BSI-DSZ-CC-1147-2020
for
MTCOS Pro 2.5 EAC with PACE / P71D352 (N7121)
from
MaskTech International GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.3
BSI-DSZ-CC-1147-2020 (*)
Security IC with MRTD EAC/PACE Application
MTCOS Pro 2.5 EAC with PACE / P71D352 (N7121)
from MaskTech International GmbH
PP Conformance: Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine
Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application"
Extended Access Control with PACE, Version
1.3.2, 5 December 2012, BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-
2012-MA-02
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations, by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC
and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 18 December 2020
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Sandro Amendola L.S.
Head of Division
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 only
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1147-2020
This page is intentionally left blank.
4 / 26
BSI-DSZ-CC-1147-2020 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification......................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication....................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results.......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary....................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE.............................................................................................13
3. Security Policy............................................................................................................14
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................14
5. Architectural Information.............................................................................................15
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................15
7. IT Product Testing.......................................................................................................15
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................17
9. Results of the Evaluation............................................................................................17
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................19
11. Security Target..........................................................................................................19
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)..............................................................19
13. Definitions.................................................................................................................20
14. Bibliography..............................................................................................................21
C. Excerpts from the Criteria..............................................................................................24
D. Annexes.........................................................................................................................25
5 / 26
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1147-2020
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs - Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell
zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI-
Gesetz) - dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365
6 / 26
BSI-DSZ-CC-1147-2020 Certification Report
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
7 / 26
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1147-2020
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2 components.
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product MTCOS Pro 2.5 EAC with PACE / P71D352 (N7121) has undergone the
certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-1033-2019.
Specific results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-1033-2019 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product MTCOS Pro 2.5 EAC with PACE / P71D352 (N7121) was
conducted by SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH. The evaluation was completed
on 17 December 2020. SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH is an evaluation
facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the applicant is: MaskTech International GmbH.
The product was developed by: MaskTech International GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 18
December 2020 is valid until 17 December 2025. Validity can be re-newed by re-
certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
8 / 26
BSI-DSZ-CC-1147-2020 Certification Report
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product MTCOS Pro 2.5 EAC with PACE / P71D352 (N7121) has been included in the
BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
MaskTech International GmbH
Nordostpark 45
90411 Nürnberg
9 / 26
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1147-2020
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
10 / 26
BSI-DSZ-CC-1147-2020 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the product MTCOS Pro 2.5 EAC with PACE / P71D352
(N7121) provided by MaskTech International GmbH. The TOE is an electronic travel
document representing a contactless smart card programmed according to ICAO
Technical Report “Supplemental Access Control” [13] and additionally providing the
Extended Access Control according to the ’ICAO 9303’ [14] and ’BSI TR-03110-1’ [15],
respectively. The communication between terminal and chip shall be protected by
Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) according to “Electronic
Passport using Standard Inspection Procedure with PACE” (PACE PP), BSI-CC-PP-0068-
V2 [9]. Additionally, Active Authentication according to [14] is provided.
The main security features of the TOE are:
• PACE function (mutual authentication and Secure Messaging);
• Active Authentication support function (prevention of copying the IC chip);
• Extended Access Control (chip authentication and terminal authentication protocol);
• Write protection function (protection against writing data after issuing a passport);
• Protection function in transport (protection against attacks during transport before
issuing the TOE); and
• Tamper resistance (protection against confidential information leak due to physical
attacks).
