BSI-DSZ-CC-0903-2015
for
z/VM Version 6, Release 3
from
IBM Corporation
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.1
BSI-DSZ-CC-0903-2015
Operating System
z/VM Version 6
Release 3
from IBM Corporation
PP Conformance: Operating System Protection Profile, Version 2.0,
01 June 2010, BSI-CC-PP-0067-2010,
OSPP Extended Package – Labeled Security,
Version 2.0, 28 May 2010,
OSPP Extended Package – Virtualization, Version
2.0, 28 May 2010
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.3
Valid Until: 29.03.2020
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and
CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence
adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
Bonn, 30 March 2015
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0903-2015
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0903-2015 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0903-2015
Contents
A. Certification........................................................................................................................7
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2. Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4. Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9
5. Publication....................................................................................................................10
B. Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1. Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2. Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................14
3. Security Policy..............................................................................................................15
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................16
5. Architectural Information...............................................................................................16
6. Documentation.............................................................................................................18
7. IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................18
8. Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................22
9. Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................22
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................25
11. Security Target............................................................................................................25
12. Definitions...................................................................................................................26
13. Bibliography................................................................................................................28
C. Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................29
CC Part 1:........................................................................................................................29
CC Part 3:........................................................................................................................30
D. Annexes...........................................................................................................................37
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0903-2015 Certification Report
A. Certification
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security2
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Technical information on the IT security certification, Procedural
Description (BSI 7138) [3]
● BSI certification: Requirements regarding the Evaluation Facility (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045.
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1. European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0903-2015
"Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices
with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too. This Domain is linked to
a conformance claim to one of the related SOGIS Recommended Protection Profiles. In
addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
As of September 2011 the new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of
Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and
the United Kingdom. Details on recognition and the history of the agreement can be found
at https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
2.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or the
assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and certificates for Protection Profiles and
for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The CCRA-2014 replaces the old CCRA signed in May 2000 (CCRA-2000). Certificates
based on CCRA-2000, issued before 08 September 2014 are still under recognition
according to the rules of CCRA-2000. For on 08 September 2014 ongoing certification
procedures and for Assurance Continuity (maintenance and re-certification) of old
certificates a transition period on the recognition of certificates according to the rules of
CCRA-2000 (i.e. assurance components up to and including EAL 4 or the assurance
family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR)) is defined until 08 September 2017.
As of September 2014 the signatories of the new CCRA are government representatives
from the following nations: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, The Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey,
United Kingdom, and the United States.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
As this certificate is a re-certification of a certificate issued according to CCRA-2000 this
certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2000, i.e. for all assurance
components selected.
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0903-2015 Certification Report
The product z/VM Version 6, Release 3 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0752-2013. Specific results from the
evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0752-2013 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product z/VM Version 6, Release 3 was conducted by atsec
information security GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 15 January 2015. atsec
information security GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification
body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: IBM Corporation.
The product was developed by: IBM Corporation.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods require
a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited as outlined on the certificate.
The owner of the certificate is obliged
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report and the
Security Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any
applicant of the product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0903-2015
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the product's evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and
production sites or processes, occur or the confidentiality of documentation and
information related to the product or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the product or resulting from
the evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the product
deliverables according to the Certification Report part B chapter 2 to third parties,
permission of the Certification Body at BSI has to be obtained.
4. to provide latest at of half of the certificate's validity period unsolicitedly and at his
own expense current qualified evidence to the Certification Body at BSI that
demonstrates that the requirements as outlined in the Security Target are up-to-date
and remain valid in view of the respective status of technology. In general, this
evidence is provided in the form of a re-assessment report according to the rules of
the BSI Certification Scheme.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5. Publication
The product z/VM Version 6, Release 3 has been included in the BSI list of certified
products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]).
Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
IBM Corporation
Dept G32, Bldg 256-3
Endicott NY
USA
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0903-2015 Certification Report
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0903-2015
1. Executive Summary
The TOE is z/VM Version 6, Release 3 clustered as up to four cooperating instances of
z/VM within a Single System Image (SSI).
z/VM is a scalable virtual machine hypervisor for IBM System z® mainframe servers onto
which to deploy mission-critical virtual servers. A single System z server can host one
z/VM instance per logical partition (LPAR), and each instance of z/VM can host tens to
hundreds of virtual servers. Multiple instances of z/VM can be connected to form a
networked system called a "collection". The communication aspects within z/VM used for
these connections are also part of the evaluation. External communication links can be
protected against loss of confidentiality and integrity by cryptographic protection
mechanisms not part of the TOE.
z/VM offers multi-system clustering technology allowing between one and four z/VM
instances in a SSI cluster. New instances of z/VM can be added to the cluster topology at
runtime. Support for live guest relocation (LGR) allows the movement of Linux virtual
servers without disruption to the operation. The z/VM systems are aware of each other and
can take advantage of their combined resources. LGR enables clients to avoid loss of
service due to planned outages by relocating guests from a system requiring maintenance
to a system that remains active during the maintenance period.
Due to the functionality of performing identification and authentication of users,
implementation of DAC and MAC, providing management facilities for all security-related
functions and the fact that support functionality is hosted in different virtual machines,
z/VM also resembles an operating system. Therefore, the Operating System Protection
Profile ([7]) is used as a basis for the ST. z/VM meets all of the requirements of the
Operating System Protection Profile base, as well as its extended packages for labeled
security and virtualization.
z/VM provides identification and authentication of users using different authentication
mechanisms, both discretionary and mandatory access control to a large number of
different objects, separation of virtual machines, a configurable audit functionality,
sophisticated security management functions, preparation of objects for reuse and
functionality used internally to protect z/VM from interference and tampering by untrusted
users or subjects.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Operating System Protection Profile, Version 2.0, 01 June 2010,
BSI-CC-PP-0067-2010, OSPP Extended Package – Labeled Security, Version 2.0, 28 May
2010, OSPP Extended Package – Virtualization, Version 2.0, 28 May 2010 [7].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ALC_FLR.3.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6.2. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some
of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0903-2015 Certification Report
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
Identification and Authentication The TOE provides identification and authentication of users by
the means of an alphanumeric user ID and a system-encrypted
password.
Discretionary Access Control (DAC) For implementation of extended DAC rules, the TOE
component RACF provides the capability and flexibility as
required by the evaluation compared to the usage of the
system. Basically, a user's authority to access a resource while
operating in a RACF-protected system at any time is
determined by a combination of several factors.
Mandatory Access Control (MAC)
and Support for Security Labels
In addition to DAC, the TOE provides Mandatory Access
Control (MAC), which imposes access restrictions to
information based on security classification.
Separation of virtual machines Operating system failures that occur in virtual machines cannot
affect the TOE running on the real processor.
Auditing The TOE provides an audit capability that allows generating
audit records for security critical events.
Object Reuse The TOE provides a facility clearing protected objects and
storage previously used by virtual machines or the TOE itself
prior to reassignment to other virtual machines or the TOE.
Security Management The TOE provides a set of commands and options to
adequately manage the security functions of the TOE.
TSF Protection The TOE control program enforces integrity of its own domain.
No virtual machine can access TOE resources without
appropriate authorization.
SSI clustering The SSI clustering mechanism integrates different z/VM
systems into one cluster in order to share different resources.
The SSI cluster communication ensures serialization of
concurrent access to shared resources, if needed.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 1.5.3 and 7.1.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8 of this
report.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
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2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
z/VM Version 6, Release 3
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of
Delivery
1 SW z/VM Version 6 Release 3, program number 5741-A07 V6R3 Tape/DVD
2 DOC Program Directory for z/VM V6R3 base GI13-3401-00 Hard copy
3 DOC Program Directory for RACF function level 630 GI13-3407-00 Hard copy
4 DOC Guide for Automated Installation and Service GC24-6246-02 Hard copy
5 DOC z/VM 6.3 Certified Product Guidance
sha256-Checksum:
71f38401dfeaf31605c35b62c508edd971c4ec6887f0e174f86e7c337d61dffb
ZVM630-CC-Guidance.zip
n/a Download
6 DOC z/VM V6R3 Secure Configuration Guide
sha256-Checksum:
6b4bef80a903fc522b67c403f07415b65a1f86e35f7ed18299217327af620e0a
zVM 630 Secure Configuration Guide.pdf
SC24-6230-05 Download
7 SW PTF UM34279 for APAR VM65474 containing RSU2 and
other service to z/VM 6.3 provided by APAR VM65473 to be
obtained electronically from ShopzSeries
https://www.ibm.com/software/shopzseries
n/a Electronic
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
All hard copy guidance documents are packaged and securely shipped with the installation
media via registered courier to the customer.
