STARCOS 3.3 ID
EAC+AA C1
Security Target Lite
Version 1.9 / Status 01.03.2011
Author Giesecke & Devrient
Status Final
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
Prinzregentenstr. 159
Postfach 80 07 29
D-81607 München
Subject to technical changes.
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Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
Prinzregentenstr. 159
Postfach 80 07 29
D-81607 München
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Contents
Contents
1 Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 5
1.1 ST Identification................................................................................................................................5
1.2 ST Overview .....................................................................................................................................5
1.3 CC Conformance...............................................................................................................................6
1.4 Tables ................................................................................................................................................6
1.5 Application Notes of the PP..............................................................................................................6
2 TOE Description .............................................................................................................................. 7
2.1 TOE definition ..................................................................................................................................7
2.2 TOE usage and security features for operational use........................................................................8
2.3 TOE life cycle .................................................................................................................................10
2.3.1 Phase 1 “Development”.................................................................................................................................. 10
2.3.2 Phase 2 “Manufacturing”................................................................................................................................ 10
2.3.3 Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”........................................................................................................ 11
2.3.4 Phase 4 “Operational Use” ............................................................................................................................. 11
3 Security Problem Definition .......................................................................................................... 12
3.1 Introduction.....................................................................................................................................12
3.1.1 Assets.............................................................................................................................................................. 12
3.1.2 Subjects .......................................................................................................................................................... 12
3.2 Assumptions....................................................................................................................................14
3.2.1 A.Pers_Agent Personalization of the MRTD’s chip...................................................................................... 14
3.2.2 A.Insp_Sys Inspection Systems for global interoperability........................................................................... 14
3.2.3 A.Signature_PKI PKI for Passive Authentication.......................................................................................... 14
3.2.4 A.Auth_PKI PKI for Inspection Systems....................................................................................................... 15
3.3 Threats.............................................................................................................................................15
3.3.1 T.Chip_ID Identification of MRTD’s chip.................................................................................................... 15
3.3.2 T.Skimming Skimming the logical MRTD ................................................................................................... 15
3.3.3 T.Read_Sensitive_Data Read the sensitive biometric reference data............................................................. 16
3.3.4 T.Forgery Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip ................................................................................................ 16
3.3.5 T.Counterfeit MRTD’s chip ........................................................................................................................... 16
3.3.6 T.Abuse-Func Abuse of Functionality .......................................................................................................... 16
3.3.7 T.Information_Leakage Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip............................................................... 17
3.3.8 T.Phys-Tamper Physical Tampering ............................................................................................................. 17
3.3.9 T.Malfunction Malfunction due to Environmental Stress ............................................................................. 17
3.4 Organisational Security Policies .....................................................................................................18
3.4.1 P.Manufact Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip........................................................................................... 18
3.4.2 P.Personalization Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organization only............................... 18
3.4.3 P.Personal_Data Personal data protection policy .......................................................................................... 18
3.4.4 P.Sensitive_Data Privacy of sensitive biometric reference data..................................................................... 18
3.5 Security Objectives .........................................................................................................................19
3.5.1 Security Objectives for the TOE.................................................................................................................... 19
3.5.2 Security Objectives for the Development and Manufacturing Environment.................................................. 21
3.5.3 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment.................................................................................... 21
4 Extended Components Definition.................................................................................................. 24
4.1 Definition of the Family FAU_SAS ...............................................................................................24
4.1.1 FAU_SAS Audit data storage......................................................................................................................... 24
4.1.2 FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage ............................................................................................................................. 24
4.2 Definition of the Family FCS_RND ...............................................................................................24
4.2.1 FCS_RND Generation of random numbers.................................................................................................... 25
4.3 Definition of the Family FIA_API..................................................................................................25
4.3.1 FIA_API Authentication Prove of Identity..................................................................................................... 25
4.4 Definition of the Family FMT_LIM ...............................................................................................26
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Contents
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4.4.1 FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability ............................................................................................ 26
4.5 Definition of the Family FPT_EMSEC...........................................................................................27
4.5.1 FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation.................................................................................................................... 28
5 Security Requirements ................................................................................................................... 29
5.1 Security Functional Requirements for the TOE..............................................................................31
5.1.1 Class FAU Security Audit .............................................................................................................................. 31
5.1.2 Class Cryptographic Support (FCS) ............................................................................................................... 31
5.1.3 Class FIA Identification and Authentication .................................................................................................. 35
5.1.4 Class FDP User Data Protection..................................................................................................................... 39
5.1.5 Class FMT Security Management .................................................................................................................. 42
5.1.6 Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions ............................................................................................. 48
5.2 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE ..............................................................................51
5.2.1 TOE Security Assurance Requirements ......................................................................................................... 51
5.3 Security Requirements for the IT environment...............................................................................52
5.3.1 Passive Authentication ................................................................................................................................... 52
5.3.2 Extended Access Control PKI ........................................................................................................................ 52
5.3.3 Basic Terminal................................................................................................................................................ 53
5.3.4 General Inspection System ............................................................................................................................. 57
5.3.5 Extended Inspection System........................................................................................................................... 60
5.3.6 Personalization Terminals .............................................................................................................................. 61
6 TOE Summary Specification ......................................................................................................... 63
6.1 TOE Security Functions..................................................................................................................63
6.1.1 SF.ACCESS (Access Control)........................................................................................................................ 63
6.1.2 SF.ADMIN (Administration of the TOE)....................................................................................................... 64
6.1.3 SF.AUTH (Authentication of the authorized TOE user)................................................................................ 65
6.1.4 SF.CRYPTO (Cryptographic Support)........................................................................................................... 66
6.1.5 SF.PROTECTION (Protection of TSC) ......................................................................................................... 66
6.1.6 SF.IC (Security Functions of the IC).............................................................................................................. 67
6.2 Assurance Measures........................................................................................................................67
7 PP Claims....................................................................................................................................... 69
7.1 PP Reference ...................................................................................................................................69
7.2 PP Additions....................................................................................................................................69
8 Rationale ........................................................................................................................................ 70
8.1 Security Objectives Rationale.........................................................................................................70
8.2 Security Requirements Rationale....................................................................................................74
8.2.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale ................................................................................................. 74
8.2.2 Dependency Rationale.................................................................................................................................... 82
8.2.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale.................................................................................................. 92
8.2.4 Security Requirements – Mutual Support and Internal Consistency .............................................................. 93
8.2.5 Rationale for Strength of Function High ........................................................................................................ 94
8.3 Rationale for TOE Summary Specification ....................................................................................94
8.3.1 Rationale for TOE Security Functions ........................................................................................................... 94
8.3.2 Rationale for Assurance Measures ............................................................................................................... 108
8.4 Rationale for PP Claims................................................................................................................109
9 Appendix...................................................................................................................................... 110
9.1 Glossary and Acronyms ................................................................................................................110
9.2 Acronyms ......................................................................................................................................115
9.3 References.....................................................................................................................................116
1 Introduction
1 Introduction
1.1 ST Identification
Title: STARCOS 3.3 ID EAC+AA C1
Reference: GDM_STA33_MRTD_ ASE_00
Version Number/Date: Version 1.9 / Status 01.03.2011
Origin: Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
Compliant to: Common Criteria Protection Profile — Machine Readable Travel
Document with ICAO Application, Extended Access Control (PP-MRTD EAC), Version
1.2, 19.11.2007, BSI-PP-0026 [21a]
TOE name: STARCOS 3.3 ID EAC+AA C1
TOE version: 3.0a
TOE documentation:
- Administrator Guidance [27a], [27b], [27c]
- User Guidance [28]
- STARCOS33PETABLES [29]
HW-Part of TOE: NXP P5CD081 (BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009) [24].
1.2 ST Overview
The aim of this document is to describe the Security Target for STARCOS 3.3 ID
EAC+AA C1 for identification documents.
The related product is the STARCOS 3.3 ID EAC+AA C1 Operating System (OS) on a
Smart Card Integrated Circuit. It is intended to be used in identification documents in
accordance with [21a] so the TOE consists of the related software in combination with
the underlying hardware ('Composite Evaluation'). STARCOS 3.3 ID EAC+AA C1
fulfils the requirements specified in [5].
STARCOS 3.3 ID EAC+AA C1 is a fully interoperable ISO 7816 compliant multi-
application Smart Card OS, including a cryptographic library enabling the user to apply
TDES and ECDH (compliant to ISO 15946).
Additionally to BSI-PP-0026 [21a] the STARCOS 3.3 ID EAC+AA C1 supports the
Active Authentication mechanism [7].
The software part of the TOE is implemented on the IC NXP P5CD081 which is
certified according to CC EAL5+ [24]. So the TOE consists of the software part and the
underlying hardware.
This document describes
 the Target of Evaluation (TOE)
 the security environment of the TOE
 the security objectives of the TOE and its environment
 and the TOE security functional and assurance requirements.
The assurance level for the TOE is CC EAL4+.
STARCOS 3.3 ID EAC+AA C1/Version 1.9 / Status 01.03.2011 Page 5 of 117
1 Introduction
The minimum strength level for the TOE security functions is high (SOF high).
1.3 CC Conformance
This TOE claims conformance to: Common Criteria V2.3 (ISO 15408) (see [1], [2], [3])
as follows:
- Part 2 extended,
- Part 3 conformant,
- Package conformant to EAL4 augmented with ADV_IMP.2 and ALC_DVS.2,
AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4.
The TOE meets the specific BSI PP: Protection Profile — Machine Readable Travel
Document with ICAO Application, Extended Access Control as stated in [21a]).
1.4 Tables
Table 1 Overview on authentication SFR ............................................................................................. 35
Table 2 Assurance Requirements: EAL (4+) ............................................................................................... 51
Table 3 SOF claims for TOE Security Functions.................................................................................. 63
Table 4 References of Assurance Measures.......................................................................................... 68
Table 5 Security Objective Rationale.......................................................................................................... 71
Table 6 Coverage of Security Objective for the TOE by SFR.............................................................. 75
Table 7 Coverage of Security Objectives for the IT environment by SFR ........................................... 80
Table 8 Dependencies between the SFR for the TOE......................................................................... 86
Table 9 Dependencies between the SFR for the IT environment ....................................................... 91
Table 10 Functional Requirements to Security Function mapping......................................................... 96
Table 11 Assurance Requirements to Assurance Measures mapping................................................... 108
1.5 Application Notes of the PP
When applicable the application notes of the PP are discussed in notes.
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2 TOE Description
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2 TOEDescription
Parts of this chapter have been taken from [21a].
2.1 TOE definition
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the contactless integrated circuit chip of machine
readable travel documents (MRTD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data
Structure (LDS) [6] and providing the Basic Access Control and the Extended Access
Control according to the ICAO document [7] and the technical report [25].
The TOE consists of
- the circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (the integrated circuit, IC) with hardware for the
contactless interface, e.g. antenna, capacitors,
- the IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC
Dedicated Support Software,
- the IC Embedded Software (operating system),
- the MRTD application
- the associated guidance documentation Administrator Guidance [27a], [27b] and
[27c], User Guidance [28], STARCOS33PETABLES [29] and
- the GMA Verifier1
[30] including its configuration file (called
“config_MRTD_SC33PE_v21a.xml”).
1
The GMA Verifier is not part of the TOE delivery. It is solely used by the MRTD Manufacturer for the
correct installation of the TOE and therefore of no use for the Personalisation Agent.
MRTD Application
PIN
Keys
Access Conditions
Logical MRTD Data
EEPROM
ROM
IC
Operating System
STARCOS 3.3 and Keys
NXP P5CD081
certified CC EAL 5+
Figure 1 TOE description
2 TOE Description
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2.2 TOE usage and security features for operational use
State or organisation issues MRTD to be used by the holder for international travel.
The traveller presents a MRTD to the inspection system to prove his or her identity.
The MRTD in context of this security target contains (i) visual (eye readable)
biographical data and portrait of the holder, (ii) a separate data summary (MRZ data) for
visual and machine reading using OCR methods in the Machine readable zone
(MRZ) and (iii) data elements on the MRTD’s chip according to LDS for contactless
machine reading. The authentication of the traveller is based on (i) the possession of a
valid MRTD personalized for a holder with the claimed identity as given on the
biographical data page and (ii) biometrics using the reference data stored in the MRTD.
The issuing State or Organization ensure the authenticity of the data of genuine
MRTD’s. The receiving State trusts a genuine MRTD of an issuing State or
Organization.
For this security target the MRTD is viewed as unit of
(a) the physical MRTD as travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip. It presents
visual readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the
MRTD holder
(1) the biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book,
(2) the printed data in the Machine-Readable Zone (MRZ) and
(3) the printed portrait.
(b) the logical MRTD as data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data
Structure [6] as specified by ICAO on the contactless integrated circuit. It
presents contactless readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of
the MRTD holder
(1) the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1),
(2) the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
(3) the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s)
(EF.DG4) or both2
(4) the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16) and
(5) the Document security object.
The issuing State or Organization implements security features of the MRTD to maintain
the authenticity and integrity of the MRTD and their data. The MRTD as the passport
book and the MRTD’s chip is uniquely identified by the document number.
The physical MRTD is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on
paper, security printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the MRTD’s chip) and
organisational security measures (e.g. control of materials, personalization procedures)
[8]. These security measures include the binding of the MRTD’s chip to the passport
book.
The logical MRTD is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created
by the document signer acting for the issuing State or Organization and the security
features of the MRTD’s chip.
2
These additional biometric reference data are optional according to [7]. This ST assumes that the issuing
State or Organization uses this option and protects these data by means of extended access control.
2 TOE Description
The ICAO defines the baseline security methods Passive Authentication and the
optional advanced security methods Basic Access Control to the logical MRTD, Active
Authentication of the MRTD’s chip, Extended Access Control to and the Data
Encryption of additional biometrics as optional security measure in the ICAO Technical
Report [7]. The Passive Authentication Mechanism and the Data Encryption are
performed completely and independently on the TOE by the TOE environment.
This security target addresses the protection of the logical MRTD (i) in integrity by
write-only-once access control and by physical means, and (ii) in confidentiality by the
Basic Access Control Mechanism and the Extended Access Control Mechanism. This
security target addresses the Chip Authentication described in [25] as an alternative to the
Active Authentication stated in [7].
The Basic Access Control is a security feature that shall be mandatory implemented by
the TOE. The inspection system (i) reads optically the MRTD, (ii) authenticates itself as
inspection system by means of Document Basic Access Keys. After successful
authentication of the inspection system the MRTD’s chip provides read access to the
logical MRTD by means of private communication (secure messaging) with this
inspection system [7], Annex E, and [6].
The security target requires the TOE to implement the Chip Authentication defined in
[25] and additionally the Active Authentication described in [7]. Both protocols provide
evidence of the MRTD’s chip authenticity where the Chip Authentication prevents data
traces described in [7], Annex G, section G.3.3. The Chip Authentication is provided by
the following steps: (i) the inspection system communicates by means of secure
messaging established by Basic Access Control, (ii) the inspection system reads and
verifies by means of the Passive Authentication the authenticity of the MRTD’s Chip
Authentication Public Key using the Document Security Object, (iii) the inspection
system generates a ephemeral key pair, (iv) the TOE and the inspection system agree on
two session keys for secure messaging in ENC_MAC mode according to the Diffie-
Hellman Primitive and (v) the inspection system verifies by means of received message
authentication codes whether the MRTD’s chip was able or not to run this protocol
properly (i.e. it could apply the Chip Authentication Private Key corresponding to the
Chip Authentication Public Key for derivation of the session keys). The Chip
Authentication requires collaboration of the TOE and the TOE environment.
The security target requires the TOE to implement the Extended Access Control as
defined in [25]. The Extended Access Control consists of two parts (i) a Terminal
Authentication Protocol to authenticate the inspection system as entity authorized by the
Issuing State or Organization through the receiving State, and (ii) an access control by
the TOE to allow reading the sensitive biometric reference data only to successfully
authenticated authorized inspection systems. It requires the Chip Authentication of the
MRTD’s chip to the inspection system and uses the secure messaging established by the
Chip Authentication Mechanism to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the
sensitive biometric reference data during their transmission from the TOE to the
inspection system. The issuing State or Organization authorizes the receiving State by
means of certification the authentication public keys of Document Verifiers who create
Inspection System Certificates.
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2 TOE Description
2.3 TOE life cycle
The TOE life cycle is described in terms of the four life cycle phases.
Figure 2 ROM Mask generation and delivery and Initialisation/Personalisation
(example)
Personalisation
Data (5)
Issuing
State
Transponder
Inlays (4) Personalisa ion
t
Agent
IC
Manufacturer
Transponder
Inlays (2)
ROM Mask
including data to ensure
for secure loading of
initialisation (1)
Initialisation
Data (3)
MRTD
Manufacturer
OS
Developer
2.3.1 Phase 1 “Development”
The TOE is developed in phase 1. The IC developer develops the integrated circuit, the
IC Dedicated Software and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE
Components.
The software developer uses the guidance documentation for the integrated circuit and
the guidance documentation for relevant parts of the IC Dedicated Software and
develops the IC Embedded Software (operating system), the MRTD application and the
guidance documentation associated with these TOE components.
The manufacturing documentation of the IC including the IC Dedicated Software and
the Embedded Software in the non-volatile non-programmable memories (ROM) is
securely delivered to the IC manufacturer((1) of figure 2). The IC Embedded Software in
the nonvolatile programmable memories, the MRTD application, the initialisation data
((3) of figure 2). and the guidance documentation is securely delivered to the MRTD
manufacturer ((2) of figure 2).
2.3.2 Phase 2 “Manufacturing”
In a first step the TOE integrated circuit is produced containing the MRTD’s chip
Dedicated Software and the parts of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software in the
nonvolatile non-programmable memories (ROM). The IC manufacturer writes the IC
Identification Data onto the chip to control the IC as MRTD material during the IC
manufacturing and the delivery process to the MRTD manufacturer. The IC is securely
STARCOS 3.3 ID EAC+AA C1/Version 1.9 / Status 01.03.2011 Page 10 of 117
2 TOE Description
delivered from the IC manufacturer to the MRTD manufacturer ((2) of figure 2)..
The MRTD manufacturer (i) add the parts of the IC Embedded Software in the
nonvolatile programmable memories (for instance EEPROM) if necessary, (ii) creates
the MRTD application, and (iii) equips MRTD’s chip with Per-personalization Data and
(iv) packs the IC with hardware for the contactless interface in the passport book.
The pre-personalized MRTD together with the IC Identifier is securely delivered from
the MRTD manufacturer to the Personalization Agent ((4) of figure 2).. The MRTD
manufacturer also provides the relevant parts of the guidance documentation to the
Personalization Agent.
2.3.3 Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”
The personalization of the MRTD includes (i) the survey of the MRTD holder
biographical data, (ii) the enrolment of the MRTD holder biometric reference data (i.e.
the digitized portraits and the optional biometric reference data), (iii) the printing of the
visual readable data onto the physical MRTD and their secure transfer to the
personalisation agent ((4) of figure 2)., (iv) the writing of the TOE User Data and
TSF Data into the logical MRTD and (v) the writing the TSF Data into the logical
MRTD and configuration of the TSF if necessary. The step (iv) is performed by the
Personalization Agent and includes but is not limited to the creation of (i) the digital
MRZ data (DG1), (ii) the digitised portrait (DG2), and (iii) the Document security
object.
The signing of the Document security object by the Document signer [7] finalizes the
personalization of the genuine MRTD for the MRTD holder. The personalized MRTD
(together with appropriate guidance for TOE use if necessary) is handed over to the
MRTD holder for operational use.
2.3.4 Phase 4 “Operational Use”
The TOE is used as MRTD’s chip by the traveller and the inspection systems in the
“Operational Use” phase. The user data can be read according to the security policy of
the Issuing State or Organization and used according to the security policy of the Issuing
State but they can never be modified.
Note 1: The authorized Personalization Agents is not allowed to add and modify data in the other
data groups of the MRTD application (e.g. person(s) to notify EF.DG16) in the Phase 4 “Operational
Use”.
Note 2: The point of TOE delivery according to CC in this ST and therefore the split up of P.Manufact and
P.Personalization is after phase 2. The secure transfer of the TOE between the manufacturer and the
personalisation site has to be realised. Note: In many cases security aspects for phase 3 are defined and
controlled by the issuing state or organisation.
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3 Security Problem Definition
3 SecurityProblemDefinition
This chapter has been taken from [21a] with minor modifications by adding the Active
Authentication mechanism indicated by underlined and bold text..
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Assets
The assets to be protected by the TOE include the User Data on the MRTD’s chip.
3.1.1.1 Logical MRTD Data
The logical MRTD data consists of the data groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 (with different
security needs) and the Document Security Object EF.SOD according to LDS [6]. These
data are user data of the TOE. The EF.COM lists the existing elementary files (EF) with
the user data. The EF.DG1 to EF.DG13 and EF.DG16 contain personal data of the
MRTD holder. The Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG14) is used by the inspection
system for the Chip Authentication. The EF.SOD is used by the inspection system for
Passive Authentication of the logical MRTD. The Active Authentication public key is
stored in EF.DG 15.
User Data TSF Data
Personal Data of the MRTD holder (EF.DG1, EF.DG2,
EF.DG5 - EF.DG13, EF.DG16)
Personalisation Agent Reference
Authentication Data
Sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3, EF.DG4) Basic Access Control (BAC) Key
Chip Authentication Public Key in EF.DG14 Public Key CVCA
Active Authentication Public Key in EF.DG15 Active Authentication Private
Key
Document Security Object (SOD) in EF.SOD CVCA Certificate
Common data in EF.COM Current date
Chip Authentication Private Key
An additional asset is the following more general one.
3.1.1.2 Authenticity of the MRTD’s chip
The authenticity of the MRTD’s chip personalized by the issuing State or Organization
for the MRTD’s holder is used by the traveller to proof his possessing of a
genuine MRTD.
3.1.2 Subjects
This security target considers the following subjects:
3.1.2.1 Manufacturer
The generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing the integrated circuit and the
MRTD Manufacturer completing the IC to the MRTD’s chip. The Manufacturer is the
default user of the TOE during the Phase 2 Manufacturing. The TOE does not
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3 Security Problem Definition
distinguish between the users IC Manufacturer and MRTD Manufacturer using this role
Manufacturer.
3.1.2.2 Personalization Agent
The agent is acting on the behalf of the issuing State or Organisation to personalize the
MRTD for the holder by some or all of the following activities (i) establishing the
identity the holder for the biographic data in the MRTD, (ii) enrolling the biometric
reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or
the encoded iris image(s) (iii) writing these data on the physical and logical MRTD for
the holder as defined for global, international and national interoperability, (iv) writing the
initial TSF data and and (iv) signing the Document Security Object defined in [6].
3.1.2.3 Country Verifying Certification Authority
The Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA) enforces the privacy policy of
the issuing Country or Organization with respect to the protection of sensitive biometric
reference data stored in the MRTD. The CVCA represents the country specific root of
the PKI of Inspection Systems and creates the Document Verifier Certificates within this
PKI. The updates of the public key of the CVCA are distributed in form of Country
Verifying CA Link-Certificates.
3.1.2.4 Document Verifier
The Document Verifier (DV) enforces the privacy policy of the receiving Country with
respect to the protection of sensitive biometric reference data to be handled by the
Extended Inspection Systems. The Document Verifier manages the authorization of the
Extended Inspection Systems for the sensitive data of the MRTD in the limits provided
by the issuing States or Organizations in form of the Document Verifier Certificates.
3.1.2.5 Terminal
A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through the
contactless interface.
3.1.2.6 Inspection system (IS)
A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining
an MRTD presented by the traveller and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the
traveller as MRTD holder. The Basic Inspection System (BIS) (i) contains a terminal for
the contactless communication with the MRTD’s chip, (ii) implements the terminals part
of the Basic Access Control Mechanism and (iii) gets the authorization to read the
logical MRTD under the Basic Access Control by optical reading the MRTD or other
parts of the passport book providing this information. Optionally, a BIS may supports
Active Authentication. The General Inspection System (GIS) is a Basic Inspection
System which implements additional the Chip Authentication Mechanism. The Extended
Inspection System (EIS) in addition to the General Inspection System (i) implements the
Terminal Authentication Protocol and (ii) is authorized by the issuing State or
Organization through the Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive
biometric reference data. The security attributes of the EIS are defined of the Inspection
System Certificates.
Note 3: The TOE does not allow the Personalization agent to disable the Basic Access Control for use
with Primary Inspection Systems as described in the BSI-PP-0017 Machine Readable Travel Document
with „ICAO Application", Basic Access Control.
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3.1.2.7 MRTD Holder
The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization
personalised the MRTD.
3.1.2.8 Traveller
Person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming the identity of the
MRTD holder.
3.1.2.9 Attacker
A threat agent trying (i) to identify and to trace the movement the MRTD’s chip
remotely (i.e. without knowing or reading the printed MRZ data), (ii) to read or to
manipulate the logical MRTD without authorization, or (iii) to forge a genuine MRTD.
