The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
TÜBİTAK BİLGEM UEKAE
ULUSAL ELEKTRONİK & KRİPTOLOJİ ARAŞTIRMA ENSTİTÜSÜ
AKİS PROJESİ
AKİS-PASAPORT
SECURITY TARGET-LITE
AKİS V1.4i
Revision No 07
Revision Date 24.06.2013
Document Code AKIS-ST
File Name AKIS_PASAPORT_ST.DOC
Prepared by
Fehime BIYIKLIOĞLU Mehtap KARAMANLI
Mehmet ERİŞ
Approved by
Project Manager Yrd. Doç. Dr. Ercan ÖLÇER
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 2.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
Date of Revision
Revision
No
Revision Reason
Date of
Revision
01 First Publication 20.09.2011
02 OR1 Corrections 20.04.2012
03 GR2 Corrections 25.05.2012
04 GR4 Corrections 20.07.2012
05 GR9 Corrections 27.11.2012
06 GR10 Corrections 02.03.2013
07 GR13 Corrections 24.06.2013
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 3.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
CONTENT
Glossary&Abbreviations ................................................................................................................. 7
1. SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION ............................................................................ 9
1.1 ST Reference.............................................................................................................................. 9
1.2 TOE Reference........................................................................................................................... 9
1.3 TOE Overview ........................................................................................................................... 9
1.4 TOE Description ...................................................................................................................... 10
2 CONFORMANCE CLAIM................................................................................................... 17
2.1 CC Conformance Claim........................................................................................................... 17
2.2 PP Claim................................................................................................................................... 17
2.3 Package Claim.......................................................................................................................... 17
2.4 Conformance Rationale............................................................................................................ 17
3 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION............................................................................... 18
3.1 Introduction.............................................................................................................................. 18
3.2 Assumptions............................................................................................................................. 19
3.3 Threats...................................................................................................................................... 20
3.4 Organizational Security Policies .............................................................................................. 23
4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES................................................................................................... 24
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE .............................................................................................. 24
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment ............................................................. 26
4.3 Security Objective Rationale.................................................................................................... 28
5 EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION.................................................................... 31
5.1 Definition of the Family FAU_SAS......................................................................................... 31
5.2 Definition of the Family FCS_RND ........................................................................................ 31
5.3 Definition of the Family FIA_API ........................................................................................... 32
5.4 Definition of the Family FMT_LIM ........................................................................................ 33
5.5 Definition of the Family FAU_SAS......................................................................................... 34
5.6 Definition of the Family FPT_EMSEC.................................................................................... 35
6 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ........................................................................................... 36
6.1 Operation Notation for Functional Requirements.................................................................... 36
6.2 Security Functional Requirements for the TOE....................................................................... 36
6.3 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE........................................................................ 52
6.4 Security Requirements Rationale ............................................................................................. 52
7 TOE Summary Specification................................................................................................. 60
7.1 TOE Security Functions........................................................................................................... 60
8 Statement of Compatibility between the Composite Security Target and the Platform
Security Target............................................................................................................................... 65
8.1 Separation of the Platform-TSF ............................................................................................... 65
8.2 Platform-SFR ........................................................................................................................... 66
8.3 Platform Security Objectives.................................................................................................... 67
8.4 Platform Security Objectives for the environment................................................................... 68
8.5 Platform-Assumptions.............................................................................................................. 68
8.6 Platform-OSPs.......................................................................................................................... 68
8.7 Platform-Threats....................................................................................................................... 69
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 4.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
9 REFERENCES....................................................................................................................... 70
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 5.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
LIST OF FIGURES
Şekil 1AKiS v1.4i Operating System components and environment....................................................... 11
Şekil 2AKiS-Pasaport OS Life Cycle Phases........................................................................................... 13
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 6.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 Abbreviations & Glossary............................................................................................................. 7
Table 2 - Security Objective Rationale .................................................................................................... 28
Table 3- SFR List.................................................................................................................................... 37
Table 4- Authentication mechanisms...................................................................................................... 41
Table 5- Coverage of Security Objective for the TOE by SFR................................................................ 54
Table 6 – Dependencies between the SFR for the TOE........................................................................... 58
Table 7 - Summary specification rationale table..................................................................................... 64
Table 8 - Security requirements mapping table....................................................................................... 67
Table 9 - Security objectives mapping table ........................................................................................... 68
Table 10 - Security objectives for the environment mapping table......................................................... 68
Table 11 - Assumptions mapping table................................................................................................... 68
Table 12 - OSP mapping table ................................................................................................................ 68
Table 13 - Threats mapping table............................................................................................................ 69
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 7.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
Glossary&Abbreviations
AKiS Akıllı Kart İşletimSistemi
ACE Advanced Crypto Engine
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
CC Common Criteria
DF Dedicated File
DG Data Group
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EF Elemantary File
ES Embedded Software
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
ICCSN Integrated Circuit Serial Number
MRTD Machine Readable Travel Document
MF Master File
NVM Non Volatile Memory
OS Operating System
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TPDU Transmission Protocol Data Unit
TSF TOE Security Functionality
Table 1Abbreviations & Glossary
Basic Software: Itis the part of ES in charge of the generic functions of the Smartcard IC such
as Operating System, general routines and Interpreters.
Embedded Software: It is defined as the software embedded in the Smartcard Integrated
Circuit. The ES may be in any part of the non-volatile memories of the Smartcard IC.
Embedded software developer: Institution (or its agent) responsible for the smartcard
embedded software development and the specification of pre-personalization requirements.
Initialization: Itis the process to write specific information in the NVM (Non-Volatile
Memory) during IC manufacturing and testing (smartcard product life cycle phase 3) as well as
to execute security protection procedures by the IC manufacturer. The information could
contain protection codes or cryptographic keys.
Integrated Circuit (IC): Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing and/or
memory functions.
IC designer: Institution (or its agent) responsible for the IC development.
IC manufacturer: Institution (or its agent) responsible for the IC manufacturing, testing, and
pre-personalization.
IC packaging manufacturer: Institution (or its agent) responsible for the IC packaging and
testing.
Personalizer: Institution (or its agent) responsible for the smartcard personalization and final
testing.
Personalization data: Specific information in the non volatile memory during personalization
phase.
Security Information: Secret data, initialization data or control parameters for protection
system.
Smartcard: A credit sized plastic card which has a non volatile memory and a processing unit
embedded within it.
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 8.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
Smartcard Issuer: Institution (or its agent) responsible for the smartcard product delivery to
the smartcard end-user.
Smartcard product manufacturer: Institution (or its agent) responsible for the smartcard
product finishing process and testing.
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 9.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
1. SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION
1.1 ST Reference
ST Title: AKiS-Pasaport v1.4i Security Target, rev 7, 24.06.2013
This Security Target describes the TOE, intended IT environment (terminal, inspection system,
and basic inspection system), security objectives, security requirements, security functions and
all necessary rationale.
1.2 TOE Reference
TOE Identification: AKiS-Pasaport v1.4i
1.3 TOE Overview
1.3.1 TOE definition
AKiS-Pasaport v1.4i is a smart card which is designed to be used as Machine Readable Travel
Document (MRTD). The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the contactless integrated circuit chip
of machine readable travel document (AKiS-Pasaport) programmed according to the Logical
Data Structure (LDS) and providing the Basic Access Control according to ‘ICAO Doc 9303’.
1.3.2 TOE usage and security features for operational use
The usage and security features are as defined in the MRTD with ICAO Application, Basic
Access Control protection profile:
A State or Organization issues MRTDs to be used by the holder for international travel. The
traveler presents a MRTD to the inspection system to prove his or her identity. The MRTD in
context of this ST contains
(i) visual (eye readable) biographical data and portrait of the holder,
(ii) a separate data summary (MRZ data) for visual and machine reading using
OCR methods in the Machine readable zone (MRZ) and
(iii) data elements on the MRTD’s chip according to LDS for contactless machine reading.
The authentication of the traveler is based on
(i) the possession of a valid MRTD personalized for a holder with the claimed identity as given
on the biographical data page and
(ii) optional biometrics using the reference data stored in the MRTD.
The issuing State or Organization ensures the authenticity of the data of genuine MRTD’s. The
receiving State trusts a genuine MRTD of an issuing State or Organization.
1.3.3 Non-TOE hardware/software/firmware required by the TOE
There is no explicit non-TOE hardware, software or firmware required by the TOE to perform
its claimed security features. The TOE is defined to comprise the chip and the complete
operating system and application. Note, the inlay holding the chip as well as the antenna and the
booklet (holding the printed MRZ) are needed to represent a complete MRTD, nevertheless
these parts are not inevitable for the secure operation of the TOE.
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 10.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
1.4 TOE Description
AKiS v1.4i algorithms and crypto specifications are;
Communication
ISO/IEC 14443 Identification Cards – Contactless Integrated Circuit Cards
Basic Access Control;
ISO/IEC11770-2 Key Establishment Mechanism 6
3DES CBC as block cipher
Cryptographic checksum ISO/IEC9797-1 MAC Algorithm 3
Active Authentication;
ISO/IEC9796-2 Digital Signature Scheme 1
1.4.1 Physical Scope of TOE
The TOE comprises
 the circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (the integrated circuit, IC): IFX SLE78CLFX1600PM
the IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated
Support Software,
 the IC Embedded Software (AKiS-Pasaport v1.4i OS),
 the MRTD application and
 the MRTD User Manual
1.4.1.1 MRTD Chip
The integrated circuit of the MRTD’s chip is IFX SLE78CLFX1600PM. IFX
SLE78CLFX1600PMhasCC EAL 5+ (AVA_VAN.5, ALC_DVS.2) certificate. AKiS-Pasaport
v1.4i Operating System is loaded into the Flash Memory of the IFX chip (that is set as Read
Only – chip: SLE78CLFX1600PM) during the manufacturing of the IC.
1.4.1.2 AKiS v1.4i Operating System
Smart cards are used as electronic authentication keys, digital signs, GSM cards and bank cards.
Also, they are used as electronic passports and e-government cards such as personal
identification and health care cards.
Basically a smart card consists of 3 main parts:
 Metallic unit on plastic material which is called plastic module (physical plastic card)
 Silicon chip located in the metallic unit on the plastic module. This chip consists of
microprocessor, RAM, Non Volatile Memory and some hardware units
 Operating system (written in Non Volatile Memory and enables the operation of card
functions using hardware units)
From the 3 parts listed above, only the third one is developed by TÜBİTAK-UEKAE. The first
part is developed by a card manufacturer company (who provides the conditions that are
presented in AKiS_TeslimveIsletim document) and the second part is developed by IFX
Company. The second part has EAL 5+ (compatible with BSI0035) certificate. TOE operates
on IFX SLE78CLFX1600PM chip. Chip consists of; 8051 based microprocessor, NVM, RAM,
crypto co-processors, Random Number Generator, MMU, UART, Timers and MED.
TOE is embedded in NVM during chip manufacturing and can’t be changed afterwards.
However, data can be written into EEPROM under operating system’s control.
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 11.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
1.4.1.2.1 AKiS v1.4i Operating System Components
Operating system components are shown in Şekil 1;
 Memory Manager
 File Manager
 Command Interpreter
 Communication Handler
Message is received by UART which is managed by communication handler in TOE. The
message comes in TPDU format which is mentioned above. Incoming TPDU packet is analysed
and block type decision is made by the communication handler. TPDU may include 3 different
types of blocks, named R, S and I block. R and S blocks are used to control the transmission
protocol (ISO 7816-3). I block carries the command which is transmitted to the command
interpreter and executed in TOE. When command execution is finished, communication handler
sends the answer to the reader via UART. If the command is related with the file system,
command interpreter calls the file manager. File manager is responsible for the operations in the
file field which is in the EEPROM. Memory manager is used to open new file, close file, delete
page and attach new page.
Şekil 1AKiS v1.4i Operating System components and environment
1.4.1.2.2 AKiS v1.4i Operating System Phases
AKiS v1.4i Operating System also consists of some phases which will be called as “AKiS v1.4i
Operating System Life cycle phases” ( Şekil 2) in order to obstruct a confusion.
There are 5 different life cycle phases available on TOE. Relations and crossing between these
life cycle phases are shown in the Şekil 2. Also there are some several keys available on
Memory Management
File Management
Command Interpreter
Communication Handler
MMU
UART
OS
CARD READER PC
Random Number
Generator
NVM
EEPROM
RAM
Timer
Interrupt Module
MED
Crypto Libs
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 12.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
TOE in order to be used within the execution of the secure commands. Command interpreter of
TOE is designed to execute some special commands for the different life cycle phases.
These phases are;
Activation:
Main purposes of the activation phase is; to check if TOE is correct (not corrupted) and load the
initial values of the keys that will be used on the execution of the secure commands
(initialization and personalization key). MF (Master File) is created in this phase.
Initialization:
Main purpose of the initialization phase is to load the initialization data into the card. Therefore
the file system will begin to construct on the EEPROM on each command.
Personalization:
Main purpose of the personalization phase is to load the personalization data into the card.
Henceforth the card will include unique data belonging to the end user.
Operation:
In the operation phase, TOE is available for the end user.
Death:
When the security conditions listed below are not satisfied or it is noticed that security is trying
to be surpassed, TOE enters the death phase:
 When 64 unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to loading of the system
keys with Exchange Challenge command.
 When 10 unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to changing of the
initialization key with Change Key command, erasing of EEPROM with Erase Files
command, Initialization Start and Initialization End commands.
 When 10 unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related tochanging of the
personalization key with Change Key command, Personalization Start and
Personalization End commands.
 When 16 to 128 (configurable) unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to
BAC authentication protocol.
 When an integrity check of interior filesystem tables fails.
1.4.1.3 The MRTD Application
The MRTD Application consists of LDS (Logical Data Structure), BAC(Basic Access Control)
keys and active authentication keys.
1.4.1.4 The MRTD User Manual
Command set and operation of the AKiS Pasaport v1.4i operating system is described in this
document.
