BSI-DSZ-CC-1107-2020
for
IFX_CCI_00002Dh, IFX_CCI_000039h,
IFX_CCI_00003Ah, IFX_CCI_000044h,
IFX_CCI_000045h, IFX_CCI_000046h,
IFX_CCI_000047h, IFX_CCI_000048h,
IFX_CCI_000049h, IFX_CCI_00004Ah,
IFX_CCI_00004Bh, IFX_CCI_00004Ch,
IFX_CCI_00004Dh, IFX_CCI_00004Eh design step
T11 with firmware 80.306.16.0, optional NRG™ SW
05.03.4097, optional HSL v3.52.9708, UMSLC lib
v01.30.0564, optional SCL v2.11.003, optional ACL
v3.02.000 and user guidance
from
Infineon Technologies AG
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.3
BSI-DSZ-CC-1107-2020 (*)
IFX_CCI_00002Dh, IFX_CCI_000039h, IFX_CCI_00003Ah, IFX_CCI_000044h,
IFX_CCI_000045h, IFX_CCI_000046h, IFX_CCI_000047h, IFX_CCI_000048h,
IFX_CCI_000049h, IFX_CCI_00004Ah, IFX_CCI_00004Bh, IFX_CCI_00004Ch,
IFX_CCI_00004Dh, IFX_CCI_00004Eh design step T11 with firmware
80.306.16.0, optional NRG™ SW 05.03.4097, optional HSL v3.52.9708, UMSLC
lib v01.30.0564, optional SCL v2.11.003, optional ACL v3.02.000 and user
guidance
from Infineon Technologies AG
PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation
Packages Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-
0084-2014
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 6 augmented by ALC_FLR.1
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility
using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by
Scheme Interpretations, by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC
Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for conformance to the Common Criteria
for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408
and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and Notification. For details
on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of
the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty
of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 17 November 2020
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Sandro Amendola L.S.
Head of Division
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1107-2020
This page is intentionally left blank.
4 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-1107-2020 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification......................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication....................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results.......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary....................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE.............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy............................................................................................................14
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................15
5. Architectural Information.............................................................................................16
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................16
7. IT Product Testing.......................................................................................................16
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................17
9. Results of the Evaluation............................................................................................18
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................27
11. Security Target..........................................................................................................28
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)..............................................................28
13. Definitions.................................................................................................................29
14. Bibliography..............................................................................................................30
C. Excerpts from the Criteria..............................................................................................33
D. Annexes.........................................................................................................................34
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1107-2020
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BSI Schedule of Costs3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 3 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I, p. 519
6 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-1107-2020 Certification Report
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2+ ALC_FLR components.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1107-2020
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product IFX_CCI_00002Dh, IFX_CCI_000039h, IFX_CCI_00003Ah,
IFX_CCI_000044h, IFX_CCI_000045h, IFX_CCI_000046h, IFX_CCI_000047h,
IFX_CCI_000048h, IFX_CCI_000049h, IFX_CCI_00004Ah, IFX_CCI_00004Bh,
IFX_CCI_00004Ch, IFX_CCI_00004Dh, IFX_CCI_00004Eh design step T11 with firmware
80.306.16.0, optional NRG™ SW 05.03.4097, optional HSL v3.52.9708, UMSLC lib
v01.30.0564, optional SCL v2.11.003, optional ACL v3.02.000 and user guidance has
undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product IFX_CCI_00002Dh, IFX_CCI_000039h, IFX_CCI_00003Ah,
IFX_CCI_000044h, IFX_CCI_000045h, IFX_CCI_000046h, IFX_CCI_000047h,
IFX_CCI_000048h, IFX_CCI_000049h, IFX_CCI_00004Ah, IFX_CCI_00004Bh,
IFX_CCI_00004Ch, IFX_CCI_00004Dh, IFX_CCI_00004Eh design step T11 with firmware
80.306.16.0, optional NRG™ SW 05.03.4097, optional HSL v3.52.9708, UMSLC lib
v01.30.0564, optional SCL v2.11.003, optional ACL v3.02.000 and user guidance was
conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 16
November 2020. TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Infineon Technologies AG.
The product was developed by: Infineon Technologies AG.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1107-2020 Certification Report
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 17
November 2020 is valid until 16 November 2025. Validity can be re-newed by re-
certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product IFX_CCI_00002Dh, IFX_CCI_000039h, IFX_CCI_00003Ah,
IFX_CCI_000044h, IFX_CCI_000045h, IFX_CCI_000046h, IFX_CCI_000047h,
IFX_CCI_000048h, IFX_CCI_000049h, IFX_CCI_00004Ah, IFX_CCI_00004Bh,
IFX_CCI_00004Ch, IFX_CCI_00004Dh, IFX_CCI_00004Eh design step T11 with firmware
80.306.16.0, optional NRG™ SW 05.03.4097, optional HSL v3.52.9708, UMSLC lib
v01.30.0564, optional SCL v2.11.003, optional ACL v3.02.000 and user guidance has been
included in the BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
Infineon Technologies AG
Am Campeon 1-12
85579 Neubiberg
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1107-2020
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1107-2020 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a Smart Card security controller called
IFX_CCI_00002Dh, IFX_CCI_000039h, IFX_CCI_00003Ah, IFX_CCI_000044h,
IFX_CCI_000045h, IFX_CCI_000046h, IFX_CCI_000047h, IFX_CCI_000048h,
IFX_CCI_000049h, IFX_CCI_00004Ah, IFX_CCI_00004Bh, IFX_CCI_00004Ch,
IFX_CCI_00004Dh, IFX_CCI_00004Eh design step T11 with firmware 80.306.16.0,
optional NRG™ SW 05.03.4097, optional HSL v3.52.9708, UMSLC lib v01.30.0564,
optional SCL v2.11.003, optional ACL v3.02.000 and user guidance.
It provides a 32-bit ARMv7-M CPU-architecture. The major components of the core system
are the CPU (Central Processing Unit), an MPU (Memory Protection Unit), a Nested
Vectored Interrupt Controller (NVIC) and an Instruction Stream Signature Checking (ISS).
The dual interface controller is able to communicate using either the contact based or the
contactless interface. Also, a variety of software libraries is present or optionally available,
i.e. NRGTM
library, HSL (hardware support library), UMSLC (user mode security life control)
library, SCL (symmetric cryptographic library) and ACL (asymmetric cryptographic library).
