1
TnD v5.1 on ID-One Cosmo X
(EAC Configuration)
Public Security Target
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About IDEMIA
IDEMIA is the global leader in trusted identities for an increasingly digital world, with the
ambition to empower citizens and consumers alike to interact, pay, connect, travel and
vote in ways that are now possible in a connected environment.
Securing our identity has become mission critical in the world we live in today. By
standing for Augmented Identity, we reinvent the way we think, produce, use and
protect this asset, whether for individuals or for objects. We ensure privacy and trust as
well as guarantee secure, authenticated and verifiable transactions for international
clients from Financial, Telecom, Identity, Security and IoT sectors.
With close to €3bn in revenues, IDEMIA is the result of the merger between OT
(Oberthur Technologies) and Safran Identity & Security (Morpho). This new company
counts 14,000 employees of more than 80 nationalities and serves clients in 180
countries.
For more information, visit www.idemia.com / Follow @IdemiaGroup on Twitter
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APPROVAL
COMPANY NAME FUNCTION
Established by: IDEMIA Prem KUMAR CERTIFICATION Project Manager
Authorized by: IDEMIA Sarra MESTIRI IDEMIA CERTIFICATION Manager
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DOCUMENT EVOLUTION
Date Version Author Revision
15/07/2021 Ed 1 Prem KUMAR Sanitized version created for Public Issue.
29/07/2021 Ed 2 Prem KUMAR
Sanitized version created for public issue after
incorporating Certifier feedback.
11/08/2021 Ed 3 Prem KUMAR
Sanitized version created for public issue after
removing [ST-IC] from References section
(2.3) of this Public ST as [PTF-ST] already
refers to it.
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Table of contents
1 SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION ...................................................................10
1.1 ST IDENTIFICATION...................................................................................................... 10
1.2 TOE REFERENCE.......................................................................................................... 10
2 TECHNICAL TERMS, ABBREVIATIONS AND ASSOCIATED REFERENCES ............12
2.1 TECHNICAL TERMS ....................................................................................................... 12
2.2 ABBREVIATIONS........................................................................................................... 24
2.3 REFERENCES ............................................................................................................... 26
3 TOE OVERVIEW AND DESCRIPTION ...................................................................29
3.1 TOE OVERVIEW .......................................................................................................... 29
3.2 TOE DESCRIPTION ....................................................................................................... 30
3.2.1 Physical scope ................................................................................................... 30
3.2.2 Logical Scope..................................................................................................... 31
3.3 REQUIRED NON-TOE HARDWARE/SOFTWARE/FIRMWARE......................................................... 33
3.4 TOE USAGE AND SECURITY FEATURES FOR OPERATIONAL USE ................................................... 33
3.4.1 TOE Usage ........................................................................................................ 33
3.4.2 Security Features ............................................................................................... 35
4 LIFE CYCLE ..........................................................................................................38
4.1 DEVELOPMENT ENVIRONMENT.......................................................................................... 38
4.2 PRODUCTION ENVIRONMENT ........................................................................................... 39
4.3 PREPARATION ENVIRONMENT........................................................................................... 47
4.4 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT .......................................................................................... 47
5 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS .....................................................................................48
5.1 CC CONFORMANCE CLAIM............................................................................................... 48
5.2 PROTECTION PROFILE CLAIMS.......................................................................................... 48
5.3 PACKAGE CLAIM........................................................................................................... 48
5.4 PP CONFORMANCE RATIONALE......................................................................................... 48
5.4.1 Main aspects...................................................................................................... 48
5.4.2 Overview of differences between the PP and the ST.............................................. 49
6 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION......................................................................50
6.1 ASSETS ..................................................................................................................... 50
6.1.1 Logical MRTD sensitive User Data........................................................................ 50
6.1.2 Authenticity of the MRTD's chip........................................................................... 50
6.2 USERS / SUBJECTS ....................................................................................................... 50
6.2.1 Manufacturer..................................................................................................... 50
6.2.2 Personalization Agent ......................................................................................... 50
6.2.3 Country Verifying Certification Authority............................................................... 50
6.2.4 Document Verifier .............................................................................................. 50
6.2.5 Terminal............................................................................................................ 51
6.2.6 Inspection system (IS) ....................................................................................... 51
6.2.7 MRTD Holder..................................................................................................... 51
6.2.8 Traveler ............................................................................................................ 51
6.2.9 Attacker ............................................................................................................ 51
6.3 THREATS ................................................................................................................... 51
6.3.1 T.Read_Sensitive_Data....................................................................................... 51
6.3.2 T.Forgery .......................................................................................................... 52
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6.3.3 T.Counterfeit ..................................................................................................... 52
6.3.4 T.Abuse-Func .................................................................................................... 52
6.3.5 T.Information_Leakage....................................................................................... 52
6.3.6 T.Phys-Tamper .................................................................................................. 53
6.3.7 T.Malfunction..................................................................................................... 53
6.4 ORGANISATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES ............................................................................... 53
6.4.1 P.BAC-PP........................................................................................................... 53
6.4.2 P.Sensitive_Data................................................................................................ 54
6.4.3 P.Manufact ........................................................................................................ 54
6.4.4 P.Personalization................................................................................................ 54
6.5 ASSUMPTIONS ............................................................................................................. 54
6.5.1 Assumptions from PP EAC................................................................................... 54
6.5.2 Additional Assumption ........................................................................................ 55
7 SECURITY OBJECTIVES.......................................................................................56
7.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE................................................................................. 56
7.1.1 Security Objectives listed in PP EAC ..................................................................... 56
7.1.2 Additional Security Objectives for the TOE............................................................ 58
7.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT .................................................. 58
7.2.1 Issuing State or Organization .............................................................................. 58
7.2.2 Receiving State or Organization........................................................................... 60
7.2.3 Additional Security Objectives for the Operational Environment.............................. 60
7.3 SECURITY OBJECTIVES RATIONALE.................................................................................... 61
7.3.1 Threats ............................................................................................................. 61
7.3.2 Organisational Security Policies ........................................................................... 62
7.3.3 Assumptions...................................................................................................... 63
7.3.4 SPD and Security Objectives ............................................................................... 64
8 EXTENDED REQUIREMENTS................................................................................67
8.1 EXTENDED FAMILIES ..................................................................................................... 67
8.1.1 Extended Family FPT_EMS - TOE Emanation ........................................................ 67
8.1.2 Extended Family FIA_API - Authentication Proof of Identity ................................... 67
8.1.3 Extended Family FMT_LIM - Limited capabilities.................................................... 68
8.1.4 Extended Family FAU_SAS - Audit data storage .................................................... 69
8.1.5 Extended Family FCS_RND - Generation of random numbers ................................. 69
9 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.................................................................................70
9.1 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS.............................................................................. 70
9.1.1 Class FAU Security Audit..................................................................................... 70
9.1.2 Class FCS Cryptographic Support......................................................................... 70
9.1.3 Class FIA Identification and Authentication........................................................... 73
9.1.4 Class FDP User Data Protection ........................................................................... 74
9.1.5 Class FMT Security Management ......................................................................... 76
9.1.6 Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions...................................................... 80
9.2 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS ............................................................................... 82
9.2.1 ADV Development.............................................................................................. 82
9.2.2 AGD Guidance documents................................................................................... 85
9.2.3 ALC Life-cycle support ........................................................................................ 87
9.2.4 ASE Security Target evaluation............................................................................ 91
9.2.5 ATE Tests.......................................................................................................... 96
9.2.6 AVA Vulnerability assessment.............................................................................. 98
9.3 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE ............................................................................... 99
9.3.1 Security Objectives for the TOE........................................................................... 99
9.3.2 Rationale tables of Security Objectives and SFRs .................................................101
9.3.3 Dependencies ...................................................................................................104
9.3.4 Rationale for the Security Assurance Requirements..............................................107
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9.3.5 ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures........................................................107
9.3.6 AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis ........................................108
10 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION .......................................................................109
10.1 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION.......................................................................................109
10.2 SFRS AND TSS ..........................................................................................................113
10.2.1 SFRs and TSS - Rationale...................................................................................113
10.2.2 Association tables of SFRs and TSS.....................................................................116
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Table of figures
Figure 1 Physical Form .............................................................................................................. 31
Figure 2 TOE’s logical architecture.............................................................................................. 32
Figure 3 Life cycle Overview....................................................................................................... 38
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Table of tables
Table 1 TOE Configurations ....................................................................................................... 11
Table 2 Applet Internal Versions................................................................................................. 11
Table 3 Different evaluated configurations of the TnD application ................................................. 29
Table 4 TOE physical ports and interfaces ................................................................................... 31
Table 5 TOE Guidance............................................................................................................... 33
Table 6 TOE Configurations during Personalization....................................................................... 33
Table 7 eMRTD and IDL Terminology.......................................................................................... 34
Table 8 BAC Configuration ......................................................................................................... 36
Table 9 Option 1: Both Platform and Applet packages are loaded at IC Manufacturer Site ............... 39
Table 10: Option 2: Both Platform and Applet packages are loaded at CC Audited IDEMIA Sites or
Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites or External Sites .......................................................................... 40
Table 11 Option 3(a): Platform package is loaded at IC Manufacturer Site and Applet package is
loaded at Audited IDEMIA Sites or Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites or External Sites through GP
Mechanism ........................................................................................................................ 41
Table 12 Platform package is loaded at IC Manufacturer Site and 3b (i) Applet package is loaded
through resident application using LSK format and 3b (ii) DUMP Package is loaded through
resident application using DSK Secret Live Key - at Audited IDEMIA Sites or Non-Audited IDEMIA
Sites or External Sites ......................................................................................................... 42
Table 13 Option 3(c): Platform package is loaded at IC Manufacturer Site and Applet package in plain
format is loaded at Audited IDEMIA Sites only ...................................................................... 43
Table 14 Option 4(a): Platform package is loaded at Audited IDEMIA Sites or Non-Audited IDEMIA
Sites or External Sites and Applet package is loaded at Audited IDEMIA Sites or Non-Audited
IDEMIA Sites or External Sites through GP Mechanism........................................................... 44
Table 15 Platform package is loaded at Audited IDEMIA Sites or Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites or External
Sites and Options 4b(i) Applet package is loaded through Resident application using LSK format
and and 4b(ii) DUMP Package is loaded through resident application using DSK Secret Live Key -
at Audited IDEMIA Sites or Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites or External Sites .................................. 45
Table 16 Option 4(c): Platform package is loaded at IC Manufacturer Site and Applet package in plain
format is loaded at CC Audited IDEMIA Sites only ................................................................. 46
Table 17 Conformance Rationale ................................................................................................ 48
Table 18 Threats and Security Objectives - Coverage.................................................................. 64
Table 19 Security Objectives and Threats - Coverage.................................................................. 65
Table 20 OSPs and Security Objectives - Coverage...................................................................... 65
Table 21 Security Objectives and OSPs - Coverage...................................................................... 66
Table 22 Assumptions and Security Objectives for the Operational Environment - Coverage ........... 66
Table 23 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment and Assumptions - Coverage ........... 66
Table 24 Security Objectives and SFRs - Coverage.................................................................... 102
Table 25 SFRs and Security Objectives..................................................................................... 104
Table 26 SFRs Dependencies .................................................................................................. 106
Table 27 SARs Dependencies .................................................................................................. 107
Table 28 SFRs and TSS - Coverage.......................................................................................... 117
Table 29 TSS and SFRs - Coverage.......................................................................................... 118
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1 Security Target Introduction
1.1 ST Identification
Title
TnD v5.1 on ID-One Cosmo X (EAC Configuration) Public
Security Target
ST Identification FQR 550 0246 Ed 3
CC Version 3.1 Revision 5
Assurance Level EAL5 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
ITSEF Brightsight
Certification Body NSCIB
Compliant to Protection
Profiles
EAC- Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO
Application”, Extended Access control – BSI-PP-0056 v1.10
25th march 2009 [EAC-PP]
1.2 TOE Reference
TOE Commercial Name TnD v5.1 on ID-One Cosmo X (EAC Configuration)
Applet Code Versions
(SAAAAR Code)
See TOE Configurations table below
Applet Internal Versions See Applet Internal Versions table below
Platform Name ID-One Cosmo X
Platform Certificate [PTF-CERT]
Platform Identification SAAAAR Code: 093363
IC Certificate Reference BSI_DSZ-CC-1107-2020
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The following table defines the TOE configurations, depending on the source code
compilation and build options:
Configurations Description of
the
configurations
Content of the config
(package/cap files)
Config 1 TnD Applet
without support
for MOC
SAAAAR + version + Config
of TnD Java Applet on
Cosmo X {config 1}
203621FF 05010000
0101
SAAAAR + version + config
of Common Package
{Cosmo X build} {Config 1}
417641FF 01000000
0201
Config 2 TnD Applet with
support for MOC
SAAAAR + version + config
of TnD Java Applet on
Cosmo X {config 2}
203621FF 05010000
0201
SAAAAR + version + config
of Common Package
{Cosmo X build} {Config 2}
417641FF 01000000
0301
Table 1 TOE Configurations
Note:
In the table above a “SAAAAR code” is denoted by first 4 bytes, a “version” by the next 2
bytes and a “config” ID by the last 2 bytes.
The “SAAAAR” is the product configuration item number within IDEMIA and is uniquely
defined as:
S IDEMIA Site code 1 byte
AAAA Article number 4 bytes
R Software Release number 1 byte
Applet Internal Versions of above Configurations are as follows:
Configurations Returned value of DF67
Config 1 00 00 02 08 01 01 00 08
Config 2 00 00 02 08 01 04 00 07
Table 2 Applet Internal Versions
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2 Technical Terms, Abbreviations and Associated
References
2.1 Technical Terms
Term Definition
Accurate Terminal
Certificate
A Terminal Certificate is accurate, if the issuing Document Verifier is
trusted by the travel document’s chip to produce Terminal Certificates
with the correct certificate effective date, see [TR-03110-1].
Advanced
Inspection
Procedure (with
PACE)
A specific order of authentication steps between a travel document and
a terminal as required by [TR-03110-1], namely (i) PACE, (ii) Chip
Authentication v.1, (iii) Passive Authentication with SOD and (iv)
Terminal Authentication v.1. AIP can generally be used by EIS-AIP-
PACE.
Agreement This term is used in the current ST in order to reflect an appropriate
relationship between the parties involved, but not as a legal notion.
Active
Authentication
Security mechanism defined in [ICAO-9303]. Option by which means
the MTRD’s chip proves and the inspection system verifies the identity
and authenticity of the MTRD’s chip as part of a genuine MRTD issued
by a known State of organization.
Application note Optional informative part of the PP containing sensitive supporting
information that is considered relevant or useful for the construction,
evaluation, or use of the TOE (cf. CC part 1, section B.2.7).
Audit records Write-only-once non-volatile memory area of the MRTDs chip to store
the Initialisation Data and Pre-personalization Data.
Authenticity Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the MRTD’s chip
were created by the issuing State or Organization
Basic Access
Control
Security mechanism defined in [ICAO-9303] by which means the
MTRD’s chip proves and the inspection system protect their
communication by means of secure messaging with Basic Access Keys
(see there).
Basic Inspection
System (BIS)
A technical system being used by an inspecting authority and operated
by a governmental organisation (i.e. an Official Domestic or Foreign
Document Verifier) and verifying the travel document presenter as the
travel document holder (for ePassport: by comparing the real biometric
data (face) of the travel document presenter with the stored biometric
data (DG2) of the travel document holder).
The Basic Inspection System with PACE is a PACE Terminal additionally
supporting/applying the Passive Authentication protocol and is
authorised by the travel document Issuer through the Document
Verifier of receiving state to read a subset of data stored on the travel
document.
Biographical data
(bio data).
The personalized details of the bearer of the document appearing as
text in the visual and machine readable zones on the biographical data
page of a passport book or on a travel card or visa.
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Term Definition
Biometric
reference data
Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD holder in the
MRTD’s chip as (i) digital portrait and (ii) optional biometric reference
data.
Card Access
Number (CAN)
Password derived from a short number printed on the front side of the
data-page.
Certificate chain A sequence defining a hierarchy certificates. The Inspection System
Certificate is the lowest level, Document Verifier Certificate in between,
and Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificates are on the
highest level. A certificate of a lower level is signed with the private key
corresponding to the public key in the certificate of the next higher
level.
Counterfeit An unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine security document
made by whatever means.
Country Signing CA
Certificate (CCSCA)
Self-signed certificate of the Country Signing CA Public Key
(KPu CSCA) issued by CSCA stored in the inspection system.
Country Signing
Certification
Authority (CSCA)
An organisation enforcing the policy of the travel document Issuer with
respect to confirming correctness of user and TSF data stored in the
travel document. The CSCA represents the country specific root of the
PKI for the travel documents and creates the Document Signer
Certificates within this PKI.
The CSCA also issues the self-signed CSCA Certificate (CCSCA) having
to be distributed by strictly secure diplomatic means, see. [ICAO-9303],
5.5.1.
The Country Signing Certification Authority issuing certificates for
Document Signers (cf. [6]) and the domestic CVCA may be integrated
into a single entity, e.g. a Country Certification Authority. However,
even in this case, separate key pairs must be used for different roles,
see [TR-03110-1].
Country Verifying
Certification
Authority (CVCA)
An organisation enforcing the privacy policy of the travel document
Issuer with respect to protection of user data stored in the travel
document (at a trial of a terminal to get an access to these data). The
CVCA represents the country specific root of the PKI for the terminals
using it and creates the Document Verifier Certificates within this PKI.
Updates of the public key of the CVCA are distributed in form of CVCA
Link-Certificates, see [TR-03110-1].
Since the Standard Inspection Procedure does not imply any certificate-
based terminal authentication, the current TOE cannot recognise a
CVCS as a subject; hence, it merely represents an organizational entity
within this ST.
The Country Signing Certification Authority (CSCA) issuing certificates
for Document Signers (cf. [ICAO-9303]) and the domestic CVCA may
be integrated into a single entity, e.g. a Country Certification Authority.
However, even in this case, separate key pairs must be used for
different roles, see [TR-03110-1].
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Term Definition
Current date The maximum of the effective dates of valid CVCA, DV and domestic
Inspection System certificates known to the TOE. It is used the validate
card verifiable certificates.
CV Certificate Certificate of the new public key of the Country Verifying Certification
Authority signed with the old public key of the Country Verifying
Certification Authority where the certificate effective date for the new
key is before the certificate expiration date of the certificate for the old
key.
CVCA link
Certificate
Certificate of the new public key of the Country Verifying Certification
Authority signed with the old public key of the Country Verifying
Certification Authority where the certificate effective date for the new
key is before the certificate expiration date of the certificate for the old
key.
Document Basic
Access Key
Derivation
Algorithm
The [ICAO-9303] describes the Document Basic Access Key Derivation
Algorithm on how terminals may derive the Document Basic Access
Keys from the second line of the printed MRZ data.
Document Details
Data
Data printed on and electronically stored in the travel document
representing the document details like document type, issuing state,
document number, date of issue, date of expiry, issuing authority. The
document details data are less-sensitive data.
Document Basic
Access Keys
Pair of symmetric Triple-DES keys used for secure messaging with
encryption (key KENC) and message authentication (key KMAC) of data
transmitted between the MRTD’s chip and the inspection system
[ICAO-9303]. It is drawn from the printed MRZ of the passport book to
authenticate an entity able to read the printed MRZ of the passport
book.
Document Security
Object (SOD)
A RFC3369 CMS Signed Data Structure, signed by the Document Signer
(DS). Carries the hash values of the LDS Data Groups. It is stored in
the MRTD’s chip. It may carry the Document Signer Certificate (CDS).
[ICAO-9303]
Document Signer
(DS)
An organisation enforcing the policy of the CSCA and signing the
Document Security Object stored on the travel document for passive
authentication.
A Document Signer is authorised by the national CSCA issuing the
Document Signer Certificate (CDS), see [TR-03110-1] and [ICAO-
9303].
This role is usually delegated to a Personalization Agent.
Document Verifier
(DV)
An organisation enforcing the policies of the CVCA and of a Service
Provider (here: of a governmental organisation / inspection authority)
and managing terminals belonging together (e.g. terminals operated by
a State’s border police), by – inter alia – issuing Terminal Certificates. A
Document Verifier is therefore a Certification Authority, authorised by
at least the national CVCA to issue certificates for national terminals,
see [TR-03110-1].
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Term Definition
Since the Standard Inspection Procedure does not imply any certificate-
based terminal authentication, the current TOE cannot recognise a DV
as a subject; hence, it merely represents an organisational entity within
this ST.
There can be Domestic and Foreign DV: A domestic DV is acting under
the policy of the domestic CVCA being run by the travel document
Issuer; a foreign DV is acting under a policy of the respective foreign
CVCA (in this case there shall be an appropriate agreement between
the travel document Issuer und a foreign CVCA ensuring enforcing the
travel document Issuer’s privacy policy) 1 2
Eavesdropper A threat agent with low attack potential reading the communication
between the MRTD’s chip and the inspection system to gain the data
on the MRTD’s chip.
Enrolment The process of collecting biometric samples from a person and the
subsequent preparation and storage of biometric reference templates
representing that person's identity. [ICAO-9303]
ePassport
application
[PACE-PP] definition
A part of the TOE containing the non-executable, related user data
(incl. biometric) as well as the data needed for authentication (incl.
MRZ); this application is intended to be used by authorities, amongst
other as a machine readable travel document (MRTD).
See [TR-03110-1].
[PP-EAC] definition
Non-executable data defining the functionality of the operating system
on the IC as the travel document’s chip. It includes
the file structure implementing the LDS [ICAO-9303],
the definition of the User Data, but does not include the User Data
itself (i.e. content of EF.DG1 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16, EF.COM and
EF.SOD) and
the TSF Data including the definition the authentication data but except
the authentication data itself.
Extended Access
Control
Security mechanism identified in [ICAO-9303] by which means the
MTRD’s chip (i) verifies the authentication of the inspection systems
authorized to read the optional biometric reference data, (ii) controls
the access to the optional biometric reference data and (iii) protects
the confidentiality and integrity of the optional biometric reference data
during their transmission to the inspection system by secure
messaging. The Personalization Agent may use the same mechanism to
authenticate themselves with Personalization Agent Authentication
1
The form of such an agreement may be of formal and informal nature; the term ‘agreement’ is used in the
current ST in order to reflect an appropriate relationship between the parties involved.
2
Existing of such an agreement may be technically reflected by means of issuing a CCVCA-F for the Public Key of
the foreign CVCA signed by the domestic CVCA.
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Term Definition
Private Key and to get write and read access to the logical MRTD and
TSF data.
Extended
Inspection System
(EIS)
A role of a terminal as part of an inspection system which is in addition
to Basic Inspection System authorized by the issuing State or
Organization to read the optional biometric reference data and
supports the terminals part of the Extended Access Control
Authentication Mechanism.
Forgery Fraudulent alteration of any part of the genuine document, e.g.
changes to the biographical data or the portrait.
Global
Interoperability
The capability of inspection systems (either manual or automated) in
different States throughout the world to exchange data, to process
data received from systems in other States, and to utilize that data in
inspection operations in their respective States. Global interoperability
is a major objective of the standardized specifications for placement of
both eye-readable and machine readable data in all MRTDs. [ICAO-
9303]
IC Dedicated
Software
Software developed and injected into the chip hardware by the IC
manufacturer. Such software might support special functionality of the
IC hardware and be used, amongst other, for implementing delivery
procedures between different players. The usage of parts of the IC
Dedicated Software might be restricted to certain life phases.
IC Dedicated
Support Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which provides
functions after TOE Delivery. The usage of parts of the IC Dedicated
Software might be restricted to certain phases.
IC Dedicated Test
Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which is used
to test the TOE before TOE Delivery but which does not provide any
functionality thereafter.
IC Embedded
Software
Software embedded in an IC and not being designed by the IC
developer. The IC Embedded Software is designed in the design life
phase and embedded into the IC in the manufacturing life phase of the
TOE.
IC Identification
Data
The IC manufacturer writes a unique IC identifier to the chip to control
the IC as travel document material during the IC manufacturing and
the delivery process to the travel document manufacturer.
Impostor A person who applies for and obtains a document by assuming a false
name and identity, or a person who alters his or her physical
appearance to represent himself or herself as another person for the
purpose of using that person’s document.
