National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
416 Maetan-3dong, Yeongtong-gu, Suwon-si, Gyeonggi-
do, 443-742 Korea
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
Samsung Galaxy Note 5 & Galaxy
Tab S2
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-10683-2015
Dated: October 13, 2015
Version: 1.2
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
®
TM
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Herb Ellis
Meredith Hennan
Jerry Myers
Aerospace Corporation
Columbia, MD
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
James Arnold
Tammy Compton
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Catonsville, MD
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 1
2 Identification............................................................................................................... 1
3 Architectural Information ........................................................................................... 3
3.1 TOE Evaluated Configuration ............................................................................ 4
3.2 TOE Architecture................................................................................................ 5
3.3 Physical Boundaries............................................................................................ 5
4 Security Policy............................................................................................................ 5
4.1 Cryptographic support ........................................................................................ 6
4.2 User data protection ............................................................................................ 6
4.3 Identification and authentication......................................................................... 6
4.4 Security management.......................................................................................... 6
4.5 Protection of the TSF.......................................................................................... 7
4.6 TOE access.......................................................................................................... 7
4.7 Trusted path/channels ......................................................................................... 7
5 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope..................................................................... 7
6 Documentation............................................................................................................ 8
7 IT Product Testing ...................................................................................................... 8
7.1 Developer Testing............................................................................................... 9
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ............................................................... 9
8 Evaluated Configuration ........................................................................................... 10
9 Results of the Evaluation .......................................................................................... 10
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE).......................................................... 10
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)............................................................ 10
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD) ............................................... 11
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC) ................................... 11
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ............... 11
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)....................................................... 11
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results........................................................................ 12
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations .................................................................. 12
11 Annexes..................................................................................................................... 12
12 Security Target.......................................................................................................... 12
13 Glossary .................................................................................................................... 12
14 Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 13
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of Samsung Galaxy Note 5 & Galaxy Tab S2
solution provided by Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. It presents the evaluation results, their
justifications, and the conformance results. This Validation Report is not an endorsement
of the Target of Evaluation by any agency of the U.S. government, and no warranty is
either expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Catonsville, MD, United States of America, and
was completed in October 2015. The information in this report is largely derived from the
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer
Security Solutions. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria
Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the Protection Profile For Mobile
Device Fundamentals, Version 2, 17 September 2014.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Samsung Galaxy Note 5 & Galaxy Tab S2 devices.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for
IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 4) for conformance to the Common Criteria for
IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 4). This Validation Report applies only to the
specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in
accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation
Scheme and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are
consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that
the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in
the Security Target (ST). Therefore the validation team concludes that the testing
laboratory’s findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results
are correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are
consistent with the evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Samsung
Electronics Co., Ltd. Samsung Galaxy Note 5 & Galaxy Tab S2 (MDFPP20) Security
Target and analysis performed by the Validation Team.
2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
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Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory
Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation.
Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated
Products List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
 The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as
evaluated.
 The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
 The conformance result of the evaluation.
 The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
 The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE: Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Samsung Galaxy Note 5 & Galaxy Tab S2
Protection Profile Protection Profile For Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 2, 17 September
2014
ST: Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Samsung Galaxy Note 5 & Galaxy Tab S2
(MDFPP20) Security Target, Version 0.4, October 8, 2015
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Samsung Galaxy Note 5 & Galaxy Tab S2
(MDFPP20) , Version 1.2, October 8, 2015
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 4
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Sponsor Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
Developer Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
CCEVS Validators Herb Ellis, The Aerospace Corporation
Meredith Hennan, The Aerospace Corporation
Jerry Myers, The Aerospace Corporation
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3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
The TOE is a mobile operating system based on Android 5.1.1 with modifications made to
increase the level of security provided to end users and enterprises. The TOE is intended to
be used as part of an enterprise messaging solution providing mobile staff with enterprise
connectivity.
The TOE includes a Common Criteria mode (or “CC mode”) that an administrator can
invoke through the use of an MDM or through a dedicated administrative application (see
the Guidance for instructions to obtain the application). The TOE must be configured as
follows in order for an administrator to transition the TOE to CC mode.
 Require a screen lock password (swipe, PIN, pattern, or facial recognition screen
locks are not allowed).
 The maximum password failure retry policy should be less than or equal to ten.
 Device encryption must be enabled.
 Revocation checking must be enabled.
When CC mode has been enabled, the TOE behaves as follows.
 The TOE sets the system wide Android CC mode property to “Enabled”.
 The TOE performs FIPS 140-2 power-on self-tests.
 The TOE performs self-tests for the key management.