This TOE is intended to be used in smart cards for particular security relevant applications
and as a developing platform for smart card operating systems. The term smartcard
embedded software is used in the following for all operating systems and applications
stored and executed on the TOE. The TOE is the platform for the smartcard embedded
software.
Depending on the blocking configuration, the TOE can have e.g. different user available
memory sizes and can come with or without individual accessible cryptographic
coprocessors. All products are identical in regard to module design, layout and footprint.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages
Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 6
augmented by ALC_FLR.1.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 6. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and
some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF_DPM Device Phase Management
SF_PS Protection against Snooping
SF_PMA Protection against Modifying Attacks
SF_PLA Protection against Logical Attacks
SF_CS Cryptographic Support
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1107-2020
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [9],
chapter 3.1.2 . Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [9], chapter 3.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
IFX_CCI_00002Dh, IFX_CCI_000039h, IFX_CCI_00003Ah, IFX_CCI_000044h,
IFX_CCI_000045h, IFX_CCI_000046h, IFX_CCI_000047h, IFX_CCI_000048h,
IFX_CCI_000049h, IFX_CCI_00004Ah, IFX_CCI_00004Bh, IFX_CCI_00004Ch,
IFX_CCI_00004Dh, IFX_CCI_00004Eh design step T11 with firmware 80.306.16.0,
optional NRG™ SW 05.03.4097, optional HSL v3.52.9708, UMSLC lib v01.30.0564,
optional SCL v2.11.003, optional ACL v3.02.000 and user guidance.
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
Hardware
IFX_CCI_00002Dh, IFX_CCI_000039h,
IFX_CCI_00003Ah, IFX_CCI_000044h,
IFX_CCI_000045h, IFX_CCI_000046h,
IFX_CCI_000047h, IFX_CCI_000048h,
IFX_CCI_000049h, IFX_CCI_00004Ah,
IFX_CCI_00004Bh, IFX_CCI_00004Ch,
IFX_CCI_00004Dh, IFX_CCI_00004Eh
T11 (design step) Wafer, IC case,
packages
Firmware
BOS & POWS 80.306.16.0 stored on the delivered
hardware
Flash Loader 09.12.0005
Software
NRGTM
SW (optional) 05.03.4097 L251 Library File
(object code), secured
download
HSL (optional) 3.52.9708
UMSLC 01.30.0564
SCL (optional) 2.11.003
ACL (optional) 3.02.000
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1107-2020 Certification Report
Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
User Guidance
32-bit Security Controller – V11, Hardware
Reference Manual
V5.2,
2020-02-05
Personalized PDF via
secure iShare server
32-bit Security Controller, SLx1/SLx3 Controller
Family, Programmer’s Reference Manual
V4.5,
2020-06-22
32-bit Security Controller – V11, Security
Guidelines
V1.00-2661,
2020-10-05
Production and personalization, 32-bit security
controller
V09.12,
2020-07-03
32-bit Security Controller, Crypto2304T V3,
User Manual (optional)
V2.0
2019-04-24
HSL for SLCx7V11a Hardware Support Library
(optional)
V03.52.9708,
2020-02-03
UMSLC library for SLCx7 in 40nm, User Mode
Security Life Control
V01.30.0564,
2019-06-19
SCL37-SCP-v440-C40, Symmetric Crypto
Library for SCP-v440 AES/DES/MAC, 32-bit
Security Controller, User interface manual
(optional)
V2.11.003,
2020-02-10
ACL37-Crypto2304T-C40, Asymmetric Crypto
Library for Crypto2304T RSA/ECC/Toolbox, 32-
bit Security Controller, User interface manual
(optional)
V3.02.000,
2020-02-07
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
Please note that NRG functionality and toolbox are out of scope of this evaluation, hence
no evaluated TOE guidance documentation applies. However, respective developer
provided documentation may be available. User discretion is advised.
The delivery documentation describes all procedures that are necessary to maintain
security when distributing versions of the TOE or parts of it to the user’s site including the
necessary intermediate delivery procedures.
Furthermore, the delivery documentation describes in a sufficient manner how the various
procedures and technical measures provide for the detection of modifications and any
discrepancies between the TOE respective parts of it send by the TOE Manufacturer and
the version received by the Composite Product Manufacturer.
Three different delivery procedures have to be taken into consideration:
● Delivery of the IC dedicated software components (IC dedicated SW, guidance) from the
TOE Manufacturer to the IC Embedded Software Developer.
● Delivery of the IC Embedded Software (ROM / Flash data, initialisation and pre-
personalisation data) from the IC Embedded Software Developer to the TOE
Manufacturer.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1107-2020
● Delivery of the final TOE from the TOE Manufacturer to the Composite Product
Manufacturer. After phase 3 the TOE is delivered in form of wafers or sawn wafers, after
phase 4 in form of modules (with or without inlay antenna) or any other packaging form
as offered.
Respective distribution centers are listed in Appendix B (see end of document).
The individual TOE hardware is uniquely identified by its identification data. Each individual
TOE can therefore be traced unambiguously and thus assigned to the entire development
and production process.
The hardware part of the TOE is identified by IFX_CCI_00002Dh, IFX_CCI_000039h,
IFX_CCI_00003Ah, IFX_CCI_000044h, IFX_CCI_000045h, IFX_CCI_000046h,
IFX_CCI_000047h, IFX_CCI_000048h, IFX_CCI_000049h, IFX_CCI_00004Ah,
IFX_CCI_00004Bh, IFX_CCI_00004Ch, IFX_CCI_00004Dh, IFX_CCI_00004Eh design
step T11.
Another characteristic of the TOE are the chip identification data. These chip identification
data is accessible via the Generic Chip Identification Mode (GCIM) (see [12], section 4.5).
At TOE start-up the so called GCIM can be chosen by applying special signalling in
contactless or contact based communication and the TOE outputs then the generic chip
identification data (unless another configuration option is chosen). This data contain the
firmware identifier accompanied with the certification identifier, the design step and even
more tracking information. In combination with [12] (section 4.5) the user can identify the
data, interpret it and retrieve the TOE versioning information. This information includes
also the required mapping of firmware identifier and certification identifier.