Improperly
documented
person
A person who travels, or attempts to travel with: (a) an expired travel
document or an invalid visa; (b) a counterfeit, forged or altered travel
document or visa; (c) someone else’s travel document or visa; or (d)
no travel document or visa, if required. [ICAO-9303]
Initialisation Process of writing Initialisation Data (see below) to the TOE (TOE life-
cycle, Phase 2 Manufacturing, Step 3).
17
Term Definition
Initialisation Data Any data defined by the TOE Manufacturer and injected into the non-
volatile memory by the Integrated Circuits manufacturer (Phase 2).
These data are for instance used for traceability and for IC
identification as MRTD’s material (IC identification data).
Inspection The act of a State examining an MRTD presented to it by a traveler
(the MRTD holder) and verifying its authenticity. [ICAO-9303]
Inspection system
(IS)
A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving
State (i) examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its
authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as MRTD holder.
Integrated circuit
(IC)
Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing and/or
memory functions. The MRTD’s chip is an integrated circuit.
Integrity Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the MRTD’s chip
have not been altered from that created by the issuing State or
Organization
Issuing
Organization
Organization authorized to issue an official travel document (e.g. the
United Nations Organization, issuer of the Laissez-passer). [ICAO-
9303]]
Issuing State The Country issuing the MRTD. [ICAO-9303]
Logical Data
Structure (LDS)
The collection of groupings of Data Elements stored in the optional
capacity expansion technology [ICAO-9303]. The capacity expansion
technology used is the MRTD’s chip.
Logical Data
Structure 2 (LDS2)
The file structures required to support the ICAO LDS2 [9303-10_LDS2]
consisting of LDS file structure with three additional and optional
applications:
• Travel records (stamps);
• Visa records; and
• Additional biometrics.
Logical travel
document
Data of the travel document holder stored according to the Logical
Data Structure [ICAO-9303] as specified by ICAO on the contact
based/contactless integrated circuit. It presents contact
based/contactless readable data including (but not limited to)
personal data of the travel document holder
the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1),
the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s)
(EF.DG4) or both and
the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16).
EF.COM and EF.SOD
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Term Definition
Machine readable
travel document
(MRTD)
Official document issued by a State or Organization which is used by
the holder for international travel (e.g. passport, visa, official document
of identity) and which contains mandatory visual (eye readable) data
and a separate mandatory data summary, intended for global use,
reflecting essential data elements capable of being machine read.
[ICAO-9303]
Machine readable
zone (MRZ)
Fixed dimensional area located on the front of the MRTD or MRP Data
Page or, in the case of the TD1, the back of the MRTD, containing
mandatory and optional data for machine reading using OCR methods.
[ICAO-9303]
The MRZ-Password is a restricted-revealable secret that is derived from
the machine readable zone and may be used for PACE.
Machine-verifiable
biometrics feature
A unique physical personal identification feature (e.g. an iris pattern,
fingerprint or facial characteristics) stored on a travel document in a
form that can be read and verified by machine. [ICAO-9303]
Manufacturer Generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing integrated circuit and
the travel document Manufacturer completing the IC to the travel
document. The Manufacturer is the default user of the TOE during the
manufacturing life phase. The TOE itself does not distinguish between
the IC Manufacturer and travel document Manufacturer using this role
Manufacturer.
Metadata of a CV
Certificate
Data within the certificate body (excepting Public Key) as described in
[TR-03110-1].
The metadata of a CV certificate comprise the following elements:
- Certificate Profile Identifier,
- Certificate Authority Reference,
- Certificate Holder Reference,
- Certificate Holder Authorisation Template,
- Certificate Effective Date,
- Certificate Expiration Date.
Optional biometric
reference data
Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD holder in the
MRTD’s chip as (i) encoded finger image(s) (DG3) or (ii) encoded iris
image(s) (DG4) or (iii) both. Note that the European commission
decided to use only finger print and not to use iris images as optional
biometric reference data.
Password
Authenticated
Connection
Establishment
(PACE)
A communication establishment protocol defined in [ICAO-9303] part
11. The PACE Protocol is a password authenticated Diffie-Hellman key
agreement protocol providing implicit password-based authentication of
the communication partners (e.g. smart card and the terminal
connected): i.e. PACE provides a verification, whether the
communication partners share the same value of a password π). Based
on this authentication, PACE also provides a secure communication,
whereby confidentiality and authenticity of data transferred within this
communication channel are maintained.
PACE passwords Passwords used as input for PACE. This may either be the CAN or the
SHA-1-value of the concatenation of Serial Number, Date of Birth and
19
Term Definition
Date of Expiry as read from the MRZ, see [ICAO-9303] part 11 or a
user PIN or PUK as specified in [TR-03110-3]
Polymorphic
Authentication
Terminal / Service
The terminal or authentication web service that is authorized to retrieve
the Polymorphic ID attributes form a Polymorphic eMRTD using
standard ICAO and EAC1 ePassport protocols (PACE, CAv1, TAv1) and
the Polymorphic Authentication (PMA)protocol to retrieve the PP, PI
and CPI data.
A Polymorphic Authentication Terminal/Service:
• implements the terminal part of the PACEv2 with PIN, PA, CAv1
and TAv1 protocols configured in accordance with ICAO
DOC9303 and TR-03110 v2.10 and the Polymorphic
Authentication protocol (PMA).
• performs the Advanced Inspection Procedure as a precondition
to gain access to the randomized polymorphic user data (PI, PP
and optional CPI) by executing the PMA protocol. The
Polymorphic Authentication Terminal/Service must pass PACE
with the correct user PIN and successful CAv1/TAv1 in order to
be able to execute the PMA protocol successfully.
performs the Polymorphic Authentication protocol (PMA) to retrieve the
randomized polymorphic user data (PI, PP and optional CPI) and the
non-card unique identifiable meta data.
Polymorphic
Authentication
System
The complete set of sub systems in the polymorphic authentication
infrastructure, required to perform user authentication with privacy
protection based on (randomized) Polymorphic ID attributes:
• Polymorphic Authentication Service
• (Central) Key Management Authority
• (optional) Polymorphic eMRTD Status Service
Polymorphic Service Provider
Polymorphic
document holder
The owner of a Polymorphic eMRTD, that contains his Polymorphic ID
attributes.
Passive
authentication
(i) verification of the digital signature of the Document Security Object
and (ii) comparing the hash values of the read LDS data fields with the
hash values contained in the Document Security Object.
Personalization The process by which the Personalization Data are stored in and
unambiguously, inseparably associated with the travel document. This
may also include the optional biometric data collected during the
“Enrolment” (cf. paragraph 1.7.4.3, TOE life-cycle, Phase 3, Step 6).
Personalization
Agent
An organisation acting on behalf of the travel document Issuer to
personalize the travel document for the travel document holder by
some or all of the following activities:
ICAO eMRTD
(i) establishing the identity of the travel document holder for
the biographic data in the travel document,
20
Term Definition
(ii) enrolling the biometric reference data of the travel
document holder,
(iii) writing a subset of these data on the physical travel
document (optical personalization) and storing them in
the travel document (electronic personalization) for the
travel document holder as defined in [TR-03110-1],
(iv) writing the document details data,
(v) writing the initial TSF data,
(vi) signing the Document Security Object defined in
[ICAO-9303] (in the role of DS).
Polymorphic eMRTD
(i) establishing the identity of the polymorphic document
holder for requesting the Polymorphic ID attributes,
(ii) Requesting the required Polymorphic eMRTD ID attributes
from the central Key Management authority,
(iii) writing Polymorphic ID attributes, Polymorphic LDS data
as defined in [PCA-eMRTD],
(iv) writing the TSF data as defined in [PCA-eMRTD],
(v) signing the Document Security Object defined in
[ICAO-9303] (in the role of DS).
Please note that the role ‘Personalization Agent’ may be distributed
among several institutions according to the operational policy of the
travel document Issuer.
Generating signature key pair(s) is not in the scope of the tasks of this
role.
Personalization
Data
A set of data incl.
individual-related data (biographic and biometric data) of the travel
document holder,
dedicated document details data and
dedicated initial TSF data (incl. the Document Security Object).
Personalization data are gathered and then written into the non-volatile
memory of the TOE by the Personalization Agent in the life-cycle phase
card issuing.
Personalization
Agent
Authentication
Information
TSF data used for authentication proof and verification of the
Personalization Agent.
Personalization
Agent Key
Symmetric cryptographic key or key set (MAC, ENC) used
by the Personalization Agent to prove his identity and get access to the
logical travel document and
by the MRTD’s chip to verify the authentication attempt of a terminal as
Personalization Agent according to the SFR
FIA_UAU.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE
(FIA_UAU.1/PACE_CAM, FIA_UAU.4/PACE_CAM, FIA_UAU.5/PACE_CAM
for PACE CAM).
21
Term Definition
Physical part of the
travel document
Travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip using secure
printing to present data including (but not limited to)
biographical data,
data of the machine-readable zone,
photographic image and
other data.
Pre-personalization Process of writing Pre-Personalization Data (see below) to the TOE
including the creation of the travel document Application (TOE life-
cycle, Phase 2, Step 5)
Pre-personalization
Data
Any data that is injected into the non-volatile memory of the TOE by
the MRTD Manufacturer (Phase 2) for traceability of non-personalized
MRTD’s and/or to secure shipment within or between life cycle phases
2 and 3. It contains (but is not limited to) the Personalization Agent
Key Pair and Chip Life-Cycle Production data (CPLC data).
Pre-personalized
travel document’s
chip
Travel document’s chip equipped with a unique identifier.
Receiving State The Country to which the MRTD holder is applying for entry. [ICAO-
9303]
Reference data Data enrolled for a known identity and used by the verifier to check the
verification data provided by an entity to prove this identity in an
authentication attempt.
RF-terminal A device being able to establish communication with an RF-chip
according to ISO/IEC 14443 [ISO14443].
Secondary image A repeat image of the holder’s portrait reproduced elsewhere in the
document by whatever means [ICAO-9303].
Secure messaging
in encrypted
/combined mode
Secure messaging using encryption and message authentication code
according to ISO/IEC 7816-4 [ISO7816]
Service Provider An official organisation (inspection authority) providing inspection
service which can be used by the travel document holder. Service
Provider uses terminals (BIS-PACE) managed by a DV.
Skimming Imitation of the inspection system to read the logical MRTD or parts of
it via the contactless communication channel of the TOE without
knowledge of the printed MRZ data.
Standard
Inspection
Procedure
A specific order of authentication steps between an travel document
and a terminal as required by [ICAO-9303] and [TR-03110-1], namely
PACE or BAC and
Passive Authentication with SOD.
SIP can generally be used by BIS-PACE and BIS-BAC.
Inspection
Procedure for
multi-application
eMRTDs
This section describes an inspection procedure designed for eMRTDs
containing one or more applications besides the eMRTD application
(“LDS2-documents”): [LDS2_TR] Annex A2.
22
Term Definition
Terminal A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE either
through the contact based or contactless interface. A technical system
verifying correspondence between the password stored in the travel
document and the related value presented to the terminal by the travel
document presenter.
In this ST the role ‘Terminal’ corresponds to any terminal being
authenticated by the TOE.
Terminal may implement the terminal’s part of the PACE protocol and
thus authenticate itself to the travel document using a shared password
(CAN or MRZ).
Terminal
Authorization
Intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorizations of the Inspection
System Certificate, the Document Verifier Certificate and Country
Verifier Certification Authority which shall be valid for the Current Date.
Terminal
Authorisation Level
Intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorisations defined by the
Terminal Certificate, the Document Verifier Certificate and Country
Verifying Certification Authority which shall be all valid for the Current
Date.
TOE tracing data Technical information about the current and previous locations of the
travel document gathered by inconspicuous (for the travel document
holder) recognising the travel document.
Travel document Official document issued by a state or organisation which is used by the
holder for international travel (e.g. passport, visa, official document of
identity) and which contains mandatory visual (eye readable) data and
a separate mandatory data summary, intended for global use,
reflecting essential data elements capable of being machine read; see
[ICAO-9303] (there “Machine readable travel document”).
Travel document
(electronic)
The contact based or contactless smart card integrated into the plastic
or paper, optical readable cover and providing the following
application: ePassport.
Travel Document
Holder
The rightful holder of the travel document for whom the issuing State
or Organisation personalized the travel document.
Travel document’s
Chip
A contact based / contactless integrated circuit chip complying with
ISO/IEC 14443 [15] and programmed according to the Logical Data
Structure as specified by ICAO, [ICAO-9303], sec III.
Traveler Person presenting the travel document to the inspection system and
claiming the identity of the travel document holder.
TSF data Data created by and for the TOE, that might affect the operation of the
TOE (CC part 1 [CC-1]).
Unpersonalized
travel document
The travel document that contains the travel document chip holding
only Initialisation Data and Pre-personalization Data as delivered to the
Personalization Agent from the Manufacturer.
User data All data (being not authentication data)
stored in the context of the ePassport application of the travel
document as defined in [5] and
23
Term Definition
being allowed to be read out solely by an authenticated terminal acting
as Basic Inspection System with PACE.
CC give the following generic definitions for user data:
Data created by and for the user that does not affect the operation of
the TSF (CC part 1 [CC-1]). Information stored in TOE resources that
can be operated upon by users in accordance with the SFRs and upon
which the TSF places no special meaning (CC part 2 [CC-2]).
Verification The process of comparing a submitted biometric sample against the
biometric reference template of a single enrollee whose identity is
being claimed, to determine whether it matches the enrollee’s
template. [ICAO-9303]
Verification data Data provided by an entity in an authentication attempt to prove their
identity to the verifier. The verifier checks whether the verification data
match the reference data known for the claimed identity.
24
2.2 Abbreviations
Acronym Definition
BIS Basic Inspection System
BIS-PACE Basic Inspection System with PACE
CA Chip Authentication
CAN Card Access Number
CC Common Criteria
CLFDB Ciphered Load File Data Block
DBI Digital Blurring of Images
DER Distinguished Encoding Rules
DES Data Encryption Standard
DF Dedicated File
DH Diffie Hellman
EAC Extended Access Control
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EF Elementary File
FID File identifier
GP Global Platform
IC Integrated Chip
ICC Integrated Chip card
ICCSN Integrated Circuit Card Serial Number.
IFD Interface Device
MAC Message Authentication code
MF Master File
MRZ Machine readable zone
PACE Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PCD Proximity Coupling Device
25
PICC Proximity Integrated Circuit Chip
PIN Personal Identification Number
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PP Protection Profile
PS Personalization System
PT Personalization Terminal
RF Radio Frequency
ROM Read Only Memory
RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman
RSA CRT Rivest Shamir Adleman – Chinese Remainder Theorem
SAI SAI (Scanning Area Identifier)
SAR Security assurance requirement
SCP Secure Channel Procotol
SFR Security functional requirement
SHA Secure Hashing Algorithm
SIP Standard Inspection Procedure
ST Security Target
TA Terminal Authentication
TOE Target Of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy (defined by the current document)
26
2.3 References
Reference Description
[AGD_OPE] FQR 220 1580 Ed 1 - TnD v5.1 on ID-One Cosmo X - Operational
User Guidance (AGD_OPE)
[AGD_PRE] FQR 220 1579 Ed 3 - TnD v5.1 on ID-One Cosmo X - Preparative
Procedures (AGD_PRE)
[ANSI_X9.31] "Digital Signatures using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the
Financial Services Industry (rDSA)"
ANSI X9.31-1998, American Bankers Association.
[BAC-PP] Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel
Document with "ICAO Application", Basic Access Control, BSI-CC-PP-
0055-2009, Version 1.10, 25th March 2009.
[CC-1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 1: Introduction and general model. Version 3.1. Revision 5. April
2017. CCMB-2017-04-001.
[CC-2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 2: Security functional requirements. Version 3.1. Revision 5.
April 2017. CCMB-2017-04-002.
[CC-3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 3: Security assurance requirements. Version 3.1. Revision 5.
April 2017. CCMB-2017-04-003.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology. Version 3.1. Revision 5. April
2017. CCMB-2017-04-004.
[EAC-PP] EAC- Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”,
Extended Access control – BSI-PP-0056 v1.10 25th march 2009.
[ICAO-9303] International Civil Aviation Organization, ICAO Doc 9303, Machine
Readable Travel Documents – 7th edition, 2015.
[IEEE_1363] IEEE Std 1363a-2004 Standard Specification of Public-Key
Cryptography.
[ISO11770-2] ISO/IEC 11770-2. Information Technology – Security techniques –
Key management – part 2: Mechanisms using symmetric techniques,
1996.
[ISO14443] ISO/IEC 14443 Identification cards -- Contactless integrated circuit
cards -- Proximity cards, 2016.
[ISO15946-2] ISO/IEC15946-2. Information technology – Security techniques –
Cryptographic techniques based on elliptic curves – Part 2: Digital
signatures, 2002.
[ISO15946-3] ISO/IEC 15946: Information technology — Security techniques —
Cryptographic techniques based on elliptic curves — Part 3: Key
establishment, 2002.
27
Reference Description
[ISO18013-3] ISO/IEC 18013-3: Information technology — Personal identification
— ISO-compliant driving licence. Part 3: Access control,
authentication and integrity validation, 2009-03-01
Including ISO/CEI 18013-3/AC1:2011, TECHNICAL CORRIGENDUM 1,
Published 2011-12-01.
[ISO7816] ISO/IEC 7816: Identification cards — Integrated circuit cards.
[ISO9796-2] ISO/IEC 9796-2: 2002, Information Technology - Security
Techniques - Digital Signature Schemes giving message recovery -
Part 2: Integer factorization based mechanisms.
[JCAPI] Published by Oracle. Java Card 3 Platform, Application Programming
Interface, Classic Edition, Version 3.0.5. May 2015.
[NIST-180-4] NIST. FIPS 180-4, Secure Hash Standard, February 2011.
[NIST-186-3] NIST. Digital Signature Standard (DSS), FIPS 186-3, 2009.
[PACE-PP] Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard Inspection
Procedure with PACE, BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011-MA-01, Version 1.01,
22 July 2014, BSI.
[PP-IC] Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages
Version 1.0, Registered and Certified by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in
der Informationstechnik (BSI) under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0084-
2014.
[PP-PL] Java Card System - Open Configuration Protection Profile, Version
3.0.5, BSI-CC-PP-0099-2017.
[PTF-ST] Security Target Lite ID-ONE COSMO X, FQR 110 9730 Ed 3
[PTF-CERT] ANSSI-CC-2021/29
[RFC-5639] Lochter, Manfred; Merkle, Johannes. Elliptic Curve Cryptography
(ECC) Brainpool Standard Curves and Curve Generation, RFC 5639,
2010.
[RSA-PKCS#3] PKCS #3: Diffie-Hellman Key-Agreement Standard, An RSA
Laboratories Technical Note, Version 1.4, Revised November 1, 1993.
[TR-03110-1] Technical Guideline TR-03110-1, Advanced Security Mechanisms for
Machine Readable Travel Documents –Part 1 – eMRTDs with
BAC/PACEv2 and EACv1, Version 2.10, 20.03.2012 by BSI.
[TR-03110-2] Technical Guideline TR-03110-2, Advanced Security Mechanisms for
Machine Readable Travel Documents –Part 2 – Extended Access
Control Version 2 (EACv2),Password Authenticated Connection
Establishment (PACE),and Restricted Identification (RI), Version
2.10, 20.03.2012 by BSI.
[TR-03110-3] TR-03110-3 Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable
Travel Documents – Part 3: Common Specifications, version 2.10,
2012-03-07 by BSI.
28
Reference Description
[TR-03111] Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI), Technical
Guideline TR-03111 Elliptic Curve Cryptography, TR-03111, Version
1.11, 17.04.2009.
29
3 TOE Overview and description
3.1 TOE Overview
The TOE is a composite product that consist of an IDEMIA applet named TnD v5.1 and its supporting
“Common” library package on top of the COSMO X Global Platform Java Card 3.0.5 operating system
and Infineon SLC37 contact/contactless smart card security controller in EAC configuration.
It supports the ICAO and TR-3110-1 and -3 defined protocols for EAC1 (Chip Authentication v1 and
Terminal Authentication v1) and Active Authentication (AA). In addition, the TOE supports Digital
Blurring of Images (DBI).
For compliancy with the protection profiles claimed in this security target, the EAC protocol MUST be
configured on the TOE for each configured ID document application mentioned below.
Within the scope of this ST, the TOE can be configured as a stand-alone application or as a
combination of the following official ID document applications:
• ICAO/EAC eMRTD and
• EU/ISO Driving Licence compliant to ISO/IEC 18013 or ISO/IEC TR 19446.
The TOE may be used as an ISO Driving Licence (IDL) compliant to ISO/IEC 18013 or ISO/IEC TR
19446, as both eMRTD and IDL applications share the same protocols and data structure
organization.
The TnD v5.1 application embeds other secure functionalities, like PACE (Generic Mapping (GM),
Integrated Mapping (IM) and Chip Authentication Mapping (CAM)), Basic Access Control (BAC), LDS2
protocol extensions for EAC1 and PACE and Polymorphic Authentication protocol (PMA) for privacy-
protected authentication with polymorphic ID attributes, which are not in the scope of this evaluation
but are covered in the scope of other evaluated configurations of this product shown in Table 3
below.
This ST considers the TnD v5.1 application in EAC configuration, marked bold in the table below.
Configuration PP Conformity Extensions to the PP
1. EAC PP 0056v1 (EAC) - Active Authentication (AA)
- Restart secure messaging AES128,
AES192 and AES256 secure messaging
(in addition to 3DES) after CAv1
- Digital Blurring of Images (DBI)
2. PACE/EAC1/Polymorphic
eMRTD/LDS2
PP 0068 (PACE) - ICAO LDS2 protocol extensions for TAv1,
PACE and CAv1
- Polymorphic eMRTD extensions for PMA and
PACE
- Active Authentication (AA)
- PACE-CAM
- BAC de-activation
- Digital Blurring of Images (DBI)
PP 0056v2 (ICAO
application, EAC with
PACE)
3. BAC PP 0055 (BAC) - Active Authentication (AA)
- Chip Authentication v1 (CAv1)
- Restart secure messaging AES128, AES192
and AES256 secure messaging (in addition to
3DES) after CAv1
Table 3 Different evaluated configurations of the TnD application
30
Note
For interoperability reasons, an eMRTD will most likely support BAC, PACE and EAC. The three TOE
configurations mentioned above cover the security level of the TOE depending on the inspection
procedure executed by the Inspection System/Advanced Inspection System:
• If the Inspection System reads MRTD data after having performed BAC + EAC, the security
of the MRTD will be covered by the security evaluation of the TOE described in this ST,
which claims compliance to [EAC-PP].
• If the Inspection System reads MRTD data after having performed PACE + EAC, the security
of the MRTD will be covered by the security evaluation of the TOE described in the ST,
claiming compliance to [EAC-PP-V2] and [PACE-PP].
• If the Inspection System reads MRTD data by performing only BAC, the security of the MRTD
will be covered by the security evaluation of the TOE described in the ST claiming
compliance to the [BAC-PP].
3.2 TOE Description
The TOE in the EAC configuration encompasses the following features:
• In Personalization phase:
 authentication protocol for personalization agent authentication;
 3DES, AES128, AES192 and AES256 Global Platform secure messaging;
 access control;
 Creation and configuration of application instances and their logical data structure;
 Secure data loading;
 Secure import and/or on-chip generation of Chip Authentication key pair for CAv1;
 Secure import and/or on-chip generation of the AA key pair;
 life-cycle phase switching to operational phase;
• In operational phase:
 EAC1: Chip Authentication v1 (CAv1) and Terminal Authentication v1 (TAv1);
 Active Authentication (AA);
 After CAv1: restart ICAO secure messaging in 3DES, AES128, AES192 or AES256 cipher
mode;
 After EAC1: access control to DG3 and DG4 based on the effective authorization
established during TAv1;
 Digital Blurring of Images (DBI).
Note:
TnD v5.1 applet supports Match on Card (MoC) functionality, which is used to support the DBI
deactivation. MoC as a security feature is not within the scope of this Security Target, though may be
configured without impacting the security of the TOE.
3.2.1 Physical scope
From physical/hardware point of view, the TOE is a bare microchip with its external interfaces for
communication. The physical medium on which the microchip is mounted is not part of the target of
evaluation because it does not alter nor modify any security functions of the TOE.
