Ärendetyp: 6 Diarienummer: 23FMV177-22
Dokument ID CSEC2022015
Enligt säkerhetsskyddslagen (2018:585)
SEKRETESS
Enligt offentlighets- och
Sekretesslagen (2009:400)
2023-05-10
Försvarets materielverk
Swedish Defence Material Administration
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - vivo X Fold2 on OriginOS
3.0
Issue: 1.0, 2023-maj-10
Authorisation: Helén Svensson, Lead Certifier , CSEC
Ärendetyp: 6 Diarienummer: 23FMV177-22
Dokument ID CSEC2022015
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification 5
3 Security Policy 6
3.1 Security audit 6
3.2 Cryptographic support 6
3.3 Identification and authentication 7
3.4 Protection of the TSF 7
3.5 TOE access 8
3.6 Trusted path/channels 8
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 9
4.1 Assumptions 9
4.2 Clarification of Scope 9
5 Architectural Information 11
6 Documentation 12
7 IT Product Testing 13
7.1 Evaluator Testing 13
7.2 Penetration Testing 13
8 Evaluated Configuration 14
9 Results of the Evaluation 15
10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations 17
11 Bibliography 18
Appendix A Scheme Versions 19
A.1 Scheme/Quality Management System 19
A.2 Scheme Notes 19
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1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is vivo X Fold2 smartphones running with OriginOS
3.0.The TOE Type is personally-owned mobile phone for both personal and enterprise
use.
The TOE is:
 Device Name vivo X Fold2
 Model Number PD2266A
 Chipset Vendor Qualcomm
 CPU Snapdragon 8 Gen2
 OS Version OriginOS 3.0
 Build Number PD2266_A_13.0.4.73.W10.V000L1
 Kernel Version Android: 13 Linux kernel: 5.15
The TOE does not include the user applications that run on top of the OriginOS, but
does include controls that limit application behavior. Furthermore, the device provides
support for downloadable MDM agents to be installed to limit or permit different
functionality of the device. There is no built-in MDM agent pre-installed on the de-
vice.
The TOE communicates and interacts with 802.11-2012 Access Points and mobile
data networks to establish network connectivity, and through that connectivity inter-
acts with MDM servers that allow administrative control of the TOE.
The TOE is delivered to retailers and users can buy the TOE from them. [CCGUIDE]
1.3 "Secure Acceptance of the TOE" describes that, when the user receives the phone,
she needs to make sure that the package is intact and the seals are not broken or re-
taped. And the user needs to check the OriginOS version and Android OS version in
the "Settings" menu. How to update the software is also descried in the guidance.
The ST makes the following claims:
 Exact conformance: Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals Ver-
sion 3.3, dated 22 September, 2022 [MDFPPv3.3]
 Exact conformance: PP-Module for Bluetooth Version 1.0, dated 15 April
2021 [BTPPMv1.0]
 Exact conformance: PP-Module for WLAN Clients Version 1.0, dated 31
March 2022 [WLANCPPMv1.0]
 Package Claims:- Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Version 1.1 Conformant, dated 1 March 2019 [TLSPKGv1.1]
The evaluation has been performed by atsec information security AB in Danderyd,
Sweden. The evaluation was completed on 2023-04-19. The evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the requirements of Common Criteria (CC), version. 3.1 release 5.
atsec information security AB is a licensed evaluation facility for Common Criteria
under the Swedish Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme. atsec infor-
mation security AB is also accredited by the Swedish accreditation body according to
ISO/IEC 17025 for Common Criteria.
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The certifier monitored the activities of the evaluator by reviewing all successive ver-
sions of the evaluation reports. The certifier determined that the evaluation results
confirm the security claims in the Security Target (ST) and the Common Methodology
for assurance level
EAL 1 + ASE_SPD.1 + ALC_TSU_EXT.1 in accordance with the evaluation activi-
ties implied by the Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals Version 3.3
[MDFPPv3.3], PP-Module for Bluetooth Version 1.0 [BTPPMv1.0], PP-Module for
WLAN Clients Version 1.0 [WLANCPPMv1.0] and Functional Package for Transport
Layer Security (TLS) Version 1.1 [TLSPKGv1.1].
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
certificate, and on the condition that all the stipulations in the Security Target are
met.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by CSEC or any other or-
ganisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the
IT product by CSEC or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate is either expressed or implied.
