Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0416-2007
for
Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005
Enterprise Edition (English) SP1
Version/Build 9.00.2047.00
from
Microsoft Corporation
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)3018 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)3018 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)3018 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-326 V3.4
Common Criteria Arrangement
BSI-DSZ-CC-0416-2007
Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server
2005 Enterprise Edition (English) SP1
Version/Build 9.00.2047.00
from
Microsoft Corporation
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3
(ISO/IEC 15408:2005) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, Version
2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
Evaluation Results:
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance Package: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL1
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme
of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, 21. March 2007
The President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Dr. Helmbrecht L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)3018 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)3018 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)3018 9582-111
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty
of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0416-2007 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
1
Under the BSIG Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
V
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0416-2007
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
Part D: Annexes
VI
BSI-DSZ-CC-0416-2007 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
2
• BSIG
3
• BSI Certification Ordinance
4
• BSI Schedule of Costs
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
• DIN EN 45011 standard
• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
5
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), version 2.3
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), version 2.3
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
• Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance
components above EAL4 (AIS 34)
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger
dated 19 May 2006, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0416-2007
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective in March 1998. This agreement has been signed by
the national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United
Kingdom. This agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates
was extended to include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels
(EAL 1 – EAL 7). The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI)
recognizes certificates issued by the national certification bodies of France and
the United Kingdom within the terms of this Agreement.
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 has been signed in May 2000 (CC-MRA). It includes also the recognition
of Protection Profiles based on the CC. As of February 2007 the arrangement
has been signed by the national bodies of:
Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden,
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America.
The current list of signatory nations resp. approved certification schemes can be
seen on the web site: http:\\www.commoncriteriaportal.org
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0416-2007 Certification Report
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005 Enterprise Edition
(English) SP1 Version/Build 9.00.2047.00 has undergone the certification
procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005
Enterprise Edition (English) SP1 Version/Build 9.00.2047.00 was conducted by
TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH, Prüfstelle für IT-Sicherheit. The TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH, Prüfstelle für IT-Sicherheit is an evaluation facility
(ITSEF)6
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor and vendor and distributor is:
Microsoft Corporation
1 Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98052-6399, USA
The certification is concluded with
• the comparability check and
• the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on 21. March 2007.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in
the following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the
following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for recertification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0416-2007
4 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-18.
The product Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005 Enterprise Edition
(English) SP1 Version/Build 9.00.2047.00 has been included in the BSI list of
the certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: http://
www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49
228 9582-111.
7
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor of
the product.
7
Microsoft Corporation
1 Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98052-6399, USA
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0416-2007 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0416-2007
Contents of the certification results
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification of the TOE 8
3 Security Policy 9
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 10
5 Architectural Information 11
6 Documentation 11
7 IT Product Testing 12
8 Evaluated Configuration 12
9 Results of the Evaluation 13
10 Comments/Recommendations 15
11 Annexes 15
12 Security Target 15
13 Definitions 15
14 Bibliography 18
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0416-2007 Certification Report
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) and subject of the Security Target (ST) [6] is
the database management system (DBMS) product Database Engine of
Microsoft SQL Server 2005 Enterprise Edition (English) SP1 Version/Build
9.00.2047.00
It has the capability to limit TOE access to authorized users, enforce
Discretionary Access Controls on objects under the control of the
database management system based on user and/or role authorizations,
and to provide user accountability via audit of users’ actions.
The TOE is part of the product package of the SQL Server 2005. It provides a
relational database engine providing mechanisms for the following security
functions:
• Security Management,
• Access Control,
• Identification and Authentication
• Security Audit.
The product package of SQL Server additionally includes a set of additional
tools which are not part of the TOE, these are Replication Services, Notification
Services, Integration Services, Analysis Services, Reporting Services,
Management Tools, Development Tools.
The TOE itself comprises the database engine of the SQL Server 2005 platform
which provides the security functionality described by the ST. The additional
tools as listed above interact with the TOE as a standard SQL client.
The IT product Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005 Enterprise
Edition (English) SP1 Version/Build 9.00.2047.00 was evaluated by TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH, Prüfstelle für IT-Sicherheit. The evaluation was
completed on 15. March 2007. The TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH, Prüfstelle
für IT-Sicherheit is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)8
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor and vendor and distributor is
Microsoft Corporation
1 Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98052-6399, USA
8
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0416-2007
1.1 Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see Annex C or [1], part
3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level
EAL1 without augmentations.
