BSI-DSZ-CC-0508-2008
for
S-TRUST Sign-it Basiskomponenten 2.1,
Version 2.1.7.1
from
OPENLiMiT SignCubes AG
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-326 V4.22
BSI-DSZ-CC-0508-2008
Signaturanwendungskomponente
S-TRUST Sign-it Basiskomponenten 2.1
Version 2.1.7.1
from OPENLiMiT SignCubes AG
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL4 augmented by
AVA_MSU.3 – Analysis and testing for insecure
states AVA_VLA.4 – Highly resistant
Common Criteria
Arrangement
for components up
to EAL 4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed / approved
evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 extended by
advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 augmented and guidance specific for the
technology of the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version
2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 26 June 2008
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Irmela Ruhrmann L.S.
Head of Division
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0508-2008
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0508-2008 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17
December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0508-2008
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates..................................................7
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates.........................................................8
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the certification result.....................................................................................8
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................10
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................11
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................14
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................16
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................17
5 Architectural Information..............................................................................................21
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................23
7 IT Product Testing........................................................................................................23
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................24
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................24
9.1 CC specific results.................................................................................................24
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment....................................................................26
10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE........................................................27
11 Security Target...........................................................................................................27
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................27
12.1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................27
12.2 Glossary...............................................................................................................27
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................29
Guidance documentation........................................................................................29
Legal regulations.....................................................................................................30
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................32
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................40
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0508-2008 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● BSIG2
● BSI Certification Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN 45011 standard
● BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005)5
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
● Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance components above
EAL4 (AIS 34)
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on ITSEC became
effective on 3 March 1998.
This agreement was signed by the national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United
Kingdom. This agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was
extended to include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7).
The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) recognises certificates issued by
the national certification bodies of France and the United Kingdom within the terms of this
Agreement.
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17
December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 19
May 2006, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0508-2008
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement.
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of certificates
based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including EAL 4 has been signed
in May 2000 (CC-MRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles based on the
CC.
As of February 2007 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia,
Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of
America. The current list of signatory nations resp. approved certification schemes can be
seen on the web site: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
The Common Criteria Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this
certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement.
This evaluation contains the components AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4 that are not
mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual
recognition the EAL4 components of these assurance families are relevant.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product S-TRUST Sign-it Basiskomponenten 2.1, Version 2.1.7.1 has undergone the
certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0494-2007.
The evaluation of the product S-TRUST Sign-it Basiskomponenten 2.1, Version 2.1.7.1
was conducted by T-Systems GEI GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 13. May
2008. The T-Systems GEI GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the
certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: OPENLiMiT SignCubes AG
The product was developed by: OPENLiMiT SignCubes AG
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4 Validity of the certification result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following
report and in the Security Target.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0508-2008 Certification Report
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of functions, please
refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security
Target at the date of certification. As attack methods may evolve over time, the resistance
of the certified version of the product against new attack methods can be re-assessed if
required and the sponsor applies for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme. It is recommended to
perform a re-assessment on a regular basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5 Publication
The product S-TRUST Sign-it Basiskomponenten 2.1, Version 2.1.7.1 has been included
in the BSI list of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
http://www.bsi.bund.de) and [5]. Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49
228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
OPENLiMiT SignCubes AG
Zugerstrasse 76B
CH 6341 Baar
Schweiz
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0508-2008
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0508-2008 Certification Report
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) and subject of the Security Target (ST) is the software
application S-TRUST Sign-it Basiskomponenten 2.1, Version 2.1.7.18
.
S-TRUST Sign-it Basiskomponenten 2.1, Version 2.1.7.1 is an electronic signature
application compliant to the German electronic signature law9
and ordinance on electronic
signatures10
. The application itself is a set of executables and programming libraries.
The S-TRUST Sign-it Basiskomponenten 2.1 were developed for the use on the operating
systems from Microsoft since Microsoft Windows NT 4.0. In the IT-security environment a
smart card terminal with secure pin entry mode as well as a smart card are required to run
the required cryptographic operations in the process of electronic signature creation.
The product provides additional cryptographic functionality like data encryption based on
symmetric encryption algorithms. These product capabilities are not part of the Common
Criteria evaluation of this product.
The TOE itself is limited to the creation of hash values, using the SHA-1, SHA-256,
SHA-384, SHA-512 and RIPEMD 160 algorithms and the RSA-Algorithm for signature
validation. It is therefore able to check and ensure the integrity as well as the
trustworthiness of signed data based on the components responsible for CRL-processing,
OCSP-processing, timestamp processing and PDF processing.
