BSI-DSZ-CC-0901-2015
for
IBM WebSphere DataPower Firmware
Version 6.0.2.0
from
IBM Corporation
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.12
BSI-DSZ-CC-0901-2015 (*)
Application-Level Firewall Software
IBM WebSphere DataPower Firmware
Version 6.0.2.0
from IBM Corporation
PP Conformance: None
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.3
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and
CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 4.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence
adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
Bonn, 9 December 2015
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0901-2015
This page is intentionally left blank.
4 / 40
BSI-DSZ-CC-0901-2015 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
5 / 40
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0901-2015
Contents
A. Certification........................................................................................................................7
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2. Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4. Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9
5. Publication....................................................................................................................10
B. Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1. Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2. Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................14
3. Security Policy..............................................................................................................15
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................15
5. Architectural Information...............................................................................................15
6. Documentation.............................................................................................................15
7. IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................16
8. Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................18
9. Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................18
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................25
11. Security Target............................................................................................................25
12. Definitions...................................................................................................................26
13. Bibliography................................................................................................................28
C. Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................31
CC Part 1:........................................................................................................................31
CC Part 3:........................................................................................................................32
D. Annexes...........................................................................................................................39
6 / 40
BSI-DSZ-CC-0901-2015 Certification Report
A. Certification
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security2
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Technical information on the IT security certification, Procedural
Description (BSI 7138) [3]
● BSI certification: Requirements regarding the Evaluation Facility (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045.
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1. European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
7 / 40
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0901-2015
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For
"Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices
with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too. In addition, certificates
issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition
agreement.
The new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of Austria, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The
current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on recognition,
and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at https://www.sogisportal.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
2.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The CCRA-2014 replaces the old CCRA signed in May 2000 (CCRA-2000). Certificates
based on CCRA-2000, issued before 08 September 2014 are still under recognition
according to the rules of CCRA-2000. For on 08 September 2014 ongoing certification
procedures and for Assurance Continuity (maintenance and re-certification) of old
certificates a transition period on the recognition of certificates according to the rules of
CCRA-2000 (i.e. assurance components up to and including EAL 4 or the assurance
family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR)) is defined until 08 September 2017.
As of September 2014 the signatories of the new CCRA-2014 are government
representatives from the following nations: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea,
Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
As the product certified has been accepted into the certification process before 08
September 2014, this certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2000, i.e.
for all assurance components selected.
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
8 / 40
BSI-DSZ-CC-0901-2015 Certification Report
The product IBM WebSphere DataPower Firmware, Version 6.0.2.0 has undergone the
certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product IBM WebSphere DataPower Firmware, Version 6.0.2.0 was
conducted by atsec information security GmbH. The evaluation was completed on
26 November 2015. atsec information security GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: IBM Corporation.
The product was developed by: IBM Corporation.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods require
a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited as outlined on the certificate. The
certificate issued on 9 December 2015 is valid until 08. December 2020. The validity date
can be extended by re-assessment or re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report and the
Security Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any
applicant of the product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
9 / 40
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0901-2015
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5. Publication
The product IBM WebSphere DataPower Firmware, Version 6.0.2.0 has been included in
the BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
IBM Corporation
550 King Street
Littleton, MA 01460
USA
10 / 40
BSI-DSZ-CC-0901-2015 Certification Report
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
11 / 40
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0901-2015
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the 'IBM WebSphere DataPower Firmware, Version
6.0.2.0' and is, combined with its underlying operating system and hardware, a network
appliance that provides application-level firewall functionality, web service proxy
functionality, and message content transformation functionality.
The network appliance is used in the following scenarios:
● In the demilitarized zone (DMZ) between an enterprise and external partners, where the
network appliance performs primarily security services (e.g. enforcement of security
policies on incoming and outgoing traffic, message content transformation or
multiprotocol bridging).
● Within the enterprise as an enterprise service bus (ESB), interconnecting disparate
enterprise assets in a meaningful way (e.g message routing, multiprotocol bridging or
message content transformation).
The TOE does not support clustering. In case several network appliances are used in the
operational environment, each network appliance works independently from the other.
The flexibility of the configuration of the network appliance allows an enterprise to deploy a
network appliance in scenarios requiring interoperability with a wide range of enterprise
assets, such as
● Authentication systems,
● Databases,
● Mainframe applications,
● Diverse message transport systems,
● Web service applications,
● Web sites.
