BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-2020
for
KoCoBox MED+ OPB 2.1 Konnektor 2.3.24
from
KoCo Connector GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.3
BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-2020 (*)
KoCoBox MED+ OPB 2.1 Konnektor
2.3.24
from KoCo Connector GmbH
PP Conformance: Common Criteria Schutzprofil (Protection Profile)
Schutzprofil 2: Anforderungen an den Konnektor,
Version 1.5.4, BSI-CC-PP-0098-V2-2020 vom
17.03.2020
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 3 augmented by ADV_FSP.4, ADV_IMP.1,
ADV_TDS.3, ALC_FLR.2, ALC_TAT.1, AVA_VAN.3
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408
and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 30 December 2020
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Sandro Amendola
Head of Division
L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-2020
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-2020 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification......................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication....................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results.......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary....................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE.............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy............................................................................................................14
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................14
5. Architectural Information.............................................................................................15
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................15
7. IT Product Testing.......................................................................................................15
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................18
9. Results of the Evaluation............................................................................................18
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................24
11. Security Target..........................................................................................................25
12. Definitions.................................................................................................................25
13. Bibliography..............................................................................................................27
C. Excerpts from the Criteria..............................................................................................32
D. Annexes.........................................................................................................................33
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-2020
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BSI Schedule of Costs3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 3 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I, p. 519
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-2020 Certification Report
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2+ ALC_FLR components.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-2020
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product KoCoBox MED+ OPB 2.1 Konnektor, 2.3.24 has undergone the certification
procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product KoCoBox MED+ OPB 2.1 Konnektor, 2.3.24 was conducted
by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 17 July 2020. TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification
body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: KoCo Connector GmbH.
The product was developed by: KoCo Connector GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 30
December 2020 is valid until 29 December 2025. Validity can be re-newed by re-
certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-2020 Certification Report
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product KoCoBox MED+ OPB 2.1 Konnektor, 2.3.24 has been included in the BSI list
of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
KoCo Connector GmbH
Dessauer Str. 28/29
10963 Berlin
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-2020
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-2020 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The target of evaluation (TOE) is KoCoBox MED+ OPB 2.1 Konnektor, Version 2.3.24. The
TOE is the base software part of the product KoCoBox MED+. This product is a decentral
component, called “e-Health Konnektor” in the context of the German health care
telematics infrastructure. The TOE consists of three parts, the network connector (NK)
(German: “Netzkonnektor”), the application connector (AK) (German:
“Anwendungskonnektor”) and a healthcare specific module (VSDM) (German: “Fachmodul
VSDM”).
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Common Criteria Schutzprofil (Protection Profile) Schutzprofil 2:
Anforderungen an den Konnektor, Version 1.5.4, BSI-CC-PP-0098-V2-2020 vom
17.03.2020 [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 3
augmented by ADV_FSP.4, ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.3, ALC_FLR.2, ALC_TAT.1,
AVA_VAN.3.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of
them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionalities:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
NK services
SF.VPN VPN Client
SF.DynamicPacketFilter Firewall with stateful packet inspection
SF.NetworkServices DHCP, DNS and NTP networking services
SF.SelfProtection/NK Mechanisms of self-protection of the TOE: Key destruction and residual
information protection for NK, Self-tests of TSF and TSF data for NK and
Mitigation of attacks
SF.Audit/NK Secure audit service for NK
SF.Administration/NK Secure administration channels and update mechanism
SF.CryptographicServices/NK Cryptographic services required by other security functionality of the TOE
AK services
SF.CryptographicServices/AK Cryptographic services for AK
SF.TLS TLS service for secure communication channel
SF.Authentication Identification and authentication service
SF.AccessControl Access control service for connect requests
SF.CardTerminalMgmt eHealth card terminal management
SF.SmartCardMgmt Smart card management
SF.SignatureService Signature Creation and Validation Application (SCaVA)
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-2020
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF.EncryptionService Document encryption service
SF.SecureStorage Secure data storage service
SF.VSDM Versichertenstammdaten (VSD) management service
SF.Administration/AK Administration management service for AK
SF.SelfProtection/AK Mechanisms of self-protection of the TOE:
• Verification management of TSL, CRL etc.
• Secure state upon failure,
• Self-tests of TSF and TSF data for AK, and
• Key destruction and residual information protection for AK.
SF.Audit/AK Secure audit service for AK
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6]
chapters 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
KoCoBox MED+ OPB 2.1 Konnektor, 2.3.24
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 FW Firmware Image 2.3.24 Initially included within the TOE.
Download via an internet URL7
from
developer.
Via KSR process as a software update
package.
7
https://www.kococonnector.com/kococonnector_downloads/downloads.de.jsp
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-2020 Certification Report
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
2 DOC Administratorhandbuch KoCoBox
MED+
2.3
(14.7.2020)
Download via an internet URL7
from
developer.