The TOE can be used as a standalone application or can be integrated into third party
products. For third party products the TOE includes an API (called OPENLiMiT SignCubes
Job Interface or OPENLiMiT SignCubes SDK v2.1) that allows access to the following core
functionality of the TOE:
● Computation of hash values implementing the algorithms mentioned above.
● Creation of electronic signatures.
● Timestamp processing.
● Support for attribute certificates in the process of electronic signature creation.
● Support for OCSP-processing in the process of electronic signature creation.
● Electronic signature verification.
● Integrity protection of the installed product.
Furthermore, the TOE provides a legal binding displaying unit (S-TRUST Sign-it Viewer)
for the Text, TIFF and PDF format. The displaying unit of the TOE allows the examination
of the files in order to ensure that the user is assured about the content to be signed or the
content of the signed file.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is not based on a certified
Protection Profile.
8
Also named S-TRUST Sign-it Basiskomponenten 2.1 in this report.
9
see [11]
10
see [12]
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0508-2008
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 5.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and
some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC part 2 extended.
The Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the IT-Environment of the TOE
are outlined in the Security Target [6], chapter 5.3.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
TOE Security
Function
Addressed issue
SF.1 Hash value computation and initiation of the electronic signature
creation process using certificates, smart card terminals and
secure signature creation devices.
The user can optionally include OCSP-responses for the
validation of certificates and add timestamps to a digital signature.
Furthermore, the S-TRUST Sign-it Basiskomponenten 2.1 allow
the creation of more than one signature without entering the PIN
for every document11
. This feature is only available for the
OPENLiMiT SignCubes Job Interface and not for the graphical
user interface included in the S-TRUST Sign-it
Basiskomponenten 2.1.
SF.2 Verification of hash values and electronic signatures using
certificate revocation lists, OCSP responses (optional) and
timestamps (optional)
Apart from the extraction of the original and the comparison with
the calculated hash value the S-TRUST Sign-it
Basiskomponenten 2.1 verify the certificate chain using the chain
model or RFC 3280.
SF.3 Program module manipulation detection
The files and libraries constituting the S-TRUST Sign-it
Basiskomponenten 2.1 are digitally signed. Each time the
application starts a specific module is responsible for verfying
these signatures mathematically.
SF.4 Unambiguous presentation of the data to be signed
The S-TRUST Sign-it Basiskomponenten 2.1 present the data to
be signed unambigiously to the user. To accomplish this, a parser
determines whether the format of the data to be signed complies
to the Adobe PDF-, the TIFF-standard or is a text file. The data is
checked for active content, unknown tags and elements or control
characters that cannot be displayed. If any irregularities are
detected, the user is informed with appropriate error messages or
warnings.
SF.5 Protection against hash value manipulation
Before the electronic signature is initiated, the S-TRUST Sign-it
11
Though the software provides this functionality, the supported smart cards require entering the PIN
for every document.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0508-2008 Certification Report
TOE Security
Function
Addressed issue
Basiskomponenten 2.1 compute the hash value of the data to be
signed. After the electronic signature creation process the S-
TRUST Sign-it Basiskomponenten 2.1 verifiy the electronic
signature using the public key of the given signer certificate. If the
original hash value and the hash value encoded in the electronic
signature are not identical, the signature is discarded.
SF.6 Assurance of the TOE’s integrity
For the integrity check the S-TRUST Sign-it Basiskomponenten
2.1 comprise a JAVA-applet that is provided online. When
assessing this applet it calculates the hash value of each file
belonging to the S-TRUST Sign-it Basiskomponenten 2.1 and
compares it to the values that were initially caluculated by the
manufacturer. If any value does not match, an error message is
displayed.
SF.7 Processing of OCSP information for certificate validation
The S-TRUST Sign-it Basiskomponenten 2.1 is able to process
OCSP-responses. First the mathematical correctness of the
signature of the OCSP-response is checked. If the OCSP-
response is used for the validation of a certificate, the complete
chain for the signing certificate of the OCSP-response is verified.
SF.8 Application of Timestamps
The S-TRUST Sign-it Basiskomponenten 2.1 apply timestamps to
files if the timestamp is electronically signed and the certificate
belonging to the signature of the timestamp is already available.
Otherwise the timestamp is not imported.
SF.9 Validation of Timestamps
The S-TRUST Sign-it Basiskomponenten 2.1 validate the
electronic signature of a timestamp mathematically. Furthermore,
the certificate underlying the electronic signature of the timestamp
is validated according to the chain model or RFC 3280. A
prerequisite for this security function is that the signing certificate
of the timestamp is already available.
SF.10 Management of Security Functions depending on licenses
The S-TRUST Sign-it Basiskomponenten 2.1 support different
licenses. E.g. for the verification of electronic signatures no
special license key must be purchased, whereas the creation of
embedded PDF-signatures requires the availability of the most
comprehensive license
Table 1: Security Functions
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6.