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 13.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
Activation Phase
Initialization Phase
Personalization
Phase
Operation Phase
EXCHANGE CHALLENGE
Death Phase
INITIALIZE
PERSONALIZE
ERASE FILES
CARD TEST
EXCHANGE CHALLENGE
CHANGE KEY
INITIALIZE
ERASE FILES
GET DATA
CREATE FILE
SELECT FILE
UPDATE BINARY
PUT DATA
CHANGE KEY
PERSONALIZE
ERASE FILES
GET DATA
CREATE FILE
SELECT FILE
UPDATE BINARY
PUT DATA
GET DATA
File system commands:
SELECT FILE
READ BINARY
Security Commands
GET CHALLANGE
INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE
MUTUAL AUTHENTICATE
ERASE FILES
GET_DATA
DELETE_FILE
READ_BINARY
ERASE_BINARY
WRITE_DELETE_KEY
READ KEY
GET_RESPONSE
DELETE_FILE
READ_BINARY
ERASE_BINARY
WRITE_DELETE_KEY
READ KEY
GET_RESPONSE
Şekil 2AKiS-Pasaport OS Life Cycle Phases
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 14.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
1.4.2 Logical Scope of TOE
For this ST the MRTD is viewed as unit of
(a) thephysical MRTD as travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip. It presents
visual readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the MRTD holder
(1) the biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book,
(2) the printed data in the Machine-Readable Zone (MRZ) and
(3) the printed portrait.
(b) thelogical MRTD as data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data
Structure as specified by ICAO on the contactless integrated circuit. It presents contactless
readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the MRTD holder
(1) the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1),
(2) the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
(3) the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16) and
(4) the Document security object.
The issuing State or Organization implements security features of the MRTD to maintain the
authenticity and integrity of the MRTD and their data. The MRTD as the passport book and the
MRTD’s chip is uniquely identified by the Document Number.
The physical MRTD is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on paper,
security printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the MRTD’s chip) and organizational
security measures (e.g. control of materials, personalization procedures). These security
measures include the binding of the MRTD’s chip to the passport book.
The logical MRTD is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created by the
document signer acting for the issuing State or Organization and the security features of the
MRTD’s chip.
The ICAO defines the baseline security methods Passive Authentication and the optional
advanced security methods Basic Access Control to the logical MRTD, Active Authentication
of the MRTD’s chip, Extended Access Control to and the Data Encryption of additional
sensitive biometrics as optional security measure in the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’. The Passive
Authentication Mechanism and the Data Encryption are performed completely and
independently on the TOE by the TOE environment.
This ST addresses the protection of the logical MRTD
(i) in integrity by writeonly-once access control and by physical means, and
(ii) in confidentiality by the Basic Access Control Mechanism.
(iii) innon-clonability by the Active Authentication Mechanism.
The Basic Access Control is a security feature which is mandatory supported by the TOE. The
inspection system
(i) reads optically the MRTD,
(ii) authenticates itself as inspection system by means of Document Basic Access
Keys.
After successful authentication of the inspection system the MRTD’s chip provides read access
to the logical MRTD by means of private communication (secure messaging) with this
inspection system.
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 15.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
TOE life cycle
The TOE life cycle is described in terms of the four life cycle phases, but TOE actually
comprises of phase 1 and step 3 of phase 2.
Phase 1 “Development”
(Step1) The TOE is developed in phase 1. The IC developer develops the integrated circuit, the
IC Dedicated Software and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE
components.
(Step2) The software developer uses the guidance documentation for the integrated circuit and
the guidance documentation for relevant parts of the IC Dedicated Software and develops the
IC Embedded Software (operating system), the MRTD application and the guidance
documentation associated with these TOE components.
The manufacturing documentation of the IC including the IC Dedicated Software and the
Embedded Software in the non-volatile non-programmable memories (ROM) is securely
delivered to the IC manufacturer. The IC Embedded Software in the non-volatile programmable
memories, the MRTD application and the guidance documentation is securely delivered to the
MRTD manufacturer.
Phase 2 “Manufacturing”
(Step3) In a first step the TOE integrated circuit is produced containing the MRTD’s chip
Dedicated Software and the parts of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software in the non-volatile
non-programmable memories NVM The IC manufacturer writes the IC Identification Data onto
the chip to control the IC as MRTD material during the IC manufacturing and the delivery
process to the MRTD manufacturer. The IC is securely delivered from the IC manufacturer to
the MRTD manufacturer.
(Step4) The MRTD manufacturer combines the IC with hardware for the contactless interface
in the passport book.
(Step5) The MRTD manufacturer initializes the MRTD by these steps
(i) configuring the MRTD (choosing hash algorithm SHA-1 or SHA-256 for internal
authenticate, enable attack counter, setting max BAC error number and delay,
setting ATS historical bytes )
(ii) creating the MRTD application and
(iii) equiping MRTD’s chips with pre-personalization Data.
Creation of the application implies the creation of MF and ICAO.DF
The pre-personalized MRTD together with the IC Identifier is securely delivered from the
MRTD manufacturer to the Personalization Agent. The MRTD manufacturer also provides the
relevant parts of the guidance documentation to the Personalization Agent.
Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”
(Step6) The personalization of the MRTD includes
(i) the survey of the MRTD holder’s biographical data,
(ii) the enrolment of the MRTD holder biometric reference data (i.e. the digitized
portraits and the optional biometric reference data),
(iii) the printing of the visual readable data onto the physical MRTD,
(iv) the writing of the TOE User Data and TSF Data into the logical MRTD and
(v) configuration of the TSF.
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 16.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
The step (iv) is performed by the Personalization Agent and includes but is not limited to the
creation of
(i) the digital MRZ data (EF.DG1),
(ii) the digitized portrait (EF.DG2), and
(iii) the Document security object.
The signing of the Document security object by the Document Signer finalizes the
personalization of the genuine MRTD for the MRTD holder. The personalized MRTD (together
with appropriate guidance for TOE use if necessary) is handed over to the MRTD holder for
operational use.
The TSF data (data created by and for the TOE, that might affect the operation of the TOE)
comprise the Manufacturer Authentication Key, the Personalization Agent Authentication Key,
the Basic Access Control Key, the Active Authentication Key, maximum value for attack
counter and BAC error counter, active authentication hash algorithm type (SHA-1 or SHA-256
is chosen).
Phase 4 “Operational Use”
(Step7) The TOE is used as MRTD chip by the traveler and the inspection systems in the
“Operational Use” phase. The user data can be read according to the security policy of the
issuing State or Organization and can be used according to the security policy of the issuing
State but they can never be modified.
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 17.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
2 CONFORMANCE CLAIM
2.1 CC Conformance Claim
This protection profile claims conformance to
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction
and General Model; CCMB-2009-07-001, Version 3.1, Revision 3, July 2009, [1]
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security
Functional Components; CCMB-2009-07-002, Version 3.1, Revision 3, July 2009, [2],
Extended
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security
Assurance Requirements; CCMB-2009-07-003, Version 3.1, Revision 3, July 2009, [3],
Comformant
The
 Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation
Methodology; CCMB-2009-07-004, Version 3.1, Revision 3, July 2009, [4]
has to be taken into account.
2.2 PP Claim
This ST claims conformance to Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel
Document with „ICAO Application”, Basic Access Control; BSI-CC-PP-0055, Version 1.10,
25th March 2009 [7].
2.3 Package Claim
EAL4 augmented with ALC_DVS.2.
2.4 Conformance Rationale
This ST claims strict conformance to the Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine
Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application”, Basic Access Control; BSI-CC-PP-0055,
Version 1.10, 25th March 2009. BSI-CC-PP-0055 is developed for ePassport applications with
Basic Access Control according to ICAO 9303. The TOE referenced in this ST is same type of
product with the TOE defined in the mentioned PP.
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 18.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
3 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION
3.1 Introduction
Assets
The assets to be protected by the TOE include the User Data on the MRTD’s chip.
Logical MRTD Data
The logical MRTD data consists of the EF.COM, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 (with different security
needs) and the Document Security Object EF.SOD according to LDS. These data are user data
of the TOE. The EF.COM lists the existing elementary files (EF) with the user data. The
EF.DG1 to EF.DG13 and EF.DG 16 contain personal data of the MRTD holder. The Chip
Authentication Public Key (EF.DG 14) is used by the inspection system for the Chip
Authentication. The EF.SOD is used by the inspection system for Passive Authentication of the
logical MRTD.
The TOE specifies the BAC mechanisms with resistance against enhanced basic attack potential
granting access to
 Logical MRTD standard User Data (i.e. Personal Data) of the MRTD holder (EF.DG1,
EF.DG2, EF.DG5 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16),
 Active Authentication Public Key in EF.DG15,
 Document Security Object (SOD) in EF.SOD,
 Common data in EF.COM
and Active Authentication mechanism.
The TOE prevents read access to sensitive User Data
 Sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3, EF.DG4).
A sensitive asset is the following more general one.
Authenticity of the MRTD’s chip
The authenticity of the MRTD’s chip personalized by the issuing State or Organization for the
MRTD holder is used by the traveler to prove his possession of a genuine MRTD.
Subjects
This ST considers the following subjects:
Manufacturer
The generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing the integrated circuit and the MRTD
Manufacturer completing the IC to the MRTD’s chip. The Manufacturer is the default user of
the TOE during the Phase 2 Manufacturing. The TOE does not distinguish between the users IC
Manufacturer and MRTD Manufacturer using this role Manufacturer.
Personalization Agent
The agent is acting on behalf of the issuing State or Organization to personalize the MRTD for
the holder by some or all of the following activities
(i) establishing the identity the holder for the biographic data in the MRTD,
(ii) enrolling the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded
finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s)
(iii) writing these data on the physical and logical MRTD for the holder as defined for
global, international and national interoperability,
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 19.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
(iv) writing the initial TSF data and
(v) signing the Document Security Object.
Terminal
A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through the contactless
interface.
Inspection system (IS)
A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State
(i) examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and
(ii) verifying the traveler as MRTD holder.
The Basic Inspection System(BIS)
(i) contains a terminal for the contactless communication with the MRTD’s chip,
(ii) implements the terminals part of the Basic Access Control Mechanism and
(iii) gets the authorization to read the logical MRTD under the Basic Access Control by
optical reading the MRTD or other parts of the passport book providing this
information.
MRTD Holder
The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization personalized the
MRTD.
Traveler
Person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming the identity of the MRTD
holder.
Attacker
A threat agent trying
(i) to identify and to trace the movement of the MRTD’s chip remotely (i.e. without
knowing or optically reading the printed MRZ data),
(ii) to read or to manipulate the logical MRTD without authorization, or
(iii) to forge a genuine MRTD.
An impostor is attacking the inspection system as TOE IT environment independent on using a
genuine, counterfeit or forged MRTD. Therefore the impostor may useresults of successful
attacks against the TOE but the attack itself is not relevant for the TOE.
3.2 Assumptions
The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be
used or is intended to be used.
A.MRTD_Manufact MRTD manufacturing on steps 4 to 6
It is assumed that appropriate functionality testing of the MRTD is used. It is assumed that
security procedures are used during all manufacturing and test operations to maintain
confidentiality and integrity of the MRTD and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any
possible copy, modification, retention, theft or unauthorized use).
A.MRTD_Delivery MRTD delivery during steps 4 to 6
Procedures shall guarantee the control of the TOE delivery and storage process and
conformance to its objectives:
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 20.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
- Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery and storage.
- Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in the
delivery process and storage.
- Procedures shall ensure that people dealing with the procedure for delivery have got the
required skill.
A.Pers_Agent Personalization of the MRTD’s chip
The Personalization Agent ensures the correctness of
(i) the logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD holder,
(ii) the Document Basic Access Keys,
(iii) the Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG14) if stored on the MRTD’s chip, and
(iv) the Document Signer Public Key Certificate (if stored on the MRTD’s chip). The
Personalization Agent signs the Document Security Object.
The Personalization Agent bears the Personalization Agent Authentication to authenticate
himself to the TOE by symmetric cryptographic mechanisms.
A.Insp_Sys Inspection Systems for global interoperability
The Inspection System is used by the border control officer of the receiving State
(i) examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and
(ii) verifying the traveler as MRTD holder.
The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability
(i) includes the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each
issuing State or Organization, and
(ii) implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control.
The Basic Inspection System reads the logical MRTD under Basic Access Control and
performs the Passive Authentication to verify the logical MRTD.
A.BAC-Keys Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys
The Document Basic Access Control Keys being generated and imported by the issuing State or
Organization have to provide sufficient cryptographic strength. As a consequence of the ‘ICAO
Doc 9303’ , the Document Basic Access Control Keys are derived from a defined subset of the
individual printed MRZ data. It has to be ensured that these data provide sufficient entropy to
withstand any attack based on the decision that the inspection system has to derive Document
Access Keys from the printed MRZ data with enhanced basic attack potential.
3.3 Threats
This section describes the threats to be averted by the TOE independently or in collaboration
with its IT environment. These threats result from the TOE method of use in the operational
environment and the assets stored in or protected by the TOE.
The TOE in collaboration with its IT environment shall avert the threats as specified below.
T.Chip_ID Identification of MRTD’s chip
Adverse action: An attacker trying to trace the movement of the MRTD by identifying remotely
the MRTD’s chip by establishing or listening to communications through the contactless
communication interface.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically readable MRZ
data printed on the MRTD data page in advance
Asset: Anonymity of user,
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 21.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
T.Skimming Skimming the logical MRTD
Adverse action: An attacker imitates an inspection system trying to establish a communication
to read the logical MRTD or parts of it via the contactless communication channel of the TOE.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically readable MRZ
data printed on the MRTD data page in advance
Asset: confidentiality of logical MRTD data
T.Eavesdropping Eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and
inspection system
Adverse action: An attacker is listening to an existing communication between the MRTD’s
chip and an inspection system to gain the logical MRTD or parts of it. The inspection system
uses the MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page but the attacker does not know these data in
advance.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically readable MRZ
data printed on the MRTD data page in advance
Asset: confidentiality of logical MRTD data
T.Forgery Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip
Adverse action: An attacker alters fraudulently the complete stored logical MRTD or any part
of it including its security related data in order to deceive on an inspection system by means of
the changed MRTD holder’s identity or biometric reference data. This threat comprises several
attack scenarios of MRTD forgery. The attacker may alter the biographical data on the
biographical data page of the passport book, in the printed MRZ and in the digital MRZ to
claim another identity of the traveler. The attacker may alter the printed portrait and the
digitized portrait to overcome the visual inspection of the inspection officer and the automated
biometric authentication mechanism by face recognition. The attacker may alter the biometric
reference data to defeat automated biometric authentication mechanism of the inspection
system. The attacker may combine data groups of different logical MRTDs to create a new
forged MRTD, e.g. the attacker writes the digitized portrait and optional biometric reference
finger data read from the logical MRTD of a traveler into another MRTD’s chip leaving their
digital MRZ unchanged to claim the identity of the holder this MRTD. The attacker may also
copy the complete unchanged logical MRTD to another contactless chip.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of one or more
legitimate MRTDs
Asset: authenticity of logical MRTD data
The TOE shall avert the threats as specified below.