1.2 Functionality
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) selected in the Security
Target are Common Criteria Part 2 extended as shown in the following tables.
The following SFRs are taken from CC part 2:
Class FAU: Security Audit
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_SEL.1 Selective audit
Class FDP: User Data Protection
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
Class FIA: Identification and Authentication
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action
FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action
Class FMT: Security Management
FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
FMT_REV.1(1) Revocation (user attributes)
FMT_REV.1(2) Revocation (subject, object attributes)
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Table 1: SFRs for the TOE taken from CC Part 2
The following CC part 2 extended SFRs are defined:
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FAU_GEN_EXP.2 User and/or group identity association
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0416-2007 Certification Report
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FAU_STG_EXP.4 Administrable Prevention of audit data loss
Table 2: SFRs for the TOE, CC part 2 extended
Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the ST chapter 5.
The following Security Functional Requirements are defined for the IT-
Environment of the TOE:
Class FAU: Security Audit
FAU_STG.1/ENV Protected audit trail storage
FAU_SAR.1/ENV Audit Review
Class FCS: Cryptographic Support
FCS_COP.1/ENV Cryptographic Operation
Class FDP: User Data Protection
FDP_ACC.1/ENV Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1/ENV Security attribute based access control
Class FIA: Identification and Authentication
FIA_UAU.1/ENV Timing of authentication
FIA_UID.1/ENV Timing of identification
Class FMT: Security Management
FMT_MSA.3/ENV Static attribute initialisation
Class FPT: Protection of the TSF
FPT_STM.1/ENV Reliable time stamps
Table 3: SFRs for the IT-Environment
Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the ST chapter 5.2.
These Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the TOE Security
Functions:
Identifier TOE Security Function Description
SF.SM Security Management This Security Function provides the
necessary functions to change the
behavior of the TSF.
SF.AC Access Control This Security Function realizes the
Discretionary Access Control Policy
for all objects under the control of
the TOE.
SF.I&A Identification and Authentication This Security Function realizes the
identification and authentication
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0416-2007
Identifier TOE Security Function Description
function of the TOE.
SF.AU Security Audit This Security Function realizes the
audit functionality for the TOE.
Table 4: Security Functions
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6.
1.3 Strength of Function
There is no strength of functions claim for the TOE.
1.4 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies
(OSPs) addressed by the evaluated IT product
The TOE maintains two types of data which represent the assets: User Data
and TSF Data.
The following list of considered threats for the TOE is defined in the Security
Target [6], chapter 3.3:
Threats Description
T.
ACCIDENTAL_ADMIN_
ERROR
An administrator may incorrectly install or configure
TOE resulting in ineffective security mechanisms.
the
T.MASQUERADE A user or process may claim to be another entity in order to
gain unauthorized access to data or TOE resources.
T.TSF_COMPROMISE A user or process may try to access (i.e. view, modify or
delete) configuration data of the TOE. This could allow the
user or process to gain knowledge about the configuration of
the TOE or could bring the TOE into an insecure configuration
in which the security mechanisms for the protection of the
assets are not longer working correctly.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ A user may try to gain unauthorized access to user data for
ACCESS which they are not authorized according to the TOE security
policy. Within the scope of this threat the user just tries to
access assets, he doesn’t have permission on, without
trying to masquerade another user or circumventing the
security mechanism in any other way.
Table 5: Threats
There are two Security policies to be fulfilled by the TOE, please refer to the
Security Target [6], chapter 3.4:
Assumption Description
P.ACCOUNTABILITY The authorized users of the TOE shall be held accountable for
their actions within the TOE.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0416-2007 Certification Report
Assumption Description
P.ROLES The TOE shall provide an authorized administrators role for
secure administration of the TOE. This role shall be separate
and distinct from other authorized users.
Table 6: Organisational Security Policies
1.5 Special configuration requirements
The TOE Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005 Enterprise Edition
(English) SP1 Version/Build 9.00.2047.00 is a portion of the product package of
the SQL Server 2005 consisting of the database engine of the SQL Server 2005
platform and including the security functions Security Management, Access
Control, Identification and Authentication, and Security Audit.
Not part of the TOE but part of the product package of SQL Server are tools,
applications, and services such as Replication Services, Notification Services,
Integration Services, Analysis Services, Reporting Services, Management
Tools, Development Tools.