The network appliances are self-contained, rack mount units while the TOE is defined as
the network appliance firmware and it contains an embedded operating system, an Secure
Shell (SSH) daemon, an application called "Router", and a Watchdog application. The
Router application and SSH daemon enforce all of the claimed security functionality.
The TOE consists of the Oversight subsystem (which includes the Watchdog application),
the Router subsystem and the SSH daemon subsystem. All hardware and the remaining
firmware are part of the Operational Environment.
There are three variations of the TOE (defined by the hardware it is hosted on) that are
included in this Security Target (ST); each TOE provides similar security functionality and
corresponds to the IBM products described below:
● The DataPower Service Gateway XG45 is a lightweight, level entry network appliance
shipped in a 1U rack system that provides Web service proxy; Application level firewall
based on information flow control policy based on protocol information, message
content, and identity assertions (authentication); Message content transformation based
on XML Path Language (XPath) and XML Stylesheet Language Tranformations (XSLT).
● The DataPower Integration Appliance XI52 offers all the functionality provided by the
XG45 but in a more powerful 2U rack system. In addition, it provides support for more
12 / 40
BSI-DSZ-CC-0901-2015 Certification Report
message formats and more connectivity options (not included in the evaluated
configuration).
● The DataPower B2B Appliance XB62 runs in a 2U rack system and provides business to
business (B2B) functionality in addition to the features included in the XG45 and XI52
models. It supports B2B messaging protocols such as AS1, AS2, AS3 and ebMS (not
included in the evaluated configuration).
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is not based on a certified
Protection Profile.
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ALC_FLR.3.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of
them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.]
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security
Functionality
Addressed issue
1 Security audit
2 Cryptographic support (TLS version 1.2, SSH version 2, XML signature,
XML encryption, Certificate validation, Random number generation)
3 User data protection
4 Identification and authentication
5 Security management
6 Protection of the TOE security functionality
7 Trusted channel
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3 .
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
13 / 40
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0901-2015
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
IBM WebSphere DataPower Firmware
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 SW Firmware for XB62
xb6020.CommonCriteria.scrypt3
SHA256:
bf7b273b5dbc57e3a11ca655c10e3830d874a9
39aa7e83b50de216eb57041333
6.0.2 Download
2 SW Firmware for XI52
xi6020.CommonCriteria.scrypt3
SHA256:
7035220ecee61a8c3d72e87f75565d79783e24
05a14af01384f0db0c1e3ecc0c
6.0.2 Download
3 SW Firmware for XG45
xg6020.CommonCriteria.scrypt3
SHA256:
8d6717c20eb36ccc9938be01d3d443a62ba72c
3686941a186f9ebc0bc1a893fb
6.0.2 Download
4 DOC Standalone Knowledge Center [9]
dp602kc.zip
SHA256:
6866c04169d35bfe9335c42198c2841c24466c
3ed4420bdd7c5d5ed00b4436b8
6.0.2 Download
5 DOC Secure Deployment Guide [8]
DataPower_Secure_Deployment_Guide_6020.
pdf
SHA256:
5c024a819eff15c46b61170d7a38c0a623eef6e
489cda835499e4e8abd879f79
6.0.2 Download
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The firmware images and the images of the Standalone Knowledge Center [9] will be
published on IBM's download website 'FixCentral'.
The delivery of the Secure Deployment Guide [8] will kicked off be by individually
contacting IBM's level 2 support.
The TOE can be identified by the checksums as given in table 2. When being installed on
the hardware, the administrator can issue the command show firmware upon wich the
version of the firmware as well as the build number will be returned. The build number of
the TOE is 256732.
14 / 40
BSI-DSZ-CC-0901-2015 Certification Report
3. Security Policy
The security policy for the TOE is defined by the security functional requirements and
divided in two distinct groups: one for enforcing information flow control, and the other to
enforce access control to objects and security management functions. The following is a
list of the subjects and objects, and their security attributes, that are participating in the
policy.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The list of objectives
which have to be met by the the environment can be found in the Security Target [6],
chapter 4.2.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is a set of applications in the firmware that provides application-level firewall
functionality, web service proxy functionality and service integration functionality. The TOE
consists of the following subsystems:
● Oversight subsystem,
● Router subsystem,
● SSH daemon subsystem.
The TOE runs on top of an embedded, optimized DataPower Operating System (IBM MCP
7, a variant of Red Hat Linux) that is included in the firmware package. The operating
system, as well as the underlying hardware, are part of the Operational Environment.
The Oversight subsystem initializes processes and monitors the Router application to
ensure that it is always running.