3.2 Assumptions
The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will
be used or is intended to be used.
3.2.1 A.Pers_Agent Personalization of the MRTD’s chip
The Personalization Agent ensures the correctness of (i) the logical MRTD with respect
to the MRTD holder, (ii) the Document Basic Access Keys, (iii) the Chip Authentication
Public Key (EF.DG14) if stored on the MRTD’s chip, (iv) the Active Authentication
Public Key if stored on the MRTD's chip and (v) the Document Signer Public Key
Certificate (if stored on the MRTD’s chip). The Personalization Agent signs the
Document Security Object. The Personalization Agent bears the Personalization Agent
Authentication to authenticate himself to the TOE by symmetric cryptographic
mechanisms.
3.2.2 A.Insp_Sys Inspection Systems for global interoperability
The Inspection System is used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i)
examining an MRTD presented by the traveller and verifying its authenticity and (ii)
verifying the traveller as MRTD holder. The Basic Inspection System for global
interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer
Public Key of each issuing State or Organization, and (ii) implements the terminal part
of the Basic Access Control [7]. The Basic Inspection System reads the logical MRTD
being under Basic Access Control and performs the Passive Authentication to verify the
logical MRTD. The General Inspection System in addition to the Basic Inspection
System implements the Chip Authentication Mechanism. The General Inspection System
verifies the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip during inspection and establishes secure
messaging with keys established by the Chip Authentication Mechanism. The Extended
Inspection System in addition to the General Inspection System (i) supports the Terminal
Authentication Protocol and (ii) is authorized by the issuing State or Organization
through the Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric
reference data.
3.2.3 A.Signature_PKI PKI for Passive Authentication
The issuing and receiving States or Organisations establish a public key infrastructure for
passive authentication i.e. digital signature creation and verification for the logical
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3 Security Problem Definition
MRTD. The issuing State or Organization runs a Certification Authority (CA) which (i)
securely generates, stores and uses the Country Signing CA Key pair, and (ii) manages
the MRTD’s Chip Authentication Key Pairs. The CA keeps the Country Signing CA
Private Key secret and distributes the Country Signing CA Public Key to ICAO, all
receiving States maintaining its integrity. The Document Signer (i) generates the
Document Signer Key Pair, (ii) hands over the Document Signer Public Key to the CA
for certification, (iii) keeps the Document Signer Private Key secret and (iv) uses
securely the Document Signer Private Key for signing the Document Security Objects of
the MRTDs. The CA creates the Document Signer Certificates for the Document Signer
Public Keys and distributes them to the receiving States and organizations.
3.2.4 A.Auth_PKI PKI for Inspection Systems
The issuing and receiving States or Organisations establish a public key infrastructure for
card verifiable certificates of the extended access control. The Country Verifying
Certification Authorities, the Document Verifier and Extended Inspection Systems hold
authentication key pairs and certificates for their public keys encoding the access control
rights. The Country Verifying Certification Authorities of the issuing States or
Organisations are signing the certificates of the Document Verifier and the Document
Verifiers are signing the certificates of the Extended Inspection Systems of the receiving
States or Organisations. The issuing States or Organizations distributes the public key of
their Country Verifying Certification Authority to their MRTD’s chip.
3.3 Threats
This section describes the threats to be averted by the TOE independently or in
collaboration with its IT environment. These threats result from the TOE method of use
in the operational environment and the assets stored in or protected by the TOE.
The TOE in collaboration with its IT environment shall avert the threats as specified
below.
3.3.1 T.Chip_ID Identification of MRTD’s chip
An attacker trying to trace the movement of the MRTD by identifying remotely the
MRTD’s chip by establishing or listening a communication through the contactless
communication interface. The attacker cannot read optically and does not know in
advance the physical MRTD.
3.3.2 T.Skimming Skimming the logical MRTD
An attacker imitates the inspection system to read the logical MRTD or parts of it via
the contactless communication channel of the TOE. The attacker can not read and
does not know in advance the physical MRTD.
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3.3.3 T.Read_Sensitive_Data Read the sensitive biometric reference
data
An attacker with high attack potential knowing the Document Basic Access Keys is
trying to gain the sensitive biometric reference data through the communication interface
of the MRTD’s chip.
The attack T.Read_Sensitive_Data is similar to the threats T.Skimming in respect of the
attack path (communication interface) and the motivation (to get data stored on the
MRTD’s chip) but differs from those in the asset under the attack (sensitive biometric
reference data vs. digital MRZ, digitized portrait and other data), the opportunity (i.e.
knowing Document Basic Access Keys) and therefore the possible attack methods. Note,
that the sensitive biometric reference data are stored only on the MRTD’s chip as private
sensitive personal data whereas the MRZ data and the portrait are visual readable on the
physical MRTD as well.
3.3.4 T.Forgery Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip
An attacker alters fraudulently the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it
including its security related data in order to impose on an inspection system by means
of the changed MRTD holder’s identity or biometric reference data.
This threat comprises several attack scenarios of MRTD forgery. The attacker may alter
the biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book, in the printed
MRZ and in the digital MRZ to claim another identity of the traveller. The attacker may
alter the printed portrait and the digitized portrait to overcome the visual inspection of
the inspection officer and the automated biometric authentication mechanism by face
recognition. The attacker may alter the biometric reference data to defeat automated
biometric authentication mechanism of the inspection system. The attacker may combine
data groups of different logical MRTDs to create a new forged MRTD, e.g. the attacker
write the digitized portrait and optional biometric reference data of finger read from the
logical MRTD of a traveller into an other MRTD’s chip leaving their digital MRZ
unchanged to claim the identity of the holder this MRTD. The attacker may also copy the
complete unchanged logical MRTD in another contactless chip.
3.3.5 T.Counterfeit MRTD’s chip
An attacker with high attack potential produces an unauthorized copy or reproduction of
a genuine MRTD’s chip to be used as part of a counterfeit MRTD. This violates the
authenticity of the MRTD’s chip used for authentication of a traveller by possession of a
MRTD.
The attacker may generate a new data set or extract completely or partially the data from
a genuine MRTD’s chip and copy them on another appropriate chip to imitate this
genuine MRTD’s chip.
The TOE shall avert the threat as specified below.
3.3.6 T.Abuse-Func Abuse of Functionality
An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in TOE operational
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phase in order (i) to manipulate User Data, (ii) to manipulate (explore, bypass, deactivate
or change) security features or functions of the TOE or (iii) to disclose or to manipulate
TSF Data.
This threat addresses misuse of the functions for the initialization and the personalization
in the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder.
3.3.7 T.Information_Leakage Information Leakage from MRTD’s
chip
An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during its usage in
order to disclose confidential TSF data. The information leakage may be inherent in the
normal operation or caused by the attacker.
Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O charac-
teristics, clock frequency, or by changes in processing time requirements. This leakage
may be interpreted as a covert channel transmission but is more closely related to meas-
urement of operating parameters which may be derived either from measurements of the
contactless interface (emanation) or direct measurements (by contact to the chip still
available even for a contactless chip) and can then be related to the specific operation
being performed. Examples are the Differential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) and
the Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Moreover the attacker may try actively to
enforce information leakage by fault injection (e.g. Differential Fault Analysis).
3.3.8 T.Phys-Tamper Physical Tampering
An attacker may perform physical probing of the MRTD’s chip in order (i) to disclose
TSF Data, or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. An
attacker may physically modify the MRTD’s chip in order to (i) modify security features
or functions of the MRTD’s chip, (ii) modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip
Embedded Software, (iii) to modify User Data or (iv) to modify TSF data.
The physical tampering may be focused directly on the discloser or manipulation of
TOE User Data (e.g. the biometric reference data for the inspection system) or TSF
Data (e.g. authentication key of the MRTD’s chip) or indirectly by preparation of the
TOE to following attack methods by modification of security features (e.g. to enable
information leakage through power analysis). Physical tampering requires direct
interaction with the MRTD’s chip internals. Techniques commonly employed in IC
failure analysis and IC reverse engineering efforts may be used. Before that hardware
security mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be identified. Determination of
software design including treatment of User Data and TSF Data may also be a
prerequisite.
The modification may result in the deactivation of a security function. Changes of
circuitry or data can be permanent or temporary.
3.3.9 T.Malfunction Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the MRTD’s chip Embedded
Software by applying environmental stress in order to (i) deactivate or modify security
features or functions of the TOE or (ii) circumvent or deactivate or modify security
functions of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software.
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3 Security Problem Definition
This may be achieved e.g. by operating the MRTD’s chip outside the normal operating
conditions, exploiting errors in the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software or misuse of
administration function. To exploit these vulnerabilities an attacker needs information
about the functional operation.
3.4 Organisational Security Policies
The TOE shall comply with the following organisation security policies (OSP) as
security rules, procedures, practices, or guidelines imposed by an organisation upon its
operations (see CC part 1 [1], sec. 3.2).
3.4.1 P.Manufact Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip
The IC Manufacturer and MRTD Manufacturer ensure the quality and the security of
the manufacturing process and control the MRTD’s material in the Phase 2
Manufacturing. The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the
IC uniquely. The MRTD Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalization Data which
contains at least the Personalization Agent Key.
3.4.2 P.Personalization Personalization of the MRTD by issuing
State or Organization only
The issuing State or Organization guarantees the correctness of the biographical data,
the printed portrait and the digitised portrait, the biometric reference data and other
data of the logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD holder. The personalization of the
MRTD for the holder is performed by authorized agents of the issuing State or
Organization only.
3.4.3 P.Personal_Data Personal data protection policy
The biographical data and their summary printed in the MRZ and stored on the MRTD’s
chip (EF.DG1), the printed portrait and the digitised portrait (EF.DG2), the biometric
reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3), the biometric reference data of iris image(s)
(EF.DG4) and data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16) stored on the
MRTD’s chip are personal data of the MRTD holder. These data groups are intended to
be used only with agreement of the MRTD holder i.e. if the MRTD is presented to an
inspection system. Additional to the Basic Access Control Authentication defined by
ICAO in [7] the MRTD’s chip shall protect the confidentiality and integrity of the
personal data during transmission to the General Inspection System after Chip
authentication.
Note 4: The organisational security policy P.Personal_Data is drawn from the ICAO Technical
Report [7]. Note that the Document Basic Access Key is defined by the TOE environment and loaded
to the TOE by the Personalization Agent.
3.4.4 P.Sensitive_Data Privacy of sensitive biometric reference data
The biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) and iris image(s) (EF.DG4) are
sensitive private personal data of the MRTD holder. The sensitive biometric reference
data can be used only by inspection systems which are authorized for this access at the
time the MRTD is presented to the inspection system. The issuing State or Organization
authorizes the Document Verifiers of the receiving States to manage the authorization of
inspection systems within the limits defined by the Document Verifier Certificate.
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3.5 Security Objectives
This chapter describes the security objectives for the TOE and the security objectives
for the TOE environment. The security objectives for the TOE environment are
separated into security objectives for the development and production environment and
security objectives for the operational environment.
3.5.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of
identified threats to be countered by the TOE and organisational security policies to be
met by the TOE.
3.5.1.1 OT.AC_Pers Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD
The TOE must ensure that the logical MRTD data groups DG1 to DG16, the Document
security object according to LDS [6] and the TSF data can be written by authorized
Personalization Agents. The logical MRTD data groups DG1 to DG16 and the TSF
data may be written only during and cannot be changed after its personalisation. The
Document security object can be updated by authorized Personalization Agents if data
in the data groups EF.DG3 to EF.DG16 are added.
3.5.1.2 OT.Data_Int Integrity of personal data
The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip
against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure the
integrity of the logical MRTD data during their transmission to the General Inspection
System after Chip Authentication.
3.5.1.3 OT.Data_Conf Confidentiality of personal data
The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the data in EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to
EF.DG16 and the Document Security Object of the logical MRTD by granting read
access to terminals successfully authenticated by as (i) Personalization Agent or (ii)
Basic Inspection System or (iii) Extended Inspection System. The TOE implements the
Basic Access Control as defined by ICAO [7] and enforce Basic Inspection System to
authenticate itself by means of the Basic Access Control based on knowledge of the
Document Basic Access Key. The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical
MRTD data during their transmission to the General Inspection System after Chip
Authentication.
3.5.1.4 OT.Sens_Data_Conf Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference data
The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference data
(EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) by granting read access only to authorized inspection systems.
The authorization of the inspection system is drawn from the Inspection System
Certificate used for the successful authentication and shall be a non-strict subset of the
authorization defined in the Document Verifier Certificate in the certificate chain to the
Country Verifier Certification Authority of the issuing State or Organization. The TOE
must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data during their transmission to
the Extended Inspection System. The confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference
data shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential.
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3 Security Problem Definition
3.5.1.5 OT.Identification Identification and Authentication of the TOE
The TOE must provide means to store IC Identification Data in its non-volatile memory.
The IC Identification Data must provide a unique identification of the IC during Phase
2 “Manufacturing” and Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”. If the TOE is
configured for use with Basic Inspection Terminals only in Phase 4 “Operational Use”
the TOE shall identify themselves only to a successful authenticated Basic Inspection
System or Personalization Agent.
3.5.1.6 OT.Chip_Auth_Proof Proof of MRTD’S chip authenticity
The TOE must support the General Inspection Systems to verify the identity and
authenticity of the MRTD’s chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization
by means of the Chip Authentication as defined in [25] The authenticity prove provided
by MRTD’s chip shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential.
The following TOE security objectives address the protection provided by the MRTD’s
chip independent on the TOE environment.
3.5.1.7 OT.Prot_Abuse-Func Protection against Abuse of Functionality
The TOE must prevent that functions of the TOE which may not be used after TOE
Delivery can be abused in order (i) to disclose critical User Data, (ii) to manipulate
critical User Data of the Smartcard Embedded Software, (iii) to manipulate Soft-coded
Smartcard Embedded Software or (iv) bypass, deactivate, change or explore security
features or functions of the TOE.
Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the capabilities of the
Test Features provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software which are not specified here.
3.5.1.8 OT.Prot_Inf_Leak Protection against Information Leakage
The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential TSF data stored
and/or processed in the MRTD’s chip
 by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time
between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power
consumption, clock, or I/O lines and
 by forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or
 by a physical manipulation of the TOE.
3.5.1.9 OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper Protection against Physical Tampering
The TOE must provide protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data,
the TSF Data, and the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. This includes protection
against attacks with high attack potential by means of
 measuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical probing on the
chips surface except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring
voltage and current) or
 measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction
between charges (using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure
analysis)
 manipulation of the hardware and its security features, as well as
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3 Security Problem Definition
 controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF Data)
with a prior
 reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions.
3.5.1.10 OT.Prot_Malfunction Protection against Malfunctions
The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside
the normal operating conditions where reliability and secure operation has not been
proven or tested. This is to prevent errors. The environmental conditions may include
external energy (esp. electromagnetic) fields, voltage (on any contacts), clock frequency,
or temperature.
3.5.1.11 OT.Active_Auth_Proof Proof of MRTD’S chip authenticity
The TOE shall support the Basic Inspection Systems to verify the identity and
authenticity of the MRTD’s chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization
by means of the Active Authentication as defined in [7]. The authenticity prove provided
by MRTD’s chip shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential.
3.5.2 Security Objectives for the Development and Manufacturing
Environment
3.5.2.1 OD.Assurance Assurance Security Measures in Development and
Manufacturing Environment
The developer and manufacturer ensure that the TOE is designed and fabricated such that
it requires a combination of complex equipment, knowledge, skill, and time to be able to
derive detailed design information or other information which could be used to
compromise security through attack. This includes the use of the Initialization Data for
unique identification of the TOE and the pre-personalization of the TOE including the
writing of the Personalization Agent Authentication key(s). The developer provides
necessary evaluation evidence that the TOE fulfils its security objectives and is resistant
against obvious penetration attacks with high attack potential.
3.5.2.2 OD.Material Control over MRTD Material
The IC Manufacturer, the MRTD Manufacturer and the Personalization Agent must
control all materials, equipment and information to produce, initialise, pre-personalize
genuine MRTD’s materials and to personalize authentic MRTDs in order to prevent
counterfeit of MRTDs using MRTD materials.
3.5.3 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
3.5.3.1 Issuing State or Organization
The Issuing State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the
TOE environment.
3.5.3.1.1 OE.Personalization Personalization of logical MRTD
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3 Security Problem Definition
The issuing State or Organization must ensure that the Personalization Agents acting on
behalf of the issuing State or Organisation (i) establish the correct identity of the holder
and create biographical data for the MRTD, (ii) enrol the biometric reference data of the
MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris
image(s) and (iii) personalize the MRTD for the holder together with the defined
physical and logical security measures to protect the confidentiality and integrity of these
data.
3.5.3.1.2 OE.Pass_Auth_Sign Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature
The Issuing State or Organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Country
Signing CA Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the Country Signing CA Private Key and
sign Document Signer Certificates in a secure operational environment, and (iii)
distribute the Certificate of the Country Signing CA Public Key to receiving States and
organizations maintaining its authenticity and integrity. The Issuing State or organization
must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Document Signing Key Pair and ensure the
secrecy of the Document Signer Private Keys, (ii) sign Document Security Objects of
genuine MRTD in a secure operational environment only and (iii) distribute the
Certificate of the Document Signing Public Key to receiving States and organizations.
The digital signature in the Document Security Object relates to all data in the data in
EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 if stored in the LDS according to [6].
3.5.3.1.3 OE.Auth_Key_MRTD MRTD Authentication Key
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure
in order to (i) generate the MRTD’s Chip Authentication Key Pair, (ii) sign and store the
Chip Authentication Public Key in the Chip Authentication Public Key data in EF.DG14
and (iii) support inspection systems of receiving States or organizations to verify the
authenticity of the MRTD’s chip used for genuine MRTD by certification of the Chip
Authentication Public Key by means of the Document Security Object.
3.5.3.1.4 OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data Authorization for Use of Sensitive Biometric
Reference Data
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure
in order to limit the access to sensitive biometric reference data of MRTD’s holders to
authorized receiving States or Organizations. The Country Verifying Certification
Authority of the issuing State or Organization generates card verifiable Document
Verifier Certificates for the authorized Document Verifier only.
3.5.3.1.5 OE.Active_Auth_Key_MRTD MRTD ActiveAuthentication Key
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure
in order to (i) generate the MRTD’s Active Authentication Key Pair, (ii) sign and store
the Active Authentication Public Key in the Active Authentication Public Key data in
EF.DG15 and (iii) support inspection systems of receiving States or organizations to
verify the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip used for genuine MRTD by certification of
the Active Authentication Public Key by means of the Document Security Object.
3.5.3.2 Receiving State or organization
The Receiving State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of
the TOE environment.
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3 Security Problem Definition
3.5.3.2.1 OE.Exam_MRTD Examination of the MRTD passport book
The inspection system of the Receiving State must examine the MRTD presented by the
traveller to verify its authenticity by means of the physical security measures and to
detect any manipulation of the physical MRTD. The Basic Inspection System for global
interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer
Public Key of each issuing State or Organization, and (ii) implements the terminal part
of the Basic Access Control [7]. Additionally General Inspection Systems and Extended
Inspection Systems perform the Chip Authentication Protocol to verify the Authenticity
of the presented MRTD’s chip.
3.5.3.2.2 OE.Passive_Auth_Verif Verification by Passive Authentication
The border control officer of the Receiving State uses the inspection system to verify
the traveller as MRTD holder. The inspection systems must have successfully verified
the signature of Document Security Objects and the integrity data elements of the
logical MRTD before they are used. The receiving States and organizations must
manage the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signing Public Key
maintaining their authenticity and availability in all inspection systems.
3.5.3.2.3 OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD Protection of data of the logical MRTD
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organisation ensures the confidentiality
and integrity of the data read from the logical MRTD. The inspection system will prevent
eavesdropping to their communication with the TOE before secure messaging is
successfully established based on the Chip Authentication Protocol.
3.5.3.2.4 OE.Ext_Insp_Systems Authorisation of Extended Inspection Systems
The Document Verifier of receiving States or Organizations authorize Extended
Inspection Systems by creation of Inspection System Certificates for access to sensitive
biometric reference data of the logical MRTD. The Extended Inspection System
authenticates themselves to the MRTD’s chip for access to the sensitive biometric
reference data with its private Terminal Authentication Key and its Inspection System
Certificate.
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4 Extended Components Definition
4 ExtendedComponentsDefinition
This security target uses components defined as extensions to CC part 2 [2]. Some of
these components are defined in [20], other components are defined in [21a].
This chapter has been taken from [21a] with minor modifications.
4.1 Definition of the Family FAU_SAS
To define the security functional requirements of the TOE an additional family
(FAU_SAS) of the Class FAU (Security Audit) is defined in [21a]. This family describes
the functional requirements for the storage of audit data. It has a more general approach
than FAU_GEN, because it does not necessarily require the data to be generated by the
TOE itself and because it does not give specific details of the content of the audit
records.
The family “Audit data storage (FAU_SAS)” is specified as follows.
4.1.1 FAU_SAS Audit data storage
Family behaviour
This family defines functional requirements for the storage of audit data.
Component levelling
FAU_SAS Audit data storage 1
FAU_SAS.1 Requires the TOE to provide the possibility to store audit data.
Management: FAU_SAS.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FAU_SAS.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
4.1.2 FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorised users] with the capability
to store [assignment: list of audit information] in the audit records.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
4.2 Definition of the Family FCS_RND
To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE an additional family
(FCS_RND) of the Class FCS (cryptographic support) is defined in [21a]. This family
describes the functional requirements for random number generation used for
cryptographic purposes. The component FCS_RND is not limited to generation of
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4 Extended Components Definition
cryptographic keys as the component FCS_CKM.1 is. The similar component
FIA_SOS.2 is intended for non-cryptographic use.
The family “Generation of random numbers (FCS_RND)” is specified as follows.
4.2.1 FCS_RND Generation of random numbers
Family behaviour
This family defines quality requirements for the generation of random numbers which
are intended to be used for cryptographic purposes.
Component levelling:
FCS_RND Generation of random numbers 1
FCS_RND.1 Generation of random numbers requires that random numbers meet a
defined quality metric.
Management: FCS_RND.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FCS_RND.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that
meet [assignment: a defined quality metric].
Dependencies: No dependencies.
4.3 Definition of the Family FIA_API
To describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family
(FIA_API) of the Class FIA (Identification and authentication) is defined here. This
family describes the functional requirements for the proof of the claimed identity for the
authentication verification by an external entity where the other families of the class FIA
address the verification of the identity of an external entity.
4.3.1 FIA_API Authentication Prove of Identity
Family behaviour
This family defines functions provided by the TOE to prove their identity and to be
verified by an external entity in the TOE IT environment.
Component levelling:
FIA_API Authentication Proof of Identity 1
FIA_API.1 Authentication Prove of Identity.
Management: FIA_API.1
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4 Extended Components Definition
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The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
anagement of authentication information used to prove the claimed identity.
4.3.1.1 of Identity
on mechanism] to
authorized user or rule].
Dependencies: No dependencies.
class
ctions by limiting the capabilities of the
d by limiting their availability.
The family “Limited capabilities and availability (FMT_LIM)” is specified as follows.
4.4.1 Limited capabilities and availability
ns
ity of this family requires the functions themselves to be designed in
omponent levelling:
M
Audit: FCS_RND.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_API.1.1 The TSF shall provide a [assignment: authenticati
prove the identity of the [assignment:
4.4 Definition of the Family FMT_LIM
The family FMT_LIM describes the functional requirements for the Test Features of the
TOE. The new functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because this
addresses the management of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical
mechanism used in the TOE show that no other class is appropriate to address the
specific issues of preventing the abuse of fun
functions an
FMT_LIM
Family behaviour
This family defines requirements that limits the capabilities and availability of functio
in a combined manner. Note that FDP_ACF restricts the access to functions whereas
the Limited capabil
a specific manner.
C
FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability
1
2
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities requires that the TSF is built to provide only the
capabilities (perform action, gather information) necessary for its genuine purpose.
e, by
moving or by disabling functions in a specific phase of the TOE’s lifecycle.
here are no management activities foreseen.
here are no actions defined to be auditable.
To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE an additional family
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability requires that the TSF restrict the use of functions
(refer to Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)). This can be achieved, for instanc
re
Management: FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
T
Audit: FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
T
4 Extended Components Definition
(FMT_LIM) of the Class FMT (Security Management) is defined here. This family
describes the functional requirements for the Test Features of the TOE. The new
functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because this class addresses the
management of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical mechanism used in
the TOE show that no other class is appropriate to address the specific issues of
preventing the abuse of functions by limiting the capabilities of the functions and by
limiting their availability.
The TOE Functional Requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” is specified as
follows.
4.4.1.1 FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities
so that in conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the following policy is
enforced [assignment: Limited capability and availability policy].
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.
The TOE Functional Requirement “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” is specified as
follows.
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability
so that in conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is
enforced [assignment: Limited capability and availability policy].