 The TOE performs secure boot integrity checking of the kernel and key system
executables.
 The TOE prevents loading of custom firmware/kernels and requires all updates
occur through FOTA (Samsung’s Firmware Over The Air firmware update method)
 The TOE uses CAVP approved cryptographic ciphers when joining and
communicating with wireless networks.
 The TOE utilizes CAVP approved cryptographic ciphers for TLS.
 The TOE ensures FOTA updates utilize 2048-bit PKCS #1 RSA-PSS formatted
signatures (with SHA-512 hashing).
The TOE includes a containerization capability, KNOX. This container provides a way to
segment applications and data into two separate areas on the device, such as a personal area
and a work area, each with its own separate apps, data and security policies. For this effort
the TOE was evaluated both without and with a KNOX container created (and to create a
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KNOX container, one must purchase an additional license). Thus, the evaluation includes
several KNOX-specific claims that apply to a KNOX container when created.
There are different models of the TOE, the Samsung Galaxy Note 5 & Galaxy Tab S2.
These models differ in physical form factor. In addition, Samsung offers each model in
differing hardware models that are specific to a cellular carrier.
 Samsung manufactures the Galaxy Note 5 hardware with an LTE cellular radio,
32GB of internal Flash storage, and 4GB of RAM.
 Samsung manufactures the Galaxy Tab S2 with an 8” or 10” screen and in a version
with and without a cellular (LTE) radio
The different models have some functional differences.
1. The Galaxy Note 5 does not support external SD cards.
2. The Galaxy Tab S2 models do not have a phone or SMS/MMS messaging
applications nor do they include an NFC radio, thus it does not provide such
functionality. The Galaxy Tab S2 does not support cellular tethering or S
Voice.
3.1 TOE Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration consists of the following devices, with Exynos 5433 ARMv8 (64-bit)
(Tab S2) & Exynos 7420 ARMv8 (64-bit) (Note 5) processors:
Device Name
Base Model
Number
Android
Version
Kernel
Version
Build
Number
Galaxy Note 5 SM-N920V 5.1.1 3.10.61 LMY47X
Galaxy Tab S2 10” LTE (US
Models)
SM-T817A 5.1.1 3.10.61 LMY47X
The devices include a final letter or number at the end of the name that denotes that the device is for
a specific carrier (for example, V = Verizon Wireless and A = AT&T, which were used during the
evaluation). The following list of letters/numbers denotes the specific models which are covered by
the evaluation:
V – Verizon Wireless,
P - Sprint,
R4 – US Cellular,
S – SK Telecom,
L – LG Uplus,
K - Olleh,
A – AT&T,
T – T-Mobile,
I - International
Only models with one of these suffixes can be placed into the validated configuration.
The security software version is MDF v2 Release 4.
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3.2 TOE Architecture
The TOE combines with a Mobile Device Management solution that enables the enterprise
to watch, control and administer all deployed mobile devices, across multiple mobile
service providers as well as facilitate secure communications through a VPN. This
partnership provides a secure mobile environment that can be managed and controlled by
the environment and reduce the risks that can be introduced through a Bring-Your-Own-
Device (BYOD) model.
Data on the TOE is protected through the implementation of Samsung On-Device
Encryption (ODE) which utilizes a CAVP certified cryptographic algorithms to encrypt
device storage. This functionality is combined with a number of on-device policies
including local wipe, remote wipe, password complexity, automatic lock and privileged
access to security configurations to prevent unauthorized access to the device and stored
data.
The Samsung Enterprise Software Development Kit (SDK) builds on top of the existing
Android security model by expanding the current set of security configuration of options to
more than 390 configurable policies and including additional security functionality such as
application whitelisting and blacklisting.
KNOX provides the ability to enhance the BYOD model by creating a separate container
for the Enterprise. Within this container, the Enterprise can provision separate applications
and ensure they are kept separate from anything the user may do outside the KNOX
container. The Enterprise can use policy controls to manage the device as a whole or the
KNOX container specifically, as needed by the organization.
3.3 Physical Boundaries
The TOE is a multi-user operating system based on Android (5.1.1) that incorporates the
Samsung Enterprise SDK. The TOE does not include the user applications that run on top
of the operating system, but does include controls that limit application behavior. The TOE
is used as a mobile device within an enterprise environment where the configuration of the
device is managed through a compliant device management solution.
The TOE communicates and interacts with 802.11-2012 Access Points and mobile data
networks to establish network connectivity, and the through that connectivity interacts with
MDM servers that allow administrative control of the TOE.
