Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0429-2007
for
Starcos 3.01 PE V1.1
from
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)3018 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)3018 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)3018 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-326 V3.4
BSI-DSZ-CC-0429-2007
Security IC with MRTD BAC Application
Starcos 3.01 PE V1.1
from
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
Common Criteria Arrangement
for components up to EAL4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, version 2.3
(ISO/IEC 15408:2005) extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL4
and smart card specific guidance for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security
Evaluation, version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
Evaluation Results:
PP Conformance: Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application",
Basic Access Control, version 1.0 (BSI-PP-0017-2005)
Functionality: BSI-PP-0017-2005 conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance Package: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL4 augmented by:
ADV_IMP.2 (Implementation of the TSF) and
ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security measures)
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme
of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, 18. July 2007
The President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Dr. Helmbrecht L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)3018 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)3018 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)3018 9582-111
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption
and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2)
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty
of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0429-2007 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
V
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0429-2007
VI
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
Part D: Annexes
BSI-DSZ-CC-0429-2007 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
• BSIG2
• BSI Certification Ordinance3
• BSI Schedule of Costs4
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
• DIN EN 45011 standard
• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), version 2.35
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), version 2.3
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
• Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance
components above EAL4 (AIS 34)
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger
dated 19 May 2006, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0429-2007
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective in March 1998. This agreement has been signed by
the national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United
Kingdom. This agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates
was extended to include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels
(EAL 1 – EAL 7). The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI)
recognizes certificates issued by the national certification bodies of France and
the United Kingdom within the terms of this Agreement.
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 has been signed in May 2000 (CC-MRA). It includes also the recognition
of Protection Profiles based on the CC. As of February 2007 the arrangement
has been signed by the national bodies of:
Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden,
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America.
The current list of signatory nations resp. approved certification schemes can be
seen on the web site: http:\\www.commoncriteriaportal.org
This evaluation contains the components ADV_IMP.2 (Implementation of the
TSF) and ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security measures) that are not mutually
recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual
recognition the EAL4-components of these assurance families are relevant.
A-2
BSI-DSZ-CC-0429-2007 Certification Report
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Starcos 3.01 PE V1.1 has undergone the certification procedure at
BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0313-2006.
The evaluation of the product Starcos 3.01 PE V1.1 was conducted by TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH, Prüfstelle IT-Sicherheit. The TÜV Informations-
technik GmbH, Prüfstelle IT-Sicherheit is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor, vendor and distributor is
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
Prinzregentenstraße 159
Postfach 80 07 29
81607 München
The certification is concluded with
• the comparability check and
• the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on 18. July 2007.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in
the following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the
following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0429-2007
A-4
4 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-22 and D1 to D-4.
The product Starcos 3.01 PE V1.1 has been included in the BSI list of the
certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: http://
www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49
228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor7
of
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the above-
mentioned website.
7
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
Prinzregentenstraße 159
Postfach 80 07 29
81607 München
BSI-DSZ-CC-0429-2007 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0429-2007
Contents of the certification results
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification of the TOE 12
3 Security Policy 13
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 13
5 Architectural Information 13
6 Documentation 14
7 IT Product Testing 14
8 Evaluated Configuration 15
9 Results of the Evaluation 15
10 Comments/Recommendations 18
11 Annexes 18
12 Security Target 18
14 Bibliography 20
B-2
BSI-DSZ-CC-0429-2007 Certification Report
1 Executive Summary
Target of Evaluation (TOE) and subject of the Security Target (ST) [7] is the
Security IC with a Machine Readable Travel Document, Basic Access Control
Application Starcos 3.01 PE V1.1.
The Security Target is based on the Common Criteria Protection Profile
Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Basic Access
Control [9].
The certification of Starcos 3.01 PE V1.1 is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-
CC-0313-2006 (Starcos 3.01 PE V1.0) with some changes at the level of
implementation and the integration of a new initialisation facility.
The TOE is the contactless integrated circuit chip of machine readable travel
documents (MRTD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure
(LDS) [10] and providing the Basic Access Control according to ICAO document
[11]. It will be embedded as an inlay chip module into a passport booklet.
The TOE comprises
• the circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (the integrated circuit, IC) with hardware
for the contactless interface, e.g. antennae, capacitors
• the IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and
IC Dedicated Support Software
• the IC Embedded Software (operating system STARCOS)
• the MRTD application (dedicated file for the ICAO application in a file
system on the chip and
• the associated guidance documentation.
The TOE is a Smart Device with an operating system (Starcos) and a dedicated
file-system, that contains all data relevant for the ICAO application.