The optional software libraries can be identified by their unique version numbers and by
calculating a hash value (e.g. SHA-256) over the delivered lib-files (.lib) and comparing the
calculated vales to the values stated in Security Target [6] and [9], sections 9 - 13.
3. Security Policy
The security policy enforced is defined by the selected set of security functional
requirements and implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
The security policy of the TOE is to provide basic security functionalities to be used by the
smart card operating system and the smart card application, thus providing an overall
smart card system security. Therefore, the TOE will implement a symmetric cryptographic
block cipher algorithm (Triple-DES and AES) to ensure the confidentiality of plain text data
by encryption and to support secure authentication protocols and it will provide different
random number generators.
The RSA library is used to provide a high-level interface to RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman)
cryptography implemented on the hardware component Crypto@2304T and includes
countermeasures against SPA, DPA and DFA attacks. The EC library is used to provide a
high-level interface to Elliptic Curve cryptography implemented on the hardware
component Crypto@2304T and includes countermeasures against SPA, DPA and DFA
attacks.
Besides that, the TOE can come with the optional Hardware Support Library (HSL)
providing a simplified interface for NVM management and provides the possibility to write
tearing safe into the NVM.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1107-2020 Certification Report
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is also to
provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the confidentiality of
cryptographic keys during AES, Triple-DES, RSA and EC cryptographic functions
performed by the TOE), against physical probing, against malfunctions, against physical
manipulations and against abuse of functionality. Hence the TOE shall:
● maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the TOE,
and
● maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security
functionalities (security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the TOE.
Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policies can be found in sections
6 and 7 of the Security Target [6] and [9].
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of threats and
organisational security policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled and measures to be taken by the IT environment,
the user or the risk manager. The following topics are of relevance:
The objective OE.Resp-Appl states that the IC embedded software developer shall treat
user data (especially keys) of the composite product appropriately. The IC embedded
software developer gets sufficient information on how to protect user data adequately in
the security guidelines [14].
The ST includes the following security objectives for the operational environment, which
are relevant for the Composite Product Manufacturer: OE.Process-Sec-IC,
OE.Lim_Block_Loader, OE.Loader_Usage, OE.TOE_Auth, and OE.Prevent_Masquerade.
The objective OE.Process-Sec-IC requires the protection of the TOE, as well as of its
manufacturing and test data up to the delivery to the end-consumer. As defined in [6] and
[9] section 1.4.5 the TOE can be delivered to the composite product manufacturer after
phase 3 or after phase 4. However, the single chips are identical in all cases. This means
that the test mode is deactivated and the TOE is locked in the user mode. Therefore, it is
not necessary to distinguish between these forms of delivery. Since Infineon has no
information about the security requirements of the implemented IC embedded software it is
not possible to define any concrete security requirements for the environment of the
composite product manufacturer.
The objective OE.TOE_Auth requires that the environment has to support the
authentication and verification mechanism and has to know the corresponding
authentication reference data. The composite product manufacturer receives sufficient
information with regard to the authentication mechanism in [15], section 2.1.5. Please note
that this objective is only valid in case the Flash Loader is ordered with mutual
authentication (i.e., option External Authentication is unavailable).
The objective OE.Prevent_Masquerade is valid in case the Flash Loader is ordered with
External Authentication (EA) instead of mutual authentication. In this case, customers
need to take care that not masquerading attacks can be performed. The objective replaces
OE.Loader-Usage. A description of the External Authentication is given in [15], section
2.1.5 and further highlights the risks of masquerading attacks when using this order option
of the flash loader:
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The objective OE.Prevent_Masquerade is valid in case the Flash Loader is ordered
with External Authentication (EA) instead of a mutual authentication. In this case,
customers need to take care that not masquerading attacks can be performed.
The objective OE.Loader_Usage requires that the authorised user has to support the
trusted communication with the TOE by protecting the confidentiality and integrity of the
loaded data and he has to meet the access conditions defined by the flash loader. [15],
section 4 provides sufficient information regarding this topic.
The objective OE.Lim_Block_Loader requires the composite product manufacturer to
protect the loader against misuse, to limit the capability of the loader and to terminate the
loader irreversibly after the intended usage. The permanent deactivation of the flash loader
is described in [15], section 2.1.2.2. This objective for the environment originates from the
“Package 1: Loader dedicated for usage in secured environment only”. However, this TOE
also implements “Package 2: Loader dedicated for usage by authorized users only” and
thus the flash loader can also be used in an unsecure environment and is able to protect
itself against misuse if the authentication and download keys are handled appropriately.
5. Architectural Information
For further information on the TOE architecture, see Security Target [6] and [9], section 1
(especially sections 1.3 and 1.4).
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
Regarding functional testing:
Different classes of functional tests were performed by the developer to test the TOE:
● Simulation tests (design verification),
● Qualification tests,
● Verification Tests,
● Security Evaluation Tests,
● Production Tests.
The developer’s testing results demonstrate that the TSFs behave as specified. The
developer’s testing results also demonstrate that the TOE behaves as expected.
In the course of the evaluation of the TOE, the following classes of functional tests were
carried out by the ITSEF:
● Module tests,
● Simulation tests,
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● Emulation tests,
● Tests in user mode,
● Tests in test mode,
● Hardware tests,
● Optional library tests,
● repetition of developer tests (see above).
With these kinds of tests the entire security functionality of the TOE was tested.
The results of the (functional) developer tests, which have been repeated by the evaluator,
matched the results the developer stated.
Overall the TSF has been functionally tested against the functional specification, the TOE
design and the security architecture description. The tests demonstrate that the TSF
performs as specified.
Regarding AVA related tests:
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential high was actually
successful in the TOE’s operational environment as defined in [6] and [9], provided that all
measures required by the developer are applied.
The embedded software has to implement the security advices given in [11] - [20].
8. Evaluated Configuration
In the broadest sense, the production of the mask sets for the chip production may be
looked upon as the procedure for the system generation. The TOE can be delivered in the
following hardware configurations
IFX_CCI_00002Dh, IFX_CCI_000039h, IFX_CCI_00003Ah, IFX_CCI_000044h,
IFX_CCI_000045h, IFX_CCI_000046h, IFX_CCI_000047h, IFX_CCI_000048h,
IFX_CCI_000049h, IFX_CCI_00004Ah, IFX_CCI_00004Bh, IFX_CCI_00004Ch,
IFX_CCI_00004Dh and IFX_CCI_00004Eh.
