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Public Security Target
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© IDEMIA. All rights reserved.
Specifications and information are subject to change without notice.
The products described in this document are subject to continuous development and improvement.
All trademarks and service marks referred to herein, whether registered or not in specific countries, are the properties of their respective owners.
- Printed versions of this document are uncontrolled -
About IDEMIA
OT-Morpho is now IDEMIA, the global leader in trusted identities for an increasingly
digital world, with the ambition to empower citizens and consumers alike to interact, pay,
connect, travel and vote in ways that are now possible in a connected environment.
Securing our identity has become mission critical in the world we live in today. By
standing for Augmented Identity, we reinvent the way we think, produce, use and protect
this asset, whether for individuals or for objects. We ensure privacy and trust as well as
guarantee secure, authenticated and verifiable transactions for international clients from
Financial, Telecom, Identity, Security and IoT sectors.
With close to €3bn in revenues, IDEMIA is the result of the merger between OT
(Oberthur Technologies) and Safran Identity & Security (Morpho). This new company
counts 14,000 employees of more than 80 nationalities and serves clients in 180
countries.
| For more information, visit www.idemia.com / Follow @IdemiaGroup on Twitter
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DOCUMENT MANAGEMENT
Business Unit – Department CI – R&D
Document type FQR
Document Title CombICAO Applet v2.1 in EAC configuration on Cosmo V9.1
– Public Security Target
FQR No 550 0085
FQR Issue 3
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DOCUMENT REVISION
Date Revision Modification
2020/03/17 1 Creation of the document
2020/04/13 2 Updated Platform version
2020/06/17 3 Updated reference of guidance documents
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 GENERAL............................................................................................................... 9
1.1 INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................ 9
1.2 PRODUCT OVERVIEW ......................................................................................................... 9
2 ST INTRODUCTION............................................................................................. 11
2.1 ST REFERENCE AND TOE REFERENCE....................................................................................11
2.1.1 ST reference.........................................................................................................11
2.1.2 TOE reference.......................................................................................................11
2.2 TOE OVERVIEW ..............................................................................................................12
2.2.1 Usage and major security features of the TOE ........................................................12
2.2.2 TOE type ..............................................................................................................14
2.2.3 Required non-TOE hardware/Software/firmware .....................................................14
2.3 TOE DESCRIPTION ..........................................................................................................14
2.3.1 Physical scope of the TOE......................................................................................14
2.3.2 TOE delivery .........................................................................................................15
2.3.3 Logical scope of the TOE .......................................................................................17
2.3.4 Authentication Protocols ........................................................................................18
2.3.5 Basic Access Control (BAC) ....................................................................................18
2.3.6 Machine Readable Travel Document (MRTD) ..........................................................19
2.3.7 Enhanced protection over Sensitive biometric data reading......................................19
2.4 LIFE CYCLE....................................................................................................................20
2.4.1 Development Environment.....................................................................................21
2.4.2 Production Environment ........................................................................................22
2.4.3 Preparation Environment .......................................................................................23
2.4.4 Operational Environment .......................................................................................23
3 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS..................................................................................... 24
3.1 COMMON CRITERIA CONFORMANCE ......................................................................................24
3.2 PROTECTION PROFILE CONFORMANCE ...................................................................................24
3.2.1 Overview..............................................................................................................24
3.2.2 Assumptions .........................................................................................................25
3.2.3 Threats ................................................................................................................25
3.2.4 Organizational Security Policies ..............................................................................26
3.2.5 Security Objectives................................................................................................26
3.3 CC CONFORMANCE AND USAGE IN REAL LIFE ...........................................................................27
4 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION ..................................................................... 28
4.1 ASSETS.........................................................................................................................28
4.2 USERS / SUBJECTS...........................................................................................................28
4.3 THREATS.......................................................................................................................30
4.4 ORGANISATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES ..................................................................................32
4.5 ASSUMPTIONS ................................................................................................................34
5 SECURITY OBJECTIVES ...................................................................................... 36
5.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE ...................................................................................36
5.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ....................................................39
5.2.1 Issuing State or Organization.................................................................................39
5.2.2 Receiving State or Organization .............................................................................40
5.2.3 Additional Security Objectives for the Operational Environment................................42
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5.3 SECURITY OBJECTIVES RATIONALE.......................................................................................42
5.3.1 Threats ................................................................................................................42
5.3.2 Organisational Security Policies ..............................................................................44
5.3.3 Assumptions .........................................................................................................45
5.3.4 SPD and Security Objectives ..................................................................................46
6 EXTENDED REQUIREMENTS ............................................................................... 51
6.1 EXTENDED FAMILIES ........................................................................................................51
6.1.1 Extended Family FPT_EMS - TOE Emanation...........................................................51
6.1.2 Extended Family FMT_LIM - Limited capabilities......................................................52
6.1.3 Extended Family FAU_SAS - Audit data storage.......................................................53
6.1.4 Extended Family FIA_API - Authentication Proof of Identity.....................................54
6.1.5 Extended Family FCS_RND - Generation of random numbers...................................55
7 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ................................................................................ 56
7.1 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ................................................................................56
7.1.1 Class FAU Security Audit........................................................................................56
7.1.2 Class FCS Cryptographic Support ...........................................................................56
7.1.3 Class FIA Identification and Authentication .............................................................60
7.1.4 Class FDP User Data Protection..............................................................................63
7.1.5 Class FMT Security Management............................................................................67
7.1.6 Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions ........................................................72
7.1.7 Class FTP Trusted path/channels............................................................................73
7.2 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS..................................................................................73
7.2.1 ADV Development.................................................................................................73
7.2.2 AGD Guidance documents .....................................................................................79
7.2.3 ALC Life-cycle support ...........................................................................................80
7.2.4 ASE Security Target evaluation ..............................................................................84
7.2.5 ATE Tests.............................................................................................................90
7.2.6 AVA Vulnerability assessment ................................................................................93
7.3 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE ..................................................................................94
7.3.1 Objectives ............................................................................................................94
7.3.2 Rationale tables of Security Objectives and SFRs.....................................................99
7.3.3 Dependencies .....................................................................................................103
7.3.4 Rationale for the Security Assurance Requirements ...............................................108
7.3.5 ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures .........................................................108
7.3.6 AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis .........................................108
8 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION....................................................................... 110
8.1 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION.........................................................................................110
8.2 SFRS AND TSS.............................................................................................................115
8.2.1 SFRs and TSS - Rationale ....................................................................................115
8.2.2 Association tables of SFRs and TSS ......................................................................120
9 GLOSSARY AND ACRONYMS............................................................................. 125
9.1 GLOSSARY ...................................................................................................................125
9.2 ACRONYMS ..................................................................................................................131
10 REFERENCES..................................................................................................... 133
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TABLE OF FIGURES
Figure 1 Physical Form of the Module ............................................................................................15
Figure 2 TOE Boundaries ..............................................................................................................17
Figure 3 Life cycle Overview..........................................................................................................21
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TABLE OF TABLES
Table 1 ST reference ....................................................................................................................11
Table 2 TOE reference..................................................................................................................11
Table 3 BAC Configuration ............................................................................................................19
Table 4 Roles identification on the life cycle ...................................................................................20
Table 5 Image containing both Java Card platform and applet is loaded at IC manufacturer (Option 1)
............................................................................................................................................22
Table 6 Cap file of CombICAO v2.1 applet is loaded (using GP) (Option 2).......................................23
Table 7 Image containing both platform and applet is loaded through the loader of the IC (Option 3)
............................................................................................................................................23
Table 8 Common Criteria conformance claim..................................................................................24
Table 9 Protection Profile conformance ..........................................................................................25
Table 10 Threats and Security Objectives - Coverage ....................................................................47
Table 11 Security Objectives and Threats - Coverage ....................................................................48
Table 12 OSPs and Security Objectives - Coverage........................................................................48
Table 13 Security Objectives and OSPs - Coverage ........................................................................49
Table 14 Assumptions and Security Objectives for the Operational Environment - Coverage.............49
Table 15 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment and Assumptions - Coverage.............50
Table 16 Security Objectives and SFRs - Coverage ......................................................................100
Table 17 SFRs and Security Objectives .......................................................................................103
Table 18 SFRs Dependencies .....................................................................................................106
Table 19 SARs Dependencies .....................................................................................................108
Table 20 SFRs and TSS - Coverage.............................................................................................122
Table 21 TSS and SFRs - Coverage.............................................................................................124
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1 GENERAL
1.1 Introduction
This security target describes the security needs induced by the CombICAO v2.1 Applet product in
EAC configuration on IDEMIA underlying Java Card ID-ONE Cosmo V9.1 Platform, see 2.1.2 .
The objectives of this Security Target are:
 To describe the Target of Evaluation (TOE), its life cycle and to position it in the smart card life
cycle,
 To describe the security environment of the TOE including the assets to be protected and the
threats to be countered by the TOE and by the operational environment during the platform
active phases,
 To describe the security objectives of the TOE and its supporting environment in terms of
integrity and confidentiality of sensitive information. It includes protection of the TOE (and its
documentation) during the product active phases,
 To specify the security requirements which include the TOE functional requirements, the TOE
assurance requirements and the security requirements for the environment,
 To describe the summary of the TOE specification including a description of the security
functions and assurance measures that meet the TOE security requirements,
 To present evidence that this ST is a complete and cohesive set of requirements that the TOE
provides on an effective set of IT security countermeasures within the security environment,
and that the TOE summary specification addresses the requirements.
1.2 Product overview
The product is designed to support the following usages:
1. eMRTD as per [ICAO_9303] and European provisions [TR_03110]; scope of the current
ST
2. ISO compliant driving license as per [ISO/IEC_18013] and [ISO/IEC_19446]; (out of the scope
of the current ST)
3. digital identity and electronic services; (out of the scope of the current ST)
It is achieved thanks to a flexible design allowing to “build” during personalization of the applet the
required application(s) by configuring accordingly:
 the file system;
 authentication protocols;
 the user authentication credentials;
 access conditions on files;
The product can be personalized to support an eMRTD application compliant with [ICAO_9303] and
European provisions [TR_03110].
The TOE can be configured in five configurations.
However, The current ST addresses CombICAO Applet v2.1 in configuration 2) below.
1) CombICAO Applet v2.1 product in BAC configuration with CA,
2) CombICAO Applet v2.1 product in EAC configuration,
3) CombICAO Applet v2.1 product in EAC with PACE configuration,
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4) CombICAO Applet v2.1 product in EAC with PACE configuration for French ID
5) CombICAO Applet v2.1 product in SSCD configuration
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2 ST INTRODUCTION
2.1 ST reference and TOE reference
2.1.1 ST reference
Title
CombICAO v2.1 Applet in EAC configuration on Cosmo V9.1 – Public
Security Target
ST Identification FQR 550 0085
ST Version 3
Authors IDEMIA
ITSEF CEA-LETI
Certification Body ANSSI
EAL
EAL5 augmented with:
 AVA_VAN.5
 ALC_DVS.2
PP [PP_EAC]
Table 1 ST reference
2.1.2 TOE reference
Product Name CombICAO v2.1 Applet
TOE Name CombICAO v2.1 Applet in EAC configuration on ID-ONE Cosmo
V9.1
Developer Name IDEMIA
TOE Identification SAAAAR code: 203523
Platform Name ID-One Cosmo V9.1 Platform
Platform Identification 092914
Platform Certificate [PTF_CERT]
Guidance documents [Applet_Perso_Guide], [Applet_User_Guide]
[PTF_AGD_PRE], [PTF_AGD_OPE], [PTF_AGD_SEC_AC],
[PTF_AGD1], [PTF_AGD2], [PTF_AGD3], [PTF_AGD4] and
[PTF_AGD5]
Table 2 TOE reference
In order to assure the authenticity of the card, the TOE Identification shall be verified by
analyzing the response of the command GET DATA, see section 4 of [Applet_Perso_Guide]
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2.2 TOE overview
2.2.1 Usage and major security features of the TOE
A State or Organization issues MRTDs to be used by the holder for international travel. The traveler
presents a MRTD to the inspection system to prove his or her identity. The MRTD in context of this
Security Target contains (i) visual (eye readable) biographical data and portrait of the holder, (ii) a
separate data summary (MRZ data) for visual and machine reading using OCR methods in the
Machine readable zone (MRZ) and (iii) data elements on the MRTD’s chip according to LDS for
contactless machine reading. The authentication of the traveler is based on (i) the possession of a
valid MRTD personalized for a holder with the claimed identity as given on the biographical data page
and (ii) optional biometrics using the reference data stored in the MRTD. The issuing State or
Organization ensures the authenticity of the data of genuine MRTD’s. The receiving State trusts a
genuine MRTD of an issuing State or Organization.
The MRTD is viewed as unit of
(a) the physical MRTD as travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip. It presents
visual readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the MRTD holder
(1) the biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book,
(2) the printed data in the Machine-Readable Zone (MRZ) and
(3) the printed portrait.
(b) the logical MRTD as data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data
Structure [ICAO_9303] as specified by ICAO on the contactless integrated circuit. It
presents contactless readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the
MRTD holder
(1) the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1),
(2) the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
(3) the optional biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s)
(EF.DG4) or both
(4) the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16) and
(5) the Document security object.
The issuing State or Organization implements security features of the MRTD to maintain the
authenticity and integrity of the MRTD and their data. The MRTD as the passport book and the
MRTD’s chip is uniquely identified by the Document Number.
The physical MRTD is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on paper, security
printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the MRTD’s chip) and organizational security measures
(e.g. control of materials, personalization procedures) [ICAO_9303]. These security measures include
the binding of the MRTD’s chip to the passport book.
The logical MRTD is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created by the
document signer acting for the issuing State or Organization and the security features of the MRTD’s
chip.
The ICAO defines the baseline security methods Passive Authentication and the optional advanced
security methods Basic Access Control to the logical MRTD, Extended Access Control to and the Data
Encryption of additional sensitive biometrics as optional security measure in the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’
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[ICAO_9303]. The Passive Authentication Mechanism and the Data Encryption are performed
completely and independently on the TOE by the TOE environment.
This security target addresses the protection of the logical travel document (i) in integrity by write-only-
once access control and by physical means, and (ii) in confidentiality by the Extended Access Control
Mechanism. Also it addresses the Chip Authentication Version 1 described in [TR_03110] as an
alternative to the Active Authentication stated in [ICAO_9303].
During the prepersonalization and personalization, the Personalisation Agent, once authenticated,
gets the rights (access control) for (1) reading and writing data,(2) instantiating the application, and (4)
writing of personalization data. The Personalisation Agent can so create the file structure (MF / ADF)
required for this configuration.
Mutatis mutandis, the TOE may also be used as an ISO driving license, compliant to ISO/IEC 18013
or ISO/IEC TR 19446 supporting BAP-1 (the same protocol as BAC but used in the context of driving
license), AA and CA, as both applications (MRTD and IDL) share the same protocols and data
structure organization. Therefore, in the rest of the document, the word “MRTD” MAY be understood
either as a MRTD in the sense of ICAO, or a driving license compliant to ISO/IEC 18013 or ISO/IEC
TR 19446 depending on the targeted usage envisioned by the issuer.
The table below indicates how terms and concept present in the current document shall be read when
considering the TOE to be an ISO driving license:
MRTD ISO driving licence
MRTD IDL
ICAO ISO/IEC
ICAO 9303 ISO/IEC 18013 or ISO/IEC TR 19446
BAC BAP-1
DG3 DG7
DG4 DG8
DG15 DG13
MRZ or CAN MRZ or SAI (Scanning area identifier)
Traveler Holder
NB: the ISO driving license is out of the scope of the current ST and not evaluated.
The confidentiality by Basic Access Control is a mandatory security feature that shall be implemented
by the TOE, too. Nevertheless this is not explicitly covered by this ST as there are known weaknesses
in the quality (i.e. entropy) of the BAC keys generated by the environment. Therefore, the MRTD has
additionally to fulfill the ‘Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with
„ICAO Application”, Basic Access Control’ [PP_BAC]. Due to the fact that [PP_BAC] does only
consider extended basic attack potential to the Basic Access Control Mechanism (i.e. AVA_VAN.3) the
MRTD has to be evaluated and certified separately.
There are separate Security Targets for BAC and EAC. Note, that the claim for conformance to the
BAC-PP [PP_BAC] does not require the conformance claim to [PP_EAC]. Nevertheless claiming
conformance of [PP_EAC] requires that the TOE meets a (separate) ST conforming to the BAC-PP
[PP_BAC].
For BAC, the inspection system (i) reads optically the MRTD, (ii) authenticates itself as inspection
system by means of Document Basic Access Keys. After successful authentication of the inspection
system the MRTD’s chip provides read access to the logical MRTD by means of private
communication (secure messaging) with this inspection system [ICAO_9303], normative appendix 5.
The Security Target requires the TOE to implement the Extended Access Control as defined in
[TR_03110]. The Extended Access Control consists of two parts (i) the Chip Authentication Protocol
and (ii) the Terminal Authentication Protocol. The Chip Authentication Protocol (i) authenticates the
MRTD’s chip to the inspection system and (ii) establishes secure messaging which is used by
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Terminal Authentication to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the sensitive biometric reference
data during their transmission from the TOE to the inspection system. Therefore Terminal
Authentication can only be performed if Chip Authentication has been successfully executed. The
Terminal Authentication Protocol consists of (i) the authentication of the inspection system as entity
authorized by the receiving State or Organization through the issuing State, and (ii) an access control
by the TOE to allow reading the sensitive biometric reference data only to successfully authenticated
authorized inspection systems. The issuing State or Organization authorizes the receiving State by
means of certification the authentication public keys of Document Verifiers who create Inspection
System Certificates.
2.2.2 TOE type
The TOE is a composite product made up of an Embedded Software developed using Java Card
technology, composed on a Java Card open platform. Both developed by IDEMIA.
The underlying Java Card open platform has already been certified, please see [PTF_CERT].
The TOE embedded is the dual (contactless and/or contact) integrated circuit chip of machine
readable travel documents (MRTD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS)
and providing :
 Extended Access Control (EAC)
Please refer to 2.3.2 TOE delivery section for more details on TOE deliveries
2.2.3 Required non-TOE hardware/Software/firmware
There is no explicit non-TOE hardware, software or firmware required by the TOE to perform its
claimed security features. The TOE is defined to comprise the chip and the complete operating system
and application. Note, the inlay holding the chip as well as the antenna and the booklet (holding the
printed MRZ) are needed to represent a complete MRTD, nevertheless these parts are not inevitable
for the secure operation of the TOE.
Note: In particular, the TOE may be used in contact mode, without any inlay or antenna.
2.3 TOE description
2.3.1 Physical scope of the TOE
The TOE is physically made up of several components hardware and software.
Once constructed, the TOE is a bare microchip with its external interfaces for
communication.
The physical medium on which the microchip is mounted is not part of the target of
evaluation as it does not alter nor modify any security functions of the TOE.
The TOE may be used on several physical medium within an inlay, or eCover; in a plastic
card are not part of the TOE.
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The physical form of the module is depicted in Figure below. The cryptographic boundary of
the module is the surface and edges of the die and associated bond pads, shown as circles
in the following figure
Figure 1 Physical Form of the Module
2.3.2 TOE delivery
The TOE is composed of:
 Circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (the IC) :
 IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated Support
Software
 ID-ONE Cosmo V9.1 Platform: see [ST_PTF] and [PTF_CERT]
 CombICAO v2.1 application
 Associated guidance documentation (delivered in electronic version)
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This lite version of the Security Target also serves as a guidance document along with above-
mentioned documents.
TOE
Component
Identification Form Factor of Delivery
Delivery method
CombICAO
v2.1 applet for
MRTD
203523
ID1 or ID3 Passport
booklets
ID1 cards or ID3 holder
pages
Antenna1
inlays
Chip in modules on a reel
CPS tool is used in the
case of an Image
delivery. Otherwise,
trusted courier is used.
Personalizing
Agent
[Applet_Perso_Guide]
Electronic doc
PGP-encrypted parts on
USB or CD media, off-
line registered
distribution by trusted
courier
End User of
the TOE
[Applet_Uder_Guide]
Underlying
platform
guidance
[PTF_AGD_OPE]
[PTF_AGD1]
[PTF_AGD2]
[PTF_AGD3]
[PTF_AGD4]
[PTF_AGD5]
[PTF_AGD_PRE]
[PTF_AGD_SEC_AC]
Form factor and Delivery Preparation:
1. As per the Software Development Process of IDEMIA, upon completion of development
activities, particular applet will be uploaded into CPS in CAP file format. Before uploading, the
applet will be verified through Oracle verifier and IDEMIA verifier.
2. During Release for Sample as project milestone, status of the applet in CPS will be changed
into “Pilot version” to be used further for manufacturing samples.
3. During Software Delivery Review as the final R&D project milestone, status of the
applet in CPS will be changed into “Industrial release” to be used further for mass
production.
1
The inlay production including the application of the antenna is not part of the TOE
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Figure 2 TOE Boundaries
2.3.3 Logical scope of the TOE
The TOE is a smartcard, composed of:
 IC,
 Java Card Open Platform (OS) and
 CombICAO v2.1 application (logical data structure).
The TOE scope encompasses the following features:
 Chip Authentication
 Terminal Authentication
 Extended Access Control
 Active Authentication
 Personalization Phase
 Prepersonalization phase
The prepersonalization and personalisation are performed by the Manufacturer and the
Personalisation Agent, which controls the TOE. All along this phase, the TOE is self-protected, as it
requires the authentication of the Manufacturer and the Personalisation Agent prior to any operation.
By being authenticated, the Personalisation Agent gets the rights (access control) for (1) reading and
writing data,(2) instantiating the application, and (4) writing of personalization data. The
Personalisation Agent can so create the file structure (MF / ADF) required for this configuration.
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2.3.4 Authentication Protocols
2.3.4.1 Terminal Authentication (TA)
This protocol enables the MRTD chip to verify that the terminal is entitled to access sensitive data. As
the terminal may access sensitive data afterwards, all further communication MUST be protected
appropriately. Terminal Authentication therefore also authenticates an ephemeral public key chosen
by the terminal that was used to set up Secure Messaging with Chip Authentication. The MRTD chip
MUST bind the terminal’s access rights to Secure Messaging established by the authenticated
ephemeral public key of the terminal.
Terminal Authentication v1 is part of the EACv1 procedure defined in [TR_03110].
2.3.4.2 Chip Authentication (CA)
The Chip Authentication Protocol is an ephemeral-static Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol that
provides secure communication and unilateral authentication of the MRTD chip.
The protocol establishes Secure Messaging between an MRTD chip and a terminal based on a static
key pair stored on the MRTD chip. Chip Authentication is an alternative to the optional ICAO Active
Authentication, i.e. it enables the terminal to verify that the MRTD chip is genuine but has two
advantages over the original protocol:
Challenge Semantics are prevented because the transcripts produced by this protocol are non-
transferable.
Besides authentication of the MRTD chip this protocol also provides strong session keys.
The protocol in version 1 provides implicit authentication of both the MRTD chip itself and the stored
data by performing Secure Messaging using the new session keys.
The protocol in Version 2 provides explicit authentication of the MRTD chip by verifying the
authentication token and implicit authentication of the stored data by performing Secure Messaging
using the new session keys.
Chip Authentication v1 is part of the EACv1 procedure defined in [TR_03110].
2.3.4.3 Active Authentication (AA)
Active Authentication is an authentication mechanism ensuring the chip is genuine. It uses a
challenge-response protocol between the IS and the chip.
Active Authentication is realized with the INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command.
The key and algorithms supported are the following:
RSA ISO/IEC 9796-2 with a key length of 1024 bits, 1536 bits or 2048 bits and hashing algorithm of
SHA1 or SHA2.