4 Security Policy
This section summarizes the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Cryptographic support
2. User data protection
3. Identification and authentication
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4. Security Management
5. Protection of the TSF
6. TOE access
7. Trusted path/channels
4.1 Cryptographic support
The TOE includes a cryptographic module with CAVP certified algorithms for a wide
range of cryptographic functions including: asymmetric key generation and establishment,
symmetric key generation, encryption/decryption, cryptographic hashing and keyed-hash
message authentication. These functions are supported with suitable random bit generation,
key derivation, salt generation, initialization vector generation, secure key storage, and key
and protected data destruction. These primitive cryptographic functions are used to
implement security protocols such as TLS, IPsec, and HTTPS and also to encrypt the
media (including the generation and protection of data, right, and key encryption keys)
used by the TOE. Many of these cryptographic functions are also accessible as services to
applications running on the TOE.
4.2 User data protection
The TOE is designed to control access to system services by hosted applications, including
protection of the Trust Anchor Database. Additionally, the TOE is designed to protect user
and other sensitive data using encryption so that even if a device is physically lost, the data
remains protected. The functionality provided by a KNOX container enhances the security
of user data by providing an additional layer of separation between apps and data while the
device is in use.
4.3 Identification and authentication
The TOE supports a number of features related to identification and authentication. From a
user perspective, except for making phone calls to an emergency number, a password (i.e.,
Password Authentication Factor) must be correctly entered to unlock the TOE. Also, even
when the TOE is unlocked the password must be re-entered to change the password.
Passwords are obscured when entered so they cannot be read from the TOE's display and
the frequency of entering passwords is limited and when a configured number of failures
occurs, the TOE will be wiped to protect its contents. Passwords can be constructed using
upper and lower case characters, numbers, and special characters and passwords between 4
and 16 characters are supported. The TOE can also serve as an 802.1X supplicant and can
use X509v3 and validate certificates for EAP-TLS, TLS and IPsec exchanges.
4.4 Security management
The TOE provides all the interfaces necessary to manage the security functions identified
throughout this Security Target as well as other functions commonly found in mobile
devices. Many of the available functions are available to users of the TOE while many are
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restricted to administrators operating through a Mobile Device Management solution once
the TOE has been enrolled. Once the TOE has been enrolled and then un-enrolled, it
removes all MDM policies and disables CC mode.
4.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements a number of features designed to protect itself to ensure the
reliability and integrity of its security features. It protects particularly sensitive data such as
cryptographic keys so that they are not accessible or exportable. It also provides its own
timing mechanism to ensure that reliable time information is available (e.g., for log
accountability). It enforces read, write, and execute memory page protections, uses address
space layout randomization, and stack-based buffer overflow protections to minimize the
potential to exploit application flaws. It is also designed to protect itself from modification
by applications as well as to isolate the address spaces of applications from one another to
protect those applications.
The TOE includes functions to perform self-tests and software/firmware integrity checking
so that it might detect when it is failing or may be corrupt. If any of the self-tests fail, the
TOE will not go into an operational mode. It also includes mechanisms (i.e., verification of
the digital signature of each new image) so that the TOE itself can be updated while
ensuring that the updates will not introduce malicious or other unexpected changes in the
TOE. Digital signature checking also extends to verifying applications prior to their
installation.
4.6 TOE access
The TOE can be locked, obscuring its display, by the user or after a configured interval of
inactivity. The TOE also has the capability to display an advisory message (banner) when
users unlock the TOE for use. The TOE is also able to attempt to connect to wireless
networks as configured.
4.7 Trusted path/channels
The TOE supports the use of 802.11-2012, 802.1X, EAP-TLS, TLS, and IPsec to secure
communications channels between itself and other trusted network devices.
5 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the
Protection Profile For Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 2, 17 September 2014
(MDFPP). That information has not been reproduced here and the MDFPP should be
consulted if there is interest in that material.
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that
need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and
clarifications of this evaluation.
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Note that:
1. As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance activities
specified in the Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile and performed by the
evaluation team).
2. This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in this
document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
3. This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities that
were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines
an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding
of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
6 Documentation
The following documentation was used as evidence for the evaluation of the Samsung
Galaxy Note 5 & Galaxy Tab S2:
 Samsung Android 5 on Galaxy Devices Guidance Documentation, version 2.3,
October 1, 2015
 Samsung Android 5 on Galaxy Devices User Guidance Documentation, version 2.3,
October 1, 2015
 Samsung Android 5 on Galaxy S6 & S6 Edge & Tab S2 Devices, version 2.2,
October 1, 2015
 Samsung Android 5 on Galaxy S6 & S6 Edge & Tab S2 Devices User Guidance
Documentation, version 2.2, October 1, 2015
Any additional customer documentation delivered with the product or available through
download was not included in the scope of the evaluation and hence should not be relied
upon when using the products as evaluated.
