Ärendetyp: 6 Diarienummer: 20FMV3029-27:1
Dokument ID
Enligt säkerhetsskyddslagen (2018:585)
SEKRETESS
Enligt offentlighets- och
Sekretesslagen (2009:400)
2021-10-29
Försvarets materielverk
Swedish Defence Material Administration
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report ALE OmniAccess Stellar
Issue: 1.0, 2021-okt-29
Authorisation: Ulf Noring, Lead Certifier , CSEC
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification 5
3 Security Policy 7
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 8
4.1 Usage Assumptions 8
4.2 Environmental Assumptions 8
4.3 Clarification of Scope 8
5 Architectural Information 11
6 Documentation 15
7 IT Product Testing 16
7.1 Developer Testing 16
7.2 Evaluator Testing 16
7.3 Penetration Testing 16
8 Evaluated Configuration 17
9 Results of the Evaluation 18
10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations 19
11 Glossary 20
12 Bibliography 21
12.1 General 21
12.2 Documentation 21
Appendix A Scheme Versions 22
A.1 Scheme/Quality Management System 22
A.2 Scheme Notes 22
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1 Executive Summary
The TOE is several hardware models of wireless local area network access points run-
ning a specific firmware. The TOE is used to securely connect wireless clients to a
wired network. It enforces Wi-Fi Protected Access 2 (WPA2) to authenticate wireless
clients and to protect the confidentiality and integrity of wireless traffic.
The TOE models are:
Alcatel-Lucent OmniAccess Stellar AP series AP1201, AP1201H/HL/L, AP1220,
AP1230, AP1251, AP1320 and AP1360 with AWOS 4.0.1 (build number 504) firm-
ware.
The TOE provides the following security functions:
• Security audit
• Cryptographic support for WPA2, IEEE 802.1X, TLS, and secure storage of pass-
words and keys
• Identification and authentication of administrators and wireless clients
• Security management
• Protection of the TSF including firmware, sensitive data and system time
• TOE access control based on inactivity time and time/day
• Trusted path/channels for remote administration and wireless communication
Alcatel-Lucent Enterprise orders for the Common Criteria evaluated TOE are deliv-
ered using reputable couriers for shipping. Hardware is packaged in electrostatic dis-
charge (ESD) bags and sealed with an ESD warning label. It is then boxed in the fac-
tory using tape.
The evaluated firmware must be loaded by the customer after receiving the hardware
in order to ensure correct configuration. The firmware on the shipped OmniAccess
Stellar AP is not guaranteed to be the same version as evaluated. The evaluated firm-
ware can be obtained from the Alcatel-Lucent Enterprise Business Portal
(https://businessportal2.alcatel-lucent.com). The TOE guidance can be downloaded
from the same portal. In order to access the Business Portal, the user must have a sup-
port contract in place.
The security target [ST] claims conformance to the EAL2 package of security assur-
ance requirements, augmented with ALC_FLR.1. It does not claim conformance to
any Protection Profile (PP).
Twelve threats, one OSP and four assumptions are specified in chapter three in the se-
curity target [ST].
The evaluation has been performed by atsec information security AB in their premises
in Danderyd, Sweden. The evaluation was completed on 2021-10-01. The evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the requirements of Common Criteria (CC), ver-
sion. 3.1 release 5.
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atsec information security AB is a licensed evaluation facility for Common Crite-ria
under the Swedish Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme. atsec in-
formation security AB is also accredited by the Swedish accreditation body according
to ISO/IEC 17025 for Common Criteria.
The certifier monitored the activities of the evaluator by reviewing all successive ver-
sions of the evaluation reports. The certifier determined that the evaluation results
confirm the security claims in the Security Target (ST) and the Common Methodology
for evaluation assurance level EAL 2 augmented by ALC_FLR.1. The technical in-
formation in this report is based on the Security Target [ST] and the Final Evaluation
Report (FER) produced by atsec information security AB.
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the cer-
tificate, and on the condition that all the stipulations in the Security Target are met.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by CSEC or any other organ-
isation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by CSEC or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate is either expressed or implied.
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2 Identification
The certified models of the TOE are:
OAW-AP1201-RW, rev. D01
OAW-AP1201-US, rev.
