BSI-DSZ-CC-0661-2011
for
Micardo V3.6 R1.0 Tachograph V2.0
from
Sagem Orga GmbH (Morpho e-Documents
Division)
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.1 CC-Zert-326 V4.37
BSI-DSZ-CC-0661-2011
Digital Tachograph
Micardo V3.6 R1.0 Tachograph V2.0
from Sagem Orga GmbH (Morpho e-Documents Division)
PP Conformance: None
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ADO_IGS.2, ADV_IMP.2,
ATE_DPT.2, AVA_VLA.4
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3, extended by advice of the Certification Body
for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance to the
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 7 April 2011
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Joachim Weber L.S.
Head of Division
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0661-2011
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0661-2011 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0661-2011
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA).........................8
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates.........................................................8
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................9
4 Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................12
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................13
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................14
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................14
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................14
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................14
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................15
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................15
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................15
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................15
9.1 CC specific results.................................................................................................15
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment....................................................................16
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................17
11 Security Target............................................................................................................18
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................18
12.1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................18
12.2 Glossary...............................................................................................................19
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................20
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................23
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................31
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0661-2011 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● BSIG2
● BSI Certification Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN 45011 standard
● BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005)5
[1]
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 [2]
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
● Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance components above
EAL4 (AIS 34)
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical
domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL1 to EAL4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher
recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined.
It includes assurance levels beyond EAL4 resp. E3 (basic).
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 19
May 2006, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0661-2011
The new agreement was initially signed by the national bodies of Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
Within the terms of this agreement the German Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI) recognises
● for the basic recognition level certificates issued as of April 2010 by the national
certification bodies of France, The Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom.
● for the higher recognition level in the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices
certificates issued as of April 2010 by the national certification bodies of France, The
Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement.
Historically, the first SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement Version 1 (ITSEC only)
became initially effective in March 1998. It was extended in 1999 to include certificates
based on the Common Criteria (MRA Version 2). Recognition of certificates previously
issued under these older versions of the SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement is being
continued.
2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of January 2009 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia,
Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United
States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes
can be seen on the web site: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement.
This evaluation contains the components ADO_IGS.2, ADV_IMP.2, ATE_DPT.2 and
AVA_VLA.4 that are not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the
CCRA. For mutual recognition the EAL4 components of these assurance families are
relevant.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Micardo V3.6 R1.0 Tachograph V2.0 has undergone the certification
procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0358-2006. Specific
results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0602-2009 were re-used.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0661-2011 Certification Report
The evaluation of the product Micardo V3.6 R1.0 Tachograph V2.0 was conducted by SRC
Security Research & Consulting GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 22 March 2011.
The SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the applicant is: Sagem Orga GmbH (Morpho e-Documents
Division)
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4 Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following
report and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5 Publication
The product Micardo V3.6 R1.0 Tachograph V2.0 has been included in the BSI list of the
certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de)
and [5]. Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
7
Sagem Orga GmbH (Morpho e-Documents Division)
Riemekestraße 160
33106 Paderborn
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0661-2011 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0661-2011
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is MICARDO V3.6 R1.0 Tachograph V2.0. It is a smart
card product which will be employed within the Tachograph System as a security medium.
It carries a specific Tachograph Application intended for its use with the recording
equipment.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is not based on a certified
Protection Profile but is written in view of the requirements of the „Generic Security Target“
for the Tachograph Cards within the Tachograph Card Specification [15], Appendix 10
(Tachograph Card Generic Security Target) and the JIL interpretations and requirements in
[16].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the Assurance Requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ADO_IGS.2, ADV_IMP.2, ATE_DPT.2, AVA_VLA.4.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 5.1.1.2. They are selected from Common Criteria Part
2 and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended. (Note: The
supplement „extended“ is only relevant for the SFRs of the underlying IC with its IC
Dedicated Support Software.)
