Top Layer Networks
IDS BalancerTM
Version 2.2 Appliance
(IDSB3531-CCV1.0, IDSB3532-CCV1.0, IDSB4508-CCV1.0)
Security Target V2.3
August 31, 2004
AppBalancing, AppSafe, DCFD, Flow Mirror, SecureWatch, TopSafe, Top Layer Attack Mitigator,
Top Layer IDS Balancer, Top Layer, and Top Layer Networks are trademarks of Top Layer.
AppSwitch, perfecting the art of network security, TopFire, TopFlow, TopPath, and TopView are
registered trademarks of Top Layer. Unless otherwise indicated, Top Layer trademarks are
registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.
All other trademarks and registered trademarks are the property of their respective holders.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
SECTION PAGE
1 SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................................1
1.1 SECURITY TARGET IDENTIFICATION....................................................................................................1
1.2 SECURITY TARGET OVERVIEW ............................................................................................................1
1.3 STATEMENT OF CONFORMANCE ..........................................................................................................1
1.4 INTERPRETATIONS................................................................................................................................1
1.5 DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION ................................................................................................................1
2 TOE DESCRIPTION ................................................................................................................................3
2.1 PRODUCT TYPE ....................................................................................................................................3
2.2 TSF BOUNDARY AND SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION .............................................................................4
2.2.1 Hardware .....................................................................................................................................5
2.2.2 Software .......................................................................................................................................5
2.3 TOE FUNCTIONALITY ..........................................................................................................................6
2.3.1 Information Flow Control............................................................................................................6
2.3.2 Identification and Authentication.................................................................................................6
2.3.3 Security Audit...............................................................................................................................7
2.3.4 TOE Access ..................................................................................................................................7
2.3.5 Security Management...................................................................................................................7
2.3.6 Protection of TOE Security Functions.........................................................................................7
2.4 IT ENVIRONMENT ................................................................................................................................8
2.5 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT...........................................................................................................89
3 TOE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT......................................................................................................10
3.1 ASSUMPTIONS ....................................................................................................................................10
3.2 THREATS ............................................................................................................................................10
4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES.....................................................................................................................12
4.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE................................................................................................12
4.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE IT ENVIRONMENT ..........................................................................12
4.3 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE NON-IT ENVIRONMENT .................................................................13
5 IT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS........................................................................................................14
5.1 TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS..................................................................................14
5.1.1 Class FAU: Security Audit.........................................................................................................14
5.1.2 Class FDP: User Data Protection.............................................................................................15
5.1.3 Class FIA: Identification and Authentication ............................................................................19
5.1.4 Class FMT: Security Management ............................................................................................19
5.1.5 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF..............................................................................................24
5.1.6 Class FTA: TOE Access.............................................................................................................24
5.2 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR THE IT ENVIRONMENT ....................................................................25
5.3 TOE SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS ...................................................................................25
5.4 STRENGTH OF FUNCTION ...................................................................................................................25
6 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION ....................................................................................................26
6.1 IT SECURITY FUNCTIONS...................................................................................................................26
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6.1.1 IFF-1 Information Flow Control ...............................................................................................26
6.1.2 Identification and Authentication...............................................................................................27
6.1.3 Audit...........................................................................................................................................27
6.1.4 Security Management.................................................................................................................28
6.1.5 TSF Self-Protection....................................................................................................................28
6.1.6 TOE Access ................................................................................................................................30
6.2 ASSURANCE MEASURES.....................................................................................................................31
6.2.1 Configuration management (ACM)............................................................................................32
6.2.2 Delivery and Operation (ADO)..................................................................................................32
6.2.3 Development documentation (ADV) ..........................................................................................33
6.2.4 Guidance Documentation (AGD)...............................................................................................33
6.2.5 Test procedures and test documentation (ATE).........................................................................33
6.2.6 Vulnerability analysis (AVA) .....................................................................................................34
6.3 STRENGTH OF FUNCTION CLAIM........................................................................................................34
7 PP CLAIMS..............................................................................................................................................35
8 RATIONALE ...........................................................................................................................................36
8.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES RATIONALE...................................................................................................36
8.2 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE.............................................................................................39
8.2.1 Functional Requirements ...........................................................................................................39
8.2.2 Dependencies .............................................................................................................................42
8.2.3 Mutual Support ..........................................................................................................................43
8.2.4 Requirements Consistency .........................................................................................................44
8.2.5 Strength of Function...................................................................................................................44
8.2.6 Assurance Requirements............................................................................................................44
8.2.7 Explicitly Stated Requirements ..................................................................................................44
8.3 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION RATIONALE ....................................................................................44
8.3.1 IT Security Functions.................................................................................................................44
8.3.2 Assurance Measures Rationale..................................................................................................47
8.3.3 Strength of Function (SOF) Rationale ......................................................................................50
8.4 PP CLAIMS RATIONALE .....................................................................................................................50
9 ACRONYMS AND TERMINOLOGY ..................................................................................................51
10 REFERENCES.....................................................................................................................................52
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Figures and Tables
Table or Figure Page
FIGURE 2.1 –BALANCER MODEL AS3532 IN A NETWORK – SAMPLE CONFIGURATION .............................................. 4
FIGURE 2.2 – IDS BALANCER MODELS .................................................................................................................. 5
TABLE 2.1 – MODELS AND PORTS.......................................................................................................................... 5
TABLE 5.1 – FUNCTIONAL COMPONENTS.............................................................................................................. 14
TABLE 5.2 – MANAGEMENT OF TSF DATA............................................................................................................ 19
TABLE 5.3 – MANAGEMENT OF SECURITY ATTRIBUTES ......................................................................................... 21
TABLE 5.4 – DEFAULT PORT ROLES..................................................................................................................... 22
TABLE 5.5 – DEFAULT VALUES OF SECURITY ATTRIBUTES .................................................................................... 23
TABLE 5.6 - EAL2 ASSURANCE COMPONENTS ..................................................................................................... 25
TABLE 6.1 – ASSURANCE MEASURES................................................................................................................... 31
TABLE 8.1 – ALL THREATS AND ASSUMPTIONS ADDRESSED.................................................................................. 36
TABLE 8.2 – ALL OBJECTIVES MAPPED TO THREATS OR ASSUMPTIONS ................................................................. 39
TABLE 8.3 - ALL OBJECTIVES ADDRESSED BY SFRS............................................................................................ 39
TABLE 8.4 – ALL SFRS MAPPED TO OBJECTIVES ................................................................................................. 42
TABLE 8.5 – ALL DEPENDENCIES SATISFIED ......................................................................................................... 42
TABLE 8.6 – MAPPING OF SFRS TO IT SECURITY FUNCTIONS ............................................................................... 44
TABLE 8.7 - MAPPING OF IT SECURITY FUNCTIONS TO SFRS................................................................................ 46
TABLE 8.8 – ASSURANCE MEASURES................................................................................................................... 47
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1 Security Target Introduction
1.1 Security Target Identification
TOE Identification: Top Layer IDS Balancer™ Version 2.2 Appliance (IDSB3531-CCV1.0,
IDSB3532-CCV1.0, IDSB4508-CCV1.0)
ST Title: Top Layer IDS BalancerTM
Version 2.2 Appliance Security Target
ST Version: Version 2.3
ST Authors: Top Layer Networks
ST Date: August 31, 2004
Assurance level: EAL2
CC Identification: Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.1,
August 1999, ISO/IEC 15408
Keywords: Network Security, Load Balancing, Intrusion Detection System (IDS),
Information Flow Control, Security Target
1.2 Security Target Overview
This Security Target (ST) defines the Information Technology (IT) security requirements for Top
Layer IDS Balancer™
Version 2.2 Appliance. The scope of the evaluation includes three models:
IDSB3531-CCV1.0, IDSB3532-CCV1.0, and IDSB4508-CCV1.0. The models only differ in the
number of ports that they support. The IDS Balancer examines packets on a network, determines
their types, and directs them to the appropriate IDS sensor for further analysis. The IDS Balancer
also executes load balancing algorithms to distribute packets among multiple IDS sensors that were
set up to process that specific type of packet.
1.3 Statement of Conformance
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Part 2 extended, Part 3 conformant, and Evaluation Assurance
Level 2 (EAL2) conformant.
1.4 Interpretations
This Security Target incorporates the International Common Criteria (CC) Interpretations that were
in effect as of 26 September 2003 and that were determined to be applicable to the TOE.
1.5 Document Organization
The main sections of an ST are the ST Introduction, Target of Evaluation (TOE) Description, TOE
Security Environment, Security Objectives, IT Security Requirements, TOE Summary Specification,
Protection Profile Claims, and Rationale.
Section 2, the TOE Description, describes the product type and the scope and boundaries of the
TOE.
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Section 3, TOE Security Environment, identifies assumptions about the TOE’s intended usage and
environment and the threats relevant to secure TOE operation.
Section 4, Security Objectives, defines the security objectives for the TOE and its environment.
Section 5 specifies the TOE Security Requirements. The TOE security requirements are made up
of TOE Security Functional Requirements, TOE Security Assurance Requirements, Requirements
for the IT Environment, and the Strength of Function claim.
Section 6, TOE Summary Specification, describes the IT Security Functions and Assurance
Measures that meet the IT Security Requirements specified in Section 5.
Section 7, Protection Profile (PP) Claims, is not applicable. This product does not claim
conformance to any PP.
Section 8, Rationale presents evidence that the ST is a complete and cohesive set of requirements.
The Rationale has three main parts: Security Objectives Rationale, Security Requirements
Rationale, and TOE Summary Specification Rationale.
Section 9 contains Acronyms and Terminology.
Section 10 contains document references.
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2 TOE DESCRIPTION
2.1 Product Type
Top Layer Networks is a developer of a series of appliances that aid consumers in deploying a
defense-in-depth security architecture providing intrusion detection and prevention. Top Layer’s
appliance offerings include secure edge controllers, intrusion prevention systems (IPS), and
intrusion detection system (IDS) load balancing and optimizers.
The TOE is the Top Layer IDS Balancer™ Version 2.2 Appliance, henceforth referred to as the
“Balancer”. The Balancer is a passive, non-inline network appliance that sends copies of data traffic
to multiple IDS sensors, henceforth referred to as the “IDS” for different kinds of examination and
balances this traffic over one or more IDS for maximum efficiency of resources.
The scope of the evaluation includes three models of the TOE: IDSB3531-CCV1.0, IDSB3532-
CCV1.0, and IDSB4508-CCV1.0., which run on the following ASIC-based platforms (AS3531,
AS3532, and TL4508, respectively). Each platform runs the same custom developed proprietary set
of software and each platform was evaluated and tested. As described in Section 2.2.1, the
platforms differ only by the number of ports that they support.
The Balancer is a stateful inspection device. This means that the Balancer copies packets from the
network, examines them, maintains a state table for traffic exchanges, and is configured by the
Administrator to either drop its copy of a packet or deliver the copy of the packet to attached IDS for
detailed analysis. Packets are not changed as they pass through the Balancer.
The copied traffic is generated by computing systems (clients, servers) communicating with each
other over the consumer’s network. Communication is based on establishing a logical connection
between cooperating systems which is called a session. A session, based on transport protocols
such as TCP or UDP, consists of two unidirectional streams of related data packets passing
between the systems, e.g., client to server; server to client. A single unidirectional stream of related
data packets is called a flow.
The Balancer’s main function utilizes a Top Layer technique known as flow mirroring. Flow Mirroring
directs all copied packets for a flow to a specified IDS for inspection. Being a stateful inspection
device, the Balancer ensures that copies of both flows of a session are sent or mirrored to the same
IDS to provide full context.
To achieve this, a Balancer connects to one or more network segments and mirrors traffic from
these segments to one or more IDSs. Multiple input ports, each connected at a different point on the
network, may be organized into input groups that direct specific sources of traffic to specific monitor
groups, that is, monitor ports organized into one or more groups. There are two types of input
groups:
• Port-based Input Groups: Aggregate traffic from multiple input ports. The Balancer mirrors
this traffic based on administrator-defined relationships and destinations.