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.
4.5 Definition of the Family FPT_EMSEC
The additional family FPT_EMSEC (TOE Emanation) of the Class FPT (Protection of
the TSF) is defined in [21a] to describe the IT security functional requirements of the
TOE. The TOE shall prevent attacks against the logical MRTD data and other secret
data where the attack is based on external observable physical phenomena of the TOE.
Examples of such attacks are evaluation of TOE’s electromagnetic radiation, simple
power analysis (SPA), differential power analysis (DPA), timing attacks, etc. This family
describes the functional requirements for the limitation of intelligible emanations which
are not directly addressed by any other component of CC part 2 [2].
The family “TOE Emanation (FPT_EMSEC)” is specified as follows.
Family behaviour
This family defines requirements to mitigate intelligible emanations.
Component levelling:
FPT_EMSEC TOE emanation 1
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE emanation has two constituents:
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4 Extended Components Definition
FPT_EMSEC.1.1 Limit of Emissions requires to not emit intelligible emissions enabling
access to TSF data or user data.
FPT_EMSEC.1.2 Interface Emanation requires not emit interface emanation enabling
access to TSF data or user data.
Management: FPT_EMSEC.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FPT_EMSEC.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
4.5.1 FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_EMSEC.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of
[assignment: specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data]
and [assignment: list of types of user data].
FPT_EMSEC.1.2 The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use
the following interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access to [assignment:
list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data].
Dependencies: No other components.
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5 SecurityRequirements
This chapter has been taken from [21a] with some modifications3
.
The CC allows several operations to be performed on functional requirements
refinement, selection, assignment, and iteration are defined in paragraph 2.1.4 of Part 2
of the CC. Each of these operations is used in this security target.
The refinement operation is used to add detail to a requirement, and thus further restricts
a requirement. Refinement of security requirements is denoted by the word “refinement”
in bold text and the added/changed words are in bold text. In cases where words from a
CC requirement were deleted, a separate attachment indicates the words that were
removed.
The selection operation is used to select one or more options provided by the CC in
stating a requirement. Selections that have been made by the PP authors are denoted as
underlined text and the original text of the component is given by a footnote. Selections
filled in by the ST author appear as double underlined text.
The assignment operation is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter,
such as the length of a password. Assignments that have been made by the PP authors
are denoted by showing as underlined text and the original text of the component is
given by a footnote. Assignments to be filled in by the ST author appear in square
brackets with an indication that an assignment is to be made [assignment:], and are filled
in this ST as underlined text.
The iteration operation is used when a component is repeated with varying operations.
Iteration is denoted by showing a slash “/”, and the iteration indicator after the
component identifier.
The following table provides an overview of the keys and certificates used:
Name Data
Country Verifying
Certification
Authority Private
Key (SKCVCA)
The Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA)
holds a private key (SKCVCA) used for signing the
Document Verifier Certificates.
Country Verifying
Certification
Authority Public
Key (PKCVCA)
The TOE stores the Country Verifying Certification
Authority Public Key (PKCVCA) as part of the TSF data to
verify the Document Verifier Certificates. The PKCVCA
has the security attribute Current Date as the most recent
valid effective date of the Country Verifying
Certification Authority Certificate or of a domestic
Document Verifier Certificate.
Country Verifying The Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate
3
The assignmemts filled in by the ST author are double underlined and when applicable the application
notes of the PP are discussed in notes (see chapter 1.7).
5 Security Requirements
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Name Data
Certification
Authority
Certificate (CCVCA)
may be a self-signed certificate or a link certificate (cf.
[25] and Glossary). It contains (i) the Country Verifying
Certification Authority Public Key (PKCVCA) as
authentication reference data, (ii) the coded access
control rights of the Country Verifying Certification
Authority, (iii) the Certificate Effective Date and the
Certificate Expiration Date as security attributes.
Document Verifier
Certificate (CDV)
The Document Verifier Certificate CDV is issued by the
Country Verifying Certification Authority. It contains (i)
the Document Verifier Public Key (PKDV) as
authentication reference data (ii) identification as
domestic or foreign Document Verifier, the coded access
control rights of the Document Verifier, the Certificate
Effective Date and the Certificate Expiration Date as
security attributes.
Inspection System
Certificate (CIS)
The Inspection System Certificate (CIS) is issued by the
Document Verifier. It contains (i) as authentication
reference data the Inspection System Public Key (PKIS),
(ii) the coded access control rights of the Extended
Inspection System, the Certificate Effective Date and the
Certificate Expiration Date as security attributes.
Chip
Authentication
Public Key Pair
The Chip Authentication Public Key Pair (SKICC, PKICC)
are used for Key Agreement Protocol: Diffie-Hellman
(DH) according to RFC 2631 or Elliptic Curve Diffie-
Hellman according to ISO 15946.
Chip
Authentication
Public Key (PKICC)
The Chip Authentication Public Key (PKICC) is stored in
the EF.DG14 Chip Authentication Public Key of the
TOE’s logical MRTD and used by the inspection system
for Chip Authentication of the MRTD’s chip. It is part of
the user data provided by the TOE for the IT
environment.
Chip
Authentication
Private Key
(SKICC)
The Chip Authentication Private Key (SKICC) is used by
the TOE to authenticate itself as authentic MRTD’s chip.
It is part of the TSF data.
Country Signing
Certification
Authority Key Pair
Country Signing Certification Authority of the Issuing
State or Organization signs the Document Signer Public
Key Certificate with the Country Signing Certification
Authority Private Key and the signature will be verified
by Receiving State or Organization (e.g. a Basic
Inspection System) with the Country Signing
Certification Authority Public Key.
Document Signer
Key Pairs
Document Signer of the Issuing State or Organization
signs the Document Security Object of the logical MRTD
with the Document Signer Private Key and the signature
will be verified by a Basic Inspection Systems of the
Receiving State or organization with the Document
Signer Public Key.
Document Basic
Access Keys
The Document Basic Access Key is created by the
Personalization Agent, loaded to the TOE, and used for
5 Security Requirements
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Name Data
mutual authentication and key agreement for secure
messaging between the Basic Inspection System and the
MRTD’s chip.
BAC Session Keys Secure messaging Triple-DES key and Retail-MAC key
agreed between the TOE and a BIS in result of the Basic
Access Control Authentication Protocol.
Chip Session Key Secure messaging Triple-DES key and Retail-MAC key
agreed between the TOE and a GIS in result of the Chip
Authentication Protocol.
Active
Authentication
Public Key Pair
The Active Authentication Key Pair (SKAAICC,
PKAAICC) are used for the Active Authentication
mechanism according to [7].
Active
Authentication
Public Key
(PKAAICC)
The Active Authentication Public Key (PKAAICC) is
stored in the EF.DG15 Active Authentication Public Key
of the TOE’s logical MRTD and used by the inspection
system for Active Authentication of the MRTD’s chip. It
is part of the user data provided by the TOE for the IT
environment.
Active
Authentication
Private Key
(SKAAICC)
The Active Authentication Private Key (SKAAICC) is
used by the TOE to authenticate itself as authentic
MRTD’s chip. It is part of the TSF data.
5.1 Security Functional Requirements for the TOE
This section on security functional requirements for the TOE is divided into sub-section
following the main security functionality.
5.1.1 Class FAU Security Audit
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Audit storage (FAU_SAS.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FAU_SAS.1.1
The TSF shall provide the Manufacturer4
with the capability to store the IC Identification
Data5
in the audit records.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
5.1.2 Class Cryptographic Support (FCS)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations are caused by different
cryptographic key generation algorithms to be implemented and key to be generated by
4
[assignment: authorised users]
5
[assignment: list of audit information]
5 Security Requirements
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the TOE.
FCS_CKM.1/KDF_MRTD Cryptographic key generation –Key Derivation Function
by the MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_CKM.1.1/ KDF_MRTD
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic
key generation algorithm Document Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm6
and
specified cryptographic key sizes 112 bit7
that meet the following: [7], Annex E.8
Dependencies:
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FCS_CKM.1/DH_MRTD Cryptographic key generation – Diffie-Hellman Keys by the
MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_CKM.1.1/DH_MRTD
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic
key generation algorithm: ECDH compliant to ISO 15946, Document Basic Access Key
Derivation and specified cryptographic key sizes 192 bit – 320 bit, 112 bit that meet the
following: [25], Annex A.1 9
.
Dependencies:
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction - MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
6
[assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm]
7 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
8 [assignment: list of standards]
9
[assignment: list of standards]
5 Security Requirements
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FCS_CKM.4.1/ MRTD
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic
key destruction method physical deletion by overwriting the memory data with zeros or
random data that meets the following: none.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
5.1.2.1 Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations are caused by different
cryptographic algorithms to be implemented by the TOE.
FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD Cryptographic operation – Hash for Key Derivation by
MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/ SHA_MRTD
The TSF shall perform hashing10
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
SHA-111
and cryptographic key sizes none12
that meet the following: FIPS 180-213
.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD Cryptographic operation –Encryption / Decryption
Triple DES
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/ TDES_MRTD
The TSF shall perform secure messaging – encryption and decryption14
in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm Triple-DES in CBC mode15
and cryptographic
key sizes 112 bit16
that meet the following: FIPS 46-3 [14] and [7]; Annex E17
.
10
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
11
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
12 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
13 [assignment: list of standards]
14
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
15
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
16
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
17
[assignment: list of standards]
5 Security Requirements
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Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD Cryptographic operation – Retail MAC
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/MAC_MRTD
The TSF shall perform secure messaging – message authentication code18
in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm Retail MAC19
and cryptographic key sizes 112
bit20
that meet the following: ISO 9797 (MAC algorithm 3, block cipher DES, Sequence
Message Counter, padding mode 2)21
.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER Cryptographic operation – Signature verification by MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/SIG_VER
The TSF shall perform digital signature verification 22
in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm ECDSA with SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256 and cryptographic
key sizes: 192 bit – 320 bit that meet the following: ISO 15946-2, FIPS PUB 180-2.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FCS_COP.1/RSA_MRTD Cryptographic operation – Signature creation by MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/RSA_MRTD
The TSF shall perform digital signature creation 23
in accordance with a specified
18
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
19
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
20
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
21
[assignment: list of standards]
22
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
23
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
5 Security Requirements
cryptographic algorithm RSA with SHA-1 and cryptographic key sizes: 1024 - 4000 bit
that meet the following: scheme 1 of ISO/IEC 9796-2:2002 [19].
Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
5.1.2.2 Random Number Generation (FCS_RND.1)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Quality metric for random numbers
(FCS_RND.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
FCS_RND.1/MRTD Quality metric for random numbers
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_RND.1.1/ MRTD
The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet the
requirements for SOF high defined in AIS 20 [5a].
Dependencies: No dependencies.
5.1.3 Class FIA Identification and Authentication
Note 5: The Table 1 provides an overview on the authentication mechanisms used.
Name SFR for the TOE SFR for the
TOE environment
(terminal)
Algorithms and
key sizes
according to [7],
Annex E, and [22]
Symmetric
Authentication
Mechanism for
Personalization
Agents
FIA_UAU.4/MRTD FIA_API.1/PT Triple-DES with 112
bit keys
Basic Access
Control
Authentication
Mechanism
FIA_AFL.1,
FIA_UAU.4/MRTD,
FIA_UAU.6/MRTD
FIA_UAU.4/BT,
FIA_UAU.6/BT
Triple-DES, 112 bit
keys and
Retail-MAC, 112 bit
keys
Chip
Authentication
Protocol
FIA_API.1/MRTD,
FIA_UAU.5/MRTD,
FIA_UAU.6/MRTD
FIA_UAU.4/GIS,
FIA_UAU.5/GIS,
FIA_UAU.6/GIS
ECDH and
Retail-MAC, 112 bit
keys
Terminal
Authentication
Protocol
FIA_UAU.5/MRTD FIA_API.1/EIS RSASSA-PKCS1-
v1_5 or EC-DSA
with SHA
Active
Authentication
Mechanism
FIA_API.1/AA FIA_UAU.4/BT RSA with 1024 -
4000 bits. Algorithm
according to [7],
Annex D
Table 1 Overview on authentication SFR
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Note the Chip Authentication Protocol include the asymmetric key agreement and the
check whether the TOE is able to generate the correct message authentication code with
the expected key for any message received by the terminal.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of identification (FIA_UID.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UID.1.1
The TSF shall allow
(1) to establish the communication channel,
(2) to read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS24
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other
TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of authentication (FIA_UAU.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.1.1
The TSF shall allow
1. to establish the communication channel,
2. to read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS,
3. to identify themselves by selection of the authentication key 25
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any
other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
24
[assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions]
25
[assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions]
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The TOE shall meet the requirements of “Single-use authentication mechanisms
(FIA_UAU.4)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UAU.4/MRTD Single-use authentication mechanisms - Single-use
authentication of the Terminal by the TOE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.4.1/ MRTD
The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism,
2. Terminal Authentication Protocol,
3. Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES 26
.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Multiple authentication mechanisms
(FIA_UAU.5)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UAU.5/MRTD Multiple authentication mechanisms
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.5.1/MRTD
The TSF shall provide
1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism,
2. Terminal Authentication Protocol,
3. Secure messaging in MAC-ENC mode,
4. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES 27
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2/MRTD
The TSF shall authenticate any user’s claimed identity according to the following rules:
1. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalization Agent by one of the
following mechanisms
(a) the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with Personalization Agent
Keys,
(b) the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with Personalization Agent Key,
(c) the Terminal Authentication Protocol with Personalization Agent Keys.
2. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Basic Inspection System only by
means of the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with the Document
Basic Access Keys.
3. After successful authentication as Basic Inspection System and until the completion
of the Chip Authentication Mechanism the TOE accepts only received command
with correct message authentication code sent by means of secure messaging with the
key agreed upon with the authenticated terminal by means of the Basic Access
26
[assignment: identified authentication mechanism(s)]
27
[assignment: list of multiple authentication mechanisms]
5 Security Requirements
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Control Authentication Mechanism.
4. After run of the Chip Authentication Mechanism the TOE accepts only received
commands with correct message authentication code sent by means of secure
messaging with key agreed with the terminal by means of the Chip Authentication
Mechanism.
5. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt by means of the Terminal Authentication
Protocol only if the terminal uses secure messaging established by the Chip
Authentication Mechanism.28
.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Re-authenticating (FIA_UAU.6)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UAU.6/MRTD Re-authenticating – Re-authenticating of Terminal by the TOE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.6.1/MRTD
The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions
1. Each command sent to the TOE after successful authentication of the terminal with
Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism and until the completion of the
Chip Authentication Mechanism shall be verified as being sent by the authenticated
BIS.
2. Each command sent to the TOE after successful run of the Chip Authentication
Protocol shall be verified as being sent by the GIS. 29
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Authentication failure handling (FIA_AFL.1)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_AFL.1.1
The TSF shall detect when an administrator configurable positive integer within range of
acceptable values 1 to 10 unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to a BAC
authentication protocol.
FIA_AFL.1.2
When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met or
surpassed, the TSF shall wait for an administrator configurable time greater 1 second
between receiving the terminal challenge eIFD and sending the TSF response eICC during
the BAC authentication attempts.
28
[assignment: rules describing how the multiple authentication mechanisms provide authentication]
29
[assignment: list of conditions under which re-authentication is required]
5 Security Requirements
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Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Authentication Proof of Identity (FIA_API.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
FIA_API.1/CAP Authentication Proof of Identity - MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_API.1.1/CAP
The TSF shall provide a Chip Authentication Protocol according to [25]
30
to prove the
identity of the TOE31
.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Authentication Proof of Identity (FIA_API.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
FIA_API.1/AA Authentication Proof of Identity - MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_API.1.1/AA
The TSF shall provide a Active Authentication Mechanism according to [7]
32
to prove
the identity of the TOE33
.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
5.1.4 Class FDP User Data Protection
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
5.1.4.1 FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_ACC.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP34
on terminals gaining write, read and
modification access to data in the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical
MRTD35
.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
30
[assignment: authentication mechanism]
31
[assignment: authorized user or rule]
32
[assignment: authentication mechanism]
33
[assignment: authorized user or rule]
34
[assignment: access control SFP]
35 [assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP]
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The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security attribute based access control
(FDP_ACF.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
5.1.4.2 FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1 Security attributes based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_ACF.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP36
to objects based on the following:
1. Subjects:
a. Personalization Agent,
b. Basic Inspection System,
c. Extended Inspection System
d. Terminal,
2. Objects:
a. data EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
b. data in EF.COM,
c. data in EF.SOD,
3. Security attributes:
a. authentication status of terminals,
b. Terminal Authorization 37
.
FDP_ACF.1.2
36
[assignment: access control SFP]
37
[assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and. for each, the SFP-
relevant security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes]
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The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled
subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
1. the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write and to read
the data of the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
2. the successfully authenticated Basic Inspection System is allowed to read the data in
EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 of the logical
MRTD,
3. the successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System is allowed to read the data
in EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 of the logical
MRTD,
4. the successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System is allowed to read data in
the EF.DG3 according to the Terminal Authorization,
5. the successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System is allowed to read data in
the EF.DG4 according to the Terminal Authorization 38
.
FDP_ACF.1.3
The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: none39
.
FDP_ACF.1.4
1. The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the rule: A
terminal authenticated as CVCA is not allowed to read to read data in the EF.DG3,
2. A terminal authenticated as CVCA is not allowed to read data in the EF.DG4,
3. A terminal authenticated as DV is not allowed to read data in the EF.DG3,
4. A terminal authenticated as DV is not allowed to read data in the EF.DG4,
5. the Terminals are not allowed to modify any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the
logical MRTD 40
.
Dependencies:
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Basic data exchange confidentiality
(FDP_UCT.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FDP_UCT.1/MRTD Basic data exchange confidentiality - MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_UCT.1.1/ MRTD
The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP41
to be able to transmit and receive42
objects in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure after Chip Authentication..
38
[assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using
controlled operations on controlled objects]
39 [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to
objects]
40
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects]
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Dependencies:
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Basic data exchange confidentiality
(FDP_UCT.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FDP_UIT.1/MRTD Data exchange integrity - MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_UIT.1.1/ MRTD
The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP43
to be able to transmit and receive44
user
data in a manner protected from modification, deletion, insertion and replay45
errors
after Chip Authentication.
FDP_UIT.1.2/ MRTD
The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether
modification, deletion, insertion and replay46
has occurred after Chip Authentication.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
5.1.5 Class FMT Security Management
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Specification of Management Functions
(FMT_SMF.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_SMF.1.1
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security management functions:
1. Initialization,
2. Personalization
3. Configuration47
.
Dependencies: No Dependencies
41
[assignment: access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s)]
42
[selection: transmit, receive]
43
[assignment: access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s)]
44
[selection: transmit, receive]
45 [selection: modification, deletion, insertion, replay]
46
[selection: modification, deletion, insertion, replay]
47
[assignment: list of security management functions to be provided by the TSF]
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The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security roles (FMT_SMR.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_SMR.1.1
The TSF shall maintain the roles
1. Manufacturer,
2. Personalization Agent,
3. Country Verifier Certification Authority,
4. Document Verifier,
5. Basic Inspection System,
6. domestic Extended Inspection System
7. foreign Extended Inspection System 48
.
FMT_SMR.1.2
The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Hierarchical to:
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_LIM.1.1
The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction
with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the following policy is enforced: Deploying
Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
1. User Data to be disclosed or manipulated
2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
3. software to be reconstructed and
4. substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable
other attacks49
.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
48
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
49
[assignment: Limited capability and availability policy]
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Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_LIM.2.1
The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction
with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is enforced: Deploying
Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
1. User Data to be disclosed or manipulated
2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
3. software to be reconstructed and
4. substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable
other attacks50
.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1)” a
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations address different management
functions and different TSF data.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Management of TSF data – Writing of Initialization Data and
Pre-personalization Data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1.1/ INI_ENA
The TSF shall restrict the ability to write51
the Initialization Data and Pre-personalization
Data52
to the Manufacturer53
.
Dependencies:
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Management of TSF data – Disabling of Read Access to
Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1.1/ INI_DIS
The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable read access for users to54
the Initialization
Data55
to the Personalization Agent56
.
Dependencies:
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
50
[assignment: Limited capability and availability policy]
51
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
52
[assignment: list of TSF data]
53
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
54
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
55
[assignment: list of TSF data]
56
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
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FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI Management of TSF data – Initialisation of CVCA Certificate
and Current Date
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1.1/CVCA_INI
The TSF shall restrict the ability to write 57
the
1. initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key,
2. initial Country Verifier Certification Authority Certificate,
3. initial Current Date 58
to the Personalization Agent.
Dependencies:
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD Management of TSF data – Country Verifier Certification
Authority
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1.1/CVCA_UPD
The TSF shall restrict the ability to update 59
the
1. Country Verifier Certification Authority Public Key,
2. Country Verifier Certification Authority Certificate 60
to Country Verifier Certification Authority 61
.
Dependencies:
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1/DATE Management of TSF data – Current date
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1.1/DATE
57
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
58
[assignment: list of TSF data]
59
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
60
[assignment: list of TSF data]
61
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
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The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify 62
the Current date 63
to
1. Country Verifier Certification Authority,
2. Document Verifier,
3. domestic Extended Inspection System 64
.
Dependencies:
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data – Key Write
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1.1/ KEY_WRITE
The TSF shall restrict the ability to write65
the Document Basic Access Keys66
to the
Personalization Agent67
.
Dependencies:
ADV_SPM.1 Informal TOE security policy model
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK Management of TSF data – Chip Authentication Private Key
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1.1/CAPK
The TSF shall restrict the ability to create and load 68
the Chip Authentication Private
Key 69
to the Manufacturer and the Personalisation Agent.
Dependencies:
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1/AAPK Management of TSF data – Active Authentication Private Key
Hierarchical to: No other components.
62
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
63
[assignment: list of TSF data]
64
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
65
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
66
[assignment: list of TSF data]
67
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
68
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
69
[assignment: list of TSF data]
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FMT_MTD.1.1/AAPK
The TSF shall restrict the ability to create and load 70
the Active Authentication Private
Key 71
to the Manufacturer and the Personalisation Agent.
Dependencies:
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ Management of TSF data – Key Read
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1.1/ KEY_READ
The TSF shall restrict the ability to read 72
the
1. Document Basic Access Keys,
2. Chip Authentication Private Key,
3. Personalization Agent Keys 73
4. Active Authentication Private Key
to none 74
.
Dependencies:
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_CHANGE Management of TSF data – Modification of
Personalization Agent Key
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1.1/ KEY_CHANGE
The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify75
the Personalization Agent Key76
to the
Personalization Agent77
.
Dependencies:
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
70
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
71
[assignment: list of TSF data]
72
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
73
[assignment: list of TSF data]
74
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
75
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
76
[assignment: list of TSF data]
77
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
5 Security Requirements
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.3 Secure TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.3.1
The TSF shall ensure that only secure values of the certificate chain are accepted for
TSF data of the Terminal Authentication Protocol and the Access Control.
Dependencies:
ADV_SPM.1 Informal TOE security policy model
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
Refinement: The certificate chain is valid if and only if
(1) the digital signature of the Inspection System Certificate can be verified
as correct with the public key of the Document Verifier Certificate and
the expiration date of the Inspection System Certificate is not before the
Current Date of the TOE,
(2) the digital signature of the Document Verifier Certificate can be verified
as correct with the public key in the Certificate of the Country Verifying
Certification Authority and the expiration date of the Document Verifier
Certificate is not before the Current Date of the TOE,
(3) the digital signature of the Certificate of the Country Verifying
Certification Authority can be verified as correct with the public key of
the Country Verifying Certification Authority known to the TOE and the
expiration date of the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification
Authority is not before the Current Date of the TOE.
The Inspection System Public Key contained in the Inspection System
Certificate in a valid certificate chain is a secure value for the authentication
reference data of the Extended Inspection System.
The intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorizations contained in the
certificates of a valid certificate chain is a secure value for Terminal
Authorization of a successful authenticated Extended Inspection System.
5.1.6 Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions
The TOE shall prevent inherent and forced illicit information flow for User Data and
TSF Data. The security functional requirement FPT_EMSEC.1 addresses the inherent
leakage. With respect to forced leakage they have to be considered in combination with
the security functional requirements “Failure with preservation of secure state
(FPT_FLS.1)” and “TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)” on the one hand and “Resistance to
physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” on the other. The SFR “Non-bypassability of the TSP
(FPT_RVM.1)” and “TSF domain separation (FPT_SEP.1)” together with “Limited
capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)”, “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” and “Resistance to
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physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” prevent bypassing, deactivation and manipulation of the
security features or misuse of TOE functions.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “TOE Emanation (FPT_EMSEC.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended):
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_EMSEC.1.1
The TOE shall not emit information about IC power consumption and command
execution time in excess of non useful information enabling access to Personalization
Agent Authentication Key78
and logical MRTD data.