This TOE is represented by various configurations called products. The module design,
layout and footprint, of all products are identical. The degree of freedom for configuring the
TOE is predefined by the developer.
Furthermore comprising of firmware and optional software libraries with revisions stated in
section 2. The flash loader (part of FW) was enabled on evaluated derivative.
An extensive overview over all possible configuration options is given in the Security
Target [6] and [9] in sections 1.4.5 and 1.4.7.
The evaluation results, also including results of tests performed by the developer, are valid
for all hardware derivates mentioned above. All identifiers represent the equal hardware
platform but name differences in configurations or market segments. Configuration
differences are achieved by blocking only. The firmware and optional software libraries
were examined in those revisions, which are stated in table 2 (above).
The evaluation results are valid for all configurations and blocking options of the hardware
stated in section 1.4.7 of the Security Target [6] and [9]. Depending on configuration,
blocking option and on selection of optional software libraries, some of the services might
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be unavailable to the user. The unavailable services have no security impact on the TOE.
The user must ensure a working configuration. The evaluation results apply to all
configurations of Flash Loader, BPU and PIN-Letter as stated in the Security Target [6] and
[9].
The evaluation results cannot be extended to further versions/derivates of the TOE and/or
other production sites without any extra investigations.
Developer and evaluator tested the TOE in these configurations in which the TOE is
delivered and which is described above and in Section 2.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 1, Durchführung
der Ortsbesichtigung in der Entwicklungsumgebung des Herstellers, Version 14, 2017-
10-11, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 14, Anforderungen
an Aufbau und Inhalt der ETR-Teile (Evaluation Technical Report) für Evaluationen nach
CC (Common Criteria), Version 7, 2010-08-03, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik.
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 19, Anforderungen
an Aufbau und Inhalt der Zusammenfassung des ETR (Evaluation Technical Report) für
Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria), Version 9, 2014-11-03, Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 20,
Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 2013-05-15, Herausgeber: Zertifizierungsstelle des
BSI im Rahmen des Zertifizierungsschemas, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik.
● A proposal for: Functionality classes for random number generators, W. Killmann, W.
Schindler, Version 2.0, 2011-09-18, T-Systems GEI GmbH and Bundesamt für Sicherheit
in der Informationstechnik. (same as [AIS31_KS2011])
● Developer evidence for the evaluation of a deterministic random number generator,
Version 0.9, 2013-02-28, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
● Evaluation Report as part of the Evaluation Technical Report, Part B – ETR-Part
Deterministic Random Number Generator, Template-Version 0.10, 2013-02-28,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
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● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 23,
Zusammentragen von Nachweisen der Entwickler, Version 4, 2017-03-15, Bundesamt
für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
● CC Supporting Document Guidance – Collection of Developer Evidence, Version 1.5,
April 2012, CCDB-2012-04-005.
● Joint Interpretation Library – Collection of Developer Evidence, Version 1.5, January
2012.
● Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) – AIS 25, Anwendungen der
CC auf integrierte Schaltungen, Version 9, 2017-03-15, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik.
● CC Supporting Document Mandatory Technical Document – Security Architecture
requirements (ADV_ARC) for smart cards and similar devices, Version 2.1, April 2014,
CCDB-2012-04-004.
● CC Supporting Document Guidance – Security Architecture requirements (ADV_ARC)
for smart cards and similar devices – Appendix 1, Version 2.0, April 2012.
● CC Supporting Document Mandatory Technical Document – The Application of CC to
Integrated Circuits, Version 3.0, Revision 1, March 2009, CCDB-2009-03-002.
● Joint Interpretation Library – Security Architecture requirements (ADV_ARC) for smart
cards and similar devices – Appendix 1, Version 2.0, January 2012.
● Joint Interpretation Library – The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits, Version 3.0,
February 2009.
● Joint Interpretation Library – Security requirements for post-delivery code loading,
Version 1.0, February 2016.
● Validity of conducted tests on Security Smart Card ICs in dependence of test date,
Version 1, 2017-03-15, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 26,
Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware Integrierte Schaltungen, Version 10, 2017-07-
03, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
● Auswahl geeigneter Chips für DPA-Messungen, Version 1.1, 2008-12-07, Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
● Special Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 1.4, 2011-06-08,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
● CC Supporting Document Mandatory Technical Document – Requirements to perform
Integrated Circuit Evaluations, Version 1.1, May 2013, CCDB-2013-05-001.
● Joint Interpretation Library – Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 2.9,
2013-01.
● Joint Interpretation Library – Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices,
Version 2.4, 2020-01, confidential.
● Joint Interpretation Library – Requirements to perform Integrated Circuit Evaluations,
Version 1.1, February 2013.
● Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) – AIS 27, Transition from
ITSEC to CC, Version 5, 2010-08-17, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik.
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● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 31,
Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 2013-05-15, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik.
● Developer evidence for the evaluation of a physical true random generator, Version 0.8,
2013-02-28, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
● Evaluation Report as part of the Evaluation Technical Report, Part B – ETR-Part True
Physical and Hybrid Random Number Generator, Template-Version 0.7, 2013-02-28,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 32, CC-
Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema, Version 7, 2011-06-08,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
● Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) – AIS 34, Evaluation
Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+ (CC v2.3 & v3.1) and EAL6 (CC
v3.1), Version 3, 2009-09-03, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 35, Öffentliche
Fassung eines Security Target (ST-lite), Version 2, 2007-11-12, Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 36,
Kompositionsevaluierung, Version 5, 2017-03-15, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik.
● CC Supporting Document Mandatory Technical Document – Composite product
evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices, Version 1.4, December 2015, CCDB-
2015-12-001.
● Joint Interpretation Library – Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar
devices, Version 1.5.1, May 2018.
● CC Supporting Document Guidance – ETR template for composite evaluation of Smart
Cards and similar devices, Version 1.1, December 2015, CCDB-2015-12-002.
● Joint Interpretation Library – ETR template for composite evaluation of Smart Cards and
similar devices, Version 1.1, August 2015.
● Joint Interpretation Library – Certification of “open” smart card products, Version 1.1 (for
trial use), 2013-02-04.
