National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
LG Electronics Inc.
20 Yoido-dong, Youngdungpogu, Seoul 152-721, Korea
LG Electronics Inc. G3 Smartphone
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID10593-2014
Dated: November 14, 2014
Version: 0.2
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
®
TM
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Luke Florer
Meredith Hennan
Jerry Myers
Ken Stutterheim
Aerospace Corporation
Sheldon Durrant
MITRE Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
James Arnold
Tammy Compton
Christopher Keenan
Khai Van
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Catonsville, MD
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 1
2 Identification............................................................................................................... 1
3 Architectural Information ........................................................................................... 3
3.1 TOE Evaluated Configuration ............................................................................ 3
3.2 Physical Boundaries............................................................................................ 3
4 Security Policy............................................................................................................ 4
4.1 Cryptographic support ........................................................................................ 4
4.2 User data protection............................................................................................ 4
4.3 Identification and authentication......................................................................... 4
4.4 Security management.......................................................................................... 5
4.5 Protection of the TSF.......................................................................................... 5
4.6 TOE access.......................................................................................................... 5
4.7 Trusted path/channels ......................................................................................... 5
5 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope..................................................................... 5
6 Documentation............................................................................................................ 6
7 IT Product Testing ...................................................................................................... 6
7.1 Developer Testing............................................................................................... 7
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ............................................................... 7
8 Evaluated Configuration............................................................................................. 7
9 Results of the Evaluation ............................................................................................ 7
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)............................................................ 8
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV).............................................................. 8
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)................................................. 8
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)..................................... 8
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ................. 9
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)......................................................... 9
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results.......................................................................... 9
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations .................................................................... 9
11 Annexes....................................................................................................................... 9
12 Security Target............................................................................................................ 9
13 Glossary .................................................................................................................... 10
14 Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 10
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of LG G3 Smartphone solution provided by LG
Electronics Inc. It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance
results. This Validation Report is not an endorsement of the Target of Evaluation by any
agency of the U.S. government, and no warranty is either expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Catonsville, MD, United States of America, and
was completed in October 2014. The information in this report is largely derived from the
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer
Security Solutions. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria
Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements of EAL 1.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the LG G3 Smartphone device.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for
IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 4) for conformance to the Common Criteria for
IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 4). This Validation Report applies only to the
specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in
accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation
Scheme and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are
consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that
the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in
the Security Target (ST). Therefore the validation team concludes that the testing
laboratory’s findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results
are correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are
consistent with the evidence produced.
The Gossamer Security Solutions evaluation team concluded that the Common Criteria
requirements for Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 1.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the LG Electronics Inc.
G3 Smartphone (MDFPP11) Security Target and analysis performed by the Validation
Team.
2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories, called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs), using the Common
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Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory
Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation.
Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated
Products List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as
evaluated.
• The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE: LG Electronics Inc. G3 Smartphone
Protection Profile Protection Profile For Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 1.1, 12 February
2014
ST: LG Electronics Inc. G3 Smartphone (MDFPP11) Security Target, Version 1.0,
November 13, 2014
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for LG Electronics Inc. G3 Smartphone (MDFPP11),
Version 1.1, November 4, 2014
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 4
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Sponsor LG Electronics Inc.
Developer LG Electronics Inc.
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
CCEVS Validators Luke Florer, The Aerospace Corporation
Meredith Hennan, The Aerospace Corporation
Jerry Myers, The Aerospace Corporation
Ken Stutterheim, The Aerospace Corporation
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Item Identifier
Sheldon Durrant, The MITRE Corporation
3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
The TOE is a mobile device designed to support enterprises and individual users alike.
Based upon Android 4.4 and improved by LG, the TOE provides wireless connectivity and
provides an execution environment for mobile applications
The TOE provides an Application Programming Interface to mobile applications and
provides users installing an application to either approve or reject an application based
upon the API access that the application requires.
The TOE also provides users with the ability to protect Data-At-Rest with AES encryption,
including all user and mobile application data stored in the user’s data partition. The TOE
affords special protection to all user and application cryptographic keys stored in the TOE.