For details on the MRTD chip and IC Dedicated Software see the certification
report BSI-DSZ-CC-0312-2006 [13] for the Philips chip P5CT072V0N.
Following the protection profile PP0002 for SmarCard IC platforms [12, Fig. 15]
the life cycle phases of a Passport device can be divided into the following
seven phases:
• Phase 1: Development of operating system software by the operating
system manufacturer
• Phase 2: Development of the smart card controller by the semiconductor
manufacturer
• Phase 3: Fabrication of the smart card controller (integrated circuit) by
the semiconductor manufacturer
• Phase 4: Installation of the chip in an inlay with an antenna
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0429-2007
• Phase 5: Completion of the smart card operating system
• Phase 6: Initialisation and personalization of the MRTD
• Phase 7: Operational phase of the MRTD
According to the MRTD BAC PP [9] the TOE life cycle is described in terms of
the four life cycle phases.
• Life cycle phase 1 “Development”: Development of Hardware and
Software. This life cycle phase 1 covers Phase 1 and Phase 2 of PP0002
[12]8
.
• Life cycle phase 2 “Manufacturing”: IC Production, Initialisation and Pre-
Personalization of the MRTD Application. This life cycle phase 2
corresponds to Phase 3 and Phase 4 of PP0002 [12] and may include for
flexibility reasons Phase 5 and some production processes from Phase 6
as well9
.
• Life cycle phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”: This life cycle phase
corresponds to the remaining initialisation and personalization processes
not covered yet from Phase 6 of the PP0002 [12].
• Life cycle phase 4 “Operational Use”. This life cycle phase corresponds
to the Phase 7 of the PP0002 [12].
The TOE is finished after initialisation, testing the OS and creation of the
dedicated file system with security attributes and ready made for the import of
LDS. This corresponds to the end of life cycle phase 2 of the Protection Profile
MRTD BAC PP [9]. A more detailed description of the production processes in
Phases 5 and 6 of PP0002 resp. Phase 2 and 3 of the MRTD BAC PP is given
in the Administrator Guidance document [14].
The IT product Starcos 3.01 PE V1.1 was evaluated by TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH, Prüfstelle IT-Sicherheit. The evaluation was
completed on 27.06.2007. The TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH, Prüfstelle IT-
Sicherheit is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)10
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor, vendor and distributor is
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
Prinzregentenstraße 159
Postfach 80 07 29
81607 München
8
Software development at G&D, Munich; for hardware development sites refer to [13]
9
Completion, Initialisation and Pass Production at Bundesdruckerei (Berlin).
The personalization process at the Bundesdruckerei was not part of the evaluation.
For hardware manufacturing sites refer to [13]
10
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility .
B-4
BSI-DSZ-CC-0429-2007 Certification Report
1.1 Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see Annex C or [1], part
3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level
EAL4 augmented (Evaluation Assurance Level augmented). The following table
shows the augmented assurance components.
Requirement Identifier
EAL4 TOE evaluation: methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
+: ADV_IMP.2 Development – Implementation of the TSF
+: ALC_DVS.2 Life cycle support – Sufficiency of security measures
Table 1: Assurance components and EAL-augmentation
1.2 Functionality
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) selected in the Security
Target are Common Criteria Part 2 extended as shown in the following tables.
The following SFRs are taken from CC part 2:
Security Functional Requirement Identifier and addressed issue
FCS Cryptographic support
FCS_CKM.1/BAC_MRTD Cryptographic key generation – Generation
of Document Basic Access Keys by the TOE
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction - MRTD
FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD Cryptographic operation – Hash for Key
Derivation by MRTD
FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD Cryptographic operation – Encryption /
Decryption Triple-DES
FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD Cryptographic operation – Retail MAC
FDP User data protection
FDP_ACC.1 (PRIM) Subset access control – Primary Access
Control
FDP_ACC.1 (BASIC) Subset access control – Basic Access
control
FDP_ACF.1 (PRIM) Security attribute based access control –
Primary Access Control
FDP_ACF.1 (Basic) Security attribute based access control –
Basic Access Control
FDP_UCT.1/MRTD Basic data exchange confidentiality - MRTD
FDP_UIT.1/MRTD Data exchange integrity - MRTD
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0429-2007
Security Functional Requirement Identifier and addressed issue
FIA Identification and authentication
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.4/MRTD Single-use authentication mechanisms -
Single-use authentication of the Terminal by
the TOE
FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.6/MRTD Re-authenticating – Re-authenticating of
Terminal by the TOE
FMT Security Management
FMT_MOF.1 Management of functions in TSF
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Management of TSF data – Writing of
Initialization Data and Pre-personalization
Data
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Management of TSF data – Disabling of
Read Access to Initialization Data and Pre-
personalization Data
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data – Key Write
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ Management of TSF data – Key Read
FPT Protection of the TOE Security Functions
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
FPT_RVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP
FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation
Table 1: SFRs for the TOE taken from CC Part 2
The following CC part 2 extended SFRs are defined:
Security Functional Requirement Identifier and addressed issue
FAU Security Audit
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
FCS Cryptographic support
FCS_RND.1/MRTD Quality metric for random numbers
FMT Security management
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0429-2007 Certification Report
Security Functional Requirement Identifier and addressed issue
FPT Protection of the TOE Security Functions
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation
Table 2: SFRs for the TOE, CC part 2 extended
Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the ST [7] chapter 5.1.