ECDSA over prime field curves with hashing algorithm of SHA1 or SHA2 and the key sizes 192 to 512.
2.3.5 Basic Access Control (BAC)
It is related to BAC mechanism as defined in [ICAO_9303].
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The protocol for Basic Access Control is specified by [ICAO_9303] Basic Access Control checks that
the terminal has physical access to the MRTD’s data page. This is enforced by requiring the terminal
to derive an authentication key from the optically read MRZ of the MRTD. The protocol for Basic
Access Control is based on [ISO_11770_2] key establishment mechanism 6. This protocol is also
used to generate session keys that are used to protect the confidentiality (and integrity) of the
transmitted data.
The Basic Access Control (BAC) is a security feature that is supported by the TOE. The inspection
system reads the printed data in the MRZ (for MRTD),authenticates itself as inspection system by
means of keys derived from MRZ data. After successful 3DES based authentication, the TOE provides
read access to data requiring BAC rights by means of a private communication (secure messaging)
with the inspection system.
The purpose of this mechanism is to ensure that the holder gives access to the IS to the
logical MRTD (data stored in the chip); It is achieved by a mutual authentication.
Once the mutual authentication is performed, a secure messaging is available to protect the
communication between the chip and the IS.
This table lists the supported configurations for BAC protocol:
Configuration Key Algo Key Length Hash Algo MAC Algo
BAC 3DES 2Key 16-bytes SHA-1 Retail MAC
Table 3 BAC Configuration
2.3.6 Machine Readable Travel Document (MRTD)
The MRTD is a complete set of commands, which allows the management of MRTD data in the
Operational Use phase (data management and authentication process under MRTD ADF).
2.3.7 Enhanced protection over Sensitive biometric data reading
The access to sensitive biometric data: the fingerprint and iris stored in DG3 and DG4 are protected in
accordance with the requirements of the protection profile and specification. Beyond that, the TOE
also provides a feature able to ensure a high level of confidentiality when reading these data. The
TOE supports a mechanism enforcing to use a minimum cryptographic strength for the confidentiality,
integrity and authenticity protection of these sensitive biometric data when being read. This may be
useful for issuing authority that do not consider DES algorithm strong enough to ensure a sufficient
level of confidentiality. This mechanism allows the TOE to enforce the terminal using a stronger
algorithm such as AES 128, or 192 bits, or 256 bits when reading the sensitive biometric data, and
deny access to them if this condition is not met (algorithm not strong enough).
The enhanced protection over sensitive biometric data reading is part of the TOE and is also part of
the TSF.
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2.4 Life Cycle
The following table presents the TOE roles and the corresponding subject:
Roles Subject
IC developer IC Manufacturer
TOE developer IDEMIA
Manufacturer
IC manufacturer IC Manufacturer
MRTD packaging responsible IDEMIA or another agent
IDEMIA
Embedded software loading
responsible
IDEMIA
Pre-personalization Agent
(Manufacturer Role)
IDEMIA or another agent
Personalization Agent IDEMIA or another agent
Table 4 Roles identification on the life cycle
Several life cycles are available, depending when the Flash Code is loaded.
The following tables present the subjects following TOE life cycle steps in accordance with the
standard smart card life cycle [PP_IC], and describe for each of them, (1) the TOE delivery point and
(2) the assurance coverage:
The TOE life cycle in the following figure distinguishes stages for development, production,
preparation and operational use in accordance with the standard smart card life cycle [PP_IC].
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Figure 3 Life cycle Overview
2.4.1 Development Environment
In this environment, the following two phases take place:
 Phase 1: IC Embedded Software Development (Java Card Open Platform
components and CombICAO v2.1 applet)
 Phase 2: IC Development
The IC Embedded Software Developer is in charge of the specification, development and validation of
the software (Java Card Open Platform and CombICAO v2.1 applet).
The IC Developer designs the IC, develops the IC dedicated software and provides information,
software or tools to the IC embedded software developer.
Roles, actors, sites and coverage for this environment of the product life-cycle are listed in the table
below:
Role Actor Site Covered by
CombICAO v2.1 Applet Developer IDEMIA IDEMIA R&D sites ALC
Redaction and Review of
Documents
IDEMIA IDEMIA R&D site ALC
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Role Actor Site Covered by
Platform Developer IDEMIA IDEMIA R&D sites
Refer to [PTF_CERT]
ALC
IC Developer IC
Manufacturer
IC Manufacturer
Refer to [PTF_CERT]
ALC
2.4.2 Production Environment
In this environment, the following two phases take place:
 Phase 3: IC manufacturing
 Phase 4: Smart card loading
The IC manufacturer is responsible for producing the IC (manufacturing, testing, and initialisation).
Depending on the intention:
 (Option 1) the developer sends the image (containing both the Java Card platform
and the CombICAO v2.1 applet) to be flashed in the IC to the IC manufacturer in the
phase 3.
Or
 (Option 2) the platform developer sends the image (containing only the Java Card
platform) to be flashed in the IC to the IC manufacturer in the phase 3. Once the Java
Card platform has been loaded, the package of CombICAO v2.1 is securely delivered
from the applet developer to the smart card loader. The cap file of the applet is then
loaded (using GP) in the Java Card platform by the smart card loader in phase 4 at
IDEMIA audited site.
Or
 (Option 3) the developer sends the image (containing both the Java Card platform
and the CombICAO v2.1 applet) to be loaded in Flash (using the loader of the IC) to
the smart card loader in phase 4.
Several life cycles are available, depending when the Flash Code is loaded. The following tables
present roles, actors, sites and coverage for this for this environment of the product life-cycle and
describe for each of them the TOE delivery point.
Role Package to be
loaded
Actor Site Covered
by
IC manufacturer Image containing
both platform and
applet
manufactur
er
IC manufacturer
production plants
[PTF_CERT]
ALC
Smart card loader - - - -
TOE Delivery Point
Table 5 Image containing both Java Card platform and applet is loaded at IC
manufacturer (Option 1)
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Role Package to be
loaded
Actor Site Covered
by
IC manufacturer Image containing
only Java Card
Platform
manufactur
er
IC manufacturer
production plants
Refer to [PTF_CERT]
ALC
Smart card loader Cap file of the applet IDEMIA IDEMIA plants ALC
TOE Delivery Point
Table 6 Cap file of CombICAO v2.1 applet is loaded (using GP) (Option 2)
Role Package to be
loaded
Actor Site Covered
by
IC manufacturer - - - -
TOE Delivery Point
Smart card loader
Image containing
both the platform
and applet
IDEMIA or
another
agent
Any AGD
Table 7 Image containing both platform and applet is loaded through the loader of the IC
(Option 3)
2.4.3 Preparation Environment
In this environment, the following two phases take place:
 Phase 5: Prepersonalisation of the applet
 Phase 6: Personalisation
The preparation environment may not necessarily take place in a manufacturing site, but may be
performed anywhere. All along these two phases, the TOE is self-protected as it requires the
authentication of the prepersonalisation agent or personalisation agent prior to any operation.
The CombICAO v2.1 applet is prepersonalised and personalised according to [Applet_Perso_Guide].
At the end of phase 6, the TOE is constructed. These two phases are covered by
[Applet_Perso_Guide] tasks of the TOE and [PTF_AGD_OPE] tasks of [PTF_CERT].
2.4.4 Operational Environment
The TOE is under the control of the User (Signatory and/or Administrator).
During this phase, the TOE may be used as described in [Applet_User_Guide] of the TOE.
This phase is covered by [Applet_User_Guide] tasks of the TOE and [PTF_AGD_OPE] tasks of
[PTF_CERT].
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3 Conformance claims
3.1 Common Criteria conformance
This Security Target (ST) claims conformance to [CC_2], [CC_3] and [CC_EM].
The conformance to the CC is claimed as follows:
CC Conformance Claim
Part 2 Conformance with extensions:
 FAU_SAS.1 “Audit storage”,
 FCS_RND.1 “Quality metric for random numbers”,
 FMT_LIM.1 “Limited capabilities”,
 FMT_LIM.2 “Limited availability”,
 FPT_EMS.1 “TOE Emanation”,
 FIA_API.12
“Authentication Proof of Identity”,
Part 3 Conformance with package EAL5 augmented with:
 ALC_DVS.2 “Sufficiency of security measures” defined in [CC_3],
 AVA_VAN.5 “Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis” defined in
[CC_3]
Table 8 Common Criteria conformance claim
Remark:
For interoperability reasons it is assumed the receiving state cares for sufficient measures against
eavesdropping within the operating environment of the inspection systems. Otherwise the TOE may
protect the confidentiality of some less sensitive assets (e.g. the personal data of the TOE holder
which are also printed on the physical TOE) for some specific attacks only against enhanced basic
attack potential (AVA_VAN.3).
FPT_EMSEC.1 from [PP_EAC] has been renamed to FPT_EMS.1, in order to keep the SFR
formatting.
3.2 Protection Profile conformance
3.2.1 Overview
This ST claims strict conformance to the following Protection Profile (PP):
Title
Common Criteria Protection Profile
Machine Readable Travel Document
with „ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control
CC Version 3.1 (Revision 2)
Assurance
Level
The minimum assurance level for this PP is EAL4 augmented
Version 1.10
2
FIA_API.1 has been added to this security target for the needs of the Chip Authentication Protocol.
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Number
Registration BSI-CC-PP-0056
Table 9 Protection Profile conformance
This ST also addresses the Manufacturing and Personalization phases at TOE level (cf. §2.4 TOE life
cycle). This ST also addresses Active Authentication as an additional authentication protocol.
Since the Chip Authentication protocol is an alternative to the Active Authentication defined in
[ICO_9303], the additional assumptions and security objectives for the operational environment
counter the same threats as the ones for chip authentication. They however do not mitigate the threat,
and instead provide an additional functionality to the ones defined in the PP.
The additions do not contradict any of the threats, assumptions, organizational policies, objectives or
SFRs stated in the [PP_EAC] that covers the advanced security methods EAC in operational use
phase.
The following parts list assumptions, threats, OSP, OT and OE for this TOE (i.e. from [PP_EAC] and
additional).
3.2.2 Assumptions
The following Assumptions are assumed for this TOE:
 A.MRTD_Manufact “MRTD manufacturing on steps 4 to 6” defined in [PP_EAC],
 A.MRTD_Delivery “MRTD delivery during steps 4 to 6” defined in [PP_EAC],
 A.Pers_Agent “Personalization of the MRTD’s chip” defined in [PP_EAC],
 A.Insp_Sys “Inspection Systems for global interoperability” defined in [PP_EAC],
 A.Signature_PKI “PKI for Passive Authentication” defined in [PP_EAC],
 A.Auth_PKI “PKI for Inspection Systems” defined in [PP_EAC],
 A.Insp_Sys_AA “Inspection Systems with Active Authentication” defined in this ST
3.2.3 Threats
This TOE averts the following threats:
 T.Read_Sensitive_Data “Read the sensitive biometric reference data” defined in
[PP_EAC],
 T.Forgery “Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip” defined in [PP_EAC],
 T.Counterfeit “MRTD’s chip” defined in [PP_EAC],
 T.Abuse-Func “Abuse of Functionality” defined in [PP_EAC],
 T.Information_Leakage “Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip” defined in
[PP_EAC],
 T.Phys-Tamper “Physical Tampering” defined in [PP_EAC],
 T.Malfunction “Malfunction due to Environmental Stress” defined in [PP_EAC],
 T.Configuration “Tampering attempt of the TOE during preparation” defined in this
ST,
 T.Forgery_Supplemental_Data “Forgery of supplemental data stored in the TOE”
defined in this ST.
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3.2.4 Organizational Security Policies
This TOE complies with the following OSP:
 P.BAC-PP “Fulfillment of the Basic Access Control Protection Profile” defined in
[PP_EAC],
 P.Sensitive_Data “Privacy of sensitive biometric reference data” defined in
[PP_EAC],
 P.Manufact “Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip” defined in [PP_EAC],
 P.Personalization “Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organization
only” defined in [PP_EAC]
 P.Activ_Auth “Active Authentication” defined in this ST.
3.2.5 Security Objectives
The Security Objectives for this TOE are the following:
 OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD” defined in [PP_EAC],
 OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” defined in [PP_EAC],
 OT.Sens_Data_Conf “Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference data” defined in
[PP_EAC],
 OT.Identification “Identification and Authentication of the TOE” defined in [PP_EAC],
 OT.Chip_Auth_Proof “Proof of MRTD’s chip authenticity” defined in [PP_EAC],
 OT.Prot_Abuse-Func “Protection against Abuse of Functionality” defined in [PP_EAC],
 OT.Prot_Inf_Leak “Protection against Information Leakage” defined in [PP_EAC],
 OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering” defined in [PP_EAC],
 OT.Prot_Malfunction “Protection against Malfunctions” defined in [PP_EAC],
 OT.Configuration “Protection of the TOE preparation” defined in this ST,
 OT.Update_File “Modification of file in Operational Use Phase” defined in this ST,
 OT.AC_SM_Level “Access control to sensitive biometric reference data according to SM
level” defined in this ST,
 OT.AA_Proof “Proof of MRTD using Active Authentication” defined in this ST,
 OT.Data_Int_AA “Data Integrity using Active Authentication” defined in this ST.
The Security Objectives for the environment of this TOE are the following:
 OE.MRTD_Manufact “Protection of the MRTD Manufacturing” defined in [PP_EAC],
 OE.MRTD_Delivery “Protection of the MRTD delivery” defined in [PP_EAC],
 OE.Personalization “Personalization of logical MRTD” defined in [PP_EAC],
 OE.Pass_Auth_Sign “Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature” defined in [PP_EAC],
 OE.Auth_Key_MRTD “MRTD Authentication Key” defined in [PP_EAC],
 OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data “Authorization for Use of Sensitive Biometric Reference Data”
defined in [PP_EAC],
 OE.BAC_PP “Fulfillment of the Basic Access Control Protection Profile” defined in [PP_EAC],
 OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport book” defined in [PP_EAC],
 OE.Passive_Auth_Verif “Verification by Passive Authentication” defined in [PP_EAC],
 OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD “Protection of data from the logical MRTD” defined in [PP_EAC],
 OE.Ext_Insp_Systems “Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems” defined in [PP_EAC],
 OE.Exam_MRTD_AA “Examination of the MRTD using Active Authentication” defined in this
ST,
 OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_AA “Protection of MRTD after Active Authentication” defined in this
ST,
 OE.Activ_Auth_Verif “Verification using Active Authentication” defined in this ST,
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 OE.Activ_Auth_Sign “Infrastructure for Active Authentication Key Generation” defined in this
ST.
3.3 CC conformance and usage in real life
In the real life, for interoperability purposes, the MRTD will most likely support BAC, PACE and EAC.
 If the terminal reads the content of the MRTD by performing BAC then EAC, the
security of the MRTD will be covered by the security evaluation of (1) the TOE
described by the ST claiming compliance to [PP_BAC] and (2) the TOE described by
the ST claiming compliance to [PP_EAC], assuming PACE is not supported (as not
used for the inspection procedure)
 If the terminal reads the content of the MRTD by performing PACE then EAC, the
security of the MRTD will be covered by the security evaluation of the TOE described
by the ST claiming compliance to [PP_EACwPACE], assuming BAC is not supported
(as not used for the inspection procedure).
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4 Security Problem Definition
4.1 Assets
Logical MRTD sensitive User Data
Sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3, EF.DG4)
Application Note:
Due to interoperability reasons the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [ICAO_9303] requires that Basic
Inspection Systems must have access to logical MRTD data DG1, DG2, DG5 to DG16.
Note the BAC mechanisms may not resist attacks with high attack potential (cf.
[PP_BAC]).
Authenticity of the MRTD's chip
The authenticity of the MRTD’s chip personalized by the issuing State or Organization for
the MRTD holder is used by the traveler to prove his possession of a genuine MRTD.
4.2 Users / Subjects
Manufacturer
The generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing the integrated circuit and the MRTD
Manufacturer completing the IC to the MRTD’s chip. The Manufacturer is the default user
of the TOE during the Phase 2 Manufacturing. The TOE does not distinguish between the
users IC Manufacturer and MRTD Manufacturer using this role Manufacturer.
Personalization Agent
The agent is acting on behalf of the issuing State or Organization to personalize the MRTD
for the holder by some or all of the following activities: (i) establishing the identity of the
holder for the biographic data in the MRTD, (ii) enrolling the biometric reference data of
the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris
image(s), (iii) writing these data on the physical and logical MRTD for the holder as
defined for global, international and national interoperability, (iv) writing the initial TSF
data and (v) signing the Document Security Object defined in [ICAO_9303].
Country Verifying Certification Authority
The Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA) enforces the privacy policy of the
issuing State or Organization with respect to the protection of sensitive biometric
reference data stored in the MRTD. The CVCA represents the country specific root of the
PKI of Inspection Systems and creates the Document Verifier Certificates within this PKI.
The updates of the public key of the CVCA are distributed in the form of Country Verifying
CA Link-Certificates.
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Document Verifier
The Document Verifier (DV) enforces the privacy policy of the receiving State with respect
to the protection of sensitive biometric reference data to be handled by the Extended
Inspection Systems. The Document Verifier manages the authorization of the Extended
Inspection Systems for the sensitive data of the MRTD in the limits provided by the
issuing States or Organizations in the form of the Document Verifier Certificates.
Terminal
A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through the contactless
interface.
Inspection system (IS)
A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining
an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the
traveler as MRTD holder. The Basic Inspection System (BIS) (i) contains a terminal for the
contactless communication with the MRTD’s chip, (ii) implements the terminals part of the
Basic Access Control Mechanism and (iii) gets the authorization to read the logical MRTD
under the Basic Access Control by optical reading the MRTD or other parts of the passport
book providing this information. The General Inspection System (GIS) is a Basic
Inspection System which implements additionally the Chip Authentication Mechanism. The
Extended Inspection System (EIS) in addition to the General Inspection System (i)
implements the Terminal Authentication Protocol and (ii) is authorized by the issuing State
or Organization through the Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive
biometric reference data. The security attributes of the EIS are defined of the Inspection
System Certificates.
MRTD Holder
The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization personalized
the MRTD.
Traveler
Person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming the identity of the
MRTD holder.
Attacker
A threat agent trying (i) to manipulate the logical MRTD without authorization, (ii) to read
sensitive biometric reference data (i.e. EF.DG3, EF.DG4) or (iii) to forge a genuine MRTD.
Application Note:
Note that an attacker trying to identify and to trace the movement of the MRTD’s chip
remotely (i.e. without knowing or optically reading the physical MRTD) is not considered
by this ST since this can only be averted by the BAC mechanism using the “weak”
Document Basic Access Keys that is covered by [PP_BAC]. The same holds for the
confidentiality of the user data EF.DG1, EF.DG2, EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 as well as EF.SOD
and EF.COM.
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An impostor is attacking the inspection system as TOE IT environment independent on
using a genuine, counterfeit or forged MRTD. Therefore the impostor may use results of
successful attacks against the TOE but the attack itself is not relevant for the TOE.
4.3 Threats
T.Read_Sensitive_Data
Adverse action: An attacker tries to gain the sensitive biometric reference data through
the communication interface of the MRTD’s chip. The attack T.Read_Sensitive_Data is
similar to the threat T.Skimming (cf. [PP_BAC]) in respect of the attack path
(communication interface) and the motivation (to get data stored on the MRTD’s chip) but
differs from those in the asset under the attack (sensitive biometric reference data vs.
digital MRZ, digitized portrait and other data), the opportunity (i.e. knowing Document
Basic Access Keys) and therefore the possible attack methods. Note, that the sensitive
biometric reference data are stored only on the MRTD’s chip as private sensitive personal
data whereas the MRZ data and the portrait are visually readable on the physical MRTD
as well.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, knowing the Document Basic Access Keys,
being in possession of a legitimate MRTD
Asset: confidentiality of sensitive logical MRTD (i.e. biometric reference) data,
T.Forgery
Adverse action: An attacker alters fraudulently the complete stored logical MRTD or any
part of it including its security related data in order to deceive on an inspection system by
means of the changed MRTD holder’s identity or biometric reference data. This threat
comprises several attack scenarios of MRTD forgery. The attacker may alter the
biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book, in the printed MRZ
and in the digital MRZ to claim another identity of the traveler. The attacker may alter the
printed portrait and the digitized portrait to overcome the visual inspection of the
inspection officer and the automated biometric authentication mechanism by face
recognition. The attacker may alter the biometric reference data to defeat automated
biometric authentication mechanism of the inspection system. The attacker may combine
data groups of different logical MRTDs to create a new forged MRTD, e.g. the attacker
writes the digitized portrait and optional biometric reference finger data read from the
logical MRTD of a traveler into another MRTD’s chip leaving their digital MRZ unchanged
to claim the identity of the holder this MRTD. The attacker may also copy the complete
unchanged logical MRTD to another contactless chip.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate
MRTDs
Asset: authenticity of logical MRTD data,
T.Counterfeit
Adverse action: An attacker with high attack potential produces an unauthorized copy or
reproduction of a genuine MRTD’s chip to be used as part of a counterfeit MRTD. This
violates the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip used for authentication of a traveler by
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possession of a MRTD. The attacker may generate a new data set or extract completely
or partially the data from a genuine MRTD’s chip and copy them on another appropriate
chip to imitate this genuine MRTD’s chip.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate
MRTDs
Asset: authenticity of logical MRTD data,
T.Abuse-Func
Adverse action: An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in
“Operational Use” phase in order (i) to manipulate User Data, (ii) to manipulate (explore,
bypass, deactivate or change) security features or functions of the TOE or (iii) to disclose
or to manipulate TSF Data. This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the
initialization and the personalization in the operational state after delivery to MRTD
holder.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD
Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF
T.Information_Leakage
Adverse action: An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during
its usage in order to disclose confidential TSF data. The information leakage may be
inherent in the normal operation or caused by the attacker. Leakage may occur through
emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O characteristics, clock frequency, or by
changes in processing time requirements. This leakage may be interpreted as a covert
channel transmission but is more closely related to measurement of operating parameters
which may be derived either from measurements of the contactless interface (emanation)
or direct measurements (by contact to the chip still available even for a contactless chip)
and can then be related to the specific operation being performed. Examples are the
Differential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) and the Differential Power Analysis (DPA).
Moreover the attacker may try actively to enforce information leakage by fault injection
(e.g. Differential Fault Analysis).
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD
Asset: confidentiality of logical MRTD and TSF data
T.Phys-Tamper
Adverse action: An attacker may perform physical probing of the MRTD’s chip in order (i)
to disclose TSF Data, or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software.
An attacker may physically modify the MRTD’s chip in order to (i) modify security features
or functions of the MRTD’s chip, (ii) modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip
Embedded Software, (iii) modify User Data or (iv) to modify TSF data. The physical
tampering may be focused directly on the disclosure or manipulation of TOE User Data
(e.g. the biometric reference data for the inspection system) or TSF Data (e.g.
authentication key of the MRTD’s chip) or indirectly by preparation of the TOE to following
attack methods by modification of security features (e.g. to enable information leakage
through power analysis). Physical tampering requires direct interaction with the MRTD’s
chip internals. Techniques commonly employed in IC failure analysis and IC reverse
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engineering efforts may be used. Before that, the hardware security mechanisms and
layout characteristics need to be identified. Determination of software design including
treatment of User Data and TSF Data may also be a pre-requisite. The modification may
result in the deactivation of a security function. Changes of circuitry or data can be
permanent or temporary.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD
Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF
T.Malfunction
Adverse action: An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the MRTD’s chip
Embedded Software by applying environmental stress in order to (i) deactivate or modify
security features or functions of the TOE or (ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify security
functions of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. This may be achieved e.g. by operating
the MRTD’s chip outside the normal operating conditions, exploiting errors in the MRTD’s
chip Embedded Software or misusing administration function. To exploit these
vulnerabilities an attacker needs information about the functional operation.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD
Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF
T.Configuration
Adverse action: An attacker may access to the TOE at Manufacturing and Personalization
phases (steps 5 and 6) to try to (i) deactivate or modify security features or functions of
the TOE or (ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip
Embedded Software.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more MRTD in
Pre-personalization or Personalization phases.