OAW-AP1201-ME, rev. A01
OAW-AP1201H-RW, rev. F01
OAW-AP1201H-US, rev. B01
OAW-AP1201H-ME, rev. B01
OAW-AP1201HL-RW, rev. A
OAW-AP1201L-RW, rev. A
OAW-AP1221-RW, rev. E
OAW-AP1221-US, rev. B
OAW-AP1221-ME, rev. B01
OAW-AP1222-RW, rev. E
OAW-AP1222-US, rev. B
Certification Identification
Certification ID CSEC2020006
Name and version of the
certified IT product
Alcatel-Lucent OmniAccess Stellar AP series
AP1201, AP1201H/HL/L, AP1220, AP1230,
AP1251, AP1320 and AP1360 with AWOS 4.0.1
(build number 504) firmware. See the list below for
the exact hardware models covered by the certifica-
tion.
Security Target Identification Alcatel-Lucent OmniAccess Stellar AP Security
Target, Alcatel-Lucent, 2021-10-06, document ver-
sion 1.0
EAL EAL 2 + ALC_FLR.1
Sponsor ALE USA Inc.
Developer ALE USA Inc.
Hardware design: HAN Networks or Sercomm Cor-
poration (depending on hardware model)
Software design: HAN Networks
ITSEF atsec information security AB
Common Criteria version 3.1 revision 5
CEM version 3.1 revision 5
QMS version 1.25
Scheme Notes Release 18.0
Recognition Scope CCRA, SOGIS, EA/MLA
Certification date 2021-10-29
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OAW-AP1222-ME, rev. B01
OAW-AP1231-RW, rev. B01
OAW-AP1231-US, rev. B04
OAW-AP1232-RW, rev. B01
OAW-AP1232-US, rev. B03
OAW-AP1251-RW, rev. E
OAW-AP1251-US, rev. C
OAW-AP1251-ME, rev. B
OAW-AP1321-RW, rev. A
OAW-AP1321-US, rev. A
OAW-AP1321-ME, rev. A
OAW-AP1322-RW, rev. A
OAW-AP1322-US, rev. A
OAW-AP1322-ME, rev. A
OAW-AP1361-RW, rev. A
OAW-AP1361-US, rev. A
OAW-AP1361-ME, rev. A
OAW-AP1361D-RW, rev. A
OAW-AP1361D-US, rev. A
OAW-AP1361D-ME, rev. A
OAW-AP1362-RW, rev. A
OAW-AP1362-US, rev. A
OAW-AP1362-ME, rev. A
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3 Security Policy
The TOE provides the following security functionality:
 Security audit
 Cryptographic support for WPA2, IEEE 802.1X, TLS, and secure storage of
passwords and keys
 Identification and authentication of administrators and wireless clients
 Security management
 Management of cryptographic keys
 Configuration of login banner, authentication failure parameters, session timeout
 Manual update of TOE firmware
 Start and stop WLAN service
 Protection of the TSF including firmware, sensitive data and system time
 TOE access control based on inactivity time and time/day
 Trusted path/channels for remote administration and wireless communication
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4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
4.1 Usage Assumptions
The Security Target [ST] makes three assumptions on the usage of the TOE.
A.LIMITED_FUNCTIONALITY
The device is assumed to provide networking functionality as its core function and not
provide functionality/services that could be deemed as general purpose computing.
For example, the device should not provide a computing platform for general purpose
applications (unrelated to networking functionality).
A.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION
A standard/generic network device does not provide any assurance regarding the pro-
tection of traffic that traverses it. The intent is for the network device to protect data
that originates on or is destined to the device itself, to include administrative data and
audit data. Traffic that is traversing the network device, destined for another network
entity, is not covered.
A.PRESHARED_KEY
For pre-shared key based authentication of wireless clients, it is assumed that the pre-
shared key is provided only to trusted users
4.2 Environmental Assumptions
The Security Target [ST] makes one assumption on the operational environment of the
TOE.
A.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION
The network device is assumed to be physically protected in its operational environ-
ment and not subject to physical attacks that compromise the security and/or interfere
with the device’s physical interconnections and correct operation. This protection is
assumed to be sufficient to protect the device and the data it contains.