The Router subsystem performs the vast majority of the security functionality. It
implements the firewall and enforces the firewall policies. It implements web service proxy
features by enforcing information flow control policies, and it provides a command-line
interface (CLI) administrative interface.
Administrators perform management tasks through a Command Line Interface (CLI).
Administrators connect to the TOE either through the network appliance's Console
connector (an RJ45 serial connector supporting RS-232c) or over the network appliance's
Ethernet management connectors (MGT0 and MGT1) using TCP/IP. The Ethernet
management connectors support the CLI over a SSH connection, which is provided
through the SSH daemon subsystem. Secure Copy (SCP) is also supported via the SSH
protocol.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
15 / 40
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0901-2015
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
Developer Testing
The developer used manual tests and a few automated tests. The test suite comprises 214
tests. Most of the tests were run manually, which by the nature of the TOE configuration
requires several different steps to copying configuration files, configuration scripts, perform
configuration commands, and running different types of external programs depending on
which of the various protocols covered by the information flow was the subject in the
respective test case.
The test approach was to use mainly use manual tests (because of the restricted TOE
interfaces) which requires a number management activities for most of the tests which can
only be done via the admin CLI interface. All security functions with the exception of the
DRNG tests were executed by using externally visible TOE interfaces. The DRNG was
tested on a debug installation to enable the use of internal TOE interfaces to be used.
As the testing effort is quite high, the developer used an iterative test approach, where
after an update of the TOE during the evaluation, he rerun all tests that were related to the
changed functionality and also rerun tests that involve and verify the general functionality
of the TOE.
The developer executed all tests on firmware level 249668. He then rerun all cryptographic
tests, RNG tests, and audit tests on firmware level 256732 which is the final firmware
version of the TOE. The firmware level difference was assessed by the evaluator who
examined the source code differences. During that examination it became clear that the
changes were of a nature that made it possible that the results for those executed tests
are able to represent the final firmware level. The DRNG tests were executed on a debug
firmware level based on 253964 which included the RNG design changes.
The TOE was configured according to the Secure Deployment Guide [8] with respect the
test relevant settings for interfaces, cryptographic implementation, and Common Criteria
mode.
All developer test results were consistent with the expected test results.
Independent Evaluator Testing
The independent functional evaluator tests comprised of 13 independent tests as well as
13 repeated developer tests witnessed by the evaluator.
The following security functions have been tested:
Authentication: FIA_UAU.2, FIA_UID.2, FIA_SOS.1, FIA_AFL.1, FIA_USB.1
Information Flow control: FDP_IFC.1, FDP_IFF.1
Security Management / Access control: FDP_ACC.2, FDP_ACF.1, FMT_MTD.1(DACP)
Cryptographic tests: FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.2, FCS_COP.1 (ENC/MAC/MD/SGN)
The testing was performed on two configurations: the developer test were rerun on the
final firmware level 256732, while the independent evaluator tests were executed on an
earlier firmware level 255579 which the evaluator assessed by examining the source code
16 / 40
BSI-DSZ-CC-0901-2015 Certification Report
differences. During that examination it became clear that the change only affected the
status output functionality and does not impact other functions.
The subset of developer tests was rerun on the platform XG45, XI52, and XB62, while all
the independent evaluator tests were run on an XI52 platform which was setup in the
ITSEF lab in Munich.
All tests were executed successfully with the actual results matching the expected results.
Penetration Testing
The penetration testing was performed on firmware level 255579. This firmware level
differs from the final TOE firmware version in two aspects: one status output command has
been corrected, and one potential buffer overflow vulnerability was corrected. By
assessing the source code differences, the evaluator came to the conclusion that the
penetration testing performed on 255579 was representative for the final TOE version.
For the collection of the RSA/DSA timing data, the developer supported the evaluator by
providing a firmware version setup that allowed access to non-externally accessible
functions.
The testing mainly covered the administrative SSH interface and the TLS/SSH-protected
information flow control TSFI, and including on test on the JSON data payload TSFI. The
total of 12 tests used only external interfaces with one exception: a program has
developed that gets compiled on the underlying OS of the TOE in order to execute and
measure the timing of DSA/RSA signature operations.
The evaluator used the information on potential vulnerabilities collected by the evaluators
during the evaluation that should be considered in the vulnerability analysis. The evaluator
took into account the ST, guidance documentation, functional specification, TOE design,
security architecture description and implementation representation to identify possible
potential vulnerabilities in the TOE mainly focusing on two aspects: the administrative login
and management functionality, and the certificate validation mechanism. Specifically, the
following areas were subject to penetration testing:
● Account Lockouts are forgotten over a reboot.