T.Abuse-Func Abuse of Functionality
Adverse action: An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in the phase
“Operational Use” in order
(i) to manipulate User Data,
(ii) to manipulate (explore, bypass, deactivate or change) security features or functions
of the TOE or
(iii) to disclose or to manipulate TSF Data.
This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialization and the personalization in
the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate
MRTD
Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF.
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 22.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
T.Information_Leakage Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip
Adverse action: An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during its
usage in order to disclose confidential TSF data. The information leakage may be inherent in
the normal operation or caused by the attacker.
Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O characteristics,
clock frequency, or by changes in processing time requirements. This leakage may be
interpreted as a covert channel transmission but is more closely related to measurement of
operating parameters, which may be derived either from measurements of the contactless
interface (emanation) or direct measurements (by contact to the chip still available even for a
contactless chip) and can then be related to the specific operation being performed. Examples
are the Differential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) and the Differential Power Analysis
(DPA). Moreover the attacker may try actively to enforce information leakage by fault injection
(e.g. Differential Fault Analysis).
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate
MRTD
Asset: confidentiality of logical MRTD and TSF data
T.Phys-Tamper Physical Tampering
Adverse action: An attacker may perform physical probing of the MRTD’s chip in order
(i) to disclose TSF Data or
(ii) to disclose/reconstruct the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software.
An attacker may physically modify the MRTD’s chip in order to
(i) modify security features or functions of the MRTD’s chip,
(ii) modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software,
(iii) modify User Data or
(iv) to modify TSF data.
The physical tampering may be focused directly on the disclosure or manipulation of TOE User
Data (e.g. the biometric reference data for the inspection system) or TSF Data (e.g.
authentication key of the MRTD’s chip) or indirectly by preparation of the TOE to following
attack methods by modification of security features (e.g. to enable information leakage through
power analysis). Physical tampering requires direct interaction with the MRTD’s chip internals.
Techniques commonly employed in IC failure analysis and IC reverse engineering efforts may
be used. Before that, the hardware security mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be
identified.
Determination of software design including treatment of User Data and TSF Data may also be a
pre-requisite. The modification may result in the deactivation of a security function. Changes of
circuitry or data can be permanent or temporary.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate
MRTD
Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF
T.Malfunction Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
Adverse action: An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the MRTD’s chip Embedded
Software by applying environmental stress in order to
(i) deactivate or modify security features or functions of the TOE or
(ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip Embedded
Software.
This may be achieved e.g. by operating the MRTD’s chip outside the normal operating
conditions, exploiting errors in the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software or misusing
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 23.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
administration function. To exploit these vulnerabilities an attacker needs information about the
functional operation.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate
MRTD
Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of
TSF
3.4 Organizational Security Policies
The TOE shall comply with the following Organizational Security Policies (OSP) as security
rules, procedures, practices, or guidelines imposed by an organization upon its operations (see
CC part 1, sec. 3.2).
P.Manufact Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip
The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The
MRTD Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalization Data which contains at least the
Personalization Agent Key.
P.Personalization Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organization only
The issuing State or Organization guarantees the correctness of the biographical data, the
printed portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and other data of the
logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD holder. The personalization of the MRTD for the
holder is performed by an agent authorized by the issuing State or Organization only.
P.Personal_Data Personal data protection policy
The biographical data and their summary printed in the MRZ and stored on the MRTD’s chip
(EF.DG1), the printed portrait and the digitized portrait (EF.DG2), the biometric reference data
of finger(s) (EF.DG3), the biometric reference data of iris image(s) (EF.DG4) and data
according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16) stored on the MRTD’s chip are personal
data of the MRTD holder. These data groups are intended to be used only with agreement of the
MRTD holder by inspection systems to which the MRTD is presented. The MRTD’s chip shall
provide the possibility for the Basic Access Control to allow read access to these data only for
terminals successfully authenticated based on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Keys.
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 24.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES
This part describes the security objectives for the TOE and the security objectives for the TOE
environment. The security objectives for the TOE environment are separated into security
objectives for the development and production environment and security objectives for the
operational environment.
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of identified
threats to be countered by the TOE and organizational security policies to be met by the TOE.
OT.AC_Pers Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD
The TOE must ensure that the logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the
Documentsecurity object according to LDS and the TSF data can be written by authorized
Personalization Agents only. The logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 and the TSF data
may be written only during and cannot be changed after its personalization. The Document
security object can be updated by authorized Personalization Agents if data in the data groups
EF.DG3 to EF.DG16 are added.
OT.Data_Int Integrity of personal data
The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip
againstphysical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure that the
inspection system is able to detect any modification of the transmitted logical MRTD data.
OT.Data_Conf Confidentiality of personal data
The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data groups EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16. Read access to EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 is granted to terminals successfully
authenticated as Personalization Agent. Read access to EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to
EF.DG16 is granted to terminals successfully authenticated as Basic Inspection System. The
Basic Inspection System shall authenticate itself by means of the Basic Access Control based
on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Key. The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of
the logical MRTD data during their transmission to the Basic Inspection System.
The traveler grants the authorization for reading the personal data inEF.DG1, EF.DG2 and
EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 to the inspection system by presenting the MRTD.The MRTD’s chip shall
provide read access to these data for terminals successfully authenticated by means of the Basic
Access Control based on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Keys.
The security objective OT.Data_Conf requires the TOE to ensure the strength of the security
function Basic Access Control Authentication. The Document Basic Access Keys are
derivedfrom the MRZ data defined by the TOE environment and are loaded into the TOE by the
Personalization Agent. Therefore the sufficient quality of these keys has to result from the MRZ
data’s entropy. Any attack based on decision of the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ that the
inspectionsystem derives Document Basic Access is ensured by OE.BAC-Keys. Note that the
authorization for reading the biometric data in EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 is only granted after
successful Enhanced Access Control not covered by this protection profile. Thus the read
access must be prevented even in case of a successful BAC Authentication.
OT.Identification Identification and Authentication of the TOE
The TOE must provide means to store IC Identification and Pre-Personalization Data in its
nonvolatile memory. The IC Identification Data must provide a unique identification of the IC
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 25.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
during Phase 2 “Manufacturing” and Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”. The storage of
the Pre- Personalization data includes writing of the Personalization Agent Key(s). In Phase 4
“Operational Use” the TOE shall identify itself only to a successful authenticated Basic
Inspection System or Personalization Agent.
The TOE security objective OT.Identification addresses security features of the TOE to support
the life cycle security in the manufacturing and personalization phases. The IC Identification
Data are used for TOE identification in Phase 2 “Manufacturing” and fortraceability and/or to
secure shipment of the TOE from Phase 2 “Manufacturing” into the Phase 3 “Personalization of
the MRTD”. The OT.Identification addresses security features of the TOE to be used by the
TOE manufacturing. In the Phase 4 “Operational Use” the TOE is identified by the Document
Number as part of the printed and digital MRZ. The OT.Identification forbids the output of any
other IC (e.g. integrated circuit card serial number ICCSN) or MRTD identifier through the
contactless interface before successful authentication as Basic Inspection System or as
Personalization Agent.
The following TOE security objectives address the protection provided by the MRTD’s
chipindependent of the TOE environment.
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func Protection against Abuse of Functionality
After delivery of the TOE to the MRTD Holder, the TOE must prevent the abuse of test and
support functions that may be maliciously used to
(i) disclose critical User Data,
(ii) manipulate critical User Data of the IC Embedded Software,
(iii) manipulate Soft-coded ICEmbedded Software or
(iv) bypass, deactivate, change or explore security features or functions of the TOE.
Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the capabilities of the Test
Features provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software which are not specified here.
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak Protection against Information Leakage
The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential TSF data stored and/or
processed in the MRTD’s chip
 by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between
events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption,
clock, or I/O lines and
 by forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or
 by a physical manipulation of the TOE.
This objective pertains to measurements with subsequent complex signal
processing due to normal operation of the TOE or operations enforced by an attacker. Details
correspond to an analysis of attack scenarios which is not given here.
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper Protection against Physical Tampering
The TOE must provide protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the TSF
Data, and the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. This includes protection against attacks with
enhanced-basic attack potential by means of
 measuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical probing on the chips
surface except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage and
current) or
 measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction between
charges (using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure analysis)
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 26.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
 manipulation of the hardware and its security features, as well as controlled
manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF Data) with a prior
 reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions.
OT.Prot_Malfunction Protection against Malfunctions
The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside
thenormal operating conditions where reliability and secure operation has not been proven or
tested. This is to prevent errors. The environmental conditions may include external energy
(esp. electromagnetic) fields, voltage (on any contacts), clock frequency, or temperature.
A malfunction of the TOE may also be caused using a direct interactionwith elements on the
chip surface. This is considered as being a manipulation (refer to theobjective OT.Prot_Phys-
Tamper) provided that detailed knowledge about the TOE´s internals.
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
Issuing State or Organization
The issuing State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE
environment.
OE.MRTD_Manufact Protection of the MRTD Manufacturing
Appropriate functionality testing of the TOE shall be used in step 4 to 6. During all
manufacturing and test operations, security procedures shall be used through phases 4, 5 and 6
to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its manufacturing and test data.
OE.MRTD_ Delivery Protection of the MRTD delivery
Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery including the
following objectives:
 non-disclosure of any security relevant information,
 identification of the element under delivery,
 meet confidentiality rules (confidentiality level, transmittal form, reception
acknowledgment),
 physical protection to prevent external damage,
 secure storage and handling procedures (including rejected TOE’s),
 traceability of TOE during delivery including the following parameters:
• origin and shipment details,
• reception, reception acknowledgement,
• location material/information.
Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in the
delivery process (including if applicable any non-conformance to the confidentiality
convention) and highlight all non-conformance to this process. Procedures shall ensure that
people (shipping department, carrier, reception department) dealing with the procedure for
delivery have got the required skill, training and knowledge to meet the procedure requirements
and be able to act fully in accordance with the above expectations.
OE.Personalization Personalization of logical MRTD
The issuing State or Organization must ensure that the Personalization Agents acting on behalf
of the issuing State or Organization
(i) establish the correct identity of the holder and create biographical data for the
MRTD,
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 27.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
(ii) enroll the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded
finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s) and
(iii) personalize the MRTD for the holder together with the defined physical and logical
security measures to protect the confidentiality and integrity of these data.
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature
The issuing State or Organization must
(i) generate a cryptographic secure Country Signing CA Key Pair,
(ii) ensure the secrecy of the Country Signing CA Private Key and sign Document
Signer Certificates in a secure operational environment, and
(iii) distribute the Certificate of the
Country Signing CA Public Key to receiving States and Organizations maintaining its
authenticity and integrity. The issuing State or Organization must
(i) generate a cryptographic secure Document Signer Key Pair and ensure the secrecy
of the Document Signer Private Keys,
(ii) sign Document Security Objects of genuine MRTD in a secure operational
environment only and
(iii) distribute the Certificate of the Document Signer Public Key to receiving States and
Organizations. The digital signature in the Document Security Object relates all data
in the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 if stored in the LDS.
OE.BAC-Keys Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys
The Document Basic Access Control Keys being generated and imported by the issuing State or
Organization have to provide sufficient cryptographic strength. As a consequence of the ‘ICAO
Doc 9303’ the Document Basic Access Control Keys are derived from a defined subset of the
individual printed MRZ data. It has to be ensured that these data provide sufficient entropy to
withstand any attack based on the decision that the inspection system has to derive Document
Basic Access Keys from the printed MRZ data with enhanced basic attack potential.
Receiving State or Organization
The receiving State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the
TOE environment.
OE.Exam_MRTD Examination of the MRTD passport book
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization must examine the MRTD
presented by the traveler to verify its authenticity by means of the physical security measures
and to detect any manipulation of the physical MRTD. The Basic Inspection System for global
interoperability
(i) includes the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of
each issuing State or Organization, and
(ii) implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control.
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif Verification by Passive Authentication
The border control officer of the receiving State uses the inspection system to verify the traveler
as MRTD holder. The inspection systems must have successfully verified the signature of
Document Security Objects and the integrity data elements of the logical MRTD before they are
used. The receiving States and Organizations must manage the Country Signing Public Key and
the Document Signer Public Key maintaining their authenticity and availability in all inspection
systems.
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 28.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD Protection of data from the logical MRTD
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization ensures the confidentiality and
integrity of the data read from the logical MRTD. The receiving State examining the logical
MRTD being under Basic Access Control will use inspection systems which implement the
terminal part of the Basic Access Control and use the secure messaging with fresh generated
keys for the protection of the transmitted data (i.e. Basic Inspection Systems).
4.3 Security Objective Rationale
The following table provides an overview for security objectives coverage.