The claimed TOE’s strength of functions high (SOF-high) for specific functions as indicated
in the Security Target [6], chapter 8 is confirmed. The rating of the strength of functions
does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG
Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). For details see chapter 9 of this report.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.
Based on these assets the security environment is defined in terms of assumptions,
threats and policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0508-2008
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE: The TOE is a software
application that does not require a special configuration. The TOE has to be configured in
accordance with the Security Target and the respective guidance documents. This means
among other aspects that for the application of qualified electronic signatures a smartcard
reader and a secure signature creation device must be used that was approved in
accordance with the German signature law [11]. The Security Target names the products
the TOE can be used with.
Further information about the configuration of the TOE and the technical environment is
available in
● the Security Target [6],
● chapter 1, chapter 4 and chapter 8 of this report,
● the user guidance [9],
● and the guidance of the API provided by the TOE [9].
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the Certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
S-TRUST Sign-it Basiskomponenten 2.1, Version 2.1.7.1
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Date Form of
Delivery
1. SW
(program)
S-TRUST Sign-it base
components 2.1, version
2.1.7.1
2.1.7.1 19.03.2008 File
2. DOC S-TRUST Sign-it
Basiskomponenten 2.1, Version
2.1.7.1 – User Guidance
(German)
2.1.7.1 27.02.2008 chm-
File
3. DOC OPENLiMiT® SignCubes SDK
v2.1 Documentation
1.2 05.03.2007 PDF-
File
4. Header
File
siqSDK.h 21.01.2008 File
5. Library
File
siqSDK.lib 05.12.2007 File
6. DOC Developer Documentation
OPENLiMiT® SignCubes SDK
1.7 28.01.2008 PDF-
File
7. Header
File
siqVendor.h 21.01.2008 File
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0508-2008 Certification Report
No Type Identifier Release Date Form of
Delivery
8. Integrity-
Tool
IntegrityTool.jar 12.12.2007 File
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE deliverables No.1 to No.2 are provided for a standard customer, who purchases
the TOE.
The TOE deliverables No.3 to 5 are delivered additionally and have to be purchased
separately. The TOE deliverables No.6 and No.7 can be used internally by the developer
of the TOE. The TOE deliverable No.8 is used to verify the integrity of the TOE.
To identify the Header, Library and Jar Files the SHA-1 values of these files are listed in
the table 3.
No. File SHA-1-value
1. siqSDK.h 9eae545de45ec0bb05284e62169396d8876ee8ed
2. siqVendor.h b449d1302fdf1aa211efb7f7decf6ac9ce8e6ba5
3. siqSDK.lib c9f82151769caf7552c1a85acaf988da59d794e4
4. IntegrityTool.jar b681b7e30b5141db02c7c4e783fbf4d52a0f3a3b
Table 3: Hash Values of TOE deliverables
The vendor provides the product either as a complete setup that comprises the user
guidance in both languages and supports all smart cards as well as all smart card
terminals that are listed in chapter 4.
Alternatively, the TOE is distributed in different parts comprising the compulsory minimal
setup and optional add-on setups.
The minimal setup contains the following constituent parts of the evaluated product:
● the user guidance and user prompting either in English or in German,
● all binary files with exception of the ones that are required for the support of the smart
cards and smart card terminals listed in chapter 4 and
● especially the S-TRUST Sign-it Integrity Tool.
After the installation of the minimal setup all functionalities of the product are available that
the most restrictive license allows to use.
The add-on setups are composed according to the needs of the customer and contain the
libraries required to support specific smart cards and smart card terminals. To use the
functionalties of other licenses of the product than the most restrictive one the installation
of the corresponding add-on setup in addition to the installation of the minimal setup is
required.
As a third alternative the vendor provides single setups that contain the minimal setup and
the support for a selected set of smart cards and smart card terminals. This alternative
may be chosen to provide a software package for a set of hardware that a Trust Center or
a major reseller dispenses.
The end-customer can acquire the TOE through different sales channels:
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0508-2008
● The costumer buys a CD-ROM that contains the required setup directly from
OPENLiMiT SignCubes AG or resellers.
● Resellers or the OPENLiMiT SignCubes AG make the software available on their
webpages. The download process must comply to the following guidelines:
● The webpage where the software is offered must be secured by means of https.
The fingerprint of the certificate must be published separately on the website of the
corresponding company.
● The website must explicitly instruct the user to execute the integrity tool first before
using the TOE.