4.3 Clarification of Scope
The Security Target contains twelve threats which have been considered during the
evaluation.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ADMINISTRATOR_ACCESS
Threat agents may attempt to gain Administrator access to the network device by ne-
farious means such as masquerading as an Administrator to the device, masquerading
as the device to an Administrator, replaying an administrative session (in its entirety,
or selected portions), or performing man-in-the-middle attacks, which would provide
access to the administrative session, or sessions between network devices. Successful-
ly gaining Administrator access allows malicious actions that compromise the security
functionality of the device and the network on which it resides.
T.WEAK_CRYPTOGRAPHY
Threat agents may exploit weak cryptographic algorithms or perform a cryptographic
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exhaust against the key space. Poorly chosen encryption algorithms, modes, and key
sizes will allow attackers to compromise the algorithms, or brute force exhaust the key
space and give them unauthorized access allowing them to read, manipulate and/or
control the traffic with minimal effort.
T.UNTRUSTED_COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS
Threat agents may attempt to target network devices that do not use standardized se-
cure tunneling protocols to protect the critical network traffic. Attackers may take ad-
vantage of poorly designed protocols or poor key management to successfully perform
man-in-the-middle attacks, replay attacks, etc. Successful attacks will result in loss of
confidentiality and integrity of the critical network traffic, and potentially could lead
to a compromise of the network device itself.
T.WEAK_AUTHENTICATION_ENDPOINTS
Threat agents may take advantage of secure protocols that use weak methods to au-
thenticate the endpoints - e.g. a shared password that is guessable or transported as
plaintext. The consequences are the same as a poorly designed protocol, the attacker
could masquerade as the administrator or another device, and the attacker could insert
themselves into the network stream and perform a man-in-the-middle attack. The re-
sult is the critical network traffic is exposed and there could be a loss of confidentiali-
ty and integrity, and potentially the network device itself could be compromised.
T.UPDATE_COMPROMISE
Threat agents may attempt to provide a compromised update of the software or firm-
ware which undermines the security functionality of the device. Non-validated updates
or updates validated using non-secure or weak cryptography leave the update firm-
ware vulnerable to surreptitious alteration.
T.UNDETECTED_ACTIVITY
Threat agents may attempt to access, change, and/or modify the security functionality
of the network device without Administrator awareness. This could result in the at-
tacker finding an avenue (e.g., misconfiguration, flaw in the product) to compromise
the device and the Administrator would have no knowledge that the device has been
compromised.
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_COMPROMISE
Threat agents may compromise credentials and device data enabling continued access
to the network device and its critical data. The compromise of credentials includes re-
placing existing credentials with an attacker’s credentials, modifying existing creden-
tials, or obtaining the Administrator or device credentials for use by the attacker.
T.PASSWORD_CRACKING
Threat agents may be able to take advantage of weak administrative passwords to gain
privileged access to the device. Having privileged access to the device provides the at-
tacker unfettered access to the network traffic and may allow them to take advantage
of any trust relationships with other network devices.
T. NETWORK_DISCLOSURE
Sensitive information on a protected network might be disclosed resulting from in-
gress- or egress-based actions.
T. NETWORK_ACCESS
Unauthorized access may be achieved to services on a protected network from outside
that network.
T. DATA_INTEGRITY
A malicious party attempts to change the data being sent - resulting in loss of integrity.
T. REPLAY_ATTACK
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If malicious or external IT entities are able to gain access to the network, they may
have the ability to capture information traversing throughout the network and send
them on to the intended receiver.
The Security Target contains one Organisational Security Policy (OSP) which has
been considered during the evaluation.
P.ACCESS_BANNER
The TOE shall display an initial banner describing restrictions of use, legal agree-
ments, or any other appropriate information to which users consent by accessing the
TOE.
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5 Architectural Information
The TOE encompasses the entire device, including both the hardware and firmware.
The TOE hardware platforms (chipset and CPU) are described in the table below. The
next table after that specifies the firmware, physical interfaces and features of the dif-
ferent TOE models. All models run the same firmware, AWOS 4.0.1 build 504.
