




COMMON CRITERIA CERTIFICATION REPORT

Lexmark MX421, MX521 and MX622 Multi-Function Printers

24 January 2019

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V 1.0





FOREWORD

This certification report is an UNCLASSIFIED publication, issued under the authority of the Chief, Communications Security Establishment (CSE). Suggestions for amendments should be forwarded through departmental communications security channels to your Client Services Representative at CSE.

The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its associated certificate, has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility – established under the Canadian Common Criteria Scheme – using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5. This certification report, and its associated certificate, applies only to the identified version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Canadian CC Scheme, and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation report are consistent with the evidence adduced. This report, and its associated certificate, are not an endorsement of the IT product by the Communications Security Establishment, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, and no warranty for the IT product by the Communications Security Establishment, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, is either expressed or implied.

If your department has identified a requirement for this certification report based on business needs and would like more detailed information, please contact:

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OVERVIEW

The Canadian Common Criteria Scheme provides a third-party evaluation service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT) security products. Evaluations are performed by a commercial Common Criteria Evaluation Facility (CCEF) under the oversight of the Certification Body, which is managed by the Communications Security Establishment.

A CCEF is a commercial facility that has been approved by the Certification Body to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such approval is accreditation to the requirements of ISO/IEC 17025:2005, the General Requirements for the Competence of Testing and Calibration Laboratories.

By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, the Certification Body asserts that the product complies with the security requirements specified in the associated security target. A security target is a requirements specification document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities. The consumer of certified IT products should review the security target, in addition to this certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT product's intended environment, the evaluated security functionality, and the testing and analysis conducted by the CCEF.

The certification report, certificate of product evaluation and security target are posted to the Certified Products list (CPL) for the Canadian CC Scheme and to the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the International Common Criteria Project).



TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary	1
1 Identification of Target of Evaluation	2
1.1 Common Criteria Conformance.....	2
1.2 TOE Description	2
1.3 TOE Architecture	3
2 Security Policy	4
2.1 Cryptographic Functionality	4
3 Assumptions and Clarifications of Scope	5
3.1 Usage and Environmental Assumptions.....	5
3.2 Clarification of Scope.....	5
4 Evaluated Configuration	6
4.1 Documentation.....	6
5 Evaluation Analysis Activities	6
5.1 Development	7
5.2 Guidance Documents	7
5.3 Life-cycle Support	7
6 Testing Activities	8
6.1 Assessment of Developer Tests.....	8
6.2 Conduct of Testing.....	8
6.3 Independent Functional Testing.....	8
6.4 Independent Penetration Testing	9
7 Results of the Evaluation	10
7.1 Recommendations/Comments.....	10
8 Supporting Content	11
8.1 List of Abbreviations.....	11
8.2 References	13



LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 TOE Architecture3

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 TOE Identification2
Table 2 Cryptographic Algorithm(s)4



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Lexmark MX421, MX521 and MX622 Multi-Function Printers (hereafter referred to as the Target of Evaluation, or TOE), from Lexmark International, Inc., was the subject of this Common Criteria evaluation. A description of the TOE can be found in Section 1.2. The results of this evaluation demonstrate that TOE meets the requirements of the conformance claim listed in Table 1 for the evaluated security functionality.

EWA-Canada is the CCEF that conducted the evaluation. This evaluation was completed 24 January 2019 and was carried out in accordance with the rules of the Canadian Common Criteria Scheme.

The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target, which identifies assumptions made during the evaluation, the intended environment for TOE, and the security functional/assurance requirements. Consumers are advised to verify that their operating environment is consistent with that specified in the security target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification report.

Communications Security Establishment, as the Certification Body, declares that the TOE evaluation meets all the conditions of the Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the Canadian Certified Products list (CPL) and the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the International Common Criteria Project).