Asset: authenticity of logical MRTD data
T. Forgery_Supplemental_Data
Adverse action: An attacker alters fraudulently the data stored in files other than EF.DG1
to EF.DG16, EF.COM and EF document security object. This may lead the extended
inspection system (EIS) using these data to be deceived.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate
MRTDs.
Asset: authenticity of data stored in files other than EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, EF.COM and EF
document security object
4.4 Organisational Security Policies
P.BAC-PP
The issuing States or Organizations ensures that successfully authenticated Basic
Inspection Systems have read access to logical MRTD data DG1, DG2, DG5 to DG16 the
[ICAO_9303] as well as to the data groups Common and Security Data. The MRTD is
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successfully evaluated and certified in accordance with the ‘Common Criteria Protection
Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Basic Access Control’
[PP_BAC] in order to ensure the confidentiality of standard user data and preventing the
traceability of the MRTD data.
Application Note:
The organizational security policy P.Personal_Data drawn from the 'ICAO Doc 9303'
[ICAO_9303] is addressed by the [PP-BAC] (cf. P.BAC-PP). The confidentiality of the
personal data other than EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 is ensured by the BAC mechanism. Note the
BAC mechanisms may not resist attacks with high attack potential (cf. [PP-BAC]). The
TOE shall protect the sensitive biometric reference data in EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 against
attacks with high attack potential. Due to the different resistance the protection of
EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 on one side and the other EF.SOD, EF.COM, EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and
EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 are addressed separated protection profiles, which is assumed to
result in technically separated evaluations (at least for classes ASE and VAN) and
certificates (cf. also to application note 1).
P.Sensitive_Data
The biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) and iris image(s) (EF.DG4) are
sensitive private personal data of the MRTD holder. The sensitive biometric reference data
can be used only by inspection systems which are authorized for this access at the time
the MRTD is presented to the inspection system (Extended Inspection Systems). The
issuing State or Organization authorizes the Document Verifiers of the receiving States to
manage the authorization of inspection systems within the limits defined by the Document
Verifier Certificate. The MRTD’s chip shall protect the confidentiality and integrity of the
sensitive private personal data even during transmission to the Extended Inspection
System after Chip Authentication.
P.Manufact
The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The
MRTD Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalization Data which contains at least the
Personalization Agent Key.
P.Personalization
The issuing State or Organization guarantees the correctness of the biographical data, the
printed portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and other data of
the logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD holder. The personalization of the MRTD for
the holder is performed by an agent authorized by the issuing State or Organization only.
P.Activ_Auth
The terminal implements the Active Authentication protocol as described in [ICAO_9303]
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4.5 Assumptions
A.MRTD_Manufact
It is assumed that appropriate functionality testing of the MRTD is used. It is assumed
that security procedures are used during all manufacturing and test operations to
maintain confidentiality and integrity of the MRTD and of its manufacturing and test data
(to prevent any possible copy, modification, retention, theft or unauthorized use).
A.MRTD_Delivery
Procedures shall guarantee the control of the TOE delivery and storage process and
conformance to its objectives:
o Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery and
storage.
o Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper
operation in the delivery process and storage.
o Procedures shall ensure that people dealing with the procedure for delivery have
got the required skill.
A.Pers_Agent
The Personalization Agent ensures the correctness of (i) the logical MRTD with respect to
the MRTD holder, (ii) the Document Basic Access Keys, (iii) the Chip Authentication Public
Key (EF.DG14) if stored on the MRTD’s chip, and (iv) the Document Signer Public Key
Certificate (if stored on the MRTD’s chip). The Personalization Agent signs the Document
Security Object. The Personalization Agent bears the Personalization Agent Authentication
to authenticate himself to the TOE by symmetric cryptographic mechanisms.
A.Insp_Sys
The Inspection System is used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i)
examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii)
verifying the traveler as MRTD holder. The Basic Inspection System for global
interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing CA Public Key and the Document Signer
Public Key of each issuing State or Organization, and (ii) implements the terminal part of
the Basic Access Control [ICAO_9303]. The Basic Inspection System reads the logical
MRTD under Basic Access Control and performs the Passive Authentication to verify the
logical MRTD. The General Inspection System in addition to the Basic Inspection System
implements the Chip Authentication Mechanism. The General Inspection System verifies
the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip during inspection and establishes secure messaging
with keys established by the Chip Authentication Mechanism. The Extended Inspection
System in addition to the General Inspection System (i) supports the Terminal
Authentication Protocol and (ii) is authorized by the issuing State or Organization through
the Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference
data.
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A.Signature_PKI
The issuing and receiving States or Organizations establish a public key infrastructure for
passive authentication i.e. digital signature creation and verification for the logical MRTD.
The issuing State or Organization runs a Certification Authority (CA) which securely
generates, stores and uses the Country Signing CA Key pair. The CA keeps the Country
Signing CA Private Key secret and is recommended to distribute the Country Signing CA
Public Key to ICAO, all receiving States maintaining its integrity. The Document Signer (i)
generates the Document Signer Key Pair, (ii) hands over the Document Signer Public Key
to the CA for certification, (iii) keeps the Document Signer Private Key secret and (iv) uses
securely the Document Signer Private Key for signing the Document Security Objects of
the MRTDs. The CA creates the Document Signer Certificates for the Document Signer
Public Keys that are distributed to the receiving States and Organizations.
A.Auth_PKI
The issuing and receiving States or Organizations establish a public key infrastructure for
card verifiable certificates of the Extended Access Control. The Country Verifying
Certification Authorities, the Document Verifier and Extended Inspection Systems hold
authentication key pairs and certificates for their public keys encoding the access control
rights. The Country Verifying Certification Authorities of the issuing States or
Organizations are signing the certificates of the Document Verifier and the Document
Verifiers are signing the certificates of the Extended Inspection Systems of the receiving
States or Organizations. The issuing States or Organizations distribute the public keys of
their Country Verifying Certification Authority to their MRTD’s chip.
A.Insp_Sys_AA
The Inspection System implements the Active Authentication Mechanism. The Inspection
System verifies the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip during inspection using the signature
returned by the TOE during Active Authentication.
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5 Security Objectives
5.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
OT.AC_Pers
The TOE must ensure that the logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the Document
security object according to LDS [ICAO_9303] and the TSF data can be written by
authorized Personalization Agents only. The logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 and
the TSF data may be written only during and cannot be changed after its personalization.
The Document security object can be updated by authorized Personalization Agents if
data in the data groups EF.DG3 to EF.DG16 are added.
Application Note:
The OT.AC_Pers implies that
(1) the data of the LDS groups written during personalization for MRTD holder (at least
EF.DG1 and EF.DG2) can not be changed by write access after personalization,
(2) the Personalization Agents may (i) add (fill) data into the LDS data groups not written
yet, and (ii) update and sign the Document Security Object accordingly. The support for
adding data in the “Operational Use” phase is optional.
OT.Data_Int
The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip against
physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure the integrity of the
logical MRTD data during their transmission to the General Inspection System after Chip
Authentication.
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3
and EF.DG4) by granting read access only to authorized Extended Inspection Systems.
The authorization of the inspection system is drawn from the Inspection System
Certificate used for the successful authentication and shall be a non-strict subset of the
authorization defined in the Document Verifier Certificate in the certificate chain to the
Country Verifier Certification Authority of the issuing State or Organization. The TOE must
ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data during their transmission to the
Extended Inspection System. The confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference data
shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential.
OT.Identification
The TOE must provide means to store IC Identification and Pre-Personalization Data in its
nonvolatile memory. The IC Identification Data must provide a unique identification of the
IC during Phase 2 “Manufacturing” and Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”. The
storage of the Pre- Personalization data includes writing of the Personalization Agent
Key(s).
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OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
The TOE must support the General Inspection Systems to verify the identity and
authenticity of the MRTD’s chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization
by means of the Chip Authentication as defined in [TR_03110]. The authenticity proof
provided by MRTD’s chip shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential.
Application Note:
The OT.Chip_Auth_Proof implies the MRTD’s chip to have (i) a unique identity as given by
the MRTD’s Document Number, (ii) a secret to prove its identity by knowledge i.e. a
private authentication key as TSF data. The TOE shall protect this TSF data to prevent
their misuse. The terminal shall have the reference data to verify the authentication
attempt of MRTD’s chip i.e. a certificate for the Chip Authentication Public Key that
matches the Chip Authentication Private Key of the MRTD’s chip. This certificate is
provided by (i) the Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG14) in the LDS [ICAO_9303] and
(ii) the hash value of the Chip Authentication Public Key in the Document Security Object
signed by the Document Signer.
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
After delivery of the TOE to the MRTD Holder, the TOE must prevent the abuse of test
and support functions that may be maliciously used to (i) disclose critical User Data, (ii)
manipulate critical User Data of the IC Embedded Software, (iii) manipulate Soft-coded IC
Embedded Software or (iv) bypass, deactivate, change or explore security features or
functions of the TOE. Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the
capabilities of the Test Features provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software which are
not specified here.
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential TSF data stored and/or
processed in the MRTD’s chip
o by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time
between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power
consumption, clock, or I/O lines and
o by forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or
o by a physical manipulation of the TOE
Application Note:
This objective pertains to measurements with subsequent complex signal processing due
to normal operation of the TOE or operations enforced by an attacker. Details correspond
to an analysis of attack scenarios which is not given here.
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
The TOE must provide protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the
TSF Data, and the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. This includes protection against
attacks with high attack potential by means of
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o measuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical probing on the chips
surface except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage
and current) or
o measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction
between charges (using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure
analysis)
o manipulation of the hardware and its security features, as well as
o controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF Data)
with a prior
o reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions.
OT.Prot_Malfunction
The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside
the normal operating conditions where reliability and secure operation has not been
proven or tested. This is to prevent errors. The environmental conditions may include
external energy (esp. electromagnetic) fields, voltage (on any contacts), clock frequency,
or temperature.
Application Note:
A malfunction of the TOE may also be caused using a direct interaction with elements on
the chip surface. This is considered as being a manipulation (refer to the objective
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper) provided that detailed knowledge about the TOE´s internals.
OT.Configuration
During Pre-personalization and Personalization phases, the TOE must control the access
to its sensitive information and its functions and must provide the means to secure
exchanges using cryptographic functions. It must also ensure secure erasing of useless
keys.
OT.Update_File
During Operational Use phase, the TOE must allow the modification of Updatable Data if
the write access to these objects is fulfilled by the Terminal.
OT.AC_SM_Level
During Operational Use phase, the TOE must allow read access to sensitive biometric data
only if the Secure Messaging level reaches or exceeds the one specified in the biometric
data Access Conditions data object.
OT.AA_Proof
The TOE must support the Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of
MRTD’s chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization by means of the
Active Authentication as defined in [ICAO_9303]. The authenticity proof through AA
provided by MRTD’s chip shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential.
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OT.Data_Int_AA
The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD's chip against
physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure the integrity of the
logical MRTD data during their transmission to the General Inspection System after Active
Authentication.
5.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
5.2.1 Issuing State or Organization
OE.MRTD_Manufact
Appropriate functionality testing of the TOE shall be used in step 4 to 6. During all
manufacturing and test operations, security procedures shall be used through phases 4, 5
and 6 to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its manufacturing and test
data.
OE.MRTD_ Delivery
Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery including
the following objectives:
o non-disclosure of any security relevant information,
o identification of the element under delivery,
o meet confidentiality rules (confidentiality level, transmittal form, reception
acknowledgment),
o physical protection to prevent external damage,
o secure storage and handling procedures (including rejected TOE’s),
o traceability of TOE during delivery including the following parameters:
 origin and shipment details,
 reception, reception acknowledgement,
 location material/information.
Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in
the delivery process (including if applicable any non-conformance to the confidentiality
convention) and highlight all non-conformance to this process. Procedures shall ensure
that people (shipping department, carrier, reception department) dealing with the
procedure for delivery have got the required skill, training and knowledge to meet the
procedure requirements and be able to act fully in accordance with the above
expectations.
OE.Personalization
The issuing State or Organization must ensure that the Personalization Agents acting on
behalf of the issuing State or Organization (i) establish the correct identity of the holder
and create biographical data for the MRTD, (ii) enroll the biometric reference data of the
MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris
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image(s) and (iii) personalize the MRTD for the holder together with the defined physical
and logical security measures to protect the confidentiality and integrity of these data.
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
The issuing State or Organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Country
Signing CA Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the Country Signing CA Private Key and
sign Document Signer Certificates in a secure operational environment, and (iii) distribute
the Certificate of the Country Signing CA Public Key to receiving States and Organizations
maintaining its authenticity and integrity. The issuing State or Organization must (i)
generate a cryptographic secure Document Signer Key Pair and ensure the secrecy of the
Document Signer Private Keys, (ii) sign Document Security Objects of genuine MRTD in a
secure operational environment only and (iii) distribute the Certificate of the Document
Signer Public Key to receiving States and Organizations. The digital signature in the
Document Security Object relates to all data in the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 if stored in
the LDS according to [ICAO_9303].
OE.Auth_Key_MRTD
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure
in order to (i) generate the MRTD’s Chip Authentication Key Pair, (ii) sign and store the
Chip Authentication Public Key in the Chip Authentication Public Key data in EF.DG14 and
(iii) support inspection systems of receiving States or organizations to verify the
authenticity of the MRTD’s chip used for genuine MRTD by certification of the Chip
Authentication Public Key by means of the Document Security Object.
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure
in order to limit the access to sensitive biometric reference data of MRTD’s holders to
authorized receiving States or Organizations. The Country Verifying Certification Authority
of the issuing State or Organization generates card verifiable Document Verifier
Certificates for the authorized Document Verifier only.
OE.BAC_PP
It has to be ensured by the issuing State or Organization, that the TOE is additionally
successfully evaluated and certified in accordance with the ‘Common Criteria Protection
Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Basic Access Control’
[PP_BAC]. This is necessary to cover the BAC mechanism ensuring the confidentiality of
standard user data and preventing the traceability of the MRTD data. Note that due to the
differences within the assumed attack potential the addressed evaluation and certification
is a technically separated process.
5.2.2 Receiving State or Organization
OE.Exam_MRTD
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization must examine the MRTD
presented by the traveler to verify its authenticity by means of the physical security
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measures and to detect any manipulation of the physical MRTD. The Basic Inspection
System for global interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing CA Public Key and the
Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organization, and (ii) implements the
terminal part of the Basic Access Control [ICAO_9303]. Additionally General Inspection
Systems and Extended Inspection Systems perform the Chip Authentication Protocol to
verify the Authenticity of the presented MRTD’s chip.
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif
The border control officer of the receiving State uses the inspection system to verify the
traveler as MRTD holder. The inspection systems must have successfully verified the
signature of Document Security Objects and the integrity data elements of the logical
MRTD before they are used. The receiving States and Organizations must manage the
Country Signing CA Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key maintaining their
authenticity and availability in all inspection systems.
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization ensures the confidentiality
and integrity of the data read from the logical MRTD. The inspection system will prevent
eavesdropping to their communication with the TOE before secure messaging is
successfully established based on the Chip Authentication Protocol.
Application Note:
The figure 2.1 in [TR_03110] supposes that the GIS and the EIS follow the order (i)
running the Basic Access Control Protocol, (ii) reading and verifying only those parts of
the logical MRTD that are necessary to know for the Chip Authentication Mechanism (i.e.
Document Security Object and Chip Authentication Public Key), (iii) running the Chip
Authentication Protocol, and (iv) reading and verifying the less-sensitive data of the
logical MRTD after Chip Authentication. The supposed sequence has the advantage that
the less-sensitive data are protected by secure messaging with cryptographic keys based
on the Chip Authentication Protocol which quality is under control of the TOE. The
inspection system will prevent additionally eavesdropping to their communication with the
TOE before secure messaging is successfully established based on the Chip Authentication
Protocol. Note that reading the lesssensitive data directly after Basic Access Control
Mechanism is allowed and is not assumed as threat in this ST. But the TOE ensures that
reading of sensitive data is possible after successful Chip Authentication and Terminal
Authentication Protocol only.
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems
The Document Verifier of receiving States or Organizations authorizes Extended
Inspection Systems by creation of Inspection System Certificates for access to sensitive
biometric reference data of the logical MRTD. The Extended Inspection System
authenticates themselves to the MRTD’s chip for access to the sensitive biometric
reference data with its private Terminal Authentication Key and its Inspection System
Certificate.
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5.2.3 Additional Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
OE.Exam_MRTD_AA
Aditionally to the OE.Exam_MRTD, the inspection systems perform the Active
Authentication protocol to verify the Authenticity of the presented MRTD’s chip.
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_AA
Aditionally to the OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD, the inspection system prevents eavesdropping
to their communication with the TOE before secure messaging is successfully established
based on the Active Authentication Protocol.
OE.Activ_Auth_Verif
In addition to the verification by passive authentication, the inspection systems may use
the verification by Active Authentication, which offers a stronger guaranty of the
authenticity of the MRTD.
OE.Activ_Auth_Sign
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure
in order to (i) generate the MRTD’s Active Authentication Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy
of the MRTD’s Active Authentication Private Key, sign and store the Active Authentication
Public Key in the Active Authentication Public Key data in EF.DG15 and (iii) support
inspection systems of receiving States or organizations to verify the authenticity of the
MRTD’s chip used for genuine MRTD by certification of the Active Authentication Public
Key by means of the Document Security Object.
5.3 Security Objectives Rationale
5.3.1 Threats
T.Read_Sensitive_Data The threat T.Read_Sensitive_Data “Read the sensitive biometric
reference data” is countered by the TOE-objective OT.Sens_Data_Conf “Confidentiality of
sensitive biometric reference data” requiring that read access to EF.DG3 and EF.DG4
(containing the sensitive biometric reference data) is only granted to authorized
inspection systems. Furthermore it is required that the transmission of these data ensures
the data’s confidentiality. The authorization bases on Document Verifier certificates issued
by the issuing State or Organization as required by OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data “Authorization
for use of sensitive biometric reference data”. The Document Verifier of the receiving
State has to authorize Extended Inspection Systems by creating appropriate Inspection
System certificates for access to the sensitive biometric reference data as demanded by
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems “Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems”.
This threat is also covered by OT.AC_SM_Level “Access control to sensitive biometric
reference data according to SM level” that enhences this protection by allowing the
issuing State or Organization to require the usage of a secure messaging with a minimum
security level for accessing the sensitive biometric reference data. The strength of the
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secure messaging is tightly bound to the underlying block Cipher involved (DES, AES-
128/192/256). This objective allows an issuing State or Organization to set a secure
messaging level it considers as sufficient to ensure a long term confidentiality of the
sensitive biometric data of its citizen when being read.
T.Forgery The threat T.Forgery "Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip" addresses the fraudulent
alteration of the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it. The security objective
OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD“ requires the TOE to limit
the write access for the logical MRTD to the trustworthy Personalization Agent. The TOE
will protect the integrity of the stored logical MRTD according the security objective
OT.Data_Int "Integrity of personal data" and OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper "Protection against
Physical Tampering". The examination of the presented MRTD passport book according to
OE.Exam_MRTD "Examination of the MRTD passport book" and OE.Exam_MRTD_AA shall
ensure that passport book does not contain a sensitive contactless chip which may
present the complete unchanged logical MRTD. shall ensure that passport book does not
contain a sensitive contactless chip which may present the complete unchanged logical
MRTD. The TOE environment will detect partly forged logical MRTD data by means of
digital signature which will be created according to OE.Pass_Auth_Sign "Authentication of
logical MRTD by Signature" and verified by the inspection system according to
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif "Verification by Passive Authentication".
T.Counterfeit The threat T.Counterfeit “MRTD’s chip” addresses the attack of unauthorized
copy or reproduction of the genuine MRTD chip. This attack is thwarted by chip an
identification and authenticity proof required by OT.Chip_Auth_Proof “Proof of MRTD’s
chip authentication” using a authentication key pair to be generated by the issuing State
or Organization. The Public Chip Authentication Key has to be written into EF.DG14 and
signed by means of Documents Security Objects as demanded by OE.Auth_Key_MRTD
“MRTD Authentication Key”.
This attack is also thwarted by Active Authentication proving the authenticity of the chip
as required by OT.AA_Proof and OT.Data_Int_AA using a authentication key pair to be
generated by the issuing State or Organization.
According to OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport book” the General
Inspection system has to perform the Chip Authentication Protocol to verify the
authenticity of the MRTD’s chip.
OE.Activ_Auth_Verif and OE.Activ_Auth_Sign covers also this threat enabling the
possibility of performing an Active Authentication which reinforce the security associated
to the communication.
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T.Abuse-Func The threat T.Abuse-Func “Abuse of Functionality” addresses attacks of
misusing MRTD’s functionality to disable or bypass the TSFs. The security objective for
the TOE OT.Prot_Abuse-Func “Protection against abuse of functionality” ensures that the
usage of functions which may not be used in the “Operational Use” phase is effectively
prevented. Therefore attacks intending to abuse functionality in order to disclose or
manipulate critical (User) Data or to affect the TOE in such a way that security features or
TOE’s functions may be bypassed, deactivated, changed or explored shall be effectively
countered.
T.Information_Leakage The threat T.Information_Leakage “Information Leakage from
MRTD’s chip”, is typical for integrated circuits like smart cards under direct attack with
high attack potential. The protection of the TOE against this threat is addressed by the
directly related security objective OT.Prot_Inf_Leak “Protection against Information
Leakage”.
T.Phys-Tamper The threat T.Phys-Tamper “Physical Tampering” is typical for integrated
circuits like smart cards under direct attack with high attack potential. The protection of
the TOE against this threat is addressed by the directly related security objective
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering”.
T.Malfunction The threat T.Malfunction “Malfunction due to Environmental Stress” is typical
for integrated circuits like smart cards under direct attack with high attack potential. The
protection of the TOE against this threat is addressed by the directly related security
objective OT.Prot_Malfunction “Protection against Malfunctions”.
T.Configuration The threat T.Configuration “Tampering attempt of the TOE during
preparation” addresses attacks in Pre-personalization and Personalization phases. The
attacker trying to access to unauthorized TOE functions, trying to access or to modify
sensitive information exchanged between the TOE and the Personalization system.
Protection of the TOE during these two phases is directly addressed by OT.Configuration
“Protection of the TOE preparation”.
T. Forgery_Supplemental_Data The threat T. Forgery_Supplemental_Data “Forgery of
supplemental data stored in the TOE” addresses the fraudulent alteration of Updatable
Data. The TOE protects the update of these data thanks to OT.Update_File “Modification
of file in Operational Use Phase” that ensures inspection system are authenticated and
data to be updated are sent through a secure channel ensuring integrity, authenticity and
confidentiality.
5.3.2 Organisational Security Policies
P.BAC-PP The OSP P.BAC-PP is directly addressed by the OE.BAC_PP.
P.Sensitive_Data The OSP P.Sensitive_Data “Privacy of sensitive biometric reference data”
is fulfilled by the TOE-objective OT.Sens_Data_Conf “Confidentiality of sensitive biometric
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reference data” requiring that read access to EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 (containing the
sensitive biometric reference data) is only granted to authorized inspection systems.