TOE Models Chipset (Qual-
comm)
CPU (integrated in main
chip)
Linux Kernel
OAW-AP1201 IPQ4018 Quad-core ARM Cortex-
A7 at 600 MHz
3.14.77-
ARM
OAW-AP1201H,
OAWAP1201HL,
OAWAP1201L
QCA9563 +
QCA9886
MIPS 74Kc at 775Mhz 3.14.77-
MIPS
OAW-AP1221,
OAWAP1222
IPQ4029 +
QCA9994
Quad-core ARM Cortex-
A7 at 717MHz
3.14.77-
ARM
OAW-AP1231,
OAWAP1232
IPQ8065 +
QCA9994
Dual-core SMP Krait CPU
(ARMv7-compliant) at
1.7GHz
3.14.77-
ARM
OAW-AP1251 IPQ4029 Quad-core ARM Cortex-
A7 at 717MHz
3.14.77-
ARM
OAW-AP1321,
OAWAP1322
IPQ8071A Quad ARM Cortex A53s,
1.0GHz
4.4.60-
ARM
OAW-AP1361,
OAWAP1361D,
OAW-AP1362
IPQ8071A Quad ARM Cortex A53s,
1.0GHz
4.4.60-
ARM
TOE Models Hardware Description
OAW-AP1201 The 802.11ac AP1201 access point supports a maximum concur-
rent data rate of 1.2 Gb/s (867 Mb/s in 5 GHz and 400 Mb/s in 2.4
GHz), 80 MHz channels (VHT80), multi-user MIMO (MU-
MIMO) and two spatial streams (2SS) per radio.
Antenna: Built-in 2×2:2 @ 2.4 GHz, 2x2:2 @ 5 GHz, BLE an-
tenna.
Interfaces:
• 1× 10/100/1000Base-T autosensing (RJ-45) port, Power over
Ethernet (PoE)
• 1x Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) 5.0 radio, integrated antenna.
Hardware ready for Zigbee.
• 1× management console port (RJ-45)
• Reset button: Factory reset
• DC48V power jack
• Kensington security slot
OAW-AP1201H,
OAWAP1201HL,
OAWAP1201L
The 802.11ac AP1201H access point supports a maximum con-
current data rate of 1.2 Gb/s (867 Mb/s in 5 GHz and 300 Mb/s in
2.4 GHz), MUMIMO and two spatial streams (2SS).
Antenna: Built-in 2×2:2 @ 2.4 GHz, 2x2:2 @ 5 GHz.
Interfaces:
• Uplink: 1× 10/100/1000Base-T autosensing (RJ-45) port, Power
over Ethernet (PoE)
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• Downlink:
o AP1201H: 1× 10/100/1000Base-T autosensing (RJ-45) port,
Power over Ethernet (PoE-PSE) 802.3af compliant;
2×10/100/1000Base-T autosensing (RJ-45) port
o AP1201HL: 3× 10/100/1000Base-T autosensing (RJ-45) port
• AP1201H and AP1201HL: Passive Pass through one pair, back
and bottom
• AP1201H and AP1201HL: 1× USB 2.0 (Type A)
• AP1201L: 1× management console port (RJ-45)
• Reset button: Factory reset
• DC48V power jack
OAW-AP1221,
OAWAP1222
The 802.11ac AP1220 series supports a maximum concurrent
data rate of 2.1 Gb/s (1733 Mb/s in 5 GHz and 400 Mb/s in 2.4
GHz), 160 MHz channels (VHT160*), multi-user MIMO
(MUMIMO) and four spatial streams (4SS).
Antenna:
• AP1221: Built-in 2×2:2 @ 2.4 GHz, 4x4:4 @ 5 GHz
• AP1222: External 2×2:2 @ 2.4 GHz, 4x4:4 @ 5 GHz
• Optional external antenna (sold separately)
Interfaces:
• 1x 10/100/1000Base-T autosensing (RJ-45) port, Power over
Ethernet (PoE)
• 1x USB 2.0 (Type A connector)
• 1x management console port (RJ-45)
• Reset button: Factory reset
• DC48V power jack
• Kensington security slot
• AP1222: 4x RP-SMA antenna connectors
OAW-AP1231,
OAWAP1232
The 802.11ac AP1230 series supports a maximum concurrent
data rate of 4.266 Gb/s (dual 1733 Mb/s in 5 GHz and 800 Mb/s
in 2.4 GHz), dual uplinks with 2.5 GbE and 1 GbE, 160 MHz
channels (VHT160*), multi- user MIMO (MUMIMO) and four
spatial streams (4SS).