The document „Microsoft SQL Server 2005 SP1 Database Engine Common
Criteria Evaluation,Guidance Addendum / Installation / Startup“ [10] describes
the evaluated configuration and the necessary setup to achieve the evaluated
configuration. It also describes that some functions were not part of the
evaluation, such as the VIA protocol, Management Studio, Graphical User
Interface (e.g. SQL Configuration Manager), common language runtime (CLR)
hosting, encryption functions, support of Windows User Interface Design and
Development, Support of Windows Internationalization (the English version is
evaluated), and clustered servers.
The TOE is running on a Microsoft Windows Server 2003 Enterprise Edition 32-
bit operating system (build 3790, English, SP1 including MS05-042
(KB899587), MS05-039 (KB899588), MS05-027 (KB896422), and patch
(KB907865)) and was configured using the Security Template
“CC_Baseline_W2K3.inf” from Windows Server 2003, Security Configuration
Guide, Version 1.0, September 22, 2005.
For this evaluation the TOE was tested using a generic Server machine with
Dual Processors of 2.80 and 2.81 GHz, 2.0 GB RAM, two HDDs, Keyboard,
Monitor, Mouse, network card, DVD-RW drive as the hardware platform.
For more details about necessary hardware requirements of the evaluated
configuration please read the Security Target [6], chapter 2. 2 and the
Certification report of the underlying operating system [8].
1.6 Assumptions about the operating environment
The following assumptions concerning the operating environment are made in
the Security Target, please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 3.2:
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0416-2007
Assumption Description
A.NO_EVIL Administrators are non-hostile, appropriately trained, and
follow all administrator guidance.
A.NO_GENERAL_PUR
POSE
There are no general-purpose computing capabilities
(e.g., compilers or user applications) available on DBMS
servers, other than those services necessary for the
operation, administration and support of the DBMS.
A.OS_PP_VALIDATED The underlying OS has been validated against
sponsored OS PP of at least Basic Robustness
Operating System provides functionality for
• Identification and authentication of users,
• Access Control for Files,
• Time stamps,
• Audit Storage and Audit Review,
• Hashing of passwords
an NSA
and the
A.PHYSICAL It is assumed that appropriate physical security is
provided for the server, on which the TOE is installed,
considering the value of the stored, processed, and
transmitted information.
A.COMM It is assumed that any communication path from and to the
TOE is appropriately secured to avoid eavesdropping and
manipulation.
Table 7: Assumptions
1.7 Disclaimers
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005 Enterprise Edition (English)
SP1 Version/Build 9.00.2047.00
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0416-2007 Certification Report
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 SW (Base
TOE
Binaries)
Database Engine of
Microsoft SQL Server
2005 Enterprise Edition
(English)
Version/Build
9.00.2047.00
(Note: TOE Ver
is only valid
application
Service Pack)
sion
after
of
CD (boxed, COTS software)
2 SW (TOE
update)
SQL Server 2005
Service Pack 1
File properties -
name:
SQLServer2005SP1
-KB913090-x86-
ENU.exe, size:
264.954.656 Bytes
Downloadable available
from:
http://www.microsoft.com/sql/
commoncriteria/
3 DOC SQL Server Books
Online
July 2006, File
properties - name:
SqlServer2K5_BOL
_Jul2006.msi, size:
129.097.728 Bytes
Downloadable available
from:
http://www.microsoft.com/sql/
commoncriteria/
4 DOC SQL Server Guidance
Addendum / Installation
/ Startup
Version 1.21 / Date
2007-03-14
Downloadable available
from:
http://www.microsoft.com/sql/
commoncriteria/
5 Configurati
on File
Startup script
(Optional), name:
EAL1_trace.sql
14/12/2006, File
properties - name:
EAL1_trace.sql,
size: 21.435 Bytes
Downloadable available
from:
http://www.microsoft.com/sql/
commoncriteria/
Table 8: Deliverables of the TOE
Note: Although several tools and services are delivered together with the TOE,
they are excluded from the TOE and are considered part of the environment.
The TOE environment also includes applications that are not delivered with the
TOE. The TOE uses the functionality of the underlying operating system
Windows 2003 Server, e.g. for log file storage, for audit record readability, for
cryptographic operations, for user data protection, for access control functions,
for user authentication and identification, for security management, and for
providing a reliable time stamp. The functionality of the underlying operating
system is specified in the security requirements for the IT environment, see
chapter 1.2 of this report, SFRs for the IT-Environment, and chapter 5.2 of the
Security Target [6].