The TOE MTCOS Pro 2.5 EAC with PACE / P71D352 (N7121), which is realized by a
smartcard (for contactless usage), comprises of:
Hardware Platform:
• P71D352 (N7121) secure dual-interface controller of NXP Semiconductors
Germany GmbH (BSI-DSZ-CC-1040-2019 [16]). Chip including cryptographic library
are certified according to EAL6 augmented with ALC_FLR.1 and ASE_TSS.2
compliant to the Protection Profile BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 [11])
Software:
• IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated
Support Software
• IC Embedded Software (Operating System MTCOS Pro 2.5)
• MRTD application
Documentation:
• User Guidance – MTCOS Pro 2.5 ePassport / P71D352 (N7121) [17]
• Guidance for Initialization and Pre-personalization – MTCOS Pro 2.5 ePassport /
P71D352 (N7121) [18]
• Manual – MTCOS Pro 2.5 on P71D352 (N7121) [19]
11 / 26
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1147-2020
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application" Extended
Access Control with PACE, Version 1.3.2, 5 December 2012, BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012-
MA-02 [10].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 5
augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [7], chapter 6.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2
and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
F.IC_CL This Security Function covers the security functions of the
hardware (IC) as well as the cryptographic library.
F.Access_Control This TSF regulates all access by external entities to operations of
the TOE which are only executed after this TSF allowed access.
F.Identification_Authentication This function provides identification/authentication of user roles.
F.Management Provides management and administrative functionalities.
F.Crypto This function provides a high-level interface to cryptographic
functions.
F.Verification TOE internal functions ensure correct operation by implementing
internal hardware test routines.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [7], chapter 7.1.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [7],
chapter 3.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [7], chapter 3.2, 3.3, 3.4.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8 of this
report.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
12 / 26
BSI-DSZ-CC-1147-2020 Certification Report
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
MTCOS Pro 2.5 EAC with PACE / P71D352 (N7121)
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW/SW MTCOS Pro 2.5 EAC with PACE / P71D352 (N7121)
An IC module including the necessary basic software
(OS) and ePassport application (file system)
SW is
implemented in
NVM; chip is
initialized and
tested before
delivery to
Personalization
Agent.
Delivery type: The
OS and
application
software flashed
on the IC Platform
1. Hardware Platform
P71D352 (N7121) secure dual-interface controller of
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH (BSI-DSZ-
CC-1040-2019 [16]). Chip including cryptographic
library are certified according to CC EAL6 augmented
with ALC_FLR.1 and ASE_TSS.2 compliant to the
Protection Profile BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 [11]).
P71D352
(N7121)
Firmware: 9.2.3
Crypto Library:
0.7.6
2. TOE Embedded Software
IC Embedded Software (the operating system
MTCOS Pro 2.5, implemented in NVM of the IC)
MTCOS Pro
Version 2.5,
Build date
2020-06-02
3. TOE Embedded Applications
IC Embedded Software / Part Application Software
(containing the MRTD Application implemented in the
NVM of the IC with the file system)
MTCOS Pro
2.5 EAC with
PACE
2 DOC 1. User Guidance – MTCOS Pro 2.5 ePassport /
P71D352 (N7121), MaskTech International GmbH
Version 1.1,
12.10.2020 [17]
Password
protected Secure
Webserver
2. Guidance for Initialization and Pre-personalization
– MTCOS Pro 2.5 ePassport / P71D352 (N7121),
MaskTech International GmbH
Version 1.1,
12.10.2020 [18]
3. Manual – MTCOS Pro 2.5 on P71D352 (N7121),
MaskTech International GmbH
Version 1.0,
29.05.2020 [19]
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
Delivery of sensitive electronic data is performed PGP encrypted via email. The guidance
documentation can be obtained by password-protected download from the MaskTech
International GmbH website (http://www.masktech.com).
The flash image (HEX file) is sent by MaskTech to the chip manufacturer NXP
Semiconductors Germany GmbH via email.
The chip-card hardware is securely shipped to the Personalisation Agent for TOE
personalisation.
For the customer (personalization agent) to be able to check the correct delivery visually, a
delivery note together with the hardware stating the product type and certification
reference number is provided. Further checks can be done using the GET CHIP ID or GET
CHIP INFORMATION command. They return the chip identifier respectively additional
information about the platform, the operating system and the patch level. Whether the chip
13 / 26
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1147-2020
contains the correct file system layout can be verified by checking the product identifier
stored in the file EF.PROJID (see [17]).