• Address-based Input Groups: Aggregate traffic based on the source IP address of the traffic.
The Balancer identifies traffic by its source IP address and mirrors it to administrator-defined
destinations.
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The Balancer balances incoming network traffic loads among the monitor ports in a given monitor
group. This grouping feature allows the Balancer to separate network traffic for the delivery to
different kinds of security devices, for example, protocol analyzers or sniffers. Monitor groups also
allow for the inspection of network traffic from certain input ports, from specific IP address ranges, or
from a set of defined traffic types based on network protocol information: IP versus non-IP; TCP,
UDP, or other IP protocol; and TCP or UDP Port. Figure 2.1 depicts the Balancer with its input ports
organized into multiple input groups, mirroring network traffic to its monitor ports which are
organized into multiple monitor groups.
2.2 TSF Boundary and Scope of the Evaluation
The Balancer TOE consists of both a proprietary hardware platform and proprietary software.
The physical boundary of the Balancer is the hardware platform itself. The TOE includes the
network ports as well as the local console port that is used for system administration. Network ports
are either input, monitor or management ports. Input ports are connected to the network being
monitored. Monitor ports are connected to the IDSs. Network traffic is mirrored from input ports to
monitor ports. The management port is connected to a trusted management network which includes
a Network Time Protocol (NTP) server. A VT-100 terminal is connected to the local console port.
The VT-100 terminal is not part of the TOE.
Figure 2.1 –Balancer Model AS3532 in a Network – Sample Configuration
I D S S e n s o r s A r r a n g e d i n T w o M o n i t o r G r o u p s
Monitor Group A Monitor Group B
NTP
Server
Port 12 Management Port
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Monitor Ports:
Ports 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11
Input Group A Input Group B
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2.2.1 Hardware
Figure 2.2 – IDS Balancer depicts the three hardware models that were evaluated: The Balancer
3500-Series (AS3531, AS3532) and the 4500-Series (TL4508). A Balancer hardware platform
consists of the following components: multiple ASICs, memory, input, monitor, and management
network ports, a local console port, the SanDisk and the enclosure. All three hardware platforms run
the same software.
Figure 2.2 – IDS Balancer Models
The 3500-series has two models, the AS3531 and the AS3532. The AS3531 has 11 10/100 ports in
addition to the management port for a total of 12 network ports. The AS3532 has two Gigabit Ports
and 11 10/100 ports in addition to the management port for a total of 14 network ports. The TL4508
has eight Gigabit Ports and seven 10/100 Ports in addition to the management port for a total of 16
ports. This is shown in Table 2.1 (Models and Ports).
Table 2.1 – Models and Ports
Model Type of Port Number
of Ports
AS3531 10BASE – T / 100BASE – TX 12
AS3532 10BASE – T / 100BASE – TX 12
1000BASE – SX 2
TL4508 10BASE – T / 100BASE – TX 8
1000BASE – SX 4
1000BASE – LX or 1000BASE – TX 4
2.2.2 Software
The Balancer uses custom developed proprietary software that controls the entire system. The
software consists of the balancer-specific software preloaded on a Compact Flash™ Card (also
referred to as a SanDisk).
There is no general-purpose operating system, untrusted software, or programming capabilities on
the hardware platform. The command line interface is the only management interface included in
the evaluated configuration. Administrators access the command line interface via a VT-100
terminal attached to the serial console port.
The administrator can enable and disable access to the Balancer’s management services. The
configuration under evaluation only includes management of the Balancer using the serial console
port. The following services are disabled in the evaluated configuration and were disabled during
testing:
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• TopView: Web Management Interface used to configure and manage the Balancer.
• Telnet: Telnet access to the Balancer’s Command Line Interface.
• SNMP: Simple Network Management Protocol interface to the Balancer.
• TopFlow: SecureWatch collector’s ability to request traffic reports from the Balancer.
• TopViewSecure: Web Management Interface using Secure Socket Layer access (HTTPS).
• OpenSSH: A form of Secure Shell used for Telnet sessions.
The above services are disabled using the Command Line Interface.
2.3 TOE Functionality
The Balancer provides the following security functions:
• Information Flow Control
• Identification and Authentication
• Security Audit
• TOE Access
• Security Management
• Protection of TOE Security Functions
2.3.1 Information Flow Control
The Balancer monitors traffic flows from multiple network segments and distributes copies of these
flows across one or more groups of attached IDSs. The decision criteria for copying a specific flow
are configured by the administrator using the command line interface. All traffic from any specific
session is copied to the same output or monitor port to the downstream attached IDS. The Balancer
also provides the capability to forward TCP Reset packets received from a monitor port to the
associated input port.
2.3.2 Identification and Authentication
The Balancer authenticates administrators. Only local (not remote) identification and authentication
are included in the evaluated configuration, as administrators access the TOE through the Serial
Console Port and the Command Line Interface.
Passwords are used for administrator authentication. The password is any combination of
alphabetic and numeric characters that must meet a minimum length of eight characters. The
administrator is able to re-set the minimum password length to eight or more characters, but cannot
change it to seven or less characters.
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A management session is created when an administrator logs in by supplying a valid combination of
user name and password. If this information is correct, the administrator is successfully
authenticated, and may proceed to issue management commands to the Balancer. If the login
attempt is rejected, no management access is granted, and a management session is unable to be
established. When the authentication is successful, the management session ends when the
administrator logs off.
2.3.3 Security Audit
The Balancer generates event logs that are copied to the SanDisk located on the Balancer and can
be viewed by the administrator using the Command Line Interface in the evaluated configuration.
The Balancer records auditable events to the event log file to the Balancer’s SanDisk. This file is
persistent across management sessions unless the system administrator performs a clear-event-log
CLI command. This command removes the Balancer’s event log file. When the next event occurs,
a new event log file is created.
The Balancer audits the following auditable events:
• Start-up of the audit event.
• Port link state changes.
• Management session start up and completion.
• Configuration backup.
• System reboot notification.
The following security relevant information is included in the audit record: date, time, and type of
event.
2.3.4 TOE Access
The Balancer provides two features—Console Session Timeout and Banner—that serve to protect
against unauthorized access. The Balancer has the capability to terminate the console session after
an administrator-defined time period of inactivity. This timeout security function prevents
unauthorized access to the Balancer should the administrator move away from the Balancer without
logging off from an open management session. The Balancer also allows an administrator to create
a customizable banner that is capable of displaying an advisory warning about unauthorized use.
2.3.5 Security Management
There are two trusted user roles: administrator and monitor. Trusted users with the administrator
role can set configuration and management options, whereas those with the monitor role can only
view them. There are no untrusted Balancer users. The TOE is managed through the Command
Line Interface, which provides the necessary functionality to configure and manage the TOE.
2.3.6 Protection of TOE Security Functions
The software and hardware subsystems work together to implement the following security
functionality related to Protection of the TSF:
• Non-Bypassability
• Domain separation
• Reliable time stamps
The Balancer ensures that security protection enforcement functions are invoked and succeed
before each function within the Balancer’s scope of control is allowed to proceed. All management
operations are conducted in the context of an associated management session. This management
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session is allocated only after successful authentication. Management operations are checked for
conformance to the granted level of access and rejected if not conformant. The management
session is destroyed when the corresponding administrator logs out of that session.
The Balancer maintains a security domain to track network traffic flow to determine on which input
port traffic arrives and to which monitor port traffic is copied. Traffic flow is based on the information
flow policy. Separation is maintained between data from different input ports.
The Balancer also maintains a security domain for its own execution that protects it from
interference and tampering by untrusted subjects.
The Balancer’s protected domain includes the preloaded software residing on the Balancer’s
SanDisk that is provided to the customer. The Balancer’s software is compiled and built as a single,
monolithic entity and is then loaded onto the Balancer’s SanDisk. The Balancer has no means for
installing, uninstalling, or activating additional applications or components such as libraries or single
files below the level of decomposition of this single monolithic entity. The software can only be
modified by physically removing the SanDisk, overwriting the appropriate executable file, and
replacing the SanDisk and rebooting.
In addition to the Balancer-specific software, other software files that are also stored and
dynamically accessed on the SanDisk include the configuration files and log file. These files can
only be modified by either violating the physical security of the Balancer and pulling out the SanDisk
memory card and accessing those files, or using the appropriate Administrator-level CLI commands
to modify the Balancer configuration, save the current Balancer configuration into the configuration
file, or clear the event log file.
Either one of these file modification methods requires physical access to the Balancer itself. The
underlying assumption regarding the operation of the Balancer is that it is maintained in a physically
secure environment. Should a breach in physical security occur, the Balancer is also protected by a
tamper-proof seal that makes any physical tampering of the unit evident to the administrator.
The Balancer maintains reliable time stamps for its own use. It is a Network Time Protocol (NTP)
client. The NTP client accesses an NTP Server in the IT environment to obtain the time. The
Balancer maintains a real-time clock in its hardware, which is equipped with a battery backup power
source. The Balancer uses Network Time Protocol (NTP as documented in RFC 1305) to configure
its time settings. Synchronization with the NTP server enables time-specific events, such as system
logs, to be correlated. The NTP server uses Coordinated Universal Time (UTC), also known as
Greenwich Mean Time (GMT).
When the Balancer receives NTP broadcasts, it determines the system time by querying an NTP
server at the administrator-defined query interval. The Balancer then updates the system clock.
2.4 IT Environment
The IT environment includes a trusted management network, a VT100 terminal, and an NTP Server.
The Balancer relies upon an NTP Server in the IT environment to provide reliable time. The NTP
Client and NTP Server communicate using the Network Time Protocol as documented in RFC 1305.
The NTP Server is the only platform and service on the trusted management network in the
evaluated configuration.
2.5 Operational Environment
The TOE is intended to be used in cases where there is a low level of risk, such as processing
unclassified and classified data in a non-hostile environment. Furthermore, the nature of the TOE is
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to function as a pass-through device within a highly protected physical environment. Packets are
not changed as they pass through the Balancer. The TOE is intended to protect itself against
attackers with an attack potential of low and the EAL2 Assurance Requirements are consistent with
such an environment.
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3 TOE Security Environment
This section identifies secure usage assumptions and threats to security.
3.1 Assumptions
This section contains assumptions regarding the security environment and the intended usage of the
TOE.
A.CONNECT The following TOE connectivity requirements are satisfied. The
Management Port of the TOE is connected to the Trusted Management
Network. The only system on the Trusted Management Network is the
Network Time Protocol (NTP) Server. Those responsible for the TOE
ensure that the NTP Server is properly configured and adequately
protected, for example by a firewall, if it obtains the time from a reliable
source over the internet. A VT100 terminal is connected to the local
console port for system administration.
A.NO_EVIL Administrators are non-hostile, appropriately trained and follow all
administrative guidance.
A.PHYSICAL The IT environment provides the TOE with appropriate physical security,
commensurate with the value of the IT assets protected by the TOE.
A.TIME The IT environment provides a Network Time Protocol (NTP) Server.
A.TRUSTED_USERS The only users of the TOE are trusted administrators.
3.2 Threats
This Security Target requires that the TOE protect against attackers with an attack potential of low.
Attackers are assumed to have a low level of expertise, resources, and motivation.
T.EXAUTH Administrators may be granted more authority than they need to perform
their jobs due to the TOE implementing only one trusted role. This
increases the risk that they will make security relevant errors in the
configuration of the TOE.
T.GUESS An attacker may try to guess administrator authentication data in order
to use this information to launch attacks on the TOE.
T.NOAUTH An attacker may attempt to bypass the security of the TOE so as to
access and use security functions and/or non-security functions
provided by the TOE.
T.NOBANNER Necessary information about acceptable usage and warnings may not
be communicated to the administrator at login increasing the risk of the
administrator selecting insecure configuration options.
T.SELPRO An unauthorized person may read, modify, or destroy security critical
TOE configuration data resulting in an insecure configuration of the
TOE.