3 Security Policy
The security policy of the TOE is to modify the TSF data to securely manage
the TOE and its security functions by authorized administrators by applying T-
SQL statements.
The TOE allows to control the access of users to objects based on the identity
of the user requesting access, the membership of this user to roles, the
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0416-2007
requested operation and the ID of the requested object. This can be done either
on an instance level or on a database level.
The TOE requires each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing
any other actions on behalf of that user. This is done on an instance level and
means that the user has to be associated with a login of the TOE. The TOE
uses a Mixed Mode Authentication which means that there are two types of
logins, i.e. Windows accounts and SQL Server logins. The administrator
specifies the type of login for every login he is creating.
The TOE also features the generation of audit logs for security relevant actions.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
4.1 Usage assumptions
Based on the personnel assumptions, the following usage condition exist.
Please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 3.2 for more detail:
• Assuming the trustworthiness and appropriate training of Administrators as
well as their adherence to all administrator guidance (A.NO_EVIL).
4.2 Environmental assumptions
The following assumptions about physical and connectivity aspects defined by
the Security Target have to be met (refer to Security Target [6], chapter 3.2):
• Assuming the provision of appropriate physical security for the server, on
which the TOE is installed, considering the value of the stored, processed,
and transmitted data (A.PHYSICAL)
• Assuming the non-availability of general-purpose computing capabilities
(e.g. compilers or user applications) on DBMS servers, other than those
services necessary for the operation, administration and support of the
DBMS (A.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE).
• Assuming that the underlying OS has been validated against an NSA
sponsored OS PP of at least Basic Robustness and that the Operating
System provides functionality for Identification and authentication of users,
Access Control for Files, Time stamps, Audit Storage and Audit Review,
Hashing of passwords (A.OS_PP_VALIDATED).
• Assuming the protection of the communication paths to and from the TOE to
avoid eavesdropping and manipulation (A.COMM).
Furthermore, the Security Target [6], chapter 3.4 defines two Organisational
Security Policies:
• P.ACCOUNTABILITY states that the authorized users of the TOE shall be
held accountable for their actions within the TOE.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0416-2007 Certification Report
• P.ROLES states that the TOE shall provide an authorized administrators’
role for secure administration of the TOE. This role shall be separate and
distinct from other authorized users
4.3 Clarification of scope
Additional threats that are not addressed by the TOE and its evaluated security
functions were not addressed by this product evaluation.
5 Architectural Information
The TOE, as illustrated in Fig. 1 of chapter 2.2 of the Security Target [6], can be
described by following components:
• The Communication part resp. Command Interpreter is the interface for
programs accessing the TOE. It is the interface between the TOE and
clients performing requests. All responses to user application requests
return to the client through the Communication part and Command
Interpreter.
• The Relational Engine is the core of the database engine and is responsible
for all security relevant decisions.
• The Storage Engine is a resource provider. It manages the physical
resources for the TOE by using the Windows OS.
• The SQL-OS is a resource provider for all situations where the TOE uses
functionality of the operating system.
• Task Management provides an OS-like environment for threads but without
calling the Windows Operating System.
• The Memory Manager is responsible for the TOE memory pool.
The IT-environment consists of the underlying operating system and hardware
platform, as well as of the other parts of the SQL Server 2005 platform, and of
the clients that interact with the TOE.
6 Documentation
The following guidance documents and supportive information belong to the
TOE and are provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
[9] SQL Server 2005 Books Online (July 2006), File properties - name:
SqlServer2K5_BOL_Jul2006.msi, size: 129.097.728 Bytes
[10] Microsoft SQL Server 2005 SP1 Common Criteria Evaluation – Guidance
Addendum / Installation / Startup, Version 1.21 / Date 2007-03-14
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7 IT Product Testing
Basis of all test configurations is an installed TOE as identified in the Security
Target [6]. For the testing, the TOE has been installed on a generic Server
machine with Dual Processors of 2.80 and 2.81 GHz, 2.0 GB RAM, two HDDs,
Keyboard, Monitor, Mouse, network card, DVD-RW drive as the hardware
platform, the underlying operation system Microsoft Windows Server 2003
Enterprise Edition 32-bit operating system (build 3790, English, SP1 including
MS05-042 (KB899587), MS05-039 (KB899588), MS05-027 (KB896422), and
patch (KB907865)).
For the ITSEF’s independent testing, the TOE was installed on a machine that
met the minimum requirements for both the TOE and Windows Server 2003
Enterprise Edition. Only the following components of SQL server were installed.