SHA-256:
69e5afcefc58eceddd45a0885de66b27f6
14bf1fbbec24e116f7466faaf86b47
3 DOC Ergänzungen zum
Administratorhandbuch KoCoBox
MED+
1.1.1 Download via an internet URL7
from
developer.
SHA-256:
0d874468dc327bff98bcbc77d0b8b898b9
799be2d3b0b82ecd15a78d6e409cea
4 DOC Allgemeine Gebrauchsanleitung
KoCoBox MED+
1.3.8 Delivered with the delivery package of
the TOE.
SHA-256:
2912d4d5eaa5113edd856e2a53e25f0f1
4dc820a0d4fce81ebb903ab67d20a7a
5 DOC JSON-Managementschnittstelle der
KoCo-Box MED+
2.22 Delivered on demand.
SHA-256:
8a375936f18256232f6dbb4c1edcd7447d
87e8b0bbef3889fb2af47c24113bf7
6 DOC Konnektor Security Guidance
Fachmodule NFDM und AMTS
1.15 Delivered on demand.
SHA-256:
e49dad7fb5498ac78653fec235c5266b05
28a05dc27896c28aa49d21735ac1b8
7 DOC Konnektor API für Fachmodule
Javadoc
2.3.24 Delivered on demand.
SHA-256:
b0fba4e9bafff2c87fcd20ace6c5ac19826
cd6a9ef6b5428cb459004387308bf
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
TOE Delivery Process
The TOE is delivered by an authorized service technician to the end user. The service
technician installs the TOE within the premises of the end user. Prior to installation, the
service technician must be identified via a photo ID by the end user. The service technician
is trained, instructs the end user and provides security advice.
TOE Identification
The TOE can be identified as follows:
● Display:
OK to enter the Menu

Select 4 for Version

Identification:
• Firmwareversion 2.3.24,
• Hardwareversion 2.0.0,
• Produktversion: 2.3.24:2.0.0
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-2020
● Web Administration Interface:
Check the entry Firmware on the status page of the Web Administration Interface

Identification: Produktversion: 2.3.24:2.0.0
The hardware is not part of the TOE and therefore not relevant for the TOE identification.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
● Security Audit,
● Cryptographic Support,
● User Data Protection,
● Identification and Authentication,
● Security Management,
● Protection of the TSF,
● Trusted Path/Channels,
● TOE Access.
Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policies can be found in chapter
6 of the Security Target [6].
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment.
Although there are various objectives for the operational TOE environment that must be
fulfilled in order to preserve security, only a small subset can be controlled by the
administrator or end user using the guidance documentation. The following topics are of
relevance:
Network connector (NK)
● OE.NK.phys_Schutz: The TOE shall be physically protected against unauthorized
access.
● OE.NK.Admin_EVG: The TOE shall be configured by a trustworthy and well trained
administrator who operates the TOE according to the guidance.
● OE.NK.PKI: If the administrator manually uploads TSLs and CRLs in the admin web
GUI. Such files shall only be taken from a trustworthy source.
When the TOE is stolen or no longer under the control of the owner, the owner shall
initiate the blocking of the TOE and its gSMC-Ks.
● OE.NK.Betrieb_CS: The client systems shall be secured by the CS administrators. The
owner of the CS shall only operate CS software that follows the developer specific CS
implementation guide “Ergänzungen zum Administratorhandbuch KoCoBox MED+”.
Application Connector (AK)
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-2020 Certification Report
● OE.AK.Admin_EVG: The administrators shall keep passwords and secrets confidential.
● OE.AK.Admin_Konsole: The admin shall use a secure web browser and not store
password.
● OE.AK.Kartenterminal: For the security of the TOE only certified eHealth card terminals
shall be used for communication with the TOE.
● OE.AK.SecAuthData, OE.AK.Clientsystem, OE.AK.ClientsystemKorrekt: The owner of
the CS shall only operate CS software that follows the developer specific CS
implementation guide “Ergänzungen zum Administratorhandbuch KoCoBox MED+” [10].
● OE.AK.phys_Schutz: The TOE must be physically protected against unauthorized
access.
● OE.AK.Personal: Only qualified and trustworthy personnel are allowed to use and
maintain the TOE.
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapters 4.3 and 4.4.
5. Architectural Information
A high level description of the IT product and its major components can be found in the
Security Target [6], chapter 1.4.7.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
Developer's Test
TOE test configurations:
The Security Target [6] has not identified different TOE variants or configurations. Only the
released TOE is referenced. Nevertheless, the developer uses two firmware variants for
blackbox and for whitebox testing. For test configuration, the developer used two
preparative and four test configurations. Environment simulation is also used.