The TOE may be used in several form factors like wafer, chip modules on a reel, chip modules
embedded in ID3 passport booklets or ID3 holder pages, chip modules embedded in ID1 cards, chip
modules embedded in antenna inlays, etc.
31
The physical form of the module is depicted in Figure 1 below. The cryptographic boundary of the
module is the surface and edges of the die and associated bond pads, shown as circles.
Figure 1 Physical Form
The contactless ports (LA and LB) of the module require a connection to an antenna. The other ports
are required for connection to the contact plate of the contact chip module. The chip module’s electrical
interfaces are according to [ISO7816] and [ISO14443] interface specifications for respectively contact
and contactless connections to card reader devices.
Port Description Logical Interface Type
VCC, GND ISO 7816: Supply voltage Power (not available in contactless‐only
configurations)
RST ISO 7816:Reset Control in (not available in contactless‐only
configurations)
CLK ISO 7816: Clock Control in (not available in contactless‐only
configurations)
I/O ISO 7816: Input/Output Control in, Data in, Data out, Status out (not available
in contactless‐only configurations)
LA, LB ISO 14443: Antenna Power, Control in, Data in, Data out, Status out (Not
available in Contact‐only configurations)
Table 4 TOE physical ports and interfaces
3.2.2 Logical Scope
The Target of Evaluation (TOE), addressed by the current security target, is an electronic travel
document representing a contactless/contact based smart card or passport programmed according to
Logical data structure (LDS). Electronic Passport is specified in [ICAO-9303], additionally providing the
Extended Access Control according to [TR-03110-1] and [TR-03110-3] and Active Authentication
according to [ICAO-9303]. The TOE may also be used as an ISO driving license, compliant to ISO/IEC
18013 or ISO/IEC TR 19446.
The TOE supports:
• BAC protocol (not within the scope of this ST),
• EAC1 protocols
o Chip Authentication v1 (CAv1) with AES128, ASE192, AES256 extensions and
o Terminal Authentication v1 (TAv1),
32
• Active Authentication (AA) and
• Digital Blurring of Images (DBI).
In accordance with [EAC-PP] the communication between terminal and chip SHALL be established and
protected by the Extended Access Control v1 (EAC1) protocol.
The “TnD v5.1 on Cosmo X” TOE consists of:
• The MRTD’s chip circuitry and the IC dedicated software;
• The IC embedded software being the “ID-One Cosmo X platform” consisting of
o Java Card virtual machine, ensuring language-level security;
o Java Card runtime environment, providing additional security features for Java card
technology enabled devices;
o Java card API, providing access to card’s resources for the Applet;
o Global Platform Card Manager, responsible for management of Applets on the card.
o Crypto Library.
• TnD v5.1 Applet along with its Common (library) Package loaded in non-volatile (FLASH)
memory*;
• The associated guidance documentation in [AGD_PRE] and [AGD_OPE];
• The Personalization Agent Key set (see [AGD_PRE]).
* In the remaining part of this Security Target, we refer “TnD v5.1 Applet along with its Common
(library) Package” as “TnD v5.1 Application”.
A schematic overview of the TOE’s logical architecture is shown in Figure 2 below.
Figure 2 TOE’s logical architecture
The following guidance documents will be provided for the TOE:
33
Description Audience Form Factor of Delivery
[AGD_PRE] Personalising Agent
Electronic Version
[AGD_OPE] End user of the TOE
Table 5 TOE Guidance
This ST Lite will also be provided along with above mentioned documents.
All the above mentioned guidance documents will be delivered via mail in a .pgp encrypted format.
Platform related guidance documents are mentioned in [PTF-ST].
Section 4, “Life Cycle” in this ST provides for more details about the TOE delivery for the different
options.
3.3 Required Non-TOE hardware/software/firmware
The TOE does not require any explicit non-TOE hardware, software or firmware to perform its claimed
security features. The TOE comprises the chip, the complete operating system and the TnD v5.1
application. Note that for an ICAO compliant ID document, the inlay holding the chip as well as the
antenna and the booklet (holding the printed MRZ) are needed to represent a complete travel
document. Nevertheless, these parts are not critical for the security of the TOE.
In order to powerup the TOE and to communicate with it, a card reader is required.
3.4 TOE usage and security features for operational use
3.4.1 TOE Usage
Depending on its configuration during pre-personalization and personalization, the TOE can be used as:
• ICAO/EAC eMRTD or
• EU/ISO Driving Licence.
The ICAO/EAC eMRTD and Driver Licence are installed as a separate application instances of the TnD
v5.1 applet, each having its own dedicated application identifier and personalization. The following
TOE configurations are covered within the scope of this Security Target:
Configuration at
Personalization
ICAO/EAC eMRTD Driver licence
1 present -
2 - present
Table 6 TOE Configurations during Personalization
The authentication protocols EAC, Chip authentication (CAv1), Active Authentication and Terminal
Authentication (TAv1) specified in [ICAO-9303] and [TR-03110] have also been referred to in
ISO18013 for EU driving licences. The BAP-1 protocol defined in ISO18013 is equal to Basic Access
Protocol (BAC) defined in [ICAO-9303]. As to the logical data structure, the ISO18013 uses the same
concept of Passive Authentication defined in [ICAO-9303], but specifies different ISO7816-4
elementary file identifiers for storing the ICAO defined content of DG3, DG4 and DG15.
When an Issuing state is using the product as an ISO compliant Driving licence, the following name
mapping of roles, definitions, data groups and protocol is applicable within the scope of this security
target:
MRTD ISO Driving License
34
MRTD IDL
ICAO ISO/IEC
ICAO 9303 ISO/IEC 18013 or ISO/IEC TR 19446
BAC BAP-1
DG3 DG7
DG4 DG8
DG15 DG13
MRZ MRZ or SAI (Scanning area identifier)
Traveler Holder
Table 7 eMRTD and IDL Terminology
Note
In the remaining parts of this document, the word “MRTD” SHOULD be understood either as an
MRTD in the sense of ICAO or a driving license compliant to ISO/IEC 18013 or ISO/IEC TR 19446
depending on the targeted usage envisioned by the issuer.
A State or Organization issues MRTDs to be used by the holder for international travel. The traveler
presents a MRTD to the inspection system to prove his or her identity. The MRTD in context of this
Security Target contains (i) visual (eye readable) biographical data and portrait of the holder, (ii) a
separate data summary (MRZ data) for visual and machine reading using OCR methods in the
Machine readable zone (MRZ) and (iii) data elements on the MRTD’s chip according to LDS for
contactless machine reading. The authentication of the traveler is based on (i) the possession of a
valid MRTD personalized for a holder with the claimed identity as given on the biographical data page
and (ii) optional biometrics using the reference data stored in the MRTD. The issuing State or
Organization ensures the authenticity of the data of genuine MRTD’s. The receiving State trusts a
genuine MRTD of an issuing State or Organization.
The MRTD is viewed as unit of
a) the physical MRTD as travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip. It presents visual
readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the MRTD holder
i) the biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book,
ii) the printed data in the Machine-Readable Zone (MRZ) and
iii) the printed portrait.
b) the logical MRTD as data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data Structure
[ICAO-9303] as specified by ICAO on the contactless integrated circuit. It presents contactless
readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the MRTD holder
i) the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1),
ii) the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
iii) the optional biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s) (EF.DG4) or
both
iv) the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16) and
v) the Document security object.
The issuing State or Organization implements security features of the MRTD to maintain the
authenticity and integrity of the MRTD and their data. The MRTD as the passport book and the
MRTD’s chip is uniquely identified by the Document Number.
The physical MRTD is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on paper, security
printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the MRTD’s chip) and organizational security measures
(e.g. control of materials, personalization procedures) [ICAO-9303]. These security measures include
the binding of the MRTD’s chip to the passport book.
The logical MRTD is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created by the
document signer acting for the issuing State or Organization and the security features of the MRTD’s
chip.
35
The ICAO defines the baseline security methods Passive Authentication and the optional advanced
security methods Basic Access Control to the logical MRTD, Extended Access Control to and the Data
Encryption of additional sensitive biometrics as optional security measure in the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’
[ICAO-9303]. The Passive Authentication Mechanism and the Data Encryption are performed
completely and independently on the TOE by the TOE environment.
This security target addresses the protection of the logical travel document (i) in integrity by write-
only-once access control and by physical means, and (ii) in confidentiality by the Extended Access
Control Mechanism. Also it addresses the Chip Authentication Version 1 described in [TR-03110] as an
alternative to the Active Authentication stated in [ICAO-9303].
During the pre-personalization and personalization, the Personalization Agent, once authenticated,
gets the rights (access control) for (1) reading and writing data,(2) instantiating the application, and
(4) writing of personalization data. The Personalization Agent can so create the file structure (MF /
ADF) required for this configuration.
The DBI feature is used as an additional layer of security during personalization. When the DBI
Activation process is performed, the biometric image of the card holder shall be corrupted/blurred.
After personalization, a specific terminal that has a de-blurring access rights will be used to deactivate
or revert the image to its original state. If this step is not performed, this means that the proper
personalization up to issuance procedures were not followed. The photo will remain blurred which will
be noticeable when reading the contents of the document. This will alert the agencies that the
document has been compromised.
3.4.2 Security Features
3.4.2.1 Active Authentication (AA)
Active Authentication is an authentication mechanism ensuring the chip is genuine. It uses a
challenge-response protocol between the IS and the chip. Active Authentication is realized with the
INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command. The following algorithms and key sizes are supported:
• RSA ISO/IEC 9796-2 with a key length of 1536, 1792, 2048, 2560, 3072, 3584 and 4096 bits
and hashing algorithm of SHA1 or SHA2 (i.e. SHA224, SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512).
• ECDSA over prime field curves with hashing algorithm of SHA1 or SHA2 and the key sizes 192
to 521.
3.4.2.2 Basic Access Control (BAC)
The protocol for Basic Access Control is specified by [BAC-PP]. Basic Access Control checks that the
terminal has physical access to the MRTD’s data page. This is enforced by requiring the terminal to
derive an authentication key from the optically read MRZ of the MRTD. The protocol for Basic Access
Control is based on [ISO11770-2] key establishment mechanism 6. This protocol is also used to
generate session keys that are used to protect the confidentiality (and integrity) of the transmitted
data.
The Basic Access Control (BAC) is a security feature that is supported by the TOE. The inspection
system reads the printed data in the MRZ (for MRTD), authenticates itself as inspection system by
means of keys derived from MRZ data. After successful 3DES based authentication, the TOE provides
read access to data requiring BAC rights by means of a private communication (secure messaging)
with the inspection system.
The purpose of this mechanism is to ensure that the holder gives access to the IS to the logical MRTD
(data stored in the chip); It is achieved by a mutual authentication. Once the mutual authentication is
performed, a secure messaging is available to protect the communication between the chip and the
IS.
This table lists the supported configurations for BAC protocol:
Configuration Key Algo Key Length Hash Algo MAC Algo
36
BAC 3DES 2Key 16-bytes SHA-1 Retail MAC
Table 8 BAC Configuration
3.4.2.3 Chip Authentication v1 (CAv1)
The Chip Authentication v1 protocol is an ephemeral-static Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol
that provides secure communication and unilateral authentication of the MRTD chip.
The protocol establishes Secure Messaging between an MRTD chip and a terminal based on a static
key pair stored on the MRTD chip. Chip Authentication v1 is an alternative to the optional ICAO Active
Authentication, i.e. it enables the terminal to verify that the MRTD chip is genuine but has two
advantages over the original protocol:
• Challenge Semantics are prevented because the transcripts produced by this protocol are
nontransferable.
• Besides authentication of the MRTD chip this protocol also provides strong session keys.
CAv1 provides implicit authentication of both the MRTD chip itself and the stored data by performing
Secure Messaging using the new session keys.
3.4.2.4 Terminal Authentication
The Terminal Authentication Protocol is a two-move challenge-response protocol that provides explicit
unilateral authentication of the terminal.
This protocol enables the MRTD chip to verify that the terminal is entitled to access sensitive data.
As the terminal may access sensitive data afterwards, all further communication MUST be protected
appropriately. Terminal Authentication therefore also authenticates an ephemeral public key chosen
by the terminal that was used to set up Secure Messaging with Chip Authentication v1. The MRTD
chip MUST bind the terminal’s access rights to Secure Messaging established by the authenticated
ephemeral public key of the terminal.
3.4.2.5 Extended Access Control v1 (EAC1)
EAC1 is an authentication protocol based on a PKI infrastructure. It further ensures that the IS is
authorized to read and/or update data stored in the applet. This authentication mechanism
generates a strong secure messaging session through the step of Chip Authentication v1.
This mechanism is realized by the following steps:
1. Chip Authentication (CAv1 )
Chip Authentication v1 is achieved by using a MANAGE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT – SET – Key
Agreement Template (MSE SET KAT) command
or
by using a MANAGE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT – SET – Authentication Template (MSE SET AT)
command followed by GENERAL AUTHENTICATE command.
The Chip Authentication mechanism enables the authentication of the chip by using an authenticated
DH scheme. It may be realized in two ways:
• Classical DH (DH El Gamal) with key length of 2048 bits
• DH over Elliptic curves over prime fields (ECDH) with the key length supported by the underlying
Java Card platform (minimum 192).
37
2. Certificate Chain verification
The certificate chain is processed through a series of MANAGE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT – SET –
Digital Signature Template (MSE SET DST) and PERFORM SECURITY OPERATION – Verify Certificate
(PSO VERIFY) commands.
The chain is done to extract a key from the IS certificate, the key which will be used in the Terminal
Authentication.
3. Terminal Authentication (TAv1)
Terminal Authentication v1 is achieved by using an EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command.
The Terminal Authentication mechanism is an authentication of the IS based on a classical
challenge/response scheme. The signature scheme may be:
• ECDSA SHA-1, ECDSA SHA-224, ECDSA SHA-256, ECDSA SHA-384, or ECDSA SHA-512 on
elliptic curves over prime field with key length supported by the underlying Java Card
platform
• RSA SHA-1, SHA-256, or SHA-512 (PKCS#1 v1.5 or PKCS#1 v2.1 - PSS) with a key length of
1280, 1536, 1792, 2048, 2560, 3072, 3584 and 4096 bits.
38
4 Life Cycle
The TOE life cycle in the following figure distinguishes stages for development, production,
preparation and operational use in accordance with the standard smart card life cycle [PP-IC].
Figure 3 Life cycle Overview
4.1 Development Environment
In this environment, the following two phases take place:
• Phase 1: IC Embedded Software Development (Java Card Open Platform components and
TnD v5.1 Application)
• Phase 2: IC Development
39
The IC Embedded Software Developer is in charge of the specification, development and validation of
the software (Java Card Open Platform and TnD v5.1 Application).
The IC Developer designs the IC, develops the IC dedicated software and provides information,
software or tools to the IC embedded software developer.
Roles, actors, sites and coverage for this environment of the product life-cycle are listed in the table
below:
Role Actor Site Covered by
TnD v5.1 Applet Developer IDEMIA MANILA, JAKARTA,COURBEVOIE and
PESSAC R&D sites
ALC
Embedded Software Developer
(Java Card Open Platform)
IDEMIA Platform Developer
Refer to [PTF-ST]
ALC
Redaction and Review of
Documents
IDEMIA NOIDA and HAARLEM R&D site ALC
IC Developer INFINEON IC Manufacturer
Refer to [PTF-ST]
ALC
4.2 Production Environment
In this environment, the following two phases take place:
• Phase 3: IC Manufacturing
• Phase 4: ID-One Cosmo X Operating System loading and TnD v5.1 Application loading (TnD
v5.1 applet and its Common package)
The TnD v5.1 Applet run time code and its Common Package are integrated in the FLASH memory of
the chip.
Depending on the intention, the following different loading options are supported. Details on delivery
methods for each option are provided in the [AGD_PRE].
(Option 1) Image Loading audited IC Manufacturer site
FLASH image containing both the “Cosmo X” Java Card Platform OS along with the TnD v5.1
Application is securely delivered directly from the software developer (IDEMIA R&D Audited Site) to
the IC Manufacturer (Infineon CC Audited Site) to be loaded into FLASH memory. The FLASH image
is always encrypted. Decryption is performed by the FLASH loader application inside the IC. The IC
loader application is preconfigured with the FLASH decryption (and Authentication) key the during IC
wafer initialisation by the IC Manufacturer.
TOE Delivery point (i.e. point in time where the TOE starts to exist):
• The TOE delivery point occurs in Phase 4, as soon as the loading of the image with Java Card
Platform OS + TnD 5.1 Applet + Common package by the IC Manufacturer has completed.
Package Actor
for FLASH image
loading
Site
For FLASH image
loading
Covered by
CC
FLASH image containing
Java Card Platform OS +
TnD v5.1 Applet and
Common package
IC Manufacturer
IC Manufacturer CC
Audited Production
Plants
specified in
[PTF-ST]
ALC
Table 9 Option 1: Both Platform and Applet packages are loaded at IC Manufacturer Site
40
(Option 2) Image loading at IDEMIA and External sites
FLASH image containing both Cosmo X Platform along with TnD v5.1 Applet and Common package is
securely delivered directly from the software developer (IDEMIA R&D Audited Site) for loading to CC
Audited IDEMIA Production Sites (Haarlem, Noida, Vitré, Shenzhen or Ostrava) or Non-Audited
IDEMIA Sites or External Sites.
TOE Delivery point:
• If loading of Java Card Platform package + TnD v5.1 Applet run time code including its
Common Package (as described below) is performed in Audited IDEMIA Production Sites, then
TOE delivery is considered at the end of Phase 4.
• If loading of Java Card Platform package + TnD v5.1 Applet run time code including its
Common Package (as described below) is performed in Non-Audited IDEMIA Production Sites
or External Sites, then TOE delivery is considered after Phase 4.
Package Actor for FLASH
image loading
Site for FLASH image
loading
Covered by
CC
FLASH image containing the
Java Card Platform OS +
TnD v5.1 Applet and
Common package
IDEMIA Authorized
Entity
or
External Authorized
Agent
CC Audited IDEMIA
Production Sites
(Shenzhen, Haarlem,
Vitré, Noida, Ostrava)
or
Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites
or
External Sites
ALC
or
AGD
Table 10: Option 2: Both Platform and Applet packages are loaded at CC Audited IDEMIA
Sites or Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites or External Sites
41
(Option 3) Platform loaded by IC Manufacturer, Applet loaded by IDEMIA or 3rd
party
Only the Cosmo X Platform is delivered to the IC Manufacturer (Infineon Audited Sites) to be loaded.
With the Cosmo X Platform already loaded (i.e. present) on the chip, the following options (3a or 3b
(i) or 3b (ii) or 3c) can be chosen for loading the TnD v5.1 applet and its Common Package.
(Option 3a) Applet loading using GP CLFDB mechanism.
The TnD v5.1 Applet with its Common package along with the TOE’s guidance documentation
is securely delivered directly from the Software Developer (IDEMIA R&D Audited Site) to
Audited IDEMIA Production Sites (Haarlem, Noida, Vitré, Shenzhen, Ostrava) or Non-
Audited IDEMIA Sites or External Sites.
Loading of the TnD v5.1 Applet and its Common package on top of the already present
COSMO X GP Java Card OS in any of these sites is accomplished by using a GP CLFDB
decryption Key.
TOE Delivery points:
• If loading of the TnD v5.1 Applet with its Common package on top of already loaded
Java Card Platform package (as described below) is done in a CC Audited IDEMIA
Production Sites then, TOE delivery is considered at the end of Phase 4.
• If loading of the TnD v5.1 Applet with its Common package on top of already loaded
Java Card Platform package (as described below) is done in Non-Audited IDEMIA
Production Sites or External Sites then, TOE delivery is considered after phase 4.
Package Actor Site Covered by
Image containing only Java
Card Platform OS
IC Manufacturer
IC Manufacturer
Production Plants
Refer to [PTF-CERT]
ALC
TnD v5.1 Applet and Common
package loaded through GP
mechanism using CLFDB Key
IDEMIA Authorized
Entity
or
External
Authorized Agent
Audited IDEMIA
Production Sites
(Shenzhen, Haarlem,
Vitré, Noida, Ostrava)
or
Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites
or
External Sites
ALC
or
AGD
Table 11 Option 3(a): Platform package is loaded at IC Manufacturer Site and Applet
package is loaded at Audited IDEMIA Sites or Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites or External Sites
through GP Mechanism
42
(Option 3b) Applet loading using the IDEMIA Resident Application
(i) TnD v5.1 Application with Common package along with the guidance documentation
is securely delivered directly from the Software Developer (IDEMIA R&D Audited Site)
to Audited IDEMIA Production Sites (Haarlem, Noida, Vitré, Shenzhen, Ostrava)
or Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites or External Sites.
TnD v5.1 applet and its Common package are securely loaded via LSK on top of the
present COSMO X Java Card OS in any of these sites. This loading is accomplished by
using the IDEMIA “Resident Application” of the COSMO X OS
(ii) The DUMP package (including TnD v5.1 Application with Common package data) with
the guidance documentation is securely delivered directly from the Software
Developer (IDEMIA R&D Audited Site) to Audited IDEMIA Production Sites
(Haarlem, Noida, Vitré, Shenzhen, Ostrava) or Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites or
External Sites.
Loading of DUMP PACKAGES in any of these sites is done through Resident
Application using DSK secret production key on top of the platform already loaded by
IC Manufacturer (Infineon).
TOE Delivery points:
• If loading of Applet package /DUMP Package on top of already loaded Java Card
Platform package (as described below) is done in Audited IDEMIA Production Sites
then, TOE delivery is considered at the end of Phase 4.
• If loading of Applet package /DUMP Package on top of already loaded Java Card
Platform package (as described below) is done in Non-Audited IDEMIA Production
Sites or External Sites then, TOE delivery after Phase 4.
Package Actor Site Covered by
Image containing only Java Card
Platform OS
IC Manufacturer
IC Manufacturer
Production Plants
Refer to [PTF-CERT]
ALC
3b (i)
TnD v5.1 Applet and Common
package loaded through Resident
Application using LSK format
IDEMIA
Authorized Entity
or
External
Authorized Agent
Audited IDEMIA
Production Sites
(Shenzhen, Haarlem,
Vitré, Noida, Ostrava)
or
Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites
or
External Sites
ALC
or
AGD
3b (ii)
DUMP PACKAGE Ciphered format
[DSK Secret Live Key]
IDEMIA
Authorized Entity
Table 12 Platform package is loaded at IC Manufacturer Site and 3b (i) Applet package is
loaded through resident application using LSK format and 3b (ii) DUMP Package is loaded
through resident application using DSK Secret Live Key - at Audited IDEMIA Sites or Non-
Audited IDEMIA Sites or External Sites
43
(Option 3c) Applet loading in plain (unprotected) format using GP
TnD v5.1 Application with Common package along with the guidance documentation is
securely delivered directly from the Software Developer (IDEMIA R&D Audited Site) to CC
Audited IDEMIA Production Sites (Haarlem, Noida, Vitré, Shenzhen, Ostrava).
Here, there is a provision for loading the applet in plain format in Common Criteria
Audited IDEMIA Sites only, on top of the platform already loaded by IC Manufacturer
(Infineon). This applet loading in plain format is not allowed in Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites or
External Sites.
TOE Delivery points:
• The loading of TnD v5.1 applet and Common package on top of already loaded Java
Card Platform package is done in plain (unprotected) format in Common Criteria
Audited IDEMIA Production Sites. The TOE delivery is considered at the end of Phase
4.
Package Actor Site Covered by
Image containing only Java
Card Platform OS
IC Manufacturer
IC Manufacturer
Production Plants
Refer to [PTF-CERT]
ALC
TnD v5.1 Applet and
Common package in Plain
Format
IDEMIA Authorized
Entity
CC Audited IDEMIA
Production Sites
(Shenzhen, Haarlem,
Vitré, Noida, Ostrava)
ALC
Table 13 Option 3(c): Platform package is loaded at IC Manufacturer Site and Applet
package in plain format is loaded at Audited IDEMIA Sites only
44
(Option 4) Platform and Applet loaded by IDEMIA or 3rd
party
Only Cosmo X Platform is securely delivered directly from the software developer (IDEMIA R&D
Audited Site) for loading to CC Audited IDEMIA Production Sites (Haarlem, Noida, Vitré,
Shenzhen or Ostrava) or Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites or External Sites.