1 IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET OF EVALUATION

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is identified as follows:

Table 1 TOE Identification

TOE Name and Version	Lexmark MX421, MX521 and MX622 Multi-Function Printers
Developer	Lexmark International, Inc.
Conformance Claim	Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices [HCD], version 1.0, dated September 10, 2015 as modified by Errata #1 dated June 2017

1.1 COMMON CRITERIA CONFORMANCE

The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5.

1.2 TOE DESCRIPTION

The TOE is a multi-functional printer system with scanning, fax, and networked capabilities. Their capabilities extend to walk-up scanning and copying, scanning to fax, scanning to email, and servicing print jobs through the network. The MFPs feature an integrated touch-sensitive operator panel.



1.3 TOE ARCHITECTURE

A diagram of the TOE architecture is as follows:




Figure 1 TOE Architecture



2 SECURITY POLICY

The TOE implements policies pertaining to the following security functional classes:

- Identification and Authentication;
- User Data Protection;
- Cryptographic Support;
- Trusted Path/Channels;
- Security Management;
- Security Audit;
- Protection of the TSF; and
- TOE Access.

Complete details of the security functional requirements (SFRs) can be found in the Security Target (ST) referenced in section 8.2.

2.1 CRYPTOGRAPHIC FUNCTIONALITY

The following Government of Canada approved cryptographic algorithms were evaluated by the CAVP and used by the TOE:

Table 2 Cryptographic Algorithm(s)

Cryptographic Algorithm	Standard	Certificate Number
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)	FIPS 197	5891, 5931, 5892 and 5932
Rivest Shamir Adleman (RSA)	FIPS 186-4	3112 and 3113
Secure Hash Algorithm (SHS)	FIPS 180-4	4642, 4686, 4643 and 4687
Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)	FIPS 198-1	3866, 3909, 3867 and 3910
Deterministic Random Bit Generation (DRBG)	SP 800-90A	2484 and 2485
Component Validation List (CVL)	SP 800-131A	2159 and 2161



3 ASSUMPTIONS AND CLARIFICATIONS OF SCOPE

Consumers of the TOE should consider assumptions about usage and environmental settings as requirements for the product's installation and its operating environment. This will ensure the proper and secure operation of the TOE.

3.1 USAGE AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS

The following assumptions are made regarding the use and deployment of the TOE:

- The TOE is assumed to be located in a physical environment that is controlled or monitored such that a physical attack is prevented or detected;
- The TOE is not intended to withstand network-based attacks from an unmanaged network environment;
- TOE Administrators are trusted to administer the TOE according to site security policies; and
- Authorized Users are trained to use the TOE according to site security policies.

3.2 CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE

The TOE incorporates CAVP-validated Cryptography and was not subjected to CMVP (FIPS-140) validation.



4 EVALUATED CONFIGURATION

The evaluated configuration for the TOE comprises:

One of the following Lexmark MFD Models:

- MX421
- MX521; and
- MX622.

All containing firmware version MXTGM.052.025 with Lexmark Secure Element (P/N 57X0185).

4.1 DOCUMENTATION

The following documents are provided to the consumer to assist in the configuration and installation of the TOE:

- a. Lexmark™ Common Criteria Installation Supplement and Administrator Guide, December 2018;
- b. Lexmark™ Embedded Web Server – Security Administrator's Guide, April 2018;
- c. Lexmark™ MB2442, MB2546, MX421, MX521, MX522, XM1242, XM1246 User's Guide, April 2018; and
- d. Lexmark™ MB2650, MX622, XM3250 User's Guide, April 2018.



5 EVALUATION ANALYSIS ACTIVITIES

The evaluation analysis activities involved a structured evaluation of the TOE. Documentation and process dealing with Development, Guidance Documents, and Life-Cycle Support were evaluated.

5.1 DEVELOPMENT

The evaluators analyzed the documentation provided by the vendor; they determined that the design completely and accurately describes the TOE security functionality (TSF) interfaces and how the TSF implements the security functional requirements (SFRs). The evaluators determined that the initialization process is secure, that the security functions are protected against tamper and bypass, and that security domains are maintained.