TOE test environment configurations:
The assumptions and objectives for the operational environment stated in [6] are not
applicable for testing. Nevertheless, the developer uses seven test environment
configurations which cover a large amount of the real environment.
Testing approach:
● Coverage and depth tests are done together.
● The test specifications give mappings to the tested TSFI(s), SFR(s), subsystem(s), and
module(s).
● Different testing approaches are used:
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-2020
• Code analysis,
• Blackbox tests:
• Manual,
• Automatic.
• Whitebox tests:
• Manual,
• Automatic.
● The test descriptions comprise (inter alia):
• Pre conditions: preparative steps,
• Test steps: core test steps with expected results,
• Post conditions: clearance steps to tidy up before the next test.
● Testing results: The developer’s testing efforts have been proven sufficient to
demonstrate that the TSFIs and subsystems perform as expected.
All test cases in each test scenario were run successfully on the TOE and they all
PASSED according to their expected result.
Evaluator Tests
TOE test configurations:
The Security Target [6] has not identified different TOE variants or configurations. Only the
released TOE is referenced. Nevertheless, the developer uses two firmware variants for
blackbox and for whitebox testing. For test configuration, the developer used two
preparative and four test configurations. Environment simulation is also used.
TOE test environment configurations:
The assumptions and objectives for the operational environment stated in [6] are not
applicable for testing. Nevertheless, the developer uses seven test environment
configurations which cover a large amount of the real environment.
Testing approach:
● Coverage and depth tests are done together.
● The test specifications give mappings to the tested TSFI(s), SFR(s), subsystem(s), and
module(s).
● Different testing approaches are used:
• Code analysis,
• Blackbox tests:
• Manual,
• Automatic.
• Whitebox tests:
• Manual,
• Automatic.
● The test descriptions comprise (inter alia):
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-2020 Certification Report
• Pre conditions: preparative steps,
• Test steps: core test steps with expected results,
• Post conditions: clearance steps to tidy up before the next test.
● Testing results: The developer’s testing efforts have been proven sufficient to
demonstrate that the TSFIs and subsystems perform as expected.
All test cases in each test scenario were run successfully on the TOE and they all
PASSED according to their expected result.
Penetration Testing
Overview:
The configuration defined in the ST was tested. Furthermore, different TOE variants were
used during penetration testing to verify different mechanisms.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results; moreover, no attack scenario with the attack potential High was actually
successful.
Penetration testing approach:
The evaluation body conducted penetration testing based on functional areas of concern
derived from SFRs and architectural mechanisms. The areas were prioritized with regard
to various factors, e.g. attack surface, estimated flaw likelihood, developer testing
coverage, and detectability of flaws during developer testing.
Medium and high areas were guaranteed to be penetration tested, with a stronger
emphasis on high priorities. Low priorities were also considered during penetration, but
could be less emphasized, if developer tests were found to be sufficient.
The penetration testing activities were performed as tests and as analytical tasks.
Whenever an analysis was estimated to yield better results, the evaluators chose the
analytical approach. Analytical activities were especially applied in the areas Update,
Random Number Generation and Hardening Mechanisms. Combined approaches were
also applied.
TOE test configurations:
The TOE was delivered by the developer in two different variants: A release TOE and a
special ATE variant. The ATE variant is an enhanced variant of the software running on the
same hardware and using the same smart cards (gSMC-K). The ATE variant is used to
enable tests that are not possible due to security mechanisms applied in the release TOE.
The differences between release TOE and the ATE variant are clearly defined. Therefore,
two goals can be achieved:
● Perform detailed testing using the target hardware and smart card,
● ensure that the tests results of the ATE variant are also valid for the TOE.
During the evaluation process, the TOE was updated. Penetration tests were performed
with versions 2.3.20 and 2.3.24. The developer provided a change analysis which
documents the differences between these versions. The evaluation body did not identify
changes that would render the 2.3.20 test results invalid for 2.3.24. The most important
tests were conducted with the final version 2.3.24.
Attack scenarios having been tested:
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-2020
The evaluation body considered security analysis and penetration testing in the following
areas:
● VPN Connections,
● Administration Connections,
● Random Number Generation,
● Update,
● Hardening Mechanisms,
● Filtering and Routing,
● Self-Protection,
● TOE Services and Network Services, and
● Audit.
Tested security functionality:
The evaluator ensured that all areas listed above are tested. Actually, the evaluation body
used a more detailed list during analysis and testing. The penetration testing was then
conducted based on priorities as described above. Therefore, a complete coverage of
security functional testing based on technical areas of concern is performed.
Verdict for the sub-activity:
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential defined by the protection
profile was actually successful in the TOE’s operational environment provided that all
measures required by the developer are applied.
Summary of Test Results and Effectiveness Analysis
The TOE testing did not reveal vulnerabilities exploitable by an attacker with the attack
potential as defined by the protection profile.