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T.UNATTENDED An administrator may leave the console unattended resulting in an
unauthorized user gaining access to the TOE and making insecure
changes to the configuration.
T.UNBALANCE Too much network traffic may be directed to a single IDS so that it is
unable to detect the intrusions that it was designed to detect.
T.UNDETECT Security relevant events may go undetected and uncorrected due to
their not being recorded, stored, or viewed.
T.USAGE The TOE may be inadvertently configured, used, or administered in an
insecure manner by either authorized or unauthorized persons.
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4 Security Objectives
This section contains the following:
• Security Objectives for the TOE,
• Security Objectives for the IT Environment, and
• Security Objectives for the Non-IT Environment.
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
The security objectives for the TOE are as follows:
O.AUDREC The TOE must provide a means to record, store, and view a readable
audit trail of the specified events relating to security management with
accurate dates and times.
O.BALANCE The TOE must provide a means of controlling the flow of network traffic
from the network being monitored to a specific IDS or groups of IDSs.
O.BANNER The TOE must provide the capability of displaying an advisory warning
about unauthorized use of the TOE at login.
O.IDAUTH The TOE must uniquely identify and authenticate all trusted users, before
granting such users access to TOE functions.
O.NONBYPASS The TOE must ensure that the security functions of the TOE cannot be
bypassed.
O.PWDLEN The TOE must enforce a minimum password length.
O.ROLES The TOE must support two administrative roles, only one of which is
granted read access.
O.SECFUN The TOE must provide functionality that enables an authorized
administrator to use the TOE security functions, and must ensure that
only authorized administrators are able to access such functionality.
O.SECSTA The TOE must provide default values for security attributes, so that the
TOE does not compromise its resources upon initial startup.
O.SELPRO The TOE must protect itself against attempts by unauthorized users to
bypass, deactivate, or tamper with TOE security functions.
O.TIMEOUT The TOE must provide the capability for the administrator to set a time
limit on console inactivity before the console session times out.
4.2 Security Objectives for the IT Environment
There is one security objective for the IT environment:
OE.TIME The IT environment must provide an RFC-1305-compliant Network Time
Protocol (NTP) Server.
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4.3 Security Objectives for the Non-IT Environment
These objectives do not levy any IT requirements, but are satisfied by procedural or administrative
measures. The Non-IT security objectives are as follows:
ON.ADMTRA Authorized administrators must be trained in the establishment and
maintenance of security policies and practices.
ON.CONNECT The following TOE connectivity requirements are satisfied. The
Management Port of the TOE must be connected to the Trusted
Management Network. The only system on the Trusted Management
Network must be the Network Time Protocol (NTP) Server. Those
responsible for the TOE must ensure that the NTP Server is properly
configured and adequately protected, for example by a firewall, if it obtains
the time from a reliable source over the internet. A VT100 terminal must
be connected to the local console port for system administration.
ON.GUIDANCE The TOE must be delivered, installed, administered, and operated in a
manner that maintains security.
ON.PHYSICAL Sufficient physical security must be provided for the TOE platform.
ON.TRUSTED_USERS The administrator must ensure that no untrusted users are granted access
to the TOE.
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5 IT Security Requirements
The conventions for indicating the completions of the operations in the security functional
requirements in Sections 5.1 and 5.3 are as follows:
• Selection: Text is bold and enclosed in brackets. An example is “FMT_MOF.1.1 The
TSF shall restrict the ability to [determine the behaviour of] the functions …”
• Assignment: Text is bolded italics and enclosed in brackets. An example is
“FDP_IFC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP] on …”
• Refinements: Text is italicized and underlined. An example is FPT_STM.1;2 where
“The TSF shall” is replaced by “The IT environment shall” in Section 5.3
• Iterations: The component ID is followed by a semicolon followed by an iteration number.
An identifying phrase follows the component title in brackets. An example is
“FPT_STM.1;2 Reliable Time Stamps [IT Environment]”
• Application notes – Introduced by “Application Note:”
5.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements
The TOE security functional requirements are listed in Table 5.1. They are all taken from Part 2 of
the Common Criteria, except for FAU_GEN_LOG.1, which is explicitly stated.
Table 5.1 – Functional Components
No. Component Component Name
1 FAU_GEN_LOG.1 Audit log generation
2 FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
3 FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
4 FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
5 FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
6 FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
7 FIA_SOS.1 Verification of Secrets
8 FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action
9 FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action
10 FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour
11 FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
12 FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
13 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
14 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
15 FPT_RVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP
16 FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation
17 FPT_STM.1;1 Reliable time stamps [TOE]
18 FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination
19 FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE access banners
5.1.1 Class FAU: Security Audit
5.1.1.1 FAU_GEN_LOG.1 Audit log generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
14
FAU_GEN_LOG.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable
events:
• Start up of audit
• Port link state change
• Management session startup and completion
• Configuration backup
• System reboot notification
FAU_GEN_LOG.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
date, time, and type of event,
Dependencies: FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
Application Note: A port link state change occurs when a port link changes state from valid to down
or from down to valid.
5.1.1.2 FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FAU_SAR.1.1 The TSF shall provide [administrator and monitor] with the capability to read [date,
time, and type of event] from the audit records.
FAU_SAR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret
the information.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
5.1.1.3 FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FAU_STG.1.1 The TSF shall protect the stored audit records from unauthorised deletion.
FAU_STG.1.2 The TSF shall be able to [prevent] unauthorised modifications to the audit records in
the audit trail.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
5.1.2 Class FDP: User Data Protection
5.1.2.1 FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_IFC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP] on: [
Subjects: External IT Entities
Information: Packet;
Operations:
• Copy packet to monitor port
• Drop the packet,
• Forward TCP reset packets]
15
Dependencies: FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
5.1.2.2 FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_IFF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP] based on the following
types of subject and information security attributes: [
Packet Attributes
• Input Port: port on which the Balancer receives the packet
• Source IP address: Source IP address in packet,
• Destination IP address: Destination IP address in packet, ,
• Multicast or Unicast: Attribute of packet.
• Application: Determined by network protocol information associated with the network
packet: IP versus non-IP; TCP, UDP or other IP protocol, and TCP or UDP Port.
• Network Session: Balancer handles complete flow of traffic for both the forward flow
from source to destination and reverse flow from destination to source.
• MAC address: MAC address of devices connected to the Balancer’s input ports.
Input Port Characteristics
• Input group membership
• Input group type (port-based or address-based)
• Source IP address range
• MAC address:
Monitor Port Characteristics
• Monitor group membership
• Destination IP address range
• Application. Determined by network protocol information: IP versus non-IP; TCP, UDP
or other IP protocol, and TCP or UDP Port.
• Application Flow Timeout:. Time after which information about a flow may not be
retained in the flow table when traffic is heavy
• Application priority: Determines which traffic is forwarded during heavy traffic
conditions
• Load balancing algorithm (either round robin or weighted round robin)
• Load balancing weight (used in weighted round robin algorithm)]
Input and Monitor Port Characteristics
• Input or monitor Port
• Input port group / monitor port group associations
• Flooding controls matrix; Specifies whether or not multicast traffic is allowed between
a specific Input port and a specific Monitor port]
16
FDP_IFF.1.2 The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled
information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: [
1. Input Port to Monitor Port
The TSF shall either copy a packet to a monitor port or drop a packet based on:
• Packet attributes,
• Input port characteristics,
• Monitor port characteristics
• Information flow control algorithm.
Note: The Balancer is a passive device on the network that it is monitoring. Packets are
copied from the input port into the Balancer for analysis and processing. When processing
is completed, the packet may be copied to one or more monitor ports or dropped. At
intermediate steps during the processing of a packet, the packet can be tentatively assigned
to a monitor group, but it will not actually be copied to a monitor port at this time.
The TSF shall copy a packet to a monitor port or drop a packet based on the following
information flow control algorithm.
Step 1:
If the packet is a multicast packet and the Flooding Controls Matrix specifies a monitor
port for the input port, then copy the packet to the specified monitor port and stop, else
drop the packet and stop.
Note: the Flooding Controls Matrix specifies whether multicast/broadcast packet arriving
at a given Input Port is allowed to be copied to a given Monitor Port. The Flooding
Controls Matrix controls flooding of broadcast/multicast traffic on a port-to-port level of
granularity.
Note: No other processing is performed on a multicast packet.
Step 2:
If the input port is a member of a port-based input group, then assign the packet to the
port-based input group and go to Step 3, else assign the packet to an address-based
input group based on source IP address range and go to Step 4 below.
Step 3:
Assign packet to the monitor group(s) associated with the input group and go to Step 5.
Note: Traffic can be assigned to up to four different monitor groups. Steps 5-8 are
repeated for each monitor group to which the network traffic is assigned. The packet may
be dropped for some monitor groups and copied to a monitor port for others.
Step 4:
If the source IP address falls into an IP address range, then assign the traffic to that IP
address range's Address-Based Input Group, else if the source IP address doesn't fall in
ANY of the IP address Ranges associated with ANY of the Address-Based Input Groups,
the traffic is assigned to the All Hosts Input Group. Then assign the traffic to the monitor
group(s) associated with the previously assigned input group and go to Step 5.
17
Note: Traffic can be assigned to up to four different monitor groups. Steps 5-8 are
repeated for each monitor group to which the network traffic is assigned. The packet may
be dropped for some monitor groups and copied to a monitor port for others.
Step 5:
If the protocol(s) of the network traffic match an application associated with the input
group/monitor group pair(s), then go to Step 6, Else drop traffic and stop.
Step 6:
If the destination address of the network traffic is within the specified destination address
range for the application, then go to step 7, else drop the traffic and stop
Step 7:
If traffic conditions allow and the application priority is high enough, then go to step 8 to
continue processing, else drop the traffic and stop.
Step 8:
If the packet is the first packet of a session, Then use the Load Balancing algorithm
associated with the Monitor Group to copy the first packet of each session to a specific
Monitor Port and stop; else copy the packet to the same monitor port as the first packet
was copied to and stop
The exception to the rule in Step 8 is occurs if the time limit for application flow timeout is
reached before another packet is received for the session. The packet may be handled as
the first packet of a new session. In other words, if the time limit for application flow
timeout is reached, later packets in a session may not be sent to the same Monitor Port as
the first packet.
Note: A session can consist of a flow pair, or the two halves of a bidirectional
exchange/conversation. Both halves of the connection are correlated, so that they are
assigned by the Load Balancing algorithm to the same Monitor Port (so an IDS won't see
just one half of the connection's traffic).
2. Monitor Port to Input Port
If an Input Port is set for the MAC address in the packet, the TSF shall forward TCP reset
packets received from a Monitor Port to an Input Port.]
FDP_IFF.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the [no information flow control SFP rules].
FDP_IFF.1.4 The TSF shall provide the following [No additional capabilities]
FDP_IFF.1.5 The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on the following rules: [no
additional rules].
FDP_IFF.1.6 The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules: [None]
Dependencies:
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
18
5.1.3 Class FIA: Identification and Authentication
5.1.3.1 FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_ATD.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to individual
users: [
• User Name
• User Role
• Password].
5.1.3.2 FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_SOS.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets meet [minimum password
length set by the administrator].
Dependencies: No dependencies
Application Note: The administrator guidance directs the administrator to set a minimum password
length of eight characters.
5.1.3.3 FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action
Hierarchical to: FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UAU.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any
other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
5.1.3.4 FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action
Hierarchical to: FIA_UID.1
FIA_UID.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to identify itself before allowing any other TSF-
mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Dependencies: No dependencies
5.1.4 Class FMT: Security Management
5.1.4.1 FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [determine the behaviour of] the functions
[listed in Table 5.2] to [the authorised roles identified in Table 5.2].