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
F.ACS Security Attribute Based Access Control
F.IA_AKEY Key Based User / TOE Authentication
F.IA_PWD Password Based User Authentication
F.DATA_INT Stored Data Integrity Monitoring and Action
F.EX_CONF Confidentiality of Data Exchange
F.EX_INT Integrity and Authenticity of Data Exchange
F.RIP Residual Information Protection
F.FAIL_PROT Hardware and Software Failure Protection
F.SIDE_CHAN Side Channel Analysis Control
F.SELFTEST Self Test
F.GEN_SES Generation of Session Keys
F.GEN_DIGSIG Generation of Digital Signatures
F.VER_DIGSIG Verification of Digital Signatures
F.RSA_ENC Encryption
F.DEC_ENC Decryption
F.CRYPTO Cryptographic Support
Table 1: TOE Security Functions
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0661-2011 Certification Report
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 6.1.1 for the IC part
of the TOE and 6.1.2.
The claimed TOE’s Strength of Functions 'high' (SOF-high) for specific functions as
indicated in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 6.2 is confirmed. The rating of the
Strength of Functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). For details see chapter 9 of this
report.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [9],
chapter 3.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Environment is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [9], chapter 3.2 - 3.4.
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
The TOE is delivered in form of initialised complete cards or in form of initialised modules
(see table 2). A Tachograph Card may be of the following types: Driver Card, Control Card,
Workshop Card or Company Card, depending on the specific application and data loaded
into the card. Additionally, a General Tachograph Card is available that can be irreversibly
converted into one of the different card types by using a specific card command after
initialisation resp. prior to the personalisation of the card. These five different card types
are considered as different configurations of the TOE.
All procedures for personalisation and configuration for the end-user necessary after
delivery are described in the user documentation [13]. For details, refer to Chapter 8.
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Micardo V3.6 R1.0 Tachograph V2.0
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW /
SW
NXP SmartMX
P5CC037V0A Secure Smart
Card Controller (incl. its IC
Dedicated Software,
covering in particular the
Crypto Library, and incl. the
ROM mask)
MICARDO V3.6
R1
Delivery of initialised modules or
smartcards
2 SW Smartcard Operating
System Software
(implemented in ROM /
EEPROM of the
microcontroller)
MICARDO V3.6
R1.0
Delivery of initialised modules or
smartcards
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0661-2011
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
3 SW Tachograph Application
Software
Indicated in the
Data Sheet
In electronic form (within
initialised module or smartcard)
4 DOC User guidance for the
Personaliser of the
Tachograph Card
Version V2.00,
09.03.2011 [12]
Document in paper / electronic
form
5 DOC User guidance for the
Operation of Tachograph
Cards by Issuer and Vehicle
Unit Developer
Version V2.00,
09.03.2011 [13]
Document in paper / electronic
form
6 DOC Data Sheet MICARDO V3.6
R1.0 Tachograph V2.0
Version 1.0.0
with customer
specific
completions [14]
Document in paper / electronic
form
7 KEY Aut-Key of the Tachograph
Card:
Public part of the
authentication key pair
relevant for the authenticity
of the Tachograph Card
Note: The card´s
authentication key pair is
generated by Sagem Orga
GmbH and depends on the
TOE’s configuration
delivered to the customer.
Furthermore, the key pair
may be chosen customer
specific.
Indicated in the
Data Sheet [14]
Document in paper / electronic
form
8 KEY Pers-Key of the Tachograph
Card:
Public part of the
personalisation key pair of
the Tachograph Card
necessary for the
personalisation process at
the personaliser
Note: The card´s
personalisation key pair is
generated by Sagem Orga
GmbH and may depend on
the TOE’s configuration
delivered to the customer.
Furthermore, the key pair
may be chosen customer
specific.
Dependent on
the TOE’s
configuration
Document in paper / electronic
form
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0661-2011 Certification Report
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
9 KEY
PAIR
Pers-Key Pair of the
Personalisation Unit (if
applicable):
Personalisation key pair for
the personalisation unit
necessary for the
personalisation of the
Tachograph Card delivered
to the personaliser
Note: The personalisation
key pair is generated by the
personaliser itself or
alternatively by Sagem Orga
GmbH. In case of a
generation at Sagem Orga
GmbH, the key pair may
depend on the TOE’s
configuration delivered to
the customer and may be
chosen customer specific.