An example for possible response values of the command GET CHIP INFORMATION can
be found in [17], Annex D. The chip-individual data, e.g. the Chip ID, and possibly the
Initialization Key Identifier may be different from the manual. Note that the IC-specific
details like batch number, wafer number and coordinates vary.
3. Security Policy
The security policy enforced is defined by the selected set of Security Functional
Requirements and implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues: The TOE
implements physical and logical security functionality in order to protect user data stored
and operated on the smartcard when used in a hostile environment. Due to the nature of
its intended application, i.e. the TOE may be issued to users and may not be directly under
the control of trained and dedicated administrators. As a result, it is imperative that
misleading, unreasonable and conflicting guidance is absent from the guidance
documentation, and that secure procedures for all modes of operation have been
addressed. Insecure states should be easy to detect. The TOE shall be shown to be highly
resistant to penetration attacks to meet the security objectives. Specific details concerning
the above mentioned security policies can be found in [6], chapter 6.3.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
Security Objectives for the operational
environment defined in Security Target
Description according to ST Reference to Guidance
OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document Travel document Authentication Key [17] sec. 3.5.11
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data Authorization for Use of Sensitive
Biometric Reference Data
[17] sec. 3.5.11
OE.Active_Auth_Key_Travel_Document Travel document Active
Authentication Key
[17] sec. 3.5.11
OE.Exam_Travel_Document Examination of the physical part of
the travel document
[17] sec. 3.6.3
OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document Protection of data from the logical
travel document
[17] sec. 3.6.3
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems Authorization of Extended Inspection
Systems
[17] sec. 3.6.3
OE.Legislative_Compliance Issuing of the travel document [17] sec. 3.5.11
OE.Passive_Auth_Sign Authentication of travel document by
Signature
[17] sec. 3.5.11
OE.Personalization Personalization of travel document [17] sec. 3.5.11
14 / 26
BSI-DSZ-CC-1147-2020 Certification Report
OE.Terminal Terminal operating [17] sec. 3.6.3
OE.Travel_Document_Holder Travel document holder Obligations [17] sec. 3.6.3
Table 3: Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and [7], chapter 4.2 as well as in the
Protection Profile [10].
5. Architectural Information
The composite TOE MTCOS Pro 2.5 EAC with PACE / P71D352 (N7121) is based on a
certified hardware platform P71D352 (N7121) together with IC Dedicated Software
including Test and Support Software, IC Embedded Software (Operating System) and the
MRTD Application. While the IC Embedded software contains the operating system
MTCOS Pro 2.5, the NVM contains the MRTD application. As all these parts of software
are running inside the IC, the external interface of the TOE to its environment can be
defined as the external interface of this IC, the P71D352 (N7121) secure dual-interface
controller of NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH (certified under BSI-DSZ-CC-1040-
2019 [16]). The Chip including cryptographic library are certified according to CC EAL6
augmented with ALC_FLR.1 and ASE_TSS.2 compliant to the Protection Profile BSI-CC-
PP-0084-2014 [11]). For details concerning the CC evaluation of the NXP IC and its
cryptographic libraries see the evaluation documentation under the Certification ID BSI-
DSZ-CC-1040-2019. This chapter gives an overview of the TOE’s Embedded Software
and the corresponding TSFs which were objects of this evaluation. The security functions
of the TOE are enforced by the following subsystems:
Subsystem TOE Security Functions
Application data SP.Access_Control, SP.Identification_Authentication
Operation System Kernel SP.Access_Control, SP.Crypto, SP.Identification_Authentication,
SP.Management, SP.Verification
HAL SP.IC_CL, SP.Crypto, SP.Identification_Authentication, SP.Verification
Hardware SP.IC_CL
Table 4: Subsystems enforcing TSF
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
7.1 Developer Test concept
15 / 26
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1147-2020
Test Configuration
Suitable samples were chosen from the described configurations (chapter 8) to test all
security functions.