Moreover, the TOE provides users the ability to AES encrypt data and files stored on an
SD Card inserted into the device.
Finally, the TOE interacts with a Mobile Device Management to allow enterprise control of
the configuration and operation of the device so as to ensure adherence to enterprise-wide
policies.
3.1 TOE Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration for the LG G3 Smartphone contains 32GB of internal Flash
storage and 3GB of memory and comes in the following different carrier versions.
• LG G3 D850 (AT&T)
• LG G3 VS985 (Verizon)
• LG G3 LS990 (Sprint)
• LG G3 D851 (T-Mobile).
The Security software version is MDF v1.1 Release 1.
3.2 Physical Boundaries
The TOE’s physical boundary is the physical perimeter of its enclosure (without the rear
access cover present, so that one can access and replace the device’s battery, SIM, and SD
Card).
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4 Security Policy
This section summarizes the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Cryptographic support
2. User data protection
3. Identification and authentication
4. Security Management
5. Protection of the TSF
6. TOE access
7. Trusted path/channels
4.1 Cryptographic support
The TOE includes cryptographic modules with FIPS certified algorithms for a wide range
of cryptographic functions including: asymmetric key generation and establishment,
symmetric key generation, encryption/decryption, cryptographic hashing and keyed-hash
message authentication. These functions are supported with suitable random bit generation,
key derivation, salt generation, initialization vector generation, secure key storage, and key
and protected data destruction. These primitive cryptographic functions are used to
implement security protocols such as TLS and HTTPS and also to encrypt Data-At-Rest
(including the generation and protection of data, right, and key encryption keys) used by
the TOE. Many of these cryptographic functions are also accessible as services to
applications running on the TOE.
4.2 User data protection
The TOE is designed to control access to system services by hosted applications, including
protection of the Trust Anchor Database. Additionally, the TOE is designed to protect user
and other sensitive data using encryption so that even if a device is physically lost, the data
remains protected.
4.3 Identification and authentication
The TOE supports a number of features related to identification and authentication. From a
user perspective, except for making phone calls to an emergency number, a password (i.e.,
Password Authentication Factor) must be correctly entered to unlock the TOE. Also, even
when the TOE is unlocked the password must be re-entered to change the password.
Passwords are obscured when entered so they cannot be read from the TOE's display, and
the frequency of entering passwords is limited. When a configured number of failures
occurs, the TOE will be wiped to protect its contents. Passwords can be constructed using
upper- and lower-case characters, numbers, and special characters, and passwords up to 16
characters are supported.
The TOE can also serve as an IEEE 802.1X supplicant and can use X509v3 and validate
certificates for EAP-TLS, TLS, and HTTPS exchanges.
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4.4 Security management
The TOE provides all the interfaces necessary to manage the security functions identified
throughout this Security Target as well as other functions commonly found in mobile
devices. Many of the available functions are available to users of the TOE, while many are
restricted to administrators operating through a Mobile Device Management solution once
the TOE has been enrolled. Once the TOE has been enrolled and then un-enrolled, it
performs a full wipe of protected data.
4.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements a number of features designed to protect itself to ensure the
reliability and integrity of its security features. It protects particularly sensitive data, such
as cryptographic keys, so that they are not accessible or exportable. It also provides its own
timing mechanism to ensure that reliable time information is available (e.g., for log
accountability). It enforces read, write, and execute memory page protections, uses address
space layout randomization, and stack-based buffer overflow protections to minimize the
potential to exploit application flaws. It is also designed to protect itself from modification
by applications as well as to isolate the address spaces of applications from one another to
protect those applications.
The TOE includes functions to perform self-tests and software/firmware integrity checking
so that it might detect when it is failing or may be corrupt. If any of the self-tests fail, the
TOE will not go into an operational mode. It also includes mechanisms (i.e., verification of
the digital signature of each new image) so that the TOE itself can be updated while
ensuring that the updates will not introduce malicious or other unexpected changes in the
TOE. Digital signature checking also extends to verifying applications prior to their
installation.