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 37, Terminologie
und Vorbereitung von Smartcard-Evaluierungen, Version 3, 2010-05-17, Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
● CC Supporting Document Guidance – Smartcard Evaluation, Version 2.0, February
2010, CCDB-2010-03-001.
● Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) – AIS 38, Reuse of evaluation
results, Version 2, 2007-09-28, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
● Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) – AIS 41, Guidelines for PPs
and STs, Version 2, 2011-01-31, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
● Guidance Document – The PP/ST Guide, Version 2, Revision 0, 2010-08, Bundesamt
für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
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● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 46, Informationen
zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und ergänzende Hinweise für die
Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 2013-12-04, Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
● Review-Protokoll zum (Krypto-)AVA-KickOff, Template-Version/Date: 2019-08-23,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
● Minimal Requirements for Evaluating Side-Channel Attack Resistance of Elliptic Curve
Implementations, Version 1.0.4, 2011-07-01, BSI.
● Methodology for cryptographic rating of memory encryption schemes used in smartcards
and similar devices, Version 1.0, 2013-10-31, BSI.
● Minimum Requirements for Evaluating Side-Channel Attack Resistance of RSA, DSA
and Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Implementations, Version 1.0, 2013-01-14, BSI.
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 47, Regelungen zu
Site Certification, Version 1.1, 2013-12-04, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik.
● Guidance for Site Certification, Version 1.1, 2013-12-04, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik.
● Joint Interpretation Library – Minimum Site Security Requirements, 04/2019.
(see [4] for respective AIS references).
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20/31 was used (see [4]).
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation, the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 6 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report),
● The components ALC_FLR.1 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation
Packages Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
[8],
● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended,
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 6 augmented by ALC_FLR.1.
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
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9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a
security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The following table (which originates from the ITSEF-evaluated table in [7] and in this
certification report is enhanced by the 100 bit column) provides an overview of the
cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to enforce the security policy and outlines its
rating from cryptographic point of view. Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in
column 'Security Level above 100 Bits' of the following table with 'no' achieves a security
level of lower than 100 Bits (in general context) only.
# Purpose /
Service
Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Security
Level
above
100 Bits
SCP (Symmetric Cryptographic Processor)
1 Cryptographic
primitive
TDES [NIST SP800-67],
[ISO18033-3]
112, 168 Yes (for |
k|=168
bit)
2 Cryptographic
primitive
AES [FIPS197],
[ISO18033-3]
128, 192, 256 Yes
3 Confidentiality TDES (see #1) in
ECB mode for
encryption and
decryption
[NIST SP800-38A] 112, 168 No
4 Confidentiality TDES (see #1) in
CBC mode for
encryption and
decryption
[NIST SP800-38A] 112, 168 Yes (for |
k|=168
bit)
5 Confidentiality AES (see #2) in ECB
mode for encryption
and decryption
[NIST SP800-38A] 128, 192, 256 No
6 Confidentiality AES (see #2) in CBC
mode for encryption
and decryption
[NIST SP800-38A] 128, 192, 256 Yes
SCL (Symmetric Cryptographic Library)
7 Cryptographic
primitive
TDES [NIST SP800-67],
[ISO18033-3]
112, 168 Yes (for |
k|=168
bit)
8 Cryptographic
primitive
AES [FIPS197],
[ISO18033-3]
128, 192, 256 Yes
9 Confidentility #7 in ECB mode for
encryption and
decryption
[NIST SP800-38A] 112, 168 No
10 Confidentility #7 in CBC mode for
encryption and
[NIST SP800-38A] 112, 168 Yes (for |
k|=168
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1107-2020 Certification Report
# Purpose /
Service
Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Security
Level
above
100 Bits
decryption bit)
11 Confidentility #7 in CTR mode for
encryption and
decryption
[NIST SP800-38A] 112, 168 Yes (for |
k|=168
bit)
12 Confidentility #7 in CFB mode for
encryption and
decryption
[NIST SP800-38A] 112, 168 Yes (for |
k|=168
bit)
13 Integrity #7 in CMAC mode
for MAC generation
and verification
[NIST SP800-38B] 112, 168 Yes (for |
k|=168
bit)
14 Integrity #7 in Retail MAC
(Algorithm 3) for
MAC generation and
verification
[ISO9797-1] 112 No
15 Confidentiality #8 in ECB mode for
encryption and
decryption
[NIST SP800-38A] 128, 192, 256 No
16 Confidentiality #8 in CBC mode for
encryption and
decryption
[NIST SP800-38A] 128, 192, 256 Yes
17 Confidentiality #8 in CTR mode for
encryption and
decryption
[NIST SP800-38A] 128, 192, 256 Yes
18 Confidentiality #8 in CFB mode for
encryption and
decryption
[NIST SP800-38A] 128, 192, 256 Yes
19 Integrity #8 in CMAC mode
for MAC generation
and verification
[NIST SP800-38B] 128, 192, 256 Yes
ACL (Asymmetric Cryptographic Library)
20 Confidentiality RSAEP encryption [PKCS #1, 5.1.1] 512 – 2112 Yes (for |
k|≥1976
bit)
21 Confidentiality IFEP-RSA encryption [IEEE_P1363,
8.2.2]
512 – 2112 Yes (for |
k|≥1976
bit)
22 Confidentiality RSADP decryption [PKCS #1, 5.1.2] 512 – 2112 Yes (for |
k|≥1976
bit)
23 Confidentiality IFDP-RSA
decryption
[IEEE_P1363,
8.2.1 (I) / 8.2.3]
512 – 2112 Yes (for |
k|≥1976
bit)
24 Confidentiality RSADP decryption
with CRT
[PKCS #1, 5.1.2] 512 – 4224 Yes (for |
k|≥1976
bit)
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# Purpose /
Service
Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Security
Level
above
100 Bits
25 Confidentiality IFDP-RSA
decryption with CRT
[IEEE_P1363,
8.2.1 (I) / 8.2.3]
512 – 4224 Yes (for |
k|≥1976
bit)
26 Authenticity RSASP1 signature
generation
[PKCS #1, 5.2.1] 512 – 2112 Yes (for |