Dependent on
the TOE’s
configuration
Document in paper / electronic
form
10 KEY Static Pers-Key (if
applicable):
Static personalisation key
for the personalisation unit
necessary for the
personalisation of the
Tachograph Card delivered
to the personaliser
Note: The static
personalisation key is
generated by the
personaliser itself or
alternatively by Sagem Orga
GmbH. In case of a
generation at Sagem Orga
GmbH, the key may depend
on the TOE’s configuration
delivered to the customer
and may be chosen
customer specific.
Dependent on
the TOE’s
configuration
Document in paper / electronic
form
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
Initialised cards/modules can be authenticated with the command INTERNAL
AUTHENTICATE. The procedure and the expected answer of the command is described
in the Data Sheet ([14], ch. 3.5).
The card types can be differentiated by the Cold and Warm EEPROM ATR in the following
way:
Cold EEPROM ATR:
3b dd 18ffc0 80 b1 fe451f C3 00 68 d2760000280409 XX 009000 YY
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0661-2011
Warm EEPROM ATR:
3b cd ff80 31 fe45 00 68 d2760000280409 XX 009000 ZZ
In both ATRs, d276000028 is the international RID of Orga, 04 identifies the producer of
the semiconductor, and 09 identifies the TOE Micardo V3.6 Tachograph 2.
The values for XX, YY and ZZ are image specific with the following values:
Card type XX YY ZZ
Driver Card 11 C4 50
Workshop Card 21 F4 60
Control Card 31 E4 70
Company Card 41 94 00
General Card 71 A4 30
Table 3: Deliverables of the TOE
3 Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
The TOE is intended to be used within the Tachograph System as a security medium
which carries a specific Tachograph Application intended for its use with the recording
equipment as specified in [15].
The TOE is the composition of the IC, IC Dedicated Software and Smart Card Embedded
Software. The security policy is to provide:
● protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the confidentiality of
cryptographic keys during cryptographic functions performed by the TOE), against
physical probing, against malfunctions, against physical manipulations, against access
for code and data memory and against abuse of functionality
● secure storage of user data and TSF data
● access control to user data and TSF data according to the specified rules
● secure communication to the vehicle unit of the Tachograph System
● as specified in Appendix 10 of Annex 1B of Regulation (EC) no. 1360/2002 [15].
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The TOE is intended to be used within the Tachograph System as a security medium
which carries a specific Tachograph Application intended for its use with the recording
equipment as specified in [15].
There do not exist any Tachograph Card specific assumptions for the environment of the
TOE as the definition of the card type is done before the TOE personalisation in phase 6
before delivery.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0661-2011 Certification Report
General assumptions are made based on the PP/9911 and PP/9806 referenced in
Appendix 10 of Annex 1B of Regulation (EC) no. 1360/2002 [15] (Generic Security Target).
These general assumptions are structured according to the phases of the life cycle. Some
of these assumptions are related to procedures in phases 1 to 5. These phases were part
of the TOE evaluation. As delivery of the TOE is defined within or at the end of phase 5 of
the life cycle, the phases 6 and 7 are the usage phases of the TOE. Procedures related to
assumptions on these phases and the additional assumption A.PERS on secure
generation and handling of personalisation data are outlined in the user documentation.
The TOE is the Micardo V3.6 R1.0 Tachograph V2.0 providing security functions as
required in Appendix 10 of Annex 1B of Regulation (EC) no. 1360/2002 [15] (Generic
Security Target). Threats on the overall Tachograph System which are not related to the
Tachograph Smart Cards were not addressed by this product evaluation.