The following Security Functional Requirements are defined for the IT-
Environment of the TOE:
Security Functional Requirement Identifier and addressed issue
FCS Cryptographic support
FCS_CKM.1/BAC_BT Cryptographic key generation – Generation
of Document Basic Access Keys by the
Basic Terminal
FCS_CKM.4/BT Cryptographic key destruction – BT
FCS_COP.1/SHA_BT Cryptographic operation – Hash Function by
the Basic Terminal
FCS_COP.1/ENC_BT Cryptographic operation – Secure
Messaging Encryption / Decryption by the
Basic Terminal
FCS_COP.1/MAC_BT Cryptographic operation – Secure
messaging Message Authentication Code by
the Basic Terminal
FCS_RND.1/BT Quality metric for random numbers - Basic
Terminal
FDP User data protection
FDP_DAU.1/DS Basic data authentication – Passive
Authentication
FDP_UCT.1/BT Basic data exchange confidentiality - Basic
Terminal
FDP_UIT.1/BT Data exchange integrity - Basic Terminal
FIA Identification and authentication
FIA_UAU.4/BT Single-use authentication mechanisms –
Basic Terminal
FIA_UAU.6/BT Re-authentication - Basic Terminal
FIA_API.1/SYM_PT Authentication Proof of Identity -
Personalization Terminal Authentication with
Symmetric Key
Table 3: SFRs for the IT-Environment
Note: Only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the ST [7] chapter 5.3.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0429-2007
These Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the TOE Security
Functions:
• SF.ACCESS (Access Control)
Before the TSF performs an operation requested by a user, this Security
function checks if the operation specific requirements on user
authorisation and protection of communication data are fulfilled.
• SF.ADMIN (Administration of the TOE)
The administration of the TOE is managed by this Security Function. The
TOE administration is mainly done in the initialisation and personalisation
phase.
• SF.AUTH (Authentication of the authorized TOE user)
The authentication of the Signatory is managed by this Security Function.
This Security function is only active during the usage phase.
• SF.CRYPTO (Cryptographic Support)
This Security Function provides the cryptographic support for the other
Security Functions.
• SF.PROTECTION (Protection of TSC)
This Security Function protects the TSF functionality, TSF data and user
data. If BAC is enabled, no unencrypted data transmission between TOE
and the outside of the TOE is allowed.
• SF.IC (Security Functions of the IC)
This Security Function covers the Security Functions of the IC.
For more details please refer to the Security Target [7], chapter 6.1.
1.3 Strength of Function
The TOE’s strength of functions is claimed high (SOF-High) for the security
functions SF.ADMIN, SF.AUTH, SF.CRYPTO, SF.IC.
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
For details see chapter 9 of this report.
1.4 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies
(OSPs) addressed by the evaluated IT product
The ST defines the following assets taken from the MRTD BAC PP [9]:
• Logical MRTD Data consisting of the data groups DG1 to DG16 and the
Document security object according to LDS [10] and
• Authenticity of the MRTD’s chip.
Assets have to be protected in terms of confidentiality and/or integrity.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0429-2007 Certification Report
The ST considers the following subjects taken from the MRTD BAC PP [9]:
• Manufacturer,
• MRTD Holder,
• Traveller,
• Personalization Agent,
• Inspection System (split into Primary Inspection System (PIS), Basic
Inspection System (BIS), and Extended Inspection System (EIS)),
• the Terminal and
• the Attacker.
For details refer to the Security Target [7] chapter 3.1.
The following list of considered threats for the TOE is defined in the Security
Target. They are taken from the MRTD BAC PP [9].
• T.Chip_ID Identification of MRTD’s chip
An attacker trying to trace the movement of the MRTD by identifying remotely
the MRTD’s chip by establishing or listening a communication through the
contactless communication interface. The attacker can not read and does not
know in advance the MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page.