8. Evaluated Configuration
The evaluation results are only valid for the single configuration defined in the Security
Target [6].
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used.
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20 was used (see [4]).
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
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As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 3 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ADV_FSP.4, ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.3, ALC_FLR.2, ALC_TAT.1,
AVA_VAN.3 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Common Criteria Schutzprofil (Protection Profile) Schutzprofil 2:
Anforderungen an den Konnektor, Version 1.5.4, BSI-CC-PP-
0098-V2-2020 vom 17.03.2020 [8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 3 augmented by ADV_FSP.4, ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.3,
ALC_FLR.2, ALC_TAT.1, AVA_VAN.3
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The following cryptographic algorithms are used by the TOE to enforce its security policy:
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Comments
1 Authenticity RSA signature
verification using
signature scheme
RSASSA-PKCS1-
1.5 with SHA-256
[RFC8017] (RSA),
[FIPS180-4] (SHA)
2048 FPT_TDC.1/NK.Zert,
FCS_COP.1/Sign,
FPT_TDC.1/NK.TLS.Zert
2 RSA signature
verification of TSL
and CRL using
signature scheme
RSASSA-PSS
with SHA-256
[RFC8017] (RSA),
[FIPS180-4] (SHA),
[XMLSig]
2048 FPT_TDC.1/NK.Zert,
FCS_COP.1/Sign,
FPT_TDC.1/NK.TLS.Zert
3 Authentication RSA signature
creation with
support of gSMC-
K and verification
using signature
scheme RSASSA-
PKCS1-1.5 with
SHA-256
(sha256withRSAE
ncryption)
[RFC8017] (RSA),
[FIPS180-4] (SHA)
2048 FCS_COP.1/NK.Auth,
FCS_COP.1/NK.TLS.Auth
4 Key
Agreement
Diffie-Hellman
(IKEv2) with key
derivation function
PRF-HMAC-
[HoAC] (DH)
[RFC3526] (dh-
group),
[FIPS180-4] (SHA),
2048 (dh-group
14) with DH
exponent length
≥ 384 bits
FCS_CKM.2/NK.IKE
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-2020
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Comments
{SHA-1, SHA-256} [RFC2104] (HMAC)
[RFC7296] (IKEv2)
5 Diffie-Hellman
with TLS key
derivation function
[HoAC] (DH)
[RFC3526] (dh-
group),
[FIPS180-4] (SHA),
[RFC2104] (HMAC),
[RFC3268]
(DHE_RSA)
[RFC5246]
(TLSv1.2)
2048 (dh-group
14) with DH
exponent length
≥ 384 bits
FCS_CKM.1/NK.TLS
6 EC Diffie-Hellman
with TLS key
derivation function
[SEC_1] (ECDH),
[FIPS180-4] (SHA),
[RFC2104] (HMAC),
[RFC4492]
(ECDHE_RSA)
[RFC5246]
(TLSv1.2),
[FIPS186-4] (P-
256,P-384),
[RFC7027]
(Brainpool)
Key sizes
corresponding
to the used
elliptic curves
P-{256,384}
and
brainpoolP{256,
384}r1
FCS_CKM.1/NK.TLS
7 Key
Generation
Key generation for
RSA key in X.509
and PKCS#12
format using
FCS_RNG.1/Hash
_DRBG
[RFC5280] (X.509),
[RFC7292]
(PKCS#12),
[RFC4055]
(supporting.