To install and configure the TOE such that it matches the evaluated configuration as
described in the Security Target, the user has to follow the guidance provided in
• z/VM V6R3.0 Secure Configuration Guide (SC24-6230-05)
listed as item 6 above.
The Secure Configuration Guide contains references to other relevant guidance
documentation contained in item 5, i.e. z/VM 6.3 Certified Product Guidance. Both the
Secure Configuration Guide and the Certified Product Guidance are available from a
secured IBM ResourceLink:
https://www.ibm.com/servers/resourcelink/lib03060.nsf/pages/zVM63SecureConfigurationGuide
2.1. Overview of Delivery Procedure
Customers with IBM customer ID may use the ShopzSeries web portal
(www.ibm.com/software/shopzseries) to file an order of the TOE or may contact an IBM
sales representative for support.
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Orders for z/VM are processed by an Production Center. The z/VM image ordered is
duplicated to an appropriate media set of the type ordered by the customer (i.e., tapes or
DVD), which is then packed in a card-box and shrink wrapped. The final package is then
delivered to the customer via a courier service together with a contents list.
The whole process starting at the preparation and labeling of the media until finally
delivering the shrink wrapped package to the customer is under supervision of a control
system making use of bar code identification for all parts of an order throughout the
complete process. The bar code enables unambiguous association of the media and the
additional documentation to a specific order number and, hence, to the customer who filed
that respective order.
Once the package arrived at the customer's site, the customer is able to verify that the
delivery matches their order by reviewing the contents list provided as part of the delivery
and by cross checking the part numbers labeled on the delivered media.
2.2. Identification of the TOE by the User
During the order process for the TOE, the customer needs to explicitly order the
CC-certified version of z/VM Version 6 Release 3. This already ensures that the product
delivered to the customer actually is the TOE containing all required components. The
administrator is also able to verify the version of the TOE by issuing the command
QUERY CPLEVEL
which will result in displaying the version string
z/VM Version 6 Release 3.0, service level 1302 (64bit)
In addition, the administrator is asked verify the list of installed PTFs against the list of
PTFs required as stated in the ST. In oder to do so, the administrator may issue the
commands
VMFSIM QUERY 6VMCPR30 SVRAPPS * TDATA :PTF
VMFSIM QUERY 6VMRAC30 SVRAPPS * TDATA :PTF
VMFSIM QUERY 6VMTCP30 SVRAPPS * TDATA :PTF
and should be able verify the presence of the following PTFs in the output received.
For CP:
UM33998 UM34002 UM34003 UM34004 UM34005 UM34010 UM34035 UM34036
UM34042 UM34044 UM34046 UM34055 UM34058 UM34062 UM34244 UM34278
For TCPIP:
UK95491 UK96279 UK98378 UQRSU01
For RACF, no PTFs should be reported.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
● Identification and authentication
● Discretionary access control
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● Mandatory access control and support for security labels in Labeled Security Mode
● Separation of virtual machines
● Audit
● Object reuse functionality
● Security management
● TSF protection
● SSI clustering
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics
are of relevance: Competent and trustworthy administrators, trusted remote IT systems,
correct configuration and setup of system, system maintenance, trusted physical
environment, secure recovery mechanisms. Details can be found in the Security Target
[6], chapter 4.2.