7 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is
derived from information contained in the Detailed Test Report for Samsung Galaxy Note
5 & Galaxy Tab S2 (MDFPP20), Version 0.2, October 1, 2015, which is not publically
available. The Assurance Activity Report (MDFPP20) for Samsung Electronics Co., LTD.
Samsung Galaxy Note 5 & Galaxy Tab S2, Version 0.3, October 8, 2015 (AAR), provides a
non-proprietary overview of testing and the prescribed assurance activities.
The following diagrams depict the test environments used by the evaluators.
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7.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according the Galaxy Devices Guidance
Documentation, version 2.3, October 1, 2015 and Samsung Android 5 on Galaxy S6 & S6
Edge & Tab S2 Devices Guidance Documentation, version 2.2, October 1, 2015 documents
and ran the tests specified in the MDFPP.
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8 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration consists of the Samsung Galaxy Note 5 & Galaxy Tab S2
devices.
To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as
specified Galaxy Devices Guidance Documentation, version 2.3, October 1, 2015 and
Samsung Android 5 on Galaxy S6 & S6 Edge & Tab S2 Devices Guidance Documentation,
version 2.2, October 1, 2015.
9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all
EAL1 work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to
the corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon
CC version 3.1 rev 4 and CEM version 3.1 rev 4. The evaluation determined the Samsung
Galaxy Note 5 & Galaxy Tab S2 TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to meet the Part 3
Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL 1).
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement
of security requirements claimed to be met by the Samsung Galaxy Note 5 & Galaxy Tab
S2 products that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security function
descriptions that support the requirements.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team
assessed the design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the
TSF provides the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional
specification contained in the Security target and Guidance documents. Additionally the
evaluator performed the assurance activities specified in the MDFPP related to the
examination of the information contained in the TSS.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
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conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team
ensured the adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE.
Additionally, the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in
describing how to securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the
design and testing phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found
that the TOE was identified.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran
the set of tests specified by the assurance activities in the MDFPP and recorded the results
in a Test Report, summarized in the Assurance Activities Report.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 AVA CEM work unit. The evaluation team
performed a public search for vulnerabilities and did not discover any public issues with
the TOE.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
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9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims
in the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the
accuracy of the claims in the ST.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The evaluated configuration requires that software updates to the TOE be restricted to
FOTA. The evaluators were unable to directly exercise this mechanism since it would have
involved placing invalid updates on the live public servers that are currently in use by
present customers. Hence, the evaluators had to take the products out of the evaluated
configuration to test the update features.
The validators suggest that the consumer pay particular attention to the evaluated
configuration of the device(s). The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the
security functional requirements specified in the Security Target, and only the functionality
implemented by the SFR’s within the Security Target was evaluated. All other functionality
provided by the devices, to include software that was not part of the evaluated
configuration, needs to be assessed separately and no further conclusions can be drawn
about their effectiveness.
11 Annexes
Not applicable
12 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Samsung Galaxy Note 5
& Galaxy Tab S2 (MDFPP20) Security Target, Version 0.4, October 8, 2015.
13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
 Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
 Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
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 Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims
made are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common
Criteria using the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is
complete, consistent, technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of
requirements for one or more TOEs that may be evaluated.
 Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor
or developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
 Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
 Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or
an IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
 Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the
issue of a Common Criteria certificate.
 Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2102.
[4] Protection Profile For Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 2, 17 September 2014.
[5] Assurance Activity Report (MDFPP20) for Samsung Electronics Co., LTD.
Samsung Galaxy Note 5 & Galaxy Tab S2, Version 0.3, October 8, 2015.
[6] Evaluation Technical Report for Samsung Galaxy Note 5 & Galaxy Tab S2
(MDFPP20) , Version 1.2, October 8, 2015.
[7] Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Samsung Galaxy Note 5 & Galaxy Tab S2
(MDFPP20) Security Target, Version 0.4, October 8, 2015.
[8] Samsung Android 5 on Galaxy Devices Guidance Documentation, version 2.3,
October 1, 2015.
[9] Samsung Android 5 on Galaxy Devices User Guidance Documentation, version 2.3,
October 1, 2015.
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[10] Samsung Android 5 on Galaxy S6 & S6 Edge & Tab S2 Devices, version 2.2,
October 1, 2015.
[11] Samsung Android 5 on Galaxy S6 & S6 Edge & Tab S2 Devices User Guidance
Documentation, version 2.2, October 1, 2015.