[RFC5280]),
[FIPS186-4] Method
B.3.3 (Key-Gen)
2048 FCS_CKM.1/NK.Zert
8 Confidentiality Symmetric
encryption and
decryption for
VPN: AES in CBC
[FIPS197] (AES),
[RFC3602] (AES-
CBC)
[RFC4303] (ESP)
[RFC4301] (IPsec)
256 FCS_COP.1/NK.ESP,
FCS_COP.1/NK.IPsec,
9 Symmetric
encryption and
decryption for
TLS: AES in CBC
[FIPS197] (AES),
[RFC3602] (AES-
CBC)
[RFC3268] (AES-
TLS with DH)
[RFC4492] (AES-
TLS with ECDH)
128, 256 FCS_COP.1/NK.TLS.AES
10 Integrity HMAC value
generation and
verification with
SHA-{1, 256}
(IKE, IPsec)
[FIPS180-4] (SHA),
[RFC2104] (HMAC),
[RFC2404] (HMAC-
SHA1),
[RFC4868] (HMAC-
SHA256/384/512),
[RFC7296] (IKEv2)
160, 256 FCS_COP.1/NK.HMAC
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-2020 Certification Report
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Comments
11 HMAC value
generation and
verification with
SHA-{1, 256, 384}
(TLS)
[FIPS180-4] (SHA),
[RFC2104] (HMAC),
[RFC5246] (TLS
v1.2)
160, 256, 384 FCS_COP.1/
NK.TLS.HMAC
12 Authenticated
Encryption
AES-128 and
AES-256 in GCM
mode for TLS 1.2
[FIPS197] (AES)
[RFC-3268] (AES-
TLS)
[SP800-38D] (GCM)
[RFC-5289] (AES-
GCM-TLS)
[RFC-5116] (AEAD)
128, 256 FCS_COP.1/NK.TLS.AES
13 Trusted
Channel
IKEv2, IPsec [RFC7296] (IKEv2)
[RFC4301] (IPsec),
[RFC4303] (ESP)
[KoCo-VPNConfig]
FTP_ITC.1/NK.VPN_TI,
FTP_ITC.1/NK.VPN_SIS
14 TLS v1.2 [RFC5246]
(TLSv1.2),
[KoCo-TLSConfig]
FTP_TRP.1/NK.Admin
FDP_ITC.2/NK.TLS
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionalities (NK)
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Comments
1 Authenticity PadES based signature
generation with SHA-
256 and support of
HBA, SMC-B, and
RSA signature
verification using
signature schemes
RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5
and RSASSA-PSS with
SHA-{256, 512/256,
384, 512}, and
ECDSA signature
verification with SHA-
256
for QES and nonQES
[RFC8017] (RSA),
[RFC5639] (ECC
Brainpool),
[FIPS186-4] (P-
256),
[TR-03111]
(ECDSA),
[FIPS180-4] (SHA),
[ISO_32000-1]
(PDF),
[PAdES],
[PAdES-BL]
RSA: 1976 to
4096;
ECDSA:
Key sizes
corresponding to
the used elliptic
curves P-256
and
brainpoolP256r1
FDP_DAU.2/
AK.QES
FDP_DAU.2/AK.Sig
FCS_COP.1/AK.PDF
.Sign
FCS_COP.1/AK.PDF
.SigPr
FCS_COP.1/AK.SH
A
FCS_COP.1/AK.Sig
Ver.SSA
FCS_COP.1/AK.Sig
Ver.PSS
FCS_COP.1/AK.Sig
Ver.ECDSA
2 RSA signature
verification of binary
data using signature
schemes RSASSA-
PKCS1-v1_5 and
RSASSA-PSS with
SHA-256
for nonQES
[RFC8017] (RSA),
[FIPS180-4] (SHA)
RSA: 1976 to
4096;
FDP_DAU.2/AK.Sig
FCS_COP.1/AK.PK
CS.SigPr
FCS_COP.1/AK.SH
A
FCS_COP.1/AK.Sig
Ver.SSA
FCS_COP.1/AK.Sig
Ver.PSS
3 XadES based signature [RFC8017] (RSA), RSA: 1976 to FDP_DAU.2/
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-2020
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Comments
generation with SHA-
256 and support of
HBA, SMC-B, and
RSA signature
verification using
signature schemes
RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5
and RSASSA-PSS with
SHA-{256, 384, 512},
and
ECDSA signature
verification with SHA-
256
for QES
[RFC5639] (ECC
Brainpool),
[FIPS186-4] (P-
256),
[TR-03111]
(ECDSA),
[FIPS180-4] (SHA),
[XMLSig],
[XAdES],
[XAdES-BL]
4096
ECDSA:
Key sizes
corresponding to
the used elliptic
curves P-256
and
brainpoolP256r1
AK.QES
FCS_COP.1/AK.XM
L.Sign
FCS_COP.1/AK.XM
L.SigPr
FCS_COP.1/AK.SH
A
FCS_COP.1/AK.Sig
Ver.SSA
FCS_COP.1/AK.Sig
Ver.PSS
FCS_COP.1/AK.Sig
Ver.ECDSA
4 CadES based signature
generation with SHA-
256 and support of
HBA, SMC-B, and
RSA signature
verification with
signature schemes
RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5
and RSASSA-PSS with
SHA-{256, 512/256,
384, 512}, and
ECDSA signature
verification with SHA-
256
for QES and nonQES
[RFC8017] (RSA),
[RFC5639] (ECC
Brainpool),
[FIPS186-4] (P-
256),
[TR-03111]
(ECDSA),
[FIPS180-4] (SHA),
[RFC5652] (CMS),
[CAdES],
[CAdES-BL]
RSA: 1976 to
4096;
ECDSA:
Key sizes
corresponding to
the used elliptic
curves P-256
and
brainpoolP256r1
FDP_DAU.2/
AK.QES
FDP_DAU.2/AK.Sig
FCS_COP.1/AK.CM
S.Sign
FCS_COP.1/AK.CM
S.SigPr
FCS_COP.1/AK.SH
A
FCS_COP.1/AK.Sig
Ver.SSA
FCS_COP.1/AK.Sig
Ver.PSS
FCS_COP.1/AK.Sig
Ver.ECDSA
5 Key
Generation
Key generation for
hybrid encryption
[SP800-133, Kp.