OT.AC_Pers
OT.Data_Int
OT.Data_Conf
OT.Identification
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfunction
OE.MRTD_Manufact
OE.MRTD_Delivery
OE.Personalization
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
OE.BAC-Keys
OE.Exam_MRTD
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
T.Chip-ID x x
T.Skimming x x
T.Eavesdropping x
T.Forgery x x x x x x
T.Abuse-Func x x
T.Information_Leakage x
T.Phys-Tamper x
T.Malfunction x
P.Manufact x
P.Personalization x x x
P.Personal_Data x x
A.MRTD_Manufact x
A.MRTD_Delivery x
A.Pers_Agent x
A.Insp_Sys x x
A.BAC-Keys x
Table 2 - Security Objective Rationale
The OSP P.Manufact“Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip” requires a unique identification of
the IC by means of the Initialization Data and the writing of the Pre-personalization Data as
being fulfilled by OT.Identification.
The OSP P.Personalization“Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organization
only” addresses the
(i) the enrolment of the logical MRTD by the Personalization Agent as described in the
security objective for the TOE environment OE.Personalization “Personalization of
logical MRTD”, and
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 29.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
(ii) the access control for the user data and TSF data as described by the security
objective OT.AC_Pers“Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD”.
Note the manufacturer equips the TOE with the Personalization Agent Key(s) according to
OT.Identification“Identification and Authentication of the TOE”. The security objective
OT.AC_Perslimits the management of TSF data and management of TSF to the
Personalization Agent.
The OSP P.Personal_Data“Personal data protection policy” requires the TOE
(i) to support the protection of the confidentiality of the logical MRTD by means of the
Basic Access Control and
(ii) enforce the access control for reading as decided by the issuing State or
Organization.
This policy is implemented by the security objectives OT.Data_Int“Integrity of personal data”
describing the unconditional protection of the integrity of the stored data and during
transmission.
The security objective OT.Data_Conf“Confidentiality of personal data” describes the
protection of the confidentiality.
The threat T.Chip_ID“Identification of MRTD’s chip” addresses the trace of the MRTD
movement by identifying remotely the MRTD’s chip through the contactless communication
interface. This threat is countered as described by the security objective OT.Identificationby
Basic Access Control using sufficiently strong derived keys as required by the security
objective for the environment OE.BAC-Keys.
The threat T.Skimming“Skimming digital MRZ data or the digital portrait” and
T.Eavesdropping “Eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and inspection system”
address the reading of the logical MRTD trough the contactless interface or listening the
communication between the MRTD’s chip and a terminal. This threat is countered by the
security objective OT.Data_Conf“Confidentiality of personal data” through Basic Access
Control using sufficiently strong derived keys as required by the security objective for the
environment OE.BAC-Keys.
The threat T.Forgery“Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip” addresses the fraudulent alteration of
the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it. The security objective
OT.AC_Pers“Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD“ requires the TOE to limit
the write access for the logical MRTD to the trustworthy Personalization Agent (cf.
OE.Personalization). The TOE will protect the integrity of the stored logical MRTD according
the security objective OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” and OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
“Protection against Physical Tampering”. The examination of the presented MRTD passport
book according to
OE.Exam_MRTD“Examination of the MRTD passport book” shall ensure that passport book
does not contain a sensitive contactless chip which may present the complete unchanged logical
MRTD. The TOE environment will detect partly forged logical MRTD data by means of digital
signature which will be created according to OE.Pass_Auth_Sign “Authentication of logical
MRTD by Signature” and verified by the inspection system according to
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif“Verification by Passive Authentication”.
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 30.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
The threat T.Abuse-Func“Abuse of Functionality” addresses attacks using the MRTD’s chip as
production material for the MRTD and misuse of the functions for personalization in the
operational state after delivery to MRTD holder to disclose or to manipulate the logical MRTD.
This threat is countered by OT.Prot_Abuse-Func“Protection against Abuse of Functionality”.
Additionally this objective is supported by the security objective for the TOE environment:
OE.Personalization“Personalization of logical MRTD” ensuring that the TOE security
functions for the initialization and the personalization are disabled and the security functions for
the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder are enabled according to the intended use
of the TOE.
The threats T.Information_Leakage “Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip”, T.Phys-
Tamper “Physical Tampering” and T.Malfunction“Malfunction due to Environmental Stress”
are typical for integrated circuits like smart cards under direct attack with high attack potential.
The protection of the TOE against these threats is addressed by the directly related security
objectives OT.Prot_Inf_Leak“Protection against Information Leakage”, OT.Prot_Phys-
Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering” and OT.Prot_Malfunction“Protection
against Malfunctions”. The assumption A.MRTD_Manufact“MRTD manufacturing on step 4
to 6” is covered by the security objective for the TOE environment
OE.MRTD_Manufact“Protection of the MRTD Manufacturing” that requires to use security
procedures during all manufacturing steps.
The assumption A.MRTD_Delivery“MRTD delivery during step 4 to 6” is covered by the
security objective for the TOE environment OE.MRTD_ Delivery “Protection of the MRTD
delivery” that requires to use security procedures during delivery steps of the MRTD.
The assumption A.Pers_Agent“Personalization of the MRTD’s chip” is covered by the security
objective for the TOE environment OE.Personalization“Personalization of logical MRTD”
including the enrolment, the protection with digital signature and the storage of the MRTD
holder personal data.
The examination of the MRTD passport book addressed by the assumption
A.Insp_Sys“Inspection Systems for global interoperability” is covered by the security
objectives for the TOEenvironment OE.Exam_MRTD“Examination of the MRTD passport
book”. The security
objectives for the TOE environment OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD“Protection of data from the
logical MRTD” will require the Basic Inspection System to implement the Basic Access
Control and to protect the logical MRTD data during the transmission and the internal handling.
The assumption A.BAC-Keys “Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys” is
directly covered by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.BAC-Keys
“Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys” ensuring the sufficient key quality to be
provided by the issuing State or Organization.
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 31.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
5 EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION
This ST does not define extended components. The extended components defined in PP
“Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application”, Basic Access Control” are
used and additionally FIA_API is added. These extended components are FAU_SAS,
FCS_RND, FMT_LIM, FIA_API and FPT_EMSEC, and defined in the PP as given below.
5.1 Definition of the Family FAU_SAS
To define the security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FAU_SAS) of the
Class FAU (Security Audit) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements
forthe storage of audit data. It has a more general approach than FAU_GEN, because it does
notnecessarily require the data to be generated by the TOE itself and because it does not
givespecific details of the content of the audit records.
The family “Audit data storage (FAU_SAS)” is specified as follows.
FAU_SAS Audit data storage
Family behavior
This family defines functional requirements for the storage of audit data.
Component leveling
FAU_SAS.1: Requires the TOE to provide the possibility to store audit data.
Management: FAU_SAS.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FAU_SAS.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FAU_SAS.1-1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorized users] with the capabilityto store
[assignment: list of audit information] in the audit records.
5.2 Definition of the Family FCS_RND
To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FCS_RND) of
the Class FCS (cryptographic support) is defined here. This family describes the
functionalrequirements for random number generation used for cryptographic purposes. The
componentFCS_RND is not limited to generation of cryptographic keys unlike the component
FCS_CKM.1.The similar component FIA_SOS.2 is intended for non-cryptographic use.
The family “Generation of random numbers (FCS_RND)” is specified as follows.
FAU_SAS Audit data storage 1
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 32.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
FCS_RND Generation of random numbers
Family behavior
This family defines quality requirements for the generation of random numbers which
areintended to be used for cryptographic purposes.
Component leveling:
FCS_RND.1: Generation of random numbers requires that random numbers meet a defined
quality metric.
Management: FCS_RND.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FCS_RND.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FCS_RND.1-1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers thatmeet
[assignment: a defined quality metric].
5.3 Definition of the Family FIA_API
To describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FIA_API) ofthe Class
FIA (Identification and authentication) is defined here. This family describes thefunctional requirements
for the proof of the claimed identity for the authentication verification byan external entity where the
other families of the class FIA address the verification of the identityof an external entity.
Application note 18: The other families of the Class FIA describe only the authentication verification of
users’ identity performed by the TOE and do not describe the functionality of the user to prove their
identity. The following paragraph defines the family FIA_API in the style of the Common Criteria part 2
(cf. [3], chapter “Explicitly stated IT security requirements (APE_SRE)”) from a TOE point of view.
FIA_API Authentication Proof of Identity
Family behavior
This family defines functions provided by the TOE to prove their identity and to be verified by
anexternal entity in the TOE IT environment.
Component leveling:
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity.
Management: FIA_API.1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT: Management of
authentication information used to prove the claimed identity.
Audit: There are no actions defined to be auditable.
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 33.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_API.1-1 The TSF shall provide a [assignment: authentication mechanism] to prove the identity of
the [assignment: authorized user or role].
5.4 Definition of the Family FMT_LIM
The family FMT_LIM describes the functional requirements for the Test Features of the
TOE.The new functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because this class
addresses themanagement of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical mechanism
used in the TOEshow that no other class is appropriate to address the specific issues of
preventing the abuse offunctions by limiting the capabilities of the functions and by limiting
their availability.
The family “Limited capabilities and availability (FMT_LIM)” is specified as follows.
FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability
Family behavior
This family defines requirements that limit the capabilities and availability of functions in
acombined manner. Note that FDP_ACF restricts the access to functions whereas the
Limitedcapability of this family requires the functions themselves to be designed in a specific
manner.
Component leveling:
FMT_LIM.1: Limited capabilities requires that the TSF is built to provide only thecapabilities
(perform action, gather information) necessary for its genuinepurpose.
FMT_LIM.2: Limited availability requires that the TSF restrict the use of functions (referto
Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)). This can be achieved, for instance,by removing or by
disabling functions in a specific phase of the TOE’s lifecycle.
Management: FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FMT_LIM)
ofthe Class FMT (Security Management) is defined here. This family describes the
functionalrequirements for the Test Features of the TOE. The new functional requirements were
defined inthe class FMT because this class addresses the management of functions of the TSF.
Theexamples of the technical mechanism used in the TOE show that no other class is
appropriate to
address the specific issues of preventing the abuse of functions by limiting the capabilities of
thefunctions and by limiting their availability.
The TOE Functional Requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” is specified as follows.
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 34.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.
FMT_LIM.1-1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities sothat in
conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” thefollowing policy is enforced
[assignment: Limited capability and availability policy].
The TOE Functional Requirement “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” is specified as follows.
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.
FMT_LIM.2-1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so thatin
conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the followingpolicy is enforced
[assignment: Limited capability and availability policy].
The functional requirements FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 assume thatthere are two types of
mechanisms (limited capabilities and limited availability) which togethershall provide
protection in order to enforce the policy. This also allows that
(i) the TSF is provided without restrictions in the product in its userenvironment but its
capabilities are so limited that the policy is enforced
or conversely
(ii) the TSF is designed with test and support functionality that is removed from,or
disabled in, the product prior to the Operational Use Phase.
The combination of both requirements shall enforce the policy.
5.5 Definition of the Family FAU_SAS
To define the security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FAU_SAS) of the
Class FAU (Security Audit) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements
forthe storage of audit data. It has a more general approach than FAU_GEN, because it does
notnecessarily require the data to be generated by the TOE itself and because it does not give
specific details of the content of the audit records.
The family “Audit data storage (FAU_SAS)” is specified as follows.
FAU_SAS Audit data storage
Family behavior
This family defines functional requirements for the storage of audit data.
Component leveling
FAU_SAS.1 Requires the TOE to provide the possibility to store audit data.
Management: FAU_SAS.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 35.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
Audit: FAU_SAS.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FAU_SAS.1-1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorized users] with the capability
tostore [assignment: list of auditinformation] in theauditrecords.
5.6 Definition of the Family FPT_EMSEC
The sensitive family FPT_EMSEC (TOE Emanation) of the Class FPT (Protection of the TSF)
isdefined here to describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE. The TOE
shallprevent attacks against the TOE and other secret data where the attack is based on
externalobservable physical phenomena of the TOE. Examples of such attacks are evaluation of
TOE’selectromagnetic radiation, simple power analysis (SPA), differential power analysis
(DPA),timing attacks, etc. This family describes the functional requirements for the limitation
ofintelligible emanations which are not directly addressed by any other component of CC part
2.
The family “TOE Emanation (FPT_EMSEC)” is specified as follows.
Family behavior
This family defines requirements to mitigate intelligible emanations.
Component leveling:
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE emanation has two constituents:
FPT_EMSEC.1-1:Limit of Emissions requires to not emit intelligible emissions enablingaccess
to TSF data or user data.
FPT_EMSEC.1-2:Interface Emanation requires to not emit interface emanation enabling
accessto TSF data or user data.
Management: FPT_EMSEC.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FPT_EMSEC.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_EMSEC.1-1: The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess
of[assignment: specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of typesof TSF data] and
[assignment: list of types of user data].
FPT_EMSEC.1-2: The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use
thefollowing interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access to[assignment: list of
types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data].
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 36.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
6 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
6.1 Operation Notation for Functional Requirements
The CC allows several operations to be performed on functional requirements; refinement,
selection, assignment, and iteration. Each ofthese operations is used in this ST.
The refinement operation is used to add detail to a requirement, and thus further restricts a
requirement. Refinement of security requirements is denoted by the word “refinement” in bold
text and the added/changed words are in bold text. In cases where words from a CC
requirement were deleted, a separate attachment indicates the words that were removed.
The selection operation is used to select one or more options provided by the CC in stating a
requirement.
The assignment operation is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter, such
as the length of a password.
The iteration operation is used when a component is repeated with varying operations. Iterated
functional requirement components are shown with a “/IDENTIFIER” for the components which used
more than once with varying operations.
6.2 Security Functional Requirements for the TOE
This section on security functional requirements for the TOE is divided into sub-section
following the main security functionality. The table below lists the SFRs that come from PP and
that are out of PP.
SFRs from PP SFRs out of PP
FAU_SAS.1 FCS_COP.1/SIGN
FCS_CKM.1 FIA_API.1
FCS_CKM.4 FIA_AFL.1/EXC
FCS_COP.1/SHA FIA_AFL.1/INI
FCS_COP.1/ENC FIA_AFL.1/PER
FCS_COP.1/AUTH FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE I2
FCS_COP.1/MAC
FCS_RND.1
FIA_UID.1
FIA_AFL.1/BAC
FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UAU.4
FIA_UAU.5
FIA_UAU.6
FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_UCT.1
FDP_UIT.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_LIM.1
FMT_LIM.2
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 37.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE I1
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
FPT_EMSEC.1
FPT_TST.1
FPT_FLS.1
FPT_PHP.3
Table 3- SFR List
6.2.1 Class FAU Security Audit
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Audit storage (FAU_SAS.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FAU_SAS.1-1The TSF shall provide the Manufacturer1
with the capability to store the
IC Identification Data2
in the audit records.