● Privilege Escalation
● Timing vulnerability for RSA and DSA signatures
● Incorrect JSON validation
● Acceptance of weak certificates
● Incomplete application of CRLs
● Use of weak SSH cipher
● Insufficient character classes applicable for user-selected passwords
● Insecure handling certificates not following ASN.1
● Unauthorized admin access with hard-coded password
Apart from standard tools to communicate with the TOE interfaces, the evaluator used
self-written code as part of the penetration tests to verify the vulnerabilities. None of the
penetration tests were successful.
17 / 40
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0901-2015
The penetration testing was carried out using the source code, internal interfaces, and
external interfaces of the TOE. The subsystems subject to penetration testing are all parts
of the TOE. The TSF under examination were the following:
● Authentication
● Management and User Data Protection
● Cryptographic support
● Trusted channels
None of the evaluator's penetration tests were successful in the sense that they allowed
the penetration of the TOE. In summary, no exploitable or residual vulnerabilities were
identified within the claimed attack level.
8. Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration consists of the firmware and guidance documentation
specified in the ST [6], section 1.5.3.1 running on the hardware models specified in the ST
[6] section 1.4.1. It includes the use of the optional IT products specified in the ST [6]
section 1.4.1. The specifications for configuring the TOE in the evaluated configuration are
located in the guidance documentation 'Secure Deployment Guide' [8]. The consumer
must read, understand, and follow the guidance documentation provided as part of the
TOE for the evaluated configuration. The following configuration information applies to the
evaluated configuration:
● Audit must always be enabled.
● SSLv3.0 must be disabled. Only TLSv1.2 is allowed.
● The WebGUI for administrative management must be disabled.
● SNMP must be disabled.
● The XML Management Interface must be disabled.
● The USB port must be disabled.
● The Intelligent Platform Management Interface (IPMI) LAN channel must be disabled.
● A Web-based Graphical User Interface (WebGUI) is disabled by default and not allowed
in the evaluated configuration.
Additional configuration information can be found in the 'Secure Deployment Guide' [8].
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used and guidance specific for the technology
of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
18 / 40
BSI-DSZ-CC-0901-2015 Certification Report
(i) Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren (Functionality Classes and Evaluation Methodology for
Deterministic RNGs)
(see [4], AIS 20).
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_FLR.3 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: None
● for the Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.3
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But Cryptographic Functionalities with
a security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 100 Bits'
of the following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general
context).
# Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanisms
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
[Bits]
Sec.
Level
≧ 100
Bits
Comments
TLS
1 Authenticity RSA signature
verification
(RSASSA-PKCS1-v1-5)
using SHA-1
RFC3447 [18]
(PKCS#1 v2.1)
FIPS180-4 [10] (SHA)
Modulus
length:
1024, 2048,
4096
no Verification of
certificate signatures
provided for
authentication
Server and client
certificates
(optional) are used.
Algorithms used
depending on the
signature
algorithm8
/ hash
functions9
used for
2 RSA signature
verification
(RSASSA-PKCS1-v1-5)
RFC3447 [18]
(PKCS#1 v2.1)
FIPS180-4 [10] (SHA)
Modulus
length:
1024
no
19 / 40
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0901-2015
# Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanisms
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
[Bits]
Sec.
Level
≧ 100
Bits
Comments
using SHA-256 signing the
certificates.
Modulus
length:
2048,
4096
Yes
3 Authentication RSA signature
generation and
verification
(RSASSA-PKCS1-v1-510
) using SHA-1
RFC3447 [18]
(PKCS#1 v2.1)
Modulus
length:
1024, 2048,
4096
no Client signs
message
(containing all
previous handshake
messages) with
private key bound to
his certificate.
Server verifies
signature of the
message.
algorithms11
depending on the
key used for signing,
contained in the
client certificate.
4 RSA signature
generation and
verification
(RSASSA-PKCS1-v1-51
)
using SHA-256
RFC3447 [18]
(PKCS#1 v2.1)
Modulus
length:
1024
no
Modulus
length:
2048,
4096
yes
5 Key establishment/
key transport
RSA encryption (client)
and decryption (server)
(RSAES-PKCS1-v1-512
)
(TLS_RSA)
RFC3447 [18]
(PKCS#1 v2.1)
Modulus
length:
1024
no Encrypted exchange
of pre-master secret
generated at client
side13
Modulus
length:
2048, 4096
yes
8
Since the TOE in general also supports DSA signature generation and verification using SHA-1; authenticity may also be checked
using DSA signature verification if the certificate itself is signed with DSA using SHA-1. Furthermore, if the signing key contained in the
client certificate is stated to be used with DSA then DSA using SHA-1 signature generation and verification will be used by the TOE for
authentication. However, this not claimed by the [ST] (please refer to FCS_COP.1) and as such not part of the TOE, and, therefore, is
not listed above.