After installing the product the user is compelled to execute the S-TRUST Sign-it Integrity
Tool. This applet is provided by OPENLiMiT SignCubes AG on the website
https://www.openlimit.com/integritytool
The S-TRUST Sign-it Integrity Tool checks whether the TOE is correctly installed on the
computer of the user and displays the versions of the different files composing the TOE.
Thus, the user can easily recognize whether he installed the correct version of the
software and which parts of the evaluated product are installed.
The TOE deliverables No. 3 to No. 5 can only be acquired from OPENLiMiT SignCubes AG.
They are handed over to end customers (i.e. application developers) either online or by a
delivery service on CD-ROM as a compressed zip-archive. The archive is digitally signed
with a qualified electronic signature. The belonging qualified certificate can be identified by
means of the following information:
Subject: Armin Lunkeit
Issuer: S-TRUST Qualified Signature CA 2005-001:PN
Valid From: 11th of October 2005
Valid Until: 31 of December 2009
Serial Number: 0x6A 41 76 EC AB 31 41 3B DC B3 87 A0 2A 62 E6 BF
SHA-1 Fingerprint: 49 DA 34 B5 BF C2 8A 41 38 1D 52 2C 6E C6 24 BD C3 0E 08 38
The receiver of the archive must verify this qualified electronic signatur to ensure the
integrity and authenticity of the software.
3 Security Policy
The S-TRUST Sign-it Basiskomponenten 2.1, Version 2.1.7.1 is a signature application
component compliant to the German signature law and ordinance on electronic signature
and thus enforces the following security policies:
● The TOE clearly indicates the creation of a qualified electronic signature and enables
the user to unambigiously identify the data to be signed.
● The TOE ensures that the identification data are not disclosed and are stored only on
the relevant secure signature creation device. The application enforces the rule that a
signature is provided only at the initiation of the authorized signing person.
● The TOE shows, to which data the signature refers, whether the signed data is
unchanged and to which signature-code owner the signature is to be assigned.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0508-2008 Certification Report
● The TOE presents the contents of the qualified certificate on which the signature is
based, the appropriate qualified attribute certificates and the results of the subsequent
check of certificates.
● If data to be signed or data already signed is displayed by the TOE certain rules for the
treatment of nonreadable signs are enforced.
● For the verification of a qualified electronic signature the TOE reliably verifies the
correctness of a signature and displays this fact appropriately.
● Using the TOE it can be clearly determined whether the verified qualified certificates
were present in the relevant register of certificates at the given time and were not
revoked.
The TOE ensures, that security-relevant changes in the technical components are
apparent to the user.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of threats and
organisational security policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
Usage assumptions
According to the ST [6], chapter 3.1, the following assumption for the usage of the TOE is
made:
● A.Personnel
The user, the administrator and the maintenance staff are trustworthy and follow the
user guide of the TOE. Especially the user verifies the integrity of the installed TOE as
described in the user documentation and on the website where from the different
setups can be downloaded.
Environmental assumptions
● A.Platform
The user utilizes an Intel 586 compatible computer as hardware platform, which
contains at least 64 MB of RAM and 120 MB of free disk space. On the computer one
of the following operating systems is installed:
● Windows NT 4.0 SP 6
● Windows 2000 SP 2
● Windows 2003
● Windows XP Home
● Windows XP Professional
● Windows XP Tablet PC Edition
● Windows XP 64 Bit Edition
● Windows Vista
● Windows Vista 64 Bit Edition
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0508-2008
Additionally the TOE supports a terminal server environment under Windows operating
systems Windows 2000 with Citrix Metaframe and Windows 2003 with and without
Citrix Metaframe.
In a terminal server environment the communication between server and client/s is
conducted via an encrypted channel and is therefore to be considered trustworthy.
In addition to these requirements, the Internet Explorer version 5.01 or higher is
installed. Moreover, the Microsoft smart card base components are installed on the
computer12
.
In addition to that, a Java Virtual Machine (JVM) is installed on the computer, which
complies at least with the Java Runtime Environment v1.4.
The user ensures that all components of the operating system are correct. The user
ensures that no malicious or harmful program is installed on the system.