The Manufacturer role is the default user identity assumed by the TOE in the Phase 2
Manufacturing. The IC manufacturer and the MRTD manufacturer in the Manufacturer role
write the Initialization Data and/or Pre-personalization Data as TSF Data of the TOE. The audit
records are write-only-once data of the MRTD’s chip (see FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS).
6.2.2 Class FCS Cryptographic Support
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations are caused by different cryptographic
key generation algorithms to be implemented and key to be generated by the TOE.
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation – Generation of Document Basic Access Keys
by the TOE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [ FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1-1The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm:Document Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm3
and
specified cryptographic key sizes 112 bit4
that meet the following: [6],ICAO DOC 9303
normative appendix 55
.
1
[assignment: authorised users]
2
[assignment: list of audit information]
3
[assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm]
4
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
5
[assignment: list of standards]
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 38.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
The TOE is equipped with the Document Basic Access Key generated and downloaded by the
Personalization Agent. The Basic Access Control Authentication Protocol described in [6],
normative appendix 5, A5.2, produces agreed parameters to generate the Triple- DES key and
the Retail-MAC message authentication keys for secure messaging by the algorithm in [6],
Normative appendix A5.1. The algorithm uses the random number RND.ICC generated by TSF
as required by FCS_RND.1.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction - MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [ FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4-1The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method [card proprietary key access functions] that meets the
following: [none].
The TOE shall destroy the Triple-DES encryption key and the Retail-MAC message
authentication keys for secure messaging.
Refinement: Key destruction is performed via writing “00” to the key memory areas.
6.2.2.1 Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations are caused by different cryptographic
algorithms to be implemented by the TOE.
FCS_COP.1/SHA Cryptographic operation – Hash for Key Derivation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [ FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1-1/SHA The TSF shall perform hashing6
in accordance with a
specifiedcryptographic algorithm SHA-2567
and cryptographic key sizes none8
that meet the
following: FIPS 180-29
.
6
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
7
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
8
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
9
[assignment: list of standards]
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 39.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
This SFR requires the TOE to implement the hash function SHA-1 for the cryptographic
primitive of the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism (see also FIA_UAU.4)
according to [6].
FCS_COP.1/ENC Cryptographic operation – Encryption / Decryption Triple DES
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [ FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1-1/ENC The TSF shall perform secure messaging (BAC) – encryption
anddecryption10
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Triple-DES in CBC
mode11
and cryptographic key sizes 112 bit12
that meet the following: FIPS 46-3 [7] and [6];
normative appendix 5, A5.313
.
This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitive for secure messaging with
encryption of the transmitted data. The keys are agreed between the TOE and the terminal as
part of the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism according to the FCS_CKM.1 and
FIA_UAU.4.
FCS_COP.1/AUTH Cryptographic operation – Authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [ FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1-1/AUTH The TSF shall perform symmetric authentication – encryption and
decryption14
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Triple-DES15
and
cryptographic key sizes 112 bit16
that meet the following: FIPS 46-3 [7]17
.
This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitive for authentication attempt
of a terminal as Personalization Agent by means of the symmetric authentication mechanism
(cf. FIA_UAU.4).
FCS_COP.1/MAC Cryptographic operation – Retail MAC
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [ FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
10
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
11
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
12
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
13
[assignment: list of standards]
14[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
15[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
16[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
17[assignment: list of standards]
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 40.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
FCS_COP.1-1/MAC The TSF shall perform secure messaging – message authentication
code18
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Retail MAC19
andcryptographic
key sizes 112 bit20
that meet the following: ISO 9797(MAC algorithm 3, block cipher DES,
Sequence Message Counter,padding mode 2)21
.
This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitive for secure messaging with
encryption and message authentication code over the transmitted data. The key is agreed
between the TSF by the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism according to the
FCS_CKM.1 and FIA_UAU.4.
FCS_COP.1/SIGN Cryptographic operation – Signature Generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [ FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1-1/SIGNThe TSF shall perform signature generation22
in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm RSASSA-PSS23
and cryptographic key sizes (1024 to 184824
)
bitthat meet the following: ISO/IEC 9796-2 scheme 1 and RFC 344725
.
6.2.2.2 Random Number Generation (FCS_RND.1)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Quality metric for random numbers (FCS_RND.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FCS_RND.1-1The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet
ANSI X9.17, AIS20 Class K426
.
This SFR requires the TOE to generate random numbers used for the authentication protocols
as required by FIA_UAU.4.
6.2.3 Class FIA Identification and Authentication
The Table 4 provides an overview on the authentication mechanisms used.
Name SFR for the TOE Algorithms and key sizes according to [6], normative
appendix 5, and [20]
18[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
19[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
20[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
21[assignment: list of standards]
22[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
23[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
24[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
25 [assignment: list of standards]
26[assignment: a defined quality metric].
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 41.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
Basic Access Control
Authentication
Mechanism
FIA_UAU.4 and
FIA_UAU.6
Triple-DES, 112 bit keys (cf. FCS_COP.1/ENC) and
Retail-MAC, 112 bit keys (cf. FCS_COP.1/MAC)
Symmetric Authentication
Mechanism for
Personalization Agents
FIA_UAU.4 Triple-DES with 112 bit keys (cf. FCS_COP.1/AUTH)
Active Authentication
Mechansim
FIA_API.1 RSASSA-PSS with 1024 to 1848 bit keys
(FCS_COP.1/SIGN)
Table 4- Authentication mechanisms
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of identification (FIA_UID.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UID.1-1The TSF shall allow
1. to read the Initialization Data in Phase 2 “Manufacturing”,
2. to read the random identifier in Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”,
3. to read the random identifier in Phase 4 “Operational Use”27
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1-2The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any
other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
The IC manufacturer and the MRTD manufacturer write the Initialization Data and/or Pre-
personalization Data in the audit records of the IC during the Phase 2 “Manufacturing”. The
audit records can be written only in the Phase 2 Manufacturing of the TOE. At this time the
Manufacturer is the only user role available for the TOE. The MRTD manufacturer may create
the user role Personalization Agent for transition from Phase 2 to Phase 3 “Personalization of
the MRTD”. The users in role Personalization Agent identify themselves by means of selecting
the authentication key. After personalization in the Phase 3 (i.e. writing the digital MRZ and the
Document Basic Access Keys) the user role Basic Inspection System is created by writing the
Document Basic Access Keys. The Basic Inspection System is identified as default user after
power up or reset of the TOE i.e. the TOE will use the Document Basic Access Key to
authenticate the user as Basic Inspection System.
In the “Operational Use” phase the MRTD must not allow anybody to read the ICCSN, the
MRTD identifier or any other unique identification before the user is authenticated as Basic
Inspection System (cf. T.Chip_ID). Note that the terminal and the MRTD’s chip use a
(randomly chosen) identifier for the communication channel to allow the terminal to
communicate with more then one RFID. If this identifier is randomly selected it will not violate
the OT.Identification. If this identifier is fixed the ST writer should consider the possibility to
misuse this identifier to perform attacks addressed by T.Chip_ID.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of authentication (FIA_UAU.1)” as
specifiedbelow (Common Criteria Part 2).
27
[assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions]
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 42.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
FIA_UAU.1-1The TSF shall allow
1. to read the Initialization Data in Phase 2 “Manufacturing”,
2. to read the random identifier in Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”,
3. to read the random identifier in Phase 4 “Operational Use”28
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1-2The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing
any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
The Basic Inspection System and the Personalization Agent authenticate themselves.
The TOE shall meet the requirements of “Single-use authentication mechanisms
(FIA_UAU.4)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms - Single-use authentication of the
Terminal by the TOE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.4-1The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism,
2. Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES29
.
The Basic Access Control Mechanism is a mutual device authentication mechanism defined in
[6]. In the first step the terminal authenticates itself to the MRTD’s chip and the MRTD’s chip
authenticates to the terminal in the second step. In this second step the MRTD’s chip provides
the terminal with a challenge-response-pair which allows a unique identification of the
MRTD’s chip with some probability depending on the entropy of the Document Basic Access
Keys. Therefore the TOE shall stop further communications if the terminal is not successfully
authenticated in the first step of the protocol to fulfill the security objective OT.Identification
and to prevent T.Chip_ID.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Multiple authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.5)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.5-1 The TSF shall provide
1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism
28
[assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions]
29
[assignment: identified authentication mechanism(s)]
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 43.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
2. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on [selection: Triple-DES,
AES] 28 to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5-2 The TSF shall authenticate any user’s claimed identity according to the
following rules:
1. the TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalization Agentby one
of the following mechanism(s)[selection: the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism
withthe Personalization Agent Keys, the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with the
Personalization Agent Key, [assignment other]],
2. the TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Basic InspectionSystem only by means of the
Basic Access Control AuthenticationMechanism with the Document Basic Access Keys 29.
FIA_UAU.5/BAC Multiple authentication mechanisms
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.5-1/BACThe TSF shall provide
1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism
2. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES30
to support user authentication.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Re-authenticating (FIA_UAU.6)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UAU.6 Re-authenticating – Re-authenticating of Terminal by the TOE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.6-1The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each command sent
to the TOE during a BAC mechanism based communication after successful authentication of
the terminal with Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism31
.
The Basic Access Control Mechanism specified in [5] includes the secure messaging for all
commands exchanged after successful authentication of the Inspection System. The TOE
checks by secure messaging in MAC_ENC mode each command based on Retail-MAC
whether it was sent by the successfully authenticated terminal (see FCS_COP.1/MAC for
further details). The TOE does not execute any command with incorrect message authentication
code. Therefore the TOE re-authenticates the user for each received command and accepts only
those commands received from the previously authenticated BAC user.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Authentication failure handling (FIA_AFL.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_AFL.1/EXCAuthentication failure handling
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
30
[assignment: list of multiple authentication mechanisms]
31
[assignment: list of conditions under which re-authentication is required]
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 44.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
FIA_AFL.1-1/EXC The TSF shall detect when [64]32
unsuccessful authentication attempts
occur related to loading of the system keys with Exchange Challenge command33
.
FIA_AFL.1-2/EXC When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been
met34
, the TSF shall force the card into death life cycle35
.
FIA_AFL.1/INIAuthentication failure handling
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_AFL.1-1/INIThe TSF shall detect when 1036
unsuccessful authentication attempts occur
related to changing of the initialization key with Change Key command, erasing of EEPROM
with Erase Files command, Initialization Start and Initialization End commands37
.
Refinement: Change Key, Erase Files, Initialization Start and Initialization End
commands use a common key counter which is updated in any unsuccessfull
authentication attempt to any of these commands.
FIA_AFL.1-2/INIWhen the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been
met38
, the TSF shall force the card into death life cycle39
.
FIA_AFL.1/PERAuthentication failure handling
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_AFL.1-1/PERThe TSF shall detect when 1040
unsuccessful authentication attempts occur
related to changing of the personalization key with Change Key command, Personalization
Start and Personalization End commands41
.
Refinement: Change Key, Personalization Start and Personalization End commands use a
common key counter which is updated in any unsuccessfull authentication attempt to any
of these commands.
FIA_AFL.1-2/PERWhen the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been
met42
, the TSF shall force the card into death life cycle43
.
32
[selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer within
[assignment: range of acceptable values]]
33
[assignment: list of authenticationevents]
34
[assignment: met or surpassed]
35
[assignment: list of actions]
36
[selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer within
[assignment: range of acceptable values]]
37
[assignment: list of authentication events]
38
[assignment: met or surpassed]
39
[assignment: list of actions]
40
[selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer within
[assignment: range of acceptable values]]
41
[assignment: list of authentication events]
42
[assignment: met or surpassed]
43
[assignment: list of actions]
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 45.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
FIA_AFL.1/BACAuthentication failure handling
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_AFL.1-1/BACThe TSF shall detect when an administrator configurable positive integer
within [16 to 128]44
unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to BAC authentication
protocol45
.
FIA_AFL.1-2/BACWhen the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been
met46
, the TSF shall wait for 2 to 10 seconds between the receiving the terminal challenge eIFD
and sending the TSF response eICC during the BAC authentication attempts47
.
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_API.1-1 The TSF shall provide Active Authentication mechanism48 to prove the identity
of the TOE49
Application Note: The TOE signs the challenge sent by the terminal with the Active
Authentication Private Key and terminal verifies the identity of MRTD with the Chip
Authentication Public Key.
6.2.4 Class FDP User Data Protection
6.2.4.1 Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control – Basic Access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1-1The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP50
on terminals gaining
write, read and modification access to data in the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of
the logical MRTD51
.
44
[selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer within
[assignment: range of acceptable values]]
45
[assignment: list of authentication events]
46
[assignment: met or surpassed]
47
[assignment: list of actions]
48
[assignment: authentication mechanism]
49
[assignment: authorized user or role
50
[assignment: access control SFP]
51
[assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP]
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 46.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
6.2.4.2 Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FDP_ACF.1 Basic Security attribute based access control – Basic Access Control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FDP_ACF.1-1The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP52
to objects based on the
following:
1. Subjects:
a. Personalization Agent,
b. Basic Inspection System,
c. Terminal,
2. Objects:
a. data EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
b. data in EF.COM,
c. data in EF.SOD,
3. Security attributes
a. authentication status of terminals53
.
FDP_ACF.1-2The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
1. the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write and to read
the data of the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
2. the successfully authenticated Basic Inspection System is allowed to read the data in
EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 of the logical
MRTD54
.
FDP_ACF.1-3The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: none55
.
FDP_ACF.1-4The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the rule:
1. Any terminal is not allowed to modify any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical
MRTD.