FPT_EMSEC.1.2
The TSF shall ensure any users79
are unable to use the following interface smart card
circuit contacts80
to gain access to Personalization Agent Authentication Key and Chip
Authentication Private Key 81
and logical MRTD data and Active Authentication Private
Key.
Dependencies: No other components.
The following security functional requirements address the protection against forced
illicit information leakage including physical manipulation.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Failure with preservation of secure state
(FPT_FLS.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_FLS.1.1
The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of
failures occur:
(1) exposure to operating conditions where therefore a malfunction could occur,
(2) failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.182
.
Dependencies:
ADV_SPM.1 Informal TOE security policy model
The TOE shall meet the requirement “TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
78
[assignment: list of types of TSF data]
79
[assignment: type of users]
80
[assignment: type of connection]
81
[assignment: list of types of TSF data]
82
[assignment: list of types of failures in the TSF]
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Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_TST.1.1
The TSF shall run a suite of self tests during initial start-up, periodically during normal
operation, at the condition Reset of the TOE to demonstrate the correct operation of the
TSF.
FPT_TST.1.2
The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of TSF
data.
FPT_TST.1.3
The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of
stored TSF executable code.
Dependencies:
FPT_AMT.1 Abstract machine testing.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_PHP.3.1
The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing83
to the TSF84
by
responding automatically such that the TSP is not violated.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
The following security functional requirements protect the TSF against bypassing. and
support the separation of TOE parts.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Non-bypassability of the TSP (FPT_RVM.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FPT_RVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_RVM.1.1
The TSF shall ensure that TSP enforcement functions are invoked and succeed before
each function within the TSC is allowed to proceed.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “TSF domain separation (FPT_SEP.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
83
[assignment: physical tampering scenarios]
84
[assignment: list of TSF devices/elements]
5 Security Requirements
FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_SEP.1.1
The TSF shall maintain a security domain for its own execution that protects it from
interference and tampering by untrusted subjects.
FPT_SEP.1.2
The TSF shall enforce separation between the security domains of subjects in the TSC.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
5.2 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE
The for the evaluation of the TOE and its development and operating environment are
those taken from the Evaluation Assurance Level 4 (EAL4) and augmented by taking the
following components:
ADV_IMP.2, ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4.
The minimum strength of function is SOF-high.
This security target does not contain any security functional requirement for which an
explicit strength of function claim is required.
5.2.1 TOE Security Assurance Requirements
The following table list the required assurance requirement classes according [21a] with
the components ADV_IMP.2, ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4
augmented to EAL4.
All final interpretations till now (17.02.2006) are applied.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ACM ACM_AUT.1 ACM_CAP.4 ACM_SCP.2
ADO ADO_DEL.2 ADO_IGS.1
ADV ADV_FSP.2 ADV_HLD.2 ADV_IMP.2 ADV_LLD.1 ADV_RCR.1
ADV_SPM.1
AGD AGD_ADM.1 AGD_USR.1
ALC ALC_DVS.2 ALC_LCD.1 ALC_TAT.1
ATE ATE_COV.2 ATE_DPT.1 ATE_FUN.1 ATE_IND.2
AVA AVA_MSU.3 AVA_SOF.1 AVA_VLA.4
Table 2 Assurance Requirements: EAL (4+)
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5.3 Security Requirements for the IT environment
This section describes the security functional requirements for the IT environment using
the CC part 2 components.
Due to CCIMB Final Interpretation #58 these components are editorial changed to
express the security requirements for the components in the IT environment where the
original components are directed for TOE security functions. The editorial changes are
indicated in bold.
5.3.1 Passive Authentication
The ICAO, the Issuing States or Organizations and the Receiving States or
Organization run a public key infrastructure for the Passive Authentication. This public
key infrastructure distributes and protects the Country Signing CA Keys and the
Document Signing Keys to support the signing of the User Data (EF.DG1 to EF.DG16)
by means of the Document Security Object. The Technical Report [7] describes the
requirements to the public key infrastructure for the Passive Authentication.
The Document Signer of the Issuing State or Organization shall meet the requirement
“Basic data authentication (FDP_DAU.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FDP_DAU.1/DS Basic data authentication – Passive Authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_DAU.1.1/ DS
The Document Signer shall provide a capability to generate evidence that can be used as
a guarantee of the validity of logical the MRTD (EF.DG1 to EF.DG16) and the
Document Security Object85
.
FDP_DAU.1.2/ DS
The Document Signer shall provide Inspection Systems of Receiving States or
Organization86
with the ability to verify evidence of the validity of the indicated
information.
Dependencies: No dependencies
5.3.2 Extended Access Control PKI
The CVCA and the DV shall establish a Document Verification PKI by generating
asymmetric key pairs and certificates for the CVCA, DV and IS which may be verified
by the TOE. The following SFR use the term “PKI” as synonym for entities like CVCA,
DV and IS which may be responsible to perform the identified functionality.
FCS_CKM.1/PKI Cryptographic key generation – Document Verification PKI
Keys
Hierarchical to: No other components.
85
[assignment: list of objects or information types]
86
[assignment: list of subjects]
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FCS_CKM.1.1/PKI
The PKI shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic
key generation algorithm: ECDSA and specified cryptographic key sizes 192 bit – 320
that meet the following: [25], Annex A 87
.
Dependencies:
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FCS_COP.1/CERT_SIGN Cryptographic operation – Certificate Signing
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/CERT_SIGN
The PKI shall perform digital signature creation 88
in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm ECDSA and cryptographic key sizes 192 bit – 320 bit that meet
the following: TR-03111 Ver. 1.0 [25].
Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
5.3.3 Basic Terminal
This section describes common security functional requirements to the Basic
Inspection Systems and the Personalization Agent if it uses the Basic Access Control
Mechanism with the Personalization Agent Authentication Keys. Both are called “Basic
Terminals” (BT) in this section.
The Basic Terminal shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation
(FCS_CKM.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FCS_CKM.1/BAC_BT Cryptographic key generation – Generation of Document
Basic Access Keys by the Basic Terminal
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_CKM.1.1/ BAC_BT
87
[assignment: list of standards]
88
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
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The Basic Terminal shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm Document Basic Access Key Derivation
Algorithm89
and specified cryptographic key sizes 112 bit90
that meet the following:
[7], Annex E91
.
Dependencies:
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FCS_CKM.4/BT Cryptographic key destruction - BT
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_CKM.4.1/BT
The Basic Terminal shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method physical deletion by overwriting the memory data
with zeros or random data that meets the following: none.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user
data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
The Basic Terminal shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation
(FCS_COP.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations are caused
by different cryptographic algorithms to be implemented by the Basic Terminal.
FCS_COP.1/SHA_BT Cryptographic operation – Hash Function by the Basic
Terminal
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/ SHA_BT
The Basic Terminal shall perform hashing92
in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithms SHA-193
and cryptographic key sizes none94
that meet the
following: FIPS 180- 295
.
89
[assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm]
90 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
91
[assignment: list of standards]
92
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
93
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
94
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
95
[assignment: list of standards]
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Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user
data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FCS_COP.1/ENC_BT Cryptographic operation – Secure Messaging Encryption /
Decryption by the Basic Terminal
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/ ENC_BT
The Basic Terminal shall perform secure messaging – encryption and decryption96
in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Triple-DES in CBC mode97
and
cryptographic key sizes 112 bit98
that meet the following: FIPS 46-3, ISO 11568-2, ISO
9797-1 (padding mode 2)99
.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user
data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FCS_COP.1/MAC_BT Cryptographic operation – Secure messaging Message
Authentication Code by the Basic Terminal
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/MAC_BT
The Basic Terminal shall perform secure messaging – message authentication code100
in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Retail-MAC101
and cryptographic
key sizes 112 bit102
that meet the following: FIPS 46-3, ISO 9797 (MAC algorithm 3,
block cipher DES, zero IV 8 bytes, padding mode 2)103
.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user
data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
96
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
97
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
98
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
99
[assignment: list of standards]
100
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
101
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
102
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
103
[assignment: list of standards]
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FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FCS_COP.1/RSA_BT Cryptographic operation – RSA
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/RSA_BT
The Basic Terminal shall perform digital signature verification104
in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm RSA with SHA-1105
and cryptographic key sizes
1024-4000 bit106
that meet the following: scheme 1 of ISO/IEC 9796-2:2002107
[19].
Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user
data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
The Basic Terminal shall meet the requirement “Quality metric for random numbers
(FCS_RND.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
FCS_RND.1/BT Quality metric for random numbers by Basic Terminal
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_RND.1.1/BT
The Basic Terminal shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet
the requirements for SOF high defined in AIS 20 [5a].
Dependencies: No dependencies.
The Basic Terminal shall meet the requirements of “Single-use authentication
mechanisms (FIA_UAU.4)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UAU.4/BT Single-use authentication mechanisms –Basic Terminal
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.4.1/BT
The Basic Terminal shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to Basic Access
Control Authentication Mechanism and Active Authentication Mechanism108
.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
The Basic Terminal shall meet the requirement “Re-authentication (FIA_UAU.6)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
104
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
105
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
106
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
107
[assignment: list of standards]
108
[assignment: identified authentication mechanism(s)]
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FIA_UAU.6/BT Re-authentication - Basic Terminal
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.6.1/BT
The Basic Terminal shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each command
sent to TOE after successful authentication of the terminal with Basic Access Control
Authentication Mechanism109
.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
5.3.4 General Inspection System
The General Inspection System (GIS) is a Basic Inspection System which implements
additional the Chip Authentication Mechanism. Therefore it has to fulfil all security
requirements of the Basic Inspection System as described above.
The General Inspection System verifies the authenticity of the MRTD’s by the Chip
Authentication Mechanism during inspection and establishes new secure messaging with
keys. The reference data for the Chip Authentication Mechanism is the Chip
Authentication Public Key read form the logical MRTD data group EF.DG14 and
verified by Passive Authentication (cf. to FDP_DAU.1/DS). Note, that the Chip
Authentication Mechanism requires the General Inspection System to verify at least one
message authentication code of a response sent by the MRTD to check the authenticity
of the chip.
The General Inspection System shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key
generation (FCS_CKM.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FCS_CKM.1/DH_GIS Cryptographic key generation – Diffie-Hellman Keys by the
GIS
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_CKM.1.1/DH_GIS
The General Inspection System shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm: ECDH, Document Basic Access Key
Derivation Algorithm and specified cryptographic key sizes: 192 bit – 320 bit, 112 bit
resp that meet the following: [25], Annex A.1 110
.
Dependencies:
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FCS_COP.1/SHA_GIS Cryptographic operation – Hash for Key Derivation by GIS
Hierarchical to: No other components.
109
[assignment: list of conditions under which re-authentication is required]
110
[assignment: list of standards]
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FCS_COP.1.1/SHA_GIS
The General Inspection System shall perform hashing 111
in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm SHA-1 and SHA-256 and cryptographic key sizes
none 112
that meet the following: FIPS 180-2 113
.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
The General Inspection System shall meet the requirement “Single-use authentication
mechanisms (FIA_UAU.4)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UAU.4/GIS Single-use authentication mechanisms - Single-use authentication
of the Terminal by the GIS
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.4.1/GIS
The General Inspection System shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism,
2. Chip Authentication Protocol114
.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
The General Inspection System shall meet the requirement “Multiple authentication
mechanisms (FIA_UAU.5)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UAU.5/GIS Multiple authentication mechanisms – General Inspection System
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.5.1/GIS
The General Inspection System shall provide
1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism,
2. Chip Authentication115
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2/GIS
111
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
112
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
113
[assignment: list of standards]
114
[assignment: identified authentication mechanism(s)]
115
[assignment: list of multiple authentication mechanisms]
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The General Inspection System shall authenticate any user’s claimed identity according
to the following rules:
1. The General Inspection System accepts the authentication attempt as MRTD only by
means of the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with the Document
Basic Access Keys.
2. After successful authentication as MRTD and until the completion of the Chip
Authentication Mechanism the General Inspection System accepts only response
codes with correct message authentication code sent by means of secure messaging
with key agreed with the authenticated MRTD by means of the Basic Access
Control Authentication Mechanism.
3. After run of the Chip Authentication Mechanism the General Inspection System
accepts only response codes with correct message authentication code sent by
means of secure messaging with key agreed with the terminal by means of the
Chip Authentication Mechanism.116
Dependencies: No dependencies.
The General Inspection System shall meet the requirement “Re-authenticating
(FIA_UAU.6)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UAU.6/GIS Re-authenticating – Re-authenticating of Terminal by the General
Inspection System
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.6.1/GIS
The General Inspection System shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions
1. Each response sent to the General Inspection System after successful authentication
of the MRTD with Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism and until the
completion of the Chip Authentication Mechanism shall have a correct MAC
created by means of secure messaging keys agreed upon by the Basic Access
Control Authentication Mechanism.
2. Each response sent to the General Inspection System after successful run of the Chip
Authentication Protocol shall have a correct MAC created by means of secure
messaging keys generated by Chip Authentication Protocol. 117
Dependencies: No dependencies.
The General Inspection System shall meet the requirement “Basic data exchange
confidentiality (FDP_UCT.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FDP_UCT.1/GIS Basic data exchange confidentiality - General Inspection System
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_UCT.1.1/GIS
116
[assignment: rules describing how the multiple authentication mechanisms provide authentication]
117
[assignment: list of conditions under which re-authentication is required]
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The General Inspection System shall enforce the Access Control SFP 118
to be able to
transmit and receive119
objects in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure after
Chip Authentication.
Dependencies:
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
The General Inspection System shall meet the requirement “Data exchange integrity
(FDP_UIT.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FDP_UIT.1/GIS Data exchange integrity - General Inspection System
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_UIT.1.1/GIS
The General Inspection System shall enforce the Access Control SFP 120
to be able to
transmit and receive 121
user data in a manner protected from modification, deletion,
insertion and replay 122
errors after Chip Authentication.
FDP_UIT.1.2/GIS
The General Inspection System shall be able to determine on receipt of user data,
whether modification, deletion, insertion and replay 123
has occurred after Chip
Authentication.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
5.3.5 Extended Inspection System
The Extended Inspection System (EIS) in addition to the General Inspection System (i)
implements the Terminal Authentication Protocol and (ii) is authorized by the issuing
State or Organization through the Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the
sensitive biometric reference data.
FCS_COP.1/SIG_SIGN_EIS Cryptographic operation – Signature creation by EIS
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/SIG_SIGN_EIS
The Extended Inspection System shall perform signature creation 124
in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm: ECDSA and cryptographic key sizes: 192 bit –
320 bit that meet the following: ISO 15946-2.
118
[assignment: access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s)]
119
[selection: transmit, receive]
120
[assignment: access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s)]
121
[selection: transmit, receive]
122
[selection: modification, deletion, insertion, replay]
123
[selection: modification, deletion, insertion, replay]
124
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
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Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FCS_COP.1/SHA_EIS Cryptographic operation – Hash for Key Derivation by EIS
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/SHA_EIS
The Extended Inspection System shall perform hashing 125
in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm SHA-1 and SHA-256 and cryptographic key sizes
none 126
that meet the following: FIPS 180-2 127
.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Authentication Proof of Identity (FIA_API.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
FIA_API.1/EIS Authentication Proof of Identity – Extended Inspection System
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_API.1.1/EIS
The Extended Inspection System shall provide a Terminal Authentication Protocol
according to [25] 128
to prove the identity of the Extended Inspection system 129
.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
5.3.6 Personalization Terminals
The TOE supports different authentication and access control mechanisms which may be
used for the Personalization Agent depending on the personalization scheme of the
Issuing State or Organization:
(1) The Basic Access Control Mechanism which may be used by the
Personalization Terminal with a Personalization Agent Secret Key Pair. The Basic
Access Control Mechanism establishes strong cryptographic keys for the secure
125
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
126
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
127
[assignment: list of standards]
128
[assignment: authentication mechanism]
129
[assignment: authorized user or rule]
5 Security Requirements
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messaging to ensure the confidentiality by Triple-DES and integrity by Retail-MAC of
the transmitted data. This approach may be used in a personalization environment where
the communication between the MRTD’s chip and the Personalization Terminal may be
listened or manipulated.
(2) The Personalization Terminal may use the Terminal Authentication Protocol
like an Extended Inspection System but using the Personalization Agent Keys to
authenticate themselves to the TOE. This approach may be used in a personalization
environment where (i) the Personalization Agent want to authenticate the MRTD’s chip
and (ii) the communication between the MRTD’s chip and the Personalization Terminal
may be listened or manipulated.
(3) In a centralized personalization scheme the major issue is high productivity of
personalization in a high secure environment. In this case the personalization agent may
wish to reduce the protocol to symmetric authentication of the terminal without secure
messaging. Therefore the TOE and the Personalization Terminal support a simple the
Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with Personalization Agent Key as requested by
the SFR FIA_UAU.4/MRTD and FIA_API.1/SYM_PT.
The Personalization Terminal shall meet the requirement “Authentication Prove of
Identity (FIA_API)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended) if it uses the
Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with Personalization Agent Key.
FIA_API.1/SYM_PT Authentication Proof of Identity - Personalization Terminal
Authentication with Symmetric Key
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_API.1.1/SYM_PT
The Personalization Terminal shall provide an Authentication Mechanism based on
Triple-DES 130
to prove the identity of the Personalization Agent 131
.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
130
[assignment: authentication mechanism]
131
[assignment: authorized user or rule]
6 TOE Summary Specification
6 TOESummarySpecification
This chapter describes the TOE Security Functions and the Assurance Measures
covering the requirements of the previous chapter.
6.1 TOE Security Functions
This chapter gives the overview description of the different TOE Security Functions
composing the TSF.
In the following table all TOE Security Functions are listed and if appropriate a SOF
claim is stated. The assessment of cryptographic algorithms is not part of this CC
evaluation.
TOE Security
Function
SOF claim Description
SF.ACCESS not appropriate This TOE Security Function is not realised by a
probabilistic or permutational noncryptographic
mechanism.
SF.ADMIN High There is a probabilistic authentication mechanism of the
card manufacturer during initialisation phase.
SF.AUTH High There is a probabilistic authentication mechanism of the
card manufacturer during initialisation phase.
SF.CRYPTO High The random number generators and hash functions are
probabilistic mechanisms. The deterministic random
number generator is rated K3 (high) according to AIS20
[5a].
SF.PROTECTION not appropriate This TOE Security Function is not realised by a
probabilistic or permutational noncryptographic
mechanism.
SF.IC High Several Security Functions of the IC are realised by
probabilistic or permutational noncryptographic
mechanisms. For the rating of the HW-RNG according
to AIS31 [5] see[24]
Table 3 SOF claims for TOE Security Functions
The SFs described in 6.1.1 to 6.1.5 are realised by software components supported by the
underlying hardware in accordance with the description in 6.1.6 (hardware related SF).
The SF.IC.2, covering a failure with preservation of secure state, is not realised by a
probabilistic or permutational noncryptographic mechanism; either a failure is detected
or not.
6.1.1 SF.ACCESS (Access Control)
Before the TSF perform an operation requested by a user, this Security function checks if
the operation specific requirements on user authorisation and protection of
communication data are fulfilled.
This Security Function is composed of
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6 TOE Summary Specification
1) The TSF enforces the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled
subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
 Allowing only the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent to write and
to read the data of the data groups EF.COM, EF.SOD and EF.DG1 to EF.DG16
of the logical MRTD,
 Allowing the successfully authenticated Basic Inspection System to read only
data in EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 of the
logical MRTD.
 Allowing the successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System to read only
data in EF.COM, EF.SOD and EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD.
2) The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the rule:
Terminals authenticated as CVCA or DV are not allowed to read data in EF.DG3 and
EF.DG4.
3) Not allowing anybody to modify any of the data groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the
logical MRTD in the usage phase.
4) TSF mediated actions on behalf of an user require his prior successful identification
and authentication, if it is not specified in this chapter otherwise.
5) Nobody is allowed to read the Document Basic Access Keys, the Chip
Authentication Private Key, the Active Authentication Private Key and the
Personalization Agent Keys.
6.1.2 SF.ADMIN (Administration of the TOE)
The administration of the TOE is managed by this Security Function.
This Security Function is composed of:
1) Storage of IC Identification Data in audit records through the Manufacturer.
2) Ability before user identification and authentication:
- to read the Initialization Data in Phase 2 “Manufacturing”,
- to read the ATR (different for and after Initialisation)
- to establish the communication channel, and
- to identify themselves by selection of the authentication key.
3) Initialization, personalisation, configuration of the TOE and identification of the
Personalization Agent Key are only allowed for the Manufacturer and the
Personalisation Agent.
4) Ability to write the Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data is restricted to
the Manufacturer.
5) Ability to disable read access for users to the Initialization Data is restricted to the
Personalization Agent.
6) The ability to write the CVCA Public Key, the initial CVCA certificate and the
initial Current Date is restricted to the Personalization Agent.
7) The ability to update the CVCA Public Key and the CVCA certificate is restricted to
the CVCA.
8) The Current Date can only be modified by the CVCA, DV or domestic Extended
Inspection System.
9) Ability to write the Document Basic Access Keys is restricted to the Personalization
Agent.
10) The creation and loading of the Chip Authentication Private Key is restricted to the
Manufacturer and the Personalisation Agent.
11) Test Features of the TOE are not available for the user in Phase 4 “Operational Use”.
If Test Features are performed by the TOE then no User Data can be disclosed or
manipulated, no TSF data can be disclosed or manipulated, no software can be
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6 TOE Summary Specification
reconstructed and no substantial information about construction of TSF can be
gathered which may enable other attacks.
12) Maintenance of the security roles: Manufacturer, Personalization Agent, Country
Verifier Certification Authority, Document Verifier, Basic Inspection System,
domestic Extended Inspection System, foreign Extended Inspection System.
13) Only secure values of the certificate chain are accepted for TSF data of the Terminal
Authentication Protocol and the Access Control.
14) Ability to write the data of the data groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical
MRTD.
15) The creation and loading of the Active Authentication Private Key is restricted to the
Manufacturer and the Personalisation Agent.
16) The ability to modify the the Personalization Agent Key is restricted to the
Personalization Agent.
This Security Function has the level of strength SOF-high.
6.1.3 SF.AUTH (Authentication of the authorized TOE user)
The authentication for the authorized TOE user is managed by this Security Function.
This Security Function is composed of:
1) User authentication provided through:
- Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism
- Terminal Authentication Protocol
- Secure messaging in MAC-ENC mode
- Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES
2) Prevention of reuse of authentication data.
3) User authentication for the Personalisation Agent:
(a) for the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with
the Personalization Agent Keys,
(b) for the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with the Personalization Agent
Key
4) User authentication for the Basic Inspection System through: the Basic Access
Control Authentication Mechanism with the Document Basic Access Keys.
5) After successful authentication as Basic Inspection System and until completion of
the Chip Authentication mechanism only commands with correct message
authentication code with key agreed upon with the authenticated terminal by means
of the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism are accepted.
6) After run of the Chip Authentication Mechanism only commands with correct
message authentication code with key agreed with the terminal by means of the Chip
Authentication Mechanism are accepted.
7) Terminal authentication attempts are only accepted if the terminal uses secure
messaging established by the Chip Authentication Mechanism.
8) Chip Authentication Protocol according to [25] to prove the identity of the TOE.
9) Re-Authentication:
(a) Each command sent to the TOE after successful authentication of the terminal
with Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism and until the completion of
the Chip Authentication Mechanism shall be verified as being sent by the
authenticated BIS.
(b) Each command sent to the TOE after successful run of the Chip Authentication
Protocol shall be verified as being sent by the GIS.
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6 TOE Summary Specification
10) The TSF wait for an administrator configurable time between receiving the terminal
challenge and sending the TSF response, if the defined number of unsuccessful
authentication attempts has been met or surpassed.
11) The TSF shall detect when an administrator configurable positive integer within
range of acceptable values 1 to 10 unsuccessful authentication attempts occurs
related to a BAC authentication protocol.
12) Ability to read the data of the groups EF.SOD, EF.COM and EF.DG1 to EF.DG16
of the logical MRTD, depending on the identity of the terminal.
13) Active Authentication Mechanism according to [7].
This Security Function has the level of strength SOF-high.
6.1.4 SF.CRYPTO (Cryptographic Support)
This Security Function provides the cryptographic support for the other Security
Functions.
This Security Function is composed of:
1) DES key generation in accordance with the Document Basic Access Control Key
Derivation Algorithm with key sizes of 112 bit that meet: [7], Annex E.
2) ECDH (compliant to ISO 15946) key import with key sizes of 192 bit - 320 bit and
the import of Document Basic Access Key Derivation with key sizes of 112 bit, that
meet [25], Annex A.1.
3) Hashing in accordance with SHA-1that meet the following: FIPS 180-2.
4) Secure messaging – encryption and decryption with Triple-DES in CBC mode and
key sizes of 112 bit that meet: FIPS 46-3 [14] and [7]; Annex E.