Furthermore it is required that the transmission of these data ensures the data’s
confidentiality. The authorization bases on Document Verifier certificates issued by the
issuing State or Organization as required by OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data “Authorization for
use of sensitive biometric reference data”. The Document Verifier of the receiving State
has to authorize Extended Inspection Systems by creating appropriate Inspection System
certificates for access to the sensitive biometric reference data as demanded by
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems “Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems”.
P.Manufact The OSP P.Manufact “Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip” requires a unique
identification of the IC by means of the Initialization Data and the writing of the Pre-
personalization Data as being fulfilled by OT.Identification.
P.Personalization The OSP P.Personalization “Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State
or Organization only” addresses the (i) the enrolment of the logical MRTD by the
Personalization Agent as described in the security objective for the TOE environment
OE.Personalization “Personalization of logical MRTD”, and (ii) the access control for the
user data and TSF data as described by the security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control
for Personalization of logical MRTD”. Note the manufacturer equips the TOE with the
Personalization Agent Key(s) according to OT.Identification “Identification and
Authentication of the TOE”. The security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for
Personalization of logical MRTD” limits the management of TSF data and management of
TSF to the Personalization Agent.
P.Activ_Auth The OSP P.Activ_Auth requires the implementation of the Active
Authentication protocol as enforced by OT.AA_Proof.
5.3.3 Assumptions
A.MRTD_Manufact The assumption A.MRTD_Manufact “MRTD manufacturing on step 4 to
6” is covered by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.MRTD_Manufact
“Protection of the MRTD Manufacturing” that requires to use security procedures during
all manufacturing steps.
A.MRTD_Delivery The assumption A.MRTD_ Delivery “MRTD delivery during step 4 to 6” is
covered by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.MRTD_ Delivery “Protection
of the MRTD delivery” that requires to use security procedures during delivery steps of
the MRTD.
A.Pers_Agent The assumption A.Pers_Agent “Personalization of the MRTD’s chip” is
covered by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.Personalization
“Personalization of logical MRTD” including the enrolment, the protection with digital
signature and the storage of the MRTD holder personal data.
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A.Insp_Sys The examination of the MRTD passport book addressed by the assumption
A.Insp_Sys “Inspection Systems for global interoperability” is covered by the security
objectives for the TOE environment OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport
book” which requires the inspection system to examine physically the MRTD, the Basic
Inspection System to implement the Basic Access Control, and the General Inspection
Systems and Extended Inspection Systems to implement and to perform the Chip
Authentication Protocol to verify the Authenticity of the presented MRTD’s chip. The
security objectives for the TOE environment OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD “Protection of data
from the logical MRTD” require the Inspection System to protect the logical MRTD data
during the transmission and the internal handling.
A.Signature_PKI The assumption A.Signature_PKI “PKI for Passive Authentication” is
directly covered by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
“Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature” covering the necessary procedures for the
Country Signing CA Key Pair and the Document Signer Key Pairs. The implementation of
the signature verification procedures is covered by OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the
MRTD passport book”.
A.Auth_PKI The assumption A.Auth_PKI “PKI for Inspection Systems” is covered by the
security objective for the TOE environment OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data “Authorization for use
of sensitive biometric reference data” requires the CVCA to limit the read access to
sensitive biometrics by issuing Document Verifier certificates for authorized receiving
States or Organizations only. The Document Verifier of the receiving State is required by
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems “Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems” to authorize
Extended Inspection Systems by creating Inspection System Certificates. Therefore, the
receiving issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key
infrastructure.
A.Insp_Sys_AA The examination of the MRTD passport book addressed by the assumption
A.Insp_Sys_AA "Inspection Systems for global interoperability" is covered by the security
objectives for the TOE environment OE.Exam_MRTD_AA "Examination of the MRTD
passport book". The security objectives for the TOE environment
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_AA "Protection of data from the logical MRTD" will require the
Basic Inspection System to implement the Active Authentication Protocol and to protect
the logical MRTD data during the transmission and the internal handling.
5.3.4 SPD and Security Objectives
Threats Security Objectives Rationale
T.Read_Sensitive_Data OT.Sens_Data_Conf,
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data,
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems, OT.AC_SM_Level
Section 5.3.1
T.Forgery OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Prot_Phys-
Tamper, OE.Pass_Auth_Sign,
OE.Exam_MRTD, OE.Passive_Auth_Verif,
Section 5.3.1
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OE.Exam_MRTD_AA
T.Counterfeit OT.Chip_Auth_Proof, OE.Auth_Key_MRTD,
OE.Exam_MRTD, OT.AA_Proof,
OT.Data_Int_AA, OE.Activ_Auth_Verif,
OE.Activ_Auth_Sign
Section 5.3.1
T.Abuse-Func OT.Prot_Abuse-Func Section 5.3.1
T.Information_Leakage OT.Prot_Inf_Leak Section 5.3.1
T.Phys-Tamper OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper Section 5.3.1
T.Malfunction OT.Prot_Malfunction Section 5.3.1
T.Configuration OT.Configuration Section 5.3.1
T.
Forgery_Supplemental_Data
OT.Update_File Section 5.3.1
Table 10 Threats and Security Objectives - Coverage
Security Objectives Threats
OT.AC_Pers T.Forgery
OT.Data_Int T.Forgery
OT.Sens_Data_Conf T.Read_Sensitive_Data
OT.Identification
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof T.Counterfeit
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func T.Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak T.Information_Leakage
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper T.Forgery, T.Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfunction T.Malfunction
OT.Configuration T.Configuration
OT.Update_File T. Forgery_Supplemental_Data
OT.AC_SM_Level T.Read_Sensitive_Data
OT.AA_Proof T.Counterfeit
OT.Data_Int_AA T.Counterfeit
OE.MRTD_Manufact
OE.MRTD_ Delivery
OE.Personalization
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign T.Forgery
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OE.Auth_Key_MRTD T.Counterfeit
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data T.Read_Sensitive_Data
OE.BAC_PP
OE.Exam_MRTD T.Forgery, T.Counterfeit
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif T.Forgery
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems T.Read_Sensitive_Data
OE.Exam_MRTD_AA T.Forgery
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_AA
OE.Activ_Auth_Verif T.Counterfeit
OE.Activ_Auth_Sign T.Counterfeit
Table 11 Security Objectives and Threats - Coverage
Organisational Security
Policies
Security Objectives Rationale
P.BAC-PP OE.BAC_PP Section 5.3.2
P.Sensitive_Data OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data,
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems
Section 5.3.2
P.Manufact OT.Identification Section 5.3.2
P.Personalization OT.AC_Pers, OT.Identification, OE.Personalization Section 5.3.2
P.Activ_Auth OT.AA_Proof Section 5.3.2
Table 12 OSPs and Security Objectives - Coverage
Security Objectives Organisational Security Policies
OT.AC_Pers P.Personalization
OT.Data_Int
OT.Sens_Data_Conf P.Sensitive_Data
OT.Identification P.Manufact, P.Personalization
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfunction
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OT.Configuration
OT.Update_File
OT.AC_SM_Level
OT.AA_Proof P.Activ_Auth
OT.Data_Int_AA
OE.MRTD_Manufact
OE.MRTD_ Delivery
OE.Personalization P.Personalization
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
OE.Auth_Key_MRTD
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data P.Sensitive_Data
OE.BAC_PP P.BAC-PP
OE.Exam_MRTD
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems P.Sensitive_Data
OE.Exam_MRTD_AA
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_AA
OE.Activ_Auth_Verif
OE.Activ_Auth_Sign
Table 13 Security Objectives and OSPs - Coverage
Assumptions Security Objectives for the Operational Environment Rationale
A.MRTD_Manufact OE.MRTD_Manufact Section 5.3.3
A.MRTD_Delivery OE.MRTD_ Delivery Section 5.3.3
A.Pers_Agent OE.Personalization Section 5.3.3
A.Insp_Sys OE.Exam_MRTD, OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD Section 5.3.3
A.Signature_PKI OE.Pass_Auth_Sign, OE.Exam_MRTD Section 5.3.3
A.Auth_PKI OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data, OE.Ext_Insp_Systems Section 5.3.3
A.Insp_Sys_AA OE.Exam_MRTD_AA, OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_AA Section 5.3.3
Table 14 Assumptions and Security Objectives for the Operational Environment -
Coverage
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Security Objectives for the Operational
Environment
Assumptions
OE.MRTD_Manufact A.MRTD_Manufact
OE.MRTD_ Delivery A.MRTD_Delivery
OE.Personalization A.Pers_Agent
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign A.Signature_PKI
OE.Auth_Key_MRTD
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data A.Auth_PKI
OE.BAC_PP
OE.Exam_MRTD A.Insp_Sys, A.Signature_PKI
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD A.Insp_Sys
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems A.Auth_PKI
OE.Exam_MRTD_AA A.Insp_Sys_AA
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_AA A.Insp_Sys_AA
OE.Activ_Auth_Verif
OE.Activ_Auth_Sign
Table 15 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment and Assumptions -
Coverage
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6 Extended Requirements
6.1 Extended Families
6.1.1 Extended Family FPT_EMS - TOE Emanation
6.1.1.1 Description
The additional family FPT_EMS (TOE Emanation) of the Class FPT (Protection of the TSF) is
defined here to describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE. The TOE shall
prevent attacks against the SCD and other secret data where the attack is based on external
observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Examples of such attacks are evaluation of
TOE?s electromagnetic radiation, simple power analysis (SPA), differential power analysis
(DPA), timing attacks, radio emanation etc. This family describes the functional requirements
for the limitation of intelligible emanations. The family FPT_EMS belongs to the Class FPT
because it is the class for TSF protection. Other families within the Class FPT do not cover
the TOE emanation.
6.1.1.2 Extended Components
Extended Component FPT_EMS.1
Description
This family defines requirements to mitigate intelligible emanations.
FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation has two constituents:
 FPT_EMS.1.1 Limit of Emissions requires to not emit intelligible emissions enabling
access to TSF data or user data.
 FPT_EMS.1.2 Interface Emanation requires to not emit interface emanation enabling
access to TSF data or user data.
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Definition
FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation
FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of
[assignment: specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data]
and [assignment: list of types of user data].
FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the
following interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access to [assignment: list of
types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data].
Dependencies: No dependencies.
6.1.2 Extended Family FMT_LIM - Limited capabilities
6.1.2.1 Description
The family FMT_LIM describes the functional requirements for the test features of the TOE.
The new functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because this class addresses
the management of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical mechanism used in
the TOE show that no other class is appropriate to address the specific issues of preventing
abuse of functions by limiting the capabilities of the functions and by limiting their
availability.
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6.1.2.2 Extended Components
Extended Component FMT_LIM.1
Description
Definition
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in
conjunction with ‘Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)’ the following policy is enforced
[assignment: Limited capability and availability policy]
Dependencies: (FMT_LIM.2)
Extended Component FMT_LIM.2
Description
Definition
FMT_LIM.2 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in
conjunction with ‘Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)’ the following policy is enforced
[assignment: Limited capability and availability policy]
Dependencies: (FMT_LIM.1)
6.1.3 Extended Family FAU_SAS - Audit data storage
6.1.3.1 Description
To define the security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FAU_SAS) of
the Class FAU (Security Audit) is defined here. This family describes the functional
requirements for the storage of audit data. It has a more general approach than FAU_GEN,
because it does not necessarily require the data to be generated by the TOE itself and
because it does not give specific details of the content of the audit records.
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6.1.3.2 Extended Components
Extended Component FAU_SAS.1
Description
Requires the TOE to provide the possibility to store audit data.
Definition
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorized users] with the capability to
store [assignment: list of audit information] in the audit records.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
6.1.4 Extended Family FIA_API - Authentication Proof of Identity
6.1.4.1 Description
To describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FIA_API)
of the Class FIA (Identification and authentication) is defined here. This family describes the
functional requirements for the proof of the claimed identity for the authentication
verification by an external entity where the other families of the class FIA address the
verification of the identity of an external entity.
Application note 10: The other families of the Class FIA describe only the authentication
verification of users' identity performed by the TOE and do not describe the functionality of
the user to prove their identity. The following paragraph defines the family FIA_API in the
style of the Common Criteria part 2 (cf. [CC_3], chapter 'Explicitly stated IT security
requirements (APE_SRE)') from a TOE point of view.
6.1.4.2 Extended Components
Extended Component FIA_API.1
Description
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
Management of authentication information used to prove the claimed identity.
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Definition
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity
FIA_API.1.1 The TSF shall provide a [assignment: authentication mechanism ] to prove the
identity of the [assignment: authorized user or role ].
Dependencies: No dependencies.
6.1.5 Extended Family FCS_RND - Generation of random numbers
6.1.5.1 Description
This family defines quality requirements for the generation of random numbers intended to
be used for cryptographic purposes.
6.1.5.2 Extended Components
Extended Component FCS_RND.1
Description
Generation of random numbers requires that random numbers meet a defined quality metric.
Definition
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet
[assignment: a defined quality metric ].
Dependencies: No dependencies.
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7 Security Requirements
7.1 Security Functional Requirements
7.1.1 Class FAU Security Audit
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Audit storage (FAU_SAS.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide the Manufacturer with the capability to store the IC
Identification Data in the audit records.
7.1.2 Class FCS Cryptographic Support
FCS_CKM.1/CA Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/CA The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm based on ECDH compliant to [ISO_11770]
and specified cryptographic key sizes 192 to 512 bit that meet the following:
[TR_03110].
Application Note:
ISO-15946 defined in the protection profile has been replaced since Part 3 that dealt with
Key Management using Elliptic Curve has been withdrawn and instead revised by
[ISO_11770]
FCS_CKM.1/CA_DATA_GEN Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/CA_DATA_GEN The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance
with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm see table below and specified
cryptographic key sizes see table below that meet the following: see table below
Algorithm Key Size Standard
Chip Authentication Data Generation using
DH keys compliant to PKCS#3
1024 to 2048 bits in
steps of 512 bits
PKCS#3
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Chip authentication data generation using
ECDH keys compliant to [ISO_15946]
192 to 512 bits [TR_03111]
.
FCS_CKM.1/GP Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/GP The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm see table below and specified
cryptographic key sizes see table below that meet the following: see table below:
Key Generation Algorithm Key Sizes Standard
Triple-DES in CBC mode 112 bit [GPC_SPE_034]
AES in CBC mode 128, 192 and 256 [GPC_SPE_014]
.
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method zeroisation that meets the following: none.
FCS_COP.1/SHA Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/SHA The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm SHA-1 and SHA-256 and cryptographic key sizes none that
meet the following: [FIPS_180_4].
FCS_COP.1/SYM Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/SYM The TSF shall perform see table below in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm see table below and cryptographic key sizes see table below
that meet the following: see table below
Cryptographic Operations Algorithms Key sizes Norms
secure messaging-encryption and
decryption
AES in CBC
mode
128, 192 and
256 bits
[TR-
03110]
secure messaging-encryption and TDES in CBC 112 bits [TR-
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decryption mode 03110]
.
FCS_COP.1/MAC Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/MAC The TSF shall perform see table below in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm see table below and cryptographic key sizes see table below
that meet the following: see table below
Cryptographic Operations Algorithms Key sizes Standard
secure messaging - message
authentication code
AES CMAC 128, 192 and
256 bits
[TR-
03110]
secure messaging - message
authentication code
Retail MAC 112 bits [TR-
03110]
.
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/SIG_VER The TSF shall perform see table below in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm see table below and cryptographic key sizes see
table below that meet the following: see table below
Cryptographic
Operation
Algorithm Key Sizes
digital signature
verification
ECDSA with SHA-1, SHA-224 and SHA-256
as defined in [FIPS_186_3]
192 to 512
digital signature
verification
RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA-1, SHA-256 and
SHA-512
1024, 1536,
2048
digital signature
verification
RSA PKCS#1-PSS with SHA-1, SHA-256 and
SHA-512
1024, 1536,
2048
.
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FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/GP_ENC The TSF shall perform see table below in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm see table below and cryptographic key sizes see
table below that meet the following: see table below
Cryptographic Operation Algorithm Key Sizes Standard
secure messaging (GP) –
encryption and decryption
Triple-DES in
CBC mode
112 bit [FIPS_46_3]
secure messaging (GP) –
encryption and decryption
AES in CBC
mode
128, 192
and 256 bits
[NIST_800_38A]
.
FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/GP_AUTH The TSF shall perform see table below in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm see table below and cryptographic key sizes see
table below that meet the following: see table below:
Cryptographic Operation Algorithm Key Sizes Standard
symmetric authentication –
message authentication code
Full 3DES
MAC
112 bit [ISO_9797_1]
symmetric authentication –
message authentication code
AES CMAC 128, 198
and 256 bits
[NIST_800_38B]
.
FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/GP_MAC The TSF shall perform see table below in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm see table below and cryptographic key sizes see
table below that meet the following: see table below
Cryptographic Operation Algorithm Key Size(s) Standard
secure messaging - message
authentication code
Retail MAC 112 bit [ISO_9797_1]
secure messaging (GP) -
encryption and decryption
AES CMAC 128, 192 and
256 bits
[NIST_800_38B
.
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FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/GP_KEY_DEC The TSF shall perform see table below in accordance with
a specified cryptographic algorithm see table below and cryptographic key sizes see
table below that meet the following: see table below:
Cryptographic
Operation
Algorithm Key Sizes Standard
key decryption Triple-DES in ECB
mode
112 bit [FIPS_46_3]
key decryption AES in CBC mode 128, 192 and 256
bits
[FIPS_197]
.
FCS_COP.1/AA Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/AA The TSF shall perform [Cryptographic Operation] in accordance with
a specified cryptographic algorithm [Cryptographic Algorithm] and cryptographic key
sizes [Cryptographic Key Sizes] that meet the following: [Standard]
Cryptographic
Operation
Cryptographic
Algorithm
Cryptographic Key
Sizes(bits)
Standard
Digital Signature
Creation
ECDSA with SHA1,
256, 384, 512
192 to 512 over
prime field curves
[ISO_9796-2],
[PKCS#3],
[FIPS_180_2] and
[X.92]
Digital Signature
Creation
RSA signature (CRT)
with SHA1, 256,
384, 512
1024, 1536 and
2048
[ISO_9796-2]
.
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet
the average Shannon entropy per internal random bit exceeds 0.994.
7.1.3 Class FIA Identification and Authentication
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FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow
o to establish the communication channel,
o to read the Initialization Data if it is not disable by TSF according to
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
o to carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing
any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UID.1/MP Timing of identification
FIA_UID.1.1/MP The TSF shall allow
o to carry out the authentication of the Manufacturer and Personalization
Agent
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2/MP The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow
o to establish the communication channel,
o to read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS,
o to identify themselves by selection of the authentication key
o to carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
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FIA_UAU.1/MP Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.1.1/MP The TSF shall allow
o to carry out the authentication of the Manufacturer and Personalization
Agent
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2/MP The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.4.1 The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
o Terminal Authentication Protocol,
o Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES and AES.
Application Note:
The authentication mechanisms based on Triple-DES and AES is the authentication process
performed in phases 5 and 6
FIA_UAU.5/EAC Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5.1/EAC The TSF shall provide
o Terminal Authentication Protocol,
o Secure messaging in MAC-ENC mode,
o Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES and AES
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2/EAC The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the
following rules:
o The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalization Agent by
the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with Personalization Agent
Key.
o After run of the Chip Authentication Protocol the TOE accepts only
received commands with correct message authentication code sent by
means of secure messaging with key agreed with the terminal by
means of the Chip Authentication Mechanism.
o The TOE accepts the authentication attempt by means of the Terminal
Authentication Protocol only if the terminal uses the public key
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presented during the Chip Authentication Protocol and the secure
messaging established by the Chip Authentication Mechanism.
FIA_UAU.6/EAC Re-authenticating
FIA_UAU.6.1/EAC The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each
command sent to the TOE after successful run of the Chip Authentication
Protocol shall be verified as being sent by the GIS.
FIA_UAU.6/MP Re-authenticating
FIA_UAU.6.1/MP The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each
command sent to the TOE after successful authentication of the terminal with
the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism shall be verified as being sent by the
authenticated terminal.
FIA_AFL.1/MP Authentication failure handling
FIA_AFL.1.1/MP The TSF shall detect when 1 unsuccessful authentication attempts occur
related to authentication of the Manufacturer and the Personalization Agent.
FIA_AFL.1.2/MP When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has
been met, the TSF shall slow down exponentially the next authentication.
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity
FIA_API.1.1 The TSF shall provide a Chip Authentication Protocol according to
[TR_03110] to prove the identity of the TOE.
7.1.4 Class FDP User Data Protection
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP on terminals gaining
write, read and modification access to data in the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD.
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FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to objects based on the
following:
o Subjects:
 Personalization Agent,
 Extended Inspection System
 Terminal,
o Objects:
 data EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
 data EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 of the logical MRTD
 data in EF.COM,
 data in EF.SOD,
o Security attributes:
 authentication status of terminals,
 Terminal Authorization.
FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
o the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write
and to read the data of the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the
logical MRTD,
o the successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System with the
Read access to DG 3 (Fingerprint) granted by the relative certificate
holder authorization encoding is allowed to read the data in EF.DG3 of
the logical MRTD.
o the successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System with the
Read access to DG 4 (Iris) granted by the relative certificate holder
authorization encoding is allowed to read the data in EF.DG4 of the
logical MRTD.
FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: rule:
o A terminal authenticated as CVCA is not allowed to read data in the
EF.DG3,
o A terminal authenticated as CVCA is not allowed to read data in the
EF.DG4,
o A terminal authenticated as DV is not allowed to read data in the
EF.DG3,
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o A terminal authenticated as DV is not allowed to read data in the
EF.DG4,
o A ny terminal is not allowed to modify any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of
the logical MRTD,
o Any terminal not being successfully authenticated as Extended
Inspection System is not allowed to read any of the EF.DG3 to EF.DG4
of the logical MRTD.
FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE Subset access control
FDP_ACC.1.1/UPD_FILE The TSF shall enforce the UPD_FILE Access Control SFP on
terminals gaining write, read and modification access to data in the file(s)
other than EF.COM, EF.SOD, and EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD.
FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1.1/UPD_FILE The TSF shall enforce the UPD_FILE Access Control SFP to
objects based on the following:
o Subjects:
 Personalization Agent,
 Extended Inspection System,
 Terminal,
o Objects:
 data in the file(s) other than EF.COM, EF.SOD, and EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD
o Security attributes
 authentication status of terminals,.
FDP_ACF.1.2/UPD_FILE The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an
operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
o the Personalization Agent is allowed to write, read and modify the data
in the file(s) other than EF.COM, EF.SOD, and EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the
logical MRTD,
o the successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System with the
name corresponding to the one (or beginning of the one) set following
FMT_MTD.1.1/UPD_FILE is allowed to modify the data in the file(s)
other than EF.COM, EF.SOD, and EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical
MRTD.
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FDP_ACF.1.3/UPD_FILE The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects
based on the following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4/UPD_FILE The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based
on the following additional rules: Any Terminal is not allowed to modify the data in
the file(s) other than EF.COM, EF.SOD, and EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical
MRTD.
FDP_UCT.1/EAC Basic data exchange confidentiality
FDP_UCT.1.1/EAC [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP
to transmit and receive user data in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure
after Chip Authentication.
FDP_UIT.1/EAC Data exchange integrity
FDP_UIT.1.1/EAC [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP
to transmit and receive user data in a manner protected from modification,
deletion, insertion and replay errors after Chip Authentication.
FDP_UIT.1.2/EAC [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of
user data, whether modification, deletion, insertion and replay has occurred after
Chip Authentication.
FDP_DAU.1/AA Basic Data Authentication
FDP_DAU.1.1/AA The TSF shall provide a capability to generate evidence that can be used
as a guarantee of the validity of the TOE iteself.