Note: Here, when the Platform package is loaded in Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites or External Sites, then
the Platform is in self-protected mode by its secure functions
The following options (4a or 4b (i) or 4b (ii) or 4c) can be chosen for loading applets on top of the
already loaded platform.
(Option 4a) Applet loading using GP CLFDB mechanism
TnD v5.1 Applet and Common package along with the guidance documentation is securely
delivered directly from the Software Developer (IDEMIA R&D Audited Site) to Audited
IDEMIA Production Sites (Haarlem, Noida, Vitré, Shenzhen, Ostrava) or Non-Audited
IDEMIA Sites or External Sites.
Loading of Applet in any of these sites is done through GP mechanism using CLFDB Key on
top of the platform already loaded by CC Audited IDEMIA Production Sites or Non-
Audited IDEMIA Sites or External Sites.
TOE Delivery points:
• If loading of the TnD v5.1 Applet and Common package on top of already loaded Java
Card Platform package (as described below) is done in CC Audited IDEMIA Production
Sites then, TOE delivery is considered at the end of Phase 4.
• If loading of the TnD v5.1 Applet and Common package onto the already loaded Java
Card Platform OS package (as described below) is done in Non-Audited IDEMIA
Production Sites or External Sites then, TOE delivery is considered after Phase 4.
Package Actor Site Covered by
Image containing
only Java Card
Platform OS
IDEMIA Authorized
Entity
or
External Authorized
Agent
Audited IDEMIA Production
Sites (Shenzhen, Haarlem, Vitré,
Noida, Ostrava)
or
Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites
or
External Sites
ALC
or
AGD
TnD v5.1 Applet
and Common
package loaded
through GP
mechanism using
CLFDB Key
IDEMIA Authorized
Entity
or
External Authorized
Agent
Audited IDEMIA Production
Sites (Shenzhen, Haarlem, Vitré,
Noida, Ostrava)
or
Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites
or
External Sites
ALC
or
AGD
Table 14 Option 4(a): Platform package is loaded at Audited IDEMIA Sites or Non-Audited
IDEMIA Sites or External Sites and Applet package is loaded at Audited IDEMIA Sites or
Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites or External Sites through GP Mechanism
45
(Option 4b) Applet loading using the IDEMIA Resident Application
(i) TnD v5.1 Application with Common package along with the guidance documentation is
securely delivered directly from the Software Developer (IDEMIA R&D Audited Site) to
Audited IDEMIA Production Sites (Haarlem, Noida, Vitré, Shenzhen, Ostrava) or
Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites or External Sites.
Secure loading of TnD v5.1 applet and its Common package is done via LSK on top of
the present COSMO X Java Card OS (already loaded by Audited IDEMIA
Production Sites or Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites or External Sites) in any of
these sites. This loading is accomplished by using the IDEMIA “Resident Application”
of the COSMO X OS
(ii) DUMP package (including the TnD v5.1 Applet and Common package data) with the
guidance documentation is securely delivered directly from the Software Developer
(IDEMIA R&D Audited Site) to Audited IDEMIA Production Sites (Haarlem, Noida,
Vitré, Shenzhen, Ostrava) or Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites or External Sites.
Loading of DUMP PACKAGES in any of these sites is done through Resident
Application using DSK secret production key on top of the platform already loaded by
Audited IDEMIA Production Sites or Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites or External
Sites.
TOE Delivery points:
• If loading of Applet package /DUMP Package on top of already loaded Java Card
Platform package (as described below) is done in Audited IDEMIA Production Sites
then, TOE delivery is considered at the end of Phase 4.
• If loading of Applet package /DUMP Package on top of already loaded Java Card
Platform package (as described below) is done in Non-Audited IDEMIA Production
Sites or External Sites then, TOE delivery is considered after Phase 4.
Package Actor Site
Covered
by
Image containing only Java
Card Platform OS
IDEMIA
Authorized Entity
or
External
Authorized Agent
Audited IDEMIA
Production Sites
(Shenzhen, Haarlem, Vitré,
Noida, Ostrava)
or
Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites
or
External Sites
ALC
or
AGD
4b (i)
TnD v5.1 Applet and Common
package loaded through
Resident Application using LSK
format
IDEMIA
Authorized Entity
or
External
Authorized Agent
Audited IDEMIA
Production Sites
(Shenzhen, Haarlem, Vitré,
Noida, Ostrava)
or
Non-Audited IDEMIA Sites
or
External Sites
ALC
or
AGD
4b (ii)
DUMP PACKAGE Ciphered
format [DSK Secret Live Key]
IDEMIA
Authorized Entity
Table 15 Platform package is loaded at Audited IDEMIA Sites or Non-Audited IDEMIA
Sites or External Sites and Options 4b(i) Applet package is loaded through Resident
46
application using LSK format and and 4b(ii) DUMP Package is loaded through resident
application using DSK Secret Live Key - at Audited IDEMIA Sites or Non-Audited IDEMIA
Sites or External Sites
(Option 4c) Applet loading in plain (unprotected) format using GP
TnD v5.1 Application with Common package along with the guidance documentation is
securely delivered directly from the Software Developer (IDEMIA R&D Audited Site) to
Audited IDEMIA Production Sites (Haarlem, Noida, Vitré, Shenzhen, Ostrava).
Here, there is a provision of loading the applet in plain format in Audited IDEMIA Sites only,
on top of the platform already loaded by Audited IDEMIA Production Sites or Non-Audited
IDEMIA Sites or External Sites. This applet loading in plain format is not allowed in Non-
Audited IDEMIA Sites or External Sites.
TOE Delivery points:
• Here, since the loading of Applet package on top of already loaded Java Card
Platform package (as described below) is done in Plain format in CC Audited IDEMIA
Production Sites, so TOE delivery is considered at the end of Phase 4.
Package Actor Site Covered by
Image containing only Java
Card Platform OS
IDEMIA Authorized
Entity
or
External
Authorized Agent
CC Audited IDEMIA
Production Sites
(Shenzhen, Haarlem,
Vitré, Noida, Ostrava)
or
Non-Audited IDEMIA
Sites
or
External Sites
ALC
or
AGD
TnD v5.1 Applet and
Common package in Plain
Format
IDEMIA Authorized
Entity
CC Audited IDEMIA
Production Sites
(Shenzhen, Haarlem,
Vitré, Noida, Ostrava)
ALC
Table 16 Option 4(c): Platform package is loaded at IC Manufacturer Site and Applet
package in plain format is loaded at CC Audited IDEMIA Sites only
47
4.3 Preparation Environment
In this environment, the following two phases take place:
• Phase 5: Pre-personalization of the applet
• Phase 6: Personalization
The preparation environment may not necessarily take place in a manufacturing site, but may be
performed anywhere. All along these two phases, the TOE is self-protected as it requires the
authentication of the pre-personalization agent or personalization agent prior to any operation.
The TnD v5.1 applet is pre-personalized and personalized according to [AGD_PRE].
These two phases are covered by [AGD_PRE] tasks of the TOE and Guidance tasks of [PTF-ST].
4.4 Operational Environment
• Phase 7: Use Phase
The TOE is used as a travel document's chip by the traveler and the inspection systems in the
“Operational Use” phase. The user data can be read according to the security policy of the issuing
State or Organisation and can be used according to the security policy of the issuing State but they
can never be modified for eMRTD application.
Note that applications can be loaded onto the ID-One Cosmo X platform during this phase.
During this phase, the TOE may be used as described in [AGD_OPE] of the TOE.
This phase is covered by [AGD_OPE] tasks of the TOE and Guidance tasks of [PTF-ST].
48
5 Conformance Claims
5.1 CC Conformance claim
This security target claims conformance to the Common Criteria version 3.1, revision 5 ([CC-2] and
[CC-3]).
The conformance to the Common Criteria is claimed as follows:
CC Conformance rationale
Part 2
Conformance with the extended3
part:
FAU_SAS.1 “Audit Storage”
FCS_RND.1 “Quality metric for random numbers”
FMT_LIM.1 “Limited capabilities”
FMT_LIM.2 “Limited availability”
FPT_EMS.1 “TOE Emanation”
FIA_API.1 “Authentication Proof of Identity”
Part 3
Conformance to Part 3.
The product claims conformance to EAL 5, augmented with:
ALC_DVS.2 “Sufficiency of security measures”
AVA_VAN.5 ”Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis”
Table 17 Conformance Rationale
5.2 Protection Profile claims
The Security Target claims strict conformance to the following PP written in CC3.1 revision 2:
Machine Readable Travel Documents with “ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control [EAC-PP].
5.3 Package Claim
This ST is conforming to assurance package EAL5 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
defined in CC part 3 [CC-3].
5.4 PP Conformance Rationale
This ST claims strict conformance to [EAC-PP]. A detailed justification is given in the following.
5.4.1 Main aspects
- The TOE description is based on the TOE definition and TOE usage of [EAC-PP].
- All definitions of the security problem definition in [EAC-PP] have been taken exactly from the
protection profile in the same wording.
- All security objectives have been taken exactly from [EAC-PP] in the same wording.
3
The rationale for SFR addition is described in the relative PP
49
- The part of extended components definition has been taken originally from [EAC-PP].
- All SFRs for the TOE have been taken originally from the [EAC-PP] added by according iterations,
selections and assignments.
- The security assurance requirements (SARs) have been taken originally from the [EAC-PP]. The
requirements are shifted to those of EAL 5+.
5.4.2 Overview of differences between the PP and the ST
a) The Active Authentication has been added to the TOE. For that:
- One assumption has been added to cover Active Authentication during personalisation:
A.Pers_Agent_AA
- One security objective for the TOE has been added: OT.AA_Proof.
- Two security objectives for the environment have been added: OE.AA_MRTD and
OE.Active_Auth_Sign. These additions to the original objectives of the PP do not
contradict with any other objective nor mitigate a threat (or part of a threat) meant to be
addressed by security objectives for the TOE in the PP.
- Following security functional requirements have been added:
• FCS_COP.1/AA
• FIA_API.1/AA
• FMT_MTD.1/AAPK
• FCS_CKM.1/AA
b) OT.DBI has been added to restrict the access to the plain image data of particular EF(s).
Enabling the feature will cause the image data to be corrupted during the reading of the file
contents until the blurring is removed by an authorized terminal. The following additional SFRs
have been defined for the same:
• FMT_MTD.1/Activate_DBI
• FMT_MTD.1/Deactivate_DBI
• FMT_MTD.1/DBI_Terminal
The additions do not contradict any of the threats, assumptions, organizational policies,
objectives or SFRs stated in the [PP_EAC] that covers the advanced security methods EAC in
operational use phase.
50
6 Security Problem Definition
6.1 Assets
6.1.1 Logical MRTD sensitive User Data
Sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3, EF.DG4)
Application Note:
Due to interoperability reasons the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [ICAO-9303] requires that Basic Inspection
Systems must have access to logical MRTD data DG1, DG2, DG5 to DG16. Note the BAC
mechanisms may not resist attacks with high attack potential (cf. [PP_BAC]).
6.1.2 Authenticity of the MRTD's chip
The authenticity of the MRTD’s chip personalized by the issuing State or Organization for the
MRTD holder is used by the traveler to prove his possession of a genuine MRTD.
6.2 Users / Subjects
6.2.1 Manufacturer
The generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing the integrated circuit and the MRTD
Manufacturer completing the IC to the MRTD’s chip. The Manufacturer is the default user of the
TOE during the Phase 2 Manufacturing. The TOE does not distinguish between the users IC
Manufacturer and MRTD Manufacturer using this role Manufacturer.
6.2.2 Personalization Agent
The agent is acting on behalf of the issuing State or Organization to personalize the MRTD for the
holder by some or all of the following activities: (i) establishing the identity of the holder for the
biographic data in the MRTD, (ii) enrolling the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the
portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s), (iii) writing these data on
the physical and logical MRTD for the holder as defined for global, international and national
interoperability, (iv) writing the initial TSF data and (v) signing the Document Security Object
defined in [ICAO-9303].
6.2.3 Country Verifying Certification Authority
The Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA) enforces the privacy policy of the issuing State
or Organization with respect to the protection of sensitive biometric reference data stored in the
MRTD. The CVCA represents the country specific root of the PKI of Inspection Systems and creates
the Document Verifier Certificates within this PKI. The updates of the public key of the CVCA are
distributed in the form of Country Verifying CA Link-Certificates.
6.2.4 Document Verifier
The Document Verifier (DV) enforces the privacy policy of the receiving State with respect to the
protection of sensitive biometric reference data to be handled by the Extended Inspection
Systems. The Document Verifier manages the authorization of the Extended Inspection Systems
for the sensitive data of the MRTD in the limits provided by the issuing States or Organizations in
the form of the Document Verifier Certificates.
51
6.2.5 Terminal
A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through the contactless interface.
6.2.6 Inspection system (IS)
A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining an MRTD
presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as MRTD
holder. The Basic Inspection System (BIS) (i) contains a terminal for the contactless
communication with the MRTD’s chip, (ii) implements the terminals part of the Basic Access
Control Mechanism and (iii) gets the authorization to read the logical MRTD under the Basic Access
Control by optical reading the MRTD or other parts of the passport book providing this information.
The General Inspection System (GIS) is a Basic Inspection System which implements additionally
the Chip Authentication Mechanism. The Extended Inspection System (EIS) in addition to the
General Inspection System (i) implements the Terminal Authentication Protocol and (ii) is
authorized by the issuing State or Organization through the Document Verifier of the receiving
State to read the sensitive biometric reference data. The security attributes of the EIS are defined
of the Inspection System Certificates.
6.2.7 MRTD Holder
The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization personalized the
MRTD.
6.2.8 Traveler
Person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming the identity of the MRTD
holder.
6.2.9 Attacker
A threat agent trying (i) to manipulate the logical MRTD without authorization, (ii) to read sensitive
biometric reference data (i.e. EF.DG3, EF.DG4) or (iii) to forge a genuine MRTD.
Application Note:
Note that an attacker trying to identify and to trace the movement of the MRTD’s chip remotely
(i.e. without knowing or optically reading the physical MRTD) is not considered by this ST since
this can only be averted by the BAC mechanism using the “weak” Document Basic Access Keys
that is covered by [PP_BAC]. The same holds for the confidentiality of the user data EF.DG1,
EF.DG2, EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 as well as EF.SOD and EF.COM.
An impostor is attacking the inspection system as TOE IT environment independent on using a
genuine, counterfeit or forged MRTD. Therefore the impostor may use results of successful attacks
against the TOE but the attack itself is not relevant for the TOE.
6.3 Threats
6.3.1 T.Read_Sensitive_Data
Adverse action: An attacker tries to gain the sensitive biometric reference data through the
communication interface of the MRTD’s chip. The attack T.Read_Sensitive_Data is similar to the
threat T.Skimming (cf. [PP_BAC]) in respect of the attack path (communication interface) and the
motivation (to get data stored on the MRTD’s chip) but differs from those in the asset under the
attack (sensitive biometric reference data vs. digital MRZ, digitized portrait and other data), the
opportunity (i.e. knowing Document Basic Access Keys) and therefore the possible attack methods.
Note, that the sensitive biometric reference data are stored only on the MRTD’s chip as private
sensitive personal data whereas the MRZ data and the portrait are visually readable on the
physical MRTD as well.
52
Threat agent: having high attack potential, knowing the Document Basic Access Keys, being in
possession of a legitimate MRTD
Asset: confidentiality of sensitive logical MRTD (i.e. biometric reference) data,
6.3.2 T.Forgery
Adverse action: An attacker alters fraudulently the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it
including its security related data in order to deceive on an inspection system by means of the
changed MRTD holder’s identity or biometric reference data. This threat comprises several attack
scenarios of MRTD forgery. The attacker may alter the biographical data on the biographical data
page of the passport book, in the printed MRZ and in the digital MRZ to claim another identity of
the traveler. The attacker may alter the printed portrait and the digitized portrait to overcome the
visual inspection of the inspection officer and the automated biometric authentication mechanism
by face recognition. The attacker may alter the biometric reference data to defeat automated
biometric authentication mechanism of the inspection system. The attacker may combine data
groups of different logical MRTDs to create a new forged MRTD, e.g. the attacker writes the
digitized portrait and optional biometric reference finger data read from the logical MRTD of a
traveler into another MRTD’s chip leaving their digital MRZ unchanged to claim the identity of the
holder this MRTD. The attacker may also copy the complete unchanged logical MRTD to another
contactless chip.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate MRTDs
Asset: authenticity of logical MRTD data,
6.3.3 T.Counterfeit
Adverse action: An attacker with high attack potential produces an unauthorized copy or
reproduction of a genuine MRTD’s chip to be used as part of a counterfeit MRTD. This violates the
authenticity of the MRTD’s chip used for authentication of a traveler by possession of a MRTD. The
attacker may generate a new data set or extract completely or partially the data from a genuine
MRTD’s chip and copy them on another appropriate chip to imitate this genuine MRTD’s chip.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate MRTDs
Asset: authenticity of logical MRTD data,
6.3.4 T.Abuse-Func
Adverse action: An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in “Operational
Use” phase in order (i) to manipulate User Data, (ii) to manipulate (explore, bypass, deactivate or
change) security features or functions of the TOE or (iii) to disclose or to manipulate TSF Data.
This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialization and the personalization in
the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD
Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF
6.3.5 T.Information_Leakage
Adverse action: An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during its usage
in order to disclose confidential TSF data. The information leakage may be inherent in the normal
operation or caused by the attacker. Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power
consumption, I/O characteristics, clock frequency, or by changes in processing time requirements.
This leakage may be interpreted as a covert channel transmission but is more closely related to
measurement of operating parameters which may be derived either from measurements of the
contactless interface (emanation) or direct measurements (by contact to the chip still available
even for a contactless chip) and can then be related to the specific operation being performed.
53
Examples are the Differential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) and the Differential Power Analysis
(DPA). Moreover the attacker may try actively to enforce information leakage by fault injection
(e.g. Differential Fault Analysis).
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD
Asset: confidentiality of logical MRTD and TSF data.
6.3.6 T.Phys-Tamper
Adverse action: An attacker may perform physical probing of the MRTD’s chip in order (i) to
disclose TSF Data, or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. An attacker
may physically modify the MRTD’s chip in order to (i) modify security features or functions of the
MRTD’s chip, (ii) modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software, (iii) modify
User Data or (iv) to modify TSF data. The physical tampering may be focused directly on the
disclosure or manipulation of TOE User Data (e.g. the biometric reference data for the inspection
system) or TSF Data (e.g. authentication key of the MRTD’s chip) or indirectly by preparation of
the TOE to following attack methods by modification of security features (e.g. to enable
information leakage through power analysis). Physical tampering requires direct interaction with
the MRTD’s chip internals. Techniques commonly employed in IC failure analysis and IC reverse
engineering efforts may be used. Before that, the hardware security mechanisms and layout
characteristics need to be identified. Determination of software design including treatment of User
Data and TSF Data may also be a pre-requisite. The modification may result in the deactivation of
a security function. Changes of circuitry or data can be permanent or temporary.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD
Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF
6.3.7 T.Malfunction
Adverse action: An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the MRTD’s chip Embedded
Software by applying environmental stress in order to (i) deactivate or modify security features or
functions of the TOE or (ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip
Embedded Software. This may be achieved e.g. by operating the MRTD’s chip outside the normal
operating conditions, exploiting errors in the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software or misusing
administration function. To exploit these vulnerabilities an attacker needs information about the
functional operation.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD
Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF
6.4 Organisational Security Policies
6.4.1 P.BAC-PP
The issuing States or Organizations ensures that successfully authenticated Basic Inspection
Systems have read access to logical MRTD data DG1, DG2, DG5 to DG16 the [ICAO-9303] as well
as to the data groups Common and Security Data. The MRTD is successfully evaluated and
certified in accordance with the ‘Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel
Document with „ICAO Application", Basic Access Control’ [PP_BAC] in order to ensure the
confidentiality of standard user data and preventing the traceability of the MRTD data.
Application Note:
The organizational security policy P.Personal_Data drawn from the 'ICAO Doc 9303' [ICAO-9303] is
addressed by the [PP-BAC] (cf. P.BAC-PP). The confidentiality of the personal data other than
EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 is ensured by the BAC mechanism. Note the BAC mechanisms may not resist
54
attacks with high attack potential (cf. [PP-BAC]). The TOE shall protect the sensitive biometric
reference data in EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 against attacks with high attack potential. Due to the
different resistance the protection of EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 on one side and the other EF.SOD,
EF.COM, EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 are addressed separated protection profiles,
which is assumed to result in technically separated evaluations (at least for classes ASE and VAN)
and certificates (cf. also to application note 1).
6.4.2 P.Sensitive_Data
The biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) and iris image(s) (EF.DG4) are sensitive private
personal data of the MRTD holder. The sensitive biometric reference data can be used only by
inspection systems which are authorized for this access at the time the MRTD is presented to the
inspection system (Extended Inspection Systems). The issuing State or Organization authorizes the
Document Verifiers of the receiving States to manage the authorization of inspection systems
within the limits defined by the Document Verifier Certificate. The MRTD’s chip shall protect the
confidentiality and integrity of the sensitive private personal data even during transmission to the
Extended Inspection System after Chip Authentication.
6.4.3 P.Manufact
The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The MRTD
Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalization Data which contains at least the Personalization Agent
Key.
6.4.4 P.Personalization
The issuing State or Organization guarantees the correctness of the biographical data, the printed
portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and other data of the logical MRTD
with respect to the MRTD holder. The personalization of the MRTD for the holder is performed by
an agent authorized by the issuing State or Organization only.
6.5 Assumptions
6.5.1 Assumptions from PP EAC
6.5.1.1 A.MRTD_Manufact
It is assumed that appropriate functionality testing of the MRTD is used. It is assumed that
security procedures are used during all manufacturing and test operations to maintain
confidentiality and integrity of the MRTD and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any
possible copy, modification, retention, theft or unauthorized use).
6.5.1.2 A.MRTD_Delivery
Procedures shall guarantee the control of the TOE delivery and storage process and conformance
to its objectives:
o Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery and
storage.
o Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in
the delivery process and storage.
o Procedures shall ensure that people dealing with the procedure for delivery have got the
required skill.
6.5.1.3 A.Pers_Agent
The Personalization Agent ensures the correctness of (i) the logical MRTD with respect to the
MRTD holder, (ii) the Document Basic Access Keys, (iii) the Chip Authentication Public Key
55
(EF.DG14) if stored on the MRTD’s chip, and (iv) the Document Signer Public Key Certificate (if
stored on the MRTD’s chip). The Personalization Agent signs the Document Security Object. The
Personalization Agent bears the Personalization Agent Authentication to authenticate himself to the
TOE by symmetric cryptographic mechanisms.
6.5.1.4 A.Insp_Sys
The Inspection System is used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining an
MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as
MRTD holder. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability (i) includes the Country
Signing CA Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organization,
and (ii) implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control [ICAO-9303]. The Basic
Inspection System reads the logical MRTD under Basic Access Control and performs the Passive
Authentication to verify the logical MRTD. The General Inspection System in addition to the Basic
Inspection System implements the Chip Authentication Mechanism. The General Inspection System
verifies the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip during inspection and establishes secure messaging
with keys established by the Chip Authentication Mechanism. The Extended Inspection System in
addition to the General Inspection System (i) supports the Terminal Authentication Protocol and
(ii) is authorized by the issuing State or Organization through the Document Verifier of the
receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data.
6.5.1.5 A.Signature_PKI
The issuing and receiving States or Organizations establish a public key infrastructure for passive
authentication i.e. digital signature creation and verification for the logical MRTD. The issuing State
or Organization runs a Certification Authority (CA) which securely generates, stores and uses the
Country Signing CA Key pair. The CA keeps the Country Signing CA Private Key secret and is
recommended to distribute the Country Signing CA Public Key to ICAO, all receiving States
maintaining its integrity. The Document Signer (i) generates the Document Signer Key Pair, (ii)
hands over the Document Signer Public Key to the CA for certification, (iii) keeps the Document
Signer Private Key secret and (iv) uses securely the Document Signer Private Key for signing the
Document Security Objects of the MRTDs. The CA creates the Document Signer Certificates for the
Document Signer Public Keys that are distributed to the receiving States and Organizations.