5. Architectural Information
5.1. General Overview
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the z/VM hypervisor product that is part of an SSI cluster
formed by one or more z/VM instances with the software components.
z/VM is an operating system designed to host other operating systems, each in its own
virtual machine. Multiple virtual machines can run concurrently to perform a variety of
functions requiring controlled, separated access to the information stored on the system.
The TOE provides a virtual machine for each logged in user, separating the execution
domain of each user from other users as defined in the virtual machine definitions stored in
the system directory. In addition, the system directory contains access control information
for privileged functions, such as use of certain options of the processor's DIAGNOSE
instruction. In addition to the system directory, the RACF security server is employed to
mediate access to resources and privileged functions.
The TOE is seen as one instance of an z/VM SSI cluster comprising of one through four
individual z/VM systems. These individual z/VM systems each execute on an abstract
machine as the sole operating system on the level of the abstract machine and exercising
full control over this abstract machine regardless which software runs inside of virtual
machines. These abstract machines are provided by logical partitions (LPAR) of IBM
System z servers.
The LPARs themselves are not part of the TOE, but belong to the TOE environment. It is to
be noted that although a z/VM instance can be run within a z/VM instance, the evaluated
configuration is restricted to one z/VM instance running directly within an LPAR. A z/VM
instance running within a virtual machine is allowed, but such "second level" z/VM
instances are not part of the evaluated configuration.
The z/VM Single System Image feature (SSI) enables up to four z/VM systems to be
configured as members of an SSI cluster, sharing different resources.
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Members of the SSI cluster can be on the same or separate hardware systems. SSI
enables the members of the cluster to be managed as one system, which allows service to
be applied to each member of the cluster, avoiding an outage to the entire cluster. SSI also
introduces the concept of live guest relocation (LGR) where a running Linux guest
operating system can be relocated from one member in an SSI cluster to another without
the need to stop the running Linux guest.
All z/VM member instances of one SSI cluster share the RACF database, but they do not
share the RACF audit disks. Each z/VM member instance must execute its own instance
of RACF accessing the shared RACF database. The sharing of the RACF database is
done by sharing the DASD (direct access storage device) volume keeping the RACF
database between the different SSI z/VM member instances.
Different instances of the TOE may also share the RACF database. The sharing is
implemented similarly to the sharing of the RACF database within the SSI cluster.
The platforms selected for the evaluation consist of IBM products, which are available
when the evaluation has been completed and will remain available for some period of time
afterwards. Even if withdrawn from general marketing, the product may be obtained by
special request to IBM. The TOE security functions (TSF) are provided by the z/VM
operating system kernel (called the Control Program – CP) and by an application called
RACF that runs within a specially-privileged virtual machine. In addition to providing user
authentication, access control, and audit services to CP, RACF can provide the same
services to other authorized virtual machines. z/VM provides management functions that
allow configuring the TSF and tailor them to the customer's needs.
Some elements have been included in the TOE which do not provide security functions,
but run in authorized mode and could therefore, if misbehaved, compromise the TOE.
Since these elements are substantial for the operation of many customer environments,
they are included as trusted applications within the TOE.
In its evaluated configuration, the TOE allows two modes of operation: a standard mode
meeting all requirements of the Operating System Protection Profile base [7] and its
extended package for Virtualization, and a more restrictive mode called Labeled Security
Mode, which additionally meets all requirements of the OSPP extended package for
Labeled Security.
In both modes, the same software elements are used. The two modes have different
RACF settings with respect to the use of security labels. All other configuration parameters
are identical in the two modes.
5.2. Major structural components of the TOE
The TOE consists of up to four z/VM instances each defined by three major components,
i.e. the z/VM Control Program, the Security Manager RACF, and the TCP/IP component,
with RACF and TCP/IP running within specific virtual machines maintained by CP.
The z/VM Control Program (CP) is primarily a real-machine resource manager. CP
provides each user with an individual working environment known as a virtual machine.
Each virtual machine is a functional equivalent of a real system, sharing the real processor
instructions and its functionality, storage, console, and input/output (I/O) device resources.
CP provides connectivity support that allows application programs running within virtual
machines to exchange information with each other and to access resources residing on
the same z/VM system or on different z/VM systems.