k|≥1976
bit)
27 Authenticity IFSP-RSA1
signature generation
[IEEE_P1363,
8.2.1 (I) / 8.2.4]
512 – 2112 Yes (for |
k|≥1976
bit)
28 Authenticity RSASP1 signature
generation with CRT
[PKCS #1, 5.2.1] 512 – 4224 Yes (for |
k|≥1976
bit)
29 Authenticity IFSP-RSA1
signature generation
with CRT
[IEEE_P1363,
8.2.1 (I) / 8.2.4]
512 – 4224 Yes (for |
k|≥1976
bit)
30 Authenticity RSAVP1 signature
verification
[PKCS #1, 5.2.2] 512 – 4224 Yes (for |
k|≥1976
bit)
31 Authenticity IFVP-RSA1 [IEEE_P1363,
8.2.5]
512 – 4224 Yes (for |
k|≥1976
bit)
32 Key generation
(see below table)
Proprietary RSA key-
pair generation with
CRT
[PKCS #1, 3.1 /
3.2]
[IEEE_P1363,
8.1.3.1]
512 – 4224 N/A
(see
below
table)
33 Key generation
(see below table)
Proprietary RSA key-
pair generation
without CRT
returning key
representation n and
d
[PKCS #1, 3.1 /
3.2]
[IEEE_P1363,
8.1.3.1]
512 – 2112 N/A
(see
below
table)
34 Key generation
(see below table)
Proprietary RSA key-
pair generation
without CRT
returning key
representation p, q
and d
[IEEE_P1363,
8.1.3.1]
512 – 2112 N/A
(see
below
table)
35 (supplementary
information)
Certified ECC curve
parameters
[FIPS186-4]
[RFC5639]
Key sizes corresponding
to the used elliptic curves
NIST: P-{192, 224, 256,
384, 521}, K-{163, 233,
283, 409}, B-{233, 283,
409} [FIPS186-4];
brainpool: P{160, 192,
224, 256, 320, 384,
512}t1, P{160, 192, 224,
256, 320, 384, 512}r1
[RFC5639]
N/A
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1107-2020 Certification Report
# Purpose /
Service
Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Security
Level
above
100 Bits
36 Cryptographic
primitive /
functionality
EC point addition on
curves listed in #35
N/A 160 - 521 N/A
37 Authenticity ECDSA signature
generation on curves
listed in #35
[ANS X9.62, 7.3],
[IEEE_P1363,
7.2.7]
160 – 521 Yes (for |
k|≥224
bit)
38 Authenticity ECDSA signature
verification on curves
listed in #35
[ANS X9.62, 7.4.1]
[IEEE_P1363,
7.2.8]
160 – 521 Yes (for |
k|≥250
bit)
39 Key agreement Elliptic Curve Diffie-
Hellman (ECDH) key
agreement on curves
listed in #35
[ANS X9.63, 5.4.1],
[ISO_11770-3, D.6]
[IEEE_P1363,
7.2.1]
160 – 521 Yes (for |
k|≥250
bit)
40 Key generation Elliptic Curve key
generation on curves
listed in #35
[ANS X9.62, A.4.3]
[IEEE_P1363,
A.16.9]
160 – 521 Yes (for |
k|≥224
bit)
Flash Loader
41 Confidentiality #2 in CCM mode for
encryption and
decryption
[NIST SP800-38C] 128 Yes
42 Authenticity #2 in CCM mode for
MAC verification
[NIST SP800-38C] 128 Yes
43 Authenticity #2 in ECB mode [NIST SP800-38A] 128 No
44 Authenticity Mutual
authentication
protocol based on
#42
[AGD_PPUM,
2.1.5]
128 Yes
45 Authenticity External
authentication
protocol based on
#43
[AGD_PPUM,
2.1.5]
128 N/A
(see
below
table)
Random Number Generation
46 RNG Physical RNG PTG.2 in [AIS31] N/A N/A
47 RNG Hybrid RNG Corresponds to
PTG.3 in [AIS31]
N/A N/A
48 RNG Deterministic RNG Corresponds to
DRG.3 in [AIS20]
N/A N/A
49 RNG Deterministic RNG Corresponds to
DRG.4 in [AIS20]
N/A N/A
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality
The TOE’s memory enryption, named ICS (“ICS-C8”) and not separately listed above, was
evaluated according to BSI’s “Methodology for cryptographic rating of memory encryption
schemes used in smartcards and similar devices” (Version 1.0, 2013-10-31).
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Regarding the cryptographic functionalities listed in rows #32 - #34 (RSA key generation
based on CryptoRsaKeyGenMask_PQ), the following applies:
CryptoRsaKeyGenMask_PQ is used for key component p, q (i.e. prime number)
generation. It implements [FIPS186-4] section B.3.3 method using AIS31 PTG.2
RBG for prime generation and [FIPS186-4] section C.3.1 primality test, extended by
additional tests. It is to be remarked that [FIPS186-4] section B.3.3 allows this
generation method only for 2048 and 3072 bit keys. That kind of conformance then
was confirmed by the ITSEF in the course of the evaluation, regardless of said
standard not being explicitly claimed in the respective FCS_CKM.1 SFRs of the
Security Target [6] and [9].
The Flash Loader's cryptographic strength with regard to the mode “external authenticate”
(see #45 in table 4) was not assessed by BSI. However, the evaluation according to the
TOE's Evaluation Assurance Level (including VAN.5) did not reveal any implementation
weaknesses.
Please note, that this holds true also for those algorithms, where no cryptographic 100-Bit-
Level assessment was given at all (i.e where ”N/A” was stated). Consequently, the
targeted Evaluation Assurance Level has been achieved for those functionalities as well.
Further conformance evaluation and assessment to claimed cryptographic functionality
standards is documented in the confidential report “Cryptographic Standards Compliance
Verification” [21].
Reference of Legislatives and Standards quoted above:
[AIS20] Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS
20, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für
deterministische Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 2013-05-15,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
[AIS31] Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS
31, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für
physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 2013-05-15,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
[ANS X9.62] American National Standard for Financial Services ANS X9.62-2005,
Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry, The
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), November 16,
2005, American National Standards Institute.
[ANS X9.63] American National Standard for Financial Services X9.63-2011,
Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry - Key
Agreement and Key Transport Using Elliptic Curve Cryptography,
December 21, 2011, American National Standards Institute
[AGD_PPUM] see reference [15] in bibliography (section 14)
[FIPS186-4] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication FIPS PUB
186-4, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), July 2013, U.S. department
of Commerce / National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST)
[FIPS197] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197,
Announcing the ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES),
2001-11-26, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
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[IEEE_P1363] IEEE P1363. Standard specifications for public key cryptography.