6.5.1.6 A.Auth_PKI
The issuing and receiving States or Organizations establish a public key infrastructure for card
verifiable certificates of the Extended Access Control. The Country Verifying Certification
Authorities, the Document Verifier and Extended Inspection Systems hold authentication key pairs
and certificates for their public keys encoding the access control rights. The Country Verifying
Certification Authorities of the issuing States or Organizations are signing the certificates of the
Document Verifier and the Document Verifiers are signing the certificates of the Extended
Inspection Systems of the receiving States or Organizations. The issuing States or Organizations
distribute the public keys of their Country Verifying Certification Authority to their MRTD’s chip.
6.5.2 Additional Assumption
6.5.2.1 A.Pers_Agent_AA
Personalization of the MRTD’s chip (Active Authentication) The Personalization Agent
ensures the correctness of the Active Authentication Public Key (EF.DG15) if stored on the MRTD’s
chip.
56
7 Security Objectives
7.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
7.1.1 Security Objectives listed in PP EAC
7.1.1.1 OT.AC_Pers
The TOE must ensure that the logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the Document security
object according to LDS [ICAO-9303] and the TSF data can be written by authorized
Personalization Agents only. The logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 and the TSF data may
be written only during and cannot be changed after its personalization. The Document security
object can be updated by authorized Personalization Agents if data in the data groups EF.DG3 to
EF.DG16 are added.
Application Note:
The OT.AC_Pers implies that
(1) the data of the LDS groups written during personalization for MRTD holder (at least EF.DG1
and EF.DG2) can not be changed by write access after personalization,
(2) the Personalization Agents may (i) add (fill) data into the LDS data groups not written yet, and
(ii) update and sign the Document Security Object accordingly. The support for adding data in the
“Operational Use” phase is optional.
7.1.1.2 OT.Data_Int
The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip against physical
manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD
data during their transmission to the General Inspection System after Chip Authentication.
7.1.1.3 OT.Sens_Data_Conf
The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3 and
EF.DG4) by granting read access only to authorized Extended Inspection Systems. The
authorization of the inspection system is drawn from the Inspection System Certificate used for the
successful authentication and shall be a non-strict subset of the authorization defined in the
Document Verifier Certificate in the certificate chain to the Country Verifier Certification Authority
of the issuing State or Organization. The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD
data during their transmission to the Extended Inspection System. The confidentiality of the
sensitive biometric reference data shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential.
7.1.1.4 OT.Identification
The TOE must provide means to store IC Identification and Pre-Personalization Data in its
nonvolatile memory. The IC Identification Data must provide a unique identification of the IC
during Phase 2 “Manufacturing” and Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”. The storage of the
Pre- Personalization data includes writing of the Personalization Agent Key(s).
7.1.1.5 OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
The TOE must support the General Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of the
MRTD’s chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization by means of the Chip
Authentication as defined in [TR-03110]. The authenticity proof provided by MRTD’s chip shall be
protected against attacks with high attack potential.
57
Application Note:
The OT.Chip_Auth_Proof implies the MRTD’s chip to have (i) a unique identity as given by the
MRTD’s Document Number, (ii) a secret to prove its identity by knowledge i.e. a private
authentication key as TSF data. The TOE shall protect this TSF data to prevent their misuse. The
terminal shall have the reference data to verify the authentication attempt of MRTD’s chip i.e. a
certificate for the Chip Authentication Public Key that matches the Chip Authentication Private Key
of the MRTD’s chip. This certificate is provided by (i) the Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG14)
in the LDS [ICAO-9303] and (ii) the hash value of the Chip Authentication Public Key in the
Document Security Object signed by the Document Signer.
7.1.1.6 OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
After delivery of the TOE to the MRTD Holder, the TOE must prevent the abuse of test and support
functions that may be maliciously used to (i) disclose critical User Data, (ii) manipulate critical User
Data of the IC Embedded Software, (iii) manipulate Soft-coded IC Embedded Software or (iv)
bypass, deactivate, change or explore security features or functions of the TOE. Details of the
relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the capabilities of the Test Features provided by
the IC Dedicated Test Software which are not specified here.
7.1.1.7 OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential TSF data stored and/or
processed in the MRTD’s chip
o by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between
events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption,
clock, or I/O lines and
o by forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or
o by a physical manipulation of the TOE
Application Note:
This objective pertains to measurements with subsequent complex signal processing due to normal
operation of the TOE or operations enforced by an attacker. Details correspond to an analysis of
attack scenarios which is not given here.
7.1.1.8 OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
The TOE must provide protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the TSF
Data, and the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. This includes protection against attacks with high
attack potential by means of
o measuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical probing on the chips surface
except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage and current) or
o measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction between
charges (using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure analysis)
o manipulation of the hardware and its security features, as well as
o controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF Data)
with a prior
o reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions.
7.1.1.9 OT.Prot_Malfunction
The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside the normal
operating conditions where reliability and secure operation has not been proven or tested. This is
to prevent errors. The environmental conditions may include external energy (esp.
electromagnetic) fields, voltage (on any contacts), clock frequency, or temperature.
58
Application Note:
A malfunction of the TOE may also be caused using a direct interaction with elements on the chip
surface. This is considered as being a manipulation (refer to the objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper)
provided that detailed knowledge about the TOE´s internals.
7.1.2 Additional Security Objectives for the TOE
7.1.2.1 OT.AA_Proof
The TOE must support the Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of MRTD’s
chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization by means of the Active Authentication
as defined in [ICAO-9303]. The authenticity proof through AA provided by MRTD’s chip shall be
protected against attacks with high attack potential.
7.1.2.2 OT.DBI
The TOE shall support Digital Blurring of Images. The feature may be used to restrict the access to
the plain image data of particular EF(s). Enabling the feature will cause the image data to be
corrupted during the reading of the file contents until the blurring is removed by an authorized
terminal.
7.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
7.2.1 Issuing State or Organization
7.2.1.1 OE.MRTD_Manufact
Appropriate functionality testing of the TOE shall be used in step 4 to 6. During all manufacturing
and test operations, security procedures shall be used through phases 4, 5 and 6 to maintain
confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its manufacturing and test data.
7.2.1.2 OE.MRTD_ Delivery
Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery including the
following objectives:
o non-disclosure of any security relevant information,
o identification of the element under delivery,
o meet confidentiality rules (confidentiality level, transmittal form, reception
acknowledgment),
o physical protection to prevent external damage,
o secure storage and handling procedures (including rejected TOE’s),
o traceability of TOE during delivery including the following parameters:
 origin and shipment details,
 reception, reception acknowledgement,
 location material/information.
Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in the
delivery process (including if applicable any non-conformance to the confidentiality convention)
and highlight all non-conformance to this process. Procedures shall ensure that people (shipping
department, carrier, reception department) dealing with the procedure for delivery have got the
required skill, training and knowledge to meet the procedure requirements and be able to act fully
in accordance with the above expectations.
59
7.2.1.3 OE.Personalization
The issuing State or Organization must ensure that the Personalization Agents acting on behalf of
the issuing State or Organization (i) establish the correct identity of the holder and create
biographical data for the MRTD, (ii) enroll the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the
portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s) and (iii) personalize the
MRTD for the holder together with the defined physical and logical security measures to protect
the confidentiality and integrity of these data.
7.2.1.4 OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
The issuing State or Organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Country Signing CA Key
Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the Country Signing CA Private Key and sign Document Signer
Certificates in a secure operational environment, and (iii) distribute the Certificate of the Country
Signing CA Public Key to receiving States and Organizations maintaining its authenticity and
integrity. The issuing State or Organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Document
Signer Key Pair and ensure the secrecy of the Document Signer Private Keys, (ii) sign Document
Security Objects of genuine MRTD in a secure operational environment only and (iii) distribute the
Certificate of the Document Signer Public Key to receiving States and Organizations. The digital
signature in the Document Security Object relates to all data in the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 if
stored in the LDS according to [ICAO-9303].
7.2.1.5 OE.Auth_Key_MRTD
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order
to (i) generate the MRTD’s Chip Authentication Key Pair, (ii) sign and store the Chip Authentication
Public Key in the Chip Authentication Public Key data in EF.DG14 and (iii) support inspection
systems of receiving States or organizations to verify the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip used for
genuine MRTD by certification of the Chip Authentication Public Key by means of the Document
Security Object.
7.2.1.6 OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order
to limit the access to sensitive biometric reference data of MRTD’s holders to authorized receiving
States or Organizations. The Country Verifying Certification Authority of the issuing State or
Organization generates card verifiable Document Verifier Certificates for the authorized Document
Verifier only.
7.2.1.7 OE.BAC_PP
It has to be ensured by the issuing State or Organization, that the TOE is additionally successfully
evaluated and certified in accordance with the ‘Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine
Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Basic Access Control’ [PP_BAC]. This is
necessary to cover the BAC mechanism ensuring the confidentiality of standard user data and
preventing the traceability of the MRTD data. Note that due to the differences within the assumed
attack potential the addressed evaluation and certification is a technically separated process.
60
7.2.2 Receiving State or Organization
7.2.2.1 OE.Exam_MRTD
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization must examine the MRTD presented
by the traveler to verify its authenticity by means of the physical security measures and to detect
any manipulation of the physical MRTD. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability (i)
includes the Country Signing CA Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing
State or Organization, and (ii) implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control [ICAO-
9303]. Additionally General Inspection Systems and Extended Inspection Systems perform the Chip
Authentication Protocol to verify the Authenticity of the presented MRTD’s chip.
7.2.2.2 OE.Passive_Auth_Verif
The border control officer of the receiving State uses the inspection system to verify the traveler as
MRTD holder. The inspection systems must have successfully verified the signature of Document
Security Objects and the integrity data elements of the logical MRTD before they are used. The
receiving States and Organizations must manage the Country Signing CA Public Key and the
Document Signer Public Key maintaining their authenticity and availability in all inspection systems.
7.2.2.3 OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization ensures the confidentiality and
integrity of the data read from the logical MRTD. The inspection system will prevent eavesdropping
to their communication with the TOE before secure messaging is successfully established based on
the Chip Authentication Protocol.
Application Note:
The figure 2.1 in [TR-03110] supposes that the GIS and the EIS follow the order (i) running the
Basic Access Control Protocol, (ii) reading and verifying only those parts of the logical MRTD that
are necessary to know for the Chip Authentication Mechanism (i.e. Document Security Object and
Chip Authentication Public Key), (iii) running the Chip Authentication Protocol, and (iv) reading and
verifying the less-sensitive data of the logical MRTD after Chip Authentication. The supposed
sequence has the advantage that the less-sensitive data are protected by secure messaging with
cryptographic keys based on the Chip Authentication Protocol which quality is under control of the
TOE. The inspection system will prevent additionally eavesdropping to their communication with
the TOE before secure messaging is successfully established based on the Chip Authentication
Protocol. Note that reading the lesssensitive data directly after Basic Access Control Mechanism is
allowed and is not assumed as threat in this ST. But the TOE ensures that reading of sensitive data
is possible after successful Chip Authentication and Terminal Authentication Protocol only.
7.2.2.4 OE.Ext_Insp_Systems
The Document Verifier of receiving States or Organizations authorizes Extended Inspection
Systems by creation of Inspection System Certificates for access to sensitive biometric reference
data of the logical MRTD. The Extended Inspection System authenticates themselves to the
MRTD’s chip for access to the sensitive biometric reference data with its private Terminal
Authentication Key and its Inspection System Certificate.
7.2.3 Additional Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
7.2.3.1 OE.AA_MRTD
Active Authentication - Inspection Systems
An Active Authentication (Basic, General or Extended) Inspection system performs all the functions
of the Basic, General and Extended Inspection System, and verifies the IC authenticity with an RSA
or ECDSA signature generated by the MRTD (if available).
61
7.2.3.2 OE.Activ_Auth_Sign
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infra-structure in order
to (i) generate the MRTD’s Active Authentication Key Pair, (ii) sign and store the Active
Authentication Public Key in the Active Authentication Public Key data in EF.DG15 (if generated)
and (iii) support inspection systems of receiving States or organizations to verify the authenticity of
the MRTD’s chip used for genuine MRTD by certification of the Active Authentication Public Key by
means of the Document Security Object.
7.3 Security Objectives Rationale
7.3.1 Threats
T.Read_Sensitive_Data The threat T.Read_Sensitive_Data “Read the sensitive biometric reference
data” is countered by the TOE-objective OT.Sens_Data_Conf “Confidentiality of sensitive biometric
reference data” requiring that read access to EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 (containing the sensitive
biometric reference data) is only granted to authorized inspection systems. Furthermore it is
required that the transmission of these data ensures the data’s confidentiality. The authorization
bases on Document Verifier certificates issued by the issuing State or Organization as required by
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data “Authorization for use of sensitive biometric reference data”. The
Document Verifier of the receiving State has to authorize Extended Inspection Systems by creating
appropriate Inspection System certificates for access to the sensitive biometric reference data as
demanded by OE.Ext_Insp_Systems “Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems”.
This objective allows an issuing State or Organization to set a secure messaging level it considers
as sufficient to ensure a long term confidentiality of the sensitive biometric data of its citizen when
being read.
T.Counterfeit The threat T.Counterfeit “MRTD’s chip” addresses the attack of unauthorized copy or
reproduction of the genuine MRTD chip. This attack is thwarted by chip an identification and
authenticity proof required by OT.Chip_Auth_Proof “Proof of MRTD’s chip authentication” using a
authentication key pair to be generated by the issuing State or Organization. The Public Chip
Authentication Key has to be written into EF.DG14 and signed by means of Documents Security
Objects as demanded by OE.Auth_Key_MRTD “MRTD Authentication Key”.
This attack is also thwarted by Active Authentication proving the authenticity of the chip as
required by OT.AA_Proof using a authentication key pair to be generated by the issuing State or
Organization.
According to OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport book” the General Inspection
system has to perform the Chip Authentication Protocol to verify the authenticity of the MRTD’s
chip.
OE.Activ_Auth_Sign and OE.AA_MRTD covers this threat enabling the possibility of performing an
Active Authentication which reinforce the security associated to the communication.
The threat is also countered by OT.DBI that helps ensure that a counterfeit TOE is identified
because of the digitally blurred images.
T.Forgery The threat T.Forgery "Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip" addresses the fraudulent alteration
of the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it. The security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access
Control for Personalization of logical MRTD“ requires the TOE to limit the write access for the
logical MRTD to the trustworthy Personalization Agent. The TOE will protect the integrity of the
stored logical MRTD according the security objective OT.Data_Int "Integrity of personal data" and
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper "Protection against Physical Tampering". The examination of the presented
MRTD passport book according to OE.Exam_MRTD "Examination of the MRTD passport book" shall
ensure that passport book does not contain a sensitive contactless chip which may present the
complete unchanged logical MRTD. The TOE environment will detect partly forged logical MRTD
62
data by means of digital signature which will be created according to OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
"Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature" and verified by the inspection system according to
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif "Verification by Passive Authentication".
T.Abuse-Func The threat T.Abuse-Func “Abuse of Functionality” addresses attacks of misusing
MRTD’s functionality to disable or bypass the TSFs. The security objective for the TOE
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func “Protection against abuse of functionality” ensures that the usage of functions
which may not be used in the “Operational Use” phase is effectively prevented. Therefore attacks
intending to abuse functionality in order to disclose or manipulate critical (User) Data or to affect
the TOE in such a way that security features or TOE’s functions may be bypassed, deactivated,
changed or explored shall be effectively countered.
T.Information_Leakage The threat T.Information_Leakage “Information Leakage from MRTD’s
chip”, is typical for integrated circuits like smart cards under direct attack with high attack
potential. The protection of the TOE against this threat is addressed by the directly related security
objective OT.Prot_Inf_Leak “Protection against Information Leakage”.
T.Phys-Tamper The threat T.Phys-Tamper “Physical Tampering” is typical for integrated circuits like
smart cards under direct attack with high attack potential. The protection of the TOE against this
threat is addressed by the directly related security objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection
against Physical Tampering”.
T.Malfunction The threat T.Malfunction “Malfunction due to Environmental Stress” is typical for
integrated circuits like smart cards under direct attack with high attack potential. The protection of
the TOE against this threat is addressed by the directly related security objective
OT.Prot_Malfunction “Protection against Malfunctions”.
7.3.2 Organisational Security Policies
P.BAC-PP The OSP P.BAC-PP is directly addressed by the OE.BAC_PP.
P.Sensitive_Data The OSP P.Sensitive_Data “Privacy of sensitive biometric reference data” is
fulfilled by the TOE-objective OT.Sens_Data_Conf “Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference
data” requiring that read access to EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 (containing the sensitive biometric
reference data) is only granted to authorized inspection systems. Furthermore it is required that
the transmission of these data ensures the data’s confidentiality. The authorization bases on
Document Verifier certificates issued by the issuing State or Organization as required by
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data “Authorization for use of sensitive biometric reference data”. The
Document Verifier of the receiving State has to authorize Extended Inspection Systems by creating
appropriate Inspection System certificates for access to the sensitive biometric reference data as
demanded by OE.Ext_Insp_Systems “Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems”.
P.Manufact The OSP P.Manufact “Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip” requires a unique identification
of the IC by means of the Initialization Data and the writing of the Pre-personalization Data as
being fulfilled by OT.Identification.
P.Personalization The OSP P.Personalization “Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or
Organization only” addresses the (i) the enrolment of the logical MRTD by the Personalization
Agent as described in the security objective for the TOE environment OE.Personalization
“Personalization of logical MRTD”, and (ii) the access control for the user data and TSF data as
described by the security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalization of logical
MRTD”. Note the manufacturer equips the TOE with the Personalization Agent Key(s) according to
63
OT.Identification “Identification and Authentication of the TOE”. The security objective OT.AC_Pers
“Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD” limits the management of TSF data and
management of TSF to the Personalization Agent.
7.3.3 Assumptions
A.MRTD_Manufact The assumption A.MRTD_Manufact “MRTD manufacturing on step 4 to 6” is
covered by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.MRTD_Manufact “Protection of the
MRTD Manufacturing” that requires to use security procedures during all manufacturing steps.
A.MRTD_Delivery The assumption A.MRTD_ Delivery “MRTD delivery during step 4 to 6” is covered
by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.MRTD_ Delivery “Protection of the MRTD
delivery” that requires to use security procedures during delivery steps of the MRTD.
A.Pers_Agent The assumption A.Pers_Agent “Personalization of the MRTD’s chip” is covered by the
security objective for the TOE environment OE.Personalization “Personalization of logical MRTD”
including the enrolment, the protection with digital signature and the storage of the MRTD holder
personal data.
A.Insp_Sys The examination of the MRTD passport book addressed by the assumption A.Insp_Sys
“Inspection Systems for global interoperability” is covered by the security objectives for the TOE
environment OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport book” which requires the
inspection system to examine physically the MRTD, the Basic Inspection System to implement the
Basic Access Control, and the General Inspection Systems and Extended Inspection Systems to
implement and to perform the Chip Authentication Protocol to verify the Authenticity of the
presented MRTD’s chip. The security objectives for the TOE environment OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
“Protection of data from the logical MRTD” require the Inspection System to protect the logical
MRTD data during the transmission and the internal handling.
A.Signature_PKI The assumption A.Signature_PKI “PKI for Passive Authentication” is directly
covered by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.Pass_Auth_Sign “Authentication of
logical MRTD by Signature” covering the necessary procedures for the Country Signing CA Key Pair
and the Document Signer Key Pairs. The implementation of the signature verification procedures is
covered by OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport book”.
A.Auth_PKI The assumption A.Auth_PKI “PKI for Inspection Systems” is covered by the security
objective for the TOE environment OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data “Authorization for use of sensitive
biometric reference data” requires the CVCA to limit the read access to sensitive biometrics by
issuing Document Verifier certificates for authorized receiving States or Organizations only. The
Document Verifier of the receiving State is required by OE.Ext_Insp_Systems “Authorization of
Extended Inspection Systems” to authorize Extended Inspection Systems by creating Inspection
System Certificates. Therefore, the receiving issuing State or Organization has to establish the
necessary public key infrastructure.
A.Pers_Agent_AA The assumption A.Pers_Agent_AA is directly covered by the security objective for
the TOE environment OE.Personalization including the enrolment, the protection with digital
signature and the storage of the MRTD holder personal data.
64
7.3.4 SPD and Security Objectives
Threats Security Objectives Rationale
T.Read_Sensitive_Data OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data,
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems
Section 7.3.1
T.Counterfeit OT.Chip_Auth_Proof, OE.Auth_Key_MRTD,
OE.Exam_MRTD, OT.AA_Proof, OE.Activ_Auth_Sign,
OT.DBI, OE.AA_MRTD
Section 7.3.1
T.Forgery OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper,
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign, OE.Exam_MRTD,
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif
Section 7.3.1
T.Abuse-Func OT.Prot_Abuse-Func Section 7.3.1
T.Information_Leakage OT.Prot_Inf_Leak Section 7.3.1
T.Phys-Tamper OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper Section 7.3.1
T.Malfunction OT.Prot_Malfunction Section 7.3.1
Table 18 Threats and Security Objectives - Coverage
Security Objectives Threats
OT.AC_Pers T.Forgery
OT.Data_Int T.Forgery
OT.Sens_Data_Conf T.Read_Sensitive_Data
OT.Identification
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof T.Counterfeit
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func T.Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak T.Information_Leakage
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper T.Forgery, T.Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfunction T.Malfunction
OT.AA_Proof T.Counterfeit
OT.DBI T.Counterfeit
OE.MRTD_Manufact
OE.MRTD_ Delivery
OE.Personalization
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign T.Forgery
OE.Auth_Key_MRTD T.Counterfeit
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data T.Read_Sensitive_Data
OE.BAC_PP
OE.Exam_MRTD T.Counterfeit, T.Forgery
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif T.Forgery
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
65
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems T.Read_Sensitive_Data
OE.AA_MRTD T.Counterfeit
OE.Activ_Auth_Sign T.Counterfeit
Table 19 Security Objectives and Threats - Coverage
Organisational Security
Policies
Security Objectives Rationale
P.BAC-PP OE.BAC_PP Section 7.3.2
P.Sensitive_Data OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data,
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems
Section 7.3.2
P.Manufact OT.Identification Section 7.3.2
P.Personalization OT.AC_Pers, OT.Identification, OE.Personalization Section 7.3.2
Table 20 OSPs and Security Objectives - Coverage
Security Objectives Organisational Security Policies
OT.AC_Pers P.Personalization
OT.Data_Int
OT.Sens_Data_Conf P.Sensitive_Data
OT.Identification P.Manufact, P.Personalization
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfunction
OT.AA_Proof
OT.DBI
OE.MRTD_Manufact
OE.MRTD_ Delivery
OE.Personalization P.Personalization
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
OE.Auth_Key_MRTD
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data P.Sensitive_Data
OE.BAC_PP P.BAC-PP
OE.Exam_MRTD
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems P.Sensitive_Data
66
OE.AA_MRTD
OE.Activ_Auth_Sign
Table 21 Security Objectives and OSPs - Coverage
Assumptions Security Objectives for the Operational Environment Rationale
A.MRTD_Manufact OE.MRTD_Manufact Section 7.3.3
A.MRTD_Delivery OE.MRTD_ Delivery Section 7.3.3
A.Pers_Agent OE.Personalization Section 7.3.3
A.Insp_Sys OE.Exam_MRTD, OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD Section 7.3.3
A.Signature_PKI OE.Pass_Auth_Sign, OE.Exam_MRTD Section 7.3.3
A.Auth_PKI OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data, OE.Ext_Insp_Systems Section 7.3.3
A.Pers_Agent_AA OE.Personalization Section 7.3.3
Table 22 Assumptions and Security Objectives for the Operational Environment -
Coverage
Security Objectives for the Operational
Environment
Assumptions
OE.MRTD_Manufact A.MRTD_Manufact
OE.MRTD_ Delivery A.MRTD_Delivery
OE.Personalization A.Pers_Agent, A.Pers_Agent_AA
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign A.Signature_PKI
OE.Auth_Key_MRTD
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data A.Auth_PKI
OE.BAC_PP
OE.Exam_MRTD A.Insp_Sys, A.Signature_PKI
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD A.Insp_Sys
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems A.Auth_PKI
OE.AA_MRTD
OE.Activ_Auth_Sign
Table 23 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment and Assumptions -
Coverage
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8 Extended Requirements
8.1 Extended Families
8.1.1 Extended Family FPT_EMS - TOE Emanation
8.1.1.1 Description
The additional family FPT_EMS (TOE Emanation) of the Class FPT (Protection of the TSF) is defined
here to describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE. The TOE shall prevent attacks
against the SCD and other secret data where the attack is based on external observable physical
phenomena of the TOE. Examples of such attacks are evaluation of TOE?s electromagnetic radiation,
simple power analysis (SPA), differential power analysis (DPA), timing attacks, radio emanation etc.