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Table 5.2 – Management of TSF Data
Security Function Operation Authorized
Role
Notes
Audit Clear audit log Administrator
19
Audit Show audit log Administrator,
Monitor
Identification and
Authentication
Set minimum password
length
Administrator
Identification and
Authentication
Show minimum password
length
Administrator,
Monitor
Identification and
Authentication
Set password Administrator
Identification and
Authentication
Show user Administrator or
Monitor
Identification and
Authentication
Set user name Administrator
Identification and
Authentication
Delete user Administrator
Identification and
Authentication
Connect Administrator,
Monitor
Starts management
session
Security Management Show session Administrator,
Monitor
Shows open
management session.
There will be only one
in the evaluated
configuration.
Security Management Quit Administrator,
Monitor
Ends management
session. Unsaved
configuration changes
are lost.
Security Management Set user role Administrator
Security Management Reset Administrator Equivalent to turning
balancer off and on.
Unsaved configuration
changes are lost.
Security Management Reset to Factory Administrator Resets configuration
options to defaults
except for IP address,
subnet mask, default
route, date, and time.
Security Management Save configuration Administrator Saves configuration
changes in file on
SanDisk.
Security Management Set management access Administrator Used to put the
Balancer in the
evaluated configuration
by denying access to
all management
interfaces except the
CLI interface.
Security Management Show management access Administrator,
Monitor
Can be used to check
with management
interfaces are enabled
to verify that the
Balancer is in the
evaluated
configuration.
Security Management Set device name, IP
address, and default route
Administrator
20
Security Management Show device name, IP
address, default route
Administrator,
Monitor
Security Management Shutdown Administrator Ends management
session and shuts
down Balancer.
Time Set IP address of NTP
Server
Administrator
Time Set NTP client query interval Administrator
Time Show NTP Administrator,
Monitor
TOE Access Set banner Administrator
TOE Access Set session timeout value Administrator
TOE Access, Show session timeout value Administrator,
Monitor
5.1.4.2 FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP] to restrict the ability to
[Perform operations as specified in Table 5.3 on] the security attributes [security attributes as
specified in Table 5.3] to [the authorized identified roles as specified in Table 5.3].
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Table 5.3 – Management of Security Attributes
21
Attribute(s) Operation Authorized
Role
Application,
Destination IP
address
Create application and associate application with
destination IP address
Administrator
Application Delete application Administrator
Application Show application Administrator or
Monitor
Application Flow
Timeout
Associate application with an Application Flow Timeout
value
Administrator
Application Priority Set application priority Administrator
Application Priority Show application priority Administrator or
Monitor
Application,
Input Group,
Monitor Group
Associate application/input group with monitor group Administrator
Application,
Input Group,
Monitor Group
Remove association between application/input group and
monitor group
Administrator
Flooding Controls Set flooding controls Administrator
Flooding Controls Show flooding controls Administrator or
Monitor
Input Group Type Create input group and specify to be address-based or
port-based
Administrator
Input Group Delete input group Administrator
Input Group Show input group Administrator or
Monitor
Input Group
Membership
Assign port to port-based input group Administrator
Monitor Group,
Load Balancing
Algorithm
Set load balancing algorithm for monitor group Administrator
Monitor Group,
Load Balancing
Algorithm
Show monitor group and load balancing algorithm for
monitor group
Administrator or
Monitor
Monitor Port,
Load Balancing
Weight
Set load balancing weight for port Administrator
Port,
Load Balancing
Weight
Show load balancing weight for port Administrator or
Monitor
Monitor Group Delete Monitor Group Administrator
Port Monitor Group
Membership
Assign port to monitor group Administrator
Port Role Set port to be input port or monitor port Administrator
Port Role Show port group Administrator or
Monitor
Source IP address
range
Set source IP address range for address-based input
group
Administrator
Source IP address
range
Delete source IP range for address-based input group Administrator
Source IP address
Range
Show source IP address range Administrator or
Monitor
MAC address Set MAC address for input port Administrator
TCP Reset Packet
Forwarding
Delete MAC address for input port Administrator
TCP Reset Packet
Forwarding
Show MAC address Administrator or
Monitor
5.1.4.3 FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MSA.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP] to provide [as specified
in Tables 5.4 and 5.5] default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow the [No one] to specify alternative initial values to override the
default values when an object or information is created.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Table 5.4 – Default Port Roles
Model Port Role Default Ports
22
TL4508 Input Port 1, 2, 9
TL4508 Monitor Port 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
Assigned to default
monitor group
TL4508 Management Port 16
TL4508 Monitor Port if in use;
None otherwise.
3, 4, 5, 6
AS3531 and
AS3532
Input Port 1
AS3531 and
AS3532
Monitor Port 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11
Assigned to default
monitor group
AS3531 and
AS3532
Management Port 12
AS3532 only Monitor Port if in use;
None otherwise
13, 14
Table 5.5 – Default Values of Security Attributes
Attribute Default Values
Input Group All Hosts
Monitor Group Default, TopFlow
Port Based or Address Based Address Based
Source Address Range 0.0.0.0 to 255.255.255.255
Input Group/Monitor Group
Association
All Hosts to Default
Applications As defined in application library
Application Destination Address 0.0.0.0 to 255.255.255.255
Application Priority Medium
Load Balancing Algorithm Round Robin
Load Balancing Weight 1
Flooding Configuration Matrix Enabled for flooding from all input ports to
all monitor ports.
TCP Reset Forwarding
Configuration Matrix
Disabled. No MAC addresses set for input
ports.
User Roles A users role is set to either administrator
or monitor at the time that the user is
created.
User Password toplayer (case sensitive)
5.1.4.4 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security management functions
[as specified in Tables 5.2 and 5.3]
Dependencies: No Dependencies
5.1.4.5 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Hierarchical to: No other components.
23
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles [
• Administrator, and
• Monitor]
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
5.1.5 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF
5.1.5.1 FPT_RVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_RVM.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that TSP enforcement functions are invoked and succeed
before each function within the TSC is allowed to proceed.
Dependencies: No dependencies
5.1.5.2 FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_SEP.1.1 The TSF shall maintain a security domain for its own execution that protects it from
interference and tampering by untrusted subjects.
FPT_SEP.1.2 The TSF shall enforce separation between the security domains of subjects in the
TSC.
Dependencies: No dependencies
5.1.5.3 FPT_STM.1;1 Reliable time stamps [TOE]
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_STM.1.1 The TSF shall be able to implement an NTP client based on RFC 1305 and provide
reliable time stamps for its own use based on the time received from the NTP server.
Dependencies: No dependencies
5.1.6 Class FTA: TOE Access
5.1.6.1 FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FTA_SSL.3.1 The TSF shall terminate an interactive session after [the time interval of user
inactivity specified by the administrator].
Dependencies: No dependencies
5.1.6.2 FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE access banners
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FTA_TAB.1.1 Before establishing a user session, the TSF shall display an advisory warning
message regarding unauthorised use of the TOE.
Dependencies: No dependencies
24
5.2 Security Requirements for the IT Environment
There is only one security requirement for the IT environment. The TOE is a Network Time Protocol
(NTP) client that accesses an NTP server in the IT environment to obtain the time.
5.2.1.1 FPT_STM.1;2 Reliable time stamps [IT Environment]
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_STM.1.1 The IT Environment shall be able to provide reliable time stamps for the NTP client of
the TOE in accordance with RFC 1305.
Dependencies: No dependencies
5.3 TOE Security Assurance Requirements
The Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE are the assurance components of Evaluation
Assurance Level 2 (EAL2) taken from Part 3 of the Common Criteria. None of the assurance
components is refined. The assurance components are listed in Table 5.6.
Table 5.6 - EAL2 Assurance Components
Component Component Title
ACM_CAP.2 Configuration items
ADO_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ADO_IGS.1 Installation, generation, and start-up procedures
ADV_FSP.1 Informal functional specification
ADV_HLD.1 Descriptive high-level design
ADV_RCR.1 Informal correspondence demonstration
AGD_ADM.1 Administrator guidance
AGD_USR.1 User guidance
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
AVA_SOF.1 Strength of TOE security function evaluation
AVA_VLA.1 Developer vulnerability analysis
5.4 Strength of Function
The minimum strength of function claim for the TOE security functional requirements is SOF-basic.
The SOF claim applies to the FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action and the FIA_SOS.1
Verification of secrets security functional requirements.
25
6 TOE Summary Specification
6.1 IT Security Functions
6.1.1 IFF-1 Information Flow Control
Subjects, Information, and Operations
The information flow control policy is based on the following subjects, information, and operations:
• Subjects: External IT Entities
• Information: Packet;
• Operations:
• Copy packet to monitor port
• Drop packet
• Forward TCP reset packet
Input Port to Monitor Port
The rules to determine whether to copy a packet to a monitor port or to drop the packet are based
on packet attributes, input port characteristics, and monitor port characteristics.
The packet attributes and port characteristics are as specified in Section 5.1.2.2 FDP_IFF.1 Simple
security attributes under FDP_IFF.1.1.
The information flow control algorithm is specified in Section 5.1.2.2 FDP_IFF.1 Simple security
attributes under FDP_IFF.1.2.
More detail about the impact of the application flow timeout attribute is provided here. The
application flow timeout value is a feature for tuning the Balancer for a specific network so it does
not run out of flows as fast as it would if this feature were not provided. The feature's intent is to
speed up the harvesting of entries in the flow table so that the flow table doesn't fill up with flows that
are expired. The feature does not result in the Balancer dropping traffic; it will continue to mirror
traffic as a new flow. If a flow expires, the number of used entries in the flow table will be reduced
by one, and when traffic starts again for the flow, a new entry will be created and the number of used
flow entries will increase by one. Externally, the second half of the flow may or may not be mirrored
to the same mirror group, depending on the results of following the information flow control
algorithm. This feature increases the Balancer’s ability to continue functioning during many well-
known denial-of-service attacks.
Monitor Port to Input Port
The only information flow from the monitor port to an input port is TCP reset packet forwarding.
26
The Balancer can forward TCP reset packets received from a Monitor Port to an Input Port if the
destination MAC address in the TCP reset packet matches the Static MAC address entry set for an
Input Port. This is how the Balancer recognizes which Input Port(s) from which to forward a TCP
reset packet. The same static MAC address can be configured to more than one Input Port. The
result in this case is that the Balancer makes copies of the TCP reset packet and forwards the
copies from all of these Input Ports.
6.1.2 Identification and Authentication
6.1.2.1 IA-1 User Identification
The TSF identifies users with the administrator or monitor role before they are able to access the
TOE. Such users are identified by their user name.
6.1.2.2 IA-2 User Authentication
The TOE provides a password mechanism to authenticate administrators and monitors before they
are able to access the TOE. If such a user enters an incorrect password, that user cannot log in and
cannot issue commands. The SOF claim for this function is SOF-Basic.
6.1.2.3 IA-3 User Attributes
The TSF maintains the following attributes for the two administrator roles that it supports:
• User Name,
• User Role, and
• User Password.
6.1.2.4 IA-4 Minimum Password Length
The TSF is able to enforce a minimum password length of eight characters. The minimum password
length can be set by the administrator.
6.1.3 Audit
6.1.3.1 AU-1 Event Log
The TSF is able to record auditable events in the event log. The event log is stored on the SanDisk
on the Balancer. There is no interface to modify individual audit records. In addition, it is assumed
that the TOE – and, therefore, the SanDisk on it -- is physically protected.
The Balancer records auditable events in the event.log file to the Balancer’s SanDisk. This file is
persistent across management sessions unless the administrator performs a “clear-event-log” CLI
command. This command removes the Balancer’s event log file until the next event occurs at which
point a new event log file is created.
6.1.3.2 AU-2 Auditable Events
The TSF is able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
• Start up of audit
• Port link state change (i.e., a change of state from “valid” to “down” or vice versa)
• Management session startup and completion
• Configuration backup
• System reboot notification
6.1.3.3 AU-3 Audit Information
The TSF records within each audit record at least the following information:
• Date
• Time
27
• Type of event
6.1.3.4 AU-4 Audit Review
The TSF provides the ability for both the administrator and monitor to view the audit records through
the Command Line Interface.
6.1.4 Security Management
6.1.4.1 SM-1 Roles
The TOE maintains two trusted roles:
• Administrator
• Monitor
6.1.4.2 SM-2 Management of security attributes
The administrator can create, modify, and delete the security attributes as specified in Table 5.3 in
Section 5.1.