FDP_DAU.1.2/AA The TSF shall provide any users with the ability to verify evidence of
the validity of the indicated information.
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FDP_ITC.1/AA Import of user data without security attributes
FDP_ITC.1.1/AA The TSF shall enforce the Active Authentication Access Control SFP
when importing user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.2/AA The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data
when imported from outside the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.3/AA The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data
controlled under the SFP from outside the TOE: none.
7.1.5 Class FMT Security Management
FMT_MOF.1/AA Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MOF.1.1/AA The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable and disable the functions
TSF Active Authentication to Personalization Agent.
FMT_MOF.1/GP Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MOF.1.1/GP The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable the functions
o transmission of user data in a manner protected from unauthorised
disclosure,
o reception of user data in a manner protected from unauthorised
disclosure,
o transmission of user data in a manner protected from modification,
deletion, insertion and replay errors,
o reception of user data in a manner protected from modification,
deletion, insertion and replay errors, to the Manufacturer and the
Personalization Agent.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
o Initialization
o Pre-personalization
o Personalization.
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FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles
o Manufacturer,
o Personalization Agent,
o Country Verifying Certification Authority,
o Document Verifier,
o domestic Extended Inspection System
o foreign Extended Inspection System.
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_ENA The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Initialization
Data and Prepersonalization Data to the Manufacturer.
Application Note:
Please refer to F.ACW for details of the data written by the manufacturer.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_DIS The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable read access for
users to the Initialization Data to the Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/CVCA_INI The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the
o initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key,
o initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate,
o initial Current Date
to the Personalization Agent.
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FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/CVCA_UPD The TSF shall restrict the ability to update the
o Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key,
o Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate
to Country Verifying Certification Authority.
FMT_MTD.1/DATE Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/DATE The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify the current date to
o Country Verifying Certification Authority,
o Document Verifier,
o domestic Extended Inspection System.
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_WRITE The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Document
Basic Access Keys to the Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/CAPK The TSF shall restrict the ability to load the Chip Authentication
Private Key to the Personalization agent.
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the
o Document Basic Access Keys,
o Chip Authentication Private Key,
o Personalization Agent Keys
to none.
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FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PERS Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/LCS_PERS The TSF shall restrict the ability to switch the LCS from
phase 6 to phase 7 to the Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/UPD_FILE Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/UPD_FILE The TSF shall restrict the ability to set the identifiers of files
that can be modified in phase 7(different from EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16) to the Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/SM_LVL The TSF shall restrict the ability to set the minimum Secure
Messaging level required to access DG 3 and DG 4 to the Personalization
Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/AA_KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the AAK to
none.
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/AA_KEY_WRITE The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the AAK to
Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.3 Secure TSF data
FMT_MTD.3.1 [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall ensure that only secure values of the
certificate chain are accepted for TSF data of the Terminal Authentication Protocol
and the Access Control.
Refinement:
The certificate chain is valid if and only if
o the digital signature of the Inspection System Certificate can be verified as correct
with the public key of the Document Verifier Certificate and the expiration date of
the Inspection System Certificate is not before the Current Date of the TOE,
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o the digital signature of the Document Verifier Certificate can be verified as correct
with the public key in the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification
Authority and the expiration date of the Document Verifier Certificate is not
before the Current Date of the TOE,
o the digital signature of the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification
Authority can be verified as correct with the public key of the Country Verifying
Certification Authority known to the TOE and the expiration date of the Certificate
of the Country Verifying Certification Authority is not before the Current Date of
the TOE.
The Inspection System Public Key contained in the Inspection System Certificate in a valid
certificate chain is a secure value for the authentication reference data of the Extended
Inspection System.
The intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorizations contained in the certificates of a
valid certificate chain is a secure value for Terminal Authorization of a successful
authenticated Extended Inspection System.
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in
conjunction with ‘Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)’ the following policy is enforced
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow,
o User Data to be manipulated,
o sensitive User Data (EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) to be disclosed,
o TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
o software to be reconstructed and
o substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which
may enable other attacks
FMT_LIM.2 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in
conjunction with ‘Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)’ the following policy is enforced
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow,
o User Data to be manipulated,
o sensitive User Data (EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) to be disclosed,
o TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
o software to be reconstructed and
o substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which
may enable other attacks
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7.1.6 Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions
FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation
FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during
command execution in excess of non useful information enabling access to
Personalization Agent Key(s) and Chip Authentication Private Key and
o Pre-personalization Agent Keys,
o Secure Messaging Session Keys,
o Active Authentication: Private Key (AAK).
FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure users are unable to use the following interface smart
card circuit contacts to gain access to Personalization Agent Key(s) and Chip
Authentication Private Key and
o Pre-personalization Agent Keys,
o Secure Messaging Session Keys
o Active Authentication: Private Key (AAK).
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures
occur:
o Exposure to out-of-range operating conditions where therefore a
malfunction could occur,
o failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.1.
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests at the conditions
o At reset, to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the
integrity of TSF data.
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the
integrity of stored TSF executable code.
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FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
FPT_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing to the
TSF by responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.
7.1.7 Class FTP Trusted path/channels
FTP_ITC.1/MP Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1.1/MP The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and
another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels
and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data
from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2/MP The TSF shall permit another trusted IT product to initiate
communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3/MP The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for loading
sensitive data (Pre-Perso_K, Perso_K and CA_SK) shall be encrypted.
7.2 Security Assurance Requirements
The Evaluation Assurance Level is EAL5 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
7.2.1 ADV Development
7.2.1.1 ADV_ARC Security Architecture
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ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_ARC.1.1D The developer shall design and implement the TOE so that the security
features of the TSF cannot be bypassed.
ADV_ARC.1.2D The developer shall design and implement the TSF so that it is able to
protect itself from tampering by untrusted active entities.
ADV_ARC.1.3D The developer shall provide a security architecture description of the TSF.
ADV_ARC.1.1C The security architecture description shall be at a level of detail
commensurate with the description of the SFR-enforcing abstractions described in the
TOE design document.
ADV_ARC.1.2C The security architecture description shall describe the security domains
maintained by the TSF consistently with the SFRs.
ADV_ARC.1.3C The security architecture description shall describe how the TSF
initialisation process is secure.
ADV_ARC.1.4C The security architecture description shall demonstrate that the TSF
protects itself from tampering.
ADV_ARC.1.5C The security architecture description shall demonstrate that the TSF
prevents bypass of the SFR-enforcing functionality.
ADV_ARC.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
7.2.1.2 ADV_FSP Functional specification
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ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional error
information
ADV_FSP.5.1D The developer shall provide a functional specification.
ADV_FSP.5.2D The developer shall provide a tracing from the functional specification to
the SFRs.
ADV_FSP.5.1C The functional specification shall completely represent the TSF.
ADV_FSP.5.2C The functional specification shall describe the TSFI using a semi-formal
style.
ADV_FSP.5.3C The functional specification shall describe the purpose and method of use
for all TSFI.
ADV_FSP.5.4C The functional specification shall identify and describe all parameters
associated with each TSFI.
ADV_FSP.5.5C The functional specification shall describe all actions associated with each
TSFI.
ADV_FSP.5.6C The functional specification shall describe all direct error messages that may
result from an invocation of each TSFI.
ADV_FSP.5.7C The functional specification shall describe all error messages that do not
result from an invocation of a TSFI.
ADV_FSP.5.8C The functional specification shall provide a rationale for each error message
contained in the TSF implementation yet does not result from an invocation of a TSFI.
ADV_FSP.5.9C The tracing shall demonstrate that the SFRs trace to TSFIs in the functional
specification.
ADV_FSP.5.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ADV_FSP.5.2E The evaluator shall determine that the functional specification is an accurate
and complete instantiation of the SFRs.
7.2.1.3 ADV_IMP Implementation representation
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ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.1.1D The developer shall make available the implementation representation for
the entire TSF.
ADV_IMP.1.2D The developer shall provide a mapping between the TOE design description
and the sample of the implementation representation.
ADV_IMP.1.1C The implementation representation shall define the TSF to a level of detail
such that the TSF can be generated without further design decisions.
ADV_IMP.1.2C The implementation representation shall be in the form used by the
development personnel.
ADV_IMP.1.3C The mapping between the TOE design description and the sample of the
implementation representation shall demonstrate their correspondence.
ADV_IMP.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that, for the selected sample of the
implementation representation, the information provided meets all requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
7.2.1.4 ADV_INT TSF internals
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ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.2.1D The developer shall design and implement the entire TSF such that it has
well-structured internals.
ADV_INT.2.2D The developer shall provide an internals description and justification.
ADV_INT.2.1C The justification shall describe the characteristics used to judge the
meaning of ``well-structured''.
ADV_INT.2.2C The TSF internals description shall demonstrate that the entire TSF is well-
structured.
ADV_INT.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ADV_INT.2.2E The evaluator shall perform an internals analysis on the TSF.
7.2.1.5 ADV_TDS TOE design
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ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.4.1D The developer shall provide the design of the TOE.
ADV_TDS.4.2D The developer shall provide a mapping from the TSFI of the functional
specification to the lowest level of decomposition available in the TOE design.
ADV_TDS.4.1C The design shall describe the structure of the TOE in terms of subsystems.
ADV_TDS.4.2C The design shall describe the TSF in terms of modules, designating each
module as SFR-enforcing, SFR-supporting, or SFR-non-interfering.
ADV_TDS.4.3C The design shall identify all subsystems of the TSF.
ADV_TDS.4.4C The design shall provide a semiformal description of each subsystem of the
TSF, supported by informal, explanatory text where appropriate.
ADV_TDS.4.5C The design shall provide a description of the interactions among all
subsystems of the TSF.
ADV_TDS.4.6C The design shall provide a mapping from the subsystems of the TSF to the
modules of the TSF.
ADV_TDS.4.7C The design shall describe each SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting module
in terms of its purpose and relationship with other modules.
ADV_TDS.4.8C The design shall describe each SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting module
in terms of its SFR-related interfaces, return values from those interfaces, interaction with
other modules and called SFR-related interfaces to other SFR-enforcing or SFR-supporting
modules.
ADV_TDS.4.9C The design shall describe each SFR-non-interfering module in terms of its
purpose and interaction with other modules.
ADV_TDS.4.10C The mapping shall demonstrate that all TSFIs trace to the behaviour
described in the TOE design that they invoke.
ADV_TDS.4.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ADV_TDS.4.2E The evaluator shall determine that the design is an accurate and complete
instantiation of all security functional requirements.
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7.2.2 AGD Guidance documents
7.2.2.1 AGD_OPE Operational user guidance
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_OPE.1.1D The developer shall provide operational user guidance.
AGD_OPE.1.1C The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the user-
accessible functions and privileges that should be controlled in a secure processing
environment, including appropriate warnings.
AGD_OPE.1.2C The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, how to
use the available interfaces provided by the TOE in a secure manner.
AGD_OPE.1.3C The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the
available functions and interfaces, in particular all security parameters under the control
of the user, indicating secure values as appropriate.
AGD_OPE.1.4C The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, clearly present
each type of security-relevant event relative to the user-accessible functions that need to
be performed, including changing the security characteristics of entities under the control
of the TSF.
AGD_OPE.1.5C The operational user guidance shall identify all possible modes of operation
of the TOE (including operation following failure or operational error), their consequences
and implications for maintaining secure operation.
AGD_OPE.1.6C The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, describe the
security measures to be followed in order to fulfil the security objectives for the
operational environment as described in the ST.
AGD_OPE.1.7C The operational user guidance shall be clear and reasonable.
AGD_OPE.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
7.2.2.2 AGD_PRE Preparative procedures
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AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
AGD_PRE.1.1D The developer shall provide the TOE including its preparative procedures.
AGD_PRE.1.1C The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure
acceptance of the delivered TOE in accordance with the developer's delivery procedures.
AGD_PRE.1.2C The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure
installation of the TOE and for the secure preparation of the operational environment in
accordance with the security objectives for the operational environment as described in
the ST.
AGD_PRE.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
AGD_PRE.1.2E The evaluator shall apply the preparative procedures to confirm that the
TOE can be prepared securely for operation.
7.2.3 ALC Life-cycle support
7.2.3.1 ALC_CMC CM capabilities
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ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and automation
ALC_CMC.4.1D The developer shall provide the TOE and a reference for the TOE.
ALC_CMC.4.2D The developer shall provide the CM documentation.
ALC_CMC.4.3D The developer shall use a CM system.
ALC_CMC.4.1C The TOE shall be labelled with its unique reference.
ALC_CMC.4.2C The CM documentation shall describe the method used to uniquely identify
the configuration items.
ALC_CMC.4.3C The CM system shall uniquely identify all configuration items.
ALC_CMC.4.4C The CM system shall provide automated measures such that only
authorised changes are made to the configuration items.
ALC_CMC.4.5C The CM system shall support the production of the TOE by automated
means.
ALC_CMC.4.6C The CM documentation shall include a CM plan.
ALC_CMC.4.7C The CM plan shall describe how the CM system is used for the development
of the TOE.
ALC_CMC.4.8C The CM plan shall describe the procedures used to accept modified or
newly created configuration items as part of the TOE.
ALC_CMC.4.9C The evidence shall demonstrate that all configuration items are being
maintained under the CM system.
ALC_CMC.4.10C The evidence shall demonstrate that the CM system is being operated in
accordance with the CM plan.
ALC_CMC.4.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
7.2.3.2 ALC_CMS CM scope
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ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5.1D The developer shall provide a configuration list for the TOE.
ALC_CMS.5.1C The configuration list shall include the following: the TOE itself; the
evaluation evidence required by the SARs; the parts that comprise the TOE; the
implementation representation; security flaw reports and resolution status; and
development tools and related information.
ALC_CMS.5.2C The configuration list shall uniquely identify the configuration items.
ALC_CMS.5.3C For each TSF relevant configuration item, the configuration list shall
indicate the developer of the item.
ALC_CMS.5.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
7.2.3.3 ALC_DEL Delivery
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DEL.1.1D The developer shall document and provide procedures for delivery of the
TOE or parts of it to the consumer.
ALC_DEL.1.2D The developer shall use the delivery procedures.
ALC_DEL.1.1C The delivery documentation shall describe all procedures that are necessary
to maintain security when distributing versions of the TOE to the consumer.
ALC_DEL.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
7.2.3.4 ALC_DVS Development security
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ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_DVS.2.1D The developer shall produce and provide development security
documentation.
ALC_DVS.2.1C The development security documentation shall describe all the physical,
procedural, personnel, and other security measures that are necessary to protect the
confidentiality and integrity of the TOE design and implementation in its development
environment.
ALC_DVS.2.2C The development security documentation shall justify that the security
measures provide the necessary level of protection to maintain the confidentiality and
integrity of the TOE.
ALC_DVS.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ALC_DVS.2.2E The evaluator shall confirm that the security measures are being applied.
7.2.3.5 ALC_LCD Life-cycle definition
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.1.1D The developer shall establish a life-cycle model to be used in the
development and maintenance of the TOE.
ALC_LCD.1.2D The developer shall provide life-cycle definition documentation.
ALC_LCD.1.1C The life-cycle definition documentation shall describe the model used to
develop and maintain the TOE.
ALC_LCD.1.2C The life-cycle model shall provide for the necessary control over the
development and maintenance of the TOE.
ALC_LCD.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
7.2.3.6 ALC_TAT Tools and techniques
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ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.2.1D The developer shall provide the documentation identifying each
development tool being used for the TOE.
ALC_TAT.2.2D The developer shall document and provide the selected implementation-
dependent options of each development tool.
ALC_TAT.2.3D The developer shall describe and provide the implementation standards that
are being applied by the developer.
ALC_TAT.2.1C Each development tool used for implementation shall be well-defined.
ALC_TAT.2.2C The documentation of each development tool shall unambiguously define
the meaning of all statements as well as all conventions and directives used in the
implementation.
ALC_TAT.2.3C The documentation of each development tool shall unambiguously define
the meaning of all implementation-dependent options.
ALC_TAT.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ALC_TAT.2.2E The evaluator shall confirm that the implementation standards have been
applied.
7.2.4 ASE Security Target evaluation
7.2.4.1 ASE_CCL Conformance claims
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ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_CCL.1.1D The developer shall provide a conformance claim.
ASE_CCL.1.2D The developer shall provide a conformance claim rationale.
ASE_CCL.1.1C The conformance claim shall contain a CC conformance claim that identifies
the version of the CC to which the ST and the TOE claim conformance.
ASE_CCL.1.2C The CC conformance claim shall describe the conformance of the ST to CC
Part 2 as either CC Part 2 conformant or CC Part 2 extended.
ASE_CCL.1.3C The CC conformance claim shall describe the conformance of the ST to CC
Part 3 as either CC Part 3 conformant or CC Part 3 extended.
ASE_CCL.1.4C The CC conformance claim shall be consistent with the extended
components definition.
ASE_CCL.1.5C The conformance claim shall identify all PPs and security requirement
packages to which the ST claims conformance.
ASE_CCL.1.6C The conformance claim shall describe any conformance of the ST to a
package as either package-conformant or package-augmented.
ASE_CCL.1.7C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the TOE type is
consistent with the TOE type in the PPs for which conformance is being claimed.
ASE_CCL.1.8C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the statement of
the security problem definition is consistent with the statement of the security problem
definition in the PPs for which conformance is being claimed.
ASE_CCL.1.9C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the statement of
security objectives is consistent with the statement of security objectives in the PPs for
which conformance is being claimed.
ASE_CCL.1.10C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the statement of
security requirements is consistent with the statement of security requirements in the PPs
for which conformance is being claimed.
ASE_CCL.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
7.2.4.2 ASE_ECD Extended components definition
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ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_ECD.1.1D The developer shall provide a statement of security requirements.
ASE_ECD.1.2D The developer shall provide an extended components definition.
ASE_ECD.1.1C The statement of security requirements shall identify all extended security
requirements.
ASE_ECD.1.2C The extended components definition shall define an extended component
for each extended security requirement.
ASE_ECD.1.3C The extended components definition shall describe how each extended
component is related to the existing CC components, families, and classes.
ASE_ECD.1.4C The extended components definition shall use the existing CC components,
families, classes, and methodology as a model for presentation.
ASE_ECD.1.5C The extended components shall consist of measurable and objective
elements such that conformance or nonconformance to these elements can be
demonstrated.
ASE_ECD.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ASE_ECD.1.2E The evaluator shall confirm that no extended component can be clearly
expressed using existing components.
7.2.4.3 ASE_INT ST introduction
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ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_INT.1.1D The developer shall provide an ST introduction.
ASE_INT.1.1C The ST introduction shall contain an ST reference, a TOE reference, a TOE
overview and a TOE description.
ASE_INT.1.2C The ST reference shall uniquely identify the ST.
ASE_INT.1.3C The TOE reference shall identify the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.4C The TOE overview shall summarise the usage and major security features of
the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.5C The TOE overview shall identify the TOE type.
ASE_INT.1.6C The TOE overview shall identify any non-TOE hardware/software/firmware
required by the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.7C The TOE description shall describe the physical scope of the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.8C The TOE description shall describe the logical scope of the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ASE_INT.1.2E The evaluator shall confirm that the TOE reference, the TOE overview, and
the TOE description are consistent with each other.
7.2.4.4 ASE_OBJ Security objectives
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ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_OBJ.2.1D The developer shall provide a statement of security objectives.
ASE_OBJ.2.2D The developer shall provide a security objectives rationale.
ASE_OBJ.2.1C The statement of security objectives shall describe the security objectives
for the TOE and the security objectives for the operational environment.
ASE_OBJ.2.2C The security objectives rationale shall trace each security objective for the
TOE back to threats countered by that security objective and OSPs enforced by that
security objective.
ASE_OBJ.2.3C The security objectives rationale shall trace each security objective for the
operational environment back to threats countered by that security objective, OSPs
enforced by that security objective, and assumptions upheld by that security objective.
ASE_OBJ.2.4C The security objectives rationale shall demonstrate that the security
objectives counter all threats.
ASE_OBJ.2.5C The security objectives rationale shall demonstrate that the security
objectives enforce all OSPs.
ASE_OBJ.2.6C The security objectives rationale shall demonstrate that the security
objectives for the operational environment uphold all assumptions.
ASE_OBJ.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
7.2.4.5 ASE_REQ Security requirements
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ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_REQ.2.1D The developer shall provide a statement of security requirements.
ASE_REQ.2.2D The developer shall provide a security requirements rationale.
ASE_REQ.2.1C The statement of security requirements shall describe the SFRs and the
SARs.
ASE_REQ.2.2C All subjects, objects, operations, security attributes, external entities and
other terms that are used in the SFRs and the SARs shall be defined.
ASE_REQ.2.3C The statement of security requirements shall identify all operations on the
security requirements.
ASE_REQ.2.4C All operations shall be performed correctly.
ASE_REQ.2.5C Each dependency of the security requirements shall either be satisfied, or
the security requirements rationale shall justify the dependency not being satisfied.
ASE_REQ.2.6C The security requirements rationale shall trace each SFR back to the
security objectives for the TOE.
ASE_REQ.2.7C The security requirements rationale shall demonstrate that the SFRs meet
all security objectives for the TOE.
ASE_REQ.2.8C The security requirements rationale shall explain why the SARs were
chosen.
ASE_REQ.2.9C The statement of security requirements shall be internally consistent.
ASE_REQ.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
7.2.4.6 ASE_SPD Security problem definition
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ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_APD.1.1D The developer shall provide a security problem definition.
ASE_SPD.1.1C The security problem definition shall describe the threats.
ASE_SPD.1.2C All threats shall be described in terms of a threat agent, an asset, and an
adverse action.
ASE_SPD.1.3C The security problem definition shall describe the OSPs.
ASE_SPD.1.4C The security problem definition shall describe the assumptions about the
operational environment of the TOE.
ASE_SPD.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
7.2.4.7 ASE_TSS TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.1.1D The developer shall provide a TOE summary specification.
ASE_TSS.1.1C The TOE summary specification shall describe how the TOE meets each
SFR.
ASE_TSS.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ASE_TSS.1.2E The evaluator shall confirm that the TOE summary specification is consistent
with the TOE overview and the TOE description.
7.2.5 ATE Tests
7.2.5.1 ATE_COV Coverage
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ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.2.1D The developer shall provide an analysis of the test coverage.
ATE_COV.2.1C The analysis of the test coverage shall demonstrate the correspondence
between the tests in the test documentation and the TSFIs in the functional specification.
ATE_COV.2.2C The analysis of the test coverage shall demonstrate that all TSFIs in the
functional specification have been tested.
ATE_COV.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
7.2.5.2 ATE_DPT Depth
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.3.1D The developer shall provide the analysis of the depth of testing.
ATE_DPT.3.1C The analysis of the depth of testing shall demonstrate the correspondence
between the tests in the test documentation and the TSF subsystems and modules in the
TOE design.
ATE_DPT.3.2C The analysis of the depth of testing shall demonstrate that all TSF
subsystems in the TOE design have been tested.
ATE_DPT.3.3C The analysis of the depth of testing shall demonstrate that all TSF modules
in the TOE design have been tested.
ATE_DPT.3.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
7.2.5.3 ATE_FUN Functional tests
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ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.1.1D The developer shall test the TSF and document the results.
ATE_FUN.1.2D The developer shall provide test documentation.
ATE_FUN.1.1C The test documentation shall consist of test plans, expected test results and
actual test results.
ATE_FUN.1.2C The test plans shall identify the tests to be performed and describe the
scenarios for performing each test. These scenarios shall include any ordering
dependencies on the results of other tests.
ATE_FUN.1.3C The expected test results shall show the anticipated outputs from a
successful execution of the tests.
ATE_FUN.1.4C The actual test results shall be consistent with the expected test results.