5 Architectural Information
The TOE is a product that is composed from an Integrated Circuit with its proprietary IC
Dedicated Software and a Smartcard Embedded Software, consisting of Basic Software
and Application Software. While the Basic Software consists of the MICARDO V3.6 R1.0
Operating System platform of the TOE (realised as native implementation), the Application
Software covers the Application Layer which is directly set-up on the MICARDO V3.6 R1.0
Operating System platform and implements the specific Tachograph Application. As all
these parts of software are running inside the IC, the external interface of the TOE to its
environment can be defined as the external interface of this IC, microcontroller "NXP
Smart Card Controller P5CC037V0A” with the Crypto Library “Secured Cryptographic
Library on P5CC037V0A” as IC Dedicated Support Software provided by NXP
Semiconductors. The IC incl. its Dedicated Software was evaluated according to Common
Criteria EAL 5 augmented with a minimum strength level for its security functions of SOF-
high (refer to Certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0465). The Crypto Library was evaluated
according to Common Criteria EAL 5 augmented with a minimum strength level for its
security functions of SOF-high and is listed under the Certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0612.
According to the high-level design (HLD) the security functions of the TOE are enforced by
the following subsystems:
● Security Functions related to the TSFI (Key Based User / TOE Authentication
(F.IA_AKEY), Password Based User Authentication (F.IA_PWD), Confidentiality of Data
Exchange (F.EX_CONF), Integrity and Authenticity of Data Exchange (F_EX_INT),
Cryptographic Support (F.CRYPTO), Generation of Session Keys (F.GEN_SES),
Generation of Digital Signatures (F.GEN_DIGSIG), Verification of Digital Signatures
(F.VER_DIGSIG), Encryption (F.RSA_ENC) and Decryption (F.RSA_DEC)): Commands,
Initialisation
● Security Attribute Based Access Control (F.ACS): Commands, High-Level OS,
Application Layer, Initialisation
● Data Integrity Protection (F.DATA_INT): Commands, High-Level OS, Low-Level OS
● Residual Information Protection (F.RIP): High-Level OS, Low-Level OS
● Failure Protection (F.FAIL_PROT): High-Level OS; Low-Level OS, Crypto IC
● Side Channel Control (F.SIDE_CHAN): High-Level OS; Low-Level OS, Crypto IC
● Self-Tests (F.SELFTEST): Low-Level OS, Initialisation
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0661-2011
More information on architecture of the TOE and a schematic picture is found in the
Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 2.1.
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7 IT Product Testing
The TOE test configuration is defined by the denotation MICARDO V3.6 R1.0 Tachograph
V2.0 and coincides with the evaluated configuration.
As a basis for the tests, real cards as well as an emulator were used. Real cards were
used mainly for APDU tests, while emulator tests were used for tests which cannot be
performed with real cards, e.g. tests where a checksum error is provoked by the tester by
manipulating the checksum during the test.
The developer tested all TOE Security Functions either on real cards or with emulator
tests. For all commands and functionality tests, test cases are specified in order to
demonstrate its expected behaviour including error cases. Hereby a representative sample
including all boundary values of the parameter set was tested, e.g. all command APDUs
and functions were tested with valid and invalid inputs. Repetition of developer tests was
performed during the independent evaluator tests.
Since many Security Functions can be tested by APDU command sequences, the
evaluators performed these tests with real cards. This is considered to be a reasonable
approach because the developer tests include a full coverage of the security functionality.
Tests with emulators were chosen by the evaluators only for those Security Functions,
where internal resources of the card needed to be modified or observed during the test.
During their independent testing, the evaluators performed
● APDU command testing related to
• initialisation, personalisation and usage phase,
• the access control of files and cryptographic keys,
• external and internal authentication based on asymmetric cryptography,
• correct PIN functionality of the workshop card,
• the correct execution of Secure Messaging,
• the correct execution of cryptographic mechanisms,
● emulator testing related to
• the correct reaction to checksum errors for stored data,
• the correct erasure of secret data after use,
• the correct reaction to a corruption of the card life cycle state,
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0661-2011 Certification Report
● further
• side channel analysis for SHA-1, DES and RSA,
• fault injection attacks (laser attacks),
• source code analysis.
The evaluators tested the TOE systematically against high attack potential during their
penetration testing.
The achieved test results corresponded to the expected test results in almost all cases.