6.1.4.3 SM-3 View Security Attributes
Both the monitor and the administrator can view the security attributes listed in Table 5.3 except for
the user password, which neither role can see.
6.1.4.4 SM-4 Default Port Roles
Each model of the Balancer has a varying number of network interfaces (see Table 2.1 in Section
2.2.1). These interfaces come with certain default port roles (i.e., input, monitor) that cannot be
changed.. The management port cannot be changed. The default port roles for each model are
specified in Table 5.4.
6.1.4.5 SM-5 Default Values of Security Attributes
The Balancer comes to the consumer with a number of security attributes enabled or disabled.
These are specified in Table 5.5 No one is authorized to change the security attributes.
6.1.4.6 SM-6 Management of Security Functions
The Administrator role can set configuration options to manage the following security functions:
identification and authentication, audit, security management, time, and TOE access.
In contrast, the Monitor user role can only view TSF data, which consists of configuration files, event
logs, and system specific information.
Security functions and the authorized roles required to execute them are listed in Table 5.2 in
Section 5.1.
6.1.5 TSF Self-Protection
6.1.5.1 FPT-1 Non-Bypassability
The TSF ensures that TOE security functions are non-bypassable. The Balancer ensures that
security protection enforcement functions are invoked and succeed before each function within the
Balancer’s scope of control is allowed to proceed. All management operations are conducted in the
context of an associated management session. This management session is allocated only after
successful authentication. Management operations are checked for conformance to the granted
level of access and rejected if not conformant. The management session is destroyed when the
28
corresponding administrator role logs out of that session. Administrators and monitors can only view
the audit log(s), security attributes, and TSF data through a special administrative interface, and only
after successfully identifying and authenticating themselves.
The Balancer maintains a security domain to track network traffic flow to determine on which input
port traffic arrives and to which monitor port traffic is copied. Traffic flow is based on the information
flow policy. Separation is maintained between data from different input ports.
The Balancer has no IP address so protocols that require an IP address cannot be used to bypass
the security functions. Network packets cannot bypass the balancer. All network packets go
through the balancer for examination. Packets are not changed as they pass through the Balancer.
6.1.5.2 FPT-2 Domain separation
The TSF maintains a security domain for its own execution that protects it from interference and
tampering by untrusted subjects. The Balancer appliance is a passive device in that it connects to
networks via other devices, e.g. LAN switches, mirror ports or via network taps. As such it is not
directly part of the network segments it is mirroring from. Also, there is no visible IP address for the
device hence it appears transparent to other network nodes and users. Since the Balancer has no
IP address, it cannot be subjected to any attacks from the network that require the target to have an
IP address. If a malicious user on the network being monitored initiates a network attack, the
Balancer simply passes the mirrored packets through transparently to the attached IDS.
The Balancer’s protected domain includes the preloaded software residing on the Balancer’s
SanDisk. The Balancer’s software is compiled and built as a single, monolithic entity and is then
loaded onto the Balancer’s SanDisk. The Balancer has no means for installing, uninstalling, or
activating additional applications, or components such as libraries or single files below the level of
decomposition of this single monolithic entity. The software can only be modified by physically
removing the SanDisk, overwriting the appropriate executable file, and replacing the SanDisk and
rebooting.
The TSF enforces separation between the security domains of subjects in the TSC. The Balancer
keeps track of the input port on which network traffic arrives and mirrors it to the correct monitor
port(s) based on the information flow policy. Separation is maintained between data from different
input ports.
The SanDisk is separate from Balancer memory components and is used for non-volatile storage of
the Balancer programs, audit log files, and configuration options.
In addition to the Balancer-specific software, other software files that are also stored and
dynamically accessed on the SanDisk include the configuration files and log file. These files can
only be modified by either violating the physical security of the Balancer and pulling out the SanDisk
memory card and accessing those files, or using the appropriate Administrator-level CLI commands
to modify the Balancer configuration, save the current Balancer configuration into the configuration
file, or clear the event log.
Either one of these file modification methods requires physical access to the Balancer itself. The
underlying assumption regarding the operation of the Balancer is that it is maintained in a physically
secure environment. Should a breach in physical security occur, the Balancer is also protected by a
tamper-proof seal that makes any physical tampering of the unit evident to the trusted user.
29
6.1.5.3 FPT-3 Reliable time stamps
The TOE retrieves and maintains reliable time stamps for its own use. The TOE is a Network Time
Protocol (NTP) client. The NTP client accesses an NTP Server in the IT environment to obtain the
time.
The trusted management network includes a computer system that serves as a dedicated Network
Time Protocol (NTP) server. The Balancer uses Network Time Protocol (NTP as documented in
RFC 1305) to configure its time settings. Synchronization with the NTP server enables time-specific
events, such as system logs, to be correlated. The NTP server uses Coordinated Universal Time
(UTC), also known as Greenwich Mean Time (GMT). When the Balancer receives NTP broadcasts,
it determines the system time by querying an NTP server at the administrator-defined query interval.
The Balancer then updates the system clock.
The Balancer maintains a “virtual software time”, also known as UTC time, as part of its functionality.
When the Balancer acts as an NTP client receiving packets, the Balancer takes the time from the
packet and compares that value with the UTC time. The UTC time is slowly adjusted to synch up
with the time server. (Slowly adjusting the time avoids discontinuities in the timestamps.)
The Balancer uses the UTC time for the following purposes:
• Determining whether an “application flow timeout” condition has been reached (FDP_IFF.1)
• Determining whether the time interval of administrator inactivity has been reached
(FTA.SSL.3)
• Stamping the date and time of event log records (FAU_GEN_LOG.1).
The Balancer converts the UTC time value to the local time value for time stamps. When the
Balancer is initially set up, the administrator is asked to select the local time zone.
6.1.6 TOE Access
The Balancer provides two features—Console Session Timeout and Banner—that serve to protect
against unauthorized access. These features are described below.
6.1.6.1 FTA-1 Timeout
The Balancer provides the capability to terminate the console session after an administrator-defined
time period of inactivity. This timeout security function prevents unauthorized access to the Balancer
should the administrator move away from the Balancer without logging off from an open
management session. Only the administrator role administrator is able to perform this function.
A timer within the Balancer is started once a CLI management session begins. With each character
of a CLI command entered during that session, the timer is reset. The Balancer continually checks
against that timer with the console session timeout value set by the set security CLI command.
When the set value is exceeded, the management session ends.
6.1.6.2 FTA-2 Banners
The Balancer allows an administrator to create a customizable banner that is capable of displaying
an advisory warning about unauthorized use. The CLI offers an option in its Set Security CLI
command to suppress display of the login banner or to set a custom banner (of up to 80 characters).
30
6.2 Assurance Measures
Table 6.1 identifies the assurance measures provided by the developer to satisfy the EAL2
assurance requirements.
Table 6.1 – Assurance Measures
Component Title Assurance Measure
ACM_CAP.2 Configuration Items
and how they are
uniquely identified
IDSB V2.2 Configuration Management Item List and Policies
Version 1.4 DOC-00020
Evidence that CM
system is being used
Top Layer Networks, Inc. Operations and Delivery
Procedures Guide Version 1.2, DOC-00022
IDSB V2.2 Configuration Management Item List and Policies
Version 1.4 DOC-00020
ADO_DEL.1 Delivery procedures Top Layer Networks, Inc. Operations and Delivery
Procedures Guide Version 1.2, DOC-00022
ADO_IGS.1 Installation,
generation, and start-
up procedures
IDSB V2.2 Configuration and Management User Guide
#990007203
TLN IDS Balancer™ Version 2.2 Command Line Interface
(CLI) User Guide with Supplemental Guidance for Common
Criteria V1.3 #990-0190-00
Top Layer 3500-Series Hardware Installation #990-0141-03
3500
Top Layer 4500-Series Hardware Installation #990-0142-04-
4500
IDSB V2.2 Configuration Worksheets Version 6.0
IDSB V2.2 Release Notes #990-0171
ADV_FSP.1 Informal functional
specification
IDSB V2.2 Product Development Specification Document
Version 1.9 DOC-00013
ADV_HLD.1 Descriptive high-level
design
IDSB V2.2 Product Development Specification Document
Version 1.9 DOC-00013
ADV_RCR.1 Informal
correspondence
demonstration
IDSB V2.2 Representation Correspondence Version 1.6,
DOC-00014
AGD_ADM.1 Administrator
guidance
IDSB V2.2 Configuration and Management User Guide
#990007203
TLN IDS Balancer™ Version 2.2 Command Line Interface
(CLI) User Guide with Supplemental Guidance for Common
Criteria V1.3 #990-0190-00
Top Layer 3500-Series Hardware Installation #990-0141-03
3500
Top Layer 4500-Series Hardware Installation #990-0142-04-
4500
IDSB V2.2 Configuration Worksheets Version 6.0
IDSB V2.2 Release Notes #990-0171
AGD_USR.1 User guidance Not applicable
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage ATE_Master List Version 1.1, PLN-00010
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing IDS Balancer™ Version 2.2 Appliance,
ATE_Master List Version 1.1, PLN-00010
Supplemental Evidence Documentation referenced in the
ATE_Master List Version 1.1, PLN-00010
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing –
sample
TOE provided for testing
AVA_SOF.1 Strength of TOE IDSB V2.2 Strength of Function Analysis Version 1.2, DOC-
31
security function
evaluation
00018
AVA_VLA.1 Developer
vulnerability analysis
IDSB V2.2 Vulnerability Analysis Version 1.4, DOC-00017
6.2.1 Configuration management (ACM)
Top Layer utilizes procedures and tools to track the TOE during its development cycle through
delivery and installation. Specific items tracked include TOE specifications, test plans, user and
administrative guidance, and implementation changes, or deviations after the TOE is manufactured.
These configuration items are tracked via:
• Engineering Change Request and Change Control Procedures
• Top Layer Networks Operations and Delivery Procedures Guide
• Software module additions and changes tracking via CASE tools
• Technical Documentation Control Policies
• Creating, Labeling, and Tracking serial numbers and MAC address of each TOE
manufactured
The following document provides the configuration item list and describes how Top Layer uniquely
identifies its configuration items:
• IDSB V2.2 Configuration Management Item List and Policies
The following documents provide evidence that a CM system is being used:
• Top Layer Networks, Inc. Operations and Delivery Procedures Guide
• IDSB V2.2 Configuration Management Item List and Policies
6.2.2 Delivery and Operation (ADO)
The following document is provided to meet the requirements for ADO_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
• Top Layer Networks Operations and Delivery Procedures Guide
Top Layer provides the documents to meet the requirements for ADO_IGS1 Installation, generation
and start-up procedures.
Guidance on how to set up and use the TOE Security Functions of the Balancer and the process of
installation, configuration, and usage are documented in:
• Top Layer 3500 Series Hardware Installation
• Top Layer 4500 Series Hardware Installation
• IDS Balancer Configuration and Management Guide (Annotated)
• IDS Balancer Release Notes (Annotated)
• IDSB V2.2 Configuration Worksheets
Guidance on how to install and operate the Balancer in the CC evaluated configuration can be found
in:
32
• Top Layer IDSB V2.2 CLI Command User Guide
6.2.3 Development documentation (ADV)
Design documentation is provided describing the TOE interfaces, functions, and subsystems. This
information is found in the following document:
• IDS Balancer Product Development Specification.
This document meets the requirements for ADV_FSP.1 Informal functional specification and
ADV_HLD.1 Descriptive high-level design.
The Representation Correspondence document describes the following mappings:
• Mapping from Target of Evaluation Summary Specification (TSS) to the Functional
Specification
• Mapping from Functional Specification to High Level Design
6.2.4 Guidance Documentation (AGD)
The following documents are provided to meet the requirements for AGD_ADM.1 Administrator
guidance:
• IDS Balancer Configuration and Management Guide
• Top Layer 3500 Series Hardware Installation
• Top Layer 4500 Series Hardware Installation
• TLN IDS Balancer™ Version 2.2 Command Line Interface (CLI) User Guide with
Supplemental Guidance for Common Criteria
• Configuration worksheets
• Release Notes
The requirements for AGD_USR.1 User guidance are not applicable, since there are no untrusted
users.