• SQL Server Database Services (Core TOE component),
• Client Components (includes Management Studio, Client tools, and books
online, which is not included within the scope of evaluation)
The evaluator tests have been performed at the ITSEF facility in Essen,
Germany.
All tests were performed using the tool “sqlcmd”, with the exception of Audit Log
Verification. The ITSEF used the provided "Profiler" tool to view and verify the
audit logs.
The evaluators performed six tests using batch files. Each batch included
several sub-testcases. The tests covered each TSF defined in the ST [6] and in
the Functional Specification with at least one test.
During the tests, the TOE operated as specified.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called Database Engine of Microsoft SQL
Server 2005 Enterprise Edition (English) SP1 Version/Build 9.00.2047.00 and is
a part of the product package of the SQL Server 2005. Not part of the TOE but
part of the product package of SQL Server 2005 are tools, applications, and
services such as Replication Services, Notification Services, Integration
Services, Analysis Services, Reporting Services, Management Tools,
Development Tools. Although they are delivered together with the TOE, they
are excluded from the TOE and are considered part of the IT-environment. The
clients are also IT-environment.
The document „Microsoft SQL Server TM 2005 SP1 Database Engine Common
Criteria Evaluation,Guidance Addendum / Installation / Startup“ [10] describes
the evaluated configuration and the necessary setup to achieve the evaluated
configuration. It also describes that several functions are not part of the
evaluation, such as the VIA protocol, Management Studio, Graphical User
Interface (e.g. SQL Configuration Manager), common language runtime (CLR)
hosting, encryption functions, support of Windows User Interface Design and
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Development, Support of Windows Internationalization (the English version is
evaluated), and clustered servers.
The TOE is running and was tested on a Microsoft Windows Server 2003
Enterprise Edition 32-bit operating system (build 3790, English, SP1 including
MS05-042 (KB899587), MS05-039 (KB899588), MS05-027 (KB896422), and
patch (KB907865)) and was configured using the Security Template
“CC_Baseline_W2K3.inf” from Windows Server 2003, Security Configuration
Guide, Version 1.0, September 22, 2005.
For this evaluation the TOE was tested using a generic Server machine with
Dual Processors of 2.80 and 2.81 GHz, 2.0 GB RAM, two HDDs, Keyboard,
Monitor, Mouse, network card, DVD-RW drive as the hardware platform.
The TOE environment also includes applications that are not delivered with the
TOE. The TOE uses the functionality of the underlying operating system
Windows 2003 Server, e.g. for log file storage, for audit record readability, for
cryptographic operations, for user data protection, for access control functions,
for user authentication and identification, for security management, and for
providing a reliable time stamp.
The Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005 Enterprise Edition
(English) SP1 Version/Build 9.00.2047.00 is delivered in form of a boxed CD
through the sales channels. Service Pack 1 as well as the Guidance called
“SQL Server 2005 Books Online (July 2006)” [9] and the additional Guidance
Document “Microsoft SQL Server 2005 SP1 Common Criteria Evaluation –
Guidance Addendum / Installation / Startup” [10] are delivered via the web only.
It has to be noted that the certification according to Common Criteria is only
valid for the database engine of SQL Server 2005 Enterprise Edition and with
Service Pack 1 only.
9 Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), [7] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as
relevant for the TOE.
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components identical
with EAL1.
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL1 and
the class ASE for the Security Target evaluation) are summarised in the
following table.
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Assurance classes and components Verdict
Security Target evaluation CC Class ASE PASS
TOE description ASE_DES.1 PASS
Security environment ASE_ENV.1 PASS
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
PP claims ASE_PPC.1 PASS
IT security requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements ASE_SRE.1 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Configuration management CC Class ACM PASS
Version Numbers ACM_CAP.1 PASS
Delivery and operation CC Class ADO PASS
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures ADO_IGS.1 PASS
Development CC Class ADV PASS
Informal functional specification ADV_FSP.1 PASS
Informal correspondence demonstration ADV_RCR.1 PASS
Guidance documents CC Class AGD PASS
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM.1 PASS
User guidance AGD_USR.1 PASS
Tests CC Class ATE PASS
Independent testing – conformance ATE_IND.1 PASS
Table 9: Verdicts for the assurance components
The evaluation has shown that:
• Security Functional Requirements specified for the TOE are Common
Criteria Part 2 extended,
• the assurance of the TOE is Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL1.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the Database Engine of
Microsoft SQL Server 2005 Enterprise Edition (English) SP1 Version/Build
9.00.2047.00 in the configuration as defined in the Security Target and
summarised in this report (refer to the Security Target [6] and the chapters 2, 4
and 8 of this report).