• T.Skimming Skimming the logical MRTD11
An attacker imitates the inspection system to read the logical MRTD or parts of
it via the contactless communication channel of the TOE. The attacker can not
read and does not know in advance the MRZ data printed on the MRTD data
page.
• T.Eavesdropping Eavesdropping to the communication between
TOE and inspection system
An attacker is listening to the communication between the MRTD’s chip and an
inspection system to gain the logical MRTD or parts of it. The inspection system
uses the MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page but the attacker does not
know this data in advance.
• T.Forgery Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip
An attacker alters fraudulently the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of
it including its security related data in order to impose on an inspection system
by means of the changed MRTD holder’s identity or biometric reference data.
This threat comprises several attack scenarios of MRTD forgery.
11
Logical MRTD: Data of the MRTD holder stored on the contactless integrated circuit
according to the Logical Data Structure [10].
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0429-2007
• T.Abuse-Func Abuse of Functionality
An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in TOE
operational phase in order (i) to manipulate User Data, (ii) to manipulate
(explore, bypass, deactivate or change) security features or functions of the
TOE or (iii) to disclose or to manipulate TSF Data. This threat addresses the
misuse of the functions for the initialisation and the personalization in the
operational state after delivery to the MRTD holder.
• T.Information_Leakage Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip
An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during its
usage in order to disclose confidential TSF data. The information leakage may
be inherent in the normal operation or caused by the attacker.
• T.Phys-Tamper Physical Tampering
An attacker may perform physical probing of the MRTD’s chip in order to
disclose TSF Data to disclose/reconstruct the MRTD’s chip Embedded
Software. An attacker may physically modify the MRTD’s chip in order to (i)
modify security features or functions of the MRTD’s chip, (ii) modify security
functions of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software, (iii) to modify User Data or
(iv) to modify TSF data.
• T.Malfunction Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
An attacker may cause a malfunction of the TSF or of the MRTD’s chip
Embedded Software by applying environmental stress in order to (i) deactivate
or modify security features or functions of the TOE or (ii) circumvent or
deactivate or modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software.
For more details refer to the Security Target chapter 3.3.
The TOE shall comply to the following organisation security policies as security
rules, procedures, practices, or guidelines imposed by an organisation upon its
operations:
• P.Manufact Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip
The IC Manufacturer and MRTD Manufacturer ensure the quality and the
security of the manufacturing process and control the MRTD’s material in the
Phase 2 Manufacturing. The Initialisation Data are written by the IC
Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The MRTD Manufacturer writes the
Pre-personalization Data which contains at least the Personalization Agent Key.
• P.Personalization Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State
or Organisation only
The issuing State or Organisation guarantees the correctness of the
biographical data, the printed portrait and the digitised portrait, the biometric
reference data and other data of the logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD
holder. The personalization of the MRTD for the holder is performed by
authorised agents of the issuing State or Organisation only.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0429-2007 Certification Report
• P.Personal_Data Personal data protection policy
The biographical data and their summary printed in the MRZ and stored on the
MRTD’s chip (DG1), the printed portrait and the digitised portrait (DG2), the
biometric reference data of finger(s) (DG3), the biometric reference data of iris
image(s) (DG4) and data according to LDS (DG5 to DG14, DG16) stored on the
MRTD’s chip are personal data of the MRTD holder. These data groups are
intended to be used only with agreement of the MRTD holder by inspection
systems to which the MRTD is presented. The MRTD’s chip shall provide the
possibility for the Basic Access Control to allow read access to these data only
for terminals successfully authenticated based on knowledge of the Document
Basic Access Keys as defined in [10].
1.5 Special configuration requirements
The issuing State or Organisation decides (i) to enable the Basic Access
Control for the protection of the MRTD holder personal data or (ii) to disable the
Basic Access Control to allow Primary Inspection Systems of the receiving
States and all other terminals to read the logical MRTD. This configuration is
performed during the personalization phase 3 of the TOE life cycle.
1.6 Assumptions about the operating environment
The assumptions are describe the security aspects of the environment in which
the TOE will be used or is intended to be used. The ST defines the following
assumptions taken from the MRTD BAC PP [9]:
• A.Pers_Agent Personalization of the MRTD’s chip
The Personalization Agent ensures the correctness of (i) the logical MRTD with
respect to the MRTD holder, (ii) the Document Basic Access Keys, (iii) the
Active Authentication Public Key Info (DG15) if stored on the MRTD’s chip, and
(iv) the Document Signer Public Key Certificate (if stored on the MRTD’s chip)
on the MRTD’s chip. (Note: Because the Active Authentication Public Key Info
(DG15) is not stored on the TOE, this assumption from the MRTD BAC PP [8] is
not relevant.) The Personalization Agent signs the Document Security Object.