4.6 TOE access
The TOE can be locked, obscuring its display, by the user or after a configured interval of
inactivity. The TOE also has the capability to display an advisory message (banner) when
users unlock the TOE for use. The TOE is also able to attempt to connect to wireless
networks as configured.
4.7 Trusted path/channels
The TOE supports the use of IEEE 802.11-2012, IEEE 802.1X, and EAP-TLS to secure
communications channels between itself and other trusted network devices.
5 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the
Protection Profile For Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 1.1, 12 February 2014
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(MDFPP). That information has not been reproduced here and the MDFPP should be
consulted if there is interest in that material.
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
MDFPP as described for this TOE in the Security Target. Other functionality included in
the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other functionality provided by
the devices needs to be assessed separately and no further conclusions can be drawn about
their effectiveness.
6 Documentation
The following documentation was used as evidence for the evaluation of the LG G3
Smartphone:
• LG Electronics Inc. G3 Administrator Guidance, version 1.0, October 30, 2014
Any additional customer documentation delivered with the product or available through
download was not included in the scope of the evaluation and hence should not be relied
upon when using the products as evaluated.
7 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is
derived from information contained in the Detailed Test Report for LG G3 Smartphone
(MDFPP11), Version 1.1, November 4, 2014, which is not publically available. Please
refer to the Assurance Activity Report for LG G3 Smartphone (MDFPP 11) Version 0.3
November 4, 2014 for an overview of the prescribed testing activities.
The following diagrams depict the test environments used by the evaluators.
Figure 1 Developer Test Setup
Windows Ubuntu
Linux
LG G3
USB Connection
Network – Putty
Connections
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7.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according the LG Electronics Inc. G3
Administrator Guidance, version 1.0, October 30, 2014 document and ran the tests
specified in the MDFPP.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration consists of the LG G3 Smartphone devices configured as
specified in LG Electronics Inc. G3 Administrator Guidance, version 1.0, October 30,
2014.
9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The evaluation activities included performance
of all EAL1 work units with a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to
the corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon
CC version 3.1 rev 4 and CEM version 3.1 rev 4. The evaluation determined the Product
Name TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to meet the Part 3 Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL
1).
Figure 2 Evaluator Test Setup
Linux
RADIUS
Backtrack
Wireshark
Linux
Windows
Network – Putty
Connection
USB Connection
USB Connection
LG G3
LG G3
Evaluator Sniffing Configuration
Evaluator Direct Connect Configuration
Access Point
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9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement
of security requirements claimed to be met by the LG G3 Smartphone product that are
consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security function descriptions that
support the requirements.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team
assessed the design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the
TSF provides the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional
specification contained in the Security target and Guidance documents. Additionally the
evaluator performed the assurance activities specified in the MDFPP related to the
examination of the information contained in the TSS.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team
ensured the adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE.
Additionally, the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in
describing how to securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the
design and testing phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found
that the TOE was identified.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
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9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran
the set of tests specified by the assurance activities in the MDFPP and recorded the results
in a Test Report, summarized in the Assurance Activities Report.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 AVA CEM work unit. The evaluation team
performed a public search for vulnerabilities and did not discover any public issues with
the TOE.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims
in the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the
accuracy of the claims in the ST.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The evaluated configuration requires that software updates to the TOE be restricted to
FOTA. The evaluators were unable to directly exercise this mechanism since it would have
involved placing invalid updates on the live public servers that are currently in use by
present customers. Hence, the evaluators had to take the products out of the evaluated
configuration to test the update features.
11 Annexes
Not applicable
12 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as LG Electronics Inc. G3 Smartphone (MDFPP11)
Security Target, Version 1.0, November 13, 2014.
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13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
• Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
• Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims
made are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common
Criteria using the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is
complete, consistent, technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of
requirements for one or more TOEs that may be evaluated.
• Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor
or developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
• Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or
an IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
• Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the
issue of a Common Criteria certificate.
• Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2102.
[4] Protection Profile For Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 1.1, 12 February
2014.
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[5] Assurance Activity Report for LG G3 Smartphone (MDFPP), Version 0.4,
November 13, 2014