IEEE, 2000
[ISO_9797-1] Information technology - Security techniques - Message
Authentication Codes (MACs) - Part 1: Mechanisms using a block
cipher, 1999-12, ISO/IEC
[ISO_11770-3] ISO 11770-3: Information technology - Security techniques – Key
management Part 3: Mechanisms using asymmetric techniques, ISO/
IEC 11770-3:2008
[ISO_18033-3] ISO 18033-3: Information technology - Security techniques –
Encryption algorithms – Part 3: Block ciphers, ISO/IEC 18033-3:2005
[NIST SP800-38A] NIST SP800-38A, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation, Methods and Techniques, 2001, National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST)
[NIST SP800-38B] NIST SP800-38B, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation, The CMAC Mode for Authentication, 2005-05, National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
[NIST SP800-38C] NIST SP800-38C, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: the CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality,
2004-05 with updates as of 2007-07-20, National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST)
[NIST SP800-67] NIST Special Publication 800-67 – Revision 2, Recommendation for
the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher – Revised
November 2017, National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST), Technology Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce
[PKCS-1] PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Standard, Version 2.2, October 27,
2012, RSA Laboratories
[RFC5639] RFC 5639 - Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Brainpool Standard
Curves and Curve Generation, IETF Trust and the persons identified
as the document authors, March 2010
(http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5639.txt)
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
Some security measures are partly implemented in this certified TOE, but require
additional configuration or control or measures to be implemented by a product layer on
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top, e.g. the Embedded Software using the TOE. For this reason the TOE includes
guidance documentation (see table 2) which contains obligations and guidelines for the
developer of the product layer on top on how to securely use this certified TOE and which
measures have to be implemented in order to fulfil the security requirements of the
Security Target of the TOE. In the course of the evaluation of the composite product or
system it must be examined if the required measures have been correctly and effectively
implemented by the product layer on top. Additionally, the evaluation of the composite
product or system must also consider the evaluation results as outlined in the document
"ETR for composite evaluation" [10].
At the point in time when evaluation and certification results are reused there might be an
update of the document "ETR for composite evaluation" available. Therefore, the certified
products list on the BSI website has to be checked for latest information on
reassessments, recertifications or maintenance result available for the product.
Furthermore:
The TOE is delivered to the composite product manufacturer and to the security IC
embedded software developer. The actual end-consumer obtains the TOE from the
composite product issuer together with the application which runs on the TOE.
The security IC embedded software developer receives all necessary recommendations
and hints to develop his software in form of the delivered documentation.
● All security hints described in the delivered documents in [11] - [20] have to be
considered.
The composite product manufacturer receives all necessary recommendations and hints to
develop his software in form of the delivered documentation.
● All security hints described in [15] have to be considered.
In addition the following hint resulting from the evaluation of the ALC evaluation aspect has
to be considered:
● The security IC embedded software developer can deliver his software either to Infineon
to let them implement it in the TOE (in the Flash memory) or to the composite product
manufacturer to let him download the software in the Flash memory.
● The delivery procedure from the security IC embedded software developer to the
composite product manufacturer is not part of this evaluation and a secure delivery is
required. The TOE provides a flash loader with mutual authentication to establish a
secure channel. In this case a secure transport is not required.
● The TOE can come with a pre-loaded image called Performance Flash Loader, which is
a non-TOE component. Using the PFL results in a non-certified product.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None.
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13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
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Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1107-2020, Version 4.0, 2020-10-15,
“IFX_CCI_00002Dh, IFX_CCI_000039h, IFX_CCI_00003Ah, IFX_CCI_000044h,
IFX_CCI_000045h, IFX_CCI_000046h, IFX_CCI_000047h, IFX_CCI_000048h,
IFX_CCI_000049h, IFX_CCI_00004Ah, IFX_CCI_00004Bh, IFX_CCI_00004Ch,
IFX_CCI_00004Dh, IFX_CCI_00004Eh T11 Security Target”, Infineon Technologies
AG (confidential document)
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 3, 2020-11-13, “ETR Summary”, TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
[8] Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages Version 1.0, 13
January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
[9] Security Target Lite BSI-DSZ-CC-1107-2020, Version 4.0, 2020-10-15,
“IFX_CCI_00002Dh, IFX_CCI_000039h, IFX_CCI_00003Ah, IFX_CCI_000044h,
IFX_CCI_000045h, IFX_CCI_000046h, IFX_CCI_000047h, IFX_CCI_000048h,
IFX_CCI_000049h, IFX_CCI_00004Ah, IFX_CCI_00004Bh, IFX_CCI_00004Ch,
IFX_CCI_00004Dh, IFX_CCI_00004Eh T11 Security Target Lite”, Infineon
Technologies AG (sanitised public document)
7
See section 9.1 for relevant AIS
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[10] ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 for BSI-DSZ-CC-1107-2020,
Version 3, 2020-11-13, “ETR for Composition”, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH
(confidential document)
[11] Configuration list for the TOE, 2019-09-13, “Configuration Management Plan”
(confidential document)
[12] “32-bit Security Controller – V11, Hardware Reference Manual”, V5.2, 2020-02-05,
Infineon Technologies AG
[13] “32-bit Security Controllers, SLx1/SLx3 Controller Family, Programmer’s Reference
Manual”, V4.5, 2020-06-22, Infineon Technologies AG
[14] “32-bit Security Controller – V11, Security Guidelines”, v1.00-2661, 2020-10-05,
Infineon Technologies AG
[15] “Production and personalization, 32-bit security controller”, v.09.12, 2020-07-03,
Infineon Technologies AG
[16] “32-bit Security Controller Crypto2304T V3, User Manual”, V2.0, 2019-04-24,
Infineon Technologies AG
[17] “HSL for SLCx7V11a Hardware Support Library”, v3.52.9708, 2020-02-03, Infineon
Technologies AG