9
In general, MD5 is also supported by the TOE as hash function. However, it is ensured by organizational controls that only certificates
signed based on strong hash functions as claimed above are used within the TOE. Thus the weak hash function MD5 is never
contained in a valid certificate installed/imported by the trained admin. Attacks that may take advantage of hash function
weakness to obtain a forged signature are not feasible in the evaluated configuration.
10
implicitly EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding method is required based on block type 1 (PS= FF).
11
Since the TOE in general also supports DSA signature generation and verification using SHA-1; authenticity may also be checked
using DSA signature verification if the certificate itself is signed with DSA using SHA-1. Furthermore, if the signing key contained in the
client certificate is stated to be used with DSA then DSA using SHA-1 signature generation and verification will be used by the TOE for
authentication. However, this not claimed by the [ST] (please refer to FCS_COP.1) and as such not part of the TOE, and, therefore, is
not listed above.
12
implicitly EME-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding method is required based on block type 2 (PS= random data.
13
Client uses the enc key bound to the certificate as provided by the server to encrypt the pre-master secret. Server
decrypts pre-master secret as indicator for possessing the respective private key
20 / 40
BSI-DSZ-CC-0901-2015 Certification Report
# Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanisms
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
[Bits]
Sec.
Level
≧ 100
Bits
Comments
6 Key derivation HMAC with SHA-256
(default: tls_prf_sha256)
RFC2104 [14]
(HMAC)
FIPS180-4 [10] (SHA)
256 yes Symmetric keys and
MAC keys for record
layer14
7 Confidentiality AES in CBC mode
(AES_128_CBC,
AES_256_CBC)
FIPS197 [11] (AES)
SP800-38A [23] (CBC)
|k|=128,
256
yes Bulk data encryption
/ decryption
(record layer)
8 Three-key TDES in CBC
mode
(3DES_EDE_CBC)
FIPS46-3 [12] (DES)
SP 800-67 [24]
(TDES/TDEA),
SP 800-38A [23]
(CBC),
|k|=168 yes
9 Integrity and
authenticity
HMAC with
SHA-1 or SHA-256
(SHA), (SHA256)
RFC2104 [14]
(HMAC)
FIPS180-4 [10] (SHA)
160
(SHA-1)
256
(SHA-256)
yes Message
authentication code
(record layer)
10 Trusted Channel FTP_ITC.1, ST [6] , sec.
6.1.8.1 for TLS
Cf. all lines above See above yes Depending on the
sec. level of the
used mechanisms
above
no
SSHv2
1 Authentication RSA signature
generation & verification
RSASSAPKCS1-v1_5
using SHA-1
(ssh-rsa)
RFC3447 [18]
(PKCS#1 v2.1)
FIPS-180-4 [10]
(SHA-1)
RFC4253 [21]
(SSH-TRANS)
for host authentication
RFC4252 [20], sec 7
(SSH-USERAUTH) for
user authentication
method: “publickey”
Modulus
length:
1024, 2048
and 4096
no Pubkeys are
exchanged
trustworthily out of
band, e.g. checking
fingerprints.
Authenticity is not
part of the TOE.
(no certificates are
used)
2 DSA signature
generation & verification
using SHA-1
(ssh-dss)
FIPS186-4 [27] (DSA)
FIPS-180-4 [10]
(SHA-1)
RFC4253 [21]
(SSH-TRANS)
for host authentication
RFC4252 [20], sec 7
(SSH-USERAUTH) for
user authentication
method: “publickey”
plength=
1024
qlength=
160
no
3 UserID & password
RFC4252 [20], sec. 5
Guess yes ST [6]
14
pre-master secret converted into the master secret, the keys of the record layer are generated by expanding the master secret using
the security parameters of the handshake protocol
21 / 40
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0901-2015
# Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanisms
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
[Bits]
Sec.
Level
≧ 100
Bits
Comments
(SSH-USERAUTH)
method; “password”
success
prob.