5) Secure messaging – message authentication with Retail MAC and key sizes of 112
bit that meet: ISO 9797 (MAC algorithm 3, block cipher DES, Sequence Message
Counter, padding mode 2).
6) Digital signature verification in accordance to ECDSA with SHA-1, SHA-224,
SHA-256 and key sizes 192 bit - 320 bit that meet ISO 15946-2, FIPS PUB 180-2.
7) Random number generation according AIS20 [5a] for key generation and
authentication process.
8) Destroying cryptographic keys by physical deletion by overwriting the memory data
with zeros or random data.
9) RSA for signature creation according scheme 1 of ISO/IEC 9796-2:2002 [19]
This Security Function has the level of strength SOF-high.
6.1.5 SF.PROTECTION (Protection of TSC)
This Security Function protects the TSF functionality, TSF data and user data. After a
successfully performed Chip Authentication no unencrypted data transmission between
TOE and the outside of the TOE is allowed.
This Security Function is composed of:
1) Ensuring that transmitted and receiveduser data is protected from modification,
deletion, insertion and replay errors through secure messaging after Chip
Authentication has been performed successfully.
2) Ensuring that transmitted and received objects are protected from unauthorised
disclosure through secure messaging after Chip Authentication has been performed
successfully.
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6 TOE Summary Specification
3) Determination on receipt of user data if modification, deletion, insertion and replay
have occurred through secure messaging after Chip Authentication has been
performed successfully.
4) Hiding information about IC power consumption and command execution time.
5) The TOE ensures that TSP enforcement functions are invoked and succeed before
each function within the TSC is allowed to proceed.
6) Maintaining a security domain for the TSF execution that protects it from
interference and tampering by untrusted subjects.
7) Enforcing separation between the security domains of subjects in the TSC.
8) Running a suite of self tests during initial start-up, periodically during normal
operation, at the condition Reset of the TOE to demonstrate the correct operation of
the TSF.
9) Providing authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of TSF data and
stored TSF executable code.
6.1.6 SF.IC (Security Functions of the IC)
This Security Function covers the Security Functions of the IC [5].
This Security Function is composed of:
1) Detection of physical tampering of the TSF with sensors for operating voltage, clock
frequency, temperature and electromagnetic radiation.
2) Resistance to physical tampering of the TSF. If the TOE detects with the above
mentioned sensors, that it is not supplied within the specified limits, a security reset
is initiated and the TOE is not operable until the supply is back in the specified
limits. The design of the hardware protects it against analysing and physical
tampering.
3) Random number generation.
4) Cryptographic support for DES calculations.
This Security Function has the level of strength SOF-high.
6.2 Assurance Measures
This chapter describes the Assurance Measures fulfilling the requirements listed in
chapter 5 Security Requirements.
The following table lists the Assurance measures and references the corresponding
documents describing the measures.
Assurance
Measures
Description
AM_ACM The configuration management is described in
GDM_STA33_MRTD_ACM_00.
AM_ADO The delivery, installation, generation and start-up of the TOE are described
in GDM_STA33_MRTD _ADO_00.
AM_ADV The representing of the TSF is described in GDM_STA33_MRTD
_ADV_SPM_00 for security policy modelling, in GDM_STA33_MRTD
_ADV_FSP_00 for functional specification, in GDM_STA33_MRTD
_ADV_HLD_00 for high level design, in GDM_STA33_MRTD
_ADV_LLD_00 for low level design, in GDM_STA33_MRTD
_ADV_IMP_00 for implementation representation and in
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Assurance
Measures
Description
GDM_STA33_MRTD _ADV_RCR_00 for representation correspondence.
AM_AGD The guidance documentation is described in GDM_STA33_MRTD
_AGD_USR_00 for the user and in GDM_STA33_MRTD
_AGD_ADM_00 for the administrator.
AM_ALC The life cycle support of the TOE during its development and maintenance
is described in GDM_STA33_MRTD _ALC_00
AM_ATE The testing of the TOE is described in GDM_STA33_MRTD _ATE_00.
AM_AVA The vulnerability assessment for the TOE is described in
GDM_STA33_MRTD _AVA_MSU_00 for the misuse, in
GDM_STA33_MRTD _AVA_SOF_00 for the strength of TOE security
functions and in GDM_STA33_MRTD _AVA_VLA_00 for the
vulnerability analysis.
Table 4 References of Assurance Measures
Note: Reference end numbers may change during evaluation process (e.g.
GDM_STA33_MRTD _AVA_VLA_00 may become GDM_STA33_MRTD
_AVA_VLA_02).
7 PP Claims
7 PPClaims
7.1 PP Reference
The conformance of this ST to the Common Criteria Protection Machine Readable
Travel Document with “ICAO Application, Extended Access Control (PP-MRTD EAC),
Version 1.2, 19.11.2007, BSI-PP-0026, [21a] is claimed.
7.2 PP Additions
Active Authentication based on ICAO PKI v1.1 [7] has been added. The added and
modified SFRs are listed in chapter 8.4
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8 Rationale
The chapters 8.1 and 8.2 (except 8.2.5) have been taken from [21a] with minor
modification to support the Active Authentication Mechanism and show that the security
objectives cover the TOE security environment and IT security requirements are
appropriate to satisfy the security objectives.
The tables in sub-sections 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3.1 Rationale for TOE Security Functions
provide the mapping of the security objectives and security requirements for the TOE.
8.1 Security Objectives Rationale
The following table provides an overview for security objectives coverage.
OT.AC_Pers
OT.Data_Int
OT.Data_Conf
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
OT.Identification
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfuntion
OT.Active_Auth_proof
OD.Assurance
OD.Material
OE.Personalization
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
OE.Auth_Key_MRTD
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data
OE.Exam_MRTD
OE.Pass_Auth_Verif
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
OE.Ext_Insp_System
OE.Active_Auth_Key_MRTD
T.Chip-ID x
132
x x
T.Skimming x
T.Read_Sensitive_Data x x x
T.Forgery x x x x x x
T.Counterfeit x x x x x x
T.Abuse-Func x
T.Information_Leakage x
T.Phys-tamper x
T.Malfunction x
P.Manufact x x
P.Personalization x x x
P.Personal_Data x x x
P.Sensitive_Data x x x
A.Pers_Agent x
A.Insp_Sys x x
A.Signature_PKI x x
A.Auth_PKI x x
132
In [21a] T.Chip-ID is covered in this table by OT.Sens_Data_Conf. However, the threat is countered
by OT.Data_Conf as stated in chapter 7.1 of [21a].
8 Rationale
Table 5 Security Objective Rationale
The OSP P.Manufact “Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip” requires the quality and
integrity of the manufacturing process and control the MRTD’s material in the Phase 2
Manufacturing including unique identification of the IC by means of the Initialization
Data and the writing of the Pre-personalization Data. The security objective for the TOE
environment OD.Assurance “Assurance Security Measures in Development and
Manufacturing Environment” address these obligations of the IC Manufacturer and
MRTD Manufacturer. OD.Material “Control over MRTD material” ensures that
materials, equipment and tools used to produce genuine and authentic MRTDs must be
controlled in order to prevent their usage for production of counterfeit MRTDs.
The OSP P.Personalization “Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or
Organization only” addresses the (i) the enrolment of the logical MRTD by the
Personalization Agent as described in the security objective for the TOE environment
OE.Personalization “Personalization of logical MRTD”, and (ii) the access control for
the user data and TSF data as described by the security objective OT.AC_Pers
“Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD”. Note, the manufacturer equips
the TOE with the Personalization Agent Authentication key(s) according to
OD.Assurance “Assurance Security Measures in Development and Manufacturing
Environment”. The security objective OT.AC_Pers limits the management of TSF
data and the enabling and disabling of the TSF Basic Access Control to the
Personalization Agent.
The OSP P.Personal_Data “Personal data protection policy” requires that the logical
MRTD can be used only with agreement of the MRTD holder i.e. if the MRTD is
presented to an inspection system. This OSP is covered by security objectives for the
TOE and the TOE environment depending on the use of the Chip Authentication
Protocol and the secure messaging based on session keys agreed in this protocol. The
security objective OT.Data_Conf requires the TOE to implement the Basic Access
Control as defined by ICAO [7] and enforce Basic Inspection System to authenticate
itself by means of the Basic Access Control based on knowledge of the Document Basic
Access Key. The security objective OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD “Protection of data of the
logical MRTD” requires the inspection system to protect their communication with the
TOE before secure messaging is successfully established based on the Chi
Authentication Protocol. After successful Chip Authentication the security objective
OT.Data_Conf “Confidentiality of personal data” ensures the confidentiality of the
logical MRTD data during their transmission to the General Inspection System.
The OSP P.Sensitive_Data “Privacy of sensitive biometric reference data” is fulfilled
and the threat T.Read_Sensitive_Data “Read the sensitive biometric reference data” is
countered by the TOE-objective OT.Sens_Data_Conf “Confidentiality of sensitive
biometric reference data” requiring that read access to EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 (containing
the sensitive biometric reference data) is only granted to authorised inspection systems.
Furthermore it is required that the transmission of these data ensures the data’s
confidentiality. The authorisation bases on Document Verifier certificates issued by the
issuing state or organisation as required by OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data “Authorisation for
use of sensitive biometric reference data”. The Document Verifier of the receiving state
has to authorize Extended Inspection Systems by creating appropriate Inspection System
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8 Rationale
certificates for access to the sensitive biometric reference data as demanded by
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems “Authorisation of Extended Inspection Systems”.
The threat T.Chip_ID “Identification of MRTD’s chip” addresses the trace of the
MRTD movement by identifying remotely the MRTD’s chip through the contactless
communication interface. This threat is countered by security objectives for the TOE and
the TOE environment depending on the use of the Chip Authentication Protocol and the
secure messaging based on session keys agreed in this protocol. The security objective
OT.Identification “Identification and Authentication of the TOE” by limiting the TOE
chip identification to the Basic Inspection System. The security objective
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD “Protection of data of the logical MRTD” requires the
inspection system to protect to their communication (as Basic Inspection
System) with the TOE before secure messaging based on the Chip Authentication
Protocol is successfully established. After successful Chip Authentication the security
objective OT.Data_Conf “Confidentiality of personal data” ensures the confidentiality of
the logical MRTD data during their transmission to the General Inspection System.
The threat T.Skimming “Skimming digital MRZ data or the digital portrait” addresses
the reading of the logical MRTD trough the contactless interface outside the
communication between the MRTD’s chip and Inspection System. This threat is
countered by the security objective OT.Data_Conf “Confidentiality of personal data”
through Basic Access Control allowing read data access only after successful
authentication of the Basic Inspection System.
The threat T.Forgery “Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip” addresses the fraudulent
alteration of the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it. The security objective
OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD“ requires the TOE
to limit the write access for the logical MRTD to the trustworthy Personalization Agent
(cf. OE.Personalization). The TOE will protect the integrity of the stored logical MRTD
according the security objective OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” and
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering”. The examination of
the presented MRTD passport book according to OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of
the MRTD passport book” shall ensure that passport book does not contain an additional
contactless chip which may present the complete unchanged logical MRTD. The TOE
environment will detect partly forged logical MRTD data by means of digital signature
which will be created according to OE.Pass_Auth_Sign “Authentication of logical
MRTD by Signature” and verified by the inspection system according to
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif “Verification by Passive Authentication”.
The threat T.Counterfeit “MRTD’s chip” addresses the attack of unauthorised copy or
reproduction of the genuine MRTD chip. This attack is thwarted by chip an identification
and authenticity proof required by OT.Chip_Auth_Proof “Proof of MRTD’s chip
authentication” using a authentication key pair to be generated by the issuing state or
organisation. The Public Chip Authentication Key has to be written into EF.DG14 and
signed by means of Documents Security Objects as demanded by
OE.Auth_Key_MRTD “MRTD Authentication Key”. According to OE.Exam_MRTD
“Examination of the MRTD passport book” the General Inspection system has to
perform the Chip Authentication Protocol to verify the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip.
MRTDs must be controlled in order to prevent their usage for production of counterfeit
MRTDs targeted on by OD.Material. Additionally, this attack is thwarted through the
chip by an identification and authenticity proof required by OT.Active_Auth_Proof
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8 Rationale
“Proof of MRTD’s chip authentication” using an authentication key pair to be generated
by the issuing state or organisation. The Public Active Authentication Key has to be
written into EF.DG15 and signed by means of Documents Security Objects as demanded
by OE.Active_Auth_Key_MRTD “MRTD Authentication Key”.
The threat T.Abuse-Func “Abuse of Functionality” addresses attacks of misusing
MRTD’s functionality to disable or bypass the TSFs. The security objectives for the
TOE OT.Prot_Abuse-Func “Protection against abuse of functionality” ensures that the
usage of functions which may not be used in the operational phase is effectively
prevented. Therefore attacks intending to abuse functionality in order to disclose or
manipulate critical (User) Data or to affect the TOE in such a way that security features
or TOE’s functions may be bypassed, deactivated, changed or explored shall be
effectively countered.
The threats T.Information_Leakage “Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip”,
T.Phys-Tamper “Physical Tampering” and T.Malfunction “Malfunction due to
Environmental Stress” are typical for integrated circuits like smart cards under direct
attack with high attack potential. The protection of the TOE against these threats is
addressed by the directly related security objectives OT.Prot_Inf_Leak “Protection
against Information Leakage”, OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical
Tampering” and OT.Prot_Malfunction “Protection against Malfunctions”.
The assumption A.Pers_Agent “Personalization of the MRTD’s chip” is covered by the
security objective for the TOE environment OE.Personalization “Personalization of
logical MRTD” including the enrolment, the protection with digital signature and the
storage of the MRTD holder personal data and the enabling of security features of the
TOE according to the decision of the Issuing State or Organization concerning the
Basic Access Control.
The examination of the MRTD passport book addressed by the assumption
A.Insp_Sys “Inspection Systems for global interoperability” is covered by the security
objectives for the TOE environment OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the MRTD
passport book” which requires the inspection system to examine physically the MRTD,
the Basic Inspection System to implement the Basic Access Control, and the General
Inspection Systems and Extended Inspection Systems to implement and to perform the
Chip Authentication Protocol to verify the Authenticity of the presented MRTD’s chip.
The security objectives for the TOE environment OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD “Protection
of data of the logical MRTD” require the Inspection System to protect the logical MRTD
data during the transmission and the internal handling.
The assumption A.Signature_PKI “PKI for Passive Authentication” is directly covered
by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.Pass_Auth_Sign “Authentication
of logical MRTD by Signature” covering the necessary procedures for the Country
Signing CA Key Pair and the Document Signer Key Pairs. The implementation of the
signature verification procedures is covered by OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the
MRTD passport book”.
The assumption A.Auth_PKI “PKI for Inspection Systems” is covered by the security
objective for the TOE environment OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data “Authorisation for use of
sensitive biometric reference data” requires the CVCA to limit the read access to
sensitive biometric by issuing Document Verifier certificates for authorised receiving
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8 Rationale
States or Organisations only. The Document Verifier of the receiving state is required by
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems “Authorisation of Extended Inspection Systems” to authorise
Extended Inspection Systems by creating Inspection System Certificates. Therefore, the
receiving issuing State or Organisation has to establish the necessary public key
infrastructure.
8.2 Security Requirements Rationale
8.2.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale
The following table provides an overview for security functional requirements coverage.
OT.AC_Pers
OT.Data_Int
OT.Data_Conf
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
OT.Identification
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfuntion
OT.Active_Auth_Proof
FAU_SAS.1 x
FCS_CKM.1/KDF_MRTD x x x x x
FCS_CKM.1/DH_MRTD x x x x
FCS_CKM.4/MRTD x x x x
FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD x x x x x
FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD x x x
FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD x x x x x
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER x x
FCS_COP.1/RSA_MRTD x x x x x
FCS_RND.1/MRTD x x
FIA_UID.1 x x x x x
FIA_UAU.1 x x x x x
FIA_UAU.4/MRTD x x x x
FIA_UAU.5/MRTD x x x x
FIA_UAU.6/MRTD x x x x
FIA_AFL.1 x
FIA_API.1/CAP x
FIA_API.1/AA x
FDP_ACC.1 x x x x
FDP_ACF.1 x x x x
FDP_UCT.1/MRTD x x
FDP_UIT.1/MRTD x x
FMT_SMF.1 x x x
FMT_SMR.1 x x x
FMT_LIM.1 x
FMT_LIM.2 x
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8 Rationale
OT.AC_Pers
OT.Data_Int
OT.Data_Conf
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
OT.Identification
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfuntion
OT.Active_Auth_Proof
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA x
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS x
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI x
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD x
FMT_MTD.1/DATE x
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE x x
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK x x x x
FMT_MTD.1/AAPK x x x x
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ x x x x x x
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_CHANGE x
FMT_MTD.3 x
FPT_EMSEC.1 x x
FPT_TST.1 x x
FPT_RVM.1 x
FPT_FLS.1 x x
FPT_PHP.3 x x
FPT_SEP.1 x x
Table 6 Coverage of Security Objective for the TOE by SFR
The security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalization of logical
MRTD” addresses the access control of the writing the logical MRTD and the
management of the TSF for Basic Access Control. The write access to the logical MRTD
data are defined by the SFR FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1, FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 in
the same way: only the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to
write the data of the groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD only once. The
SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including Personalization Agent) and the SFR
FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions (including Personalization). The
Personalization Agent handles the Document Basic Access Keys according to the SFR
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE as authentication reference data for Basic Access Control.
The authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent shall be performed by TSF
according to SRF FIA_UAU.4/MRTD and FIA_UAU.5/MRTD. If the Basic Access
Control Authentication Mechanism with the Personalization Agent Authentication Key is
used the TOE will use the FCS_RND.1/MRTD (for the generation of the challenge),
FCS_CKM.1/KDF_MRTD, FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD (for the derivation of the session
keys), and FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD and FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD (for the
ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging) and FIA_UAU.6/MRTD (for the re-
authentication). If the Personalization Terminal want to authenticate themselves to the
TOE by means of the Terminal Authentication Protocol (after Chip Authentication) with
the Personalization Agent Keys the TOE will use TSF according to the
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8 Rationale
FCS_RND.1/MRTD (for the generation of the challenge), FCS_CKM.1/DH_MRTD,
FCS_CKM.1/KDF_MRTD, FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD (for the derivation of the new
session keys after Chip Authentication), and FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD and
FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD (for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging),
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER (as part of the Terminal Authentication Protocol) and
FIA_UAU.6/MRTD (for the re-authentication). If the Personalization Terminal want to
authenticate themselves to the TOE by means of the Symmetric Authentication
Mechanism with Personalization Agent Key the TOE will use TSF according to the
FCS_RND.1/MRTD (for the generation of the challenge) and
FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD (to verify the authentication attempt). The session keys are
destroyed according to FCS_CKM.4 after use.
The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ prevents read access to the secret key of the
Personalization Agent Keys and ensures together with the SFR FPT_EMSEC.1 the
confidentially of these keys.
If the Personalization Agent wants to change the Personallization Agent Keys, the TOE
will use the TSF according to the FMT_MTD.1/KEY_CHANGE.
The security objective OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” requires the TOE to
protect the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip against physical
manipulation and unauthorized writing. The write access to the logical MRTD data is
defined by the SFR FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 in the same way: only the
Personalization Agent is allowed to write the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical
MRTD (FDP_ACF.1.2, rule 1) and terminals are not allowed to modify any of the data in
EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD (cf. FDP_ACF.1.4). The Personalization
Agent must identify and authenticate themselves according to FIA_UID.1 and
FIA_UAU.1 before accessing these data. The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles and the
SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions.
The TOE supports the inspection system detect any modification of the transmitted
logical MRTD data after Chip Authentication. The authentication of the terminal as
Personalization Agent shall be performed by TSF according to SRF FIA_UAU.4/MRTD,
FIA_UAU.5/MRTD and FIA_UAU.6/MRTD. The SFR FIA_UAU.6/MRTD and
FDP_UIT.1/MRTD requires the integrity protection of the transmitted data after chip
authentication by means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic
functions according to FCS_CKM.1/DH_MRTD (for the generation of shared secret),
FCS_CKM.1/KDF_MRTD, FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD (for the derivation of the new
session keys), and FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD and FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD for the
ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging. The session keys are destroyed according to
FCS_CKM.4 after use.
The SFR FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ requires that the Chip
Authentication Key cannot be written unauthorized or read afterwards.
The security objective OT.Data_Conf “Confidentiality of personal data” requires the
TOE to ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16. The
SFR FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 allow only those actions before identification
respective authentication which do not violate OT.Data_Conf. The read access to the
logical MRTD data is defined by the FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1.2: only the successful
authenticated Personalization Agent, Basic Inspection Systems (Note the General
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8 Rationale
Inspection Systems use the role Basic Inspection System.) and Extended Inspection
Systems are allowed to read the data of the logical MRTD. The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists
the roles (including Personalization Agent and Basic Inspection System) and the SFR
FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions (including Personalization for the key
management for the Document Basic Access Keys). The SFR
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE addresses the key management and
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ prevents reading of the Document Basic Access Keys.
The SFR FIA_AFL.1 strengthens the authentication function as terminal part of the Basic
Access Control Authentication Protocol or other authentication functions if necessary.
The SFR FIA_UAU.4/MRTD prevents reuse of authentication data to strengthen the
authentication of the user. The SFR FIA_UAU.5/MRTD enforces the TOE (i) to accept
the authentication attempt as Basic Inspection System only by means of the Basic Access
Control Authentication Mechanism with the Document Basic Access Keys and (ii) to
accept chip authentication only after successful authentication as Basic Inspection
System. Moreover, the SFR FIA_UAU.6/MRTD requests secure messaging after
successful authentication of the terminal with Basic Access Control Authentication
Mechanism.
After Chip authentication the TOE and the General Inspection System establish
protection of the communication by secure messaging (cf. the SFR FDP_UCT.1/MRTD
and FDP_UIT.1/MRTD) in ENC_MAC_Mode by means of the cryptographic functions
according to FCS_CKM.1/DH_MRTD (for the generation of shared secret),
FCS_CKM.1/KDF_MRTD, FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD (for the derivation of the new
session keys), and FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD and FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD for the
ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging. The session keys are destroyed according to
FCS_CKM.4 after use. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
requires that the Chip Authentication Key cannot be written unauthorized or read
afterwards.
Note, neither the security objective OT.Data_Conf nor the SFR FIA_UAU.5/MRTD
requires the Personalization Agent to use the Basic Access Control Authentication
Mechanism or secure messaging.
The security objective OT.Sense_Data_Conf “Confidentiality of sensitive biometric
reference data” is enforced by the Access Control SFP defined in FDP_ACC.1 and
FDP_ACF.1 allowing the data of EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 only to be read by successfully
authenticated Extended Inspection System being authorised by a validly verifiable
certificate according FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER.
The SFR FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 requires authentication of the inspection systems.
The SFR FIA_UAU.5/MRTD requires the successful Chip Authentication before any
authentication attempt as Extended Inspection System. The SFR FIA_UAU.6/MRTD and
FDP_UCT.1/MRTD requires the confidentiality protection of the transmitted data after
chip authentication by means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic
functions according to FCS_RND.1/MRTD (for the generation of the terminal
authentication challenge), FCS_CKM.1/DH_MRTD (for the generation of shared secret),
FCS_CKM.1/KDF_MRTD, FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD (for the derivation of the new
session keys), and FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD and FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD for the
ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging. The session keys are destroyed according to
FCS_CKM.4 after use. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
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8 Rationale
requires that the Chip Authentication Key cannot be written unauthorized or read
afterwards.
To allow a verification of the certificate chain as in FMT_MTD.3 the CVCA’s public
key and certificate as well as the current date are written or update by authorised
identified role as of FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI, FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD and
FMT_MTD.1/DATE.
The security objective OT.Identification “Identification and Authentication of the TOE”
address the storage of the IC Identification Data uniquely identifying the MRTD’s chip
in its non-volatile memory. This will be ensured by TSF according to SFR FAU_SAS.1.
The TOE shall identify itself only to a successful authenticated Basic Inspection System
in Phase 4 “Operational Use”. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA allows only the
Manufacturer to write Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data. The SFR
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS allows the Personalization Agent to disable Initialization Data if
their use in the phase 4 “Operational Use” violates the security objective
OT.Identification. The SFR FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 do not allow reading of any
data uniquely identifying the MRTD’s chip before successful authentication of the Basic
Inspection Terminal and will stop communication after unsuccessful authentication
attempt (cf. Application note 32 of [21a]).
The security objective OT.Chip_Auth_Proof “Proof of MRTD’s chip authenticity” is
ensured by the Chip Authentication Protocol provided by FIA_API.1/CAP proving the
identity of the TOE. The Chip Authentication Protocol defined by
FCS_CKM.1/DH_MRTD is performed using a TOE internally stored confidential
private key as required by FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ. The
Chip Authentication Protocol [25] requires additional TSF according to
FCS_CKM.1/KDF_MRTD, FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD (for the derivation of the session
keys), FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD and FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD (for the
ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging).