The user utilizes a secure signature creation system, which consists of a smart-card
terminal with secure pin entry capabilities together with a smart card. The user utilizes
one of the following SigG approved smart cards:
● ZKA Banking signature card, v6.2b NP and 6.2f NP, Type 3 from Giesecke &
Devrient
● ZKA Banking signature card, v6.2 NP, Type 3 from Giesecke & Devrient
● ZKA Banking signature card v6.31 NP, Type 3 from Giesecke & Devrient
● ZKA Banking signature card v6.32, Type 3 from Giesecke & Devrient
● ZKA Banking Signature Card, Version 6.4 from Giesecke & Devrient
● ZKA Banking Signature Card, Version 6.51 from Giesecke & Devrient
● ZKA Banking Signature Card, v6.6 from Giesecke & Devrient
● ZKA signature card, version 5.02 from Gemplus-mids GmbH
● ZKA signature card, version 5.10 (ZKA 680 V5A) from Gemplus-mids GmbH
● ZKA signature card, version 5.11 from Gemplus-mids GmbH
● ZKA signature card, version 5.11 M from Gemplus GmbH (Gemalto)
● ZKA SECCOS Sig v1.5.3 from Sagem Orga GmbH
In addition to the listed smart cards, the user utilizes any smart card that provides a PKCS
#15 interface or a SigG-application for qualified electronic signatures.
The user utilizes one of the following smart-card terminals:
● Cherry ST-2000
● Kobil B1 Pro USB
● Kobil TriB@nk
● Kobil KAAN Advanced
● SCM Microsystems SPRx32
12
The manual installation of the Microsoft SmartCard base components is required for
Microsoft Windows NT 4.0, SP 6
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● Reiner SCT cyberJack e-com v2.0
● Reiner SCT cyberJack e-com v3.0
● Reiner SCT cyberJack pinpad v2.0
● Reiner SCT cyberJack pinpad v3.0
● Omnikey Cardman 3621
● Omnikey Cardman 3821
● Fujitsu Siemens S26381-K329-V2xx HOS:01
The used components are approved components according to the German signature
law. The certificates can be obtained from the BSI (www.bsi.bund.de).
● A.Network
The computer where the TOE is installed may have internet access. In this case a
firewall is used to ensure that no system services or components are compromised
through internet attacks. In addition to this, the user utilizes a virus scanner, which is
able to detect virus programs as well as backdoor programs and root kits. At least the
virus scanner is able to inform the user about attacks or detected malicious programs.
● A.Access
The computer on which the TOE is installed is located in an environment where the
user has full control about inserted storage devices and shared network storage
places. The TOE is protected in such way that it is not possible to access parts of the
TOE or the TOE as a whole through existing network connections.
Clarification of scope
The TOE cannot assure the correctness of the following functions:
● Private Key material. The secure signature creation device must assure the
correctness and integrity of the private key material.
● Assurance of the operating system integrity. The TOE does not contain any capabilities
for ensuring the integrity of the operating system and its environment. The user must
assure that sufficient actions are undertaken to avoid that the operating system may be
compromised.
● Strength and security of cryptographic operations. The TOE uses libraries for hash
value creation and the RSA algorithm for signature validation. Therefore the TOE can
only assure the compliance to given standardization documentation and test vectors
but must not make any statement about the strength of the cryptographic operations.
The capability characteristics of the TOE are limited to the computation of hash values and
the usage of secure signature creation devices for electronic signature creation and the
usage of the RSA algorithm for signature verification. Manipulations on the IT-security
environment cannot be recognized or even prevented by the TOE.
Applications that use the TOE via the evaluated API are not in the focus of this evaluation.
Restrictions and Exceptions
The following tables show the combinations between operating system, smart card and
smart card reader that are not supported.
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Table 4 depicts which smart card terminals are not supported by the corresponding
operating system.
Operating system Smart card terminal
Windows NT 4 SP 6 Cherry St 2000 (Firmware version 5.08)
Cherry ST2000 (Firmware version 5.11)
Reiner SCT cyberJack pinpad v3.0
Reiner SCT cyberJack e-com v3.0
Kobil KAAN Advanced
Kobil TriB@nk
Kobil B1 Pro USB
Fujitsu Siemens S26381-K329-V2xx HOS: 01
Omnikey Cardman 3621
Omnikey Cardman 3821
Windows XP 64 Bit Edition Kobil KAAN Advanced
Kobil TriB@nk
Kobil B1 Pro USB
SCM SPRx32 (Firmware version 4.15)
SCM SPR x32 (Firmware version 5.10)
Windows Vista Reiner SCT cyberJack pinpad v2.0
Reiner SCT cyberJack e-com v2.0
SCM SPRx32 (Firmware version 4.15)
Windows Vista 64 Bit Edition Kobil KAAN Advanced
Kobil B1 Pro USB
Kobil TriB@nk
SCM SPRx32 (Firmware version 4.15)
SCM SPR x32 (Firmware version 5.10)
Reiner SCT cyberJack pinpad v2.0
Reiner SCT cyberJack e-com v2.0
Windows 2000 Server with
Citrix Meta Frame
Kobil TriB@nk
Kobil B1 Pro USB
Windows 2003 Server with
Citrix Meta Frame
Kobil TriB@nk
Table 4: Incompatibility between operating system and smart card terminals
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These combinations are not included in the evaluation and therefore not included in
the certificate.