2. Any terminal is not allowed to read any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical
MRTD.
3. The Basic Inspection System is not allowed to read the data in EF.DG3 and
EF.DG456
.
52
[assignment: access control SFP]
53
[assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and. for each, the SFPrelevant
security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes]
54
[assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations
on controlled objects]
55
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects]
56
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects]
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 47.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
6.2.4.3 Inter-TSF-Transfer
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Basic data exchange confidentiality (FDP_UCT.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality - MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [ FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
[ FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FDP_UCT.1-1The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP57
to be able to transmit and
receive58
user data in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Data exchange integrity (FDP_UIT.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity - MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
FDP_UIT.1-1The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP59
to be able to transmit and
receive60
user data in a manner protected from modification, deletion, insertion and
replay61
errors.
FDP_UIT.1-2The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether modification,
deletion, insertion and replay62
has occurred.
6.2.5 Class FMT Security Management
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF.1)”
as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No Dependencies
FMT_SMF.1-1The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
1. Initialization,
2. Pre-personalization,
3. Personalization63
.
57
[assignment: access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s)]
58
[selection: transmit, receive]
59
[assignment: access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s)
60
[selection: transmit, receive]
61
[selection: modification, deletion, insertion, replay]
62
[selection: modification, deletion, insertion, replay]
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 48.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security roles (FMT_SMR.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
FMT_SMR.1-1The TSF shall maintain the roles
1. Manufacturer,
2. Personalization Agent,
3. Basic Inspection System64
.
FMT_SMR.1-2The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” as specified
below(Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.
FMT_LIM.1-1The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in
conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
1. User Data to be disclosed or manipulated
2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
3. software to be reconstructed and
4. substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable
other attacks65
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.
FMT_LIM.2-1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that
in conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
1. User Data to be disclosed or manipulated,
2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
3. software to be reconstructed and
4. substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable
other attacks66
.
63
[assignment: list of management functions to be provided by the TSF]
64
[assignment: theauthorisedidentifiedroles]
65
[assignment: Limited capability and availability policy]
66
[assignment: Limited capability and availability policy]
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 49.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
The formulation of “Deploying Test Features …” in FMT_LIM.2.1 might be a little bit
misleading since the addressed features are no longer available (e.g. by disabling or removing
the respective functionality). Nevertheless the combination of FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 is
introduced provide an optional approach to enforce the same policy. Note that the term
“software” in item 3 of FMT_LIM.1.1 and FMT_LIM.2.1 refers to both IC Dedicated and IC
Embedded Software.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations address different management functions and
different TSF data.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Management of TSF data – Writing of Initialization Data and
Prepersonalization Data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1-1/INI_ENA The TSF shall restrict the ability to write67
the Initialization Data
and Prepersonalization Data68
to the Manufacturer69
.
The pre-personalization Data includes but is not limited to the authentication reference data for
the Personalization Agent which is the symmetric cryptographic Personalization Agent Key.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Management of TSF data – Disabling of Read Access to
Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1-1/INI_DIS The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable read access for users to70
theInitialization Data71
to the Personalization Agent72
.
According to P.Manufact the IC Manufacturer and the MRTD Manufacturer are the default
users assumed by the TOE in the role Manufacturer during the Phase 2 “Manufacturing” but the
TOE is not requested to distinguish between these users within the role Manufacturer. The TOE
may restrict the ability to write the Initialization Data and the Prepersonalization Data by
(i) allowing to write these data only once and
(ii) blocking the role
Manufacturer at the end of the Phase 2. The IC Manufacturer may write the Initialization Data
which includes but are not limited to the IC Identifier as required by FAU_SAS.1. The
Initialization Data provides a unique identification of the IC which is used to trace the IC in the
Phase 2 and 3 “personalization” but is not needed and may be misused in the Phase 4
“Operational Use”. Therefore the external read access shall be blocked. The MRTD
Manufacturer will write the Pre-personalization Data.
67
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
68
[assignment: list of TSF data]
69
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
70
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
71
[assignment: list of TSF data]
72
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 50.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE I1 Management of TSF data – Key Write Initialization 1
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_WRITEI1The TSF shall restrict the ability to write73
the Document
Basic Access Keys74
to the Personalization Agent75
.
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE I2 Management of TSF data – Key Write Initialization 2
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_WRITE I2The TSF shall restrict the ability to write76
the Active
Authentication Keys77
to the Personalization Agent78
.
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ Management of TSF data – Key Read
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1-1/KEY_READ
The TSF shall restrict the ability to read79
the Document Basic Access Keys and Personalization
Agent Keys80
to none81
.
The Personalization Agent generates, stores and ensures the correctness of the Document Basic
Access Keys.
6.2.6 Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions
The TOE shall prevent inherent and forced illicit information leakage for User Data and TSF
Data. The security functional requirement FPT_EMSEC.1 addresses the inherent leakage. With
respect to the forced leakage they have to be considered in combination with the security
functional requirements “Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)” and “TSF
testing (FPT_TST.1)” on the one hand and “Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” on the
other. The SFRs “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)”, “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)”
and “Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” together with the SAR “Security architecture
description” (ADV_ARC.1) prevent bypassing, deactivation and manipulation of the security
features or misuse of TOE functions.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “TOE Emanation (FPT_EMSEC.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
73
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
74
[assignment: list of TSF data]
75
[assignment: list of TSF data]
76
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
77
[assignment: list of TSF data]
78
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
79
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
80
[assignment: list of TSF data]
81
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 51.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No Dependencies.
FPT_EMSEC.1-1The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during command
execution82
in excess of non-useful information83
enabling access to Personalization Agent
Key(s)84
and none85
.
FPT_EMSEC.1-2The TSF shall ensure any unauthorized users86
are unable to use the
following interface smart card circuitcontacts87
to gain access to Personalization Agent Key(s)88
and none89
.
The following security functional requirements address the protection against forced illicit
information leakage including physical manipulation.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No Dependencies.
FPT_FLS.1-1The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur:
1. Exposure to out-of-range operating conditions where therefore a malfunction could
occur,
2. failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.190
.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)” as specified below (Common
Criteria Part 2).
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No Dependencies.
FPT_TST.1-1The TSF shall run a suite of self tests at the conditions [during initial startup,
when any command is received, during cryptographic operations]91
to demonstrate the correct
operation of the TSF92
.
FPT_TST.1-2The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the
82
[assignment: types of emissions]
83
[assignment: specified limits]
84
[assignment: list of types of TSF data]
85
[assignment: list of types of user data]
86
[assignment: type of users]
87
[assignment: type of connection]
88
[assignment: list of types of user data]
89
[assignment: list of types of user data]
90
[assignment: list of types of failures in the TSF]
91
[selection: during initial start-up, periodically during normal operation, at the request of the authorised
user, at the conditions [assignment: conditions under which self test should occur]]
92
[selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], the TSF]
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 52.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
integrity of TSF data93
.
FPT_TST.1-3The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity
of stored TSF executable code.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_PHP.3-1The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing94
to the
TSF95
by responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.
The TOE will implement appropriate measures to continuously counter physical manipulation
and physical probing. Due to the nature of these attacks (especially manipulation) the TOE can
by no means detect attacks on all of its elements. Therefore, permanent protection against these
attacks is required ensuring that the TSP could not be violated at any time. Hence, “automatic
response” means here (i) assuming that there might be an attack at any time and (ii)
countermeasures are provided at any time.
The SFRs “Non-bypassability of the TSF FPT_RVM.1” and “TSF domain separation
FPT_SEP.1” are no longer part of [2]. These requirements are now an implicit part of the
assurance requirement ADV_ARC.1.
6.3 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE
The for the evaluation of the TOE and its development and operating environment are those
taken from the Evaluation Assurance Level 4 (EAL4) and augmented by taking the following
component: ALC_DVS.2.
6.4 Security Requirements Rationale
6.4.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale
The following table provides an overview for security functional requirements coverage.
93
[selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], TSF data]
94
[assignment: physical tampering scenarios]
95
[assignment: list of TSF devices/elements]
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 53.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
OT.AC_Pers
OT.Data_Int
OT.Data_Conf
OT.Identification
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfunction
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
FAU_SAS.1 x
FCS_CKM.1 x x x
FCS_CKM.4 x x
FCS_COP.1/SHA x x x
FCS_COP.1/ENC x x x
FCS_COP.1/AUTH x x
FCS_COP.1/MAC x x x
FCS_COP.1/SIGN x x
FCS_RND.1 x x x
FIA_UID.1 x x
FIA_AFL.1/EXC x
FIA_AFL.1/INI x x
FIA_AFL.1/PER x x
FIA_AFL.1/BAC x x
FIA_UAU.1 x x
FIA_UAU.4 x x x
FIA_UAU.5 x x x
FIA_UAU.6 x x x
FIA_API.1 x
FDP_ACC.1 x x x
FDP_ACF.1 x x x
FDP_UCT.1 x x x
FDP_UIT.1 x x x
FMT_SMF.1 x x x
FMT_SMR.1 x x x
FMT_LIM.1 x
FMT_LIM.2 x
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA x
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS x
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE I1, I2 x x x
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ x x x
FPT_EMSEC.1 x x
FPT_TST.1 x x
FPT_FLS.1 x x x
FPT_PHP.3 x x x
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 54.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
Table 5- Coverage of Security Objective for the TOE by SFR
The security objective OT.AC_Pers“Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD”
addresses the access control of the writing the logical MRTD. The write access to the logical
MRTD data are defined by the SFR FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 as follows: only the
successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write the data of the groups
EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD only once.
The authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent shall be performed by TSF
according to SRF FIA_UAU.4 and FIA_UAU.5. The Personalization Agent can be
authenticated by using the symmetric authentication mechanism (FCS_COP.1/ AUTH).
FIA_AFL.1/INI and FIA_AFL.1/PER describe the authentication failures and the actions taken
after unsuccessfull authentication attempts during initialization and personalization.
In case of using the BAC mechanism the SFR FIA_UAU.6 describes the re-authentication and
FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1 the protection of the transmitted data by means of secure
messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to FCS_CKM.1,
FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_RND.1 (for key generation), and FCS_COP.1/ENC as well as
FCS_COP.1/MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode.
The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including Personalization Agent) and the SFR
FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions (including Personalization) setting the
Document Basic Access Keys according to the SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE as
authentication reference data. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ prevents read access to the
secret key of the Personalization Agent Keys and ensure together with the SFR FCS_CKM.4,
FPT_EMSEC.1, FPT_FLS.1 and FPT_PHP.3 the confidentially of these keys.
The security objective OT.Data_Int“Integrity of personal data” requires the TOE to protect the
integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip against physical manipulation and
unauthorized writing. The write access to the logical MRTD data is defined by the SFR
FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 in the same way: only the Personalization Agent is allowed to
write the data of the groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD (FDP_ACF.1.2, rule 1)
and terminals are not allowed to modify any of the data groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the
logical MRTD (cf. FDP_ACF.1.4). The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including
Personalization Agent) and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions
(including Personalization). The authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent shall be
performed by TSF according to SRF FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.5 and FIA_UAU.6 using either
FCS_COP.1/ENC and FCS_COP.1/MAC or FCS_COP.1/AUTH.
The security objective OT.Data_Int“Integrity of personal data” requires the TOE to ensure that
the inspection system is able to detect any modification of the transmitted logical MRTD data
by means of the BAC mechanism. The SFR FIA_UAU.6, FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1
requires the protection of the transmitted data by means of secure messaging implemented by
the cryptographic functions according to FCS_CKM.1, FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_RND.1 (for
key generation), and FCS_COP.1/ENC and FCS_COP.1/MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode. The
SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE requires the Personalization Agent to establish the Document
Basic Access Keys in a way that they cannot be read by anyone in accordance to
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ. FCS_COP.1/SIGN requires the protection of the integrity of the
logical MRTD data by active authentication mechanism.
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 55.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
The security objective OT.Data_Conf“Confidentiality of personal data” requires the TOE to
ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16. The SFR
FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 allow only those actions before identification respective
authentication which do not violate OT.Data_Conf. In case of failed authentication attempts
FIA_AFL.1 enforces additional waiting time prolonging the necessary amount of time for
facilitating a brute force attack. The read access to the logical MRTD data is defined by the
FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1.2: the successful authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed
to read the data of the logical MRTD (EF.DG1 to EF.DG16). The successful authenticated
Basic Inspection System is allowed to read the data of the logical MRTD (EF.DG1, EF.DG2
and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16). The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including Personalization
Agent and Basic Inspection System) and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management
functions (including Personalization for the key management for the Document Basic Access
Keys). FCS_COP.1/SIGN requires the protection of confidentiality of the logical MRTD data
by active authentication mechanism. FIA_AFL.1/EXC, FIA_AFL.1/BAC, FIA_AFL.1/INI and
FIA_AFL.1/PER prevent unauthenticated users to access logical MRTD data.
The SFR FIA_UAU.4 prevents reuse of authentication data to strengthen the authentication of
the user. The SFR FIA_UAU.5 enforces the TOE to accept the authentication attempt as Basic
Inspection System only by means of the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with
the Document Basic Access Keys. Moreover, the SFR FIA_UAU.6 requests secure messaging
after successful authentication of the terminal with Basic Access Control Authentication
Mechanism which includes the protection of the transmitted data in ENC_MAC_Mode by
means of the cryptographic functions according to FCS_COP.1/ENC and FCS_COP.1/MAC
(cf. The SFR FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1). (for key generation), and FCS_COP.1/ENC and
FCS_COP.1/ MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode. The SFR FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4,
FCS_COP.1/SHA and FCS_RND.1 establish the key management for the secure messaging
keys. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE addresses the key management and
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ prevents reading of the Document Basic Access Keys.
Note, neither the security objective OT.Data_Conf nor the SFR FIA_UAU.5 requires the
Personalization Agent to use the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism or secure
messaging.
The security objective OT.Identification“Identification and Authentication of the TOE”
address the storage of the IC Identification Data uniquely identifying the MRTD’s chip in its
non-volatile memory. This will be ensured by TSF according to SFR FAU_SAS.1.