6.1] (Direct Key-
Gen)
256 FCS_CKM.1/
AK.AES
6 Authenticated
Encryption
Document (XML, MIME,
CMS) hybrid encryption
and decryption4
using
encryption scheme
RSAES-OAEP with
AES-GCM
[XMLEnc] (XML),
[RFC5751]
(S/MIME) with
[RFC5083] (CMS
Authenticated-
Enveloped-Data
Content Type),
[RFC5652] (CMS),
[RFC8017] (RSA),
[FIPS197] (AES),
[SP-800-38D]
(GCM),
[RFC5084] (AES-
GCM in CMS)
RSA-ENC: 2048
RSA-DEC:
depending on
card8
AES-GCM-ENC:
256
AES-GCM-DEC:
128, 192, 256
Authentication
tag: 128
FCS_COP.1/
AK.XML.Ver
FCS_COP.1/AK.MIM
E.Ver
FCS_COP.1/AK.CM
S.Ver
FCS_COP.1/AK.XM
L.Ent
FCS_COP.1/AK.MIM
E.Ent
FCS_COP.1/AK.CM
S.Ent
FCS_CKM.4/AK
FCS_COP.1/AK.AES
Table 4: TOE cryptographic functionalities (AK)
8
The asymmetric decryption is performed within the smart cards, e.g. HBA.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-2020 Certification Report
According to [gemSpec_Kon], [gemSpec_Krypt] and [TR03116-1] the algorithms are
suitable for the corresponding purpose.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But Cryptographic Functionalities with
a security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 100 Bits'
of the following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general
context).
The following cryptographic algorithms are additionally used by the TOE to enforce its
security policy:
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key
Size in
Bits
Security
Level
above 100
Bits
Comments
1 Authenticity Firmware update
file signature
verification using
RSASSA-PSS with
SHA-512
[RFC8017] (RSA),
[FIPS180-4] (SHA)
2048 yes FDP_ACC.1/AK.Update
FDP_ACF.1/AK.Update
FDP_UIT.1/AK.Update
FCS_COP.1/Sign
2 FW update X.509
certificate
verification using
RSASSA-PSS with
SHA-256
[RFC8017] (RSA),
[FIPS180-4] (SHA)
4096 yes FDP_ACC.1/AK.Update
FDP_ACF.1/AK.Update
FDP_UIT.1/AK.Update
FCS_COP.1/Sign
Table 5: Additional TOE cryptographic functionalities (NK)
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Security
Level
above
100 Bits
Comments
1 Key
Generation
Config Data Backup
Encryption:
Key generation for
PBKDF2
[KoCo-
ConfigFileKeyGen]
~115 yes FMT_MTD.1/
AK.eHKT_Abf
2 Authenticated
Encryption
Config Data Backup
Encryption:
AES-GCM encryption
and decryption using
PBKDF2
[FIPS197] (AES)
[SP800-38D]
(GCM)
[RFC5084] (AES-
GCM in CMS)
[SP800-132]
(PBKDF2)
~115
AES-GCM-
ENC: 256
AES-GCM-
DEC: 256
Authenticati
on tag: 128
yes FMT_MTD.1/
AK.eHKT_Abf
FMT_MTD.1/A
K.eHKT_Mod
3 Authenticity Config Data Backup
Signature:
[RFC8017] (RSA),
[FIPS180-4] (SHA),
RSA: 1976
to 4096
yes FMT_MTD.1/
AK.eHKT_Abf
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-2020
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Security
Level
above
100 Bits
Comments
Signature generation
with SHA-256 and
support of SMC-B, and
RSA signature
verification with
signature scheme
RSASSA-PSS with
SHA-256
[RFC5652] (CMS) FMT_MTD.1/A
K.eHKT_Mod
Table 6: Additional TOE cryptographic functionalities (AK)
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
In addition, the following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the TOE:
● The administrator shall only configure the TOE by using the functionality of the web
administration interface as presented in the recommended web browser.
● The TOE is only able to provide its security services under the following conditions:
• The TOE is configured with mandatory TLS and mandatory client system
authentication.
• The connected client systems verify the authenticity of the Konnektor when using
services and receiving events.
• The user is able to identify whether a client system connection is secure.
The TOE user shall only operate the TOE under the conditions above. A violation of
these conditions is considered a vulnerability of the TOE in the operational environment.
In this case, the TOE user is responsible to counter the vulnerability.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-2020 Certification Report
● The TOE supports different setups. The main setups are “Parallel” Mode, “InReihe”
Mode and Offline Mode. The “InReihe” Mode is recommended since it provides a higher
protection of the connected LAN.