Details can be found in the Security Target [6].
5 Architectural Information
The TOE S-TRUST Sign-it Basiskomponenten 2.1, Version 2.1.7.1 is a signature
application component compliant to the German electronic signature law and ordinance on
electronic signatures. The application itself is a set of executables and programming
libraries. This means that the may be used as a single application but also may be
integrated into third party products. The TOE comprises three different parts:
– the S-Trust Sign-it Security Environment Manager
– the S-Trust Sign-it Viewer
– the S-Trust Sign-it Integrity Tool
The first two parts represent the main components of the TOE whereas the S-Trust Sign-it
Integrity Tool is a separate application implemented as a Java Applet. The S-Trust Sign-it
Integrity Tool is used to allow the user to check the integrity of the installed product.
The figure below provides an overview of the main components and their interfaces as
described in the High-Level Design.
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Figure 1: Decomposition of the main components of the TOE
In Figure 1 the lined boxes represent the subsystems of the main components of the TOE
whereas the arrows indicate interfaces between subsystems. Dashed boxes refer to
external subsystems that are part of the IT environment of the TOE (see chapter 4 in this
report).
The S-Trust Sign-it Viewer is a software component for displaying signed data or data to
be signed according to the signature law §17 paragraph 2. The S-Trust Sign-it Viewer is
able to display TIFF documents following the Adobe TIFF specification, PDF documents
that follow the PDF 1.7 document format as well as documents that contain ASCII
characters. If the user decides to sign the document that is currently displayed with the S-
Trust Sign-it Viewer, he can start the process of electronic signature creation using the S-
Trust Sign-it Viewer as an indirect interface to that functionality provided by the S-Trust
Sign-it Security Environment Manager.
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The S-Trust Sign-it Security Environment Manager provides the following functionality that
may be accessed in parts or completely through the use of the S-Trust Sign-it SDK:
● Computation of hash values using the SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 and
RIPEMD-160 algorithms.
● Creation of electronic signatures using a smart card and a secure pin entry device
(smart card reader).
● Timestamp processing during the process of electronic signature creation.
● Support for attribute certificates in the process of electronic signature creation.
● Support for OCSP processing during the electronic signature creation.
● Electronic signature verification including OCSP and CRL processing as well as
timestamp processing. The use of attribute certificates is supported.
● API’s for applications/product parts that want to use the provided functionality.
● Ensuring the integrity and correctness of the S-Trust Sign-it base components installed
on the user’s computer.
Providing graphical interfaces in the process of signature creation, verification and product
configuration
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7 IT Product Testing
Developer tests
The tests of the developer were conducted with the smard cards, smart card terminals and
operating systems listed in chapter 4 assumption A.Platform and thus in accordance with
the ST [6]. All additional prerequisites mentioned in the assumptions on the operating
environment (see chapter 1 and chapter 4 in this report) concerning the installation of
modules of the operating systems (e.g. the correct version of the Internet explorer) or
firewalls and virus scanners were fullfilled for the computers of the testbed.
All tests of the developer were conducted with the same version of the TOE that is listed in
the configuration list [8]. The test description demonstrates that the developer performed
his testing on an adequate level for the evaluation assurance level EAL4+. According to
the verdict of the evaluator mentioned in the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR, [7]), the
test effort of the developer demonstrate that the security functionalities defined in the ST
[6] have been implemented as required.
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Evaluator tests
Due to the evaluation assurance level EAL 4+ the ITSEF is obliged to repeat a subset of
the developer tests as well as conduct independent and penetration tests to a
commensurate extent.
For the repetition of the developer tests the testbed of the developer was used. The
independent evaluator tests follow two different test approaches. On the one hand tests
are derived from the developer tests to examine the behaviour of the TOE in a broader
approach. This kind of tests strengthen the confidence of the evaluators in the test
approach of the developer. On the other hand the evaluators developed new tests to
examine special reactions of the TOE. Due to this probing the existence of certain
vulnerabilities can be eleminated.
For the evaluator tests at the ITSEF facility in Bonn the following configuration was
employed:
• Computer with Windows 2000, Service Pack 4 and JRE 1.4.2_08
• Card reader SCM Microsystems SPR x32
• Smart card ZKA Banking signature card, v6.2b NP and 6.2f NP, Type 3 from Giesecke
& Devrient
Test results
The tests showed that the TOE behaves as expected. The depth of testing is adequate for
the evaluation assurance level chosen EAL 4+. The TOE successfully passed independent
testing. The tests performed by the evaluators confirmed that under the given assumptions
no vulnerabilities can be exploited.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE was evaluated in the configuration as described in the Evaluation Technical
Report [7] and summarized in chapter 2 of this report.