ATE_FUN.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
7.2.5.4 ATE_IND Independent testing
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ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample
ATE_IND.2.1D The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
ATE_IND.2.1C The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
ATE_IND.2.2C The developer shall provide an equivalent set of resources to those that
were used in the developer's functional testing of the TSF.
ATE_IND.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ATE_IND.2.2E The evaluator shall execute a sample of tests in the test documentation to
verify the developer test results.
ATE_IND.2.3E The evaluator shall test a subset of the TSF to confirm that the TSF
operates as specified.
7.2.6 AVA Vulnerability assessment
7.2.6.1 AVA_VAN Vulnerability analysis
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AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5.1D The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
AVA_VAN.5.1C The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
AVA_VAN.5.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
AVA_VAN.5.2E The evaluator shall perform a search of public domain sources to identify
potential vulnerabilities in the TOE.
AVA_VAN.5.3E The evaluator shall perform an independent, methodical vulnerability
analysis of the TOE using the guidance documentation, functional specification, TOE
design, security architecture description and implementation representation to identify
potential vulnerabilities in the TOE.
AVA_VAN.5.4E The evaluator shall conduct penetration testing based on the identified
potential vulnerabilities to determine that the TOE is resistant to attacks performed by an
attacker possessing High attack potential.
7.3 Security Requirements Rationale
7.3.1 Objectives
7.3.1.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
OT.AC_Pers The security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalization of logical
MRTD” addresses the access control of the writing the logical MRTD. The write access to
the logical MRTD data are defined by the SFR FIA_UID.1, FIA_UID.1/MP, FIA_UAU.1,
FIA_UAU.1/MP FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 in the same way: only the successfully
authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write the data of the groups EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD only once. The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including
Personalization Agent) and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions
(including Personalization). The Personalization Agent handles the Document Basic Access
Keys according to the SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE as authentication reference data for
Basic Access Control.
The following paragraph is extracted from [PP_EAC] and has been refined according to
the technical characteristics of this TOE. The refinement is right after.
The authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent shall be performed by TSF
according to SFR FIA_UAU.4 and FIA_UAU.5/EAC. If the Personalization Terminal want to
authenticate itself to the TOE by means of the Terminal Authentication Protocol (after
Chip Authentication) with the Personalization Agent Keys the TOE will use TSF according
to the FCS_RND.1 (for the generation of the challenge), FCS_CKM.1/CA,
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FCS_CKM.1/CA_DATA_GEN for generation of CA Data in phase 6, FCS_COP.1/SHA (for
the derivation of the new session keys after Chip Authentication), and FCS_COP.1/SYM
and FCS_COP.1/MAC (for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging), FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER
(as part of the Terminal Authentication Protocol) and FIA_UAU.6/EAC (for the re-
authentication). If the Personalization Terminal wants to authenticate itself to the TOE by
means of the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with Personalization Agent Key the
TOE will use TSF according to the FCS_RND.1 (for the generation of the challenge) and
FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC (to verify the authentication attempt). The session keys are
destroyed according to FCS_CKM.4 after use.
Note: As TA mechanism is not supported for the authentication of the terminal as
Personalization Agent, the following two paragraphs have been added to demonstrate
that symmetric authentication used in Personalization phase fulfills the OT.AC_Pers. The
authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent is performed by TSF according to
SFR FIA_UAU.4 and FIA_UAU.5/EAC. The Personalization Agent can be authenticated by
using the symmetric authentication mechanism (FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH) with the
personalization key. FIA_UAU.6/MP describes the re-authentication. In case of failed
authentication attempts FIA_AFL.1/MP enforces additional waiting time prolonging the
necessary amount of time for facilitating a brute force attack.
As the symmetric authentication is used in Personalization phase, the SFR FIA_UAU.6/MP
describes the re-authentication. Secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic
functions according to FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_RND.1 (for key generation), and
FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC as well as FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode. The SFR
FCS_CKM.4 enforces the destruction of Secure Messaging session keys.
The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ prevents read access to the secret key of the
Personalization Agent Keys and ensures together with the SFR FPT_EMS.1 the
confidentially of these keys.
SFR FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE and FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE define rules to manage files
different from the ones managed by FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1. The Personalization
Agent is the only subject allowed to ends Personalization of logical MRTD, setting the TOE
Life Cycle State in Operational Use state according to FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PERS. Since then
it is no more possible to return in Personalization state.
OT.Data_Int The security objective OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” requires the
TOE to protect the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip against
physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The write access to the logical MRTD
data is defined by the SFR FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 in the same way: only the
Personalization Agent is allowed to write the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical
MRTD (FDP_ACF.1.2, rule 1) and terminals are not allowed to modify any of the data in
EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD (cf. FDP_ACF.1.4). The Personalization Agent
must identify and authenticate themselves according to FIA_UID.1, FIA_UID.1/MP,
FIA_UAU.1 and FIA_UAU.1/MP before accessing these data. The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the
roles and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions.
The TOE supports the inspection system detect any modification of the transmitted logical
MRTD data after Chip Authentication. The authentication of the terminal as
Personalization Agent shall be performed by TSF according to SRF FIA_UAU.4,
FIA_UAU.5/EAC and FIA_UAU.6/EAC. The SFR FIA_UAU.6/EAC and FDP_UIT.1/EACA
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requires the integrity protection of the transmitted data after chip authentication by
means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to
FCS_CKM.1/CA (for the generation of shared secret), FCS_COP.1/SHA (for the derivation
of the new session keys), and FCS_COP.1/SYM and FCS_COP.1/MAC for the
ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging. The session keys are destroyed according to
FCS_CKM.4 after use.
The SFR FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ requires that the Chip
Authentication Key cannot be written unauthorized or read afterwards.
The following part is added to integrate the Manufacturing and Personalization phases in
the OT_Data_Int.
Manufacturer and Personalization Agent are also able to detect any modification of the
transmitted logical MRTD data by means of the Symmetric Authentication mechanism.
The SFR FIA_UAU.6/MP and FMT_MOF.1/GP requires the protection of the transmitted
data by means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions
according to FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_RND.1 (for key generation), and FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC
and FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode. FCS_CKM.4 enforces the destruction of
Secure Messaging session keys.
SFR FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE and FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE define rules to manage files
different from the ones managed by FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1.
OT.Sens_Data_Conf The security objective OT.Sens_Data_Conf “Confidentiality of
sensitive biometric reference data” is enforced by the Access Control SFP defined in
FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 allowing the data of EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 only to be read by
successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System being authorized by a validly
verifiable certificate according FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER.
The SFR FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 requires the identification and authentication of the
inspection systems. The SFR FIA_UAU.5/EAC requires the successful Chip Authentication
(CA) before any authentication attempt as Extended Inspection System. During the
protected communication following the CA the reuse of authentication data is prevented
by FIA_UAU.4. The SFR FIA_UAU.6/EAC and FDP_UCT.1/EAC requires the confidentiality
protection of the transmitted data after chip authentication by means of secure
messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to FCS_RND.1 (for the
generation of the terminal authentication challenge), FCS_CKM.1/CA (for the generation
of shared secret), FCS_CKM.1/CA_DATA_GEN for generation of CA Data in phase 6,
FCS_COP.1/SHA (for the derivation of the new session keys), and FCS_COP.1/SYM and
FCS_COP.1/MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging. The session keys are
destroyed according to FCS_CKM.4 after use. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ requires that the Chip Authentication Key cannot be written
unauthorized or read afterwards.
To allow a verification of the certificate chain as in FMT_MTD.3 the CVCA’s public key and
certificate as well as the current date are written or update by authorized identified role
as of FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI, FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD and FMT_MTD.1/DATE.
The following part is added to integrate the Manufacturing and Personalization phases in
the OT_Sens_Data_Conf.
Manufacturer and Personalization Agent are also able to detect any modification of the
transmitted logical MRTD data by means of the Symmetric Authentication mechanism.
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The SFR FIA_UAU.6/MP, and FMT_MOF.1/GP requires the protection of the transmitted
data by means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions
according to FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_RND.1 (for key generation), and FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC
and FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode. FCS_CKM.4 enforces the destruction of
Secure Messaging session keys.
SFR FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE and FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE define rules to manage files
different from the ones managed by FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1.
OT.Identification The security objective OT.Identification “Identification and
Authentication of the TOE” address the storage of the IC Identification Data uniquely
identifying the MRTD’s chip in its non-volatile memory. This will be ensured by TSF
according to SFR FAU_SAS.1.
The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA allows only the Manufacturer to write Initialization Data
and Pre-personalization Data (including the Personalization Agent key). The SFR
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS allows the Personalization Agent to disable Initialization Data if their
usage in the phase 4 “Operational Use” violates the security objective OT.Identification
“Identification and Authentication of the TOE”.
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof The security objective OT.Chip_Auth_Proof “Proof of MRTD’s chip
authenticity” is ensured by the Chip Authentication Protocol provided by FIA_API.1
proving the identity of the TOE. The Chip Authentication Protocol defined by
FCS_CKM.1/CA is performed using a TOE internally stored confidential private key as
required by FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ. The Chip Authentication Data
is generated by using FCS_CKM.1/CA_DATA_GEN. The Chip Authentication Protocol
[TR_03110] requires additional TSF according to FCS_COP.1/SHA (for the derivation of
the session keys), FCS_COP.1/SYM and FCS_COP.1/MAC (for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure
messaging).
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func The security objective OT.Prot_Abuse-Func “Protection against
Abuse of Functionality” is ensured by the SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 which prevent
misuse of test functionality of the TOE or other features which may not be used after TOE
Delivery.
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak The security objective OT.Prot_Inf_Leak “Protection against Information
Leakage” requires the TOE to protect confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the
MRTD’s chip against disclosure
o by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time
between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power
consumption, clock, or I/O lines which is addressed by the SFR FPT_EMS.1,
o by forcing a malfunction of the TOE which is addressed by the SFR FPT_FLS.1 and
FPT_TST.1, and/or
o by a physical manipulation of the TOE which is addressed by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.
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OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper The security objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against
Physical Tampering” is covered by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.
OT.Prot_Malfunction The security objective OT.Prot_Malfunction “Protection against
Malfunctions” is covered by (i) the SFR FPT_TST.1 which requires self tests to
demonstrate the correct operation and tests of authorized users to verify the integrity of
TSF data and TSF code, and (ii) the SFR FPT_FLS.1 which requires a secure state in case
of detected failure or operating conditions possibly causing a malfunction.
OT.Configuration The security objective OT.Configuration “Protection of the TOE
preparation” addresses management of the Data Configuration, Pre-personalization Agent
keys, Personalization Agent keys and the Life Cycle State of the TOE.
The authentication of the terminal as Manufacturer is performed by TSF according to SFR
FIA_UAU.4 and FIA_UAU.5/EAC. The Manufacturer can be authenticated by using the
symmetric authentication mechanism (FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH) with the Pre-personalization
key. FIA_UAU.6/MP describes the re-authentication. In case of failed authentication
attempts FIA_AFL.1/MP enforces additional waiting time prolonging the necessary amount
of time for facilitating a brute force attack. The SFR FTP_ITC.1/MP allows the
Manufacturer to communicate with the OS.
Once step 4 is done, the MRTD packaging responsible is allowed to set the Pre-
personalization Agent keys according to the SFR FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC. The read
access to the Pre-personalization keys is prevented by SFRs FPT_EMS.1, FPT_FLS.1 and
FPT_PHP.3 the confidentially of these keys.
In step 5, the authentication of the terminal as Manufacturer shall be performed by TSF
according to SFR FIA_UAU.4 and FIA_UAU.5/EAC. The Manufacturer shall be
authenticated by using the symmetric authentication mechanism (FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH).
In case of failed authentication attempts FIA_AFL.1/MP enforces additional waiting time
prolonging the necessary amount of time for facilitating a brute force attack
The SFR FIA_UAU.6/MP describes the re-authentication and the protection of the
transmitted data by means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic
functions according to FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_RND.1 (for key generation), and
FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC as well as FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode. The SFR
FCS_CKM.4 enforces the destruction of Secure Messaging session keys.
The Personalization Agent can enable the modification of files in operational use phase
according to FMT_MTD.1/UPD_FILE.
The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management
functions setting the Pre-personalization Agent Keys. The read access to the secret key of
the Personalization Agent Keys is prevented by the SFRs FCS_CKM.4, FPT_EMS.1,
FPT_FLS.1 and FPT_PHP.3.
Since then it is no more possible to return in manufacturing state and the role
Manufacturer is no longer available as FCS_CKM.4 destroys Manufacturer keys.
OT.Update_File The security objective OT.Update_File deals with the capability to update
date in the operational phase after a succesful authentication. This objective is enforced
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by FMT_MTD.1/UPD_FILE thatensures only the terminal specified by the personalization
agent can update the data in the operational phase.
FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE and FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE enforce the acccess conditions that are
required to be fulfilled before data is updated.
OT.AC_SM_Level The security objective OT.AC_SM_LEVEL is enforced by
FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL that allows the personalization agent to set the SM level required to
access to the sensitive data
OT.AA_Proof The security objective OT.AA_Proof is ensured by the Active Authentication
Protocol activated by FMT_MOF.1/AA and provided by FDP_DAU.1/AA, FDP_ITC.1/AA
proving the identity and authenticity of the TOE. The Active Authentication relies on
FCS_COP.1/AA and FCS_RND.1. It is performed using a TOE internally stored confidential
private key as required by FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE and FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ.
OT.Data_Int_AA The security objective OT.AA_Proof is ensured by the Active
Authentication Protocol activated by FMT_MOF.1/AA and provided by FDP_DAU.1/AA and
FDP_ITC.1/AA proving the identity and authenticity of the TOE.
7.3.2 Rationale tables of Security Objectives and SFRs
Security Objectives Security Functional Requirements Rationale
OT.AC_Pers FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/SHA,
FCS_COP.1/SYM, FCS_COP.1/MAC,
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER, FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC,
FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC, FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1,
FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.5/EAC, FIA_UAU.6/EAC,
FIA_UAU.6/MP, FIA_AFL.1/MP, FDP_ACC.1,
FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE, FDP_ACF.1,
FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ,
FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PERS, FPT_EMS.1, FCS_CKM.1/GP,
FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH, FCS_RND.1,
FCS_CKM.1/CA_DATA_GEN, FIA_UID.1/MP,
FIA_UAU.1/MP
Section 7.3.1
OT.Data_Int FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/SHA,
FCS_COP.1/SYM, FCS_COP.1/MAC,
FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC, FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC,
FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.5/EAC,
FIA_UAU.6/EAC, FIA_UAU.6/MP, FDP_ACC.1,
FDP_ACF.1, FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE,
FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE, FDP_UIT.1/EAC, FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1, FMT_MOF.1/GP, FMT_MTD.1/CAPK,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_RND.1,
FIA_UID.1/MP, FIA_UAU.1/MP
Section 7.3.1
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OT.Sens_Data_Conf FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/SHA,
FCS_COP.1/SYM, FCS_COP.1/MAC,
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER, FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC,
FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC, FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1,
FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.5/EAC, FIA_UAU.6/EAC,
FIA_UAU.6/MP, FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1,
FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE, FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE,
FDP_UCT.1/EAC, FMT_MOF.1/GP,
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI, FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD,
FMT_MTD.1/DATE, FMT_MTD.1/CAPK,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, FMT_MTD.3, FCS_CKM.1/GP,
FCS_RND.1, FCS_CKM.1/CA_DATA_GEN
Section 7.3.1
OT.Identification FAU_SAS.1, FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA,
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
Section 7.3.1
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_COP.1/SYM,
FCS_COP.1/MAC, FIA_API.1, FMT_MTD.1/CAPK,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, FCS_CKM.1/CA_DATA_GEN
Section 7.3.1
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2 Section 7.3.1
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak FPT_EMS.1, FPT_FLS.1, FPT_TST.1, FPT_PHP.3 Section 7.3.1
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper FPT_PHP.3 Section 7.3.1
OT.Prot_Malfunction FPT_TST.1, FPT_FLS.1 Section 7.3.1
OT.Configuration FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC,
FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH, FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC,
FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC, FIA_UAU.6/MP,
FIA_AFL.1/MP, FCS_CKM.4, FIA_UAU.4, FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1, FMT_MTD.1/UPD_FILE, FPT_EMS.1,
FPT_FLS.1, FPT_PHP.3, FCS_RND.1, FIA_UAU.5/EAC,
FTP_ITC.1/MP
Section 7.3.1
OT.Update_File FMT_MTD.1/UPD_FILE, FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE,
FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE
Section 7.3.1
OT.AC_SM_Level FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL Section 7.3.1
OT.AA_Proof FCS_COP.1/AA, FCS_RND.1, FDP_DAU.1/AA,
FDP_ITC.1/AA, FMT_MOF.1/AA,
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ,
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE
Section 7.3.1
OT.Data_Int_AA FDP_DAU.1/AA, FDP_ITC.1/AA, FMT_MOF.1/AA Section 7.3.1
Table 16 Security Objectives and SFRs - Coverage
Security Functional
Requirements
Security Objectives
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FAU_SAS.1 OT.Identification
FCS_CKM.1/CA OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int,
OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FCS_CKM.1/CA_DATA_GEN OT.AC_Pers, OT.Sens_Data_Conf,
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FCS_CKM.1/GP OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int,
OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Configuration
FCS_CKM.4 OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int,
OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Configuration
FCS_COP.1/SHA OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int,
OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FCS_COP.1/SYM OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int,
OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FCS_COP.1/MAC OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int,
OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER OT.AC_Pers, OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int,
OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Configuration
FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH OT.AC_Pers, OT.Configuration
FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int,
OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Configuration
FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC OT.Configuration
FCS_COP.1/AA OT.AA_Proof
FCS_RND.1 OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int,
OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Configuration,
OT.AA_Proof
FIA_UID.1 OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FIA_UID.1/MP OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int
FIA_UAU.1 OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FIA_UAU.1/MP OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int
FIA_UAU.4 OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int,
OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Configuration
FIA_UAU.5/EAC OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int,
OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Configuration
FIA_UAU.6/EAC OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FIA_UAU.6/MP OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int,
OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Configuration
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FIA_AFL.1/MP OT.AC_Pers, OT.Configuration
FIA_API.1 OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FDP_ACC.1 OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FDP_ACF.1 OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int,
OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Update_File
FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int,
OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Update_File
FDP_UCT.1/EAC OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FDP_UIT.1/EAC OT.Data_Int
FDP_DAU.1/AA OT.AA_Proof, OT.Data_Int_AA
FDP_ITC.1/AA OT.AA_Proof, OT.Data_Int_AA
FMT_MOF.1/AA OT.AA_Proof, OT.Data_Int_AA
FMT_MOF.1/GP OT.Data_Int, OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FMT_SMF.1 OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Configuration
FMT_SMR.1 OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Configuration
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA OT.Identification
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS OT.Identification
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FMT_MTD.1/DATE OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE OT.AC_Pers
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK OT.Data_Int, OT.Sens_Data_Conf,
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int,
OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PERS OT.AC_Pers
FMT_MTD.1/UPD_FILE OT.Configuration, OT.Update_File
FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL OT.AC_SM_Level
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ OT.AA_Proof
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE OT.AA_Proof
FMT_MTD.3 OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FMT_LIM.1 OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
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FMT_LIM.2 OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
FPT_EMS.1 OT.AC_Pers, OT.Prot_Inf_Leak,
OT.Configuration
FPT_FLS.1 OT.Prot_Inf_Leak, OT.Prot_Malfunction,
OT.Configuration
FPT_TST.1 OT.Prot_Inf_Leak, OT.Prot_Malfunction
FPT_PHP.3 OT.Prot_Inf_Leak, OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper,
OT.Configuration
FTP_ITC.1/MP OT.Configuration
Table 17 SFRs and Security Objectives
7.3.3 Dependencies
7.3.3.1 SFRs Dependencies
Requirements CC Dependencies Satisfied Dependencies
FAU_SAS.1 No Dependencies
FCS_CKM.1/CA (FCS_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/SYM,
FCS_COP.1/MAC
FCS_CKM.1/CA_DATA_GEN (FCS_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4,
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER
FCS_CKM.1/GP (FCS_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4,
FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC,
FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC
FCS_CKM.4 (FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2)
FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_CKM.1/GP
FCS_COP.1/SHA (FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2)
and (FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/SYM (FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2)
and (FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/MAC (FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2)
and (FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER (FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2)
FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_CKM.4
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and (FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC (FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2)
and (FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH (FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2)
and (FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC (FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2)
and (FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC (FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2)
and (FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/AA (FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2)
and (FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4, FDP_ITC.1/AA
FCS_RND.1 No Dependencies
FIA_UID.1 No Dependencies
FIA_UID.1/MP No Dependencies
FIA_UAU.1 (FIA_UID.1) FIA_UID.1
FIA_UAU.1/MP (FIA_UID.1) FIA_UID.1/MP
FIA_UAU.4 No Dependencies
FIA_UAU.5/EAC No Dependencies
FIA_UAU.6/EAC No Dependencies
FIA_UAU.6/MP No Dependencies
FIA_AFL.1/MP (FIA_UAU.1) FIA_UAU.1/MP
FIA_API.1 No Dependencies
FDP_ACC.1 (FDP_ACF.1) FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACF.1 (FDP_ACC.1) and
(FMT_MSA.3)
FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE (FDP_ACF.1) FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE
FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE (FDP_ACC.1) and
(FMT_MSA.3)
FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE
FDP_UCT.1/EAC (FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1) and
(FTP_ITC.1 or
FTP_TRP.1)
FDP_ACC.1
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FDP_UIT.1/EAC (FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1) and
(FTP_ITC.1 or
FTP_TRP.1)
FDP_ACC.1
FDP_DAU.1/AA No Dependencies
FDP_ITC.1/AA (FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1) and
(FMT_MSA.3)
FDP_ACC.1
FMT_MOF.1/AA (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MOF.1/GP (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1 No Dependencies
FMT_SMR.1 (FIA_UID.1) FIA_UID.1
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/DATE (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PERS (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/UPD_FILE (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
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FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.3 (FMT_MTD.1) FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI,
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD
FMT_LIM.1 (FMT_LIM.2) FMT_LIM.2
FMT_LIM.2 (FMT_LIM.1) FMT_LIM.1
FPT_EMS.1 No Dependencies
FPT_FLS.1 No Dependencies
FPT_TST.1 No Dependencies
FPT_PHP.3 No Dependencies
FTP_ITC.1/MP No Dependencies
Table 18 SFRs Dependencies
Rationale for the exclusion of Dependencies
The dependency FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 of FCS_COP.1/SHA is
discarded. The hash algorithm required by the SFR FCS_COP.1/SHA does not need any
key material. Therefore neither a key generation (FCS_CKM.1) nor an import
(FDP_ITC.1/2) is necessary.
The dependency FMT_MSA.3 of FDP_ACF.1 is discarded. The access control TSF
according to FDP_ACF.1 uses security attributes which are defined during the
personalization and are fixed over the whole life time of the TOE. No management of
these security attribute (i.e. SFR FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.3) is necessary here.
The dependency FMT_MSA.3 of FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE is discarded. The access
control TSF according to FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE uses security attributes which are defined
during the personalization and are fixed over the whole life time of the TOE. No
management of these security attribute (i.e. SFR FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.3) is
necessary here.
The dependency FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1 of FDP_UCT.1/EAC is discarded. The SFR
FDP_UCT.1/EAC requires the use secure messaging between the MRTD and the GIS.
There is no need for the SFR FTP_ITC.1, e.g. to require this communication channel to be
logically distinct from other communication channels since there is only one channel.
Since the TOE does not provide a direct human interface a trusted path as required by
FTP_TRP.1 is not applicable here.