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2 Identification
Certification Identification
Certification ID CSEC2022015
Name and version of the cer-
tified IT product
vivo X Fold2 on OriginOS 3.0
Security Target Identification vivo X Fold2 on OriginOS 3.0 Security Target, vivo
Mobile Communication Co., Ltd, 2023-04-06, docu-
ment version 1.0
EAL EAL 1 augmented with ASE_SPD.1 and
ALC_TSU_EXT.1
PP claim Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals
Version 3.3 [MDFPPv3.3], PP-Module for Bluetooth
Version 1.0 [BTPPMv1.0], PP-Module for WLAN
Clients Version 1.0 [WLANCPPMv1.0] and Func-
tional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Version 1.1 [TLSPKGv1.1]
Sponsor vivo Mobile Communication Co., Ltd
Developer vivo Mobile Communication Co., Ltd
ITSEF atsec information security AB
Common Criteria version 3.1 release 5
CEM version 3.1 release 5
QMS version 2.3.1
Scheme Notes Release 20.0
Recognition Scope CCRA, SOGIS, EA/MLA
Certification date 2023-05-10
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3 Security Policy
 Security Audit
 Cryptographic support
 User data protection
 Identification and authentication
 Security management
 Protection of the TSF
 TOE access
 Trusted path/channels
3.1 Security audit
The TOE implements a security log and logcat that are each stored in a circular
memory buffer. An MDM agent can read/fetch the security logs, can retrieve logcat
logs, and then handle appropriately (potentially storing the log to Flash or transmitting
its contents to the MDM server). These log methods meet the logging requirements
outlined by FAU_GEN.1 in [MDFPPv3.3].
3.2 Cryptographic support
The TOE provides cryptographic services via the following two cryptographic mod-
ules:
 BoringSSL: 0x1010107f
 Application Processor of X Fold2: Qualcomm SnapDragon 8 Gen2
BoringSSL is a fork of OpenSSL which is built into shared libraries of OriginOS. The
cryptographic functions provided by BoringSSL include symmetric key generation,
encryption and decryption, asymmetric key generation and key establishment, crypto-
graphic hashing, and keyed-hash message authentication. The TOE also provides be-
low functions which are used to implement security protocols and the encryption of
data-at-rest:
 Random number generation
 Data encryption and decryption
 Signature generation/verification
 Message digest
 Message authentication
 Key generation
 Key wrapping
Above listed Application Processors provides a set of FIPS 140-2 certified hardware
cryptographic modules, the cryptographic functions provided by Application Proces-
sors include symmetric key generation, encryption and decryption, cryptographic
hashing, and keyed-hash message authentication. The TOE also provides below func-
tions which are used to implement security protocols and the encryption of data-at-
rest:
 Random number generation
 Data encryption and decryption
 Message digest
 Message authentication
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 Key generation
 Key derivation
Many of above listed cryptographic functions are also accessible as services to appli-
cations running on the TOE allowing application developers to ensure their applica-
tion meets the required criteria to remain compliant to [MDFPPv3.3] standards.
3.2.1 User data protection
The TOE controls access to system services by hosted applications, including protec-
tion of the Trust Anchor Database. Additionally, User data in files is protected using
cryptographic functions, ensuring this data remains protected even if the device gets
lost or is stolen. Data is protected such that only the app that owns the data can access
it. The TOE’s evaluated configuration supports Android Enterprise profiles to provide
additional separation between application and application data belonging to the Enter-
prise profile. Please see the Admin Guide for additional details regarding how to set
up and use Enterprise profiles.
3.3 Identification and authentication
Except for answering calls, making emergency calls, using the cameras, using the
flashlight, using the quick settings, and checking notifications, users need to authenti-
cate using a passcode. The user is required to use the passcode authentication mecha-
nism under the following conditions.
 Turn on or restart the device
 Unlock the device for the first time after reboot
 Update software
 Erase the device
 View or change passcode settings
 Install enterprise profiles
The passcode can be configured for a minimum length, for dedicated passcode poli-
cies, and for a maximum lifetime. When entered, passcodes are obscured and the fre-
quency of entering passcodes is limited as well as the number of consecutive failed
attempts of entering the passcode.
The TOE also enters a locked state after a (configurable) time of user inactivity, and
the user is required to enter his passcode to unlock the TOE.
External entities connecting to the TOE via a secure protocol (Extensible Authentica-
tion Protocol Transport Layer Security (EAPTLS), Transport Layer Security (TLS))
can be authenticated using X.509 certificates.
3.3.1 Security management
The TOE provides all the interfaces necessary to manage the security functions identi-
fied throughout this Security Target as well as other functions commonly found in mo-
bile devices. Many of the available functions are available to users of the TOE while
many are restricted to administrators operating through a Mobile Device Management
solution once the TOE has been enrolled. Once the TOE has been enrolled and then
un-enrolled, it will remove Enterprise applications and remove MDM policies
3.4 Protection of the TSF
Some of the functions the TOE implements to protect the TSF and TSF data are as fol-
lows:
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 Protection of cryptographic keys - they are not accessible or exportable using the
application processor’s hardware.