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In order to create and maintain these rules (virtual machine definitions), additional
management software is employed, that runs outside the CP, but is part of the TOE.
Hence, each component of the management software runs within a virtual machine. The
following list illustrates, which functionality runs within virtual machines:
● CMS: a single-user general-purpose operating system that is employed to run the RACF
and TCP/IP applications. CMS does not provide any security functionality but
implements a file system that can be used by applications running on top.
● RACF server: provides authentication, authorization, and audit services to CP and other
authorized virtual machines that run applications on CMS. It runs within a virtual
machine maintained by CP and communicates with CP through a tightly-controlled
well-defined interface.
● TCP/IP server: provides traditional IP-based communications services. For TLS
encrypted communication, it interacts with the SSL server, which is seen as a
subcomponent of the TCP/IP component rather than an additional part of the TOE. Both
the TCP/IP server and the SSL server are not part of CP, but each run within a
respective virtual machine maintained by CP.
Embedded within the TCP/IP stack is the TELNET service that enables users to access
their virtual machine consoles ("log on") from the IP network. In particular, this TELNET
Service receives console traffic from the network, removes the telnet or TN3270 protocol
wrappers, and then forwards it to CP using a special form of the DIAGNOSE processor
instruction. CP generates a virtual console session as a memory object. All outgoing
information is sent from the CP back to the TELNET Service, which encapsulates the
information in the Telnet or TN3270E protocol and sends it back to the client. The TCP/IP
server also provides TLS services allowing the establishment of a cryptographically
secured channel to access a CP console.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
7.1. Test Configuration
Developer as well as the independent evaluator testing was performed on the same
configuration, i.e. on systems GDLMCCC and GDLPCCC each running within a logical
partition. The logical partitions were provided by certified versions of PR/SM on an IBM
System z10 Enterprise Class server and an IBM zEnterprise EC12 server, respectively.
The test systems - for both the developer and the evaluator test sessions - had installed
the TOE in its evaluated configuration as required by the Secure Configuration Guide [10].
This was confirmed by the evaluator analysing developer evidence generated and running
respective checks on his own.
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7.2. Developer Testing
The following functional testing was performed by the developer:
TOE test configuration:
The tests were performed on system GDLMCCC as one of the configured SSI cluster
members running within a logical partition of a System z10 High End server. Test related to
the SSI feature also involved system GDLPCCC as a second cluster member configured
and running within a logical partition of a IBM zEnterprise EC12 server.
The test systems each had installed the z/VM Version 6 Release 3 with SSI feature
enabled. The evaluator verified that all required RSU and PTF as stated in section 1.5.4.1
of the ST [6] were installed on the machines.
The TOE had been in its evaluated configuration when the developer tests were
performed.
The limitation of tests performed to the test systems identified above was accepted,
because the system configuration was considered to be representative for all allowed
configurations. The TOE relies on an underlying abstract machine that is compliant with
the z/Architecture definition. Extensive testing of the underlying hardware was performed
by IBM on all processor configurations (including the chosen one) to verify full
z/Architecture compliance of the abstract machine provided to the TOE.
Testing approach:
The developer designed a specific CC related test suite that contains various test
scenarios covering the security functions provided by the TOE.
The tests performed by the developer directly stimulate the following subset of TSFIs
identified in the Functional Specification:
● CP commands
● RACF commands
● API
● RACF Report Writer
● TELNET Server
and observe the resulting behaviour.
The following TSFI are tested indirectly by the tests performed and the required test setup:
● System Directory
● System Configuration
● TCP/IP configuration files and commands
● IUCV
All but two test cases are automated, i.e. after executing a script file, a significant amount
of single tests are executed. Proper verification whether the actual test results match the
expected results is already included in the respective test cases. The manual test cases
related to the RACF Report Writer and the certificate based authentication implemented by
the SSL Server contain sufficiently detailed information for the tester to decide on whether
the actual test results obtained match the expected results.