This family describes the functional requirements for the limitation of intelligible emanations. The
family FPT_EMS belongs to the Class FPT because it is the class for TSF protection. Other families
within the Class FPT do not cover the TOE emanation.
8.1.1.2 Extended Components
Extended Component FPT_EMS.1
Description
This family defines requirements to mitigate intelligible emanations. FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation has
two constituents: - FPT_EMS.1.1 Limit of Emissions requires to not emit intelligible emissions enabling
access to TSF data or user data. - FPT_EMS.1.2 Interface Emanation requires to not emit interface
emanation enabling access to TSF data or user data.
Definition
FPT_EMS.1 - TOE Emanation
FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of
[assignment: specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data].
FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the following
interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access to [assignment: list of types of TSF
data].
8.1.2 Extended Family FIA_API - Authentication Proof of Identity
8.1.2.1 Description
To describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FIA_API) of the
Class FIA (Identification and authentication) is defined here. This family describes the functional
requirements for the proof of the claimed identity for the authentication verification by an external
entity where the other families of the class FIA address the verification of the identity of an external
entity.
Application note 10: The other families of the Class FIA describe only the authentication verification
of users' identity performed by the TOE and do not describe the functionality of the user to prove
68
their identity. The following paragraph defines the family FIA_API in the style of the Common Criteria
part 2 (cf. [3], chapter 'Explicitly stated IT security requirements (APE_SRE)') from a TOE point of
view.
8.1.2.2 Extended Components
Extended Component FIA_API.1
Description
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT: Management of
authentication information used to prove the claimed identity.
Definition
FIA_API.1 - Authentication Proof of Identity
FIA_API.1.1 The TSF shall provide a [assignment: authentication mechanism] to prove the
identity of the [assignment: authorized user or role].
8.1.3 Extended Family FMT_LIM - Limited capabilities
8.1.3.1 Description
The family FMT_LIM describes the functional requirements for the test features of the TOE. The new
functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because this class addresses the management
of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical mechanism used in the TOE show that no
other class is appropriate to address the specific issues of preventing abuse of functions by limiting
the capabilities of the functions and by limiting their availability.
8.1.3.2 Extended Components
Extended Component FMT_LIM.2
Definition
FMT_LIM.2 - Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in
conjunction with ‘Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)’ the following policy is enforced [assignment:
Limited capability and availability policy]
Extended Component FMT_LIM.1
Definition
FMT_LIM.1 - Limited capabilities
69
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in
conjunction with ‘Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)’ the following policy is enforced [assignment:
Limited capability and availability policy]
8.1.4 Extended Family FAU_SAS - Audit data storage
8.1.4.1 Description
To describe the security functional requirements of the TOE, the family FAU_SAS of the class FAU
(Security audit) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for the storage of
audit data. It has a more general approach than FAU_GEN, because it does not necessarily require
the data to be generated by the TOE itself and because it does not give specific details of the content
of the audit records. The family ‘Audit data storage (FAU_SAS)’ is specified as follows:
8.1.4.2 Extended Components
Extended Component FAU_SAS.1
Description
Requires the TOE to provide the possibility to store audit data.
Definition
FAU_SAS.1 - Audit storage
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorised users] with the capability to store
[assignment: list of audit information] in the audit records.
8.1.5 Extended Family FCS_RND - Generation of random numbers
8.1.5.1 Description
This family defines quality requirements for the generation of random numbers intended to be used
for cryptographic purposes.
8.1.5.2 Extended Components
Extended Component FCS_RND.1
Description
Generation of random numbers requires that random numbers meet a defined quality metric.
Definition
FCS_RND.1 - Quality metric for random numbers
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet
[assignment: a defined quality metric].
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9 Security Requirements
9.1 Security Functional Requirements
9.1.1 Class FAU Security Audit
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Audit storage (FAU_SAS.1)” as specified below (Common
Criteria Part 2 extended).
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide the Manufacturer with the capability to store the IC
Identification Data in the audit records.
9.1.2 Class FCS Cryptographic Support
FCS_CKM.1/CA Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/CA The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm [Cryptographic Key Generation Algorithm] and
specified cryptographic key sizes [Cryptographic Key Sizes] that meet the following:
[Standards]
Cryptographic Key Generation Algorithm
Cryptographic
Key Sizes
Standards
Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 [TR-
03110-1] based on the ECDH protocol
compliant to [TR-03111] in combination with
112 bits 3DES or 128, 192 or 256 bits AES
192, 224, 256,
320, 384, 512
and 521 bits
[TR-03111]
Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 [TR-
03110-1] based on the DH protocol compliant
to [TR-03110-1] in combination with 112 bits
3DES or 128, 192 or 256 bits AES
2048 bits
[TR-03110-1] and
[RSA-PKCS#3]
Application Note:
ISO-15946 defined in the protection profile has been replaced since Part 3 that dealt with Key
Management using Elliptic Curve has been withdrawn and instead revised by [ISO_11770]
FCS_CKM.1/AA Cryptographic key generation
71
FCS_CKM.1.1/AA The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm [Cryptographic Key Generation Algorithm] and
specified cryptographic key sizes [Cryptographic Key Sizes] that meet the following:
[Standards]
Cryptographic Key
Generation Algorithm
Cryptographic Key Sizes Standards
ECC
192, 224, 256, 320, 384,
512 and 521
[IEEE_1363]
RSA
1536, 1792, 2048, 2560,
3072, 3584 and 4096
[ANSI_X9.31]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic
key destruction method physically overwriting the keys that meets the following: none.
FCS_COP.1/SHA Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/SHA The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512 and cryptographic key sizes
none that meet the following: [FIPS_180_4].
FCS_COP.1/SYM Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/SYM The TSF shall perform see table below in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm see table below and cryptographic key sizes see table below that
meet the following: see table below
Cryptographic Operations
Cryptographic
Algorithms
Key Sizes Standards
secure messaging encryption
and decryption
AES in CBC mode
128, 192
and 256
[TR-03110-1]
secure messaging encryption
and decryption
3DES in CBC mode 112 [TR-03110-1]
FCS_COP.1/MAC Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/MAC The TSF shall perform see table below in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm see table below and cryptographic key sizes see table below that
meet the following: see table below
Cryptographic Operations
Cryptographic
Algorithms
Key Sizes Standards
secure messaging -
message authentication
code
AES CMAC
128, 192
and 256
bits
[TR-03110]
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secure messaging -
message authentication
code
Retail MAC 112 bits [TR-03110]
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/SIG_VER The TSF shall perform see table below in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm see table below and cryptographic key sizes see table below that
meet the following: see table below
Cryptographic
Operations
Cryptographic
Algorithms
Key Sizes Standards
digital
signature
verification
ECDSA with SHA-1,
SHA-224, SHA-256,
SHA-384 and SHA-
512
192, 224, 256, 320,
384, 512 and 521
bits
ISO15946-2
specified in
[ISO15946-2]
digital
signature
verification
RSA with SHA-1,
SHA-256 and SHA-
512
1280, 1536, 1792,
2048, 2560, 3072,
3584 and 4096 bits
PKCS#1 v1.5 and
PKCS#1-PSS
FCS_COP.1/AA Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/AA The TSF shall perform [Cryptographic Operation] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [Cryptographic Algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes
[Cryptographic Key Sizes] that meet the following: [Standard]
Cryptographic
Operation
Cryptographic
Algorithm
Cryptographic Key
Sizes(bits)
Standard
Digital Signature
Creation
ECDSA 192 to 521 over prime
field curves
[ISO_9796-2], [RSA-
PKCS#3],
[FIPS_180_2] and
[X.92]
Digital Signature
Creation
RSA signature 1536, 1792, 2048,
2560, 3072, 3584 and
4096
[ISO_9796-2]
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet the
deterministic random number generation specified by FCS_RNG.1 Quality metric for
random numbers of [PTF-ST].
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9.1.3 Class FIA Identification and Authentication
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow
o to establish the communication channel,
o to read the Initialization Data if it is not disable by TSF according to
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
o to carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other
TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow
o to establish the communication channel,
o to read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS,
o to identify themselves by selection of the authentication key
o to carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any
other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.4.1 The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
o Terminal Authentication Protocol,
o Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES and AES.
Application Note:
The authentication mechanisms based on Triple-DES and AES is the authentication process performed
in phases 5 and 6
FIA_UAU.5/EAC Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5.1/EAC The TSF shall provide
o Terminal Authentication Protocol,
o Secure messaging in MAC-ENC mode,
o Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES and AES
to support user authentication.
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FIA_UAU.5.2/EAC The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the
following rules:
o The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalization Agent by the
Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with Personalization Agent Key.
o After run of the Chip Authentication Protocol the TOE accepts only received
commands with correct message authentication code sent by means of secure
messaging with key agreed with the terminal by means of the Chip
Authentication Mechanism.
o The TOE accepts the authentication attempt by means of the Terminal
Authentication Protocol only if the terminal uses the public key presented
during the Chip Authentication Protocol and the secure messaging established
by the Chip Authentication Mechanism.
FIA_UAU.6/EAC Re-authenticating
FIA_UAU.6.1/EAC The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each command
sent to the TOE after successful run of the Chip Authentication Protocol shall be
verified as being sent by the GIS.
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity
FIA_API.1.1 The TSF shall provide a Chip Authentication Protocol according to [TR-03110]
to prove the identity of the TOE.
FIA_API.1/AA Authentication Proof of Identity
FIA_API.1.1/AA The TSF shall provide a Active Authentication to prove the identity of the TOE.
9.1.4 Class FDP User Data Protection
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP on terminals gaining write, read
and modification access to data in the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the
logical MRTD.
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to objects based on the following:
75
o Subjects:
 Personalization Agent,
 Extended Inspection System
 Terminal,
o Objects:
 data EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
 data EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 of the logical MRTD
 data in EF.COM,
 data in EF.SOD,
o Security attributes:
 authentication status of terminals,
 Terminal Authorization.
FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
o the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write and to
read the data of the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
o the successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System with the Read
access to DG 3 (Fingerprint) granted by the relative certificate holder
authorization encoding is allowed to read the data in EF.DG3 of the logical
MRTD.
o the successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System with the Read
access to DG 4 (Iris) granted by the relative certificate holder authorization
encoding is allowed to read the data in EF.DG4 of the logical MRTD.
FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: rule:
o A terminal authenticated as CVCA is not allowed to read data in the EF.DG3,
o A terminal authenticated as CVCA is not allowed to read data in the EF.DG4,
o A terminal authenticated as DV is not allowed to read data in the EF.DG3,
o A terminal authenticated as DV is not allowed to read data in the EF.DG4,
o A ny terminal is not allowed to modify any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the
logical MRTD,
o Any terminal not being successfully authenticated as Extended Inspection
System is not allowed to read any of the EF.DG3 to EF.DG4 of the logical MRTD.
FDP_UCT.1/EAC Basic data exchange confidentiality
FDP_UCT.1.1/EAC [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to
transmit and receive user data in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure after Chip
Authentication.
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FDP_UIT.1/EAC Data exchange integrity
FDP_UIT.1.1/EAC [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to
transmit and receive user data in a manner protected from modification, deletion, insertion
and replay errors after Chip Authentication.
FDP_UIT.1.2/EAC [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user
data, whether modification, deletion, insertion and replay has occurred after Chip
Authentication.
9.1.5 Class FMT Security Management
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
o Initialization
o Pre-personalization
o Personalization
o Activate and deactivate DBI.
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles
o Manufacturer,
o Personalization Agent,
o Country Verifying Certification Authority,
o Document Verifier,
o domestic Extended Inspection System
o foreign Extended Inspection System.
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_ENA The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Initialization Data and
Prepersonalization Data to the Manufacturer.
Application Note:
Please refer to F.ACW for details of the data written by the manufacturer.
77
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_DIS The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable read access for users to the
Initialization Data to the Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/CVCA_INI The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the
o initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key,
o initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate,
o initial Current Date
to the Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/CVCA_UPD The TSF shall restrict the ability to update the
o Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key,
o Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate
to Country Verifying Certification Authority.
FMT_MTD.1/DATE Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/DATE The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify the current date to
o Country Verifying Certification Authority,
o Document Verifier,
o domestic Extended Inspection System.
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_WRITE The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Document Basic
Access Keys to the Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/CAPK The TSF shall restrict the ability to load or create the Chip Authentication
Private Key to the Personalization agent.
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FMT_MTD.1/AAPK Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/AAPK The TSF shall restrict the ability to load or create the Active
Authentication Private Key to the Personalization agent.
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the
o Document Basic Access Keys,
o Chip Authentication Private Key,
o Personalization Agent Keys
to none.
FMT_MTD.1/Activate_DBI Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/Activate_DBI The TSF shall restrict the ability to digitally blur the images in EF
DG 1 to EF DG 8 to personalization agent.
Application Note:
Even though practically EF DG2, EF DG3 and EF DG 4 will be the files which will be directly acted
upon by the personalization agent but since the implementation is not restricted to only these files, so
EF DG1 to EF DG 8 is also mentioned in above instantiation.
FMT_MTD.1/Deactivate_DBI Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/Deactivate_DBI The TSF shall restrict the ability to remove the blurring on the
digital images to the terminal whose name is set by the personalization agent.
FMT_MTD.1/DBI_Terminal Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/DBI_Terminal The TSF shall restrict the ability to set the name (or beginning of
the name) of the terminal allowed to remove the digital blurring in phase 7, and
identifiers of these files to personalization agent.
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FMT_MTD.3 Secure TSF data
FMT_MTD.3.1 [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall ensure that only secure values of the certificate
chain are accepted for TSF data of the Terminal Authentication Protocol and the Access
Control.
Refinement:
The certificate chain is valid if and only if
o the digital signature of the Inspection System Certificate can be verified as correct with the
public key of the Document Verifier Certificate and the expiration date of the Inspection
System Certificate is not before the Current Date of the TOE,
o the digital signature of the Document Verifier Certificate can be verified as correct with the
public key in the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority and the
expiration date of the Document Verifier Certificate is not before the Current Date of the
TOE,
o the digital signature of the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority can
be verified as correct with the public key of the Country Verifying Certification Authority
known to the TOE and the expiration date of the Certificate of the Country Verifying
Certification Authority is not before the Current Date of the TOE.
The Inspection System Public Key contained in the Inspection System Certificate in a valid
certificate chain is a secure value for the authentication reference data of the Extended Inspection
System.
The intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorizations contained in the certificates of a valid
certificate chain is a secure value for Terminal Authorization of a successful authenticated
Extended Inspection System.
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in
conjunction with ‘Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)’ the following policy is enforced Deploying
Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow,
o User Data to be manipulated,
o sensitive User Data (EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) to be disclosed,
o TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
o software to be reconstructed and
o substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may
enable other attacks
FMT_LIM.2 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in
conjunction with ‘Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)’ the following policy is enforced Deploying
Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow,
o User Data to be manipulated,
o sensitive User Data (EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) to be disclosed,
o TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
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o software to be reconstructed and
o substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may
enable other attacks
9.1.6 Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions
FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation
FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations and
electromagnetic radiation during command execution in excess of non useful
information enabling access to Personalization Agent Key(s) and Chip Authentication
Private Key and
o Pre-personalization Agent Keys,
o Secure Messaging Session Keys,
o Active Authentication: Private Key (AAK).
FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure users are unable to use the following interface smart card
circuit contacts to gain access to Personalization Agent Key(s) and Chip Authentication
Private Key and
o Pre-personalization Agent Keys,
o Secure Messaging Session Keys
o Active Authentication: Private Key (AAK).
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur:
o Exposure to out-of-range operating conditions where therefore a malfunction
could occur,
o failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.1.
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests at the conditions
o At reset, to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of TSF
data.
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of
stored TSF executable code.
81
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
FPT_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing to the TSF by
responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.
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9.2 Security Assurance Requirements
The Evaluation Assurance Level is EAL5 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
9.2.1 ADV Development
9.2.1.1 ADV_ARC Security Architecture
ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_ARC.1.1D The developer shall design and implement the TOE so that the security features of
the TSF cannot be bypassed.
ADV_ARC.1.2D The developer shall design and implement the TSF so that it is able to protect itself
from tampering by untrusted active entities.
ADV_ARC.1.3D The developer shall provide a security architecture description of the TSF.
ADV_ARC.1.1C The security architecture description shall be at a level of detail commensurate with
the description of the SFR-enforcing abstractions described in the TOE design document.
ADV_ARC.1.2C The security architecture description shall describe the security domains maintained
by the TSF consistently with the SFRs.
ADV_ARC.1.3C The security architecture description shall describe how the TSF initialisation process
is secure.
ADV_ARC.1.4C The security architecture description shall demonstrate that the TSF protects itself
from tampering.
ADV_ARC.1.5C The security architecture description shall demonstrate that the TSF prevents bypass
of the SFR-enforcing functionality.
ADV_ARC.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
9.2.1.2 ADV_FSP Functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional error
information
ADV_FSP.5.1D The developer shall provide a functional specification.
ADV_FSP.5.2D The developer shall provide a tracing from the functional specification to the SFRs.
83
ADV_FSP.5.1C The functional specification shall completely represent the TSF.
ADV_FSP.5.2C The functional specification shall describe the TSFI using a semi-formal style.
ADV_FSP.5.3C The functional specification shall describe the purpose and method of use for all
TSFI.
ADV_FSP.5.4C The functional specification shall identify and describe all parameters associated with
each TSFI.
ADV_FSP.5.5C The functional specification shall describe all actions associated with each TSFI.
ADV_FSP.5.6C The functional specification shall describe all direct error messages that may result
from an invocation of each TSFI.
ADV_FSP.5.7C The functional specification shall describe all error messages that do not result from
an invocation of a TSFI.
ADV_FSP.5.8C The functional specification shall provide a rationale for each error message
contained in the TSF implementation yet does not result from an invocation of a TSFI.
ADV_FSP.5.9C The tracing shall demonstrate that the SFRs trace to TSFIs in the functional
specification.
ADV_FSP.5.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
ADV_FSP.5.2E The evaluator shall determine that the functional specification is an accurate and
complete instantiation of the SFRs.
9.2.1.3 ADV_IMP Implementation representation
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.1.1D The developer shall make available the implementation representation for the entire
TSF.
ADV_IMP.1.2D The developer shall provide a mapping between the TOE design description and the
sample of the implementation representation.
ADV_IMP.1.1C The implementation representation shall define the TSF to a level of detail such that
the TSF can be generated without further design decisions.
ADV_IMP.1.2C The implementation representation shall be in the form used by the development
personnel.
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ADV_IMP.1.3C The mapping between the TOE design description and the sample of the
implementation representation shall demonstrate their correspondence.
ADV_IMP.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that, for the selected sample of the implementation
representation, the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of
evidence.
9.2.1.4 ADV_INT TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.2.1D The developer shall design and implement the entire TSF such that it has well-
structured internals.
ADV_INT.2.2D The developer shall provide an internals description and justification.
ADV_INT.2.1C The justification shall describe the characteristics used to judge the meaning of
``well-structured''.
ADV_INT.2.2C The TSF internals description shall demonstrate that the entire TSF is well-
structured.
ADV_INT.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
ADV_INT.2.2E The evaluator shall perform an internals analysis on the TSF.
9.2.1.5 ADV_TDS TOE design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.4.1D The developer shall provide the design of the TOE.
ADV_TDS.4.2D The developer shall provide a mapping from the TSFI of the functional specification
to the lowest level of decomposition available in the TOE design.
ADV_TDS.4.1C The design shall describe the structure of the TOE in terms of subsystems.
ADV_TDS.4.2C The design shall describe the TSF in terms of modules, designating each module as
SFR-enforcing, SFR-supporting, or SFR-non-interfering.
ADV_TDS.4.3C The design shall identify all subsystems of the TSF.
85
ADV_TDS.4.4C The design shall provide a semiformal description of each subsystem of the TSF,
supported by informal, explanatory text where appropriate.
ADV_TDS.4.5C The design shall provide a description of the interactions among all subsystems of
the TSF.
ADV_TDS.4.6C The design shall provide a mapping from the subsystems of the TSF to the modules
of the TSF.
ADV_TDS.4.7C The design shall describe each SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting module in terms of
its purpose and relationship with other modules.
ADV_TDS.4.8C The design shall describe each SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting module in terms of
its SFR-related interfaces, return values from those interfaces, interaction with other modules and
called SFR-related interfaces to other SFR-enforcing or SFR-supporting modules.
ADV_TDS.4.9C The design shall describe each SFR-non-interfering module in terms of its purpose
and interaction with other modules.
ADV_TDS.4.10C The mapping shall demonstrate that all TSFIs trace to the behaviour described in
the TOE design that they invoke.
ADV_TDS.4.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
ADV_TDS.4.2E The evaluator shall determine that the design is an accurate and complete
instantiation of all security functional requirements.
9.2.2 AGD Guidance documents
9.2.2.1 AGD_OPE Operational user guidance
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_OPE.1.1D The developer shall provide operational user guidance.
AGD_OPE.1.1C The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the user-accessible
functions and privileges that should be controlled in a secure processing environment, including
appropriate warnings.
AGD_OPE.1.2C The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, how to use the
available interfaces provided by the TOE in a secure manner.
AGD_OPE.1.3C The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the available
functions and interfaces, in particular all security parameters under the control of the user,
indicating secure values as appropriate.
86
AGD_OPE.1.4C The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, clearly present each type of
security-relevant event relative to the user-accessible functions that need to be performed,
including changing the security characteristics of entities under the control of the TSF.
AGD_OPE.1.5C The operational user guidance shall identify all possible modes of operation of the
TOE (including operation following failure or operational error), their consequences and
implications for maintaining secure operation.
AGD_OPE.1.6C The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, describe the security
measures to be followed in order to fulfil the security objectives for the operational environment as
described in the ST.
AGD_OPE.1.7C The operational user guidance shall be clear and reasonable.
AGD_OPE.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
9.2.2.2 AGD_PRE Preparative procedures
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
AGD_PRE.1.1D The developer shall provide the TOE including its preparative procedures.
AGD_PRE.1.1C The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure
acceptance of the delivered TOE in accordance with the developer's delivery procedures.
AGD_PRE.1.2C The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure
installation of the TOE and for the secure preparation of the operational environment in
accordance with the security objectives for the operational environment as described in the ST.
AGD_PRE.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
AGD_PRE.1.2E The evaluator shall apply the preparative procedures to confirm that the TOE can be
prepared securely for operation.
87
9.2.3 ALC Life-cycle support
9.2.3.1 ALC_CMC CM capabilities
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and automation
ALC_CMC.4.1D The developer shall provide the TOE and a reference for the TOE.
ALC_CMC.4.2D The developer shall provide the CM documentation.
ALC_CMC.4.3D The developer shall use a CM system.
ALC_CMC.4.1C The TOE shall be labelled with its unique reference.
ALC_CMC.4.2C The CM documentation shall describe the method used to uniquely identify the
configuration items.
ALC_CMC.4.3C The CM system shall uniquely identify all configuration items.
ALC_CMC.4.4C The CM system shall provide automated measures such that only authorised
changes are made to the configuration items.
ALC_CMC.4.5C The CM system shall support the production of the TOE by automated means.
ALC_CMC.4.6C The CM documentation shall include a CM plan.
ALC_CMC.4.7C The CM plan shall describe how the CM system is used for the development of the
TOE.
ALC_CMC.4.8C The CM plan shall describe the procedures used to accept modified or newly created
configuration items as part of the TOE.
ALC_CMC.4.9C The evidence shall demonstrate that all configuration items are being maintained
under the CM system.
ALC_CMC.4.10C The evidence shall demonstrate that the CM system is being operated in
accordance with the CM plan.