ε ≤ 3
10^-4
FIA_SOS.1 &
FIA_AFL.1:
SSH (CLI):
Blocking after x
attempts (1≤x≤64) –
lock-out duration
120 min or explicit
re-enabling by
admin
SFTP:
Blocking after x
attempts (1≤x≤64) –
lock-out until explicit
re-enabling by
admin.
4 Key agreement DH with
DH group1-sha1
RFC4253 [21]
(SSH-TRANS)
supported by
RFC2409 [16] (DH
groups IKE)
FIPS-180-4 [10]
(SHA-1)
plength=10
24
no
5 DH with
DH group14-sha1
RFC4253 [21]
(SSH-TRANS)
supported by
RFC3526 [28] (DH
groups IKE)
FIPS-180-4 [10]
(SHA-1)
plength=20
48
yes
6 DH with
diffie-hellman-group-exc
hange-sha1
RFC4253 [21]
(SSH-TRANS)
supported by
RFC4419 [29]
(DH-Group Exchange)
FIPS-180-4 [10]
(SHA-1)
plength=10
24
no
plength=
2K, 3K, 4K,
yes
7 Confidentiality AES in CBC mode, and
CTR mode
(aes128-cbc,
aes192-cbc,
aes256-cbc)
(aes128-ctr, aes192-ctr,
aes256-ctr);
FIPS197 [11] (AES),
SP 800-38A [23]
(CBC, CTR),
RFC 4253 [21] (SSH
using AES with CBC
mode),
RFC4344 [22] (SSH
using AES with CTR
mode)
|k|=128,
192, 256
yes Binary packet
protocol: encryption
8 Three-key TDES in CBC
mode
FIPS46-3 [12] (DES)
SP 800-67 [24]
(TDES/TDEA),
|k|=168 yes
22 / 40
BSI-DSZ-CC-0901-2015 Certification Report
# Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanisms
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
[Bits]
Sec.
Level
≧ 100
Bits
Comments
(3des-cbc)
SP 800-38A [23]
(CBC),
RFC4253 [21] (SSH
using 3DES with CBC
mode)
9 Integrity and
authenticity
HMAC-SHA-1 FIPS180-4 [10] (SHA),
RFC2104 [14]
(HMAC),
RFC4251 [19] /
RFC4253 [21] (SSH
general / detailed
HMAC support),
RFC4253 [21] (SSH
detailed HMAC
support)
|k|=160 yes Binary packet
protocol:
message
authentication
10 Trusted channel FTP_ITC.1, ST [6] , sec.
6.1.8.1 for SFTP
yes Depending on the
sec. Level of the
used mechanisms
above
no
11 Trusted path FTP_TRP.1, ST [6] , sec.
6.1.8.2 for SSH
yes Depending on the
sec. level of the
used mechanisms
above
no
XML
1 Authenticity RSA signature
verification
(RSASSA-PKCS1-v1-5)
using SHA-1
RFC3447 [18]
(PKCS#1 v2.1)
FIPS180-4 [10] (SHA)
Modulus
length:
1024, 2048,
4096
no Verification of
certificate
signatures
provided as part of
the XML blob (e.g.
as reference).
Key usage of
certificates
signing, encryption
Algorithms used
depending on the
signature
algorithm / hash
algorithm used for
signing the
certificates.