Furthermore, the TOE shall identify itself only to a successful authenticated Basic
InspectionSystem in Phase 4 “Operational Use”. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA allows only
the Manufacturer to write Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data (including the
Personalization Agent key). The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS allows the Personalization Agent
to disable Initialization Data if their usage in the phase 4 “Operational Use” violates the
security objective OT.Identification. The SFR FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 do not allow
reading of any data uniquely identifying the MRTD’s chip before successful authentication of
the Basic Inspection Terminal and will stop communication after unsuccessful authentication
attempt. In case of failed authentication attempts related to BAC authentication protocol,
FIA_AFL.1/BAC enforces additional waiting time prolonging the necessary amount of time for
facilitating a brute force attack.
The security objective OT.Prot_Abuse-Func“Protection against Abuse of Functionality” is
ensured by the SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 which prevent misuse of test functionality of
the TOE or other features which may not be used after TOE Delivery.
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 56.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
The security objective OT.Prot_Inf_Leak“Protection against Information Leakage” requires
the TOE to protect confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the MRTD’s chip against
disclosure
- by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between events
found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption, clock, or I/O
lines, which is addressed by the SFR FPT_EMSEC.1,
- by forcing a malfunction of the TOE, which is addressed by the SFR FPT_FLS.1 and
FPT_TST.1, and/or
- by a physical manipulation of the TOE, which is addressed by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.
The security objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering” is
covered by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.
The security objective OT.Prot_Malfunction“Protection against Malfunctions” is covered by
(i) the SFR FPT_TST.1 which requires self tests to demonstrate the correct operation and
tests of authorized users to verify the integrity of TSF data and TSF code, and
(ii) the SFR FPT_FLS.1 which requires a secure state in case of detected failure or
operating conditions possibly causing a malfunction.
6.4.2 Dependency Rationale
The dependency analysis for the security functional requirements shows that the basis for
mutual support and internal consistency between all defined functional requirements is
satisfied. All dependencies between the chosen functional components are analyzed, and non-
dissolved dependencies are appropriately explained.
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 57.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
The table 4 shows the dependencies between the SFR of the TOE.
SFR Dependencies Support of theDependencies
FAU_SAS.1 No dependencies n.a.
FCS_CKM.1 [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographickeydistributionor
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographicoperation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographickeydestruction,
Fulfilledby FCS_COP.1/ENC and
FCS_COP.1/MAC, Fulfilledby
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.4 [FDP_ITC.1 Import of
userdatawithoutsecurityattributes, FDP_ITC.2
Import of user data withsecurityattributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographickeygeneration]
Fulfilledby FCS_CKM.1,
FCS_COP.1/SHA [FDP_ITC.1 Import of
userdatawithoutsecurityattributes, FDP_ITC.2
Import of user data withsecurityattributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographickeygeneration],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographickeydestruction
justification 1 fornon-
satisfieddependencies, Fulfilledby
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/ENC [FDP_ITC.1 Import of
userdatawithoutsecurityattributes, FDP_ITC.2
Import of user data withsecurityattributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographickeygeneration],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographickeydestruction
Fulfilledby FCS_CKM.1, Fulfilledby
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/AUTH [FDP_ITC.1 Import of
userdatawithoutsecurityattributes, FDP_ITC.2
Import of user data withsecurityattributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographickeygeneration],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographickeydestruction
justification 2 fornon-
satisfieddependenciesjustification 2
fornon-satisfieddependencies
FCS_COP.1/MAC [FDP_ITC.1 Import of
userdatawithoutsecurityattributes, FDP_ITC.2
Import of user data withsecurityattributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographickeygeneration],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographickeydestruction
Fulfilledby FCS_CKM.1, Fulfilledby
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_RND.1 No dependencies n.a.
FIA_AFL.1 /BAC FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication Fulfilledby FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UID.1 No dependencies n.a.
FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification Fulfilledby FIA_UID.1
FIA_UAU.4 No dependencies n.a.
FIA_UAU.5 No dependencies n.a.
FIA_UAU.6 No dependencies n.a.
FIA_API.1/AA
No dependencies n.a.
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 58.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACF.1 Security
attributebasedaccesscontrol
Fulfilledby FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACC.1 Subsetaccesscontrol, FMT_MSA.3
Staticattributeinitialization
Fulfilledby FDP_ACC.1, justification 3
fornon-satisfieddependencies
FDP_UCT.1 [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trustedchannel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trustedpath], [FDP_IFC.1
Subsetinformationflowcontrolor FDP_ACC.1
Subsetaccesscontrol]
justification 4 fornon-
satisfieddependenciesFulfilledby
FDP_ACC.1
FDP_UIT.1 [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trustedchannel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trustedpath], [FDP_IFC.1
Subsetinformationflowcontrolor FDP_ACC.1
Subsetaccesscontrol]
justification 4 fornon-
satisfieddependenciesFulfilledby
FDP_ACC.1
FMT_SMF.1 No dependencies n.a.
FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification Fulfilledby FIA_UID.1
FMT_LIM.1 FMT_LIM.2 Fulfilledby FMT_LIM.2
FMT_LIM.2 FMT_LIM.1 Fulfilledby FMT_LIM.1
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
managementfunctions, FMT_SMR.1 Security
roles
Fulfilledby FMT_SMF.1 Fulfilledby
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
managementfunctions, FMT_SMR.1 Security
roles
Fulfilledby FMT_SMF.1 Fulfilledby
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
managementfunctions, FMT_SMR.1 Security
roles
Fulfilledby FMT_SMF.1 Fulfilledby
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE
I1, I2
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
managementfunctions, FMT_SMR.1 Security
roles
Fulfilledby FMT_SMF.1 Fulfilledby
FMT_SMR.1
FPT_EMSEC.1 No dependencies n.a.
FPT_FLS.1 No dependencies n.a.
FPT_PHP.3 No dependencies n.a.
FPT_TST.1 No dependencies n.a.
Table 6 – Dependencies between the SFR for the TOE
Justification for non-satisfied dependencies between the SFR for TOE:
No. 1: The hash algorithm required by the SFR FCS_COP.1/SHA does not need any key
material. Therefore neither a key generation (FCS_CKM.1) nor an import (FDP_ITC.1/2) is
necessary.
No. 2: The SFR FCS_COP.1/AUTH uses the symmetric Personalization Key permanently
stored during the Pre-Personalization process (cf. FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA) by the
manufacturer. Thus there is neither the necessity to generate or import a key during the
addressed TOE lifecycle by the means of FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC. Since the key is
permanently stored within the TOE there is no need for FCS_CKM.4, too.
No. 3: The access control TSF according to FDP_ACF.1 uses security attributes which are
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 59.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
defined during the personalization and are fixed over the whole life time of the TOE. No
management of these security attribute (i.e. SFR FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.3) is necessary
here.
No. 4: The SFR FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1 require the use secure messaging between the
MRTD and the BIS. There is no need for SFR FTP_ITC.1, e.g. to require this communication
channel to be logically distinct from other communication channels since there is only one
channel. Since the TOE does not provide a direct human interface a trusted path as required by
FTP_TRP.1 is not applicable here.
6.4.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
The EAL4 was chosen to permit a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous, do not
require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line. EAL4 is
applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate to high level of
independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur
sensitive security specific engineering costs.
The selection of the component ALC_DVS.2 provides a higher assurance of the security of the
MRTD’s development and manufacturing especially for the secure handling of the MRTD’s
material.
The component ALC_DVS.2 augmented to EAL4 has no dependencies to other security
Requirements
Dependencies ALC_DVS.2: no dependencies.
6.4.4 Security Requirements – Mutual Support and Internal Consistency
The following part of the security requirements rationale shows that the set of security
requirements for the TOE consisting of the security functional requirements (SFRs) and the
security assurance requirements (SARs) together form a mutually supportive and internally
consistent whole.
The analysis of the TOE´s security requirements with regard to their mutual support and
internal consistency demonstrates:
The dependency analysis in Dependency Rationale for the security functional requirements
shows that the basis for mutual support and internal consistency between all defined functional
requirements is satisfied. All dependencies between the chosen functional components are
analyzed, and non-satisfied dependencies are appropriately explained.
The assurance class EAL4 is an established set of mutually supportive and internally consistent
assurance requirements. The dependency analysis for the sensitive assurance components in
section Security Assurance Requirements Rationale shows that the assurance requirements
are mutually supportive and internally consistent as all (sensitive) dependencies are satisfied
and no inconsistency appears.
Inconsistency between functional and assurance requirements could only arise if there are
functional-assurance dependencies which are not met, a possibility which has been shown not
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 60.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
to arise in Dependency Rationale and Security Assurance Requirements Rationale.
Furthermore, as also discussed in Security Assurance Requirements Rationale, the chosen
assurance components are adequate for the functionality of the TOE. So the assurance
requirements and security functional requirements support each other and there are no
inconsistencies between the goals of these two groups of security requirements.
Inconsistency between functional and assurance requirements could only arise if there are
functional-assurance dependencies which are not met, a possibility which has been shown not
to arise in Dependency Rationale and Security Assurance Requirements Rationale.
Furthermore, as also discussed in Security Assurance Requirements Rationale, the chosen
assurance components are adequate for the functionality of the TOE. So the assurance
requirements and security functional requirements support each other and there are no
inconsistencies between the goals of these two groups of security requirements.
7 TOE Summary Specification
7.1 TOE Security Functions
7.1.1 Cryptographic Operations
This function implements the following cryptographic operations for the TOE:
1. 3DES key generation according to Document Basic Access Control Key Derivation
Algorithm with key sizes of 112 bit.
2. Hashing according to SHA-1 and SHA-256 that meets FIPS 180-2. For Basic Access
Control SHA-1 is used. For active authentication manufacturer decides which
algorithms will be used : SHA-1 or SHA-256.
3. Secure messaging: encryption and decryption with 3DES algorithm in CBC mode with
key sizes of 112 bits. 8 bytes zero IV, padding mode 2 is used.
4. Secure messaging: message authentication with Retail MAC with key sizes 112 bits
according to ISO 9797. MAC Algorithm 3 is used with block cipher 3DES.
5. Active authentication signature generation according to ISO/IEC 9796-2 scheme 1 with
RSA algorithm RFC 3447 RSASSA-PSS key sizes 1024 to 1848 bits.
6. After each active authentication, active authentication keys are destroyed by writing 0.
7. After each BAC session both the 3DES encryption key and message authentication key
are destroyed by writing 0.
8. After each initialization authentication and personalization authentication, initialization
key and personalization key are destroyed by writing 0.
9. Random number generation according to ANSI X9.17, AIS20 Class K4 for key
generation, authentication operations.
7.1.2 Identification and Authentication
This function implements the following identification and authentication operations for the
TOE:
1. Storage of IC Identification data by the Manufacturer (with PUT DATA command)
2. The following data can be read before identification and authentication
a. Initialization data in Manufacturing phase
b. ATS (Answer to Select) in all phases
3. TSF mediated actions require successful identification and authentication, because BAC
is activated.
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 61.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
4. Authentication data (random numbers) are prevented to be reused.
5. User authentication is provided through:
a. BAC authentication mechanism in Operation Phase through BAC Authenticaton
mechanism with Document Basic Access keys.
b. Symmetric authentication mechanism based on 3DES in Manufacturing Phase
with initialization key.
c. Symmetric authentication mechanism based on 3DES in Personalization Phase
with personalization key.
6. Active authentication of the TOE is provided through Active authentication mechanism
with active authentication keys.
7.1.3 User Data Protection
This function implements the following user data protection operations for the TOE:
1. Allowing only the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent to read and write
EF.SOD, EF.COM anddata groups DG1 to DG16 of the LDS.
2. Allowing the terminals to read data groups DG1-DG2 andDG5 to DG 16 of the LDS
after successful BAC authentication.
3. Not allowing anybody to modify any data groups DG1 to DG 16 of the LDS in
Operation phase.
4. Not allowing anybody to write/modify/erase any data (keys, LDS data) in Operation
phase.
5. Transmitted and received user data is protected from modification, deletion, insertion
and replay errors through secure messaging.
6. Determination on receipt of user data if modification, deletion, insertion and replay have
occurred through secure messaging.
7. Not allowing anybody to read DG3 and DG4.
7.1.4 Security Management
This function implements the following security management operations for the TOE:
1. Initialization, personalization and configuration of the TOE are only allowed for the
manufacturer and the personalization agent.
2. Initialization data and pre-personalization data can only be written by the manufacturer.
3. Ability to set maximum value of the BAC error counter and wait time for the BAC error
is restricted to the manufacturer.
4. When BAC error counter exceeds the threshold, the TOE waits for a pre-configured
wait time without any action.
5. Ability to set the hash algorithm for the active authentication, SHA-1 or SHA-256, is
restricted to the manufacturer and the personalization agent.
6. Maintenance of the security roles: Manufacturer, personalization agent, Basic Inspection
System.
7. Personalization Agent is allowed to write the Document Basic Access Keys.
8. Manufacturer and Personalization Agent are allowed to write the Active Authentication
keys.
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 62.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
9. After unsuccessfull authentication in INITIALIZATION START, INITIALIZATION
END, and CHANGE KEY commands in Manufacturing phase, the initialization key
error counter is incremented. When the counter reaches the threshold, the TOE enters
the Death phase and can no longer be used.
10. After unsuccessfull authentication in PERSONALIZATION START,
PERSONALIZATION END, CHANGE KEY commands in Personalization phase, the
personalization key error counter is incremented. When the counter reaches the
threshold, the TOE enters the Death phase and can no longer be used.
11. After unsuccessfull authentication in EXCHANGE CHALLENGE command in
Manufacturing phase, the EXCHANGE CHALLENGE error counter is incremented.
When the counter reaches the threshold, the TOE enters the Death phase and can no
longer be used which may enable other attacks.
12. Nobody is allowed to read Document Basic Access keys and Active Authentication
Private keys.