Testing approach
Each security function is covered by at least one test case. The tests performed can be
categorized into two groups: tests with the real card and tests with the emulator. The latter
are used for situations that cannot be achieved in a real card's life.
Amount of developer testing performed
The test cases are dedicated to the demonstration of the proper implementation of all
security functions, card commands and operating system functionalities. For all commands
resp. functionality, test cases are specified in order to demonstrate the expected behavior
including error cases.
Testing Results
All test cases were executed successfully and matched the expected result.
7.2 Evaluator Tests
Independent Testing according to ATE_IND
Test Configuration
Suitable samples were chosen from the described configurations (chapter 8) to test all
security functions.
Testing approach
The tests performed can be categorized into two groups: tests with the real card and tests
with the emulator. The latter are used for situations that cannot be achieved in a real card's
life. From all existing file system setups, a representative subset of setups was chosen for
evaluator testing. For the chosen setups the evaluators conducted all test cases of the
developer’s test suite for non-interactive tests using the test equipment provided by the
developer. The evaluators decided to focus their own independent tests on tests with real
cards, but emulator tests were also conducted. For these tests the evaluators derived
some test ideas from the developer tests under consideration of the described security
functionality. Furthermore, the evaluators used fuzz testing to determine the correct
implementation of the TOE.
Testing Results
All test cases developed by the evaluator were executed successfully and ended up with
the expected result. All repeated developer tests have been conducted successfully and all
the actual test results were as the expected ones (as gained by the developer). For the
test results of the emulator tests the evaluator repeated the emulator tests executed by the
developer. The repetition of the emulator tests showed that the test results are consistent.
Fuzz testing did not reveal any flaws in the TOE’s implementation.
Penetration Testing according to AVA_VAN
Penetration testing approach
The penetration testing was performed using the test environment of the evaluation facility.
All relevant information as well as evaluation documentation was taken into account for the
analysis by the evaluators. For the penetration analysis the evaluator analysed the CC
deliverables for potential vulnerabilities already during the evaluation work for the
16 / 26
BSI-DSZ-CC-1147-2020 Certification Report
corresponding aspects. The evaluators found no exploitable vulnerabilities in the
evaluation deliverables. The evaluator used the potential vulnerabilities from the JIL
document as the leads for further investigations. All possible attack methods against an
authentic operational TOE were analysed. Thereby the results and experience of the ISCI
working group consolidated in the corresponding document were taken into account.
Testing Results
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential High was actually
successful in the TOE’s operational environment as defined in [6] provided that all
measures required by the developer are applied. Potential vulnerabilities cannot be
exploited during the phases development, manufacturing and personalisation.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configuration of the TOE: MTCOS Pro 2.5 EAC with
PACE / P71D352 (N7121) consisting of:
• MTCOS Pro 2.5 EAC with PACE / P71D352 (N7121)
• Operating system and a file system in the context of the ICAO application with the
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH P71D352 (N7121) Chip; software completely
contained in NVM
• File system layout (described in [17])
• User guidance [17],
• Initialization/Pre-Personalization Guidance [18],
• Product Manual [19].
The IC embedded software consists of the operating system MTCOS Pro 2.5 and an
application layer, consisting of the MRTD application.
In order to meet customer requirements, the product is provided in two configurations.
These differ in the amount of memory space for user data and the combination of data
groups. The TOE has the following two main MRTD configurations:
• MRTD-LayoutA (without EF.DG4)
• MRTD-LayoutFlex (with EF.DG4)
For data group files sizes please refer to [17], sec. 3.1. The key files to be used for
asymmetric cryptography can be configured by the Personalization Agent with the
configuration combinations as listed in [17, 3.5.6].
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [8] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
17 / 26
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1147-2020
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
(i) Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices according to AIS
36 (see [4]). On base of this concept the relevant guidance documents of the
underlying IC platform (refer to [20]) and the document ETR for composite
evaluation from the IC’s evaluation ([21]) have been applied in the TOE evaluation.