6.2.5 Test procedures and test documentation (ATE)
The following documentation was provided to meet the ATE evidence requirements:
• IDS Balancer™ Version 2.2 Appliance,
• ATE_Master List Version 1.1, PLN-00010
• Supplemental Evidence Documentation referenced in the ATE_Master List Version 1.1,
PLN-00010
33
6.2.6 Vulnerability analysis (AVA)
• IDSB V2.2 Strength of Function Analysis – Supplemental Common Criteria Evidence
Documentation contains the SOF Analysis
• IDSBS V2.2 Vulnerability Analysis contains the Vulnerability Analysis.
6.3 Strength of Function Claim
The strength of function claim applies to the password authentication mechanism. The related IT
security function is IA-2 User authentication. The Strength of Function claim for the password
authentication mechanism (IA-2) is SOF-Basic.
A minimum password length of 8 is required in order for the TOE to be able to meet its SOF
requirement.
34
7 PP Claims
The IDS BalancerTM
Security Target was not written to claim conformance to any existing Protection
Profile.
35
8 RATIONALE
8.1 Security Objectives Rationale
Table 8.1 shows that all threats are countered and all assumptions are addressed by the security
objectives. Rationale is provided following the Table 8.1. Table 8.2 shows that each security
objective maps to at least one threat or assumption so that all of the objectives are necessary.
Table 8.1 – All Threats and Assumptions Addressed
Threat Objective
TOE
T.EXAUTH Administrators may be granted more authority than
they need to perform their jobs due to the TOE
implementing only one trusted role.
O.ROLES
T.GUESS An attacker may try to guess administrator
authentication data in order to use this information to
launch attacks on the TOE.
O.PWDLEN
T.NOAUTH An attacker may attempt to bypass the security of
the TOE so as to access and use security functions
and/or non-security functions provided by the TOE.
O.IDAUTH
O.NONBYPASS
O.SECFUN
O.SECSTA
T.NOBANNER Necessary information about acceptable usage and
warnings may not be communicated to the
administrator at login increasing the risk of the
administrator selecting insecure configuration
options.
O.BANNER
T.SELPRO An unauthorized person may read, modify, or
destroy security critical TOE configuration data
resulting in an insecure configuration of the TOE.
O.SECSTA
O.SELPRO
T.UNATTENDED An administrator may leave the console unattended
resulting in an unauthorized user gaining access to
the TOE and making insecure changes to the
configuration.
O.TIMEOUT
OE.TIME
T.UNBALANCE Too much network traffic may be directed to a single
IDS so that it is unable to detect the intrusions that it
was designed to detect.
O.BALANCE
OE.TIME
T.UNDETECT Security relevant events may go undetected and
uncorrected due to not being recorded, stored, or
viewed.
O.AUDREC
OE.TIME
T.USAGE The TOE may be inadvertently configured, used or
administered in an insecure manner by either
authorized or unauthorized persons.
O.SECFUN
Assumptions
36
A.CONNECT The following TOE connectivity requirements
are satisfied. The Management Port of the
TOE is connected to the Trusted Management
Network. The only system on the Trusted
Management Network is the Network Time
Protocol (NTP) Server. Those responsible for
the TOE ensure that the NTP Server is properly
configured and adequately protected, for
example by a firewall, if it obtains the time from
a reliable source over the internet. A VT100
terminal is connected to the local console port
for system administration.
ON.CONNECT
A.NO_EVIL Administrators are non-hostile, appropriately
trained and follow all administrative guidance.
ON.ADMTRA
ON.GUIDANCE
A.PHYSICAL The IT environment provides the TOE with
appropriate physical security, commensurate
with the value of the IT assets protected by the
TOE.
ON.PHYSICAL
A.TIME The IT environment provides a Network Time
Protocol (NTP) Server.
OE.TIME
A.TRUSTED_USERS The only users of the TOE are trusted
administrators.
ON.TRUSTED_USERS
T.EXAUTH states that administrators may be granted more authority than they need to perform their
jobs due to the TOE implementing only one trusted role. This threat is countered by O.ROLES,
which ensures that the TOE will support multiple administrative roles, so that some administrators
can be granted more authority than others.
T.GUESS states that an attacker may try to guess administrator authentication data in order to use
this information to launch attacks on the TOE. This threat is diminished by O.PWDLEN, which
ensures that the TOE will enforce a minimum password length. This increases the average time
required to guess a password using a brute force attack so that the TOE is able to meet its SOF
requirement of SOF-Basic.
T.NOAUTH states that an attacker may attempt to bypass the security of the TOE so as to access
and use security functions and/or non-security functions provided by the TOE. This threat is
countered by O.IDAUTH, O.SECFUN, O.SECSTA, and O.NONBYPASS. O.IDAUTH ensures that
the TOE will uniquely identify and authenticate all users, before granting a user access to TOE
functions. O.SECFUN ensures that the TOE provides functionality that enables an authorized
administrator to use the TOE security functions, and will ensure that only authorized administrators
are able to access such functionality. O.SECSTA ensures that the TOE provides default values for
security attributes, so that the TOE does not compromise its resources upon initial startup
O.NONBYPASS states that the TOE must ensure that the security functions of the TOE cannot be
bypassed.
37
T.NOBANNER states that necessary information about acceptable usage and warnings may not be
communicated to the administrator at login increasing the risk of the administrator selecting insecure
configuration options. This threat is diminished by O.BANNER, which ensures that the TOE
provides the capability of displaying an advisory warning about unauthorized use of the TOE at
login.
T.SELPRO states that an unauthorized person may read, modify, or destroy security critical TOE
configuration data resulting in an insecure configuration of the TOE. This threat is countered by
O.SECSTA and O.SELPRO. O.SECSTA ensures that the TOE provides default values for security
attributes, so that the TOE does not compromise its resources upon initial startup. O.SELPRO
ensures that the TOE will protect itself against attempts by unauthorized users to bypass,
deactivate, or tamper with TOE security functions.
T.UNATTENDED states that an administrator may leave the console unattended resulting in an
unauthorized user gaining access to the TOE and making insecure changes to the configuration.
This threat is diminished by O.TIMEOUT, which ensures that the TOE provides the capability for the
administrator to set a time limit on console session inactivity before the console session times out.
O.TIMEOUT depends on OE.TIME which states that the TOE must obtain its time from an NTP
server.
T.UNBALANCE states that too much network traffic may be directed to a single IDS, so that it is
unable to detect the intrusions that it was designed to detect. This threat is countered by
O.BALANCE. O.BALANCE ensures that the TOE provides a means of controlling the flow of
network traffic from the network being monitored to a specific IDS or groups of IDSs. O. BALANCE
depends on OE.TIME which states that the TOE must obtain its time from an NTP server.
T.UNDETECT states that security relevant events may go undetected and uncorrected due to not
being recorded, stored, or viewed. This threat is countered by O.AUDREC. O.AUDREC ensures
that the TOE provides a means to record and view a readable audit trail of security related events,
with accurate dates and times. O.AUDREC depends on OE.TIME which states that the TOE must
obtain its time from an NTP server.
T.USAGE states that the TOE may be inadvertently configured, used or administered in an insecure
manner by either authorized or unauthorized persons. This threat is countered by O.SECFUN.
O.SECFUN ensures that the TOE provides functionality that enables an authorized administrator to
use the TOE security functions, and will ensure that only authorized administrators are able to
access such functionality.
A.CONNECT states that the following TOE connectivity requirements are satisfied: the
Management Port of the TOE is connected to the Trusted Management Network; and that the only
system on the Trusted Management Network is the Network Time Protocol (NTP) Server, those
responsible for the TOE ensure that the NTP Server is properly configured and adequately
protected, for example by a firewall, if it obtains the time from a reliable source over the internet, and
a VT100 terminal is connected to the local console port for system administration. This assumption
is addressed by ON.CONNECT, which ensures that the TOE connectivity requirements will be
satisfied.
A.NO_EVIL states that administrators are non-hostile, appropriately trained and follow all
administrative guidance. This assumption is addressed by ON.ADMTRA and ON.GUIDANCE.
ON.ADMTRA ensures that authorized administrators are trained in the establishment and
maintenance of security policies and practices. ON.GUIDANCE ensures that the TOE will be
delivered, installed, administered, and operated in a manner that maintains security.
A.PHYSICAL states that the IT environment provides the TOE with appropriate physical security,
commensurate with the value of the IT assets protected by the TOE. This assumption is addressed
by ON.PHYSICAL, which ensures that sufficient physical security will be provided for the TOE
platform.
38
A.TIME states that the IT environment provides a Network Time Protocol (NTP) Server. This
assumption is directly addressed by OE.TIME, which ensures that the IT environment provides a
RFC 1305- compliant Network Time Protocol (NTP) Server.
A.TRUSTED_USERS states that the only users of the TOE are trusted administrators. This
assumption is addressed by ON.TRUSTED USERS, which states that the administrator ensures that
no untrusted users are granted access to the TOE.
Table 8.2 – All Objectives Mapped to Threats or Assumptions
Objective Threat or Assumption
O.AUDREC T.UNDETECT
O.BALANCE T.UNBALANCE
O.BANNER T.NOBANNER
O.IDAUTH T.NOAUTH
O.NONBYPASS T.NOAUTH
O.PWDLEN T.GUESS
O.ROLES T.EXAUTH
O.SECFUN T.NOAUTH
T.USAGE
O.SECSTA T.NOAUTH
T.SELPRO
O.SELPRO T.SELPRO
O.TIMEOUT T.UNATTENDED
OE.TIME A.TIME
T.UNATTENDED
T.UNBALANCE
T.UNDETECT
ON.ADMTRA A.NO_EVIL
ON.CONNECT A.CONNECT
ON.GUIDANCE A.NO_EVIL
ON.PHYSICAL A.PHYSICAL
ON.TRUSTED_USERS A.TRUSTED_USERS
8.2 Security Requirements Rationale
8.2.1 Functional Requirements
Table 8.3 shows that all of the security objectives of the TOE are satisfied. Rationale text follows
Table 8.3. Table 8.4 shows that each security functional requirement maps to at least one objective,
so none of the requirements are unnecessary.
Table 8.3 - All Objectives Addressed by SFRs
Objective Objective Description SFR
O.AUDREC The TOE must provide a means to
record, store, and view a readable
audit trail of the specified events
relating to security management with
accurate dates and times.
FAU_GEN_LOG.1 Audit log generation
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
FPT_STM.1;1 Reliable time stamps [TOE]
39
O.BALANCE The TOE must provide a means of
controlling the flow of network traffic
from the network being monitored to a
specific IDS or groups of IDSs.
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
FPT_STM.1;1 Reliable time stamps [TOE]
O.BANNER The TOE must provide the capability of
displaying an advisory warning about
unauthorized use of the TOE at login.
FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE access banners
O.IDAUTH The TOE must uniquely identify and
authenticate all users, before granting
such users access to TOE functions.
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action
O.NONBYPASS The TOE must ensure that the security
functions of the TOE cannot be
bypassed.
FPT_RVM,1 Non-bypassability
O.PWDLEN The TOE must enforce a minimum
password length.
FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets
O.ROLES The TOE must support two
administrative roles, only one of which
is granted read access.
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
O.SECFUN The TOE must provide functionality
that enables an authorized
administrator to use the TOE security
functions, and must ensure that only
authorized administrators are able to
access such functionality.
FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions
behaviour
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
O.SECSTA The TOE must provide default values
for security attributes, so that the TOE
does not compromise its resources
upon initial startup.
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
O.SELPRO The TOE must protect itself against
attempts by unauthorized users to
bypass, deactivate, or tamper with
TOE security functions.