● Implementers of client systems shall oblige to the requirements for client systems as
stated in [10].
● For the active VPN connections using IPsec no countermeasures against statistic traffic
analysis are implemented.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
AEAD Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
AK Application connector
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
CRL Certificate Revocation List
DH Diffie-Hellman
DOC Documentation
DRNG Deterministic RNG
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
eGK Elektronische Gesundheitskarte
ESP Encapsulating Security Payload
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
FW Firmware
gSMC-K Secure module for the connector
GUI Graphical User Interface
HBA Heilberufsausweis
HMAC Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-2020
HW Hardware
ICCSN Integrated Circuit Card Serial Number
ICMP Internet Control Message Protocol
IKE Internet Key Exchange Protocol
IP Internet Protocol
IPSec Internet Protocol Security
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
JSON JavaScript Object Notation
KSR Konfigurations- und Software-Repository
LAN Local Area Network
LE Leistungserbringer
NK Network connector
PED Professionelle endnutzernahe Dienstleister
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SIS Secure Internet Service
SM-K Secure Module Connector
SMC-B Secure Module Card – Type B: Praxisausweis / Institutionsausweis
ST Security Target
TI Telematikinfrastruktur
TLS Transport Layer Security
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TSL Trust-Service Status List
UID Unique Identification number
VPN Virtual Private Network
VSDM Versichertenstammdatenmanagement
WAN Wide Area Network
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-2020 Certification Report
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE9
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
9
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
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[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-2020, Version 1.27, 16.07.2020, Security Target
Konnektor, KoCo Connector GmbH
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1, 16.07.2020, EVALUATION TECHNICAL
REPORT SUMMARY (ETR SUMMARY), TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH,
(confidential document)
[8] Common Criteria Schutzprofil (Protection Profile) Schutzprofil 2: Anforderungen an
den Konnektor, Version 1.5.4, BSI-CC-PP-0098-V2-2020 vom 17.03.2020
[9] Configuration list for the TOE (confidential document)
• Konfiguration Items os-cillation, Version 2.3.24
• Konfiguration Items n-design, Version 1.14
[10] Guidance documentation for the TOE:
• Administratorhandbuch KoCoBox MED+, KoCo Connector GmbH, Version 2.3,
14.07.2020
• Ergänzungen zum Administratorhandbuch KoCoBox MED+, KoCo Connector
GmbH, Version 1.1.1, 29.05.2020
• Allgemeine Gebrauchsanleitung KoCoBox MED+, KoCo Connector GmbH,
Version 1.3.8, 08.07.2020
• JSON-Management-schnittstelle der KoCo-Box MED+, KoCo Connector GmbH,
Version 2.22, 30.01.2020
• Konnektor Security Guidance Fachmodule NFDM und AMTS, KoCo Connector
GmbH, Version 1.15, 08.07.2020
• Konnektor API für Fachmodule Javadoc, KoCo Connector GmbH, Version
2.3.24, 29.06.2020
[11] Implementation standards:
[CAdES] ETSI: Electronic Signature Formats, Electronic Signatures and
Infrastructures (ESI) – Technical Specification, ETSI TS 101 733 V1.7.4, 2008-07
[CAdES-BL] European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI): Electronic
Signatures and Infrastructure (ESI); CAdES Baseline Profile; ETSI Technical
Specification TS 103 173, Version 2.1.1, 2012-03
[HoAC] A. Menezes, P. van Oorschot und O. Vanstone. Handbook of Applied
Cryptography. CRCPress, 1996.
[FIPS180-4] FIPS PUB 180-4 Secure Hash Signature Standard (SHS), NIST, March
2012
[FIPS186-4] FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS
PUBLICATION 186-4: Digital Signature Standard (DSS); National Institute of
Standards and Technology, July 2013
[FIPS197] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197: ADVANCED
ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES), NIST, November 2001
[ISO_32000-1] ISO 32000-1:2008, Document management – Portable document
format – Part 1: PDF 1.7, 2008-07, International Organization for Standardization
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-2020 Certification Report
[PAdES] European Telecommunications Standards Institute. Electronic Signatures
and Infrastructures (ESI). PDF Advanced Electronic Signature Profiles. Part 3:
PAdES Enhanced – PAdES-BES and PAdES-EPES Profiles. ETSI Technical
Specification. Version 1.2.1. ETSI, Juli 2010
[PAdES-BL] European Telecommunications Standards Institute. Electronic
Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI). PAdES Baseline Profile. ETSI Technical
Specification. Version 2.2.2. ETSI, Apr. 2013
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, „HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for
Message Authentication", February 1997
[RFC2404] The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within ESP and AH, Network Working
Group, November 1998
[RFC3268] Chown, P., Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Cipher suites for
Transport Layer Security (TLS), June 2002
[RFC3526] More Modular Exponential (MODP) Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet
Key Exchange (IKE), May 2003
[RFC3602] S .Frankel, R. Glenn, S. Kelly: The AES-CBC Cipher Algorithm and Its
Use with IPsec. September 2003
[RFC 3852] Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS), The Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF), July 2004
[RFC4035] Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security Extensions, RFC 4035, R.