The dependency FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1 of FDP_UIT.1/EAC is discarded. The SFR
FDP_UIT.1/EAC requires the use secure messaging between the MRTD and the GIS.
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There is no need for the SFR FTP_ITC.1, e.g. to require this communication channel to be
logically distinct from other communication channels since there is only one channel.
Since the TOE does not provide a direct human interface a trusted path as required by
FTP_TRP.1 is not applicable here.
The dependency FMT_MSA.3 of FDP_ITC.1/AA is discarded. The access control TSF
according to FDP_ACF.1 uses security attributes which are defined during the
personalization and are fixed over the whole life time of the TOE. No management of
these security attribute (i.e. SFR FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.3) is necessary here.
7.3.3.2 SARs Dependencies
Requirements CC Dependencies Satisfied Dependencies
ADV_ARC.1 (ADV_FSP.1) and (ADV_TDS.1) ADV_FSP.5, ADV_TDS.4
ADV_FSP.5 (ADV_IMP.1) and (ADV_TDS.1) ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.4
ADV_IMP.1 (ADV_TDS.3) and (ALC_TAT.1) ADV_TDS.4, ALC_TAT.2
ADV_INT.2 (ADV_IMP.1) and (ADV_TDS.3) and
(ALC_TAT.1)
ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.4,
ALC_TAT.2
ADV_TDS.4 (ADV_FSP.5) ADV_FSP.5
AGD_OPE.1 (ADV_FSP.1) ADV_FSP.5
AGD_PRE.1 No Dependencies
ALC_CMC.4 (ALC_CMS.1) and (ALC_DVS.1) and
(ALC_LCD.1)
ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DVS.2,
ALC_LCD.1
ALC_CMS.5 No Dependencies
ALC_DEL.1 No Dependencies
ALC_DVS.2 No Dependencies
ALC_LCD.1 No Dependencies
ALC_TAT.2 (ADV_IMP.1) ADV_IMP.1
ASE_CCL.1 (ASE_ECD.1) and (ASE_INT.1) and
(ASE_REQ.1)
ASE_ECD.1, ASE_INT.1,
ASE_REQ.2
ASE_ECD.1 No Dependencies
ASE_INT.1 No Dependencies
ASE_OBJ.2 (ASE_SPD.1) ASE_SPD.1
ASE_REQ.2 (ASE_ECD.1) and (ASE_OBJ.2) ASE_ECD.1, ASE_OBJ.2
ASE_SPD.1 No Dependencies
ASE_TSS.1 (ADV_FSP.1) and (ASE_INT.1) and
(ASE_REQ.1)
ADV_FSP.5, ASE_INT.1,
ASE_REQ.2
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ATE_COV.2 (ADV_FSP.2) and (ATE_FUN.1) ADV_FSP.5, ATE_FUN.1
ATE_DPT.3 (ADV_ARC.1) and (ADV_TDS.4) and
(ATE_FUN.1)
ADV_ARC.1, ADV_TDS.4,
ATE_FUN.1
ATE_FUN.1 (ATE_COV.1) ATE_COV.2
ATE_IND.2 (ADV_FSP.2) and (AGD_OPE.1) and
(AGD_PRE.1) and (ATE_COV.1) and
(ATE_FUN.1)
ADV_FSP.5, AGD_OPE.1,
AGD_PRE.1, ATE_COV.2,
ATE_FUN.1
AVA_VAN.5 (ADV_ARC.1) and (ADV_FSP.4) and
(ADV_IMP.1) and (ADV_TDS.3) and
(AGD_OPE.1) and (AGD_PRE.1) and
(ATE_DPT.1)
ADV_ARC.1, ADV_FSP.5,
ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.4,
AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1,
ATE_DPT.3
Table 19 SARs Dependencies
7.3.4 Rationale for the Security Assurance Requirements
The EAL5 was chosen to permit a developer to gain maximum assurance from security
engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate
application of specialist security engineering techniques.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a high
level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a rigorous
development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to specialist security
engineering techniques.
7.3.5 ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
The selection of the component ALC_DVS.2 provides a higher assurance of the security of
the MRTD’s development and manufacturing especially for the secure handling of the
MRTD’s material.
The component ALC_DVS.2 augmented to EAL5 has no dependencies to other security
requirements.
7.3.6 AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
The selection of the component AVA_VAN.5 provides a higher assurance of the security by
vulnerability analysis to assess the resistance to penetration attacks performed by an
attacker possessing a high attack potential. This vulnerability analysis is necessary to fulfill
the security objectives OT.Sens_Data_Conf and OT.Chip_Auth_Proof.
The component AVA_VAN.5 has the following dependencies:
 ADV_ARC.1 “Security architecture description”
 ADV_FSP.4 “Security-enforcing functional specification”
 ADV_TDS.3 “Basic modular design”
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 ADV_IMP.1 “Implementation representation of the TSF”
 AGD_OPE.1 “Operational user guidance”
 AGD_PRE.1 “Preparative procedures”
 ATE_DPT.1 “Testing: basic design”
All of these are met or exceeded in the EAL5 assurance package
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8 TOE Summary Specification
8.1 TOE Summary Specification
F.ACR - Access Control in Reading
This function controls access to read functions and enforces the security policy for data
retrieval. Prior to any data retrieval, it authenticates the actor trying to access the data,
and checks the access conditions are fulfilled as well as the life cycle state. It ensures that
at any time, the following keys are never readable:
o Pre-personalization Agent keys,
o Personalization Agent keys,
o CA private key,
o Document basic access keys,
o Active Authentication Keys
Regarding the file structure:
In the Operational Use phase:
o The terminal can read user data, the Document Security Object, (EF.COM,
EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16) only after EAC authentication and through a valid
secure channel.
In the Production and preparation stage:
The Manufacturer can read the Initialization Data in Stage 2 “Production”. The pre-
personalization agent and the Personalization Agent can read only the random identifier in
Stage 3 “Preparation” stored in the TOE. Other data-elements can only be read after they
are authenticated by the TOE (using their authentication keys).
It ensures as well that no other part of the memory can be accessed at anytime
F.ACW - Access Control in Writing
This function controls access to write functions (in NVM) and enforces the security policy
for data writing. Prior to any data update, it authenticates the actor, and checks the
access conditions are fulfilled as well as the life cycle state.
Regarding the file structure:
In the Operational Use phase:
It is not possible to create any files (system or data files). Furthermore, it is not possible
to update any files (system or data files), except for CVCA which can be updated if the
“Secure Messaging” access condition is verified by the subjects defined in
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD and FMT_MTD.1/DATE..
In the Production and preparation stage:
The Manufacturer can write all the Initialization data and data for the Pre-personalization.
The Personalization Agent can write through a valid secure channel all the data and
Document Basic Access Keys, Chip Authentication Private Key, Active Authentication Keys
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and Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key after it is authenticated by the
TOE (using its authentication keys).
The Pre-Personalization Agent can write through a valid secure channel data to be used
by the personalization agent (after it is authenticated by the TOE using its authentication
keys). The Pre-personalization agent is only active after delivery. The key that is written in
the TOE for authentication purposes during manufacturing in meant for the pre-
personalizaiton agent. the Pre-personalization agent (which is seen as a sub-role of thep
Personalization agent) will refresh this key.
F.AA - Active Authentication
This security functionality ensures the Active Authentication is performed as described in
[ICAO_9303] (if it is activated by the personalizer).
F.CLR_INFO - Clear Residual Information
This security function ensures clearing of sensitive information
o Authentication state is securely cleared in case an error is detected or a new
authentication is attempted
o Authentication data related to GP authentication and EAC is securely cleared to
prevent reuse
o Session keys is securely erased in case an error is detected or the secure
communication session is closed
F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support
This Security Function provides the following cryptographic features:
o Key Generation based on ECDH with key sizes 192 to 512 bits.
o Key generation for Triple-DES in CBC mode for 112 bits.
o Key generation for AES in CBC mode with key sizes 128, 192 and 256 bits.
o Hashing using SHA-1 and SHA-256 meeting [FIPS_180_4]
o Secure messaging (encryption and decryption)using:
 Triple-DES in CBC mode (keys size 112 bits)
 AES in CBC mode (key sizes 128, 192 and 256 bits)
o Secure messaging (message authentication code) using:
 Retail MAC with key size 112 bits
 AES CMAC with key sizes 128, 192 and 256 bits
o Digital signature creation using:
 ECDSA with SHA-1, 224, 256, 384 and 512 with key sizes 192 to 512 bits over
prime field curves
 RSA signature (CRT) with SHA-1, 224, 256, 384 and 512 with key sizes 1024,
1536, 2048
o Digital signature verification using:
 ECDSA with SHA-1, SHA-224 and SHA-256 with key sizes 192 to 512 bits.
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 RSA PKCS#1v1.5 with SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-512 with key sizes 1024,
1536, 2048
 RSA PKCS#1-PSS with SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-512 with key sizes 1024,
1536, 2048
o GP Secure Messaging (encryption and decryption) using:
 Triple-DES in CBC mode with key size 112 bits as defined in [FIPS_46_3].
 AES with key sizes 128, 192 and 256 bits as defined in [NIST_800_38A].
o GP Secure Messaging (message authentication code) using:
 Retail MAC with key size 112 bits as defined in [ISO_9797_1].
 AES CMAC with key sizes 128, 192 and 256 bits as defined in
[NIST_800_38B].
o Symmetric Authentication - encryption and decryption using:
 Full 3DES MAC with key size 112 bits as defined in [ISO_9797_1].
 AES CMAC with key sizes 128, 192 and 256 bits as defined in
[NIST_800_38B].
o Key decryption using:
 Triple-DES in ECB mode with key size 112 bits as defined in [FIPS_46_3].
 AES in CBC mode with key sizes 128, 192 and 256 bits as defined in
[FIPS_197].
o Chip Authentication Data Generation using DH, with key sizes 1024 to 2048 bits in
steps of 512 bits.
o Chip Authentication Data Generation using ECDH, with key sizes 192 to 512 bits.
o Random number generation that meets the requirement the average Shannon
entropy per internal random bit exceeds 0.994.
F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC
This TSF provides the Extended Access Control, authentication and session keys
generation to be used by F.SM, as described in [TR_03110]. It also provides the following
management functions:
o Maintain the roles: Document Verifier, CVCA, Domestic EIS, Foreign EIS
o Limit the ability to update the CVCA Public key and CVCA Certificate to the Country
Verifying Certification Authority
o Limit the ability to update the date to CVCA, Document Verifier and Domestic
Extended Inspection System.
F.PERS - MRTD Personalization
This security functionality ensures that the TOE, when delivered to the Personalization
Agent, provides and requires authentication for data exchange. This authentication is
based on a Triple DES and AES authentication mechanism. This security function is also
responsible for management operations during personalization phase. This function allows
to:
o Manage symmetric authentication using Personalization Agent keys,
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o Configuration of the TOE
o Compute session keys to be used by F.SM,
o Load user data,
o Configure SM level for biometrical data access,
o Load Chip Authentication keys in encrypted form,
o Chip Authentication Key Generation,
o Write Active Authentication Keys,
o Enable and disable Active Authentication,
o Disable read access to Initialization Data,
o Write initial CVCA Public Key, initial CVCA Certificate and initial current date
o Write the document basic access keys,
o Set the files that are allowed to be modified in phase 7,
o Write the Document Security Object (SO d),
o Set TOE life cycle to Operational Use phase
In case the number of consecutive failed authentication attempts crosses 1 the TSF will
slow down further authentication attempts.
F.PHY - Physical Protection
This Security Function protects the TOE against physical attacks, so that the integrity and
confidentiality of the TOE is ensured, including keys, user data, configuration data and
TOE life cycle. It detects physical tampering, responds automatically, and also controls the
emanations sent out by the TOE.
This Security Function also limits any physical emanations from the TOE so as to prevent
any information leakge via these emanations that might reveal or provide access to
sensitive data.
Furthermore, it prevents deploying test features after TOE delivery.
F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization
This security functionality ensures that the TOE, when delivered to the Manufacturer,
provides and requires an authentication mechanism for data exchange. This
authentication is based on Triple DES and AES symmetric authentication mechanism. This
function allows to:
o Manage symmetric authentication using Pre-personalization Agent keys,
o Compute session keys to be used by F.SM,
o Initialization of the TOE,
o Load Personalization Agent keys in encrypted form,
o Store the Initialization and Pre-Personalization data in audit records.
In case the number of consecutive failed authentication attempts crosses 1 the TSF will
slow down further authentication attempts.
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F.SM - Secure Messaging
This security functionality ensures the confidentiality, authenticity and integrity of the
communication between the TOE and the interface device. In the operational phase, after
a successful Authentication Procedure (i.e. CA), a secure channel is established. This
security functionality also provides a Secure Messaging (SCP02 and SCP03) for the
transmission of user data in Pre-personalization and Personalization phases. The protocols
can be configured to protect the exchanges integrity and/or confidentiality. If an error
occurs in the secure messaging layer or if the session is closed, the session keys are
destroyed. This ensures protection against replay attacks as session keys are never
reused.
F.SS - Safe State Management
This security functionality ensures that the TOE gets back to a secure state when:
o a tearing occurs (during a copy of data in NVM).
o an error due to self test as defined in FPT_TST.1.
o any physical tampering is detected.
This security functionality ensures that if such a case occurs, the TOE either is switched in
the state "kill card" or becomes mute.
F.STST - Self Test
This security function implements self test features through platform functionalities at
reset as defined in FPT_TST.1 to ensure the integrity of the TSF and TSF data.
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8.2 SFRs and TSS
8.2.1 SFRs and TSS - Rationale
Class FAU Security Audit
FAU_SAS.1 is met by F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization
Class FCS Cryptographic Support
FCS_CKM.1/CA is met by F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC that generates keys after
a successful authentication using F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support
FCS_CKM.1/CA_DATA_GEN is met by F.PERS - MRTD Personalization that uses
F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support to generate Chip Authentication Data.
FCS_CKM.1/GP is met by F.PERS - MRTD Personalization and F.PREP - MRTD Pre-
personalization that generate Cryptographic keys as defined in the requirement using
F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support.
FCS_CKM.4 is met by F.CLR_INFO - Clear Residual Information and F.SM - Secure
Messaging that destroys the session keys upon closure of a secure messaging session.
FCS_COP.1/SHA is met by F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support.
FCS_COP.1/SYM is met by F.SM - Secure Messaging that uses F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic
Support maintain a secure messaging session as defined in the requirement.
FCS_COP.1/MAC is met by F.SM - Secure Messaging that uses F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic
Support maintain a secure messaging session as defined in the requirement.
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER is met by F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC that uses
F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support for Terminal Authentication.
FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC is met by F.SM - Secure Messaging that uses F.CRYPTO -
Cryptographic Support maintain a secure messaging session as defined in the
requirement.
FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH is met by F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization and F.PERS - MRTD
Personalization that use F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Supportto perform Symmetric
Authentication.
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FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC is met by F.SM - Secure Messaging that uses F.CRYPTO -
Cryptographic Support maintain a secure messaging session as defined in the
requirement.
FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC is met by F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization and F.PERS -
MRTD Personalization that use F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support to perform key
decryption.
FCS_COP.1/AA is covered by F.AA - Active Authentication in association with F.CRYPTO -
Cryptographic Support
FCS_RND.1 is met by F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support
Class FIA Identification and Authentication
FIA_UID.1 is met by F.ACR - Access Control in Reading that manages read access to data
based on the current authentication state.
It is also met by F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC that allows Chip Authentication.
FIA_UID.1/MP is met by F.PERS - MRTD Personalization and F.PREP - MRTD Pre-
personalization that provide semmetric authentication for manufacturer and
personalization agent authentication.
FIA_UAU.1 is met by F.ACR - Access Control in Reading that manages read access to data
based on the current authentication state.
It is also met by F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC that allows Chip Authentication.
FIA_UAU.1/MP is met by F.PERS - MRTD Personalization and F.PREP - MRTD Pre-
personalization that provide semmetric authentication for manufacturer and
personalization agent authentication.
FIA_UAU.4 is met by F.CLR_INFO Clear Residual Information that ensures all
authentication data is securely erased to prevent reuse.
FIA_UAU.5/EAC is met by F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC that provides Terminal
Authentication.
SFR is also met by F.PERS - MRTD Personalization that provides symmetric authentication.
The SFR is also met by F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization that provides manufacturer
authentication
Finally, it is also met by F.SM - Secure Messaging that provides a secure messaging
session.
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FIA_UAU.6/EAC is met by F.SM - Secure Messaging that ensures all messages are sent
through the secure communication channel after Chip Authentication.
FIA_UAU.6/MP is met by F.SM - Secure Messaging that ensures all messages are sent
through the secure communication channel after Chip Authentication.
FIA_AFL.1/MP is met by F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization and F.PERS - MRTD
Personalization that ensure that after 3 authentication attempts the Toe increases time
taken to respond to a terminal challenge.
FIA_API.1 is met by F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC that provides Chip
Authentication as defined by [TR_03110]
Class FDP User Data Protection
FDP_ACC.1 is met by F.ACW - Access Control in Writing and F.ACR - Access Control in
Reading that control read and write access to the data based on the current
authentication state using authentication mechanisms provided by F.EAC - Extended
Access Control, EAC and F.PERS - MRTD Personalization
FDP_ACF.1 is met by F.ACW - Access Control in Writing and F.ACR - Access Control in
Reading that control read and write access to the data based on the current
authentication state using authentication mechanisms provided by F.EAC - Extended
Access Control, EAC and F.PERS - MRTD Personalization
FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE is met by F.ACW - Access Control in Writing and F.ACR - Access
Control in Reading that control read and write access to the data based on the current
authentication state using authentication mechanisms provided by F.EAC - Extended
Access Control, EAC and F.PERS - MRTD Personalization
FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE is met by F.ACW - Access Control in Writing and F.ACR - Access
Control in Reading that control read and write access to the data based on the current
authentication state using authentication mechanisms provided by F.EAC - Extended
Access Control, EAC and F.PERS - MRTD Personalization
FDP_UCT.1/EAC is met by F.SM - Secure Messaging that ensures all data is sent throught
the secure communication channel after a successful Chip Authentication.
FDP_UIT.1/EAC is met by F.SM - Secure Messaging that ensures all messages are sent
through the secure communication channel after Chip Authentication.
FDP_DAU.1/AA is met by F.AA - Active Authentication that helps provide the gurantee of
the TOE.
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FDP_ITC.1/AA is met by F.ACW - Access Control in Writing that uses F.AA - Active
Authentication to implement this access control policy.
Class FMT Security Management
FMT_MOF.1/AA is met by F.PERS - MRTD Personalization
FMT_MOF.1/GP is met by F.SM - Secure Messaging that provides a secure meants of
transfer of user data after authentication using F.PERS - MRTD Personalization and
F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization
FMT_SMF.1 is met by F.PERS - MRTD Personalization and F.PREP - MRTD Pre-
personalization that utilizeF.ACW - Access Control in Writing to control write access via
secure messaging provided by F.SM - Secure Messaging
FMT_SMR.1 is met by F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC, F.PERS - MRTD
Personalization and F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization. These roles are maintained by
means of the authentication states during the authentication mechanisms provided by the
3 Security Functions
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA is met by F.ACW - Access Control in Writing that ensures access
conditions are met by way of authentication through F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS is met by F.PERS - MRTD Personalization that allows the
personalization agent to disable read access in F.ACR - Access Control in Reading
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI is met by F.ACW - Access Control in Writing that ensures access
conditions are met by way of authentication through F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD is met by F.ACW - Access Control in Writing that controls access
to updation of CVCA data by authentication through F.EAC - Extended Access Control,
EAC
FMT_MTD.1/DATE is met by F.ACW - Access Control in Writing that controls access to
updation of CVCA data by authentication through F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE is met by F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK is met by F.ACW - Access Control in Writing that ensures access
conditions are met by way of authentication through F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ is met by F.ACR - Access Control in Reading that ensures the
secret keys are never readable.
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FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PERS is met by F.PERS - MRTD Personalization that allows the
personalization agent after succesful authentication to switch the lifecycle state from
phase 6 to phase 7
FMT_MTD.1/UPD_FILE is met by F.PERS - MRTD Personalization that controls access
conditions in F.ACW - Access Control in Writing to allow only the name set by the
personalization agent to be able to edit files in Operation Phase
FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL is met by F.PERS - MRTD Personalization that allows the
personalization agent to configure access conditions to DG.3 and DG.4 in F.ACW - Access
Control in Writing
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ is met by F.ACR - Access Control in Reading that ensures
that Active Authentication Keys are never readable.
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE is met by F.ACW - Access Control in Writing that uses
F.PERS - MRTD Personalization to ensure Personalization Agent access is provided after
successful authentication.
FMT_MTD.3 is met by F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC
FMT_LIM.1 is met by F.PHY - Physical Protection and F.SS - Safe State Management that
ensure that no data can be manipulated or revealed and the TSF assumes a safe state in
case any illegal attempts to do so are detected.
FMT_LIM.2 is met by F.PHY - Physical Protection and F.SS - Safe State Management that
ensure that no data can be manipulated or revealed and the TSF assumes a safe state in
case any illegal attempts to do so are detected.
Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions
FPT_EMS.1 is met by F.PHY - Physical Protection that prevents emanations beyond
permissible limits to prevent any accidental revelation of data.
FPT_FLS.1 is met by F.SS - Safe State Management.
FPT_TST.1 is met by F.STST - Self Test that performs self tests to ensure integrity of the
TSF
FPT_PHP.3 is met by F.PHY - Physical Protection that protects the TOE against any physical
probing or tampering by using F.SS - Safe State Management in case any physical
manipulation is detected.