5.2 GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS

The evaluators examined the TOE preparative user guidance and operational user guidance and determined that it sufficiently and unambiguously describes how to securely transform the TOE into its evaluated configuration and how to use and administer the product. The evaluators examined and tested the preparative and operational guidance, and determined that they are complete and sufficiently detailed to result in a secure configuration.

Section 0 provides details on the guidance documents.

5.3 LIFE-CYCLE SUPPORT

An analysis of the TOE configuration management system and associated documentation was performed. The evaluators found that the TOE configuration items were clearly marked.



6 TESTING ACTIVITIES

Testing consists of the following three steps: assessing developer tests, performing independent functional tests, and performing penetration tests.

6.1 ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPER TESTS

The evaluators verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities by examining their test evidence, and reviewing their test results.

6.2 CONDUCT OF TESTING

The TOE was subjected to a comprehensive suite of formally documented, independent functional and penetration tests. The detailed testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed results are documented in a separate Test Results document.

6.3 INDEPENDENT FUNCTIONAL TESTING

During this evaluation, the evaluator developed independent functional tests by examining design and guidance documentation.

All testing was planned and documented to a sufficient level of detail to allow repeatability of the testing procedures and results. The following testing activities were performed:

- a. PP Assurance Activities: The evaluator performed the assurance activities listed in the claimed PP.

6.3.1 FUNCTIONAL TEST RESULTS

The developer's tests and the independent functional tests yielded the expected results, providing assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its ST and functional specification.



6.4 INDEPENDENT PENETRATION TESTING

Subsequent to the independent review of public domain vulnerability databases and all evaluation deliverables, limited independent evaluator penetration testing was conducted. The penetration tests focused on:

- a. Use of automated vulnerability scanning tools to discover potential network, platform and application layer vulnerabilities such as Heartbleed, Shellshock, FREAK, POODLE, DROWN and GHOST;
- b. User Data Persistence after Restart of Printer: The objective of this test case is to verify that settings are what they should be upon restarting; and
- c. Faxing a Postscript file: The objective of this test case is to verify that a PS file faxed to the printer will not execute.

6.4.1 PENETRATION TEST RESULTS

The independent penetration testing did not uncover any exploitable vulnerabilities in the intended operating environment.



7 RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION

This evaluation has provided the basis for the conformance claim documented in Table 1. The overall verdict for this evaluation is **PASS**. These results are supported by evidence in the ETR.

The IT product identified in this report has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility established under the Canadian Common Criteria Scheme using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5. These evaluation results apply only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete certification report.

The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Canadian Common Criteria Scheme and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation report are consistent with the evidence adduced. This is not an endorsement of the IT product by CSE or by any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by CSE or by any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this certificate, is expressed or implied.

7.1 RECOMMENDATIONS/COMMENTS

It is recommended that all guidance outlined in Section 4.1 be followed to configure the TOE in the evaluated configuration.



8 SUPPORTING CONTENT

8.1 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Term	Definition
AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
CAVP	Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CCEF	Common Criteria Evaluation Facility
CM	Configuration Management
CMVP	Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CPL	Certified Products List
CSE	Communications Security Establishment
CVL	Component Validation List
DRBG	Deterministic Random Bit Generation
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR	Evaluation Technical Report
HMAC	Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
IT	Information Technology
ITS	Information Technology Security
LAN	Local Area Network
PP	Protection Profile
RSA	Rivest Shamir Adleman



Term	Definition
SFR	Security Functional Requirement
SHS	Secure Hash Algorithm
ST	Security Target
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSF	TOE Security Function



8.2 REFERENCES

Reference
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
Lexmark MX421, MX521 and MX622 Multi-Function Printers Security Target, Version 1.4, January 23, 2019.
Evaluation Technical Report for Lexmark MX421, MX521 and MX622 Multi-Function Printers, Version 1.1, January 24, 2019.
Assurance Activity Report for Lexmark MX421, MX521 and MX622 with Firmware version MXTGM.052.025, Version 1.1, January 24, 2019.