The security objective OT.Prot_Abuse-Func “Protection against Abuse of
Functionality” is ensured by (i) the SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 which prevent
misuse of test functionality of the TOE or other which may not be used after TOE
Delivery, (ii) the SFR FPT_RVM.1 which prevents by monitoring the bypass and
deactivation of security features or functions of the TOE, and (iii) the SFR FPT_SEP.1
which prevents change or explore security features or functions of the TOE by means
of separation the other TOE functions.
The security objective OT.Prot_Inf_Leak “Protection against Information Leakage”
requires the TOE to protect confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the
MRTD’s chip against disclosure
- by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time
between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power
consumption clock, or I/O lines, which is addressed by the SFR FPT_EMSEC.1,
- by forcing a malfunction of the TOE, which is addressed by the SFR FPT_FLS.1
and FPT_TST.1, and/or
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8 Rationale
- by a physical manipulation of the TOE, which is addressed by the SFR
FPT_PHP.3.
The security objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering”
is covered by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.
The security objective OT.Prot_Malfunction “Protection against Malfunctions” is
covered by (i) the SFR FPT_TST.1 which requires self tests to demonstrate the correct
operation and tests of authorized users to verify the integrity of TSF data and TSF
code, (ii) the SFR FPT_FLS.1 which requires a secure state in case of detected failure
or operating conditions possibly causing a malfunction, and (iii) the SFR FPT_SEP.1
limiting the effects of malfunctions due to TSF domain separation.
The security objective OT.Active_Auth_Proof “Proof of MRTD’s chip authenticity” is
ensured by the Active Authentication Protocol provided by FIA_API.1/AA proving the
identity of the TOE. The Active Authentication Protocol defined by FIA_API.1/AA is
performed using a TOE internally stored confidential private key as required by
FMT_MTD.1/AAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ. The Active Authentication
Protocol [7] requires additional TSF according to FCS_COP.1/RSA_MRTD.
The security objectives OD.Assurance and OD.Material for the IT environment will be
supported by non-IT security measures only.
The security objective OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data is directed to establish the Document
Verifier PKI and will be supported by non-IT security measures only.
The following table provides an overview how security functional requirements for the
IT environment cover security objectives for the TOE environment. The protection
profile describes only those SFR of the IT environment directly related to the SFR for
the TOE.
OE.Personalization
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
OE.Auth_Key_MRTD
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data
OE.Exam_MRTD
OE.Pass_Auth_Verif
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
OE.Ext_Insp_System
OE.Active_Auth_Key_MRTD
Document Signer
FDP_DAU.1/DS x x x x x
Document Verification PKI
FCS_CKM.1/PKI x
FCS_COP.1/CERT_SIGN x
Basic Inspection System
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OE.Personalization
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
OE.Auth_Key_MRTD
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data
OE.Exam_MRTD
OE.Pass_Auth_Verif
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
OE.Ext_Insp_System
OE.Active_Auth_Key_MRTD
FCS_CKM.1/KDF_BT x x x
FCS_CKM.4/BT x x
FCS_COP.1/SHA_BT x x x
FCS_COP.1/ENC_BT x x x
FCS_COP.1/MAC_BT x x x
FCS_RND.1/BT x x x
FIA_UAU.4/BT x x x
FIA_UAU.6/BT x x x
General Inspection System
FCS_CKM.1/DH_GIS x x
FCS_COP.1/SHA_GIS x x
FIA_UAU.4/GIS x
FIA_UAU.5/GIS x x
FIA_UAU.6/GIS x x
FDP_UCT.1/GIS x x x
FDP_UIT.1/GIS x x x
Extended Inspection System
FCS_COP.1/SIG_SIGN_EIS x x
FCS_COP.1/SHA_EIS x x
FIA_API.1/EIS x x
Personalization Agent
FIA_API.1/SYM_PT x
Table 7 Coverage of Security Objectives for the IT environment by SFR
The OE.Personalization “Personalization of logical MRTD” requires the
Personalization Terminal to authenticate themselves to the MRTD’s chip to get the write
authorization.
If the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with the Personalization Agent
Authentication Key is used the Personalization Terminal will use the FCS_RND.1/BT
(for the generation of the challenge), FCS_CKM.1/KDF_BT, FCS_COP.1/SHA_BT (for
the derivation of the session keys), and FCS_COP.1/ENC_BT and
8 Rationale
FCS_COP.1/MAC_BT (for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging) to authenticate
themselves and to protect the personalization data during transfer.
If the Personalization Terminal want to authenticate themselves to the TOE by means of
the Terminal Authentication Protocol (after Chip Authentication) with the
Personalization Agent Keys the Personalization Terminal will use TSF according to the
FCS_RND.1/BT (for the generation of the challenge), FCS_CKM.1/DH_GIS,
FCS_CKM.1/KDF_BT, FCS_COP.1/SHA_GIS (for the derivation of the new session
keys after Chip Authentication), and FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD an
FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD (for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging),
FCS_COP.1/SIG_SIGN_EIS, FCS_COP.1/SHA_EIS and FIA_API.1/EIS (as part of the
Terminal Authentication Protocol).
If the Personalization Terminals want to authenticate themselves to the TOE by means
of the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with Personalization Agent Key the TOE
will use TSF according to the SFR FIA_API.1/SYM_PT, FCS_RND.1/MRTD (for the
generation of the challenge) and FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD (to verify the
authentication attempt). Using the keys derived by means of the Chip Authentication
Mechanism the Personalisation Agent will transfer MRTD holder’s personalisation data
(identity, biographic data, correctly enrolled biometric reference data) in a confidential
and integrity protected manner as required by FDP_UCT.1/GIS and FDP_UIT.1/GIS.
The OE.Pass_Auth_Sign “Authentication of logical MRTD Signature” is covered by
FDP_DAU.1/DS which requires the Document Signer to provide a capability to
generate evidence for the validity of EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 and the Document Security
Objects and therefore, to support the inspection system to verify the logical MRTD.
The OE.Auth_Key_MRTD “MRTD Authentication Key” is covered by
FDP_DAU.1/DS which requires the Document Signer to provide a capability to
generate evidence for the validity of chip authentication public key in DG 14. There is
no need for the PP to provide any specific requirement for the method of generation,
distribution and handling of the Chip Authentication Private Key by the IT environment.
The OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data “Authorization for Use of Sensitive Biometric Reference
Data” addresses the establishment of the Document Verification PKI which include
cryptographic key generation for the Document Verification PKI Keys and the signing
of the certificates. The SFR FCS_CKM.1/PKI and FCS_COP.1/CERT_SIGN enforce
that these cryptographic functions fit the signature verification function for the
certificates and the terminal authentication addressed by FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER.
The OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport book” requires the Basic
Inspection System for global interoperability to implement the terminal part of the Basic
Access Control [7] as required by FCS_CKM.1/KDF_BT, FCS_CKM.4/BT,
FCS_COP.1/SHA_BT, FCS_COP.1/ENC_BT, FCS_COP.1/MAC_BT,
FCS_RND.1/BT, FIA_UAU.4/BT and FIA_UAU.6/BT. The verification of the
authenticity of the MRTD’s chip by General Inspection Systems and Extended
Inspection Systems (including the functionality of the GIS) is covered by
the FCS_CKM.1/DH_GIS, FCS_COP.1/SHA_GIS, FIA_UAU.4/GIS, FIA_UAU.5/GIS
and FIA_UAU.6/GIS providing the Chip Authentication Protocol and checking
continuously the messages received from the MRTD’s chip. The authenticity of the
Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG14) is ensured by FDP_DAU.1/DS.
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8 Rationale
The OE.Pass_Auth_Verif “Verification by Passive Authentication” is covered by the
SFR FDP_DAU.1/DS.
The security objective OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD “Protection of data of the logical
MRTD“ addresses the protection of the logical MRTD during the transmission and
internal handling. The SFR FIA_UAU.4/BT, FIA_UAU.5/GIS and FIA_UAU.6/BT
address the terminal part of the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism and
FDP_UCT.1/GIS and FDP_UIT.1/BT the secure messaging established by the Chip
Authentication mechanism. The SFR FCS_CKM.1/KDF_BT, FCS_COP.1/SHA_BT,
FCS_COP.1/ENC_BT, FCS_COP.1/MAC_BT and FCS_RND.1/BT as well as
FCS_CKM.4/BT are necessary to implement this mechanism. The BIS shall destroy the
Document Access Control Key and the secure messaging keys after inspection of the
MRTD according to FCS_CKM.4 because they are not needed any more.
The OE.Ext_Insp_System “Authorisation of Extended Inspection Systems” is covered
by the Terminal Authentication Protocol proving the identity of the EIS as required by
FIA_API.1/EIS basing on signature creation as required by
FCS_COP.1/SIG_SIGN_EIS and including a hash calculation according
FCS_COP.1/SHA_EIS.
The OE.Active_Auth_Key_MRTD “MRTD Authentication Key” is covered by
FDP_DAU.1/DS which requires the Document Signer to provide a capability to
generate evidence for the validity of active authentication public key in DG 15. There is
no need for the PP to provide any specific requirement for the method of generation,
distribution and handling of the Active Authentication Private Key by the IT
environment.
8.2.2 Dependency Rationale
The dependency analysis for the security functional requirements shows that the basis
for mutual support and internal consistency between all defined functional requirements
is satisfied. All dependencies between the chosen functional components are analyzed,
and non-dissolved dependencies are appropriately explained.
The table 7 shows the dependencies between the SFR and of the SFR to the SAR of
the TOE.
SFR Dependencies Support of the
Dependencies
FAU_SAS.1 No dependencies n.a.
FCS_CKM. 1/KDF_MRTD [FCS_CKM.2
Cryptographic key distribution
or FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic
operation], FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key destruction,
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security
attributes
FCS_CKM.4, FCS
COP.1/TDES MRTD,
FCS_COP. 1/MAC_MRTD
justification 1 for non-
satisfied dependencies
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8 Rationale
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SFR Dependencies Support of the
Dependencies
FCS_CKM.1/DH_MRTD [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic
key
distribution or FCS_COP.1
Cryptographic operation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction, FMT_MSA.2
Secure security attributes
FCS_CKM.4,
FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD,
FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD
justification 2 for non-
satisfied dependencies
FCS_CKM.4/MRTD [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data
with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic
key generation], FMT_MSA.2
Secure security attributes
FCS_CKM.1, justification
1 for non-satisfied
dependencies
FCS_COP. 1/SHA_MRTD [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user
data with security attributes,
or FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key
generation], FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key
destruction, FMT_MSA.2
Secure security attributes
FCS_CKM.1,
FCS_CKM.4, justification
2 for non-satisfied
dependencies
FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user
data with security attributes,
or FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key
generation], FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key
destruction, FMT_MSA.2
Secure security attributes
FCS_CKM.1,
FCS_CKM.4, justification
4 for non-satisfied
dependencies
FCS_COP. 1/MAC_MRTD [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user
data with security attributes,
or FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key
generation], FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key
destruction, FMT_MSA.2
Secure security attributes
FCS_CKM.1,
FCS_CKM.4, justification
4 for non-satisfied
dependencies
8 Rationale
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SFR Dependencies Support of the
Dependencies
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data
with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction, FMT_MSA.2
Secure security attributes
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4,
justification 5 for non-
satisfied
dependencies
FCS_RND.1/MRTD No dependencies n.a.
FCS_COP.1/RSA_MRTD [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic
key
distribution or FCS_COP.1
Cryptographic operation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction, FMT_MSA.2
Secure security attributes
FCS_CKM.4, see
justification A for non-
satisfied dependencies
FIA_UID.1 No dependencies n.a.
FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.1 Timing of
authentication
Fulfilled
FIA_UAU.4/MRTD No dependencies n.a.
FIA_UAU.5/MRTD No dependencies n.a.
FIA_UAU.6/MRTD No dependencies n.a.
FIA_AFL.1 FIA_UAU.1 Timing of
authentication
Fulfilled
FIA_API.1/CAP No dependencies n.a.
FIA_API.1/AA No dependencies n.a.
FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACF.1 Security
attribute based access
control
Fulfilled by
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACC.1 Subset
access control,
FMT_MSA.3 Static
attribute initialization
FDP_ACC.1,
justification 6 for non-
satisfied dependencies
FDP_UCT.1/MRTD [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted
channel, or FTP_TRP.1
Trusted path], [FDP_ACC.1
Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow control]
FDP_ACC.1,
justification 7 for non-
satisfied dependencies
8 Rationale
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SFR Dependencies Support of the
Dependencies
FDP_UIT.1/MRTD [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted
channel, or FTP_ TRP.1
Trusted path], [FDP_ACC.1
Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow control]
FDP_ACC.1,
justification 7 for non-
satisfied dependencies
FMT_SMF.1 No dependencies n.a.
FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 Timing of
identification
Fulfilled
FMT_LIM.1 FMT_LIM.2 Fulfilled
FMT_LIM.2 FMT_LIM.1 Fulfilled
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management functions,
FMT_SMR.1
Security roles
Fulfilled
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled
FMT_MTD.1/DATE FMT_SMF.1 Specification
of management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security
roles
Fulfilled
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRIT
E
FMT_SMF.1 Specification
of management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security
roles
Fulfilled
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled
FMT_MTD.1/AAPK FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled
8 Rationale
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SFR Dependencies Support of the
Dependencies
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_CHAN
GE
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled
FMT_MTD.3 ADV_SPM.1, FMT_MTD.1
FPT_EMSEC.1 No dependencies n.a.
FPT_FLS.1 ADV_SPM.1 Fulfilled by EAL4
FPT_PHP.3 No dependencies n.a.
FPT_RVM.1 No dependencies n.a.
FPT_SEP.1 No dependencies n.a.
FPT_TST.1 FPT_AMT.1 Abstract
machine testing
See justification 8 for
non-satisfied
dependencies
Table 8 Dependencies between the SFR for the TOE
Justification for non-satisfied dependencies between the SFR for TOE:
No. 1: The SFR FCS_CKM.1/KDF_MRTD uses only the Document Basic Access Keys
or other shared secrets to generate the secure messaging keys used for
FCS_COP.1/TDES and FCS_COP.1/MAC. The SFR FCS_CKM.4/MRTD destroys
these keys automatically. These simple processes do not need any special security
attributes for the secure messaging keys.
No. 2: The SFR FCS_CKM.1/DH_MRTD calculates shared secrets to generate the
secure messaging keys used for FCS_COP.1/TDES and FCS_COP.1/MAC. The SFR
FCS_CKM.4/MRTD destroys these keys automatically. These simple processes do not
need any special security attributes for the secure messaging keys.
No. 3: The cryptographic algorithm SHA-1 does not use any cryptographic key.
Therefore none of the listed SFRs are needed to be defined for this specific instantiation
of FCS_COP.1.
No. 4: The SFR FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD and FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD use the
automatically generated secure messaging keys assigned to the session with the
successfully authenticated BIS only. There is no need for any special security attributes
for the secure messaging keys.
No. 5: The SFR FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER uses the initial public key Country Verifying
Certification Authority and the public keys in certificates provided by the terminals as
TSF data for the Terminal Authentication Protocol and the Access Control. Their
validity verified according to FMT_MDT.3 and their security attributes are managed by
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI, FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD and FMT_MTD.1/DATE. There
is no need to import user data or manage their security attributes.
No. 6: The access control TSF according to FDP_ACF.1 uses security attributes which
are defined during the personalization and are fixed over the whole life time of the TOE.
8 Rationale
No management of these security attribute (i.e. SFR FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.2) is
necessary here.
No. 7: The SFR FDP_UCT.1/MRTD and FDP_UIT.1/MRTD require the use secure
messaging between the MRTD and the BIS. There is no need for sensitive SFR
FTP_ITC.1, e.g. to require this communication channel to be logically distinct from
other communication channels it is the only one.
No. 8: The TOE consists of the software and its underlying hardware on which it is
running. Thus there is no abstract machine to be tested.
No.A: The SFR FCS_COP.1/RSA_MRTD does not calculate any shared secrets, nor
does it import user data. Therefore there is not need for any special security attributes.
The following table shows the dependencies between the SFR for the IT environment
and of the SFR to the SAR of the TOE.
SFR Dependencies Support of the Dependencies
FDP_DAU.1 No dependencies n.a.
FCS_CKM.1/PKI [FCS_CKM.2
Cryptographic key
distribution or
FCS_COP.1
Cryptographic
operation], FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key
destruction, FMT_MSA.2
Secure security attributes
justification 9 for non-
satisfied dependencies
FCS_COP.1/CERT_SIGN [FDP_ITC.1 Import of
user data without security
attributes, FDP_ITC.2
Import of user data with
security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key
generation],
FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key
destruction, FMT_MSA.2
Secure security attributes
justification 9 for non-satisfied
dependencies
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SFR Dependencies Support of the Dependencies
FCS_CKM.1/KDF_BT [FCS_CKM.2
Cryptographic key
distribution or
FCS_COP.1
Cryptographic operation],
FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key
destruction, FMT_MSA.2
Secure security attributes
FCS_CKM.4,
FCS_COP.1/TDES_BT,
FCS_COP.1/MAC_BT
justification 10 for nonsatisfied
dependencies
FCS_CKM.4/BT [FDP_ITC.1 Import of
user data without security
attributes or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of
user data with security
attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key
generation], FMT_MSA.2
Secure security attributes
FCS_CKM.1, justification 10
for non-satisfied dependencies
FCS_COP.1/SHA_BT [FDP_ITC.1 Import of
user data without security
attributes or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user
data with security
attributes, or FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key
generation], FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key
destruction, FMT_MSA.2
Secure security attributes
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4,
justification 11 for non-satisfied
dependencies
FCS_COP.1/ENC_BT [FDP_ITC.1 Import of
user data without security
attributes or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user
data with security
attributes, or FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key
generation], FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key
destruction, FMT_MSA.2
Secure security attributes
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4,
justification 12 for non-satisfied
dependencies
8 Rationale
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SFR Dependencies Support of the Dependencies
FCS_COP.1/MAC_BT [FDP_ITC.1 Import of
user data without security
attributes or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user
data with security
attributes, or FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key
generation], FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key
destruction, FMT_MSA.2
Secure security attributes
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4,
justification 12 for non-satisfied
dependencies
FCS_COP.1/RSA_BT [FCS_CKM.2
Cryptographic key
distribution or
FCS_COP.1
Cryptographic operation],
FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key
destruction, FMT_MSA.2
Secure security attributes
FCS_CKM.4, see justification B
for non-satisfied dependencies
FCS_RND.1/BT No dependencies n.a.
FIA_UAU.4/BT No dependencies n.a.
FIA_UAU.6/BT No dependencies n.a.
FCS_CKM.1/DH_GIS [FCS_CKM.2
Cryptographic key
distribution or
FCS_COP.1
Cryptographic operation],
FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key
destruction, FMT_MSA.2
Secure security attributes
FCS_COP.1/MAC_BT,
FCS_CKM.4/BT, justification
13 for non-satisfied
dependencies
8 Rationale
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SFR Dependencies Support of the Dependencies
FCS_COP.1/SHA_GIS [FDP_ITC.1 Import of
user data without security
attributes, FDP_ITC.2
Import of user data with
security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key
generation],
FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key
destruction, FMT_MSA.2
Secure security attributes
FCS_COP.1/MAC_BT,
FCS_CKM.4/BT, justification
13 for non-satisfied dependencies
FIA_UAU.4/GIS No dependencies n.a.
FIA_UAU.5/GIS No dependencies n.a.
FIA_UAU.6/GIS No dependencies n.a.
FDP_UCT.1/GIS [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF
trusted channel, or FTP_
TRP.1 Trusted path],
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset
access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow control]
justification 14 for non-
satisfied dependencies
FDP_UIT.1/GIS [FTP_ITC.1 I nter-TSF
trusted channel, or FTP
TRP.1 Trusted path],
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset
access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow control]
justification 14 for non-
satisfied dependencies
FCS_COP.1/
SIG_SIGN_EIS
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of
user data without security
attributes, FDP_ITC.2
Import of user data with
security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key
generation], FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key
destruction, FMT_MSA.2
Secure security attributes
justification 15 for nonsatisfied
dependencies
8 Rationale
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SFR Dependencies Support of the Dependencies
FCS_COP.1/SHA_EIS [FDP_ITC.1 Import of
user data without security
attributes, FDP_ITC.2
Import of user data with
security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key
generation],
FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key
destruction, FMT_MSA.2
Secure security attributes
justification 15 for nonsatisfied
dependencies
FIA_API.1/EIS No dependencies n.a.
FIA_API.1/SYM_PT No dependencies n.a.
Table 9 Dependencies between the SFR for the IT environment
Justification for non-satisfied dependencies between the SFR for the IT environment.
No. 9: The TOE does not have specific functional security requirements to the IT
environment establishing Document Verification PKI which have to be described by the
listed dependency here.
No. 10: The SFR FCS_CKM.1/KDF_BT derives the Document Basic Access Keys and
uses this key to generate the secure messaging keys used for FCS_COP.1/TDES and
FCS_COP.1/MAC. The SFR FCS_CKM.4/BT destroys these keys. These processes do
not need any special security attributes for the secure messaging keys.
No. 11: The cryptographic algorithm SHA-1 does not use any cryptographic key.
Therefore none of the listed SFR is needed to be defined for this specific instantiation of
FCS_COP.1.
No. 12: The SFR FCS_COP.1/TDES_BT and FCS_COP.1/MAC_BT use the
automatically generated secure messaging keys assigned to the session with the
successfully authenticated MRTD only. There is no need for any special security
attributes for the secure messaging keys.
No. 13: The SFR FCS_CKM.1/DH_GIS and FCS_COP.1/SHA_GIS are used for
generation of secure messaging session keys (cf. FCS_COP.1/SHA_GIS, application
note 66 of [21a]) by means of the Chip Authentication Protocol. These session keys are
destroyed by the same function as for the Basic Terminal (cf. FCS_CKM.4/BT). There
is no need for import or management of security attributes of these session keys.
No. 14: The SFR FDP_UCT.1/MRTD and FDP_UIT.1/MRTD require the use secure
messaging between the MRTD and the GIS as described by the FDP_UCT.1/GIS and
FDP_UIT.1/GIS. There is no need to provide further description of this communication.
8 Rationale
No. 15: The SFR FCS_COP.1/SIGN_EIS and FCS_COP.1/SHA_EIS are used by the
Extended Inspection System for the proof of identity to the TOE by means of the
Terminal Authentication Key Pair. The TOE does not have any specific requirements
for the method of importing (cf. FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2) or generation (cf
FCS_CKM.1) of the Terminal Authentication Key Pair, which is completely up to the
IT environment.
No.B: The SFR FCS_COP.1/RSA_BT does not calculate any shared secrets, nor does it
import user data. Therefore there is not need for any special security attributes.
8.2.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
The EAL4 was chosen to permit a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources.
EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to
an existing product line. EAL4 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or
users require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in
conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur sensitive security specific
engineering costs.
The selection of component ADV_IMP.2 provides a higher assurance for the
implementation of the MRTD’s chip especially for the absence of unintended
functionality.
The selection of the component ALC_DVS.2 provides a higher assurance of the security
of the MRTD’s development and manufacturing especially for the secure handling of
the MRTD’s material.
The selection of the component AVA_MSU.3 provides a higher assurance of the
security of the MRTD’s usage especially in phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD” and
Phase 4 “Operational Use”. It is imperative that misleading, unreasonable and
conflicting guidance is absent from the guidance documentation, and that secure
procedures for all modes of operation have been addressed. Insecure states should be
easy to detect.
The minimal strength of function “high” was selected to ensure resistance against direct
attacks on functions based on probabilistic or permutational mechanisms. The SOF
requirement applies to the identification and authentication functionality within the TOE
to fulfil the OT.Sens_Data_Conf and OT.Chip_Auth_Proof. This is consistent with the
security objective OD.Assurance.
The selection of the component AVA_VLA.4 provides a higher assurance of the
security by vulnerability analysis to assess the resistance to penetration attacks
performed by an attacker possessing a high attack potential. This vulnerability analysis
is necessary to fulfil the security objectives OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
and OD.Assurance.
The component ADV_IMP.2 has the following dependencies:
- ADV_LLD.1 Descriptive low-level design
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8 Rationale
- ADV_RCR.1 Informal correspondence demonstration
- ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
All of these are met or exceeded in the EAL4 assurance package.
The component ALC_DVS.2 has no dependencies.
The component AVA_MSU.3 has the following dependencies:
- ADO_IGS.1 Installation, generation, and start-up procedures
- ADV_FSP.1 Informal functional specification
- AGD_ADM.1 Administrator guidance
- AGD_USR.1 User guidance
All of these are met or exceeded in the EAL4 assurance package.