13. Test features of the TOE are not available in Operation phase. If test features are
performed by the TOE, no user data, TSF data can be disclosed or manipulated, no
software can be reconstructed and no substantial information about TSF can be
gathered.
14. Ability to disable read access for users to theInitialization Data to the Personalization
Agent.
7.1.5 Protection
This function protects the TSF, TSF data and user data. It implements the following protection
operations for the TOE:
1. Masking in the core supports the protection of data transfers and calculations. It is
important to realize a random timing behavior for code execution so that the same code
will always produce a different timing profile. Random Timing Jitter is a useful tool
against different form of side-channel attacks.
2. The cache is a vital component of the SLE 78 family and contributes significantly to the
processor performance. PFD (Post Failure Detection) cache integrity check to detect
distinct memory manipulation.
3. Security Trap Handling on User Mode Security Live Control allows “emergency”
handling to be carried out in the case of a security alarm. UmSLC Test tests sensors and
alarms.
4. Watchdog supports detection of program flow manipulations. It can be combined with
checkpoint functionality.
5. Level Concept satisfies hierchical separation of code blocks with different access rights
and restricted code access for unprivileged levels..
6. FixKey is general IP protection. VarKey is specific temporarily required secrets. MED-
Configuration of Rounds protect of highly sensitive data.
7. One of Random Number Generators is True Random Number Generator. It provides
highest quality true random numbers for any kind of cryptographic seed. No online test
is required. Other Random Number Generator is Pseudo Random Number Generator
(PRNG). It is used for high performance random number generation.
8. Symmetric Crypto Processor (SCP) is coprocessor for fully built-in triple-DES and AES
with keys up to 256 bits. Crypto engine (Crypto@2304T) for public key Cryptography
satisfies RSA with register lengths of up to 2304 bits, RSA calculations with key
lengths of up to: 2048 bits w/o CRT and 4096 bits with CRT.
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 63.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
9. TSF Data integrity check, tests the TSF data before usage and if any manipulation is
detected the TOE enters Death phase.
10. TSF code integrity check allows the authorized user to check the integrity of the TSF
Code.
In this section it is shown that security functions fulfill security requirements. At least one
security function meets each security requirement. The numbers indicate the operation number
listed under the security functions chapter.
Cryptographic
Operation
Identification
and
Authentication
User
Data
Protection
Security
Management
Protection
FAU_SAS.1-1 1
FCS_CKM.1-1 1
FCS_CKM.4-1 6,7,8
FCS_COP.1-1/SHA 2 5
FCS_COP.1-1/ENC 3
FCS_COP.1-1/AUTH 3
FCS_COP.1-1/MAC 4
FCS_COP.1-1/SIGN 5
FCS_RND.1-1 9 7
FIA_UID.1-1 2
FIA_UID.1-2 3
FIA_UAU.1-1 2
FIA_UAU.1-2 3
FIA_UAU.4-1 4
FIA_UAU.5-1 5
FIA_UAU.5-2 5
FIA_UAU.6-1 5
FIA_API.1-1 5 6
FIA_AFL.1-1/EXC 11
FIA_AFL.1-2/EXC 11
FIA_AFL.1-1/INI 9,
FIA_AFL.1-2/INI 9,
FIA_AFL.1-1/PER 10,
FIA_AFL.1-2/PER 10,
FIA_AFL.1-1/BAC 3
FIA_AFL.1-2/BAC 4
FDP_ACC.1-1 1
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 64.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
FDP_ACF.1-1 2
FDP_ACF.1-2 1,2,7
FDP_ACF.1-3 1,2
FDP_ACF.1-4 3,4
FDP_UCT.1-1 5
FDP_UIT.1-1 5
FDP_UIT.1-2 6
FMT_SMF.1-1 1
FMT_SMR.1-1 6
FMT_SMR.1-2 6
FMT_LIM.1-1 13
FMT_LIM.2-1 13
FMT_MTD.1-1/INI_ENA 2
FMT_MTD.1-1/INI_DIS 14
FMT_MTD.1-1/KEY_WRITE I1,I2 7,8
FMT_MTD.1-1/KEY_READ 12
FPT_EMSEC.1-1 1,6,8
FPT_EMSEC.1-2 1,6,8
FPT_FLS.1-1 2
FPT_TST.1-1 3
FPT_TST.1-2 9
FPT_TST.1-3 10
FPT_PHP.3-1 2,4,5
Table 7 - Summary specification rationale table
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 65.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
8 Statement of Compatibility between the Composite Security Target
and the Platform Security Target
This chapter shows that the security objectives, security requirements and security functionality
in the Composite-ST and the Platform-ST are compatible.
8.1 Separation of the Platform-TSF
Security functions for the platform and their usage in TOE are listed below. They are categorized as
“relevant Platform-TSF” if TOE uses this TSF and “irrelevant Platform-TSF” if they are not used.
Relevant Platform Security Functionality Irrelevant Platform Security Functionality
SF_PS Protection against Snooping SF_DPM Device Phase Management
SF_PMA Protection against Modification
Attacks
SF_PLA Protection against Logical Attacks
SF_CS Cryptographic Support
8.1.1 Relevant Platform Security Functionality
SF_PS Protection against Snooping
This function is relevant Platform-TSF, TOE is protected against snooping. All contents of memories
of the TOE are encrypted on chip to protect against data analysis on stored data as well as on internally
transmitted data.
SF_PMA Protection against Modification Attacks
This function is relevant Platform-TSF, because the TOE is protected against fault and modifying
attacks. The core provides the functionality of double-computing and result comparison of all tasks to
detect incorrect calculations. The detection of an incorrect calculation is stored and the TOE enters a
defined secure state which causes the chip internal reset process. Whenever a physical manipulation or
a physical probing attack is detected, the processing of the TOE is immediately stopped and the TOE
enters a secure state called security reset.
SF_CS Cryptographic Support
This function is relevant Platform-TSF, because the TOE uses Triple DES coprocessor in Triple DES
operations (encryption/decryption), RSA coprocessor in RSA operations(Encryption, Decryption,
Signature Generation and Verification) and the SHA-2 library for hash value calculation. Additionally,
Toolbox Library , Base Library and TRNG is used by TOE. Toolbox Library provides the basic long
integer arithmetic and modular functions in software, supported by the crytographic coprocessor. Base
Library provides the low level interface to the asymmetric cryptographic coprocessor and has no user
available interface. The TOE is equipped with physical True Random Number Generator(TRNG).
8.1.2 Irrelevant Platform Security Functionality
SF_DPM Device Phase Management
This function is irrelevant.
SF_PLA Protection against Logical Attacks
This function is non-relevant Platform-TSF , because the TOE does not use privilege levels of the CPU
and memory access controls offered by the platform.
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 66.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
8.2 Platform-SFR
Platform SFR Composite SFR Rational
FRU_FLT.2
Limited fault tolerance
 FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE
Emanation
 FPT_PHP.3 Resistance
to physical attack
Platform SFR FRU_FLT.2 is used
to support following Composite
SFRs:
 FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE
Emanation and
 FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to
physical attack
FPT_FLS.1
Failure with preservation of secure state
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with
preservation of secure state
The requirements match they
have the same meaning
FMT_LIM.1
Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.1 Limited
capabilities
The requirements match they
have the same meaning
FMT_LIM.2
Limited availability
FMT_LIM.2 Limited
availability
The requirements match they
have the same meaning
FAU_SAS.1
Audit storage
FAU_SAS.1Audit storage The requirements match they
have the same meaning
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical
attack
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to
physical attack
The requirements match they
have the same meaning
FDP_ITT.1 Basic internal transfer
protection
 FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE
Emanation
 FPT_PHP.3 Resistance
to physical attack
Platform SFR FRU_FLT.2 is used
to support following Composite
SFRs:
 FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE
Emanation and
 FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to
physical attack
FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data
transfer protection
 FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE
Emanation
 FPT_PHP.3 Resistance
to physical attack
Platform SFR FRU_FLT.2 is used
to support following Composite
SFRs:
 FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE
Emanation and
 FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to
physical attack
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow
control
 FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE
Emanation
 FPT_PHP.3 Resistance
to physical attack
Platform SFR FRU_FLT.2 is used
to support following Composite
SFRs:
 FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE
Emanation and
 FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to
physical attack
FCS_RNG.1 Quality metric for random
numbers
FCS_RND.1 The requirements match they
have the same meaning
FPT_TST.2 Subset TOE security testing FPT_TST.1.1 TSF testing Composite product runs the self
tests provided by platform.
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control Not used by composite product.
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based Not used by composite product.
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 67.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
access control
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security
attributes
Not used by composite product.
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute
initialization
Not used by composite product.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
Management functions
Not used by composite product.
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
management
Not used by composite product.
FDP_SDI.1 Stored data integrity
monitoring
Supports the composite SFR
:FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to
physical attack
FDP_SDI.2 Stored data integrity
monitoring and action
Supports the composite SFR
:FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to
physical attack
FCS_COP.1 [DES] FCS_COP.1/ENC The requirements match they
have the same meaning
FCS_COP.1 [AES] This SFR of the platform is not
used by the TOE.
FCS_COP.1 [RSA] Supports the composite SFR,
FIA_API.1
FCS_COP.1[ECDSA] This SFR of the platform is not
used by the TOE.
FCS_COP.1 [ECDH] This SFR of the platform is not
used by the TOE.
FCS_COP.1 [SHA] FCS_COP.1/SHA The requirements match they
have the same meaning
Table 8 - Security requirements mapping table
8.3 Platform Security Objectives
Platform Security Objective Composite Security Objective Rationale
O.Leak-Inherent OT.Prot_Inf_Leak The security objectives match
O.Mem_Access This objective is not related
O.Phys-Probing OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper The security objectives match
O.Malfunction OT.Prot_Malfunction The security objectives match
O.Phys-Manipulation OT.Data_Int
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
The security objectives match
O.Leak-Forced OT.Prot_Inf_Leak The security objectives match
O.Abuse-Func OT.Prot_Abuse-Func The security objectives match
O.Identification OT.Identification The security objectives match
O.RND This is used by embedded OS
according to FCS_RND.1
O.Add-Functions Additional functions are
Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES), Triple Data
Encryption Standard (3DES),
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 68.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
Rivest-Shamir-Adleman
(RSA), Elliptic Curve
Cryptography (EC), Secure
Hash Algorithm (SHA-2).
Besides EC, they are used by
embedded OS.
Table 9 - Security objectives mapping table
8.4 Platform Security Objectives for the environment
Platform Security Objective Composite Security Objective Rationale
OE.Plat-Appl OT.Prot_Inf_Leak The security objectives match
OE.Resp-Appl OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int,
OT.Data_Conf
The security objectives match
OE.Process-Sec-IC OE.MRTD_Manufact The security objectives match
Table 10 - Security objectives for the environment mapping table
8.5 Platform-Assumptions
Platform Assumptions Composite Assumptions Rationale
A.Process-Sec-IC A.MRTD_Delivery
A.Pers_Agent
Covered by A.MRTD_Delivery,
A.Pers_Agent assumptions and
ALC SAR class of composite
product.
A.Plat-Appl Considered for the development of
the embedded OS
A.Resp-Appl Considered for the development of
the embedded OS
A.Key-Function Considered for the development of
the embedded OS
Table 11 - Assumptions mapping table
8.6 Platform-OSPs
Platform OSP Composite OSP Rationale
P.Process-TOE P.Manufact
P.Personalization
The OSPs match
P.Add-Functions This policy supports Cryptographic
Support SFRs.
Table 12 - OSP mapping table
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 69.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
8.7 Platform-Threats
Platform Threats Composite Threats Rationale
T.Leak-Inherent T.Information_Leakage The threats match
T.Phys-Probing T.Phys-Tamper The threats match
T.Malfunction T.Malfunction The threats match
T.Phys-Manipulation T.Forgery
T.Phys-Tamper
The threats match
T.Leak-Forced T.Information_Leakage,
T.Phys-Tamper,
T.Malfunction
The threats match
T.Abuse-Func T.Abuse-Func The threats match
T.Mem-Access The threat is not specified in
composite ST
T.RND The threat is not specified in
composite ST, however it is used by
the composite ST.
Table 13 - Threats mapping table
AKIS PROJE GRUBU
Rev. No:01 Rev. Date:20.09.2011 AKIS-ST 70.thpage of 70pages
The
contents
of
this
document
are
the
property
of
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
and
should
not
be
reproduced,
copied
or
disclosed
to
a
third
party
without
the
written
consent
of
the
proprietor.
©
2014
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
Ulusal
Elektronik
ve
Kriptoloji
Araştırma
Enstitüsü
P.K.
74,
Gebze,
41470
Kocaeli,
TÜRKİYE
Tel:
(0262)
648
1000,
Faks:
(0262)
648
1100
Bu
dokümanın
içeriği
TÜBİTAK
BİLGEM
UEKAE
’in
mülkiyetindedir.
Sahibinin
yazılı
izni
olmadan
çoğaltılamaz,
kopyalanamaz
ve
üçüncü
şahıslara
açıklanamaz.
9 REFERENCES
CommonCriteria
[1] CommonCriteriafor Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and
General Model; CCMB-2009-07-001, Version 3.1, Revision 3, July 2009
[2] CommonCriteriafor Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security
FunctionalComponents; CCMB-2009-07-002, Version 3.1, Revision 3, July 2009
[3] CommonCriteriafor Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security
AssuranceRequirements; CCMB-2009-07-003, Version 3.1, Revision 3, July 2009
[4] CommonMethodologyfor Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation
Methodology; CCMB-2009-07-004, Version3.1, Revision 3, July 2009
ICAO
[5]ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, part 1 – Machine
ReadablePassports,Sixth Edition, 2006, International CivilAviationOrganization
[6]Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application”, Basic Access Control; BSI-
CC-PP-0055, Version 1.10, 25th March 2009, BundesamtfürSicherheit in der
Informationstechnik
[7] Security TargetM7820 M11includingoptional Software LibrariesRSA - EC – SHA-2 –
Toolbox,Infineon Technologies AG, Chipcard and Security, Evaluation Documentation,
certifiedunderGermanSchemewithcertificationreport - BSI-DSZ-CC-0640