The Personalization Agent bears the Personalization Agent Authentication to
authenticate himself to the TOE by symmetric cryptographic mechanisms.
• A.Insp_Sys Inspection Systems for global interoperability
The Inspection System is used by the border control officer of the receiving
State (i) examining an MRTD presented by the traveller and verifying its
authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveller as MRTD holder. The Primary
Inspection System for global interoperability contains the Country Signing Public
Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organisation
[9]. The Primary Inspection System performs the Passive Authentication to
verify the logical MRTD if the logical MRTD is not protected by Basic Access
Control. The Basic Inspection System in addition to the Primary Inspection
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System implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control and reads the
logical MRTD being under Basic access Control.
1.7 Disclaimers
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Starcos 3.01 PE V1.1
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW /
SW
Chip modules with Philips
P5CT072V0N including
STARCOS 3.01 PE V1.1
- ROM mask of the TOE
already Implemented:
"P5CT072EV4/T0N49360”
(MOB4).
CPAZ0SCSR30-
01Au_V200
dated 08.06.2004
SW completely contained in
ROM and EEPROM memory,
chip mounted into an inlay
package initialised and tested
- EEPROM part of the TOE
loaded before TOE delivery:
Initialisation Table ID: 02 41
01 00 EA 64 C5 24 96 43
2C 7D
CPAZ0SCSR301
-01Cu_V100
dated 14.12.2006
2 DOC Administrator Guidance
STARCOS 3.01 PE V1.1
[14]
Version 2.2,
9. February 2007
Document in electronic form
(encrypted / signed)
3 DOC User guidance STARCOS
3.01 PE V1.1 [15]
Version 1.1,
18. April 2007
Document in electronic form
(encrypted / signed)
4 DOC Correspondence between
initialisation table and
Common Criteria
Certification [16]
Version 1.4,
6. February 2007
Document in electronic form
(encrypted / signed)
5 DOC Installation, generation and
start up STARCOS 3.01 PE
V1.1[17]
Version 1.0,
9. February 2007
Document in electronic form
(encrypted / signed)
Table 4: Deliverables of the TOE
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The TOE is finalized at the end of phase 2 according to the MRTD BAC PP.
Delivery is performed from the Initialization facility to the personalisation facility.
Any delivery of the initialised inlays is done via a security transport of the MRTD
Manufacturer (G&D) or a security transport maintained by the Personalization
Agent. This delivery process has therefore to be regarded as 'personal pickup'.
In addition, the correct inlay modules for the TOE are secured by cryptographic
means. Furthermore, the personalizer receives information about the
personalisation commands and process requirements. To ensure that the
personalizer receives this evaluated version, the procedures to start the
personalisation process as described in the administrator manual for
personalisation [14] have to be followed.
3 Security Policy
The security policy of the TOE is defined according to the MRTD BAC PP [9] by
the security objectives and requirements for the contactless chip of machine
readable travel documents (MRTD) based on the requirements and
recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). It
addresses the advanced security methods Basic Access Control in the
Technical reports of the ICAO New Technology Working Group.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The assumptions on Personalization of the MRTD’s chip and on Inspection
Systems for global interoperability as outlined above are of relevance.
The state or organisation issues the MRTD to be used by the holder for
international travel. The traveller presents a MRTD to the inspection system to
prove his or her identity. The authentication of the traveller is based on (i) the
possession of a valid MRTD personalized for a holder with the claimed identity
as given on the biographical data page and (ii) biometrics using the reference
data stored in the MRTD. The issuing State or Organisation ensure the
authenticity of the data of genuine MRTD’s. The receiving State trust a genuine
MRTD of a issuing State or Organisation.
5 Architectural Information
The TOE consists of hardware and embedded software which can be separated
into the following subsystems: Access Control, Setup, Commands, Application
Data and Basic Functions, Crypto Functions, Secure Messaging, Hardware.
At the subsystem ‘Setup’ the startup of the TOE is initiated. This subsystem
calls ‘Access control’ for the initialisation of security states. Then ‘Setup’ gives
the control to ‘Commands’ which receives command messages via the
corresponding interfaces of ‘Hardware’, calls ‘Access control’ for verification of
access conditions, calls ‘Secure Messaging’ for verification and unwrapping of
the incoming message if BAC is required, performs the command execution,
calls ‘Secure Messaging’ for wrapping of the outgoing message, calls
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‘Hardware’ for transmitting the outgoing message and then starts this process
again. ‘Crypto functions’ and ‘Application Data and basic functions’ are general
support subsystems which are called for cryptographic support or access to
application data, respectively.