ALC_CMC.4.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
9.2.3.2 ALC_CMS CM scope
88
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5.1D The developer shall provide a configuration list for the TOE.
ALC_CMS.5.1C The configuration list shall include the following: the TOE itself; the evaluation
evidence required by the SARs; the parts that comprise the TOE; the implementation
representation; security flaw reports and resolution status; and development tools and related
information.
ALC_CMS.5.2C The configuration list shall uniquely identify the configuration items.
ALC_CMS.5.3C For each TSF relevant configuration item, the configuration list shall indicate the
developer of the item.
ALC_CMS.5.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
9.2.3.3 ALC_DEL Delivery
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DEL.1.1D The developer shall document and provide procedures for delivery of the TOE or
parts of it to the consumer.
ALC_DEL.1.2D The developer shall use the delivery procedures.
ALC_DEL.1.1C The delivery documentation shall describe all procedures that are necessary to
maintain security when distributing versions of the TOE to the consumer.
ALC_DEL.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
9.2.3.4 ALC_DVS Development security
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_DVS.2.1D The developer shall produce and provide development security documentation.
ALC_DVS.2.1C The development security documentation shall describe all the physical, procedural,
personnel, and other security measures that are necessary to protect the confidentiality and
integrity of the TOE design and implementation in its development environment.
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ALC_DVS.2.2C The development security documentation shall justify that the security measures
provide the necessary level of protection to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE.
ALC_DVS.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
ALC_DVS.2.2E The evaluator shall confirm that the security measures are being applied.
9.2.3.5 ALC_LCD Life-cycle definition
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.1.1D The developer shall establish a life-cycle model to be used in the development and
maintenance of the TOE.
ALC_LCD.1.2D The developer shall provide life-cycle definition documentation.
ALC_LCD.1.1C The life-cycle definition documentation shall describe the model used to develop and
maintain the TOE.
ALC_LCD.1.2C The life-cycle model shall provide for the necessary control over the development
and maintenance of the TOE.
ALC_LCD.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
9.2.3.6 ALC_TAT Tools and techniques
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.2.1D The developer shall provide the documentation identifying each development tool
being used for the TOE.
ALC_TAT.2.2D The developer shall document and provide the selected implementation-dependent
options of each development tool.
ALC_TAT.2.3D The developer shall describe and provide the implementation standards that are
being applied by the developer.
ALC_TAT.2.1C Each development tool used for implementation shall be well-defined.
ALC_TAT.2.2C The documentation of each development tool shall unambiguously define the
meaning of all statements as well as all conventions and directives used in the implementation.
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ALC_TAT.2.3C The documentation of each development tool shall unambiguously define the
meaning of all implementation-dependent options.
ALC_TAT.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
ALC_TAT.2.2E The evaluator shall confirm that the implementation standards have been applied.
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9.2.4 ASE Security Target evaluation
9.2.4.1 ASE_CCL Conformance claims
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_CCL.1.1D The developer shall provide a conformance claim.
ASE_CCL.1.2D The developer shall provide a conformance claim rationale.
ASE_CCL.1.1C The conformance claim shall contain a CC conformance claim that identifies the
version of the CC to which the ST and the TOE claim conformance.
ASE_CCL.1.2C The CC conformance claim shall describe the conformance of the ST to CC Part 2 as
either CC Part 2 conformant or CC Part 2 extended.
ASE_CCL.1.3C The CC conformance claim shall describe the conformance of the ST to CC Part 3 as
either CC Part 3 conformant or CC Part 3 extended.
ASE_CCL.1.4C The CC conformance claim shall be consistent with the extended components
definition.
ASE_CCL.1.5C The conformance claim shall identify all PPs and security requirement packages to
which the ST claims conformance.
ASE_CCL.1.6C The conformance claim shall describe any conformance of the ST to a package as
either package-conformant or package-augmented.
ASE_CCL.1.7C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the TOE type is consistent
with the TOE type in the PPs for which conformance is being claimed.
ASE_CCL.1.8C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the statement of the security
problem definition is consistent with the statement of the security problem definition in the PPs for
which conformance is being claimed.
ASE_CCL.1.9C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the statement of security
objectives is consistent with the statement of security objectives in the PPs for which conformance
is being claimed.
ASE_CCL.1.10C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the statement of security
requirements is consistent with the statement of security requirements in the PPs for which
conformance is being claimed.
ASE_CCL.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
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9.2.4.2 ASE_ECD Extended components definition
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_ECD.1.1D The developer shall provide a statement of security requirements.
ASE_ECD.1.2D The developer shall provide an extended components definition.
ASE_ECD.1.1C The statement of security requirements shall identify all extended security
requirements.
ASE_ECD.1.2C The extended components definition shall define an extended component for each
extended security requirement.
ASE_ECD.1.3C The extended components definition shall describe how each extended component is
related to the existing CC components, families, and classes.
ASE_ECD.1.4C The extended components definition shall use the existing CC components, families,
classes, and methodology as a model for presentation.
ASE_ECD.1.5C The extended components shall consist of measurable and objective elements such
that conformance or nonconformance to these elements can be demonstrated.
ASE_ECD.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
ASE_ECD.1.2E The evaluator shall confirm that no extended component can be clearly expressed
using existing components.
9.2.4.3 ASE_INT ST introduction
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_INT.1.1D The developer shall provide an ST introduction.
ASE_INT.1.1C The ST introduction shall contain an ST reference, a TOE reference, a TOE overview
and a TOE description.
ASE_INT.1.2C The ST reference shall uniquely identify the ST.
ASE_INT.1.3C The TOE reference shall identify the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.4C The TOE overview shall summarise the usage and major security features of the TOE.
93
ASE_INT.1.5C The TOE overview shall identify the TOE type.
ASE_INT.1.6C The TOE overview shall identify any non-TOE hardware/software/firmware required
by the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.7C The TOE description shall describe the physical scope of the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.8C The TOE description shall describe the logical scope of the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
ASE_INT.1.2E The evaluator shall confirm that the TOE reference, the TOE overview, and the TOE
description are consistent with each other.
9.2.4.4 ASE_OBJ Security objectives
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_OBJ.2.1D The developer shall provide a statement of security objectives.
ASE_OBJ.2.2D The developer shall provide a security objectives rationale.
ASE_OBJ.2.1C The statement of security objectives shall describe the security objectives for the
TOE and the security objectives for the operational environment.
ASE_OBJ.2.2C The security objectives rationale shall trace each security objective for the TOE back
to threats countered by that security objective and OSPs enforced by that security objective.
ASE_OBJ.2.3C The security objectives rationale shall trace each security objective for the
operational environment back to threats countered by that security objective, OSPs enforced by
that security objective, and assumptions upheld by that security objective.
ASE_OBJ.2.4C The security objectives rationale shall demonstrate that the security objectives
counter all threats.
ASE_OBJ.2.5C The security objectives rationale shall demonstrate that the security objectives
enforce all OSPs.
ASE_OBJ.2.6C The security objectives rationale shall demonstrate that the security objectives for
the operational environment uphold all assumptions.
ASE_OBJ.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
9.2.4.5 ASE_REQ Security requirements
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ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_REQ.2.1D The developer shall provide a statement of security requirements.
ASE_REQ.2.2D The developer shall provide a security requirements rationale.
ASE_REQ.2.1C The statement of security requirements shall describe the SFRs and the SARs.
ASE_REQ.2.2C All subjects, objects, operations, security attributes, external entities and other terms
that are used in the SFRs and the SARs shall be defined.
ASE_REQ.2.3C The statement of security requirements shall identify all operations on the security
requirements.
ASE_REQ.2.4C All operations shall be performed correctly.
ASE_REQ.2.5C Each dependency of the security requirements shall either be satisfied, or the
security requirements rationale shall justify the dependency not being satisfied.
ASE_REQ.2.6C The security requirements rationale shall trace each SFR back to the security
objectives for the TOE.
ASE_REQ.2.7C The security requirements rationale shall demonstrate that the SFRs meet all security
objectives for the TOE.
ASE_REQ.2.8C The security requirements rationale shall explain why the SARs were chosen.
ASE_REQ.2.9C The statement of security requirements shall be internally consistent.
ASE_REQ.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
9.2.4.6 ASE_SPD Security problem definition
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_APD.1.1D The developer shall provide a security problem definition.
ASE_SPD.1.1C The security problem definition shall describe the threats.
ASE_SPD.1.2C All threats shall be described in terms of a threat agent, an asset, and an adverse
action.
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ASE_SPD.1.3C The security problem definition shall describe the OSPs.
ASE_SPD.1.4C The security problem definition shall describe the assumptions about the operational
environment of the TOE.
ASE_SPD.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
9.2.4.7 ASE_TSS TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.1.1D The developer shall provide a TOE summary specification.
ASE_TSS.1.1C The TOE summary specification shall describe how the TOE meets each SFR.
ASE_TSS.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
ASE_TSS.1.2E The evaluator shall confirm that the TOE summary specification is consistent with the
TOE overview and the TOE description.
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9.2.5 ATE Tests
9.2.5.1 ATE_COV Coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.2.1D The developer shall provide an analysis of the test coverage.
ATE_COV.2.1C The analysis of the test coverage shall demonstrate the correspondence between the
tests in the test documentation and the TSFIs in the functional specification.
ATE_COV.2.2C The analysis of the test coverage shall demonstrate that all TSFIs in the functional
specification have been tested.
ATE_COV.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
9.2.5.2 ATE_DPT Depth
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.3.1D The developer shall provide the analysis of the depth of testing.
ATE_DPT.3.1C The analysis of the depth of testing shall demonstrate the correspondence between
the tests in the test documentation and the TSF subsystems and modules in the TOE design.
ATE_DPT.3.2C The analysis of the depth of testing shall demonstrate that all TSF subsystems in the
TOE design have been tested.
ATE_DPT.3.3C The analysis of the depth of testing shall demonstrate that all TSF modules in the TOE
design have been tested.
ATE_DPT.3.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
9.2.5.3 ATE_FUN Functional tests
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.1.1D The developer shall test the TSF and document the results.
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ATE_FUN.1.2D The developer shall provide test documentation.
ATE_FUN.1.1C The test documentation shall consist of test plans, expected test results and actual
test results.
ATE_FUN.1.2C The test plans shall identify the tests to be performed and describe the scenarios for
performing each test. These scenarios shall include any ordering dependencies on the results of
other tests.
ATE_FUN.1.3C The expected test results shall show the anticipated outputs from a successful
execution of the tests.
ATE_FUN.1.4C The actual test results shall be consistent with the expected test results.
ATE_FUN.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
9.2.5.4 ATE_IND Independent testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample
ATE_IND.2.1D The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
ATE_IND.2.1C The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
ATE_IND.2.2C The developer shall provide an equivalent set of resources to those that were used in
the developer's functional testing of the TSF.
ATE_IND.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
ATE_IND.2.2E The evaluator shall execute a sample of tests in the test documentation to verify the
developer test results.
ATE_IND.2.3E The evaluator shall test a subset of the TSF to confirm that the TSF operates as
specified.
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9.2.6 AVA Vulnerability assessment
9.2.6.1 AVA_VAN Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5.1D The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
AVA_VAN.5.1C The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
AVA_VAN.5.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
AVA_VAN.5.2E The evaluator shall perform a search of public domain sources to identify potential
vulnerabilities in the TOE.
AVA_VAN.5.3E The evaluator shall perform an independent, methodical vulnerability analysis of the
TOE using the guidance documentation, functional specification, TOE design, security architecture
description and implementation representation to identify potential vulnerabilities in the TOE.
AVA_VAN.5.4E The evaluator shall conduct penetration testing based on the identified potential
vulnerabilities to determine that the TOE is resistant to attacks performed by an attacker possessing
High attack potential.
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9.3 Security Requirements Rationale
9.3.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
9.3.1.1 Security Objectives listed in PP EAC
OT.AC_Pers The security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD”
addresses the access control of the writing the logical MRTD. The write access to the logical MRTD
data are defined by the SFR FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1, FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 in the same way:
only the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write the data of the groups
EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD only once. The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including
Personalization Agent) and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions (including
Personalization). The Personalization Agent handles the Document Basic Access Keys according to
the SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE as authentication reference data for Basic Access Control.
The following paragraph is extracted from [PP_EAC] and has been refined according to the
technical characteristics of this TOE. The refinement is right after.
The authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent shall be performed by TSF according to
SFR FIA_UAU.4 and FIA_UAU.5/EAC. If the Personalization Terminal want to authenticate itself to
the TOE by means of the Terminal Authentication Protocol (after Chip Authentication) with the
Personalization Agent Keys the TOE will use TSF according to the FCS_RND.1 (for the generation
of the challenge), FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_COP.1/SHA (for the derivation of the new session keys
after Chip Authentication), and FCS_COP.1/SYM and FCS_COP.1/MAC (for the ENC_MAC_Mode
secure messaging), FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER (as part of the Terminal Authentication Protocol) and
FIA_UAU.6/EAC (for the re-authentication). If the Personalization Terminal wants to authenticate
itself to the TOE by means of the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with Personalization Agent
Key the TOE will use TSF according to the FCS_RND.1. The session keys are destroyed according
to FCS_CKM.4 after use.
Note: As TA mechanism is not supported for the authentication of the terminal as Personalization
Agent, the following two paragraphs have been added to demonstrate that symmetric
authentication used in Personalization phase fulfills the OT.AC_Pers. The authentication of the
terminal as Personalization Agent is performed by TSF according to SFR FIA_UAU.4 and
FIA_UAU.5/EAC. The Personalization Agent can be authenticated by using the symmetric
authentication mechanism with the personalization key.
The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ prevents read access to the secret key of the Personalization
Agent Keys and ensures together with the SFR FPT_EMS.1 the confidentially of these keys.
OT.Data_Int The security objective OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” requires the TOE to
protect the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip against physical manipulation
and unauthorized writing. The write access to the logical MRTD data is defined by the SFR
FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 in the same way: only the Personalization Agent is allowed to write the
data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD (FDP_ACF.1.2, rule 1) and terminals are not
allowed to modify any of the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD (cf. FDP_ACF.1.4).
The Personalization Agent must identify and authenticate themselves according to FIA_UID.1 and
FIA_UAU.1 before accessing these data. The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles and the SFR
FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions.
The TOE supports the inspection system detect any modification of the transmitted logical MRTD
data after Chip Authentication. The authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent shall be
performed by TSF according to SRF FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.5/EAC and FIA_UAU.6/EAC. The SFR
FIA_UAU.6/EAC and FDP_UIT.1/EACA requires the integrity protection of the transmitted data
after chip authentication by means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic
functions according to FCS_CKM.1/CA (for the generation of shared secret), FCS_COP.1/SHA (for
the derivation of the new session keys), and FCS_COP.1/SYM and FCS_COP.1/MAC for the
100
ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging. The session keys are destroyed according to FCS_CKM.4 after
use.
The SFR FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ requires that the Chip Authentication Key
cannot be written unauthorized or read afterwards.
The following part is added to integrate the Manufacturing and Personalization phases in the
OT_Data_Int.
OT.Sens_Data_Conf The security objective OT.Sens_Data_Conf “Confidentiality of sensitive
biometric reference data” is enforced by the Access Control SFP defined in FDP_ACC.1 and
FDP_ACF.1 allowing the data of EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 only to be read by successfully authenticated
Extended Inspection System being authorized by a validly verifiable certificate according
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER.
The SFR FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 requires the identification and authentication of the inspection
systems. The SFR FIA_UAU.5/EAC requires the successful Chip Authentication (CA) before any
authentication attempt as Extended Inspection System. During the protected communication
following the CA the reuse of authentication data is prevented by FIA_UAU.4. The SFR
FIA_UAU.6/EAC and FDP_UCT.1/EAC requires the confidentiality protection of the transmitted data
after chip authentication by means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic
functions according to FCS_RND.1 (for the generation of the terminal authentication challenge),
FCS_CKM.1/CA (for the generation of shared secret), FCS_COP.1/SHA (for the derivation of the
new session keys), and FCS_COP.1/SYM and FCS_COP.1/MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure
messaging. The session keys are destroyed according to FCS_CKM.4 after use. The SFR
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ requires that the Chip Authentication Key cannot
be written unauthorized or read afterwards.
To allow a verification of the certificate chain as in FMT_MTD.3 the CVCA’s public key and
certificate as well as the current date are written or update by authorized identified role as of
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI, FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD and FMT_MTD.1/DATE.
The following part is added to integrate the Manufacturing and Personalization phases in the
OT_Sens_Data_Conf.
OT.Identification The security objective OT.Identification “Identification and Authentication of the
TOE” address the storage of the IC Identification Data uniquely identifying the MRTD’s chip in its
non-volatile memory. This will be ensured by TSF according to SFR FAU_SAS.1.
The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA allows only the Manufacturer to write Initialization Data and Pre-
personalization Data (including the Personalization Agent key). The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
allows the Personalization Agent to disable Initialization Data if their usage in the phase 4
“Operational Use” violates the security objective OT.Identification “Identification and
Authentication of the TOE”.
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof The security objective OT.Chip_Auth_Proof “Proof of MRTD’s chip
authenticity” is ensured by the Chip Authentication Protocol provided by FIA_API.1 proving the
identity of the TOE. The Chip Authentication Protocol defined by FCS_CKM.1/CA is performed using
a TOE internally stored confidential private key as required by FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ. The Chip Authentication Protocol [TR-03110] requires additional TSF
101
according to FCS_COP.1/SHA (for the derivation of the session keys), FCS_COP.1/SYM and
FCS_COP.1/MAC (for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging).
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func The security objective OT.Prot_Abuse-Func “Protection against Abuse of
Functionality” is ensured by the SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 which prevent misuse of test
functionality of the TOE or other features which may not be used after TOE Delivery.
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak The security objective OT.Prot_Inf_Leak “Protection against Information
Leakage” requires the TOE to protect confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the MRTD’s
chip against disclosure
o by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between
events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption,
clock, or I/O lines which is addressed by the SFR FPT_EMS.1,
o by forcing a malfunction of the TOE which is addressed by the SFR FPT_FLS.1 and
FPT_TST.1, and/or
o by a physical manipulation of the TOE which is addressed by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper The security objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical
Tampering” is covered by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.
OT.Prot_Malfunction The security objective OT.Prot_Malfunction “Protection against Malfunctions”
is covered by (i) the SFR FPT_TST.1 which requires self tests to demonstrate the correct operation
and tests of authorized users to verify the integrity of TSF data and TSF code, and (ii) the SFR
FPT_FLS.1 which requires a secure state in case of detected failure or operating conditions
possibly causing a malfunction.
9.3.1.2 Additional Security Objectives for the TOE
OT.AA_Proof The security objective OT.AA_Proof is ensured by the Active Authentication Protocol as
defined in FIA_API.1/AA. The FCS_CKM.1/AA provides key generation for Active Authentication.
The Active Authentication relies on FCS_COP.1/AA and FCS_RND.1. It is performed using a TOE
internally stored confidential private key as required by FMT_MTD.1/AAPK.
OT.DBI is met by FMT_MTD.1/Activate_DBI that allows the personalization agent to digitally blurr the
images in defined EFs. FMT_MTD.1/DBI_Terminal helps to ensure that only an authorized terminal
who's name is set by the personalization agent can remove the blurring as defined in
FMT_MTD.1/Deactivate_DBI.
FMT_SMF.1 provides the necessary management functions based on the roles identified in
FMT_SMR.1.
9.3.2 Rationale tables of Security Objectives and SFRs
Security Objectives Security Functional Requirements Rationale
OT.AC_Pers FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/SHA,
FCS_COP.1/SYM, FCS_COP.1/MAC, FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER,
FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.5/EAC,
FIA_UAU.6/EAC, FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, FPT_EMS.1, FCS_RND.1
Section 9.3.1
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OT.Data_Int FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/SHA,
FCS_COP.1/SYM, FCS_COP.1/MAC, FIA_UID.1,
FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.5/EAC, FIA_UAU.6/EAC,
FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FDP_UIT.1/EAC, FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1, FMT_MTD.1/CAPK, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
Section 9.3.1
OT.Sens_Data_Conf FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/SHA,
FCS_COP.1/SYM, FCS_COP.1/MAC, FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER,
FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.5/EAC,
FIA_UAU.6/EAC, FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1,
FDP_UCT.1/EAC, FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI,
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD, FMT_MTD.1/DATE,
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, FMT_MTD.3,
FCS_RND.1
Section 9.3.1
OT.Identification FAU_SAS.1, FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA, FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Section 9.3.1
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_COP.1/SYM,
FCS_COP.1/MAC, FIA_API.1, FMT_MTD.1/CAPK,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
Section 9.3.1
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2 Section 9.3.1
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak FPT_EMS.1, FPT_FLS.1, FPT_TST.1, FPT_PHP.3 Section 9.3.1
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper FPT_PHP.3 Section 9.3.1
OT.Prot_Malfunction FPT_TST.1, FPT_FLS.1 Section 9.3.1
OT.AA_Proof FCS_COP.1/AA, FCS_RND.1, FCS_CKM.1/AA,
FMT_MTD.1/AAPK, FIA_API.1/AA
Section 9.3.1
OT.DBI FMT_MTD.1/Activate_DBI, FMT_MTD.1/Deactivate_DBI,
FMT_MTD.1/DBI_Terminal, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
Section 9.3.1
Table 24 Security Objectives and SFRs - Coverage
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Security Functional
Requirements
Security Objectives
FAU_SAS.1 OT.Identification
FCS_CKM.1/CA OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Sens_Data_Conf,
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FCS_CKM.1/AA OT.AA_Proof
FCS_CKM.4 OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FCS_COP.1/SHA OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Sens_Data_Conf,
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FCS_COP.1/SYM OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Sens_Data_Conf,
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FCS_COP.1/MAC OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Sens_Data_Conf,
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER OT.AC_Pers, OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FCS_COP.1/AA OT.AA_Proof
FCS_RND.1 OT.AC_Pers, OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.AA_Proof
FIA_UID.1 OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FIA_UAU.1 OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FIA_UAU.4 OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FIA_UAU.5/EAC OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FIA_UAU.6/EAC OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FIA_API.1 OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FIA_API.1/AA OT.AA_Proof
FDP_ACC.1 OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FDP_ACF.1 OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FDP_UCT.1/EAC OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FDP_UIT.1/EAC OT.Data_Int
FMT_SMF.1 OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.DBI
FMT_SMR.1 OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.DBI
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA OT.Identification
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS OT.Identification
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FMT_MTD.1/DATE OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE OT.AC_Pers
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK OT.Data_Int, OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FMT_MTD.1/AAPK OT.AA_Proof
104
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Sens_Data_Conf,
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FMT_MTD.1/Activate_DBI OT.DBI
FMT_MTD.1/Deactivate_DBI OT.DBI
FMT_MTD.1/DBI_Terminal OT.DBI
FMT_MTD.3 OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FMT_LIM.1 OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
FMT_LIM.2 OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
FPT_EMS.1 OT.AC_Pers, OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
FPT_FLS.1 OT.Prot_Inf_Leak, OT.Prot_Malfunction
FPT_TST.1 OT.Prot_Inf_Leak, OT.Prot_Malfunction
FPT_PHP.3 OT.Prot_Inf_Leak, OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
Table 25 SFRs and Security Objectives
9.3.3 Dependencies
9.3.3.1 SFRs Dependencies
Requirements CC Dependencies Satisfied Dependencies
FAU_SAS.1 No Dependencies
FCS_CKM.1/CA (FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1)
and (FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/SYM,
FCS_COP.1/MAC
FCS_CKM.1/AA (FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1)
and (FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/AA
FCS_CKM.4 (FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2)
FCS_CKM.1/CA
FCS_COP.1/SHA (FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2) and (FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/SYM (FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2) and (FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/MAC (FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2) and (FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER (FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2) and (FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/AA (FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2) and (FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.1/AA, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_RND.1 No Dependencies
FIA_UID.1 No Dependencies
FIA_UAU.1 (FIA_UID.1) FIA_UID.1
FIA_UAU.4 No Dependencies
105
FIA_UAU.5/EAC No Dependencies
FIA_UAU.6/EAC No Dependencies
FIA_API.1 No Dependencies
FIA_API.1/AA No Dependencies
FDP_ACC.1 (FDP_ACF.1) FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACF.1 (FDP_ACC.1) and
(FMT_MSA.3)
FDP_ACC.1
FDP_UCT.1/EAC (FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1)
and (FTP_ITC.1 or
FTP_TRP.1)
FDP_ACC.1
FDP_UIT.1/EAC (FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1)
and (FTP_ITC.1 or
FTP_TRP.1)
FDP_ACC.1
FMT_SMF.1 No Dependencies
FMT_SMR.1 (FIA_UID.1) FIA_UID.1
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/DATE (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/AAPK (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/Activate_DBI (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/Deactivate_DBI (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/DBI_Terminal (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.3 (FMT_MTD.1) FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI,
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD
FMT_LIM.1 (FMT_LIM.2) FMT_LIM.2
FMT_LIM.2 (FMT_LIM.1) FMT_LIM.1
106
FPT_EMS.1 No Dependencies
FPT_FLS.1 No Dependencies
FPT_TST.1 No Dependencies
FPT_PHP.3 No Dependencies
Table 26 SFRs Dependencies
Rationale for the exclusion of Dependencies
The dependency FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 of FCS_COP.1/SHA is
discarded. The hash algorithm required by the SFR FCS_COP.1/SHA does not need any key
material. Therefore neither a key generation (FCS_CKM.1) nor an import (FDP_ITC.1/2) is
necessary.