Regarding the exceptional test cases, it was sufficiently explained and justified why they
gave no indications for an unexpected behaviour of security functions of the TOE.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is delivered in form of initialised and tested complete cards or in form of
initialised and tested modules (see table 2). A Tachograph Card may be of the following
types: Driver Card, Control Card, Workshop Card or Company Card depending on the
specific application and data loaded into the card. Additionally, a General Tachograph Card
is available that can be irreversibly converted into one of the different card types by using
a specific card command after initialisation resp. prior to the personalisation of the card.
These five different card types are considered as different configurations of the TOE.
All procedures for personalisation and configuration for the end-user necessary after
delivery are described in the user documentation [13].
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL4
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
(i) The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
(ii) Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards and
(iii) ETR-lite – for Composition and ETR-lite – for Composition: Annex A Composite
smartcard evaluation: Recommended best practice
(see [4], AIS 25, AIS 26 and AIS 36) were used.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the class ASE
● All components of the EAL 4 package as defined in the CC (see also part C of this
report)
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● The components ADO_IGS.2, ADV_IMP.2, ATE_DPT.2, AVA_VLA.4 augmented for this
TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0358-2006, re-use of specific evaluation
tasks was possible. Specific results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0602-2009
were also re-used.
Formally, the evaluation is a re-evaluation of the Tachograph Card certified under BSI-
DSZ-CC-0358-2006 (0358). On application level, changes were considered with regard to
0358. However, changes regarding the operating system, the Microkernel and the
Initialisation Module are considered with regard to the Electronic Health Card certification
BSI-DSZ-CC-0602-2009, since the operating system used there (MICARDO V3.5) is much
more comparable to the operating system used in the current evaluation (MICARDO V3.6)
than that of the 0358 certification (MICARDO V3.0). The focus of this re-evaluation was on
the changes that are mainly a different IC with crypto library, adoptions of the operating
system and commands to fit the Tachograph interface and minor changes in the
application software.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: None
● for the Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
(Note: The supplement „extended“ is only relevant for the SFRs
of the underlying IC with its IC Dedicated Support Software.)
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by
ADO_IGS.2, ADV_IMP.2, ATE_DPT.2, AVA_VLA.4
● The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function : high
• the generation of random numbers (connected with security functions F.RNG for HW
generation and/or F.RNG_Access for SW generation);
• the mechanisms against leakage attacks (as defined in F.LOG);
• the mechanisms F.DES, F.GEN_DIGSIG, F.RSA_DEC and the critical mechanisms of
F.IA_KEY, as far as resistance against SPA, DPA, DFA and timing attacks is
concerned;
• the password based authentication mechanism (connected with F.IA_PWD).
The functions F.RSA_sign and F.RSA_encrypt, as far as resistance against SPA, DPA,
DFA and timing attacks is concerned, were rated SOF high in the certification of the
Crypto Lib.
No SOF claims are made for the CRC checksum mechanism, for F.RSA_public,
F.VER_DIGSIG, F.RSA_ENC, F.SHA-1, and for the cryptographic algorithms
themselves.
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The TOE is conformant to the requirements of the „Generic Security Target“ for the
Tachograph Cards within the Tachograph Card Specification [15], Appendix 10
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(Tachograph Card Generic Security Target) and the Tachograph JIL interpretations and
requirements in [16].
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The following cryptographic algorithms are used by the TOE to enforce its security policy:
– hash functions:
SHA-1
– algorithms for the encryption and decryption:
RSA 1024, Triple-DES, Retail-MAC
This holds for the following security functions:
– F.GEN_DIGSIG, F.VER_DIGSIG, F.IA_AKEY, F.CRYPTO, F.EX_CONF, F.EX_INT,
F.RSA_ENC, F.RSA_DEC
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). According to [15] the algorithms are
suitable for authentication and data integrity between vehicle units and tachograph cards
and digital signature of data downloaded from vehicle units or tachograph cards to external
media.
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The operational documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the
usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all
aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered
by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptograhic algortithms as outlined in chapter 9 has to
be considered by the user and his system risk management process.