The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for recertification or assurance continuity of the
modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the
evaluation of the modified product does not reveal any security deficiencies.
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10 Comments/Recommendations
The Guidance documentation (see chapter 6 of this report) contains necessary
information about the secure usage of the TOE. Additionally, for secure usage
of the TOE the fulfilment of the assumptions about the environment in the
Security Target [6] and the Security Target as a whole has to be taken into
account. Therefore a user/administrator has to follow the guidance in these
documents. Please read also chapter 8 of this report.
The user of the TOE has to be aware of the existence and purpose of the
Guidance Documentation Addendum Document “Microsoft SQL Server 2005
SP1 Common Criteria Evaluation – Guidance Addendum / Installation / Startup”
[10]. Therefore, the TOE’s Internet product homepage has to provide
information about the existence of the document and describe how to access
the document. The reference has to be unambiguous and permanent.
The guidance and the Guidance Documentation Addendum contain necessary
information about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be
considered.
11 Annexes
None.
12 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the security target [6] of the target of evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document.
13 Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
API Application Programming Interface
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CD Compact Disk
CC-MRA Common Criteria - Mutual Recognition Arrangement
CLR Common Language Runtime
COTS Commercial Off The Shelf
DBMS Database Management System
DVD Digital Versatile Disc
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EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
HDD Hard Disk Drive
IT Information Technology
NSA National Security Agency
OS Operating system
PP Protection Profile
RAM Random Access Memory
RW Read-Write
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SOF Strength of Function
SP Service Pack
SQL Structured Query Language
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
T-SQL Transact-SQL
VIA Virtual Interface Adapter
13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
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Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
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14 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.3, August 2005
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Evaluation Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-0416-2007, Microsoft SQL Server 2005 SP1
Database Engine Common Criteria Evaluation, Version: 1.4, 2007-01-
23)
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 3, Datum 2007-03-14, TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
[8] Certification Report/ Validation Report, Microsoft Windows 2003 Server
and XP Workstation, Report Number: CCEVS-VR-05-0131, Dated:
November 6, 2005, Version: 1.1, National Institute of Standards and
Technology
[9] SQL Server 2005 Books Online (July 2006), File properties - name:
SqlServer2K5_BOL_Jul2006.msi, size: 129.097.728 Bytes)
[10] Microsoft SQL Server 2005 SP1 Common Criteria Evaluation – Guidance
Addendum / Installation / Startup, Version 1.21, 2007-03-14
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements
that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result
is presented with respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3
(assurance requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of
requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
a) CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the
functional requirements are based only upon functional components in
CC Part 2.
b) CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the
functional requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
a) CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the
assurance requirements are based only upon assurance components in
CC Part 3.
b) CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the
assurance requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part
3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect
to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
a) Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-
defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) include all components in the
packages listed as part of the conformance result.
b) Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-
defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all
components in the packages listed as part of the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect
to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
a) PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of
the conformance result.“
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CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are
shown in Table 1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
ACM: Configuration management CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
ADV: Development TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
Development security (ALC_DVS)
ALC: Life cycle support Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
Coverage (ATE_COV)
ATE: Tests Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that
balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of
acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate
concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of
maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are
included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful
and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and
components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and
STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a
hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families.
Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component
where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation
assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance.
They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more
assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is
accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component
from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth)
and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no
more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance
dependencies of every component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other
combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the
addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already
included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another
hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an
EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be
augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component”
is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it
the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of
the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended
with explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance Class Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but
the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where
independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has
been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer,
including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the
guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could
be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE,
and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a
manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection
against identified threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of
design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the
part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such
it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the
absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a
situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the
developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from
positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of
existing sound development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough
investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-
engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other
resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically
feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in
conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-
specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security
engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported
by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a
TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5
assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5
requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of
specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development
and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable
costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to
produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant
risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for
application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets
justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies
the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with
tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal
analysis.“
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Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted,
it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept
of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their
security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical
analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required
to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE
security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of
the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to
violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover
flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the
ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised
capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of
all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance
level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified
vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found
useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by
the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the
TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a
low (for AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for
AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant)
attack potential.
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