N 232-004020-00 Rev A
i. Dell SonicWall SonicOS Enhanced V6.2 VPN Gateway on NSA, SM, and TZ Appliances Common Criteria
Guidance Supplement Version: 1.2, 7 March 2018
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5 EVALUATION ANALYSIS ACTIVITIES
The evaluation analysis activities involved a structured evaluation of the TOE. Documentation and process
dealing with Development, Guidance Documents, and Life-Cycle Support were evaluated.
5.1 DEVELOPMENT
The evaluators analyzed the documentation provided by the vendor; they determined that the design
completely and accurately describes the TOE security functionality (TSF) interfaces and how the TSF implements
the security functional requirements (SFRs). The evaluators determined that the initialization process is secure,
that the security functions are protected against tamper and bypass, and that security domains are maintained.
5.2 GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS
The evaluators examined the TOE preparative user guidance and operational user guidance and determined that
it sufficiently and unambiguously describes how to securely transform the TOE into its evaluated configuration
and how to use and administer the product. The evaluators examined and tested the preparative and
operational guidance, and determined that they are complete and sufficiently detailed to result in a secure
configuration.
Section 4.1 provides details on the guidance documents.
5.3 LIFE-CYCLE SUPPORT
An analysis of the TOE configuration management system and associated documentation was performed. The
evaluators found that the TOE configuration items were clearly marked.
The evaluators examined the delivery documentation and determined that it described all of the procedures
required to maintain the integrity of the TOE during distribution to the consumer.
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6 TESTING ACTIVITIES
Testing consists of the following three steps: assessing developer tests, performing independent functional tests,
and performing penetration tests.
6.1 ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPER TESTS
The evaluators verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities by examining their test evidence,
and reviewing their test results, as documented in the ETR. The correspondence between the tests identified in
the developer’s test documentation and the functional specification was complete.
6.2 CONDUCT OF TESTING
The TOE was subjected to a comprehensive suite of formally documented, independent functional and
penetration tests. The detailed testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected
results and observed results are documented in a separate Test Results document.
6.3 INDEPENDENT FUNCTIONAL TESTING
During this evaluation, the evaluator developed independent functional tests by examining design and guidance
documentation.
All testing was planned and documented to a sufficient level of detail to allow repeatability of the testing
procedures and results. The following testing activities were performed:
a. PP Assurance Activities: The evaluator performed the assurance activities listed in the claimed PP;
b. Cryptographic module/library verification: The evaluator verified the cryptographic certificates claimed
are valid and present in the TOE.
6.3.1 FUNCTIONAL TEST RESULTS
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests yielded the expected results, providing assurance
that the TOE behaves as specified in its ST and functional specification.
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6.4 INDEPENDENT PENETRATION TESTING
Subsequent to the independent review of public domain vulnerability databases and all evaluation deliverables,
limited independent evaluator penetration testing was conducted. The penetration tests focused on:
a. Use of automated vulnerability scanning tools to discover potential network, platform and application
layer vulnerabilities such as Heartbleed, Shellshock, FREAK, POODLE, and GHOST; and
b. Fuzz Testing: The evaluator conducted fuzz testing using unexpected inputs and malformed packets on
the TOE interfaces.
6.4.1 PENETRATION TEST RESULTS
The independent penetration testing did not uncover any exploitable vulnerabilities in the intended operating
environment.
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7 RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION
This evaluation has provided the basis for the conformance claim documented in Table 1. The overall verdict for
this evaluation is PASS. These results are supported by evidence in the ETR.
The IT product identified in this report has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility established under
the Canadian Common Criteria Scheme using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5, for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5. These
evaluation results apply only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration and
in conjunction with the complete certification report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Canadian Common Criteria Scheme
and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This is not an endorsement of the IT product by CSE or by any other organization that recognizes or gives effect
to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by CSE or by any other organization that recognizes or gives
effect to this certificate, is expressed or implied.
7.1 RECOMMENDATIONS/COMMENTS
It is recommended that all guidance outlined in Section 4.1 be followed to configure the TOE in the evaluated
configuration.
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8 SUPPORTING CONTENT
8.1 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Term Definition
AD Active Directory
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CCEF Common Criteria Evaluation Facility
CLI Command Line Interface
CM Configuration Management
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSE Communications Security Establishment
DPD Dead Peer Detection
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
GC Government of Canada
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
PP Protection Profile
RADIUS Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
SSH Secure Shell
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Function
VPN Virtual Private Network
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8.2 REFERENCES
Reference
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April
2017.
Security Target for SonicWall SonicOS Enhanced V6.2 VPN Gateway on NSA, SM, and TZ Appliances,
v1.9P, 4 June 2018
Evaluation Technical Report for SonicWall SonicOS Enhanced V6.2 VPN Gateway on NSA, SM, and TZ
Appliances, v0.9, 16 May 2018
Assurance Activity Report for SonicWall SonicOS Enhanced V6.2 VPN Gateway on NSA, SM, and TZ Appliances,
v1.2, 17 May 2018