FPT_RVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP
FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation
O.TIMEOUT The TOE must provide the capability
for the administrator to set a time limit
on console session inactivity before the
console times out.
FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination
FPT_STM.1;1 Reliable time stamps [TOE]
OE.TIME The IT environment must provide a
RFC 1305- compliant Network Time
Protocol (NTP) Server.
FPT_STM.1;2 Reliable time stamps [IT
Environment]
O.AUDREC states that the TOE must provide a means to record and view a readable audit trail of
the specified events relating to security management with accurate dates and times. This objective
is met by FAU_GEN_LOG.1 Audit log generation, FAU_SAR.1 Audit Review, and FPT_STM.1;1
Reliable time stamps [TOE]. FAU_GEN_LOG.1 requires that the TOE record the specific security
management events identified in that component. FAU_SAR.1 requires that the TOE provide the
capability to review auditable events. FAU_STG.1 requires that the audit records be stored and
protected from modification. FPT_STM.1;1 requires that the TOE provide reliable time stamps to be
recorded in the audit record.
O.BALANCE states that the TOE must provide a means of controlling the flow of network traffic
from the network being monitored to a specific IDS or groups of IDSs. This objective is met by
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control, FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes, and FMT_MSA.3
Static attribute initialization. FDP_IFC.1 and FDP_IFF.1 require that the information flow security
40
policy defined in those components be enforced. FPT_STM.1;1 requires that the TOE provide
reliable time stamps to be used to determine if an application flow timeout has occurred.
O.BANNER states that the TOE must provide the capability of displaying an advisory warning about
unauthorized use of the TOE at login. This objective is met by FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE access
banners, which requires that the TOE must provide an advisory warning regarding unauthorised use
of the TOE.
O.IDAUTH states that the TOE must uniquely identify and authenticate all users, before granting
such users access to TOE functions. This objective is met by FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition,
FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action, and FIA_UID.2 User identification before any
action. FIA_UID.2 and FIA_UAU.2 together require user identification and authentication before the
TSF allows any other TSF-mediated actions on the behalf of the user. FIA_ATD.1 requires the
specification of user attributes, which include username for identification and password for
authentication. FIA_UID.2 requires that users always be identified and FIA_UAU.2 requires that
users always be authenticated.
O.NONBYPASS states that the TOE must ensure that the security functions of the TOE cannot be
bypassed. This objective is met by FPT_RVM.1 Non-bypassability, which requires that TSP
enforcement functions be invoked and succeed before each function with the TSC is allowed to
proceed.
O.PWDLEN states that the TOE must enforce a minimum password length. This objective is directly
met by FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets, which requires a minimum password length.
O.ROLES states that the TOE must support two administrative roles, only one of which is granted
read access. This objective is met by FMT_SMR.1 Security roles, which requires two administrative
roles: administrator and monitor. The monitor role can only view security attributes and
configuration options, but not change them. The Administrator role can modify the values of security
attributes and configuration options as well as view them.
O.SECFUN states that the TOE must provide functionality that enables an authorized administrator
to use the TOE security functions, and must ensure that only authorized administrators are able to
access such functionality. This objective is met by FMT_MOF.1 Management of TSF data,
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes, FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation,
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions, and FMT_SMR.1 Security roles. FMT_MOF.1
and FMT_MSA.1 specify the security functions available to the authorized administrators and the
security attributes that the administrators can manage. FMT_MSA.3 specifies that no one is
authorized to change the default values. FMT_SMF.1 specifies the security management functions
that the TOE supports. FMT_SMR.1 specifies the authorized roles of administrator and monitor.
O.SECSTA states that the TOE must provide default values for security attributes, so that the TOE
does not compromise its resources upon initial startup. This objective is met by FMT_MSA.3 Static
attribute initialization, which requires that the initial values of security attributes be secure.
O.SELPRO states that the TOE must protect itself against attempts by unauthorized users to
bypass, deactivate, or tamper with TOE security functions. This objective is met by FPT_RVM.1
Non-bypassability of the TSP and FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation. FPT_RVM.1 requires that
the TOE security functions by non-bypassable. FPT_SEP.1 requires that the TSF provide a domain
for its own protection so that its security functions cannot be deactivated or tampered with.
O.TIMEOUT states that the TOE must provide the capability for the administrator to set a time limit
on console session inactivity before the console session times out. This objective is met by
FTA_SSL.3, which requires that the TSF terminate a session after an administrator-specified period
41
of inactivity. FPT_STM.1;1 requires that the TOE provide reliable time stamps to be used to
determine if the time limit for a period of inactivity has been reached.
OE.TIME states that the IT environment must provide an RFC 1305- compliant Network Time
Protocol (NTP) Server. This objective is met by FPT_STM.1;2 Reliable time stamps, which requires
that the IT environment provide reliable time via an NTP Server.
Table 8.4 – All SFRs Mapped to Objectives
Ref # Component Component Title Objective
Requirements for the TOE
1 FAU_GEN_LOG.1 Audit log generation O.AUDREC
2 FAU_SAR.1 Audit review O.AUDREC
3 FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage O.AUDREC
4 FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control O.BALANCE
5 FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes O.BALANCE
6 FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition O.IDAUTH
7 FIA_SOS.1 Verification of Secrets O.PWDLEN
8 FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action O.IDAUTH
9 FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action O.IDAUTH
10 FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions
behavior
O.SECFUN
11 FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes O.SECFUN
12 FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization O.SECFUN
O.SECSTA
13 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions O.SECFUN
14 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles O.ROLES
O.SECFUN
15 FPT_RVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP O.NONBYPASS
O.SELPRO
16 FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation O.SELPRO
17 FPT_STM.1;1 Reliable time stamps [TOE] O.AUDREC
O.BALANCE
O.TIMEOUT
18 FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination O.TIMEOUT
19 FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE access banners O.BANNER
Requirements for the IT Environment
1E FPT_STM.1;2 Reliable time stamps [IT Environment] OE.TIME
8.2.2 Dependencies
Table 8.5 shows that all SFR dependencies are satisfied. The dependencies of FAU_SAR.1 and
FAU_STG.1 on FAU_GEN.1 are met by FAU_GEN_LOG.1 instead. The dependencies of
FIA_UAU.1 and FMT_SMR.1 on FIA_UID.1 are met by FIA_UID.2, which is hierarchical to
FIA_UID.1.
Table 8.5 – All Dependencies Satisfied
Ref
#
Component Component Name Dependencies
from Part 2
Reference
1 FAU_GEN_LOG.1 Audit log generation FPT_STM.1 17
1E
42
Ref
#
Component Component Name Dependencies
from Part 2
Reference
2 FAU_SAR.1 Audit Review FAU_GEN.1 1 (in lieu of
FAU_GEN.1)
3 FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage FAU_GEN.1 1 (in lieu of
FAU_GEN.1)
4 FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control FDP_IFF.1 5
5 FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes FDP_IFC.1
FMT_MSA.3
4
6 FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition None -
7 FIA_SOS.1 Verification of Secrets None -
8 FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action FIA_UID.1 9 (H)
9 FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action None -
10 FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions
behaviour
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
13
14
11 FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FDP_IFC.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
4
13
14
12 FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization FMT_MSA.1
FMT_SMR.1
11
14
13 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions None -
14 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FIA_UID.1 9 (H)
15 FPT_RVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP None -
16 FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation None -
17 FPT_STM.1;1 Reliable time stamps [TOE] None -
18 FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated time stamps None -
19 FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE access banners None -
Requirements for the IT Environment
IE FPT_STM.1;2 Reliable time stamps [IT Environment] None -
The above table shows that all dependencies identified in the CC Part 2 are satisfied. In addition,
although not indicated in the CC text, FDP_IFF.1 and FTA_SSL.3 have dependencies on reliable
time stamps, FPT_STM.1.
The dependencies for the assurance requirements are satisfied, since EAL2 is defined so that all the
assurance dependencies are satisfied.
8.2.3 Mutual Support
This section provides the rationale that the Security Functional Requirements support each other.
Section 8.2.1 shows that all of the security objectives are satisfied and the all of the security
requirements trace to objectives.
Section 8.2.2 shows that all dependencies are satisfied.
Even when no dependency between these requirements is indicated, the security requirements
support each other where necessary in the following ways:
• FPT_RVM.1 prevents bypass of other security functional requirements.
• FPT_SEP.1 prevents tampering with other security functional requirements.
• FMT_MOF.1 and FMT_MSA.1 prevent de-activation of other security functional
requirements.
43
• FAU_GEN_LOG.1 enables detection of attacks aimed at defeating other security functional
requirements.
The operations on the security functional requirements were reviewed to ensure that they did not
affect the mutual support between the requirements.
8.2.4 Requirements Consistency
The Security Functional Requirements are consistent with each other. Inconsistent SFRs (such as
identification of users and anonymity) were not selected. Operations were completed in a consistent
manner. The following assignments are consistent between SFRs: audit information, information
flow control SFP, information to be controlled (packets), information flow control security attributes,
and user attributes.
8.2.5 Strength of Function
A strength of function level of SOF-Basic counters an attack level of low. This is sufficient for this
TOE, which is intended to be used in environments where the level of risk is low. The SOF claim
applies to FIA_UAU.1 and FIA_SOS.1. The SOF analysis is in the following document: IDSB V2.2
Strength of Function Analysis – Supplemental Common Criteria Evidence Documentation.
8.2.6 Assurance Requirements
Evaluation Assurance Level EAL2 was chosen to provide a basic level of assurance due to the low
level threat of malicious attacks.
8.2.7 Explicitly Stated Requirements
FAU_GEN_LOG.1 was explicitly stated as a substitute for FAU_GEN.1 as the TOE does not record
the identity of the subject as FAU_GEN.1.2a requires. FAU_GEN_LOG.1 uses the text of
FAU_GEN.1 as a model. The only differences are that the auditable events are explicitly listed and
subject is not included in the list of information to be recorded. This ensures that the requirement is
measurable and states objective evaluation requirements. This also ensures that including
FAU_GEN_LOG.1 does not introduce the need for additional assurance measures. EAL2
assurance measures that are appropriate for FAU_GEN.1 are also appropriate for
FAU_GEN_LOG.1
8.3 TOE Summary Specification Rationale
8.3.1 IT Security Functions
Table 8.6 shows that the IT Security Functions in the TOE Summary Specification (TSS) address all
of the TOE Security Functional Requirements. Rationale text follows Table 8.6.
Table 8.6 – Mapping of SFRs to IT Security Functions
Ref
#
Component Component Title IT Security Function
1 FAU_GEN_LOG.1 Audit log generation AU-1 Event Log
44
AU-2 Auditable Events
AU-3 Audit Information
2 FAU_SAR.1 Audit Review AU-4 Audit Review
3 FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage AU-1 Event Log
4 FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control IFF-1 Information Flow Control
5 FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes IFF-1 Information Flow Control
6 FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition IA-3 User Attributes
7 FIA_SOS.1 Verification of Secrets IA-4 Minimum Password Length
8 FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any
action
IA-2 User Authentication
9 FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action IA-1 User Identification
10 FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions
behaviour
SM-6 Management of Security Functions
11 FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes SM-2 Management of security attributes
SM-3 View Security Attributes
12 FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization SM-4 Default Port Roles
SM-5 Default Values of Security
Attributes
13 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management
functions
SM-2 Management of security attributes
SM-3 View Security Attributes
SM-6 Management of Security Functions
14 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles SM-1 Roles
15 FPT_RVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP FPT-1 Non-Bypassability
16 FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation FPT-2 Domain separation
17 FPT_STM.1;1 Reliable time stamps FPT-3 Reliable time stamps
18 FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination FTA-1 Timeout
19 FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE access banners FTA-2 Banners
FAU_GEN_LOG.1 Audit log generation: This security function is implemented by AU-1 Event Log,
AU-2 Auditable Events, and AU-3 Audit Information. AU-1 states that the TOE is able to record
events in the audit log. AU-2 identifies the types of events that are logged. AU-3 states that the
type of event, time and date are recorded.