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IBM usually performs a significant amount of SAK testing verifying that the interface
provided towards the virtual machines managed by the TOE is compliant with the
z/Architecture definition. Those SAK tests, however, are to be considered negative tests,
since they cannot actually prove compliance with z/Architecture but due to extensively
issuing random processor instruction streams over a significant amount of time without
ending up in any system errors, sufficient confidence of proper z/Architecture
implementation is built up. Note that for the current evaluation no SAK tests at the level of
z/VM were deemed necessary by the developer as there have not been any changes to
the z/Architecture since the previous evaluation. However, SAK tests have been actually
performed at the level of the underlying PR/SM for the hardware platforms supported by
z/VM and did not reveal any deviations as verified as part of the respective PR/SM
evaluations performed.
The developer testing was performed to the depth of the TOE design at subsystem level,
i.e. the developer test-depth analysis demonstrated that the TOE subsystems CP, RACF,
and TCPIP have been subject to test cases exercising the TSFI and the TSF implemented
by those components.
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Testing results:
The test evidence provided by the developer and examined by the evaluator demonstrates
that all but one test case were successful, i.e. the TOE behaviour observed during the
tests matched the expected behaviour.
For test cases related to one specific TSFI deviations from the expected behaviour were
identified, which resulted in opening a respective bugfix record. A profound analysis of the
error performed by the developer resulted in the determination that the observed
deviations do not present a security/integrity issue, i.e. no security mechanisms of the TOE
were bypassed or disabled and no vulnerability is introduced. The evaluator was able to
verify that corrective actions to address the failure have been initiated already.
7.3. Evaluator Testing Effort
The evaluator repeated a randomly chosen subset of the developer tests for each of the
test case groups "CP commands", "RACF commands", and "DIAGNOSE".
In addition, the evaluator devised independent test cases to cover the TSFI that are not
explicitly but only implicitly triggered by the developer tests repeated. The independent
evaluator test cases directly trigger the TELNET Server, the TCP/IP configuration files and
commands, the System Directory, and RACF and CP commands. The evaluator covered
all TSFI except the API comprising the z/Architecture instructions and the RACF Report
Writer by independent test cases, with those not explicitly listed above triggered indirectly.
Verdict for the activity:
The overall judgement on the results of evaluator testing during the evaluation is the
following:
● all but a total of five developer tests re-performed passed, i.e. the actual results
achieved by the evaluator matched the expected results. For each of the failing test
cases, the developer provided a rationale on why the tests returned results that deviate
from the expected output. While one test case failed due to an obvious but non-critical
configuration issue, the others actually demonstrated correct behaviour of the command
tested but reported failure due to errors in the test procedures that misinterpreted the
output received. For those, corrective actions to properly update the test procedures
have been already initiated.
● all test cases devised by the evaluator passed, i.e. the actual test results matched the
expected results.
By using developer tests as base for independent testing, the evaluator achieved the same
test depth as the developer when repeating a subset of the developer tests. Therefore, the
tests performed by the evaluator were at the level of the subsystems of the TOE design.
There were no failed tests that were caused by TOE behaviour different from the expected
behaviour or violating requirements stated in ST.
7.4. Evaluator Penetration Testing
The evaluator consulted public domain information in order to identify vulnerabilities that
would require performing penetration testing, but found no such vulnerabilities.
As for the penetration testing based on the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis
the evaluator devised a total of two penetration test cases. Whereas one of the test cases
was intended to identify additional interfaces potentially bearing weaknesses, the second
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test case was intended to explicitly probe for weaknesses of the TELNET server interface.
All tests were performed at the depth of the subsystems of the TOE design exercising the
TCPIP subsystem of the TOE.
8. Evaluated Configuration
The Target of Evaluation is z/VM Version 6 Release 3. The TOE is software only and is
accompanied by guidance documentation. The items listed in table 2 of this report
represent the TOE.