The component AVA_VLA.4 has the following dependencies:
- ADV_FSP.1 Informal functional specification
- ADV_HLD.2 Security enforcing high-level design
- ADV_IMP.1 Subset of the implementation of the TSF
- ADV_LLD.1 Descriptive low-level design
- AGD_ADM.1 Administrator guidance
- AGD_USR.1 User guidance
All of these are met or exceeded in the EAL4 assurance package.
8.2.4 Security Requirements – Mutual Support and Internal Consistency
The following part of the security requirements rationale shows that the set of security
requirements for the TOE consisting of the security functional requirements (SFRs) and
the security assurance requirements (SARs) together forms a mutually supportive and
internally consistent whole.
The analysis of the TOE´s security requirements with regard to their mutual support
and internal consistency demonstrates:
The dependency analysis in section 8.2.2 Dependency Rationale for the security
functional requirements shows that the basis for mutual support and internal
consistency between all defined functional requirements is satisfied. All dependencies
between the chosen functional components are analysed, and non-satisfied
dependencies are appropriately explained.
The assurance class EAL4 is an established set of mutually supportive and internally
consistent assurance requirements. The dependency analysis for the additional
assurance components in section 8.2.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
shows that the assurance requirements are mutually supportive and internally
consistent as all (additional) dependencies are satisfied and no inconsistency appears.
Inconsistency between functional and assurance requirements could only arise if there
are functional-assurance dependencies which are not met, a possibility which has been
shown not to arise in sections 8.2.2 Dependency Rationale and 8.2.3 Security
Assurance Requirements Rationale. Furthermore, as also discussed in section 8.2.3
Security Assurance Requirements Rationale, the chosen assurance components are
adequate for the functionality of the TOE. So the assurance requirements and security
functional requirements support each other and there are no inconsistencies between
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8 Rationale
the goals of these two groups of security requirements.
8.2.5 Rationale for Strength of Function High
The TOE shall demonstrate to be highly resistant against penetration attacks in order to
meet the requirements of the Protection Profile [21a] (see 5.2) and its correspondent
SFRs (FIA_UAU.4 , FCS_RND.1 and FPT_FLS.1). The protection against attacks with
a high attack potential dictates a strength of function high rating for functions in the
TOE that are realised by probabilistic or permutational mechanisms (SF.ADMIN
(Administration of the TOE), SF.AUTH (Authentication of the authorized TOE user),
SF.CRYPTO (Cryptographic Support), SF.IC (Security Functions of the IC)).
8.3 Rationale for TOE Summary Specification
8.3.1 Rationale for TOE Security Functions
The following table gives the coverage of the TOE Security Functional Requirements by
the TOE Security Functions. The numbers in the table give the corresponding
component of the Security Function covering the requirement.
The identified components obviously satisfy the requirements.
TOE SFR / Security Function
SF.ACCESS
(Access
Control)
SF.ADMIN
(Administration
of
the
TOE)
SF.AUTH
(Authentication
of
the
authorized
TOE
user)
SF.CRYPTO
(Cryptographic
Support)
SF.PROTECTION
(Protection
of
TSC)
SF.IC
(Security
Functions
of
the
IC)
FAU_SAS.1.1 1)
FCS_CKM.1.1/DH_MRTD 2)
FCS_CKM.1.1/KDF_MRTD 1)
FCS_CKM.4.1/ MRTD 8)
FCS_COP.1.1/ SHA_MRTD 3)
FCS_COP.1.1/ TDES_MRTD 4) 4)
FCS_COP.1.1/MAC_MRTD 5)
FCS_RND.1.1/ MRTD 7) 3)
FCS_COP.1.1/SIG_VER 6)
FCS_COP.1.1/RSA_MRTD 9)
FIA_AFL.1.1 11)
FIA_AFL.1.2 10)
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TOE SFR / Security Function
SF.ACCESS
(Access
Control)
SF.ADMIN
(Administration
of
the
TOE)
SF.AUTH
(Authentication
of
the
authorized
TOE
user)
SF.CRYPTO
(Cryptographic
Support)
SF.PROTECTION
(Protection
of
TSC)
SF.IC
(Security
Functions
of
the
IC)
FIA_API.1.1/CAP 8)
FIA_API.1.1/AA 13)
FIA_UID.1.1 2)
FIA_UID.1.2 4)
FIA_UAU.1.1 2)
FIA_UAU.1.2 4)
FIA_UAU.4.1/ MRTD 2)
FIA_UAU.5.1/MRTD 1)
FIA_UAU.5.2/MRTD 3), 4), 5), 6), 7)
FIA_UAU.6.1/MRTD 9)
FDP_ACC.1.1 1), 2), 3)
FDP_ACF.1.1 1), 2)
FDP_ACF.1.2 1) 14) 12)
FDP_ACF.1.3 1), 2)
FDP_ACF.1.4 2)
FDP_UCT.1.1/ MRTD 2)
FDP_UIT.1.1/ MRTD 1)
FDP_UIT.1.2/ MRTD 3)
FMT_SMF.1.1 3)
FMT_SMR.1.1 12)
FMT_SMR.1.2 12)
FMT_LIM.1.1 11)
FMT_LIM.2.1 11)
FMT_MTD.1.1/ INI_ENA 4)
FMT_MTD.1.1/ INI_DIS 5)
FMT_MTD.1.1/ KEY_WRITE 9)
FMT_MTD.1.1/ KEY_READ 5)
FMT_MTD.1.1/ KEY_CHANGE 16)
FMT_MTD.1.1/CVCA_INI 6)
FMT_MTD.1.1/CVCA_UPD 7)
FMT_MTD.1.1/DATE 8)
FMT_MTD.1.1/CAPK 10)
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TOE SFR / Security Function
SF.ACCESS
(Access
Control)
SF.ADMIN
(Administration
of
the
TOE)
SF.AUTH
(Authentication
of
the
authorized
TOE
user)
SF.CRYPTO
(Cryptographic
Support)
SF.PROTECTION
(Protection
of
TSC)
SF.IC
(Security
Functions
of
the
IC)
FMT_MTD.1.1/AAPK 15)
FMT_MTD.3.1 13)
FPT_EMSEC.1.1 4)
FPT_EMSEC.1.2 4)
FPT_FLS.1.1 2)
FPT_TST.1.1 8)
FPT_TST.1.2 9)
FPT_TST.1.3 9)
FPT_PHP.3.1 1)
FPT_RVM.1.1 5)
FPT_SEP.1.1 6)
FPT_SEP.1.2 7)
Table 10 Functional Requirements to Security Function mapping
8.3.1.1 Justifications for the correspondence between functional requirements and security
functions
8.3.1.1.1 FAU_SAS.1.1
The storage of IC Identification Data in audit records through the Manufacturer is
managed by the TSF.ADMIN (Administration of the TOE).
FAU_SAS.1.1 requires that the Manufacturerhas the capability to store the IC
Identification Datain the audit records.
SF.ADMIN.1 states that the Storage of IC Identification Data in audit records through
the Manufacturer is supported by the TOE and therefore meets the above stated TOE
SFR.
8.3.1.1.2 FCS_CKM, FCS_COP, FCS_RND
The cryptographic support for the other Security Functions is managed by SF.CRYPTO
(Cryptographic Support).
8 Rationale
FCS_CKM.1.1/DH_MRTD requires that cryptographic keys are generated in
accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm: ECDH compliant
to ISO 15946, Document Basic Access Key Derivation and specified cryptographic key
sizes: 192 bit – 320 bit, 112 bit that meet the following: [25], Annex A.1.
SF.CRYPTO.2 states that ECDH (ISO 15946) key generation and Document Basic
Access Key Derivation is in accordance with the above stated standards and therefore
meets the above stated TOE SFR.
FCS_CKM.1.1/ KDF_MRTD requires that the Document Basic Access Control Key
Derivation Algorithmand specified cryptographic key sizes 112 bit thatmeet the
following: [7], Annex E. are applied. SF.CRYPTO.1 states that DES key generation in
accordance with the Document Basic Access Control Key Derivation Algorithm with
key sizes of 112 bit that meet: [7], Annex E are supported by the TOE and therefore
meets the above stated TOE SFR.
FCS_CKM.4.1/ MRTD requires that cryptographic keys are destroyed in accordance
with a specified cryptographic key destruction method physical deletion by overwriting
the memory data with zeros or random data that meets the following: none.
SF.CRYPTO.8 states that cryptographic keys are destroyed by physical deletion by
overwriting the memory data with zeros or random data and therefore meets the above
stated TOE SFR.
FCS_COP.1.1/SIG_VER requires that the TSF shall perform digital signature
verification in accordance with specified cryptographic algorithms.
SF.CRYPTO.6 states that Digital signature verification is in accordance to ECDSA with
SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256 and key sizes 192 bit - 320 bit that meet ISO 15946-2, FIPS
PUB 180-2.
FCS_COP.1.1/ SHA_MRTD requires that hashingis performedin accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm SHA-1and cryptographic key sizes nonethat meet the
following: FIPS 180-2.
SF.CRYPTO.3 states that hashing by the TOE is performed in accordance with SHA-1
that meets the following: FIPS 180-2 and therefore meets the above stated TOE SFR.
FCS_COP.1.1/ TDES_MRTD requires that secure messaging – encryption and
decryptionis performedin accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Triple-
DES in CBC modeand cryptographic key sizes 112 bit that meet the following: FIPS 46-
3 [14] and [7]; Annex E.
SF.CRYPTO.4 states that secure messaging – encryption and decryption is performed
with Triple-DES in CBC mode and key sizes of 112 bit that meet: FIPS 46-3 [14]and [7];
Annex E and SF. IC.4 supports the cryptographic support for DES calculations and
therefore meets the above stated TOE SFR.
FCS_COP.1.1/MAC_MRTD requires that secure messaging – message authentication
code is performed in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Retail MAC
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8 Rationale
and cryptographic key sizes 112 bitthat meet the following: ISO 9797 (MAC algorithm
3, block cipher DES, Sequence Message Counter, padding mode 2).
SF.CRYPTO.5 states that secure messaging – message authentication is performed with
Retail MAC and key sizes of 112 bit that meet: ISO 9797 (MAC algorithm 3, block
cipher DES, zero IV 8 bytes, padding mode 2) and therefore meets the above stated TOE
SFR.
FCS_RND.1.1/ MRTD requires that the TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate
random numbers that meet AIS 20 [5a].
SF.CRYPTO.7 states that random number generation according AIS20 [5a] for key
generation and authentication process is supported by the TOE and SF.IC.3 states that
the TOE supports random number generation and therefore meets the above stated TOE
SFR.
FCS_COP.1.1/RSA_MRTD requires that the TSF shall provide a signature creation
according to scheme 1 of IOS/IEC 9796-2:2002 [19].
SF.CRYPTO.9 states, that the TOE provides RSA signature creation according to
scheme 1 of ISO/IEC 9796-2:2002 [19] and therefore meets the above stated SFR.
8.3.1.1.3 FIA_AFL, FIA_API, FIA_UID, FIA_UAU
The Timing of identification and authentication is managed by TSF.ADMIN
(Administration of the TOE) if the administrator is involved and additionally by
TSF.AUTH (Authentication of the TOE).
FIA_AFL.1.1 requires that the TSF shall detect when an administrator configurable
positive integer within range of acceptable values 1 to 10 unsuccessful authentication
attempts occur related to a BAC authentication protocol.
SF.AUTH.11 states that the TOE shall detect when an administrator configurable
positive integer within range of acceptable values 1 to 10 unsuccessful authentication
attempts occurs related to a BAC authentication protocol and therefore meets the above
stated TOE SFR.
FIA_AFL.1.2 requires that the TSF shall wait for an administrator configurable time
between receiving the terminal challenge eIFD and sending the TSF response eICC during
the BAC authentication attempts when the defined number of unsuccessful
authentication attempts has been met or surpassed
SF.AUTH.10 states that the TOE waits for an administrator configurable time between
receiving the terminal challenge and sending the TSF response, if the defined number of
unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met or surpassed and therefore meets the
above stated TOE SFR.
FIA_API.1.1/CAP requires that the TSF shall provide a Chip Authentication Protocol
according to [25] to prove the identity of the TOE
SF.AUTH.8 states that the TOE has implemented the Chip Authentication Protocol
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according to [25] to prove the identity of the TOE and therefore meets the above stated
TOE SFR.
FIA_UID.1.1 requires that the TSF shall allow
(3) to establish the communication channel,
(4) to read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS133
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
SF.ADMIN.2 states that the TOE realises the possibility to read before user
identification and authentication:
- the Initialization Data in Phase 2 “Manufacturing”,
- to read the ATR (different for and after Initialisation)
- to establish the communication channel, and
- to identify themselves by selection of the authentication key.
and therefore meets the above stated TOE SFR.
FIA_UID.1.2 requires that TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified
before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
SF.ACCESS.4 states that the TSF mediated actions on behalf of an user require his prior
successful identification and authentication if it is not specified in this chapter 6
otherwise and therefore meets the above stated TOE SFR.
FIA_UAU.1.1requires that the TSF shall allow
1. to establish the communication channel,
2. to read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS,
3. to identify themselves by selection of the authentication key
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
SF.ADMIN.2 states that the TOE realises the possibility to read before user
identification and authentication:
- the Initialization Data in Phase 2 “Manufacturing”,
- the ATR (different for and after Initialisation)
- to establish the communication channel, and
to identify themselves by selection of the authentication key and therefore meets the
above stated TOE SFR.
FIA_UAU.1.2 requires that the TSF shall require each user to be successfully
authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
SF.ACCESS.4 states that the TSF mediated actions on behalf of an user require his prior
successful identification and authentication if it is not specified in this chapter otherwise
and therefore meets the above stated TOE SFR.
FIA_UAU.4.1/ MRTD requires that the TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data
related to
1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism,
133
[assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions]
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2. Terminal Authentication Protocol,
3. Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES.
SF.AUTH.2 realises the prevention of reuse of authentication data and therefore meets the
above stated TOE SFR.
FIA_UAU.5.1/MRTD requires that the TSF shall provide
1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism,
2. Terminal Authentication Protocol,
3. Secure messaging in MAC-ENC mode,
4. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES 134
to support user authentication.
SF.AUTH.1 realises user authentication provided through:
- Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism
- Terminal Authentication Protocol
- Secure messaging in MAC-ENC mode
- Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES
and therefore meets the above stated TOE SFR.
FIA_UAU.5.2/MRTD requires that the TSF shall authenticate any user’s claimed
identity according
to the following rules:
1. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalization Agent by one of
the following mechanisms:
a) the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with Personalization
Agent Keys,
b) the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with Personalization Agent Key,
c) the Terminal Authentication Protocol with Personalization Agent Keys.
2. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Basic Inspection System only by
means of the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with the
Document Basic Access Keys.
3. After successful authentication as Basic Inspection System and until the
completion of the Chip Authentication Mechanism the TOE accepts only
received command with correct message authentication code sent by means of
secure messaging with the key agreed upon with the authenticated terminal by
means of the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism.
4. After run of the Chip Authentication Mechanism the TOE accepts only received
commands with correct message authentication code sent by means of secure
messaging with key agreed with the terminal by means of the Chip
Authentication Mechanism.
5. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt by means of the Terminal
Authentication Protocol only if the terminal uses secure messaging established
by the Chip Authentication Mechanism.135
.
SF.AUTH.3 - 7 realises user authentication for the Personalisation Agent:
134
[assignment: list of multiple authentication mechanisms]
135
[assignment: rules describing how the multiple authentication mechanisms provide authentication]
8 Rationale
(a) for the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with
the Personalization Agent Keys,
(b) for the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with the Personalization Agent
Key
(c) for the Terminal Authentication Protocol with the Personalization Agent Keys
and user authentication for the Basic Inspection System through:
- the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with the Document Basic
Access Keys
and therefore meets the above stated TOE SFR.
FIA_UAU.6.1/MRTD requires that the TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the
conditions
1. Each command sent to TOE after successful authentication of the terminal with Basic
Access Control Authentication Mechanism and until the completion of the Chip
Authentication Mechanism shall be verified as being sent by the authenticated BIS.
2. Each command sent to the TOE after successful run of the Chip Authentication
Protocol shall be verified as being sent by the GIS.
SF.AUTH.9 enables the authentication of a user under the above stated and therefore
meets the above stated TOE SFR.
8.3.1.1.4 FDP_ACC, FDP_ACF
The TSF.ACCESS (Access Control) performs an operation requested by an user, this
Security function checks if the operation specific requirements on user authorisation and
protection of communication data are fulfilled.
FDP_ACC.1.1 requires that the TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFPon terminals
gaining write, read and modification access to data in the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD.
SF.ACCESS.1, 2 and 3:
 allows only the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent to write the data
of the data groups COM, SOD and DG1 to DG16 of the logical MRTD,
 allows only the the successfully authenticated Basic Inspection System to read
only data in COM, SOD, DG1, DG2 and DG5 to DG16 of the logical MRTD.
 allows only the the successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System to
read only data in COM, SOD and DG1 to DG16 of the logical MRTD.
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the rule: Terminals
authenticated as CVCA or DV are not allowed to read data in DG3 and DG4 and
therefore meets the above stated TOE SFR.
FDP_ACF.1.1 requires that the TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFPto objects
based on the following:
1. Subjects:
a. Personalization Agent,
b. Basic Inspection System,
c. Extended Inspection System
d. Terminal,
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8 Rationale
2. Objects:
a. data EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
b. data in EF.COM,
c. data in EF.SOD,
3. Security attributes:
a. authentication status of terminals,
b. Terminal Authorization
SF.ACCESS.1 and 2:
 allows only the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent to write the data
of the data groups COM, SOD and DG1 to DG16 of the logical MRTD,
 allows only the the successfully authenticated Basic Inspection System to read
only data in COM, SOD, DG1, DG2 and DG5 to DG16 of the logical MRTD.
 allows only the the successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System to
read only data in COM, SOD and DG1 to DG16 of the logical MRTD.
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the rule: Terminals
authenticated as CVCA or DV are not allowed to read data in DG3 and DG4 and
therefore meets the above stated TOE SFR.
FDP_ACF.1.2 requires that the TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an
operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
1. the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write and to read
the data of the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
2. the successfully authenticated Basic Inspection System is allowed to read the data in
EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 of the logical
MRTD,
3. the successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System is allowed to read the
data in EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 of the logical
MRTD,
4. the successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System is allowed to read data in
the EF.DG3 according to the Terminal Authorization,
5. the successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System is allowed to read data in
the EF.DG4 according to the Terminal Authorization
SF.ACCESS.1
 Allows only the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent to write and to
read the data of the data groups COM, SOD and DG1 to DG16 of the logical
MRTD,
 Allows the successfully authenticated Basic Inspection System to read only data
in COM, SOD, DG1, DG2 and DG5 to DG16 of the logical MRTD.
 Allows the successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System to read only
data in COM, SOD and DG1 to DG16 of the logical MRTD.
SF.ADMIN.14 realises the ability to write the data of the data groups DG1 to DG16 of
the logical MRTD.
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8 Rationale
SF.AUTH.12 realises the ability to read the data of the groups SOD, COM and DG1 to
DG16 of the logical MRTD and therefore meets the above stated TOE SFR.
FDP_ACF.1.3 requires that the TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to
objects based on the following additional rules: none.
SF.ACCESS.1 and 2
 Allows only the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent to write and to
read the data of the data groups COM, SOD and DG1 to DG16 of the logical
MRTD,
 Allows the successfully authenticated Basic Inspection System to read only data
in COM, SOD, DG1, DG2 and DG5 to DG16 of the logical MRTD.
 Allows the successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System to read only
data in COM, SOD and DG1 to DG16 of the logical MRTD.
 denies access of subjects to objects based on the rule: Terminals authenticated as
CVCA or DV are not allowed to read data in DG3 and DG4
and therefore meets the above stated TOE SFR.
FDP_ACF.1.4 requires that the TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects
based on the rules:
1. The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the rule: A
terminal authenticated as CVCA is not allowed to read to read data in the EF.DG3,
2. A terminal authenticated as CVCA is not allowed to read data in the EF.DG4,
3. A terminal authenticated as DV is not allowed to read data in the EF.DG3,
4. A terminal authenticated as DV is not allowed to read data in the EF.DG4,
5. the Terminals are not allowed to modify any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the
logical MRTD.
SF.ACCESS.2 is not allowing access of subjects to objects based on the rule: Terminals
authenticated as CVCA or DV are not allowed to read data in DG3 and DG4 and
therefore meets the above stated TOE SFR.
8.3.1.1.5 FDP_UCT, FDP_UIT
The Security Function TSF.PROTECTION (Protection of TSC) protects the TSF
functionality, TSF data and user data.
FDP_UCT.1.1/ MRTD requires that the TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to be
able to transmit and receiveobjects in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure
after Chip Authentication.
SF.PROTECTION.2 ensures that transmitted and received objects are protected from
unauthorised disclosure after Chip Authentication and therefore meets the above stated
TOE SFR.
FDP_UIT.1.1/ MRTD requires that the TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFPto be
able to transmit and receiveuser data in a manner protected from modification, deletion,
insertion and replayerrors after Chip Authentication.
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8 Rationale
SF.PROTECTION.1 ensures that transmitted and receiveduser data is protected from
modification, deletion, and insertion and replay errors after Chip Authentication and
therefore meets the above stated TOE SFR.
FDP_UIT.1.2/ MRTD requires that the TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user
data, whether modification, deletion, insertion after Chip Authentication and replayhas
occurred.
SF.PROTECTION.3 determines on receipt of user data if modification, deletion,
insertion and replay has occurred after Chip Authentication and therefore meets the
above stated TOE SFR.
8.3.1.1.6 FMT_SMF, FMT_SMR, FMT_LIM, FMT_MTD
The administration of the TOE is managed by TSF.ADMIN (Administration of the
TOE).
FMT_SMF.1.1 requires that the TSF shall be capable of performing the following
security management functions:
1. Initialization,
2. Personalization
3. Configuration.
SF.ADMIN.3 assigns the security management functions: initialization, personalisation
and configuration to the Manufacturer and Personalisation Agent and therefore meets the
above stated TOE SFR.
FMT_SMR.1.1 requires that the TSF shall maintain the roles
1. Manufacturer,
2. Personalization Agent,
3. Country Verifier Certification Authority,
4. Document Verifier,
5. Basic Inspection System,
6. domestic Extended Inspection System
7. foreign Extended Inspection System
SF.ADMIN.12 maintains the security roles: Manufacturer, Personalization Agent,
Country Verifier Certification Authority, Document Verifier, Basic Inspection System,
domestic Extended Inspection System, foreign Extended Inspection System and
therefore meets the above stated TOE SFR.
FMT_SMR.1.2 requires that the TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
SF.ADMIN.12 maintains the security roles: Manufacturer, Personalization Agent,
Country Verifier Certification Authority, Document Verifier, Basic Inspection System,
domestic Extended Inspection System, foreign Extended Inspection System and
therefore meets the above stated TOE SFR.
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8 Rationale
FMT_LIM.1.1 requires that the TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their
capabilities so that in conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the
following policy is enforced: Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
User Data to be disclosed or manipulated, TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated,
software to be reconstructed and no substantial information about construction of TSF to
be gathered which may enable other attacks.
SF.ADMIN.11 deploys Test Features after TOE Delivery that does not allow User Data
to be disclosed or manipulated, TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated, software to be
reconstructed and no substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered
which may enable other attacks and therefore meets the above stated TOE SFR.
FMT_LIM.2.1 requires that the TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their
availability so that in conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the
following policy is enforced: Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
User Data to be disclosed or manipulated TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated,
software to be reconstructed and no substantial information about construction of TSF to
be gathered which may enable other attacks.
SF.ADMIN.11 deploys Test Features after TOE Delivery that does not allow User Data
to be disclosed or manipulated, TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated, software to be
reconstructed and no substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered
which may enable other attacks and therefore meets the above stated TOE SFR.
FMT_MTD.1.1/ INI_ENA requires that the TSF shall restrict the ability to write the
Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Datato the Manufacturer.
SF.ADMIN.4 has the ability to write the Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data
restricted to the Manufacturer and therefore meets the above stated TOE SFR.
FMT_MTD.1.1/ INI_DIS requires that the TSF shall restrict the ability to disable read
access for users to the Initialization Data to the Personalization Agent.
SF.ADMIN.5 has the ability to disable read access for users to the Initialization Data
restricted to the Personalization Agent and therefore meets the above stated TOE SFR.
FMT_MTD.1.1/ KEY_WRITE requires that the TSF shall restrict the ability to writethe
Document Basic Access Keysto the Personalization Agent.
SF.ADMIN.9 restricts the ability to write the Document Basic Access Keys to the
Personalization Agent and therefore meets the above stated TOE SFR.
FMT_MTD.1.1/ KEY_READ requires that the TSF shall restrict the ability to readthe
Document Basic Access Keys, Personalization Agent Keys, Chip Authentication Private
Key and the Active Authentication Private Keyto none.
SF.ACCESS.5 has the ability to disable read access for users to the Initialization Data
restricted to the Personalization Agent and therefore meets the above stated TOE SFR.