The TSF of the software uses the hardware via evaluated hardware interfaces.
External interface of the composite TOE used in the MRTD application is a
specific set of commands operating on a defined file-system of the application.
This interface is available to the inspection system via the contactless chip
interface.
6 Documentation
The administrator guidance document [14] describes the tasks of an
administrator to install and configure the TOE in a secure manner. This
administrator guidance is addressed to all persons who are responsible for
configuring, maintaining and administering the TOE e.g. for personalisation the
Personalization Agent of the TOE who needs information about security
procedures and how the TOE supports the personalisation process.
Information for initialisation is also included in [14] although this process is
performed before TOE delivery.
The user guidance document [15] is provided for the developer of an inspection
system who needs information how the TOE interacts with the inspection
system and includes requirements for the issuer and MRTD holder.
The document “Correspondence between initialisation table and Common
Criteria Certification” [16] defines the initialisation table relevant for the TOE.
7 IT Product Testing
Developer tests, independent evaluator tests and penetration tests were
performed using MRTD chips Starcos 3.01 PE V1.1 on Philips P5CT072V0N
composed of the hardware chip, its dedicated software, the operating system
and a file-system for the ICAO application. Both the Passive Authentication and
BAC (Basic Access Control) configurations were tested. The Tests have been
conducted via the contactless interface. The composite smartcard TOE was
tested by using specific tools.
All TSF and related sub-functions and subsystems are tested in order to assure
complete coverage of all SFR. The Test suites were implemented in
accordance with functional specification and high level design in order to verify
the TOE’s compliance with its expected behaviour. All test cases in each test
suite were run successfully on this TOE version. The developer performed
functional tests with a TOE in the personalization phase and in the operational
phase. The test coverage analysis and the test depth analysis gave evidence
that the TOE was systematically tested on the level of the functional
specification and on subsystem level.
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The tests were performed using a smart card simulator and real chips with the
TOE software and the ICAO file-system.
During independent testing the evaluator has verified the developer’s test by
performing the whole developer’s test campaign covering all security functions.
During the evaluator’s TSF testing the TOE operated as specified.
Independent evaluator tests were performed in various life cycle phases of the
TOE using real chips and an emulator. The tests confirmed the expected
behaviour as specified.
The evaluators penetration tests confirmed the effectiveness of all security
functions of the TOE. During these tests the different life cycle phases were
considered. The penetration tests were performed based on the developers
vulnerability analysis and based on the independent vulnerability analysis of the
evaluator. Potential vulnerabilities were assessed upon their exploitability by
analysis and tests. Analysis results and test results showed that potential
vulnerabilities are not exploitable in the intended operational environment of the
TOE and that the TOE is resistant against low attack potential AVA_VLA.2 as
specified.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is delivered in form of initialised and tested inlay modules. This
corresponds to the end of life cycle phase 2 of the Protection Profile MRTD
BAC PP [9].
All procedures for personalisation and configuration for the end-user necessary
after delivery are described in the Administrator Guidance document [14].
The TOE only features two fixed configurations which cannot be altered by the
end user. One configuration is Passive Authentication and the other is Basic
Authentication Control (BAC). The personalizer sets the TOE to one of the
above configurations. Both configurations have the same version number. The
TOE was tested in both configurations. The evaluation and subsequent
certification are only valid for Starcos 3.01 PE V1.1
The certification body shall be advised of any modifications made to this
configuration and of modifications to the initialisation tables listed in Table 5 by
the developer. The certification body will then check if the certification results
are still valid and initiate further steps concerning a re-evaluation and re-
certification, if necessary.
9 Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [8] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as
relevant for the TOE.
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As the evaluation of the TOE was conducted as a composition evaluation, the
ETR [8] includes also the evaluation results of the composite evaluation activi-
ties in accordance with CC Supporting Document, ETR-lite for Composition:
Annex A Composite smart card evaluation [4, AIS 36]. The ETR [8] builds up on
the ETR-lite for Composition document of the evaluation of the underlying
Philips chip P5CT072V0N (see BSI-DSZ-CC-0312-2006 [13]).
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components identical
with EAL4. For components beyond EAL4 the methodology was defined in co-
ordination with the Certification Body [4, AIS 34]). For smart card specific
methodology the scheme interpretations AIS 25, AIS 26 and AIS 36 (see [4])
were used.
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL4
augmented and the class ASE for the Security Target evaluation) are
summarised in the following table.