The TOE allows only one mode of operation though several different functionalities are
bound to purchasing a corresponding license. Depending on the license, the user may use
only parts of the functionality evaluated and certified. In any case, the evaluation and the
certificate cover all functionalities that the purchase of the most comprehensive license
provides.
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components used up to EAL4
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 augmented
and guidance specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
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i) Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema, AIS20, Version 1,
02.12.1999, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI), Bonn, Ein
Vorschlag zu: Funktionsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
(see [4], AIS 20) were used.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the class ASE
● All components of the EAL 4 augmented package as defined in the CC (see also part C
of this report)
● The components
AVA_MSU.3 – Analysis and testing for insecure states
● AVA_VLA.4 – Highly resistant
augmented for this TOE evaluation.
● All components claimed in the Security Target [6], chapter 5.2 and defined in the CC
(see also part C of this report).
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0494-2008, re-use of specific evaluation
tasks was possible.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● for the functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL4 augmented by
AVA_MSU.3 – Analysis and testing for insecure states
AVA_VLA.4 – Highly resistant
The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function high:
(i) the TOE Security Function
● SF.1 (Hash value computation and initiation of the electronic signature creation)
● SF.2 (Verification of hash values and electronic signatures)
● SF.3 (Program module manipulation detection)
● SF.5 (Protection against hash value manipulation)
● SF.6 (Assurance of the TOE’s integrity)
● SF.7 (Processing of OCSP information for certificate validation)
● SF.8 (Application of Timestamps)
● SF.9 (Validation of Timestamps)
● SF.10 (Management of Security Functions depending on licenses)
(ii) and for other usage of encryption and decryption within the TOE.
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The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for
encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for
encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). This holds for:
● the TOE Security Function SF.1 and
● SF.2.
The following cryptographic algorithms are used by the TOE to enforce its security policy:
– hash functions:
– SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 and RIPEMD 160
– algorithms for the encryption and decryption:
RSA-Algorithms with bitlengths between 1024-2048 bits.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this evaluation
(see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). According to Bundesnetzagentur –
Bekanntmachung zur elektronischen Signatur nach dem Signaturgesetz und der
Signaturverordnung (Übersicht über geeignete Algorithmen), vom 17.12.2007 the
algorithms are suitable for - Erzeugung und Prüfung von qualifizierten elektronischen
Signaturen -.
The following table describes the validity period of hash functions according to the
publication of the Bundesnetzagentur [14].
Hash function Valid until end of
SHA-1 June 2008
RIPEMD 160 2010
SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 2014
Table 8: Validity period of hash functions
As the S-TRUST Sign-it Basiskomponenten 2.1, Version 2.1.7.1 implement certain
cryptographic algorithms for the verification of electronic signatures, the following table
summarizes the validity period of these algorithms as published by the
Bundesnetzagentur.
Algorithm with bitlength Valid until end of
RSA 1024 2007
RSA 1280 2008
RSA 1536 2009
RSA 1728 2010
RSA 1976 2014
Table 9: Validity period of cryptographic algorithms
A bitlength of 2048 Bits is recommended for an acceptable long term security level.
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Detailed information about suitable algorithms for the application of qualified electronic
signatures can be obtained from the website of the Bundesnetzagentur (see
www.bundesnetzagentur.de).
10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE
The operational documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the
usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered.
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the security target [6] of the target of evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
API Application Programming Interface
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC Part 3 to
an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
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Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a
category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for enforcing a
closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used as the
basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing the minimum
efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security behaviour by directly attacking
its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function
provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE security by attackers
possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the
function provides adequate protection against straightforward or intentional breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a moderate attack potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function
provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or organised breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a high attack potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated administrator and user
guidance documentation that is the subject of an evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and firmware of the
TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed, protected
and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a TOE and
are subject to the rules of the TSP.
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13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.3,
August 2005
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE.
specifically:
- AIS 25, Version 3, 6 August 2007 for: CC Supporting Document, - The
Application of CC to Integrated Circuits, Version 2.0, CCDB-2006-04-003,
April 2006
- AIS 26, Version 3, 6 August 2007 for: CC Supporting Document, -Application
of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 2.3, CCDB-2007-04-001, April
2007
- AIS 31, Version 1, 25 Sept. 2001 for: Functionality classes and evaluation
methodology of physical random number generators
- AIS 32, Version 1, 02 July 2001, Übernahme international abgestimmter CC-
Interpretationen ins deutsche Zertifizierungs-schema.