FMT_MTD.1.1/CVCA_INI requires that the TSF shall restrict the ability to write the
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8 Rationale
1. initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key,
2. initial Country Verifier Certification Authority Certificate,
3. initial Current Date
to the Personalization Agent.
SF.ADMIN.6 restricts the ability to write the CVCA Public Key, the initial CVCA
certificate and the initial Current Date is restricted to the Personalization Agent and
therefore meets the above stated TOE SFR.
FMT_MTD.1.1/CVCA_UPD requires that the TSF restricts the ability to update the
1. Country Verifier Certification Authority Public Key,
2. Country Verifier Certification Authority Certificate
to Country Verifier Certification Authority.
SF.ADMIN.7 restricts the ability to update the CVCA Public Key and the CVCA
certificate is restricted to the CVCA and therefore meets the above stated TOE SFR.
FMT_MTD.1.1/DATE requires that the TSF restricts the ability to modify the Current
date to
1. Country Verifier Certification Authority,
2. Document Verifier,
3. domestic Extended Inspection System.
SF.ADMIN.8 restricts the modification of the Current Date to the CVCA, DV or
domestic Extended Inspection System and therefore meets the above stated TOE SFR.
FMT_MTD.1.1/CAPK requires that the TSF restricts the ability to create and load the
Chip Authentication Private Key to the Manufacturer and the Personalisation Agent.
SF.ADMIN.10 restricts the creation and loading of the Chip Authentication Private Key
to the Manufacturer and the Personalisation Agent and therefore meets the above stated
TOE SFR.
FMT_MTD.1.1/AAPK requires that the TSF restricts the ability to create and load the
Active Authentication Private Key to the Manufacturer and the Personalisation Agent.
SF.ADMIN.15 restricts the creation and loading of the Active Authentication Private
Key to the Manufacturer and the Personalisation Agent and therefore meets the above
stated TOE SFR.
FMT_MTD.1.1/ KEY_CHANGE requires that the TSF shall restrict the ability to
modifythe Personlization Agent Keyto the Personalization Agent.
SF.ADMIN.16 restricts the ability to modify the Personalization Agent Key to the
Personalization Agent and therefore meets the above stated TOE SFR.
FMT_MTD.3.1 requires that the TSF ensures that only secure values of the certificate
chain are accepted for TSF data of the Terminal Authentication Protocol and the Access
Control.
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8 Rationale
SF.ADMIN.13 requires that only secure values of the certificate chain are accepted for
TSF data of the Terminal Authentication Protocol and the Access Control and therefore
meets the above stated TOE SFR.
8.3.1.1.7 FPT_EMSEC, FPT_FLS, FPT_TST, FPT_PHP, FPT_RVM, FPT_SEP
SF.PROTECTION (Protection of TSC) protects the TSF functionality, TSF data and user
data and SF.IC (Security Functions of the IC) covers the Security Functions of the IC.
FPT_EMSEC.1.1 requires that the TOE shall not emit information about IC power
consumption and command execution time in excess of non useful information enabling
access to Personalization Agent Authentication Key and logical MRTD data.
SF.PROTECTION.4 hides information about IC power consumption and command
execution time, to ensure that the IC contacts VCC, GND and IO can not be used to gain
access to Personalization Agent Authentication Key and logical MRTD data and
therefore meets the above stated TOE SFR.
FPT_EMSEC.1.2 requires that the TSF shall ensure any unauthorized usersare unable
to use the following interface smart card circuit contactsto gain access to Personalization
Agent Authentication Keyand logical MRTD data.
SF.PROTECTION.4 hides information about IC power consumption and command
execution time, to ensure that the IC contacts VCC, GND and IO can not be used to gain
access to Personalization Agent Authentication Key and logical MRTD data and
therefore meets the above stated TOE SFR.
FPT_FLS.1.1 requires that the TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following
types of failures occur:
(1) exposure to operating conditions where therefore a malfunction could occur,
(2) failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.1.
SF.IC.2 provides resistance to physical tampering of the TSF. If the TOE detects with the
above mentioned sensors, that it is not supplied within the specified limits, a security
reset is initiated and the TOE is not operable until the supply is back in the specified
limits. The design of the hardware protects it against analysing and physical tampering
and therefore meets the above stated TOE SFR.
FPT_TST.1.1 requires that the TSF shall run a suite of self tests during initial start-up,
periodically during normal operation, at the condition Reset of the TOE to demonstrate
the correct operation of the TSF.
SF.PROTECTION.8 demonstrates the correct operation of the TSF and therefore meets
the above stated TOE SFR.
FPT_TST.1.2 requires that the TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability
to verify the integrity of TSF data.
SF.PROTECTION.9 demonstrates the correct operation of the TSF and therefore meets
the above stated TOE SFR.
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8 Rationale
FPT_TST.1.3 requires that the TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability
to verify the integrity of stored TSF executable code.
SF.PROTECTION.9 demonstrates the correct operation of the TSF and therefore meets
the above stated TOE SFR.
FPT_PHP.3.1 requires that the TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical
probing to the TSF by responding automatically such that the TSP is not violated.
SF.IC.1 provides detection of physical tampering of the TSF with sensors for operating
voltage, clock frequency, temperature and electromagnetic radiation and therefore meets
the above stated TOE SFR.
FPT_RVM.1.1 requires that the TSF shall ensure that TSP enforcement functions are
invoked and succeed before each function within the TSC is allowed to proceed.
SF.PROTECTION.5 provides the invocation of TSP enforcement functions. After
succeeding each function within the TSC is allowed to proceed and therefore meets the
above stated TOE SFR.
FPT_SEP.1.1 requires that the TSF shall maintain a security domain for its own
execution that protects it from interference and tampering by untrusted subjects.
SF.PROTECTION.6 maintains a security domain for the TSF execution that protects it
from interference and tampering by untrusted subjects and therefore meets the above
stated TOE SFR.
FPT_SEP.1.2 requires that the TSF shall enforce separation between the security
domains of subjects in the TSC.
SF.PROTECTION.7 enforces separation between the security domains of subjects in the
TSC and therefore meets the above stated TOE SFR.
8.3.2 Rationale for Assurance Measures
The following table demonstrates the coverage of the Assurance Requirements by the
Assurance measures by indicating the correspondence with crosses.
Assurance
Requirements
/ Assurance
Measures
AM_ACM AM_ADO AM_ADV AM_AGD AM_ALC AM_ATE AM_AVA
ACM X
ADO X
ADV X
AGD X
ALC X
ATE X
AVA X
Table 11 Assurance Requirements to Assurance Measures mapping
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8 Rationale
8.4 Rationale for PP Claims
This security target is conformant to the claimed PP [21a].
Additionally, the Active Authentication Mechanism is included in the TOE. This implies
the below desribed augmentations:
Addition of new TOE Objectives:
 OT.Active_Auth_Proof
Addition of new IT Environment Objectives:
 OE.Active_Auth_Key_MRTD
Addition of new SFR's for the TOE:
 FCS_COP.1/RSA_MRTD
 FIA_API.1/AA
 FMT_MTD.1/AAPK
Extension of existing SFR's for the TOE:
 FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ: to include the Active Authentication private key
 FPT_EMSEC.1.2: to include the Active Authentication private key
Addition of new IT environment SFRs:
 FCS_COP.1.1/RSA_BT
Extension of IT environment SFRs:
 FIA_UAU.4/BT: include the Active Authentication mechanism
In the personalization phase the TOE allows the Personalization Agent to use the
EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command to replace the existing personalization keys.
This implies the following augmentations:
Addion of new SFR for the TOE:
 FMT_MTD.1.1/ KEY_CHANGE
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9 Appendix
9 Appendix
9.1 Glossary and Acronyms
Term Definition
Active
Authentication
Security mechanism defined in [7] option by which means the MTRD’s chip proves
and the inspection system verifies the identity and authenticity of the MTRD’s chip
as part of a genuine MRTD issued by a known State of organization.
Application
note
Optional informative part of the PP containing additional supporting information
that is considered relevant or useful for the construction, evaluation, or use of the
TOE (cf. CC part 1, section B.2.7).
Audit records Write-only-once non-volatile memory area of the MRTDs chip to store the
Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data.
Authenticity Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the MRTD’s chip were
created by the issuing State or Organization
Basic Access
Control
Security mechanism defined in [7] by which means the MTRD’s chip proves and
the inspection system protects their communication by means of secure messaging
with Basic Access Keys (see there).
Basic
Inspection
System (BIS)
An inspection system which implements the terminals part of the Basic Access
Control Mechanism and authenticates themselves to the MRTD’s chip using the
Document Basic Access Keys drawn form printed MRZ data for reading the logical
MRTD.
Biographical
data
(biodata)
The personalized details of the bearer of the document appearing as text in the
visual and machine readable zones on the biographical data page of a passport book
or on a travel card or visa. [8]
biometric
reference data
Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD holder in the MRTD’s chip
as (i) digital portrait and (ii) optional biometric reference data.
Certificate
chain
Hierarchical sequence of Inspection System Certificate (lowest level),
Document Verifier Certificate and Country Verifying Certification Authority
Certificates (highest level), where the certificate of a lower lever is signed
with the private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate of the
next higher level. The Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate is
signed with the private key corresponding to the public key it contains (selfsigned
certificate).
Counterfeit An unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine security document made by
whatever means. [8]
Country
Signing
CA Certificate
CCSCA)
Certificate of the Country Signing Certification Authority Public Key (KPuCSCA)
issued by Country Signing Certification Authority stored in the inspection system.
Country
Verifying
Certification
Authority
The country specific root of the PKI of Inspection Systems and creates the
Document Verifier Certificates within this PKI. It enforces the Privacy policy
of the issuing Country or Organization in respect to the protection of sensitive
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Term Definition
biometric reference data stored in the MRTD. It is
Current date The maximum of the effective dates of valid CVCA, DV and domestic
Inspection System certificates known to the TOE. It is used the validate card
verifiable certificates.
CVCA link
Certificate
Certificate of the new public key of the Country Verifying Certification
Authority signed with the old public key of the Country Verifying
Certification Authority where the certificate effective date for the new key is
before the certificate expiration date of the certificate for the old key.
Document
Basic
Access Key
Derivation
Algorithm
The [7], Annex E.1 describes the Document Basic Access Key Derivation
Algorithm on how terminals may derive the Document Basic Access Keys
from the second line of the printed MRZ data.
Document
Basic
Access Keys
Pair of symmetric Triple-DES keys used for secure messaging with encryption (key
KENC) and message authentication (key KMAC) of data transmitted between the
MRTD’s chip and the inspection system [7]. It is drawn from the printed MRZ of
the passport book to authenticate an entity able to read the printed MRZ of the
passport book.
Document
Security Object
SOD)
A RFC3369 CMS Signed Data Structure, signed by the Document Signer (DS).
Carries the hash values of the LDS Data Groups. It is stored in the MRTD’s chip. It
may carry the Document Signer Certificate (CDS). [7]
Document
Verifier
Certification authority creating the Inspection System Certificates and
managing the authorization of the Extended Inspection Systems for the
sensitive data of the MRTD in the limits provided by the issuing States or
Organizations
Eavesdropper A threat agent with low attack potential reading the communication between the
MRTD’s chip and the inspection system to gain the data on the MRTD’s chip.
Enrolment The process of collecting biometric samples from a person and the subsequent
preparation and storage of biometric reference templates representing that person's
identity. [9]
Extended
Access
Control
Security mechanism identified in [7] by which means the MTRD’s chip (i) verifies
the authentication of the inspection systems authorized to read the optional
biometric reference data, (ii) controls the access to the optional biometric reference
data and (iii) protects the confidentiality and integrity of the optional biometric
reference data during their transmission to the inspection system by secure
messaging. The Personalization Agent may use the same mechanism to authenticate
themselves with Personalization Agent Authentication Private Key and to get write
and read access to the logical MRTD and TSF data.
Extended
Inspection
System
A General Inspection System which (i) implements the Chip Authentication
Mechanism, (ii) implements the Terminal Authentication Protocol and (iii) is
authorized by the issuing State or Organization through the Document Verifier of
the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data.
Extended
Inspection
System
EIS)
A role of a terminal as part of an inspection system which is in addition to Basic
Inspection System authorized by the issuing State or Organization to read the
optional biometric reference data and supports the terminals part of the Extended
Access Control Authentication Mechanism.
Forgery Fraudulent alteration of any part of the genuine document, e.g.
9 Appendix
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Term Definition
changes to the biographical data or the portrait. [8]
General
Inspection
System
A Basic Inspection System which implements sensitively the Chip Authentication
Mechanism.
Global
Interoperability
The capability of inspection systems (either manual or automated) in different
States throughout the world to exchange data, to process data received from
systems in other States, and to utilize that data in inspection operations in their
respective States. Global interoperability is a major objective of the standardized
specifications for placement of both eye-readable and machine readable data in all
MRTDs. [9]
IC Dedicated
Support
Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which provides functions
after TOE Delivery. The usage of parts of the IC Dedicated Software might be
restricted to certain phases.
IC Dedicated
Test
Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which is used to test the
TOE before TOE Delivery but which does not provide any functionality thereafter.
Impostor A person who applies for and obtains a document by assuming a false name and
identity, or a person who alters his or her physical appearance to represent himself
or herself as another person for the purpose of using that person’s document. [8]
Improperly
documented
person
A person who travels, or attempts to travel with: (a) an expired travel document or
an invalid visa; (b) a counterfeit, forged or altered travel document or visa; (c)
someone else’s travel document or visa; or (d) no travel document or visa, if
required. [9]
Initialisation
Data
Any data defined by the TOE Manufacturer and injected into the nonvolatile
memory by the Integrated Circuits manufacturer (Phase 2). These data are for
instance used for traceability and for IC identification as MRTD’s material (IC
identification data).
Inspection The act of a State examining an MRTD presented to it by a traveller (the MRTD
holder) and verifying its authenticity. [9]
Inspection
system
IS)
A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i)
examining an MRTD presented by the traveller and verifying its authenticity and
(ii) verifying the traveller as MRTD holder.
Integrated
circuit
(IC)
Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing and/or memory functions.
The MRTD’s chip is an integrated circuit.
Integrity Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the MRTD’s chip have
not been altered from that created by the issuing State or Organization
Issuing
Organization
Organization authorized to issue an official travel document (e.g. the United
Nations Organization, issuer of the Laissez-passer). [6]
Issuing State The Country issuing the MRTD. [6]
Logical Data
Structure (LDS)
The collection of groupings of Data Elements stored in the optional capacity
expansion technology. [6]
The capacity expansion technology used is the MRTD’s chip.
Logical MRTD Data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data Structure [6] as
specified by ICAO on the contactless integrated circuit.
9 Appendix
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Term Definition
It presents contactless readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of
the MRTD holder
(1) personal data of the MRTD holder
(2) the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data,
(3) the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
(4) the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s)
(EF.DG4) or both and
(5) the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16).
Logical travel
document
Data stored according to the Logical Data Structure as specified by ICAO in the
contactless integrated circuit including (but not limited to)
(1) data contained in the machine-readable zone (mandatory),
(2) digitized photographic image (mandatory) and
(3) fingerprint image(s) and/or iris image(s) (optional).
Machine
readable
travel
document
(MRTD)
Official document issued by a State or Organization which is used by the holder for
international travel (e.g. passport, visa, official document of identity) and which
contains mandatory visual (eye readable) data and a separate mandatory data
summary, intended for global use, reflecting essential data elements capable of
being machine read. [6]
Machine
readable
visa (MRV)
A visa or, where appropriate, an entry clearance (herein after collectively referred to
as visas) conforming to the specifications contained herein, formulated to improve
facilitation and enhance security for the visa holder. Contains mandatory visual (eye
readable) data and a separate mandatory data summary capable of being machine
read. The MRV is normally a label which is attached to a visa page in a passport. [6]
Machine
readable
zone (MRZ)
Fixed dimensional area located on the front of the MRTD or MRP Data Page or, in
the case of the TD1, the back of the MRTD, containing mandatory and optional
data for machine reading using OCR methods. [6]
Machine-
verifiable
biometrics
feature
A unique physical personal identification feature (e.g. an iris pattern, fingerprint or
facial characteristics) stored on a travel document in a form that can be read and
verified by machine. [8]
MRTD
application
Non-executable data defining the functionality of the operating system on the IC as
the MRTD’s chip. It includes
- the file structure implementing the LDS [6],
- the definition of the User Data, but does not include the User Data itself (i.e.
content of DG1 to DG13 and DG 16) and
- the TSF Data including the definition the authentication data but except the
authentication data itself.
MRTD Basic
Access Control
Mutual authentication protocol followed by secure messaging between the
inspection system and the MRTD’s chip based on MRZ information as key seed
and access condition to data stored on MRTD’s chip according to LDS.
MRTD holder The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization
personalized the MRTD.
MRTD’s Chip A contactless integrated circuit chip complying with ISO/IEC 14443 and
programmed according to the Logical Data Structure as specified by ICAOT, [10],
p. 14.
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Term Definition
MRTD’s chip
Embedded
Software
Software embedded in a MRTD’s chip and not being developed by the IC Designer.
The MRTD’s chip Embedded Software is designed in Phase 1 and embedded into
the MRTD’s chip in Phase 2 of the TOE life-cycle.
Optional
biometric
reference data
Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD holder in the MRTD’s chip
as (i) encoded finger image(s) (DG3) or (ii) encoded iris image(s) (DG4) or (iii)
both. Note that the European commission decided to use only finger print and not to
use iris images as optional biometric reference data.
Passive
authentication
(i) verification of the digital signature of the Document Security Object and (ii)
comparing the hash values of the read LDS data fields with the hash values
contained in the Document Security Object.
Personalization The process by which the portrait, signature and biographical data are applied to the
document. [8]
Personalization
Agent
The agent acting on the behalf of the issuing State or organisation to personalize the
MRTD for the holder by (i) establishing the identity the holder for the biographic
data in the MRTD, (ii) enrolling the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder
i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) or (ii) the encoded iris image(s) and
(iii) writing these data on the physical and logical MRTD for the holder.
Personalization
Agent
Authentication
Information
TSF data used for authentication proof and verification of the Personalization
Agent.
Personalization
Agent
Authentication
Key
Symmetric cryptographic key used (i) by the Personalization Agent to prove
their identity and get access to the logical MRTD according to the SFR
FIA_UAU.4/BT FIA_UAU.6/BT and FIA_API.1/SYM_PT and (ii) by the
MRTD’s chip to verify the authentication attempt of a terminal as
Personalization Agent according to the SFR FIA_UAU.4/MRTD,
FIA_UAU.5/MRTD and FIA_UAU.6/MRTD.
Physical travel
document
Travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip using secure printing to present
data including (but not limited to)
(1) biographical data,
(2) data of the machine-readable zone,
(3) photographic image and
(4) other data.
Pre-
personalization
Data
Any data that is injected into the non-volatile memory of the TOE by the MRTD
Manufacturer (Phase 2) for traceability of non-personalized MRTD’s and/or to
secure shipment within or between life cycle phases 2 and 3. It contains (but is not
limited to) the Active Authentication Key Pair and the Personalization Agent Key
Pair.
Pre-
personalized
MRTD’s chip
MRTD’s chip equipped with an unique identifier and an unique asymmetric Active
Authentication Key Pair of the chip.
Receiving
State
The Country to which the MRTD holder is applying for entry. [6]
Reference data Data enrolled for a known identity and used by the verifier to check the verification
data provided by an entity to prove this identity in an authentication attempt.
secondary A repeat image of the holder’s portrait reproduced elsewhere in the document by
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Term Definition
image whatever means. [8]
secure
messaging
in encrypted
mode
Secure messaging using encryption and message authentication code according to
ISO/IEC 7816-4.
Skimming Imitation of the inspection system to read the logical MRTD or parts of it via the
contactless communication channel of the TOE without knowledge of the printed
MRZ data.
Terminal
Authorization
Intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorizations defined by the Inspection
System Certificate, the Document Verifier Certificate and Country Verifier
Certification Authority which shall be all valid for the Current Date.
travel
document
A passport or other official document of identity issued by a State or organization,
which may be used by the rightful holder for international travel. [9]
traveller Person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming the identity of
the MRTD holder.
TSF data Data created by and for the TOE, that might affect the operation of the TOE (CC
part 1 [1]).
unpersonalized
MRTD
MRTD material prepared to produce an personalized MRTD containing an
initialised and pre-personalized MRTD’s chip.
User data Data created by and for the user, that does not affect the operation of the TSF (CC
part 1 [1]).
Verification The process of comparing a submitted biometric sample against the biometric
reference template of a single enrolee whose identity is being claimed, to determine
whether it matches the enrolee’s template. [9]
verification
data
Data provided by an entity in an authentication attempt to prove their identity to the
verifier. The verifier checks whether the verification data match the reference data
known for the claimed identity.
9.2 Acronyms
Acronym Term
BIS Basic Inspection System
CC Common Criteria
EIS Extended Inspection System
GMA Generic MRTD Application
n.a. Not applicable
OSP Organisational security policy
PT Personalization Terminal
SAR Security assurance requirements
SFR Security functional requirement
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE security functions
9 Appendix
9.3 References
Common Criteria
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and
General Model; Version 2.3, August 2005, CCMB-2005-09-001
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security Functional
Requirements; Version 2.3, August 2005, CCMB-2005-09-002
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security Assurance
Requirements; Version 2.3, August 2005, CCMB-2005-09-00
[4] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation
Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005, CCMB-2005-09-004
[5] Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema, AIS31: Funktionalitätsklassen und
Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 1, 25.09.2001,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
[5a] Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS), AIS 20; Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Version 1.0, 02.12.1999
ICAO
[6] Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, Development of a Logical Data
Structure – LDS, For Optional Capacity Expansion Technologies, Revision –1.7, published by
authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation Organization, LDS 1.7, 2004-05-
18
[7] Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, PKI for Machine Readable Travel
Documents Offering ICC Read-Only Access, Version - 1.1, Date - October 01, 2004, published
by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation Organization
[8] ANNEX to Section III SECURITY STANDARDS FOR MACHINE READABLE TRAVEL
DOCUMENTS, Excerpts from ICAO Doc 9303, Part 1 - Machine Readable Passports, Fifth
Edition – 2003
[9] BIOMETRICS DEPLOYMENT OF MACHINE READABLE TRAVEL DOCUMENTS,
TECHNICAL REPORT Development and Specification of Globally Interoperable Biometric
Standards for Machine Assisted Identity Confirmation using Machine Readable Travel
Documents, Version 1.9, ICAO TAG MRTD/NTWG, 19 May 2003
[10] INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION FACILITATION (FAL) DIVISION,
twelfth session (Cairo, Egypt, 22 March – 1 April 2004)
Cryptography
[14] FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS PUBLICATION FIPS PUB 46-3,
DATA ENCRYPTION STANDARD (DES), Reaffirmed 1999 October 25, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards and Technology
[19] ISO/IEC 9796-2, Information Technology – Security Techniques – Digital Signature Schemes
giving message recovery – Part 2: Integer factorisation based mechanisms, 2002
Protection Profiles
[20] PP conformant to Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July 2001; registered
and certified by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) under the reference
BSI-PP-0002-2001
[21a] Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO
Application”, Extended Access Control (PP-MRTD EAC), Version 1.2, 19.11.2007, BSI-PP-
0026, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Other
STARCOS 3.3 ID EAC+AA C1/Version 1.9 / Status 01.03.2011 Page 116 of 117
9 Appendix
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[22] Dennis Kügler: „Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents”,
Version 0.7, BSI, presented 1.12.2004
[23] ISO 7816, Identification cards – Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts, Part 4: Organization,
security and commands for interchange, FDIS 2004
[24] Certification report BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009 for Smart Card Controller P5CD081V1A and its
major configurations P5CC081V1A, P5CN081V1A, P5CD041V1A, P5CD021V1A and
P5CD016V1A each with ID dedicated Software from NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH,
Business Line Identification, 10.11.2009
[25] Technical Guideline Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel
Documents – Extended Access Control (EAC), Version 1.11, TR-03110, Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI), 21.02.2008
[27a] Administrator Guidance for external Initialisation of STARCOS 3.3 ID EAC+AA C1, Version
1.3, 25.02.2011, Giesecke & Devrient
[27b] Administrator Guidance for external Personalization of STARCOS 3.3 ID EAC+AA C1, Version
1.5, 25.02.2011, Giesecke & Devrient
[27c] Administrator Guidance for Inlay Production STARCOS 3.3 ID EAC+AA C1, Version 1.1,
25.02.2011, Giesecke & Devrient
[28] User guidance STARCOS 3.3 ID EAC+AA C1, Version 1.1, 25.02.2011, Giesecke & Devrient
[29] STARCOS 3.3 Passport Edition TABLES, Version 1.3, 23.02.2011, Giesecke & Devrient
[30] Generic MRTD Application Verifier Tool for STARCOS 3.3 ID EAC+AA C1, Version 3.0,
17.11.2009, Giesecke & Devrient
-End of Document-