Antenna:
• AP1231: Built-in 4×4:4 @ 2.4 GHz, dual 4x4:4 @ 5 GHz
• AP1232: External 4×4:4 @ 2.4 GHz, dual 4x4:4 @ 5 GHz 8
RP-SMA connectors for external dual band antennas.
• Optional external antenna (sold separately)
Interfaces:
• 1x 100/1000/2500Base-T autosensing (RJ-45) port, Power over
Ethernet (PoE)
• 1x 10/100/1000Base-T autosensing (RJ-45) port, Power over
Ethernet (PoE)
• 1x Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) radio, integrated antenna
• 1x USB 2.0 (Type A connector)
• 1x management console port (RJ-45)
• Reset button: Factory reset
• DC48V power jack
• Kensington security slot
• AP1232: 8x RP-SMA antenna connectors
OAW-AP1251 The AP1251 supports the IP67 standard for harsh outdoor envi-
ronments, such as exposure to high and low temperatures, persis-
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tent moisture and precipitation, and electrical interfaces include
industrial strength surge protection. The AP1251 supports a max-
imum concurrent data rate of 1.267 Gb/s (867 Mb/s in 5 GHz and
400 Mb/s in 2.4 GHz), and dual Gigabit Ethernet links, integrated
omni-directional antennas, the AP1251 is ideal for medium densi-
ty outdoor environments.
Antenna: Built-in 2×2:2 @ 2.4 GHz, 2x2:2 @ 5 GHz.
Interfaces:
• 1× 10/100/1000Base-T autosensing (RJ-45) port, Power over
Ethernet (PoE)
• 1× 10/100/1000Base-T autosensing (RJ-45) port
• 1x management console port (Micro-USB)
• Reset button: Factory reset
OAW-AP1321,
OAWAP1322
The OmniAccess Stellar AP1320 series supports a maximum
aggregate data rate of ̃3Gbps (2.4Gbps in 5 GHz and 573Mbps in
GHz). To support this higher capacity the access point is powered
by a Multigig Ethernet uplink.
Antenna:
• AP1321: 2×2:2 @ 2.4 GHz, 4x4:4 @ 5 GHz
• AP1322: 2×2:2 @ 2.4 GHz, 4x4:4 @ 5 GHz
Interfaces:
• 1x 10BASE-Te/100BASE-TX/1000BASET/2500BASE-T IEEE
802.3 compliant autosensing (RJ-45) port, ENET0, Power over
Ethernet (PoE) 802.3at compliant
• 1x 10/100/1000 BASE-T IEEE 802.3 compliant auto-sensing
(RJ-45) port, ENET1, Power over Ethernet (PoE) 802.3at compli-
ant
• 1x BLE/ZigBee radio
• 1x USB 2.0 Type A (5V, 500mA)
• 1x management console port (RJ-45)
• Reset button: Factory reset
• DC48V power jack
• AP1322: 4x RP-SMA female external antenna connectors
OAW-AP1361,
OAWAP1361D,
OAW-AP1362
The OmniAccess Stellar AP1320 series supports a maximum
aggregate data rate of ̃3Gbps (2.4Gbps in 5 GHz and 573Mbps in
GHz). To support this higher capacity the access point is powered
by a Multigig Ethernet uplink.