 Protection of REKs - The TOE disallows all read access to the Root Encryption
Key and retains all keys derived from the REK within its the Trusted Execution
Environment (TEE). Application software can only use keys derived from the
REK by reference and receive the result.
 The TOE enforces read, write, and execute memory page protections, uses address
space layout randomization, and stack-based buffer overflow protections to mini-
mize the potential to exploit application flaws. It also protects itself from modifi-
cation by applications as well as to isolate the address spaces of applications from
one another to protect those applications.
 Digital signature protection of the TSF image - all updates to the TSF need to be
digitally signed.
 Software/firmware integrity self-test upon start-up - the TOE will not go opera-
tional when this test fails.
 Digital signature verification for apps.
 Access to defined TSF data and TSF services only when the TOE is unlocked.
 The TOE provides its own timing mechanism to ensure that reliable time infor-
mation is available (e.g., for log accountability).
3.5 TOE access
The TSF provides functions to lock the TOE upon request by user or after an adminis-
trator configurable time of inactivity.
The TOE also has the capability to display an administrator specified (using the
TOE’s MDM API) advisory message (banner) when the user unlocks the TOE for the
first use after reboot.
The TOE is also able to attempt to connect to wireless networks as configured.
3.6 Trusted path/channels
The TOE supports the use of the following cryptographic protocols that define a
trusted channel between itself and another trusted IT product.
 IEEE 802.11-2012
 IEEE 802.11ac-2013 (a.k.a. Wi-Fi 5)
 IEEE 802.11ax (a.k.a. Wi-Fi 6)
 IEEE 802.1X
 EAP-TLS (1.1, 1.2)
 TLS (1.1, 1.2)
 HTTPS
 Bluetooth (5.0)
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4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
4.1 Assumptions
The Security Target [ST] makes six assumptions on the usage of the TOE.
A.CONFIG - It is assumed that the TOE’s security functions are configured correctly
in a manner to ensure that the TOE security policies will be enforced on all applicable
network traffic flowing among the attached networks.
A.NOTIFY - It is assumed that the mobile user will immediately notify the adminis-
trator if the Mobile Device is lost or stolen.
A.PRECAUTION - It is assumed that the mobile user exercises precautions to reduce
the risk of loss or theft of the Mobile Device.
A.PROPER_USER - Mobile Device users are not willfully negligent or hostile, and
use the device within compliance of a reasonable Enterprise security policy.
A.NO_TOE_BYPASS - Information cannot flow between the wireless client and the
internal wired network without passing through the TOE.
A.TRUSTED_ADMIN - TOE Administrators are trusted to follow and apply all ad-
ministrator guidance in a trusted manner.
4.2 Clarification of Scope
The Security Target contains eight threats, which have been considered during the
evaluation.
T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP - An attacker is positioned on a wireless communica-
tions channel or elsewhere on the network infrastructure. Attackers may monitor and
gain access to data exchanged between the Mobile Device and other endpoints.
T.NETWORK_ATTACK - An attacker is positioned on a wireless communications
channel or elsewhere on the network infrastructure. Attackers may initiate communi-
cations with the Mobile Device or alter communications between the Mobile Device
and other endpoints in order to compromise the Mobile Device. These attacks include
malicious software update of any applications or system software on the device. These
attacks also include malicious web pages or email attachments, which are usually de-
livered to devices over the network.
T.PHYSICAL_ACCESS - An attacker, with physical access, may attempt to access
user data on the Mobile Device including credentials. These physical access threats
may involve attacks, which attempt to access the device through external hardware
ports, impersonate the user authentication mechanisms, through its user interface, and
also through direct and possiblydestructive access to its storage media. Note: Defend-
ing against device re-use after physical compromise is out of scope for this Protection
Profile.
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T.MALICIOUS_APP - Applications loaded onto the Mobile Device may include ma-
licious or exploitable code. This code could be included intentionally or unknowingly
by the developer, perhaps as part of a software library. Malicious apps may attempt to
exfiltrate data to which they have access. They may also conduct attacks against the
platform’s system software, which will provide them with additional privileges and
the ability to conduct further malicious activities. Malicious applications may be able
to control the device's sensors (GPS, camera, microphone) to gather intelligence about
the user's surroundings even when those activities do not involve data resident or
transmitted from the device. Flawed applications may give an attacker access to per-
form network-based or physical attacks that otherwise would have been prevented.