The TOE is defined by an SSI cluster of up to four cooperating instances of the z/VM
product each running on an abstract machine as the sole operating system on the level of
the abstract machine and exercising full control over that abstract machine regardless
which software runs inside of virtual machines. The abstract machines are provided by a
logical partition (LPAR) of IBM System z servers. Sharing of the RACF database between
z/VM and z/OS is technically feasible, it is explicitly excluded from this evaluation.
z/VM executes on an abstract machine as the sole operating system and exercising full
control over this abstract machine. This abstract machine can be provided by one of the
following: a logical partition provided by a certified version of PR/SM on an IBM System z
processor:
● IBM System z10 Business Class with CP Assist for Cryptographic Functions (CPACF)
DES/TDES Enablement Feature 3863 active
● IBM System z10 Enterprise Class with CPACF DES/TDES Enablement Feature 3863
active
● IBM zEnterprise 114 with CPACF DES/TDES Enablement Feature 3863 active
● IBM zEnterprise 196 with CPACF DES/TDES Enablement Feature 3863 active
● IBM zEnterprise EC12 with CPACF DES/TDES Enablement Feature 3863 active
The LPARs themselves are not part of the TOE, but belong to the TOE environment. It is to
be noted that although a z/VM instance technically can be run within a z/VM instance, the
evaluated configuration is restricted to z/VM instances running directly within an LPAR. A
z/VM instance running within a virtual machine is allowed, but such "second level" z/VM
instances are not part of the evaluated configuration.
The evaluated configuration of the TOE is additionally defined by the configuration
requirements to be met as stated in the Secure Configuration Guide [10]. The ST [6] in
section 1.5.4.3 redirects readers to this document, which is part of the deliverables as
listed in table 2.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [8] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5. For
RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20 was used (see [4]).
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As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_FLR.3 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a
re-evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0752-2013, re-use of specific
evaluation tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on:
● TOE functionality with respect to subsystem CP was enhanced by implementation of the
Single System Image (SSI) feature including Life Guest Relocation (LGR) capability.
● TOE functionality with respect to subsystem TCPIP was modified to support TLS v1.2.
● TOE functionality with respect to subsystem RACF was modified to support a common
security context within the SSI cluster by sharing the RACF database.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance:
Operating System Protection Profile, Version 2.0, 01 June 2010,
BSI-CC-PP-0067-2010,
OSPP Extended Package – Labeled Security, Version 2.0, 28 May 2010,
OSPP Extended Package – Virtualization, Version 2.0, 28 May 2010 [7]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.3
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But Cryptographic Functionalities with
a security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 100 Bits'
of the following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general
context).
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Security
Level
above 100
Bits
Comments
1 Authenticity RSA signature
verification
(RSASSA-PKCS1-v1-5)
using SHA-1
[RFC3447]
(PKCS#1 v2.1)
[FIPS180-4]
Modulus
length:
2048,
No Verification of
certificate signatures
provided for
authentication Server
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No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Security
Level
above 100
Bits
Comments
(SHA) 3072,
4096
and Client certificates
are used.
2 RSA signature
verification
(RSASSA-PKCS1-v1-5)
using SHA-256
Yes
3 DSA signature
verification using SHA-1
[FIPS186-3]
(DSA)
[FIPS-180-4]
(SHA-1)
L= 1024
N= 160
No
4 Authentication RSA signature
verification
(RSASSA-PKCS1-v1-5)
using SHA-1
[RFC3447]
(PKCS#1 v2.1)
Modulus
length:
2048,
3072,
4096
No Client signs message
with private key bind
to his certificate.
Server verifies
signature of the
message.