[18] “UMSLC library for SLCx7 in 40nm”, v01.30.0564, 2019-06-19, Infineon
Technologies AG
[19] “SCL37-SCP-v440-C40 Symmetric Crypto Library for SCPv440 AES/DES/MAC”,
v2.11.003, 2020-02-10, Infineon Technologies AG
[20] “ACL37-Crypto2304T-C40 Asymmetric Crypto Library for Crypto2304T
RSA/ECC/Toolbox”, v3.02.000, 2020-02-07, Infineon Technologies AG
[21] “Cryptographic Standards Compliance Verification”, Version 1, 2020-07-14, TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
[22] “Site Technical Audit Report (STAR) Amkor Technology, Portugal”, Version 1, 2020-
10-12, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH
[23] “Site Technical Audit Report (STAR) Amkor Technologies Inc., Philippines”, Version
1, 2020-10-12, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH
[24] “Site Technical Audit Report (STAR) DHL Supply Chain Singapore Pte Ltd.,
Advanced Regional Center”, Version 1, 2020-10-12, TÜV Informationstechnik
GmbH
[25] “Site Technical Audit Report (STAR) DNP Photomask Europe S.p.A., Agrate, Italy”,
Version 1, 2020-10-12, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH
[26] “Site Technical Audit Report (STAR) exceet Card Austria GmbH”, Version 1, 2020-
10-12, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH
[27] “Site Technical Audit Report (STAR) Infineon Technologies AG, Augsburg”, Version
1, 2020-10-12, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH
[28] “Site Technical Audit Report (STAR) Infineon Technologies India Pvt. Ltd, Bangalore,
India”, Version 1, 2020-10-12, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH
[29] “Site Technical Audit Report (STAR) Infineon Technologies AG, Bucharest”, Version
1, 2020-10-12, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH
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[30] “Site Technical Audit Report (STAR) Infineon Technologies GmbH & Co. KG,
Dresden”, Version 1, 2020-10-12, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH
[31] “Site Technical Audit Report (STAR) Infineon Technologies Austria AG, Graz”,
Version 1, 2020-10-12, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH
[32] “Site Technical Audit Report (STAR) Infineon Technologies IT Services GmbH,
Klagenfurt”, Version 1, 2020-10-12, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH
[33] “Site Technical Audit Report (STAR) Infineon Technologies AG, Munich”, Version 1,
2020-10-12, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH
[34] “Site Technical Audit Report (STAR) Infineon Technologies Sdn. Bhd., Melaka,
Malaysia”, Version 1, 2020-10-12, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH
[35] “Site Technical Audit Report (STAR) Infineon Technologies North America Corp.,
Morgan Hill”, 2020-10-12, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH
[36] “Site Technical Audit Report (STAR) Infineon Technologies AG, Milpitas, CA, USA”,
Version 1, 2020-10-12, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH
[37] “Site Technical Audit Report (STAR) Infineon Technologies AG, Regensburg”,
Version 1, 2020-10-12, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH
[38] “Site Technical Audit Report (STAR) Infineon Technologies AG, Singapore, Kallang”,
Version 1, 2020-10-12, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH
[39] “Site Technical Audit Report (STAR) Infineon Technologies Austria AG, Villach”,
Version 1, 2020-10-12, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH
[40] “Site Technical Audit Report (STAR) Infineon Technologies Co Ltd, Wuxi, China”,
Version 1, 2020-10-12, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH
[41] “Site Technical Audit Report (STAR) Kuehne & Nagel, Großostheim”, Version 1,
2020-10-12, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH
[42] “Site Technical Audit Report (STAR) KWE Kintetsu World Express (China) Co., Ltd.”,
Version 1, 2020-10-12, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH
[43] “Site Technical Audit Report (STAR) Paragon ID, Burlington, USA”, Version 1, 2020-
10-12, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH
[44] “Site Technical Audit Report (STAR) Toppan Printing Co., Ltd., Ranzan, Japan”,
Version 1, 2020-10-12, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH
[45] “Site Technical Audit Report (STAR) Toppan Printing Company America, Inc., Round
Rock, USA”, Version 1, 2020-10-12, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH
[46] “Site Technical Audit Report (STAR) TSMC, Hsinchu Fab12A P1 / P2 / P3, Taiwan”,
Version 1, 2020-10-12, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH
[47] “Site Technical Audit Report (STAR) UTAC Thai Limited, UTL1 / UTL.3”, Version 1,
2020-10-12, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailled definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1107-2020
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product IFX_CCI_00002Dh, IFX_CCI_000039h, IFX_CCI_00003Ah,
IFX_CCI_000044h, IFX_CCI_000045h, IFX_CCI_000046h, IFX_CCI_000047h,
IFX_CCI_000048h, IFX_CCI_000049h, IFX_CCI_00004Ah, IFX_CCI_00004Bh,
IFX_CCI_00004Ch, IFX_CCI_00004Dh, IFX_CCI_00004Eh design step T11 with firmware
80.306.16.0, optional NRG™ SW 05.03.4097, optional HSL v3.52.9708, UMSLC lib
v01.30.0564, optional SCL v2.11.003, optional ACL v3.02.000 and user guidance, (Target
of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by Scheme
Interpretations, by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC
Supporting Documents for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
(CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 17 November 2020, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria
assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.5, ALC_CMS.5,
ALC_DEL.1, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_FLR.1, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.3) are fulfilled for the
development and production sites of the TOE.
The Site Technical Audit Reports (STAR) ([22] – [47]) are thus part of this certification
procedure.
Besides the production and development sites, the relevant TOE distribution centers are
as follows:
Distribution Center name Address
DHL Singapore DHL Exel Supply Chain
Singapore Pte Ltd., Advanced Regional Center
Tampines LogisPark
1 Greenwich Drive
Singapore 533865
G&D Neustadt Giesecke & Devrient Secure Data management
GmbH
Austraße 101b
96465 Neustadt b. Coburg
Germany
IFX Morgan Hill Infineon Technologies North America Corp.
18275 Serene Drive
Morgan Hill, CA 95037
USA
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Distribution Center name Address
KWE Shanghai KWE Kintetsu World Express (China) Co., Ltd.
Shanghai Pudong Airport Pilot Free Trade Zone
No. 530 Zheng Ding Road
Shanghai,
P.R. China
K&N Großostheim Infineon Technology AG
Distribution Center Europe (DCE)
Kühne & Nagel
Stockstädter Strasse 10 – Building 8A
63762 Großostheim
Germany
Table 4: TOE Distribution Centers
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [9]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
Note: End of report
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