T.PERSISTENT_PRESENCE - Persistent presence on a device by an attacker implies
that the device has lost integrity and cannot regain it. The device has likely lost this
integrity due to some other threat vector, yet the continued access by an attacker con-
stitutes an on-going threat in itself. In this case, the device and its data may be con-
trolled by an adversary as well as by its legitimate owner.
T.TSF_FAILURE - Security mechanisms of the TOE generally build up from a primi-
tive set of mechanisms (e.g., memory management, privileged modes of process exe-
cution) to more complex sets of mechanisms. Failure of the primitive mechanisms
could lead to a compromise in more complex mechanisms, resulting in a compromise
of the TSF.
T.UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS - A user may gain unauthorized access to the TOE
data and TOE executable code. A malicious user, process, or external IT entity may
masquerade as an authorized entity in order to gain an authorized access to data or
TOE resources. A malicious user, process, or external IT entity may misrepresent it-
self as the TOE to obtain identification and authentication data.
T.UNDETECTED_ACTIONS - Malicious remote users or external IT entities may
take actions that adversely affect the security of the TOE. These actions may remain
undetected and thus their effects cannot be effectively mitigated.
The Security Target does not contain any Organisational Security Policies (OSPs)
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5 Architectural Information
The TOE’s OS manages the device hardware and provides the technologies with a rich
API set required to implement native applications, it also provides the capability to
approve or reject an application based upon the API access that the application re-
quires (or to grant applications access at runtime).
The TOE provides a built-in Mobile Device Management (MDM) framework API,
giving management features that may be utilized by external MDM solutions (not part
of this evaluation), allowing enterprises to use profiles to control some of the device
settings. Security management capabilities are also provided to users via the user in-
terface of the device and to administrators through the installation of Configuration
Profiles on the device by using MDM solutions.
The TOE provides cryptographic services for the encryption of data-at-rest (DAR)
within the TOE, for secure communication channels, for protection of Configuration
Profiles, and for use by apps. These cryptographic services can also be used to estab-
lish a trusted channel to other IT entities.
User data protection is provided by encrypting all the user and mobile application data
stored in the user’s data partition, restricting access by apps and by restricting access
until the user has been successfully authenticated.
User identification and authentication is provided by a user defined passphrase where
the minimum length of the passphrase, passphrase rules, and the maximum number of
consecutive failed authentication attempts can be configured by an administrator. Any
kind of Smart Lock mechanism shall be disabled in the CC configuration of the TOE.
The TOE protects itself by having its own code and data protected from unauthorized
access (using hardware provided memory protection features), by encrypting internal
user and TOE Security Functionality (TSF) data using TSF protected keys and encryp-
tion / decryption functions, by self-tests, by ensuring the integrity and authenticity of
TSF updates and downloaded apps, and by locking the TOE upon user request or after
a defined time of user inactivity.
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6 Documentation
The following guidance document is part of the TOE:
vivo X Fold2 on OriginOS 3.0 Administrator Guidance 1.0 [CCGUIDE]
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7 IT Product Testing
7.1 Evaluator Testing
The TOE was set up at the atsec office in Danderyd, Sweden and the testing was per-
formed between February and April 2023. Re-testing was performed in April 2023.
The following TOE model was used during the full test round:
 Device Name: vivo X Fold2
 Model Number: PD2266A
 Chipset Vendor: Qualcomm
 CPU: Snapdragon 8 Gen 2
 OS Version: OriginOS3. 0
 Build Number: PD2266_A_13.0.4.71.W10.V000L1
 Kernel Version: Android version 13, Linux kernel 5.15
Seven tests were re-executed on the following TOE model which is specified in the
[ST]:
 Device Name: vivo X Fold2
 Model Number: PD2266A
 Chipset Vendor: Qualcomm
 CPU: Snapdragon 8 Gen 2
 OS Version: OriginOS3. 0
 Build Number: PD2266_A_13.0.4.73.W10.V000L1
 Kernel Version: Android version 13, Linux kernel 5.15
The algorithm testing was covered by NIST CAVS tests, which were performed by
atsec.
All CAVS tests were successful.
The evaluator performed tests to ensure that the TOE behaves as specified in the ST
and the guidance documentation as well as to perform tests described in
[MDFPPv3.3], [BTPPMv1.0], [WLANCPPMv1.0] and [TLSPKGv1.1].
All evaluator test cases were completed successfully
7.2 Penetration Testing
No potential vulnerabilities were found to be applicable to the TOE in its operational
environment. The evaluator also performed multiple negative tests during independent
testing without finding any issues. Thus the evaluator identified no need for penetra-
tion testing.