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
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12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
ASE Security Target evaluation class
ATR Answer to Reset
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation
CM Card Manager
DES Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
DFA Differential Fault Analysis
DPA Differential Power Analysis
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EEPROM Electronically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
ES Embedded Software
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IC Integrated Circuit
ISO International Organization for Standardization
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
MAC Message Authentication Code
OS Operating System
PC Personal Computer
PIN Personal Identification Number
PP Protection Profile
RNG Random Number Generator
ROM Read Only Memory
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm
SAR Security Assurance Requirements
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SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SOF Strength of Function
SPA Simple Power Analysis
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
Triple-DES Symmetric block cipher algorithm based on the DES
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSFI TOE security functions interface
TSP TOE Security Policy
TSS TOE Summary Specification
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC Part 3 to
an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a
category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for enforcing a
closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used as the basis
for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing the minimum
efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security behaviour by directly attacking
its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function
provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE security by attackers
possessing a low attack potential.
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SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the
function provides adequate protection against straightforward or intentional breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a moderate attack potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function
provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or organised breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a high attack potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated administrator and user
guidance documentation that is the subject of an evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and firmware of the
TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed, protected and
distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a TOE and
are subject to the rules of the TSP.
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13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.3,
August 2005
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE.8
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically updated list
published also on the BSI Website
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-0661-2011, MICARDO V3.6 R1.0 Tachograph V2.0,
Version V1.00, Sagem ORGA GmbH, 9.03.2011 (confidential document)
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.3, Date 11.03.2011, SRC Security Research
& Consulting GmbH (confidential document)
[8] Configuration list for the TOE, MICARDO V3.6 R1.0 Tachograph V2.0, Version
X.1.00.3, 28.09.2010, Sagem ORGA GmbH, file name
ORGA_MIC_V36_R10_P5_TC_ConfList_X1003.pdf (confidential document)
[9] Security Target ST Lite - MICARDO V3.6 R1.0 Tachograph V2.0, Version V1.02,
Sagem ORGA GmbH, 12.05.2011 (sanitised public document)
[10] ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 for the Product Crypto Library
V2.2 on P5CC037V0A, Version 2.0, 03.08.2010, Brightsight (confidential document)
[11] ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 for the Product NXP
P5CC037V0A Secure Smart Card Controller, Version 1.3, 28.09.2010, T-Systems
GEI GmbH (confidential document)
[12] User Guidance for the Personaliser of the Tachograph Card, MICARDO, V3.6
Tachograph V2, Version Version V2.00, 9.03.2011, Sagem ORGA GmbH, file name
ORGA_MIC_V36_R10_TC2_USR_PERS_X2002.pdf
8
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 1, 2 December 1999, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie
für deterministische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 25, Version 6, 7 September 2009, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen
including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 7, 3 August 2010, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte
Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 1, 25 September 2001 Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie
für physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 34, Version 3, 3 September 2009, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes
for EAL5+ (CCv2.3 & CCv3.1) and EAL6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 35, Version 2.0, 12 November 2007, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite)
including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 36, Version 3, 19 October 2010, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and
CC Supporting Document
• AIS 38, Version 2.0, 28 September 2007, Reuse of evaluation results
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[13] User Guidance for the Operation of the Tachograph Card, MICARDO V3.6
Tachograph V2, Version V2.00, 9.03.2011, Sagem ORGA GmbH, file name
ORGA_MIC_V36_R10_TC2_USR_OPR_X2002.pdf
[14] MICARDO V3.6 R1.0 Tachograph V2.0, Data Sheet, V1.0.0, Sagem ORGA GmbH,
file name ORGA_MIC_V36_R10_TC2_DataSheetForm_X1002.doc
[15] Annex 1B of Commission Regulation (EC) No.1360/2002 on recording equipment in
road transport: Requirements for Construction, Testing, Installation and Inspection
(in: Official Journal of the European Communities, L 207 / 1 ff.), Commission of the
European Communities, 05.08.2002.