The dependency FMT_MSA.3 of FDP_ACF.1 is discarded. The access control TSF according to
FDP_ACF.1 uses security attributes which are defined during the personalization and are fixed over
the whole life time of the TOE. No management of these security attribute (i.e. SFR FMT_MSA.1
and FMT_MSA.3) is necessary here.
The dependency FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1 of FDP_UCT.1/EAC is discarded. The SFR
FDP_UCT.1/EAC requires the use secure messaging between the MRTD and the GIS. There is no
need for the SFR FTP_ITC.1, e.g. to require this communication channel to be logically distinct
from other communication channels since there is only one channel. Since the TOE does not
provide a direct human interface a trusted path as required by FTP_TRP.1 is not applicable here.
The dependency FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1 of FDP_UIT.1/EAC is discarded. The SFR
FDP_UIT.1/EAC requires the use secure messaging between the MRTD and the GIS. There is no
need for the SFR FTP_ITC.1, e.g. to require this communication channel to be logically distinct
from other communication channels since there is only one channel. Since the TOE does not
provide a direct human interface a trusted path as required by FTP_TRP.1 is not applicable here.
9.3.3.2 SARs Dependencies
Requirements CC Dependencies Satisfied Dependencies
ADV_ARC.1 (ADV_FSP.1) and (ADV_TDS.1) ADV_FSP.5, ADV_TDS.4
ADV_FSP.5 (ADV_IMP.1) and (ADV_TDS.1) ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.4
ADV_IMP.1 (ADV_TDS.3) and (ALC_TAT.1) ADV_TDS.4, ALC_TAT.2
ADV_INT.2 (ADV_IMP.1) and (ADV_TDS.3) and
(ALC_TAT.1)
ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.4, ALC_TAT.2
ADV_TDS.4 (ADV_FSP.5) ADV_FSP.5
AGD_OPE.1 (ADV_FSP.1) ADV_FSP.5
AGD_PRE.1 No Dependencies
ALC_CMC.4 (ALC_CMS.1) and (ALC_DVS.1) and
(ALC_LCD.1)
ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1
ALC_CMS.5 No Dependencies
107
ALC_DEL.1 No Dependencies
ALC_DVS.2 No Dependencies
ALC_LCD.1 No Dependencies
ALC_TAT.2 (ADV_IMP.1) ADV_IMP.1
ASE_CCL.1 (ASE_ECD.1) and (ASE_INT.1) and
(ASE_REQ.1)
ASE_ECD.1, ASE_INT.1, ASE_REQ.2
ASE_ECD.1 No Dependencies
ASE_INT.1 No Dependencies
ASE_OBJ.2 (ASE_SPD.1) ASE_SPD.1
ASE_REQ.2 (ASE_ECD.1) and (ASE_OBJ.2) ASE_ECD.1, ASE_OBJ.2
ASE_SPD.1 No Dependencies
ASE_TSS.1 (ADV_FSP.1) and (ASE_INT.1) and
(ASE_REQ.1)
ADV_FSP.5, ASE_INT.1, ASE_REQ.2
ATE_COV.2 (ADV_FSP.2) and (ATE_FUN.1) ADV_FSP.5, ATE_FUN.1
ATE_DPT.3 (ADV_ARC.1) and (ADV_TDS.4) and
(ATE_FUN.1)
ADV_ARC.1, ADV_TDS.4,
ATE_FUN.1
ATE_FUN.1 (ATE_COV.1) ATE_COV.2
ATE_IND.2 (ADV_FSP.2) and (AGD_OPE.1) and
(AGD_PRE.1) and (ATE_COV.1) and
(ATE_FUN.1)
ADV_FSP.5, AGD_OPE.1,
AGD_PRE.1, ATE_COV.2,
ATE_FUN.1
AVA_VAN.5 (ADV_ARC.1) and (ADV_FSP.4) and
(ADV_IMP.1) and (ADV_TDS.3) and
(AGD_OPE.1) and (AGD_PRE.1) and
(ATE_DPT.1)
ADV_ARC.1, ADV_FSP.5,
ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.4,
AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1,
ATE_DPT.3
Table 27 SARs Dependencies
9.3.4 Rationale for the Security Assurance Requirements
The EAL5 was chosen to permit a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering
based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a high level of
independently assured security in a planned development and require a rigorous development
approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to specialist security engineering
techniques.
9.3.5 ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
The selection of the component ALC_DVS.2 provides a higher assurance of the security of the MRTD’s
development and manufacturing especially for the secure handling of the MRTD’s material.
The component ALC_DVS.2 augmented to EAL5 has no dependencies to other security requirements.
108
9.3.6 AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
The selection of the component AVA_VAN.5 provides a higher assurance of the security by
vulnerability analysis to assess the resistance to penetration attacks performed by an attacker
possessing a high attack potential. This vulnerability analysis is necessary to fulfill the security
objectives OT.Sens_Data_Conf and OT.Chip_Auth_Proof.
The component AVA_VAN.5 has the following dependencies:
• ADV_ARC.1 “Security architecture description”
• ADV_FSP.4 “Security-enforcing functional specification”
• ADV_TDS.3 “Basic modular design”
• ADV_IMP.1 “Implementation representation of the TSF”
• AGD_OPE.1 “Operational user guidance”
• AGD_PRE.1 “Preparative procedures”
• ATE_DPT.1 “Testing: basic design”
All of these are met or exceeded in the EAL5 assurance package.
109
10 TOE Summary Specification
10.1 TOE Summary Specification
F.ACR - Access Control in Reading
This function controls access to read functions and enforces the security policy for data retrieval.
Prior to any data retrieval, it authenticates the actor trying to access the data, and checks the access
conditions are fulfilled as well as the life cycle state. It ensures that at any time, the following keys
are never readable:
o Pre-personalization Agent keys,
o Personalization Agent keys,
o CA private key,
o Document basic access keys,
o Active Authentication Keys
Regarding the file structure:
In the Operational Use phase:
o The terminal can read user data, the Document Security Object, (EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1
to EF.DG16) only after EAC authentication and through a valid secure channel as defined by
access conditions in [ICAO-9303].
In the Production and preparation stage:
The Manufacturer can read the Initialization Data in Stage 2 “Production”. The pre-personalization
agent and the Personalization Agent can read only the random identifier in Stage 3 “Preparation”
stored in the TOE. Other data-elements can only be read after they are authenticated by the TOE
(using their authentication keys).
It ensures as well that no other part of the memory can be accessed at anytime
F.ACW - Access Control in Writing
This function controls access to write functions (in NVM) and enforces the security policy for data
writing. Prior to any data update, it authenticates the actor, and checks the access conditions are
fulfilled as well as the life cycle state.
Regarding the file structure:
In the Operational Use phase:
It is not possible to create any files (system or data files). Furthermore, it is not possible to update
any files (system or data files), except for CVCA which can be updated if the “Secure Messaging”
access condition is verified by the subjects defined in FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD and
FMT_MTD.1/DATE.
In the Production and preparation stage:
The Manufacturer can write all the Initialization data and data for the Pre-personalization. The
Personalization Agent can write through a valid secure channel all the data and Document Basic
Access Keys, Chip Authentication Private Key, Active Authentication Keys and Country Verifying
Certification Authority Public Key after it is authenticated by the TOE (using its authentication keys).
The Pre-Personalization Agent can write through a valid secure channel data to be used by the
personalization agent (after it is authenticated by the TOE using its authentication keys). The Pre-
personalization agent is only active after delivery. The key that is written in the TOE for
authentication purposes during manufacturing in meant for the pre-personalizaiton agent. the Pre-
110
personalization agent (which is seen as a sub-role of thep Personalization agent) will refresh this
key.
F.AA - Active Authentication
This security functionality ensures the Active Authentication is performed as described in [ICAO-
9303] (if it is activated by the personalizer).
F.CLR_INFO - Clear Residual Information
This security function ensures clearing of sensitive information
o Authentication state is securely cleared in case an error is detected or a new authentication
is attempted
o Authentication data related to GP authentication and EAC is securely cleared to prevent
reuse
o Session keys is securely erased in case an error is detected or the secure communication
session is closed
F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support
This Security Function provides the following cryptographic features:
o Key Generation based on ECDH with key sizes 192 to 521 bits.
o Key Generation based on DH with key size 2048 bits.
o RSA Key generation with key sizes 1536, 1792, 2048, 2560, 3072, 3584 and 4096
o ECC key Pair generation with key sizes 192, 224, 256, 320, 384, 512 and 521
o Hashing using SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512 meeting [FIPS_180_4]
o Secure messaging (encryption and decryption)using:
 Triple-DES in CBC mode (keys size 112 bits)
 AES in CBC mode (key sizes 128, 192 and 256 bits)
o Secure messaging (message authentication code) using:
 Retail MAC with key size 112 bits
 AES CMAC with key sizes 128, 192 and 256 bits
o Digital signature verification using:
 ECDSA with key sizes 192 to 521 bits.
 RSA with key sizes 1280, 1536, 1792, 2048, 2560, 3072, 3584 and 4096 bits.
o Digital signature generation using:
 ECDSA with key sizes 192 to 521 bits.
 RSA with key sizes 1536, 1792, 2048, 2560, 3072, 3584 and 4096 bits.
o Deterministic random number generation specified by FCS_RNG.1 Quality metric for
random numbers of [PTF-ST].
F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC
This TSF provides the Extended Access Control, authentication and session keys generation to be
used by F.SM, as described in [TR-03110]. It also provides the following management functions:
o Maintain the roles: Document Verifier, CVCA, Domestic EIS, Foreign EIS
o Limit the ability to update the CVCA Public key and CVCA Certificate to the Country Verifying
Certification Authority
o Limit the ability to update the date to CVCA, Document Verifier and Domestic Extended
Inspection System
111
o Ensures only secure values are accepted for TSF data of the Terminal Authentication Protocol
v.1 and the Access Control
o The terminal whose name is set by the personalization agent is allowed to remove the digital
blurring on images.
F.PERS - MRTD Personalization
This security functionality ensures that the TOE, when delivered to the Personalization Agent,
provides and requires authentication for data exchange. This function allows to:
o Manage symmetric authentication using Personalization Agent keys,
o Compute session keys to be used by F.SM,
o Load user data,
o Digitally blur the images in EF DG1 to EF DG8,
o Set the name (or beginning of the name) of the terminal allowed to remove the digital
blurring in phase 7
o Load or create Chip Authentication Key,
o Load or create Active Authentication Key,
o Disable read access to Initialization Data,
o Write initial CVCA Public Key, initial CVCA Certificate and initial current date
o Write the document basic access keys,
o Write the Document Security Object (SO d),
F.PHY - Physical Protection
This Security Function protects the TOE against physical attacks, so that the integrity and
confidentiality of the TOE is ensured, including keys, user data, configuration data and TOE life cycle.
It detects physical tampering, responds automatically, and also controls the emanations sent out by
the TOE.
This Security Function also limits any physical emanations from the TOE so as to prevent any
information leakge via these emanations that might reveal or provide access to sensitive data.
Furthermore, it prevents deploying test features after TOE delivery.
F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization
This security functionality ensures that the TOE, when delivered to the Manufacturer, provides and
requires an authentication mechanism for data exchange.
o Compute session keys to be used by F.SM,
o Initialization of the TOE,
o Load Personalization Agent keys in encrypted form,
o Store the Initialization and Pre-Personalization data in audit records.
F.SM - Secure Messaging
This security functionality ensures the confidentiality, authenticity and integrity of the communication
between the TOE and the interface device. In the operational phase, after a successful
Authentication Procedure (i.e. CA), a secure channel is established. This security functionality also
provides a Secure Messaging (SCP02 and SCP03) for the transmission of user data in Pre-
personalization and Personalization phases. The protocols can be configured to protect the
exchanges integrity and/or confidentiality. If an error occurs in the secure messaging layer or if the
session is closed, the session keys are destroyed. This ensures protection against replay attacks as
session keys are never reused.
112
F.SS - Safe State Management
This security functionality ensures that the TOE gets back to a secure state when:
o a tearing occurs (during a copy of data in NVM).
o an error due to self test as defined in FPT_TST.1.
o any physical tampering is detected.
This security functionality ensures that if such a case occurs, the TOE either is switched in the state
"kill card" or becomes mute.
F.STST - Self Test
This security function implements self test features through platform functionalities at reset as
defined in FPT_TST.1 to ensure the integrity of the TSF and TSF data.
113
10.2 SFRs and TSS
10.2.1 SFRs and TSS - Rationale
Class FAU Security Audit
FAU_SAS.1 is met by F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization
Class FCS Cryptographic Support
FCS_CKM.1/CA is met by F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC that generates keys after a successful
authentication using F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support
FCS_CKM.1/AA is met by F.AA - Active Authentication and F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support
FCS_CKM.4 is met by F.CLR_INFO - Clear Residual Information and F.SM - Secure Messaging that
destroys the session keys upon closure of a secure messaging session.
FCS_COP.1/SHA is met by F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support.
FCS_COP.1/SYM is met by F.SM - Secure Messaging that uses F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support
maintain a secure messaging session as defined in the requirement.
FCS_COP.1/MAC is met by F.SM - Secure Messaging that uses F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support
maintain a secure messaging session as defined in the requirement.
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER is met by F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC that uses F.CRYPTO -
Cryptographic Support for Terminal Authentication.
FCS_COP.1/AA is covered by F.AA - Active Authentication in association with F.CRYPTO -
Cryptographic Support
FCS_RND.1 the deterministic random number generation specified by FCS_RNG.1 Quality metric for
random numbers of [PTF-ST].
Class FIA Identification and Authentication
FIA_UID.1 is met by F.ACR - Access Control in Reading that manages read access to data based on
the current authentication state.
It is also met by F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC that allows Chip Authentication.
FIA_UAU.1 is met by F.ACR - Access Control in Reading that manages read access to data based on
the current authentication state.
It is also met by F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC that allows Chip Authentication.
114
FIA_UAU.4 is met by F.CLR_INFO Clear Residual Information that ensures all authentication data is
securely erased to prevent reuse.
FIA_UAU.5/EAC is met by F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC that provides Terminal
Authentication.
SFR is also met by F.PERS - MRTD Personalization that provides symmetric authentication.
The SFR is also met by F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization that provides manufacturer
authentication
Finally, it is also met by F.SM - Secure Messaging that provides a secure messaging session.
FIA_UAU.6/EAC is met by F.SM - Secure Messaging that ensures all messages are sent through the
secure communication channel after Chip Authentication.
FIA_API.1 is met by F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC that provides Chip Authentication as
defined by [TR-03110]
FIA_API.1/AA is met by F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC that provides Chip Authentication as
defined by [TR-03110]
Class FDP User Data Protection
FDP_ACC.1 is met by F.ACW - Access Control in Writing and F.ACR - Access Control in Reading that
control read and write access to the data based on the current authentication state using
authentication mechanisms provided by F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC and F.PERS - MRTD
Personalization
FDP_ACF.1 is met by F.ACW - Access Control in Writing and F.ACR - Access Control in Reading that
control read and write access to the data based on the current authentication state using
authentication mechanisms provided by F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC and F.PERS - MRTD
Personalization
FDP_UCT.1/EAC is met by F.SM - Secure Messaging that ensures all data is sent throught the
secure communication channel after a successful Chip Authentication.
FDP_UIT.1/EAC is met by F.SM - Secure Messaging that ensures all messages are sent through the
secure communication channel after Chip Authentication.
Class FMT Security Management
FMT_SMF.1 is met by F.PERS - MRTD Personalization and F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization that
utilizeF.ACW - Access Control in Writing to control write access via secure messaging provided by
F.SM - Secure Messaging
FMT_SMR.1 is met by F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC, F.PERS - MRTD Personalization and
F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization. These roles are maintained by means of the authentication
states during the authentication mechanisms provided by the 3 Security Functions
115
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA is met by F.ACW - Access Control in Writing that ensures access conditions
are met by way of authentication through F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS is met by F.PERS - MRTD Personalization that allows the personalization
agent to disable read access in F.ACR - Access Control in Reading
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI is met by F.ACW - Access Control in Writing that ensures access conditions
are met by way of authentication through F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD is met by F.ACW - Access Control in Writing that controls access to
updation of CVCA data by authentication through F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC
FMT_MTD.1/DATE is met by F.ACW - Access Control in Writing that controls access to updation of
CVCA data by authentication through F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE is met by F.ACW - Access Control in Writing that controls write access
based on F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK is met by F.ACW - Access Control in Writing that ensures access conditions are
met by way of authentication through F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization
FMT_MTD.1/AAPK is met by F.ACW - Access Control in Writing that ensures access conditions are
met by way of authentication through F.PERS - MRTD Personalization
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ is met by F.ACR - Access Control in Reading that ensures the secret keys
are never readable.
FMT_MTD.1/Activate_DBI is met by F.PERS - MRTD Personalization
FMT_MTD.1/Deactivate_DBI is met by F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC
FMT_MTD.1/DBI_Terminal is met by F.PERS - MRTD Personalization
FMT_MTD.3 is met by F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC
FMT_LIM.1 is met by F.PHY - Physical Protection and F.SS - Safe State Management that ensure
that no data can be manipulated or revealed and the TSF assumes a safe state in case any illegal
attempts to do so are detected.
FMT_LIM.2 is met by F.PHY - Physical Protection and F.SS - Safe State Management that ensure
that no data can be manipulated or revealed and the TSF assumes a safe state in case any illegal
attempts to do so are detected.
Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions
FPT_EMS.1 is met by F.PHY - Physical Protection that prevents emanations beyond permissible limits
to prevent any accidental revelation of data.
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FPT_FLS.1 is met by F.SS - Safe State Management.
FPT_TST.1 is met by F.STST - Self Test that performs self tests to ensure integrity of the TSF
FPT_PHP.3 is met by F.PHY - Physical Protection that protects the TOE against any physical probing
or tampering by using F.SS - Safe State Management in case any physical manipulation is
detected.
10.2.2 Association tables of SFRs and TSS
Security Functional
Requirements
TOE Summary Specification
FAU_SAS.1 F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization
FCS_CKM.1/CA F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC, F.CRYPTO -
Cryptographic Support
FCS_CKM.1/AA F.AA - Active Authentication, F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support
FCS_CKM.4 F.SM - Secure Messaging, F.CLR_INFO - Clear Residual
Information
FCS_COP.1/SHA F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support
FCS_COP.1/SYM F.SM - Secure Messaging, F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support
FCS_COP.1/MAC F.SM - Secure Messaging, F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC, F.CRYPTO -
Cryptographic Support
FCS_COP.1/AA F.AA - Active Authentication, F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support
FCS_RND.1 F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support
FIA_UID.1 F.ACR - Access Control in Reading, F.EAC - Extended Access
Control, EAC
FIA_UAU.1 F.ACR - Access Control in Reading, F.EAC - Extended Access
Control, EAC
FIA_UAU.4 F.CLR_INFO - Clear Residual Information
FIA_UAU.5/EAC F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC, F.PERS - MRTD
Personalization, F.SM - Secure Messaging, F.PREP - MRTD Pre-
personalization
FIA_UAU.6/EAC F.SM - Secure Messaging
FIA_API.1 F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC
FIA_API.1/AA F.AA - Active Authentication
FDP_ACC.1 F.ACW - Access Control in Writing, F.ACR - Access Control in
Reading, F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC, F.PERS - MRTD
Personalization
FDP_ACF.1 F.ACW - Access Control in Writing, F.ACR - Access Control in
Reading, F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC, F.PERS - MRTD
Personalization
FDP_UCT.1/EAC F.SM - Secure Messaging
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FDP_UIT.1/EAC F.SM - Secure Messaging
FMT_SMF.1 F.ACW - Access Control in Writing, F.PERS - MRTD
Personalization, F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization, F.SM -
Secure Messaging
FMT_SMR.1 F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC, F.PERS - MRTD
Personalization, F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA F.ACW - Access Control in Writing, F.PREP - MRTD Pre-
personalization
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS F.ACR - Access Control in Reading, F.PERS - MRTD
Personalization
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI F.ACW - Access Control in Writing, F.PERS - MRTD
Personalization
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD F.ACW - Access Control in Writing, F.EAC - Extended Access
Control, EAC
FMT_MTD.1/DATE F.ACW - Access Control in Writing, F.EAC - Extended Access
Control, EAC
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE F.PERS - MRTD Personalization, F.ACW - Access Control in
Writing
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK F.ACW - Access Control in Writing, F.PERS - MRTD
Personalization
FMT_MTD.1/AAPK F.ACW - Access Control in Writing, F.PERS - MRTD
Personalization
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ F.ACR - Access Control in Reading
FMT_MTD.1/Activate_DBI F.PERS - MRTD Personalization
FMT_MTD.1/Deactivate_DBI F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC
FMT_MTD.1/DBI_Terminal F.PERS - MRTD Personalization
FMT_MTD.3 F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC
FMT_LIM.1 F.SS - Safe State Management, F.PHY - Physical Protection
FMT_LIM.2 F.PHY - Physical Protection, F.SS - Safe State Management
FPT_EMS.1 F.PHY - Physical Protection
FPT_FLS.1 F.SS - Safe State Management
FPT_TST.1 F.STST - Self Test
FPT_PHP.3 F.PHY - Physical Protection, F.SS - Safe State Management
Table 28 SFRs and TSS - Coverage
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TOE Summary
Specification
Security Functional Requirements
F.ACR - Access Control
in Reading
FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1, FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
F.ACW - Access
Control in Writing
FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA,
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI, FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD, FMT_MTD.1/DATE,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE, FMT_MTD.1/CAPK, FMT_MTD.1/AAPK
F.AA - Active
Authentication
FCS_CKM.1/AA, FCS_COP.1/AA, FIA_API.1/AA
F.CLR_INFO - Clear
Residual Information
FCS_CKM.4, FIA_UAU.4
F.CRYPTO -
Cryptographic Support
FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_CKM.1/AA, FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_COP.1/SYM,
FCS_COP.1/MAC, FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER, FCS_COP.1/AA, FCS_RND.1
F.EAC - Extended
Access Control, EAC
FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER, FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1,
FIA_UAU.5/EAC, FIA_API.1, FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD, FMT_MTD.1/DATE, FMT_MTD.1/Deactivate_DBI,
FMT_MTD.3
F.PERS - MRTD
Personalization
FIA_UAU.5/EAC, FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS, FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE,
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK, FMT_MTD.1/AAPK, FMT_MTD.1/Activate_DBI,
FMT_MTD.1/DBI_Terminal
F.PHY - Physical
Protection
FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2, FPT_EMS.1, FPT_PHP.3
F.PREP - MRTD Pre-
personalization
FAU_SAS.1, FIA_UAU.5/EAC, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA
F.SM - Secure
Messaging
FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/SYM, FCS_COP.1/MAC, FIA_UAU.5/EAC,
FIA_UAU.6/EAC, FDP_UCT.1/EAC, FDP_UIT.1/EAC, FMT_SMF.1
F.SS - Safe State
Management
FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2, FPT_FLS.1, FPT_PHP.3
F.STST - Self Test FPT_TST.1
Table 29 TSS and SFRs - Coverage