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8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE needs to be configured according to the instructions in [CCGUIDE] to be in
a known state. More specifically, [CCGUIDE] 3.1 "Common Criteria Mode" describes
how to configure the device into the Common Criteria mode, which includes the fol-
lowing settings:
 Require a lock screen password
 Disable Smart Lock
 Disable Debugging Features (Developer options)
 Disable installation of applications from unknown sources
 Enable Audit Logging
 Disable USB Debugging function
Besides, Bluetooth and Wi-Fi on the TOE should be configured according to the in-
structions in chapter 4 "Bluetooth Configuration" and chapter 5 "Wi-Fi Configuration"
of [CCGUIDE], respectively.
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The evaluators applied each work unit of the Common Methodology [CEM] within
the scope of the evaluation, and concluded that the TOE meets the security objectives
stated in the Security Target [ST] for an attack potential of Basic.
The certifier reviewed the work of the evaluators and determined that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the Common Criteria [CC].
The evaluators' overall verdict is PASS.
The verdicts for the assurance classes and components are summarised in the follow-
ing table:
Assurance Class/Family Short name Verdict
Development ADV PASS
Functional Specification ADV_FSP.1 PASS
Guidance Documents AGD PASS
Operational User Guidance AGD_OPE.1 PASS
Preparative Procedures AGD_PRE.1 PASS
Evaluation Activities for MDFPP AGD_MDFPP.1 PASS
Assurance activities for BTPPM AGD_BTPPM.1 PASS
Assurance activities for WLAN package AGD_WLANEP.1 PASS
Assurance activities for TLS package AGD_TLSPKG.1 PASS
Life-cycle Support ALC PASS
CM Capabilities ALC_CMC.1 PASS
CM Scope ALC_CMS.1 PASS
Evaluation Activities for MDFPP ALC_MDFPP.1 PASS
Security Target Evaluation ASE PASS
ST Introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Conformance Claims ASE_CCL.1 PASS
Security Problem Definition ASE_SPD.1 PASS
Security Objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
Extended Components Definition ASE_ECD.1 PASS
Security Requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
TOE Summary Specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Evaluation Activities for MDFPP ASE_MDFPP.1 PASS
Assurance activities for BTPPM ASE_BTPPM.1 PASS
Assurance activities for WLAN package ASE_WLANEP.1 PASS
Assurance activities for TLS package ASE_TLSPKG.1 PASS
Tests ATE PASS
Independent Testing ATE_IND.1 PASS
Evaluation Activities for MDFPP ATE_MDFPP.1 PASS
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Assurance activities for BTPPM ATE_BTPPM.1 PASS
Assurance activities for WLAN package ATE_WLANEP.1 PASS
Assurance activities for TLS package ATE_TLSPKG.1 PASS
Vulnerability Assessment AVA PASS
Vulnerability Analysis AVA_VAN.1 PASS
Evaluation Activities for MDFPP AVA_MDFPP.1 PASS
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10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations
None.
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11 Bibliography
ST vivo X Fold2 on OriginOS 3.0 Security Target, vivo Mobile
Communication Co., Ltd, 2023-04-06, document version 1.0
CCGUIDE vivo X Fold2 on OriginOS 3.0 Administrator Guidance 1.0
MDFPPv3.3 Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals Version
3.3, dated 22 September, 2022
BTPPMv1.0 PP-Module for Bluetooth Version 1.0, dated 15 April 2021
WLANCPPMv1.0 PP-Module for WLAN Clients Version 1.0, dated 31 March
2022
TLSPKGv1.1 Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS) Ver-
sion 1.1, dated 1 March 2019
CCpart1 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Eval-
uation, Part 1, version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-
2017-04-001
CCpart2 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Eval-
uation, Part 2, version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-
2017-04-002
CCpart3 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Eval-
uation, Part 3, version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-
2017-04-003
CC CCpart1 + CCPart2 + CCPart3
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-
04-004
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Appendix A Scheme Versions
During the certification the following versions of the Swedish Common Criteria Eval-
uation and Certification scheme have been used.
A.1 Scheme/Quality Management System
Version Introduced Impact of changes
2.3.1 2023-04-20 None.
2.3 Application Original version
A.2 Scheme Notes
The following Scheme Notes have been considered during the evaluation:
 SN15-Testing
 SN18-Highlighted Requirements on the Security Target
 SN22-Vulnerability assessment
 SN23-Evaluation reports for NIAP PPs and cPPs
 SN25-Use of CAVP-tests in CC evaluations
 SN27-ST Requirements at the Time of Application for Certification
 SN28-Updated procedures for application, evalua-tion and certification
 SN 30 - CM of Third Party Components