(ii) Guidance for Smartcard Evaluation (AIS 37, see [4]).
(iii) Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices (AIS 26, see [4]).
(iv) Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards (AIS 26, see [4]).
(v) Application of CC to Integrated Circuits (AIS 25, see [4]).
(vi) Security Architecture requirements (ADV_ARC) for smart cards and similar devices
(AIS 25, see [4]).
(vii) Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+ and EAL6 (AIS 34,
see [4])
(viii) Functionality classes and evaluation methodology of physical and deterministic
random number generators (AIS 20 and AIS 31, see [4]).
(ix) Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen (AIS 46, see [4]).
For smart card specific methodology the scheme interpretations AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 34,
AIS 36, AIS 37 and AIS 46 (see [4]) were used. For RNG assessment the scheme
interpretations AIS 20 and AIS 31 were used (see [4]).
A document ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 has not been provided in
the course of this certification procedure. It could be provided by the ITSEF and submitted
to the certification body for approval subsequently.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 5 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-1033-2019, re-use of specific evaluation
tasks was possible. Subject to the re-evaluation were changes to the certified product such
as a shift to the NXP Platform P71D352 (N7121), certified under BSI-DSZ-CC-1040-2019.
While the base certification was provided as a multi-application product (containing an
SSCD certified in another procedure), the TOE includes only an ePassport application
using the contactless interface. The MTCOS operating system has been revised. Among
others it now allows more configuration options for personalization. NXP Semiconductors
Germany GmbH is included as Initialization/Pre-personalization Agent in life cycle phase 2,
step 5 performing on-wafer initialization. Hardware-depending tools have changed.
The evaluation has confirmed:
18 / 26
BSI-DSZ-CC-1147-2020 Certification Report
● PP Conformance: Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application"
Extended Access Control with PACE, Version 1.3.2, 5 December
2012, BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012-MA-02 [10]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The table A.1 presented in chapter A of the Security Target [6] gives an overview of the
cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to enforce the security policy and outlines the
standard of application where its specific appropriateness is stated. The strength of the
cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification procedure (see
BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). An explicit validity period is not given.
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [7] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
Not applicable.
19 / 26
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1147-2020
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
BAC Basic Access Control
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CA Chip Authentication
CAM Chip Authentication Mapping
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CMAC Cipher-Based Message Authentication Code
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
DES Data Encryption Standard
EAC Extended Access Control
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IC Integrated Circuit
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
MAC Message Authentication Code
MRTD Machine Readable Travel Document
MRZ Machine Readable Zone
NVM Non Volatile Memory
PACE Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PP Protection Profile
ROM Read Only Memory
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
20 / 26
BSI-DSZ-CC-1147-2020 Certification Report
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
21 / 26
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1147-2020
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1147-2020, Machine Readable Travel Document with
“ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control, MTCOS Pro 2.5 EAC with PACE /
P71D352 (N7121), MaskTech International GmbH, Version 0.7, 12 October 2020
(confidential document)
[7] Security Target Lite BSI-DSZ-CC-1147-2020, Machine Readable Travel Document
with “ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control, MTCOS Pro 2.5 EAC with
PACE / P71D352 (N7121), MaskTech International GmbH, Version 1.1, 12 October
2020 (public document)
[8] Evaluation Technical Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1147-2020, MTCOS Pro 2.5 EAC with
PACE / P71D352 (N7121) (BAC), Version 1.4, 17 December 2020, SRC Security
Research & Consulting GmbH (confidential document)
[9] Common Criteria Protection Profile Electronic Passport using Standard Inspection
Procedure with PACE (ePass PACE PP), Version 1.01, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-
PP-0068-V2-2011-MA-01
[10] Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO
Application" Extended Access Control with PACE, Version 1.3.2, 5 December 2012,
BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012-MA-02
[11] Common Criteria Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile with
Augmentation Packages, Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
[12] Configuration List for MTCOS Pro 2.5 EAC with PACE / P71D352 (N7121) (BAC),
Version 0.6, 30 November 2020, MaskTech International GmbH
7
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 25, Version 9, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 10, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 35, Version 2, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and
CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 36, Version 5, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
22 / 26
BSI-DSZ-CC-1147-2020 Certification Report
[13] ICAO. Technical Report: Supplemental Access Control for Machine Readable Travel
Documents. V1.01. International Civil Aviation Organization, 15 April 2014
[14] ICAO, Machine Readable Travel Documents, Part 1 - Machine Readable Pass-
ports. International Civil Aviation Organization, 2015 ICAO, Machine Readable
Travel Documents, Part 3 - Machine Readable Official Travel Documents.