- AIS 34, Version 1.00, 1 June 2004, Evaluation Methodology for CC
Assurance Classes for EAL5+
- AIS 35 ST-lite
- AIS 36, Version 1, 29 July 2002 for: CC Supporting Document, ETR-lite for
Composition, Version 1.1, July 2002 and CC Supporting Document, ETR-lite
for Composition: Annex A Composite smartcard evaluation, Version 1.2
March 2002
- AIS 38, Version 2.0, 28 September 2007, Reuse of evaluation results
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically updated list
published also on the BSI Web-site
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-0508-2008, Version 1.4, 18.03.2008, Electronic Signature
Application S-TRUST Sign-it Basiskomponenten 2.1, Version 2.1.7.1, OPENLiMiT
SignCubes AG
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.0, 08.04.2008, T-Systems GEI GmbH
(confidential document)
[8] Configuration list for the S-TRUST Sign-it Basiskomponenten 2.1, Version 2.1.7.1,
04.04.2008, OPENLiMiT SignCubes GmbH (confidential document)
Guidance documentation
[9] S-TRUST Sign-it Basiskomponenten 2.1, Version 2.1.7.1, User Guidance, Version
2.1.7.1, OPENLiMiT SignCubes GmbH, file: deuS-TRUST Sign-it. chm, 3.184.117
bytes, 27.02.2008.
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OPENLiMiT SignCubes SDK v2.1, Release 1.2, 05.03.2007, OPENLiMiT
SignCubes GmbH
[10] Auslieferungshinweise für Terminalserverlizenzen, S-TRUST Sign-it
Basiskomponenten 2.1, Version 2.1.7.1, Version 1.0, OPENLiMiT SignCubes
GmbH
Legal regulations
[11] Gesetz über Rahmenbedingungen für elektronische Signaturen (Signaturgesetz -
SigG)1) vom 16. Mai 2001 (BGBl. I S. 876) zuletzt geändert durch Art. 1 des Ersten
Gesetzes zur Änderung des Signaturgesetzes (1. SigÄndG), 01/04/2005, BGBl.
volume 2005 part I p. 2
[12] Verordnung zur elektronischen Signatur (Signaturverordnung - SigV), 11/16/2001,
BGBl. volume 2001 part I p. 876
[13] Maßnahmenkatalog für technische Komponenten nach dem Signaturgesetz, Stand
15. Juli 1998, publisher RegTP
[14] Bekanntmachung zur elektronischen Signatur nach dem Signaturgesetz und der
Signaturverordnung (Übersicht über geeignete Algorithmen), published
February 05, 2008, in the Bundesanzeiger No. 19, p. 376 and available on the web-
pages of the Bundesnetzagentur).
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result is presented with
respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3 (assurance requirements) and, if
applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the functional
requirements are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2.
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the functional
requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the assurance
requirements are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the assurance
requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect to sets of
defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
– Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance
result.
– Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions
or assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the packages listed as part of
the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect to
Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
– PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.“
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CC Part 3:
Protection Profile criteria overview (chapter 8.2)
“The goal of a PP evaluation is to demonstrate that the PP is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more evaluatable TOEs. Such a PP may be eligible for inclusion within a PP registry.”
“Assurance Class Assurance Family
TOE description (APE_DES)
Security environment (APE_ENV)
Class APE: Protection Profile
evaluation
PP introduction (APE_INT)
Security objectives (APE_OBJ)
IT security requirements (APE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements (APE_SRE)
Table 3 - Protection Profile families - CC extended requirements ”
Security Target criteria overview (Chapter 8.3)
“The goal of an ST evaluation is to demonstrate that the ST is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as the basis for the corresponding TOE
evaluation.”
“Assurance Class Assurance Family
TOE description (ASE_DES)
Security environment (ASE_ENV)
ST introduction (ASE_INT)
Class ASE: Security Target
evaluation
Security objectives (ASE_OBJ)
PP claims (ASE_PPC)
IT security requirements (ASE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements (ASE_SRE)
TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS)
Table 5 - Security Target families - CC extended requirements ”
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Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in Table
1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
ACM: Configuration management CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
ADV: Development TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
Development security (ALC_DVS)
ALC: Life cycle support Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
Coverage (ATE_COV)
ATE: Tests Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/
or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended with explicitly
stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by Evaluation Assurance
Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against identified
threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter
11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter
11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested (chapter
11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.“
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
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Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it may still
be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its underlying
security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their security behaviour can be
made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of
these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. The qualification is made in
the form of a strength of TOE security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified,
during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by other
methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flaws that
will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interfere with or
alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the presence of
security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all the TOE
deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. The developer is
required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to
make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the evaluator's
independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the
developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is
resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (for
AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3 Moderately
resistant) or high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant) attack potential.”
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D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
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