Assurance classes and components Verdict
Security Target evaluation CC Class ASE PASS
TOE description ASE_DES.1 PASS
Security environment ASE_ENV.1 PASS
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
PP claims ASE_PPC.1 PASS
IT security requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements ASE_SRE.1 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Configuration management CC Class ACM PASS
Partial CM automation ACM_AUT.1 PASS
Generation support and acceptance procedures ACM_CAP.4 PASS
Problem tracking CM coverage ACM_SCP.2 PASS
Delivery and operation CC Class ADO PASS
Detection of modification ADO_DEL.2 PASS
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures ADO_IGS.1 PASS
Development CC Class ADV PASS
Fully defined external interfaces ADV_FSP.2 PASS
Security enforcing high-level design ADV_HLD.2 PASS
Implementation of the TSF ADV_IMP.2 PASS
Descriptive low-level design ADV_LLD.1 PASS
Informal correspondence demonstration ADV_RCR.1 PASS
Informal TOE security policy model ADV_SPM.1 PASS
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Assurance classes and components Verdict
Guidance documents CC Class AGD PASS
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM.1 PASS
User guidance AGD_USR.1 PASS
Life cycle support CC Class ALC PASS
Sufficiency of security measures ALC_DVS.2 PASS
Developer defined life-cycle model ALC_LCD.1 PASS
Well-defined development tools ALC_TAT.1 PASS
Tests CC Class ATE PASS
Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS
Testing: high-level design ATE_DPT.1 PASS
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
Independent testing - sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
Vulnerability assessment CC Class AVA PASS
Validation of analysis AVA_MSU.2 PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_SOF.1 PASS
Independent vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA.2 PASS
Table 5: Verdicts for the assurance components
The evaluation has shown that:
• the TOE is conformant to the PP Machine Readable Travel Document
with „ICAO Application", Basic Access Control, version 1.0 (BSI-PP-
0017-2005) [9]
• Security Functional Requirements specified for the TOE are PP
conformant and Common Criteria Part 2 extended
• the assurance of the TOE is Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL4
augmented by ADV_IMP.2 (Implementation of the TSF) and ALC_DVS.2
(Sufficiency of security measures).
The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function
SOF-high: SF.ADMIN, SF.AUTH, SF.CRYPTO, SF.IC. The rating of the
strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for
encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). This holds
for the Triple-DES functionality.
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production
environment see annex A in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the Starcos 3.01 PE V1.1.
The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification or assurance continuity of the
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modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the
evaluation of the modified product does not reveal any security deficiencies.
10 Comments/Recommendations
The operational documents [14] and [15] contain necessary information about
the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered.
The TOEs implemented security functions meet the claimed Strength of
Function SOF-high from design and construction point of view. The strength of
function available in a specific system context where the TOE is used depends
on the selection of the data used to set up the communication to the TOE.
Therefore, the issuing state or organisation is responsible for the strength of
function that can be achieved in a specific system context. This has to be
assessed in the specific system context. Then, the administrator (personalizer)
is in collaboration with the issuing state or organisation responsible to provide
keys with sufficient entropy, as required by the specific system context.
Furthermore an appropriate protection after the initialization must be ensured up
to delivery to the end-user to prevent any possible copy, modification, retention,
theft, or unauthorized use of the TOE and of its manufacturing and test data
(refer to the assumption A.Process-Card from the ST of the hardware platform).
Only chips from the production sites (waferfabs, module production sites) as
outlined in the certification reports for the Philips chip P5CT072V0N (BSI-DSZ-
CC-0312-2005 [13]) shall be used.
The Personalization Agent has to verify that the correct version of the TOE was
delivered.
Defect chips and invalid passports including a chip must be destroyed in a way
that the chip itself is destructed.
11 Annexes
Annex A: Evaluation results regarding the development and production
environment (see part D of this report).
12 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the security target [7] of the target of evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document. It is a sanitized version of the
complete security target [6] used for the evaluation performed.