International Civil Aviation Organization, 2015
[15] Technical Guideline TR-03110-1: Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine
Readable Travel Documents – Part 1 – eMRTDs with BAC/PACEv2 and EACv1,
Version 2.20, BSI, 2015
[16] Security Target Lite ’NXP Secure Smart Card Controller N7121 with IC Dedicated
Software and Crypto Library’, BSI-DSZ-CC-1040-2019, Rev. 1.1, 31 May 2019, NXP
Semiconductors
[17] User Guidance – MTCOS Pro 2.5 ePassport / P71D352 (N7121), Version 1.1, 12
October 2020, MaskTech International GmbH
[18] Guidance for Initialization and Pre-personalization – MTCOS Pro 2.5 ePassport /
P71D352 (N7121), Version 1.1, 12 October 2020, MaskTech International GmbH
[19] MANUAL – MTCOS 2.5 on P71D352 (N7121), Version 1.0, 29 May 2020, MaskTech
International GmbH
[20] Certification Report, BSI-DSZ-CC-1040-2019 for NXP Secure Smart Card Controller
N7121 with IC Dedicated Software and Crypto Library from NXP Semiconductors
Germany GmbH
[21] ETR for Composition NXP Secure Smart Card Controller N7121 with IC Dedicated
Software and Crypto Library (N7121) – EAL6+ according to AIS36,
BSI-DSZ-CC-1040, Version 8.0, 31 May 2019, Brightsight BV
23 / 26
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1147-2020
C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailled definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
24 / 26
BSI-DSZ-CC-1147-2020 Certification Report
D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
25 / 26
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1147-2020
Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1147-2020
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product MTCOS Pro 2.5 EAC with PACE / P71D352 (N7121) (Target of Evaluation,
TOE) has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common
Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by Scheme
Interpretations, by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC
Supporting Documents for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
(CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 18 December 2020, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria
assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.5,
ALC_DEL.1, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.2, ALC_COMP.1)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
a) MaskTech International GmbH, Nordostpark 45, 90411 Nuremberg, Germany
(Software Development, Initialisation/Pre-personalisation)
b) Linxens (Thailand) Co Ltd., 142 Moo, Hi-Tech Industrial Estate, Tambon Ban
Laean, Amphor Bang-pa-in, 13160 Ayutthaya Thailand, BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0143-
2019, Site Certificate (Initialisation/Pre-personalisation)
c) HID Global Ireland, Teoranta Pairc Tionscail na Tullaigh, Baile na hAbhann Co.
Galway, Ireland, BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0114-2018, Site Certificate (Initialisation/Pre-
personalisation)
d) HID Global Sdn. Bhd. No. 2, Jalan i-Park 1/1 Kawasan Perindustrian i-Park,
Bandar Indahpura 81000 Kulai, Johor, Malaysia, BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0156-2020,
Site Certificate (Initialisation/Pre-personalisation)
e) For development and production sites regarding the platform IC from NXP
Semiconductors Germany GmbH, please refer to the certification report BSI-
DSZ-CC-1040-2020 [20], Product Certificate (IC Development, IC
Manufacturing, Initialisation/Pre-personalisation)
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [7]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
Note: End of report
26 / 26