[16] JIL Security Evaluation and Certification of Digital Tachographs, Version 1.12, JIL
Working Group (BSI, CESG, DCSSI, NLNCSA), June 2003.
[17] Certification Report, for Crypto Library V2.2 on P5CC037V0A from NXP
Semiconductors Germany GmbH, Certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0612-2010,
5 August 2010.
[18] Geeignete Algorithmen zur Erfüllung der Anforderungen nach §17 Abs.1 bis 3 SigG
vom 22. Mai 2001 in Verbindung mit Anlage 1 Anschnitt I Nr. 2 SigV vom 22. Nov.
2001, 22.12.2010, Bundesnetzagentur
[19] Tachograph Product Update – Impact Analysis Report, Version X1.00.1, Sagem
ORGA GmbH, 03.09.2009, file name ORGA_MIC_V36_TC_IAR_X1001.doc
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0661-2011 Certification Report
C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result is presented with
respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3 (assurance requirements) and, if
applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the functional
requirements are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2.
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the functional
requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the assurance
requirements are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the assurance
requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect to sets of
defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
– Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance
result.
– Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the packages listed as part of
the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect to
Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
– PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.“
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CC Part 3:
Protection Profile criteria overview (chapter 8.2)
“The goal of a PP evaluation is to demonstrate that the PP is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more evaluatable TOEs. Such a PP may be eligible for inclusion within a PP registry.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation
TOE description (APE_DES)
Security environment (APE_ENV)
PP introduction (APE_INT)
Security objectives (APE_OBJ)
IT security requirements (APE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements (APE_SRE)
Table 4 - Protection Profile families - CC extended requirements”
Security Target criteria overview (Chapter 8.3)
“The goal of an ST evaluation is to demonstrate that the ST is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as the basis for the corresponding TOE
evaluation.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation
TOE description (ASE_DES)
Security environment (ASE_ENV)
ST introduction (ASE_INT)
Security objectives (ASE_OBJ)
PP claims (ASE_PPC)
IT security requirements (ASE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements (ASE_SRE)
TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS)
Table 5 - Security Target families - CC extended requirements ”
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Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in Table
1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
ACM: Configuration management
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
ADV: Development
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
ALC: Life cycle support
Development security (ALC_DVS)
Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
ATE: Tests
Coverage (ATE_COV)
Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 6: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended with explicitly
stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 7: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against identified
threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.“
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it may still
be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its underlying
security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their security behaviour can be
made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of
these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. The qualification is made in
the form of a strength of TOE security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified,
during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by other
methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flaws that
will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interfere with or
alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the presence of
security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all the TOE
deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. The developer is
required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to
make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the evaluator's
independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the
developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is
resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (for AVA_VLA.2
Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or
high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant) attack potential.”
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D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment 37
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0661-2011 Certification Report
Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0661-2011
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Micardo V3.6 R1.0 Tachograph V2.0 (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been
evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 extended by advice of the Certification Body for
components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC
15408:2005)..
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 7 April 2011, the following results regarding the
development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria Security Assurance
Requirements
● ACM – Configuration management (i.e. ACM_AUT.1, ACM_CAP.4, ACM_SCP.2),
● ADO – Delivery and operation (i.e. ADO_DEL.2, ADO_IGS.2) and
● ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_DVS.1, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1),
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
(a) Sagem Orga GmbH (Morpho e-Documents Division), Riemekestraße 160,
Office Center Almepark, Building G, level 04 and 05, 33104 Paderborn
(embedded software development and testing)
(b) Sagem Orga GmbH (Morpho e-Documents Division), Konrad-Zuse-Ring 1,
24220 Flintbek (production of modules/cards, initialisation and delivery)
(c) For development and productions sites regarding the "Crypto Library V2.2 on
P5CC037V0A" from NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH refer to the
certification report BSI-DSZ-CC-0612-2010 [17].
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]). The evaluators verified, that the Threats, Security Objectives
and Requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [9]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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