13.1 Acronyms
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
BAC Basic Access Control
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BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation
DOC Document
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EEPROM Electronically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
ES Embedded Software
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IC Integrated Circuit
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation
LDS Logical Data Structure
MRTD Machine Readable Travel Document
MRZ Machine Readable Zone
PP Protection Profile
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
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Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.3, August 2005
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Evaluation Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
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[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[6] Securtity Target STARCOS 3.01 PE V1.1, BSI-DSZ-CC-0429-2007,
Version 3.7, 9 February 2007, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH (confidential
document)
[7] Security Target Lite STARCOS 3.01 PE V1.1, BSI-DSZ-CC-0429-2007,
Version 1.0, 10.07.2007, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH (sanitized public
document)
[8] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1, 4 June 2007, CC Evaluation of
STARCOS 3.01 PE Version 1.1 , TÜVIT (confidential document)
[9] Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document
with „ICAO Application", Basic Access Control, BSI-PP-0017, Version
1.0, 18 August 2005, BSI
[10] Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, Development of
a Logical Data Structure – LDS, For Optional Capacity Expansion
Technologies, Revision –1.7, published by authority of the secretary
general, International Civil Aviation Organisation, LDS 1.7, 18 May 2004
[11] Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, PKI for Machine
Readable Travel Documents Offering ICC Read-Only Access, Version -
1.1, Date - 01 October 2004, published by authority of the secretary
general, International Civil Aviation Organisation
[12] Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July 2001, BSI
registration ID: BSI-PP-0002-2001, developed by Atmel Smart Card ICs,
Hitachi Ltd., Infineon Technologies AG, Philips Semiconductors
[13] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0312-2005 for Philips Secure Smart
Card Controller P5CT072V0N including OM9500/1 and OM9501/2,
P5CD072V0N and P5CD036V0N with specific IC Dedicated Software,
7 October 2005, BSI
[14] Administrator Guidance STARCOS 3.01 PE V1.1, Giesecke & Devrient
GmbH, Version 2.2, 9 February 2007
[15] User guidance STARCOS 3.01 PE V1.1, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH,
Version 1.1, 18 April 2007
[16] Correspondence between initialisation table and Common Criteria
Certification, V1.4, 6 February 2007
[17] Installation, generation and start up STARCOS 3.01 PE V1.1, Version
1.0, 9 February 2007
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0429-2007 Certification Report
C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements
that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result
is presented with respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3
(assurance requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of
requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
a) CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the
functional requirements are based only upon functional components in
CC Part 2.
b) CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the
functional requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
a) CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the
assurance requirements are based only upon assurance components in
CC Part 3.
b) CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the
assurance requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part
3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect
to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
a) Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-
defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) include all components in the
packages listed as part of the conformance result.
b) Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-
defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all
components in the packages listed as part of the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect
to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
a) PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of
the conformance result.“
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CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are
shown in Table 1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
ACM: Configuration management CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
ADV: Development TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
Development security (ALC_DVS)
ALC: Life cycle support Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
Coverage (ATE_COV)
ATE: Tests Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that
balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of
acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate
concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of
maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are
included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful
and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and
components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and
STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a
hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families.
Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component
where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation
assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance.
They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more
assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is
accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component
from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth)
and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no
more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance
dependencies of every component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other
combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the
addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already
included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another
hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an
EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be
augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component”
is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it
the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of
the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended
with explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance Class Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but
the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where
independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has
been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer,
including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the
guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could
be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE,
and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a
manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection
against identified threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of
design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the
part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such
it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the
absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a
situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the
developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from
positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of
existing sound development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough
investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-
engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other
resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically
feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in
conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-
specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security
engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported
by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a
TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5
assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5
requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of
specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development
and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable
costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to
produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant
risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for
application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets
justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies
the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with
tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal
analysis.“
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Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted,
it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept
of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their
security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical
analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required
to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE
security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of
the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to
violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover
flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the
ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised
capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of
all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance
level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified
vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found
useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by
the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the
TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a
low (for AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for
AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant)
attack potential.”
BSI-DSZ-CC-0429-2007 Certification Report
D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment D-3
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Annex A of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0429-2007
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Starcos 3.01 PE V1.1 (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been
evaluated at an accredited and licensed/ approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC
15408:2005) extended by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL4 and smart card specific guidance for conformance to the
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 18. July 2007, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common
Criteria assurance requirements
• ACM – Configuration management (i.e. ACM_AUT.1, ACM_CAP.4,
ACM_SCP.2),
• ADO – Delivery and operation (i.e. ADO_DEL.2, ADO_IGS.1) and
• ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1),
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
a) Giesecke & Devrient GmbH, Prinzregentenstrasse 159, 81677 München,
Germany (Development Center)
b) Bundesdruckerei, Oranienstrasse 91, 10958 Berlin, Germany (TOE
Completion, Initialisation and Pass Production).
c) For development and productions sites regarding the Philips chip
P5CT072V0N refer to the certification report BSI-DSZ-CC-0312-2005.
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in
accordance with the Security Target (Securtity Target STARCOS 3.01 PE V1.1,
BSI-DSZ-CC-0429-2007, Version 3.7, 9 February 2007, Giesecke & Devrient
GmbH [6]). The evaluators verified, that the requirements for the TOE life cycle
phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security Target [6]) are fulfilled by the
procedures of these sites.
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