2 RSA signature
verification
(RSASSA-PKCS1-v1-5)
using SHA-256
RFC3447 [18]
(PKCS#1 v2.1)
FIPS180-4 [10] (SHA)
Modulus
length:
1024
no
Modulus
length:
2048,
4096
yes
3 DSA signature
verification using SHA-1
FIPS186-4 [27] (DSA)
FIPS-180-4 [10]
(SHA-1)
plength=
1024
qlength=
160
no
4 Authentication RSA signature
generation and
verification
RSASSAPKCS1-v1_5
using SHA-1
XML Signature Syntax
and Processing
(Second Edition) [26]
RFC3447 [18]
Modulus
length:
1024, 2048,
4096
no
23 / 40
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0901-2015
XML
(xmldsig#rsa-sha-1)
(xmldsig#sha-1)
(PKCS#1 v2.1)
FIPS-180-4 [10] (SHA)
5 RSA signature
generation and
verification
RSASSAPKCS1-v1_5
using SHA-256,
SHA-384, SHA-512
(xmldsig-more#rsa-sha2
56, sha384, sha512)
XML Signature Syntax
and Processing
(Second Edition) [26]
RFC3447 [18]
(PKCS#1 v2.1)
FIPS-180-4 [10] (SHA)
Modulus
length:
1024
no
Modulus
length:
2048, 4096
yes
6 DSA signature
generation and
verification using SHA-1
(xmldsig#dsa-sha-1)
XML Signature Syntax
and Processing
(Second Edition) [26]
FIPS186-4 [27] (DSA)
FIPS-180-4 [10] (SHA)
plength=
1024
qlength=
160
no
7 Integrity and
authenticity
HMAC-SHA-1
possibly truncated,
minimum to 80 bits
(xmldsig#hmac-sha-1)
XML Signature Syntax
and Processing
(Second Edition) [26]
FIPS180-4 [10] (SHA),
RFC2104 [14] (HMAC)
RFC2404 [15] (HMAC
using truncated
SHA-1)
|k|=160
no trunc or
trunc to 96,
128
yes Message
authentication
code
XML Signature is
also supported for
XML encryption. It
is the
recommended
way to provide key
based
authentication
|k|=160
trunc 80
no
8 Key transport
(public key)
RSA encryption and
decryption
RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5
(xmlenc#rsa-1_5)
XML Encryption
Syntax and Processing
[25]
RFC3447 [18]
(PKCS#1 v2.1)
Modulus
length:
1024
no The symmetric key
gets encrypted by
a pub key and
transported within
the XML structure
Modulus
length:
2048, 4096
yes
9 RSA encryption and
decryption
RSAES-OAEP
(including MGF1 with
SHA1 mask generation
function i.e. EME-OAEP
is used with SHA1)
(xmlenc#rsa-oaep-mgf1p
)
(xmldsig#sha1)
XML Encryption
Syntax and Processing
[25]
RFC3447 [18]
(PKCS#1 v2.1)
Modulus
length:
1024
no
Modulus
length:
2048, 4096
yes
10 Key transport
(key wrapping)
AES key wrapping
(xmlenc#kw-aes128,
kw-aes256, kw aes192)
XML Encryption
Syntax and Processing
[25]
RFC3394 [30]
|k|=128,
192, 256
yes The symmetric key
gets wrapped with
a shared secret
(KEK) &
24 / 40
BSI-DSZ-CC-0901-2015 Certification Report
XML
transported within
the XML structure
11 CMS TDES key wrap15
(xmlenc#kw-tripledes)
XML Encryption
Syntax and Processing
[25]
RFC3217 [17]
|k|=168 yes
12 Confidentiality AES in CBC mode
(xmlenc# (aes128-cbc,
aes192-cbc,
aes256-cbc))
XML Encryption
Syntax and Processing
[25]
FIPS197 [11] (AES),
SP 800-38A [23]
(CBC)
|k|=128,
192, 256
yes Block encryption
13 TDES in CBC mode
(xmlenc#tripledes-cbc)
XML Encryption
Syntax and Processing
[25]
SP 800-67 [24]
(TDES/TDEA),
SP 800-38A [23]
(CBC),
|k|=168 yes
14 Key generation AES key generation
based on RNG as
defined in FCS_RNG.1
|k|=128, 192, 256
n/a n/a Symmetric key for
block encryption,
FCS_CKM.1
TDES key generation
3x56 =|k|=168
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a
re-certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
15
CMS TDES key wrap specifies the TripleDES key wrap algorithm for wrapping TripleDES content encryption keys with TripleDES key
encryption keys when using the CMS KeyAgreeRecipientInfo or KEKRecipientInfo choice for providing recipient specific information
when encrypting data using the CMS EnvelopedData type.