FAU_SAR.1 Audit Review is implemented by AU-4 Audit Review, which states that the administrator
and monitor roles can view audit records through the command line interface.
FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage is implemented by AU-1 Event Log, which states that the
audit log is stored on the SanDisk and there is no interface to modify individual audit records.
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control is implemented by IFF-1 Information Flow Control, which
states that the subjects are external IT entities, the protected information is network traffic, and the
controlled operations are 1) copy network traffic to monitor port, 2) Forward TCP Reset Packets, and
3) drop the traffic.
FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes is also implemented by IFF-1 Information Flow Control. IFF-1
specifies the subjects, information, and operations, identifies the information flow control attributes,
and describes the algorithm used to determine whether or not to mirror the network traffic to a
monitor port. It also describes the two additional capabilities: TCP Reset Packet Forwarding and
Application Flow Control Timeout.
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition is implemented by IA-3 User Attributes, which states that the
TSF maintains the user attributes: User Name, User Role, and User password.
45
FIA_SOS.1 Verification of Secrets is implemented by IA-4 Minimum Password Length, which states
that the TSF is able to enforce a minimum password length.
FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action is implemented by IA-2 User Authentication, which
states that the TOE provides a password mechanism to authenticate each user before they are able
to access the TOE.
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action is implemented by IA-1 User Identification, which
states that the TSF identifies each user before they are able to access the TOE. Users are identified
by their user name.
FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour is implemented by SM-6 Management of
Security Functions, which describes the management of security functions.
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes is implemented by SM-2 Management of security
attributes and SM-3 View Security Attributes. SM-2 Management of security attributes describes
how the administrator role can create, modify, and delete the security attributes. SM-3 View
Security Attributes describes how the monitor role can view security attributes.
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation is implemented by SM-4 Default Port Roles and SM-5
Default Values of Security Attributes. SM-4 Default Port Roles lists the default port roles for each
platform. SM-5 Default Values of Security Attributes lists the default values of security attributes.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions is implemented by SM-2 Management of
security attributes, SM-3 View Security Attributes, and SM-6 Management of Security Functions.
SM-2 Management of security attributes describes security management of attributes that can be
performed by the administrator role. SM-3 View Security Attributes describes security attributes that
can be viewed by the monitor role. SM-6 Management of Security Functions describes the
management of security functions.
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles are implemented by SM-1 Roles, which identifies the two trusted roles:
administrator and monitor.
FPT_RVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP is implemented by FPT-1 Non-Bypassability, which
describes how the Balancer ensures that its security functions are non-bypassable.
FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation is implemented by FPT-2 Domain separation, which describes
how the Balancer maintains a security domain that protects itself from interference and tampering.
FPT_STM.1;1 Reliable time stamps is implemented by FPT-3 Reliable time stamps, which states
that the TOE maintains reliable time stamps for its own use and implements an NTP client to obtain
the time from an NTP server.
FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination is implemented by FTA-1 Timeout, which states that the TSF
terminates the console session of a time period of inactivity specified by the administrator.
FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE access banners is implemented by FTA-2 Banners, which states that the
TSF is capable of displaying an advisory warning about unauthorized use of the TOE.
Table 8.7 - Mapping of IT Security Functions to SFRs
IT Security Function Component Component Title
IFF-1 Information Flow Control FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
IA-1 User Identification FIA_UID.2 User identification before any
action
IA-2 User Authentication FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any
46
action
IA-3 User Attributes FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
IA-4 Minimum Password Length FIA_SOS.1 Verification of Secrets
AU-1 Event Log FAU_GEN_LOG.1 Audit log generation
FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
AU-2 Auditable Events FAU_GEN_LOG.1 Audit log generation
AU-3 Audit Information FAU_GEN_LOG.1 Audit log generation
AU-4 Audit review FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
SM-1 Roles FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
SM-2 Management of security attributes FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management
functions
SM-3 View Security Attributes FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management
functions
SM-4 Default Port Roles FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
SM-5 Default Values of Security Attributes FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
SM-6 Management of Security Functions FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions
behaviour
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management
functions
FPT-1 Non-Bypassability FPT_RVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP
FPT-2 Domain separation FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation
FPT-3 Reliable time stamps FPT_STM.1;1 Reliable time stamps
FTA-1 Timeout FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated terminated
FTA-2 Banner FTA_TAB.1 Default security banners
8.3.2 Assurance Measures Rationale
Table 8.8 identifies the assurance measures provided by the developer to satisfy the EAL2
assurance requirements.
Table 8.8 – Assurance Measures
Component Title Assurance Measure
ACM_CAP.2 Configuration Items
and how they are
uniquely identified
IDSB V2.2 Configuration Management Item List and Policies
Version 1.4 DOC-00020
Evidence that CM
system is being used
Top Layer Networks, Inc. Operations and Delivery
Procedures Guide Version 1.2, DOC-00022
IDSB V2.2 Configuration Management Item List and Policies
Version 1.4 DOC-00020
ADO_DEL.1 Delivery procedures Top Layer Networks, Inc. Operations and Delivery
Procedures Guide Version 1.2, DOC-00022
ADO_IGS.1 Installation,
generation, and start-
up procedures
IDSB V2.2 Configuration and Management User Guide
#990007203
TLN IDS Balancer™ Version 2.2 Command Line Interface
(CLI) User Guide with Supplemental Guidance for Common
Criteria V1.3 #990-0190-00
Top Layer 3500-Series Hardware Installation #990-0141-03
3500
47
Top Layer 4500-Series Hardware Installation #990-0142-04-
4500
IDSB V2.2 Configuration Worksheets Version 6.0
IDSB V2.2 Release Notes #990-0171
ADV_FSP.1 Informal functional
specification
IDSB V2.2 Product Development Specification Document
Version 1.9 DOC-00013
ADV_HLD.1 Descriptive high-level
design
IDSB V2.2 Product Development Specification Document
Version 1.9 DOC-00013
ADV_RCR.1 Informal
correspondence
demonstration
IDSB V2.2 Representation Correspondence Version 1.6,
DOC-00014
AGD_ADM.1 Administrator
guidance
IDSB V2.2 Configuration and Management User Guide
#990007203
TLN IDS Balancer™ Version 2.2 Command Line Interface
(CLI) User Guide with Supplemental Guidance for Common
Criteria V1.3 #990-0190-00
Top Layer 3500-Series Hardware Installation #990-0141-03
3500
Top Layer 4500-Series Hardware Installation #990-0142-04-
4500
IDSB V2.2 Configuration Worksheets Version 6.0
IDSB V2.2 Release Notes #990-0171
AGD_USR.1 User guidance Not applicable
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage ATE_Master List Version 1.1, PLN-00010
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing IDS Balancer™ Version 2.2 Appliance,
ATE_Master List Version 1.1, PLN-00010
Supplemental Evidence Documentation referenced in the
ATE_Master List Version 1.1, PLN-00010
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing –
sample
TOE provided for testing
AVA_SOF.1 Strength of TOE
security function
evaluation
IDSB V2.2 Strength of Function Analysis Version 1.2, DOC-
00018
AVA_VLA.1 Developer
vulnerability analysis
IDSB V2.2 Vulnerability Analysis Version 1.4, DOC-00017
ACM_CAP.2
Top Layer provides that following document to specify the configuration item list and describe how
Top Layer uniquely identifies its configuration items:
• IDSB V2.2 Configuration Management Item List and Policies
Top Layer provides the following documents as evidence that the CM system is being used:
• Top Layer Networks, Inc. Operations and Delivery Procedures Guide
• IDSB V2.2 Configuration Management Item List and Policies
ADO_DEL.1
Top Layer provides the following documents to meet the requirements for ADO_DEL.1 Delivery
procedures
• Top Layer Networks Operations and Delivery Procedures Guide
48
ADO_IGS.1
Top Layer provides the following documents to meet the requirements for ADO_IGS1 Installation,
generation and start-up procedures:
• IDSB V2.2 Configuration and Management User Guide – installation
• TLN IDS Balancer™ Version 2.2 Command Line Interface (CLI) User Guide with
Supplemental Guidance for Common Criteria – installation in evaluated configuration
• Top Layer 3500-Series Hardware Installation – hardware installation
• Top Layer 4500-Series Hardware Installation – hardware installation
• IDSB V2.2 Release Notes - installation and configuration information
• IDSB V2.2 Configuration Worksheets –configuration aid
ADV_FSP.1
Top Layer provides the IDS Balancer Product Development Specification to meet the requirements
for ADV_FSP.1 Informal functional specification.
ADV_HLD.1
Top Layer provides the IDS Balancer Product Development Specification to meet the requirements
for ADV_HLD.1 Descriptive high-level design.
ADV_RCR.1
Top Layer provides the IDSB V2.2 Representation Correspondence to meet the requirements for
ADV_RCR.1 Informal correspondence demonstration. This document provides the following
mappings:
• Mapping from Target of Evaluation Summary Specification (TSS) to the Functional
Specification
• Mapping from Functional Specification to High Level Design
AGD_ADM.1
Top Layer provides the following documents to meet the requirements for AGD_ADM.1
Administrator guidance:
• IDSB V2.2 Configuration and Management User Guide - general information on configuration
and management of the IDSB
• TLN IDS Balancer™ Version 2.2 Command Line Interface (CLI) User Guide with
Supplemental Guidance for Common Criteria - Provides specific information on managing
the TOE in the evaluated configuration.
• Top Layer 3500-Series Hardware Installation – hardware installation
• Top Layer 4500-Series Hardware Installation - hardware installation
• IDSB V2.2 Configuration Worksheets - installation aid
• IDSB V2.2 Release Notes - information on configuration and management
AGD_USR.1
49
The requirements for AGD_USR.1 User guidance are not applicable, since there are no untrusted
users.
ATE_COV.1:
Top Layer provides the ATE Master List to meet the requirements for ATE_COV.1
ATE_FUN.1:
Top Layer provides the following documents to meet the requirements for ATE_FUN.1:
• IDS Balancer™ Version 2.2 Appliance,
• ATE Master List Version 1.1,
• Supplemental Evidence Documentation referenced in the ATE_Master List
ATE_IND.2
Top Layer provides the TOE for testing.
AVA_SOF.1:
Top Layer provides the IDSB V2.2 Strength of Function Analysis – Supplemental Common Criteria
Evidence Documentation to meet the requirements for AVA_SOF.1 Strength of security function
analysis. This document contains the SOF Analysis.
AVA_VLA.1:
Top Layer provides the IDSBS V2.2 Vulnerability Analysis to meet the requirements for
AVA_VLA.1.Developer vulnerability analysis. This document contains the developer vulnerability
analysis.
8.3.3 Strength of Function (SOF) Rationale
The SOF requirement applies to the password authentication mechanism. The SOF claim for this
mechanism is SOF-Basic. A strength of function level of SOF-Basic counters an attack level of low.
This is sufficient for this TOE, which is intended to be used in environments where the level of risk is
low. This meets the requirement for a minimum overall SOF level of SOF-Basic.
8.4 PP Claims Rationale
This ST does not claim conformance to any PP.
50
9 ACRONYMS and TERMINOLOGY
ASIC Application Specific Integrated Circuit
CC Common Criteria [for IT Security Evaluation]
COTS Commercial-Off-The-Shelf
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
Flow A unidirectional stream of related data packets
IT Information Technology
IDS Intrusion Detection System
IDSB IDS Balancer
Mirror Top Layer technology for passive copying packets from a network
segment to an attached intrusion detection system
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
Treatment IDS Balancer policy for mirroring packets from input ports to monitor
ports
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
UDP User Datagram Protocol
WMI Web Management Interface
51
52
10 References
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.1, August 1999.
Network Working Group, Request for Comments (RFC)-1305, Network Time Protocol (Version 3),
Specification, Implementation and Analysis, Mills, David L., March 1992
U.S. Government Traffic-Filter Firewall Protection Profile for Low-Risk Environments Version 1.1;
April1999