Arends, R. Austein, M. Larson, D. Massey, S. Rose.
[RFC4055] Additional Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in the
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile. RFC. Updated by RFC 5756. Fremont, CA, USA: RFC Editor, Juni
2005.
[RFC4301] Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol (IPsec), S. Kent, K. Seo,
December 2005
[RFC4303] IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP), RFC 4303 (ESP), S. Kent,
December 2005
[RFC4492] Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer
Security (TLS), The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), May 2006
[RFC4868] Using HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512 with
IPsec, S. Kelly, S. Frankel, May 2007
[RFC5083] Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Authenticated-Enveloped-Data
Content Type, Housley, November 2007
[RFC5084] Using AES-CCM and AES-GCM Authenticated Encryption in the
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS), Housley, November 2007
[RFC5116] An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated Encryption, The Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF), January 2008
[RFC5246] The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2, RFC 5246,
Network Working Group
[RFC5289] TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois
Counter Mode (GCM), August 2008
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-2020
[RFC5639] Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Brainpool Standard Curves and
Curve Generation, RFC 5639, M. Lochter, BSI, J. Merkle, secunet Security
Networks
[RFC5652] Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS), IETF Trust and the persons
identified as the document authors, The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF),
September 2009
[RFC5751] Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3.2
Message Specification, The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), January 2010
[RFC5996] The Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2), D. Harkins, D.
Carrel, September 2010
[RFC7027] Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Brainpool Curves for Transport Layer
Security (TLS), RFC 7027, J. Merkle, M. Lochter, October 2013
[RFC7292] PKCS #12: Personal Information Exchange Syntax v1.1. RFC 7292
(Informational). RFC. Fremont, CA, USA: RFC Editor, July 2014
[RFC7296] Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2), The Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF), October 2014
[RFC8017] PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications, Version 2.2, Fremont, CA,
USA: RFC Editor, Nov. 2016
[SEC_1] Standards For Efficient Cryptography – SEC 1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography,
Version 1.0,Tech. report, Certicom Research, 2000
[SP800-38A] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation – Methods and
Techniques, December 2001
[SP800-38D] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:
Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC, November 2007
[SP800-90A] Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic
Random Bit Generators, NIST Special Publication 800-90A, Revision 1, June 2015
[SP800-132] Recommendation for Password-Based Key Derivation, NIST Special
Publication 800-132. National Institute of Standards und Technology, Dez. 2010
[SP800-133] Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation, NIST Special
Publication 800-133. National Institute of Standards und Technology, Dez. 2012
[TR-03111] Elliptic Curve Cryptography. Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03111.
Technical Guideline. Version 2.9. Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI), 28. Aug. 2012
[XAdES] XML Advanced Electronic Signatures (XAdES), European
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI): Technical Specication XML
Advanced Electronic Signatures (XAdES). ETSI Technical Specication TS 101 903,
Version 1.4.2, 2010
[XAdES-BL] European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI): Electronic
Signatures and Infrastructure (ESI); XAdES Baseline Profile; ETSI Technical
Specification TS 103 171, Version 2.1.1, 2012-03
[XMLSig] XML Signature Syntax and Processing (Second Edition), W3C
Recommendation 10 June 2008
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-2020 Certification Report
[XMLEnc] XML Encryption Syntax and Processing Version 1.1, W3C
Recommendation. W3C, Apr. 2013
[12] Developer documents:
[KoCo-ConfigFileKeyGen] KoCo Key Generation for Configuration Data Export
Passwords, Version 1.0, 16.07.2020, KoCo Connector GmbH
[KoCo-TLSConfig] KoCo TLS-Channel Configuration, Version 1.0, 16.07.2020,
KoCo Connector GmbH
[KoCo-VPNConfig] KoCo VPN-Channel Configuration, Version 1.0, 16.07.2020,
KoCo Connector GmbH
[13] Application standards:
[gemSpec_Kon] Spezifikation Konnektor, gematik, Version 5.4.0, 26.10.2018
[gemSpec_Krypt] Einführung der Gesundheitskarte: Konnektorspezifikation, gematik
Gesellschaft für Telematikanwendungen der Gesundheitskarte mbH, Version 2.16.0,
02.03.2020
[TR03116-1] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03116-1, Kryptographische Vorgaben für
Projekte der Bundesregierung, Teil 1: Telematikinfrastruktur, Technische
Arbeitsgruppe TR-03116, 21.09.2018 (Version 3.20)
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-2020
C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailled definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1068-2020 Certification Report
D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Note: End of report
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