25 / 40
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0901-2015
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
ASN Abstract Syntax Notation
B2B Business to Business
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CLI Command Line Interface
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
CRL Certificate Revocation List
DMZ Demilitarized Zone
DRNG Deterministic Random Number Generator
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ESB Enterprise Service Bus
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
GUI Graphical User Interface
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
JSON JavaScript Object Notation
LAN Local Area Network
PP Protection Profile
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
26 / 40
BSI-DSZ-CC-0901-2015 Certification Report
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
SSH Secure Shell
SSL Secure Sockets Layer
ST Security Target
TLS Transport Layer Security
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
USB Intelligent Platform Management Interface (IPMI
USB Universal Serial Bus
XML Extensible Markup Language
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on
well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
27 / 40
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0901-2015
13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 4, September 2012
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 4, September 2012
[3] BSI certification: Technical information on the IT security certification of products,
protection profiles and sites (BSI 7138) and Requirements regarding the Evaluation
Facility for the Evaluation of Products, Protection Profiles and Sites under the CC
and ITSEC (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE16
.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
in the BSI Website
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0901-2015, Version 1.42, Date 13.03.2015, IBM
WebSphere DataPower Firmware, Version 6.0.2.0 Security Target, IBM Corporation
[7] Evaluation Technical Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0901 for IBM WebSphere DataPower
Firmware, Version 6.0.2.0, Version 7, Date 26.11.2015, atsec information security
GmbH, (confidential document)
[8] WebSphere DataPower Version 6.0.2 Secure Deployment Guide, Revision 2, Date
08.10.2015, IBM Corporation
[9] Standalone Infocenter for the TOE Version 6.0.2, Date 27.03.2015, File name
agd/dp602kc-2015-03-27.zip, IBM Corporation
[10] SECURE HASH STANDARD (SHS), Version FIPS 180-4, Date March 2012
[11] FIPS PUB 197: Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), Author(s) National Institute of
Standards and Technology, Date 2001-11-26
[12] FIPS PUB 46-3: Data Encryption Standard (DES), Author(s) National Institute of
Standards and Technology, Date 1999-10-25
[13] RFC 4253, The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol, Author(s) T. Ylonen,
C. Lonvick, Date 2006-01-01
[14] RFC2104, HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication, Author(s) H.
Krawczyk, M. Bellare, R. Canetti, Date 1997-02-01
[15] RFC2404, The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within ESP and AH, Author(s) C. Madson,
R. Glenn, Date 1998-11-01
[16] RFC2409, The Internet Key Exchange (IKE), Author(s) D. Harkins, D. Carrel, Date
1998-11-01
16
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
28 / 40
BSI-DSZ-CC-0901-2015 Certification Report
[17] RFC3217, Triple-DES and RC2 Key Wrapping, Author(s) R. Housley, Date
2001-12-01
[18] RFC3447, Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography
Specifications Version 2.1, Author(s) J. Jonsson, B. Kaliski, Date 2003-02-01
[19] RFC4251, The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Architecture, Author(s) T. Ylonen, C.
Lonvick, Date 2006-01-01
[20] RFC4252, The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication Protocol, Author(s) T. Ylonen, C.
Lonvick, Date 2006-01-01
[21] RFC4253, The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol, Author(s) T. Ylonen, C.
Lonvick, Date 2006-01-01
[22] RFC4344, The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Encryption Modes, Author(s) M.
Bellare, T. Kohno, C. Namprempre, Date 2006-01-01
[23] SP 800-38A, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods and
Techniques, Version NIST Special Publication 800-38A 2001 Edition, Date
December 2001
[24] SP 800-67, Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block
Cipher, Version Revision 1, Date January 2012
[25] XML Encryption Syntax and Processing, Date December 10, 2002
[26] XML Signature Syntax and Processing (Second Edition), Date 10 June 2008
[27] DIGITAL SIGNATURE STANDARD (DSS), Version FIPS PUB 186-4, Date July 2013
[28] RFC3526, More Modular Exponential (MODP) Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet
Key Exchange (IKE), Author(s) T. Kivinen, M. Kojo, Date 2003-05-01
[29] RFC4419, Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport
Layer Protocol, Author(s) M. Friedl, N. Provos, W. Simpson, Date 2006-03-01
[30] RFC3394, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm, Author(s) J.
Schaad, R. Housley, Date 2002-09-01
29 / 40
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0901-2015
This page is intentionally left blank.
30 / 40
BSI-DSZ-CC-0901-2015 Certification Report
C. Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
31 / 40
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0901-2015
CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
32 / 40
BSI-DSZ-CC-0901-2015 Certification Report
Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal
high-level design presentation
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
33 / 40
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0901-2015
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
34 / 40
BSI-DSZ-CC-0901-2015 Certification Report
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL 1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL 1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL 1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that
the TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions
through security objectives.
EAL 1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL 1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL 2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL 2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL 2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL 3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL 3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
35 / 40
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0901-2015
EAL 3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL 4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL 4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL 4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL 4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL 5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter
8.7)
“Objectives
EAL 5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL 5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL 5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL 5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL 6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL 6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL 6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL 7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL 7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL 7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
36 / 40
BSI-DSZ-CC-0901-2015 Certification Report
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL 1 EAL 2 EAL 3 EAL 4 EAL 5 EAL 6 EAL 7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
37 / 40
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0901-2015
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
“Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
38 / 40
BSI-DSZ-CC-0901-2015 Certification Report
D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
39 / 40
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0901-2015
This page is intentionally left blank.
40 / 40