Antenna:
• AP1361: 2×2:2 @ 2.4 GHz, 4x4:4 @ 5 GHz
• AP1361D: 2×2:2 @ 2.4 GHz, 4x4:4 @ 5 GHz
• AP1362: 2×2:2 @ 2.4 GHz, 4x4:4 @ 5 GHz
Interfaces:
• 1x 10/100/1000/2500 Mbps IEEE 802.3 compliant autosensing
(RJ-45) uplink port, ENET0, Power over Ethernet (PoE)
802.3at/bt compliant
• 1x 10/100/1000 Mbps IEEE 802.3 compliant auto-sensing (RJ-
45) downlink port, ENET1, PoE output up to 802.1at power de-
pendent on input PoE
• 1x SFP port
• 1x BLE/ZigBee radio
• 1x USB 2.0 Type C
• 1x management console port (Micro-USB)
• Reset button: Factory reset
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• AP1362: 6x N-type external antenna connectors, integrated 6KA
lightning protection, not require additional lighting arrester
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6 Documentation
The following documentation comprises the TOE guidance and is available on the Al-
catel-Lucent Enterprise Service and Support website:
• OmniAccess Stellar AP User Guide [APGUIDE]
• Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guide for Alcatel-Lucent Enterprise
OmniAccess Stellar Wireless Access Points [CCECG]
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7 IT Product Testing
7.1 Developer Testing
The developer has performed testing against all TSFIs, covering functionality related
to every claimed SFR by at least one test. Since the TOE includes different AP mod-
els, the developer has performed testing against a set of TOE models covering every
hardware chipset:
● AP1201
● AP1201H
● AP1221
● AP1231
● AP1321
The developer has executed a total of 78 test cases for each tested TOE model. The
test cases specify both negative and positive testing. The developer has provided the
results of all test cases that were performed. All tests were successful.
7.2 Evaluator Testing
The evaluator did not identify any gaps in the coverage of the developer's testing to
TSF or TSFIs. The evaluator expanded two developer test cases to increase the depth
of testing for the two sensitive cryptographic TSFIs:
● ETC#1: Extended TLS testing
● ETC#2: Extended WPA2 testing
The evaluator also re-executed a sample of the developer's test cases, which consisted
of 7 manual tests. These tests were selected to cover all TSFIs and every applicable
SFR class. As SFR classes denominate separate security functions, the evaluator used
these to attempt to cover different areas of the TOE implementation. While the devel-
oper had tested all relevant TOE models, the evaluator selected AP1221 and
AP1201H. All evaluator tests were executed against both models. All evaluator tests,
both the test sample and test subset, were completed successfully.
7.3 Penetration Testing
Penetration testing was conducted against a set of potential vulnerabilities within the
TOE, as identified during the public search for vulnerabilities and during the search of
vulnerabilities through the developer's evidence. For each identified attack surface and
potential vulnerability, a penetration test was devised to verify that no actual vulnera-
bility was present. A port scanner was used to scan for undocumented network ports.
An automated TLS scanner was used to verify the setup of the TLS service. Finally,
for a number of unused services, various tools were used to attempt to establish a con-
nection and extract any kind of data. The testing was conducted using negative tests,
i.e. that output was not expected in the case that no vulnerability was present. To con-
firm the whether the identified potential vulnerabilities were applicable to the TOE,
only simple tests were necessary, e.g. to attempt to connect to a service and confirm
that the attempt was unsuccessful. However, at least one test was devised for each po-
tential vulnerability. None of the performed penetration tests revealed any applicable
vulnerability in the TOE.
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8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is intended to operate in a secure enterprise environment that protects the
TOE from unauthorized physical access. Appropriate security policy and security pro-
cedure guidance must be in place to govern operational management of the TOE with-
in its operational environment.
The TOE environment requires an administrator workstation is also needed to config-
ure the TOE. For 802.1X authentication, a RADIUS server is needed. A syslog server
can be provided for additional log storage.
The following items need to be adhered to in the evaluated configuration:
• Versions 1.1 and 1.2 of the TLS protocol are the only versions allowed in the evalu-
ated configuration. Usage of other protocol versions usually supported in SSL and
TLS (SSLv1.0, SSLv2.0, SSLv3.0 or TLSv1.0) are prohibited.
• The console interface shall not be used to perform any management functions on the
TOE
• FTP/TFTP access to the AP must be disabled for security reasons.
• Secure Shell (SSH) is used only for diagnostics and must be disabled in the CC eval-
uated configuration.
• The use of NTP to synchronize the time with an external time source must be disa-
bled in the CC evaluated configuration.
• The use of captive portal for guest WLAN access must be disabled in the CC evalu-
ated configuration.
For more information on the evaluated configuration, please see the Common Criteria
Evaluated Configuration Guide for Alcatel-Lucent Enterprise OmniAccess Stellar
Wireless Access Points [CCECG] which is available on the Alcatel-Lucent Enterprise
Service and Support website.