5 RSA signature
verification
(RSASSA-PKCS1-v1-5)
using SHA-256
Yes
6 RSA signature
verification
(RSASSA-PKCS1-v1-5)
using SHA-384
Yes
7 Key
agreement
(key transport)
RSA encryption (client)
and decryption (server)
(RSAES-PKCS1-v1-5)
[RFC3447]
(PKCS#1 v2.1)
Modulus
length:
2048,
3072,
4096
Yes Encrypted exchange
of pre-master secret
generated at client
side
8 Key
agreement
Diffie-Hellman [RFC2631] Groups with
modulus size
between
1024 bits and
2048bits
(in multipls of
64 bits)
No
9 Key derivation HMAC with SHA-256
(TLSv1.2)
[RFC2104]
(HMAC)
[FIPS180-4]
(SHA)
256 Yes Symmetric keys and
MAC keys for record
layer
10 HMAC with SHA-1
(TLSv1.2)
160 Yes
11 HMAC with SHA-1 and
MD5 (TLSv1.1)
Yes
12 Confidentiality AES in CBC mode
(AES_128_CBC,
AES_256_CBC)
[FIPS197]
(AES)
[SP800-38A]
(CBC)
|k| = 128, 256 Yes Bulk data encryption /
decryption (record
layer)
13 Three-key TDES
in CBC mode
(3DES_EDE_CBC)
[FIPS46-3]
(DES)
[SP 800-67]
(TDES/TDEA)
|k| = 168 Yes
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No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Security
Level
above 100
Bits
Comments
[SP 800-38A
(CBC)
[RFC4253]
(SSH-2 using
3DES with CBC
mode)
14 Integrity
and
authenticity
HMAC with SHA-1 or
SHA-256
[RFC2104]
(HMAC)
[FIPS180-4
(SHA)
160
(SHA-1)
256
(SHA-256)
Yes Message
authentication code
(record layer)
15 Trusted
Channel
TLSv1.2 [RFC5246] [RFC5246]
(TLSv1.2)
additionally refer
to lines 1-14
above
N/A No
16 TLSv1.1 [RFC4346] [RFC4346]
(TLSv1.1)
additionally refer
to lines 1-14
above
No
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition, all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a
re-certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
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12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
API Application Programming Interface
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CMS Conversational Monitor System
CP Control Program
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
DAC Discretionary Access Control
DASD Direct-access storage device
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
IUCV Inter User Communication Vehicle
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
LGR Live Guest Relocation
LPAR Logical Partition
MAC Mandatory Access Control
PP Protection Profile
PR/SM Processor Resource/System Manager
PTFs Product temporary fix
RACF IBM Resource Access Control Facility
RSU Recommended Service Upgrade
SAK System Assurance Kernel
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SSI Single System Image
SSL Secure Sockets Layer
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ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on
well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 4, September 2012
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 4, September 2012
[3] BSI certification: Technical information on the IT security certification of products,
protection profiles and sites (BSI 7138) and Requirements regarding the Evaluation
Facility for the Evaluation of Products, Protection Profiles and Sites under the CC
and ITSEC (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
in the BSI Website
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0903-2015, Version 1.2, Date 19 December 2014, IBM
z/VM Version 6 Release 3 Security Target, IBM Corporation
[7] Operating System Protection Profile, Version 2.0, 01 June 2010,
BSI-CC-PP-0067-2010,
OSPP Extended Package – Labeled Security, Version 2.0, 28 May 2010,
OSPP Extended Package – Virtualization, Version 2.0, 28 May 2010
[8] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 3, Date 19 December 2014, Final Evaluation
Technical Report, atsec information security GmbH, (confidential document)
[9] Configuration list for the TOE, Date 2014-04-14, Configation lists for zVM 6.3 CP,
RACF, SSI, and TCP/IP components, Filename “[ConfCode] Configlist for zVM 6.3
CP RACF TCPIP SSI Components.zip”, (confidential documents)
[10] z/VM Version 6 Release 3 Secure Configuration Guide IBM,Version SC24-6230-05
Date 2014-05-27
[11] Program Directory for z/VM Version 6 Release 3, Version GI13-3401-00, Document
Date: July 2013
[12] Program Directory for RACF Security Server for z/VM, function level 630, Version
GI13-3407-00, Date July 2013
8
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
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Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal
high-level design presentation
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
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component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL 1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL 1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL 1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that
the TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions
through security objectives.
EAL 1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL 1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL 2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL 2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL 2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL 3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL 3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
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EAL 3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL 4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL 4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL 4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL 4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL 5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter
8.7)
“Objectives
EAL 5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL 5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL 5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL 5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL 6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL 6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL 6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL 7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL 7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL 7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL 1 EAL 2 EAL 3 EAL 4 EAL 5 EAL 6 EAL 7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
“Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
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