Class FTP Trusted path/channels
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FTP_ITC.1/MP is met by F.SM - Secure Messaging that provides a ssecure channel for
communication after authentication as defined in F.PERS - MRTD Personalization and
F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization
8.2.2 Association tables of SFRs and TSS
Security Functional
Requirements
TOE Summary Specification
FAU_SAS.1 F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization
FCS_CKM.1/CA F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC, F.CRYPTO -
Cryptographic Support
FCS_CKM.1/CA_DATA_GEN F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support, F.PERS - MRTD
Personalization
FCS_CKM.1/GP F.PERS - MRTD Personalization, F.PREP - MRTD Pre-
personalization, F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support
FCS_CKM.4 F.SM - Secure Messaging, F.CLR_INFO - Clear Residual
Information
FCS_COP.1/SHA F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support
FCS_COP.1/SYM F.SM - Secure Messaging, F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic
Support
FCS_COP.1/MAC F.SM - Secure Messaging, F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic
Support
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC, F.CRYPTO -
Cryptographic Support
FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC F.SM - Secure Messaging, F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic
Support
FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH F.PERS - MRTD Personalization, F.PREP - MRTD Pre-
personalization, F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support
FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC F.SM - Secure Messaging, F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic
Support
FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support, F.PREP - MRTD Pre-
personalization, F.PERS - MRTD Personalization
FCS_COP.1/AA F.AA - Active Authentication, F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic
Support
FCS_RND.1 F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support
FIA_UID.1 F.ACR - Access Control in Reading, F.EAC - Extended
Access Control, EAC
FIA_UID.1/MP F.PERS - MRTD Personalization, F.PREP - MRTD Pre-
personalization
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FIA_UAU.1 F.ACR - Access Control in Reading, F.EAC - Extended
Access Control, EAC
FIA_UAU.1/MP F.PERS - MRTD Personalization, F.PREP - MRTD Pre-
personalization
FIA_UAU.4 F.CLR_INFO - Clear Residual Information
FIA_UAU.5/EAC F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC, F.PERS - MRTD
Personalization, F.SM - Secure Messaging, F.PREP - MRTD
Pre-personalization
FIA_UAU.6/EAC F.SM - Secure Messaging
FIA_UAU.6/MP F.SM - Secure Messaging
FIA_AFL.1/MP F.PERS - MRTD Personalization, F.PREP - MRTD Pre-
personalization
FIA_API.1 F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC
FDP_ACC.1 F.ACW - Access Control in Writing, F.ACR - Access Control
in Reading, F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC, F.PERS
- MRTD Personalization
FDP_ACF.1 F.ACW - Access Control in Writing, F.ACR - Access Control
in Reading, F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC, F.PERS
- MRTD Personalization
FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE F.ACW - Access Control in Writing, F.ACR - Access Control
in Reading, F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC, F.PERS
- MRTD Personalization
FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE F.ACW - Access Control in Writing, F.ACR - Access Control
in Reading, F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC, F.PERS
- MRTD Personalization
FDP_UCT.1/EAC F.SM - Secure Messaging
FDP_UIT.1/EAC F.SM - Secure Messaging
FDP_DAU.1/AA F.AA - Active Authentication
FDP_ITC.1/AA F.ACW - Access Control in Writing, F.AA - Active
Authentication
FMT_MOF.1/AA F.PERS - MRTD Personalization
FMT_MOF.1/GP F.SM - Secure Messaging, F.PERS - MRTD Personalization,
F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization
FMT_SMF.1 F.ACW - Access Control in Writing, F.PERS - MRTD
Personalization, F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization, F.SM
- Secure Messaging
FMT_SMR.1 F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC, F.PERS - MRTD
Personalization, F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization
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FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA F.ACW - Access Control in Writing, F.PREP - MRTD Pre-
personalization
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS F.ACR - Access Control in Reading, F.PERS - MRTD
Personalization
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI F.ACW - Access Control in Writing, F.PERS - MRTD
Personalization
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD F.ACW - Access Control in Writing, F.EAC - Extended
Access Control, EAC
FMT_MTD.1/DATE F.ACW - Access Control in Writing, F.EAC - Extended
Access Control, EAC
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE F.PERS - MRTD Personalization
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK F.ACW - Access Control in Writing, F.PERS - MRTD
Personalization
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ F.ACR - Access Control in Reading
FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PERS F.PERS - MRTD Personalization
FMT_MTD.1/UPD_FILE F.ACW - Access Control in Writing, F.PERS - MRTD
Personalization
FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL F.ACW - Access Control in Writing, F.PERS - MRTD
Personalization
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ F.ACR - Access Control in Reading
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE F.ACW - Access Control in Writing, F.PERS - MRTD
Personalization
FMT_MTD.3 F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC
FMT_LIM.1 F.SS - Safe State Management, F.PHY - Physical
Protection
FMT_LIM.2 F.PHY - Physical Protection, F.SS - Safe State
Management
FPT_EMS.1 F.PHY - Physical Protection
FPT_FLS.1 F.SS - Safe State Management
FPT_TST.1 F.STST - Self Test
FPT_PHP.3 F.PHY - Physical Protection, F.SS - Safe State
Management
FTP_ITC.1/MP F.SM - Secure Messaging, F.PERS - MRTD Personalization,
F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization
Table 20 SFRs and TSS - Coverage
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TOE Summary
Specification
Security Functional Requirements
F.ACR - Access
Control in Reading
FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1, FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1,
FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE, FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE, FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ
F.ACW - Access
Control in Writing
FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE, FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE,
FDP_ITC.1/AA, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA,
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI, FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD, FMT_MTD.1/DATE,
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK, FMT_MTD.1/UPD_FILE, FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL,
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE
F.AA - Active
Authentication
FCS_COP.1/AA, FDP_DAU.1/AA, FDP_ITC.1/AA
F.CLR_INFO - Clear
Residual
Information
FCS_CKM.4, FIA_UAU.4
F.CRYPTO -
Cryptographic
Support
FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_CKM.1/CA_DATA_GEN, FCS_CKM.1/GP,
FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_COP.1/SYM, FCS_COP.1/MAC,
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER, FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC, FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH,
FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC, FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC, FCS_COP.1/AA,
FCS_RND.1
F.EAC - Extended
Access Control,
EAC
FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER, FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1,
FIA_UAU.5/EAC, FIA_API.1, FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1,
FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE, FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE, FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD, FMT_MTD.1/DATE, FMT_MTD.3
F.PERS - MRTD
Personalization
FCS_CKM.1/CA_DATA_GEN, FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH,
FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC, FIA_UID.1/MP, FIA_UAU.1/MP,
FIA_UAU.5/EAC, FIA_AFL.1/MP, FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1,
FDP_ACC.1/UPD_FILE, FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE, FMT_MOF.1/AA,
FMT_MOF.1/GP, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1, FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS,
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE, FMT_MTD.1/CAPK,
FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PERS, FMT_MTD.1/UPD_FILE, FMT_MTD.1/SM_LVL,
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE, FTP_ITC.1/MP
F.PHY - Physical
Protection
FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2, FPT_EMS.1, FPT_PHP.3
F.PREP - MRTD
Pre-personalization
FAU_SAS.1, FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH,
FCS_COP.1/GP_KEY_DEC, FIA_UID.1/MP, FIA_UAU.1/MP,
FIA_UAU.5/EAC, FIA_AFL.1/MP, FMT_MOF.1/GP, FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1, FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA, FTP_ITC.1/MP
F.SM - Secure
Messaging
FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/SYM, FCS_COP.1/MAC, FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC,
FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC, FIA_UAU.5/EAC, FIA_UAU.6/EAC, FIA_UAU.6/MP,
FDP_UCT.1/EAC, FDP_UIT.1/EAC, FMT_MOF.1/GP, FMT_SMF.1,
FTP_ITC.1/MP
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F.SS - Safe State
Management
FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2, FPT_FLS.1, FPT_PHP.3
F.STST - Self Test FPT_TST.1
Table 21 TSS and SFRs - Coverage
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9 GLOSSARY AND ACRONYMS
9.1 Glossary
Term Definition
Active Authentication Security mechanism defined in [ICAO_9303] option by which means the
MRTD’s chip proves and the inspection system verifies the identity and
authenticity of the MRTD’s chip as part of a genuine MRTD issued by a
known State or Organization.
Audit records Write-only-once non-volatile memory area of the MRTDs chip to store the
Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data.
Authenticity Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the MRTD’s chip
were created by the issuing State or Organization.
Basic Access Control
(BAC)
Security mechanism defined in [ICAO_9303] by which means the MRTD’s
chip proves and the inspection system protects their communication by
means of secure messaging with Document Basic Access Keys (see there).
Basic Inspection
System (BIS)
An inspection system which implements the terminals part of the Basic
Access Control Mechanism and authenticates itself to the MRTD’s chip
using the Document Basic Access Keys derived from the printed MRZ data
for reading the logical MRTD.
Biographical data
(biodata)
The personalized details of the MRTD holder of the document appearing as
text in the visual and machine readable zones on the biographical data
page of a passport book or on a travel card or visa. [ICAO_9303]
Biometric reference
data
Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD holder in the MRTD’s
chip as (i) digital portrait and (ii) optional biometric reference data.
Counterfeit An unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine security document
made by whatever means. [ICAO_9303]
Country Signing CA
Certificate (Ccsca)
Self-signed certificate of the Country Signing CA Public Key (KPuCSCA)
issued by CSCA stored in the inspection system.
Document Basic
Access Keys
Pair of symmetric (two-key) Triple-DES keys used for secure messaging
with encryption (key KENC) and message authentication (key KMAC) of
data transmitted between the MRTD’s chip and the inspection system
[ICAO_9303]. It is drawn from the printed MRZ of the passport book to
authenticate an entity able to read the printed MRZ of the passport book.
Document Security
Object (SOD)
A RFC3369 CMS Signed Data Structure, signed by the Document Signer
(DS). Carries the hash values of the LDS Data Groups. It is stored in the
MRTD’s chip. It may carry the Document Signer Certificate (CDS).
[ICAO_9303]
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Term Definition
Eavesdropper A threat agent with Enhanced-Basic attack potential reading the
communication between the MRTD’s chip and the inspection system to
gain the data on the MRTD’s chip.
Enrolment The process of collecting biometric samples from a person and the
subsequent preparation and storage of biometric reference templates
representing that person’s identity. [ICAO_9303]
Extended Access
Control (EAC)
Security mechanism identified in [ICAO_9303] by which means the MRTD’s
chip (i) verifies the authentication of the inspection systems authorized to
read the optional biometric reference data, (ii) controls the access to the
optional biometric reference data and (iii) protects the confidentiality and
integrity of the optional biometric reference data during their transmission
to the inspection system by secure messaging. The Personalization Agent
may use the same mechanism to authenticate themselves with
Personalization Agent Private Key and to get write and read access to the
logical MRTD and TSF data.
Extended Inspection
System (EIS)
A role of a terminal as part of an inspection system which is in addition to
Basic Inspection System authorized by the issuing State or Organization to
read the optional biometric reference data and supports the terminals part
of the Extended Access Control Authentication Mechanism.
Forgery Fraudulent alteration of any part of the genuine document, e.g. changes
to the biographical data or the portrait. [ICAO_9303]
Global Interoperability The capability of inspection systems (either manual or automated) in
different States throughout the world to exchange data, to process data
received from systems in other States, and to utilize that data in inspection
operations in their respective States. Global interoperability is a major
objective of the standardized specifications for placement of both eye-
readable and machine readable data in all MRTDs. [ICAO_9303]
IC Dedicated Support
Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which provides
functions after TOE Delivery. The usage of parts of the IC Dedicated
Software might be restricted to certain phases.
IC Dedicated Test
Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which is used to
test the TOE before TOE Delivery but which does not provide any
functionality thereafter.
IC Identification Data The IC manufacturer writes a unique IC identifier to the chip to control the
IC as MRTD material during the IC manufacturing and the delivery process
to the MRTD manufacturer (i.e MRTD packaging responsible).
Impostor A person who applies for and obtains a document by assuming a false
name and identity, or a person who alters his or her physical appearance
to represent himself or herself as another person for the purpose of using
that person’s document. [ICAO_9303]
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Term Definition
Improperly document
person
A person who travels, or attempts to travel with: (a) an expired travel
document or an invalid visa; (b) a counterfeit, forged or altered travel
document or visa; (c) someone else’s travel document or visa; or (d) no
travel document or visa, if required. [ICAO_9303]
Initialization Process of writing Initialization Data (see below) to the TOE (cf. 1.3.7.2.3
Phase 3: Manufacturing and Testing).
Initialization Data Any data defined by the TOE Manufacturer and injected into the non-
volatile memory by the Integrated Circuits manufacturer (Phase 2). These
data are for instance used for traceability and for IC identification as
MRTD’s material (IC identification data).
Inspection The act of a State examining an MRTD presented to it by a traveler (the
MRTD holder) and verifying its authenticity. [ICAO_9303]
Inspection System
(IS)
A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State
(i) examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its
authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as MRTD holder.
Integrated Circuit (IC) Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing and/or memory
functions. The MRTD’s chip is a integrated circuit.
Integrity Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the MRTD’s chip
have not been altered from that created by the issuing State or
Organization
Issuing Organization Organization authorized to issue an official travel document (e.g. the
United Nations Organization, issuer of the Laissez-passer). [ICAO_9303]
Issuing State The Country issuing the MRTD. [ICAO_9303]
Logical Data Structure
(LDS)
The collection of groupings of Data Elements stored in the optional
capacity expansion technology [ICAO_9303]. The capacity expansion
technology used is the MRTD’s chip.
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Term Definition
Logical MRTD Data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data Structure
[ICAO_9303] as specified by ICAO on the contactless integrated circuit. It
presents contactless readable data including (but not limited to)
(1) personal data of the MRTD holder,
(2) the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1),
(3) the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
(4) the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s)
(EF.DG4) or both and
(5) the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16).
(6) EF.COM and EF.SOD
Logical travel
document
Data stored according to the Logical Data Structure as specified by ICAO
in the contactless integrated circuit including (but not limited to)
(1) data contained in the machine-readable zone (mandatory),
(2) digitized photographic image (mandatory) and
(3) fingerprint image(s) and/or iris image(s) (optional).
Machine Readable
Travel Document
(MRTD)
Official document issued by a State or Organization which is used by the
holder for international travel (e.g. passport, visa, official document of
identity) and which contains mandatory visual (eye readable) data and a
separate mandatory data summary, intended for global use, reflecting
essential data elements capable of being machine read. [ICAO_9303]
Machine Readable
Visa (MRV)
A visa or, where appropriate, an entry clearance (hereinafter collectively
referred to as visas) conforming to the specifications contained herein,
formulated to improve facilitation and enhance security for the visa holder.
Contains mandatory visual (eye readable) data and a separate mandatory
data summary capable of being machine read. The MRV is normally a label
which is attached to a visa page in a passport. [ICAO_9303]
Machine Readable
Zone (MRZ)
Fixed dimensional area located on the front of the MRTD or MRP Data
Page or, in the case of the TD1, the back of the MRTD, containing
mandatory and optional data for machine reading using OCR methods.
[ICAO_9303]
Machine-verifiable
biometrics feature
A unique physical personal identification feature (e.g. an iris pattern,
fingerprint or facial characteristics) stored on a travel document in a form
that can be read and verified by machine. [ICAO_9303]
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Term Definition
MRTD application Non-executable data defining the functionality of the operating system on
the IC as the MRTD’s chip. It includes
- the file structure implementing the LDS [ICAO_9303],
- the definition of the User Data, but does not include the User Data itself
(i.e. content of EF.DG1 to EF.DG14, EF.DG 16, EF.COM and EF.SOD) and
- the TSF Data including the definition the authentication data but except
the authentication data itself.
MRTD Basic Access
Control
Mutual authentication protocol followed by secure messaging between the
inspection system and the MRTD’s chip based on MRZ information as key
seed and access condition to data stored on MRTD’s chip according to
LDS.
MRTD holder The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or
Organization personalized the MRTD.
MRTD’s Chip A contactless integrated circuit chip complying with ISO/IEC 14443 and
programmed according to the Logical Data Structure as specified by
ICAOT, [ICAOT], p. 14.
MRTD’s chip
Embedded Software
Software embedded in a MRTD’s chip and not being developed by the IC
Designer. The MRTD’s chip Embedded Software is designed in Phase 1 and
embedded into the MRTD’s chip in Phase 2 of the TOE life-cycle.
Optional biometric
reference data
Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD holder in the MRTD’s
chip as (i) encoded finger image(s) (EF.DG3) or (ii) encoded iris image(s)
(EF.DG4) or (iii) both. Note that the European commission decided to use
only finger print and not to use iris images as optional biometric reference
data.
Passive authentication (i) verification of the digital signature of the Document Security Object and
(ii) comparing the hash values of the read LDS data fields with the hash
values contained in the Document Security Object.
Personalization The process by which the portrait, signature and biographical data are
applied to the document. This may also include the optional biometric data
collected during the “Enrolment” (cf. 1.3.7.5 Phase 6: TOE Personalization,
phase 6).
Personalization Agent The agent acting on the behalf of the issuing State or Organization to
personalize the MRTD for the holder by (i) establishing the identity the
holder for the biographic data in the MRTD, (ii) enrolling the biometric
reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger
image(s) or (ii) the encoded iris image(s) and (iii) writing these data on
the physical and logical MRTD for the holder.
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Term Definition
Personalization Agent
Authentication
Information
TSF data used for authentication proof and verification of the
Personalization Agent.
Personalization Agent
Key
Symmetric cryptographic authentication key used (i) by the Personalization
Agent to prove their identity and get access to the logical MRTD and (ii) by
the MRTD’s chip to verify the authentication attempt of a terminal as
Personalization Agent according to the SFR FIA_UAU.4/BAC,
FIA_UAU.5/BAC and FIA_UAU.6/BAC.
Physical travel
document
Travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip using secure printing to
present data including (but not limited to)
(1) biographical data,
(2) data of the machine-readable zone,
(3) photographic image and
(4) other data.
Pre-Personalization Process of writing Pre-Personalization Data (see below) to the TOE
including the creation of the MRTD Application (cf 1.3.7.3.1 Phase 4 and
5: Loading and Pre-personalization , Phase 5)
Pre-personalization
Data
Any data that is injected into the non-volatile memory of the TOE by the
MRTD Manufacturer (i.e. IC manufacturer) (Phase 2) for traceability of
non-personalized MRTD’s and/or to secure shipment within or between life
cycle phases 2 and 3. It contains (but is not limited to) the Personalization
Agent Key Pair.
Pre-personalized
MRTD’s chip
MRTD’s chip equipped with an unique identifier.
Primary Inspection
System (PIS)
An inspection system that contains a terminal for the contactless
communication with the MRTD’s chip and does not implement the
terminals part of the Basic Access Control Mechanism.
random identifier Random identifier used to establish a communication to the TOE in Phase
3 and 4 preventing the unique identification of the MRTD and thus
participates in the prevention of traceability.
Receiving State The Country to which the Traveler is applying for entry. [ICAO_9303]
reference data Data enrolled for a known identity and used by the verifier to check the
verification data provided by an entity to prove this identity in an
authentication attempt.
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Term Definition
secondary image A repeat image of the holder’s portrait reproduced elsewhere in the
document by whatever means. [ICAO_9303]
Secure messaging in
encrypted mode
Secure messaging using encryption and message authentication code
according to ISO/IEC 7816-4
Skimming Imitation of the inspection system to read the logical MRTD or parts of it
via the contactless communication channel of the TOE without knowledge
of the printed MRZ data.
Travel document A passport or other official document of identity issued by a State or
Organization, which may be used by the rightful holder for international
travel. [ICAO_9303]
Traveler Person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming the
identity of the MRTD holder.
TSF data Data created by and for the TOE, that might affect the operation of the
TOE ([CC_1]).
Unpersonalized MRTD The MRTD that contains the MRTD Chip holding only Initialization Data
and Pre-personalization Data as delivered to the Personalization Agent
from the Manufacturer.
User data Data created by and for the user, that does not affect the operation of the
TSF ([CC_1]).
Verification The process of comparing a submitted biometric sample against the
biometric reference template of a single role whose identity is being
claimed, to determine whether it matches the role’s template.
Verification data Data provided by an entity in an authentication attempt to prove their
identity to the verifier. The verifier checks whether the verification data
match the reference data known for the claimed identity.
9.2 Acronyms
Acronym Term
BIS Basic Inspection System
CC Common Criteria
EF Elementary File
GIS General Inspection System
ICCSN Integrated Circuit Card Serial Number
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ISK Issuer Secret Key
LCS Life Cycle State
MF Master File
OSP Organizational Security Policy
PT Personalization Terminal
SAR Security Assurance Requirements
SFR Security Functional Requirement
TOE Target Of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
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10 REFERENCES
Common Criteria
[CC_1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1:
Introduction and general model. Version 3.1. Revision 5. April 2017. CCMB-2017-04-
001.
[CC_2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security
functional requirements. Version 3.1. Revision 5. April 2017. CCMB-2017-04-002.
[CC_3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security
assurance requirements. Version 3.1. Revision 5. April 2017. CCMB-2017-04-003.
[CC_EM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation
Methodology. Version 3.1. Revision 5. April 2017. CCMB-2017-04-004.
Protection Profiles
[PP_0002] PP conformant to Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July
2001; registered and certified by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI) under the reference BSI-PP-0002-2001
Smartcard Integrated Circuit Platform Augmentations, Version 1.00, March 8th,
2002
[PP_IC] Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages, Version
1.0; Registered and Certified by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI) under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
[PP_BAC] Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”, Basic Access
control – BSI-PP-0055 v1.10 25th march 2009
[PP_EAC] Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with
„ICAO Application", Extended Access Control, BSI-PP-0056, Version 1.10, 25th
March 2009
[PP_EACwPACE] Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with
“ICAO Application”, Extended Application Control with PACE (EAC PP), BSI-CC-
PP-0056-V2-2012, Version 1.3.2, 5th
December 2012
Platform
[ST_PTF] FQR 110 9395 Ed3 Public Security Target Cosmo v9.1
[PTF_CERT] ANSSI-CC-2020/07
[PTF_AGD1] ID-One COSMO V9.1 Application Loading Protection Guidance, FQR 110
9238 Ed 1
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[PTF_AGD2] ID-One COSMO V9.1 Security Recommendations, FQR 110 9237 Ed 2
[PTF_AGD3] ID-One Cosmo V9.1 platform - Javadoc, FQR 110 9242 Ed 1
[PTF_AGD4] FQR 110 8805 Ed 2 JCVM Patch
[PTF_AGD5] FQR 110 9402 Ed 1 – 27/11/2019 - IDEMIA Platform Flash Generation
[PTF_AGD_OPE] ID-One COSMO V9.1, Reference Guide FQR 110 9200 Ed 4
[PTF_AGD_PRE] ID-One COSMO V9.1 Pre-Perso Guide, FQR 110 9208 Ed 6
[PTF_AGD_SEC_AC
]
FQR 110 8921 Ed 1 – 24/09/2018 - Secure acceptance and delivery of
sensitive elements
ICAO
[ICAO_9303] ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, Seventh Edition, 2015 –
Security Mechanisms for MRTDs
[ICAOT] INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION FACILITATION (FAL)
DIVISION, twelfth session (Cairo, Egypt, 22 March – 1 April 2004)
ISO
[ISO_9797_1] ISO/IEC 9797-1 Information technology – Security techniques – Message
Authentication codes (MACs) – part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher, Second
edition 2011-03-01
[ISO_9796-2] ISO/IEC 9796-2:2002 - Information technology - Security techniques - Digital
signature schemes giving message recovery - Part 2: Mechanisms using a hash-
function
[ISO_11770] ISO/IEC 11770-3:2015 Information technology -- Security techniques – Key
management – Part 3:Mechanisms using asymmetric techniques
IDEMIA
[ALC_KM] Key management for Flash code, I CRD13 2 CRD 512 03, January 2016
[ALC_SCT] ID division: sensitive code transfer, I/R&D/2/SQA 515 01, March 2010
[ALC_STM] Secure transfer of masks, I CRD13 2 CRD 507 04, January 2012
[Applet_Perso_Guide
]
FQR 220 1455 Ed 6 – CombICAO v2.1 Applet – Perso Guide, IDEMIA
[Applet_User_Guide] FQR 220 1456 Ed 6 – CombICAO v2.1 Applet – User Guide, IDEMIA
CombICAO Applet v2.1 in
EAC configuration on
Cosmo V9.1 Public Security Target
135 | 135
Other
[TR_03110] Technical Guideline Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel
Documents
[TR_03111] Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI), Technical Guideline
TR-03111 Elliptic Curve Cryptography, TR-03111, 17.04.2009
[FIPS_180_4] FIPS 180-4, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS PUB)
180-4, Secure Hash Standard, August 2015
[FIPS_180_2] FIPS Publication 180-2 Secure Hash Standard (+ Change Notice to include SHA-
224), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards and
Technology, 2002 August 1
[FIPS_46_3] FIPS 46-3, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS PUB) 46-
3, Data Encryption Standard (DES), 1999 October 25
[FIPS_186_3] FIPS 186-3, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS PUB)
186-3, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), June 2009
[FIPS_197] FIPS 197, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS PUB 197),
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
[NIST_800_38B
]
NIST Special Publication 800-38B: 2005, Recommendation for Block Cipher
Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication, May 2005
[GPC_SPE_034] GlobalPlatform – Card Specification – Version 2.2.1 – Public Release, January
2011
[PKCS#3] PKCS #3: Diffie-Hellman Key-Agreement Standard, An RSA Laboratories
Technical Note, Version 1.4 Revised November 1, 1993
[X9.62] AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARD X9.62-1998: Public Key Cryptography For
The Financial Services Industry (rDSA), 9 september 1998