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The evaluators applied each work unit of the Common Methodology [CEM] within
the scope of the evaluation, and concluded that the TOE meets the security objectives
stated in the Security Target [ST] for an attack potential of Basic.
The certifier reviewed the work of the evaluators and determined that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the Common Criteria [CC].
The evaluators' overall verdict is PASS.
The verdicts for the assurance classes and components are summarised in the follow-
ing table:
Assurance Class Name / Assurance Family Name Short name (includ-
ing component iden-
tifier for assurance
families)
Verdict
Security Target Evaluation
ST Introduction
Conformance claims
Security Problem Definition
Security objectives
Extended components definition
Derived security requirements
TOE summary specification
ASE
ASE_INT.1
ASE_CCL.1
ASE_SPD.1
ASE_OBJ.2
ASE_ECD.1
ASE_REQ.2
ASE_TSS.1
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
Life-cycle support
Use of a CM system
Parts of the TOE CM Coverage
Delivery procedures
Flaw reporting procedures
ALC
ALC_CMC.2
ALC_CMS.2
ALC_DEL.1
ALC_FLR.1
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
Development
Security architecture description
Security-enforcing functional specification
Basic design
ADV
ADV_ARC.1
ADV_FSP.2
ADV_TDS.1
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
Guidance documents
Operational user guidance
Preparative procedures
AGD
AGD_OPE.1
AGD_PRE.1
PASS
PASS
PASS
Tests
Evidence of coverage
Functional testing
Independent testing - sample
ATE
ATE_COV.1
ATE_FUN.1
ATE_IND.2
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
Vulnerability Assessment
Vulnerability analysis
AVA
AVA_VAN.2
PASS
PASS
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10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations
None.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report ALE OmniAccess Stellar
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11 Glossary
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security,
document describing the methodology used in Common Cri-
teria evaluations
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility, test laboratory licensed to
operate within a evaluation and certification scheme
ST Security Target, document containing security requirements
and specifications , used as the basis of a TOE evaluation
TOE Target of Evaluation
AP Access Point
WLAN Wireless Local Area Network
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12 Bibliography
12.1 General
CC Combination of CCp1, CCp2, CCp3, and CEM (see below)
CCp1 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1,
version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-001
CCp2 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2,
version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-002
CCp3 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part
3:, version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-003
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-004
ST Alcatel-Lucent OmniAccess Stellar AP Security Target, ALE USA Inc.,
2021-10-06, document version 1.0
SP-002 SP-002 Evaluation and Certification, CSEC, 2021-06-04, document ver-
sion 33.0
SP-188 SP-188 Scheme Crypto Policy, CSEC, 2021-06-07, document version
11.0
12.2 Documentation
APGUIDE Alcatel-Lucent Enterprise OmniAccess Stellar AP User Guide - AWOS
4.0.1, ALE USA Inc., 2020-10-21, version 033517-10 Rev. B
CCECG Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guide for Alcatel-Lucent
Enterprise OmniAccess Stellar Wireless Access Points, Bojie Xie, 2021-
05-31, version 0.12
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Appendix A Scheme Versions
During the certification the following versions of the Swedish Common Criteria Eval-
uation and Certification scheme have been used.
A.1 Scheme/Quality Management System
Version Introduced Impact of changes
1.25 2021-06-17 None
1.24.1 2020-12-03 None
1.24 2020-11-19 None
1.23.2 Application Original version
A.2 Scheme Notes
Scheme
Note
Version Title Applicability
SN-15 3.0 Demonstration of
test coverage
Clarify demonstration of test cover-
age at EAL2.
SN-18 3.0 Highlighted Re-
quirements on
the Security Tar-
get
Clarifications on the content of the
ST.
SN-22 3.0 Vulnerability
Assessment
Vulnerability assessment needs to be
redone if 30 days or more has passed
between AVA and the final version
of the final evaluation report.
SN-27 1.0 ST Requirements
at the Time of
Application for
Certification
Expectations on the quality of the
Security Target at the time of appli-
cation for certification
SN-28 1.0 Updated proce-
dures application,
evaluation and
certification
Evaluator reports should be received
in two batches.