TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V.
Headoffice:
Westervoortsedijk 73
NL-6827 AV Arnhem
P.O. Box 2220
NL-6802 CE Arnhem
Location Leek:
Eiberkamp 10
NL-9351 VT Leek
P.O. Box 37
NL-9350 AA Leek
info@nl.tuv.com
www.tuv.com/nl
Tel. +31 (0) 88 888 7 888
Fax +31 (0) 88 888 7 879
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. is
a registered company at the Dutch
Chamber of Commerce under
number 27288788
VAT number: NL815820380B01
IBAN: NL61DEUT0265155096
Version
2016-2
®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
Certification Report
NXP JCOP 3 SECID P60 (OSA)
Sponsor and developer: NXP Semiconductors GmbH
Business Unit Security & Connectivity
Stresemannallee 101
22505 Hamburg, Germany
Evaluation facility: Brightsight
Delftechpark 1
2628 XJ Delft
The Netherlands
Reportnumber: NSCIB-CC-16-99111-CR
Report version: 1
Projectnumber: NSCIB-CC-16-99111
Authors(s): Wouter Slegers
Date: 10 August 2016
Number of pages: 13
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.
Page: 3/13 of report number: NSCIB-CC-16-99111-CR, dated 10 August 2016
®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
CONTENTS:
Foreword 4
Recognition of the certificate 5
International recognition 5
European recognition 5
1 Executive Summary 6
2 Certification Results 7
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 7
2.2 Security Policy 7
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 7
2.4 Architectural Information 8
2.5 Documentation 8
2.6 IT Product Testing 9
2.7 Evaluated Configuration 11
2.8 Results of the Evaluation 11
2.9 Comments/Recommendations 11
3 Security Target 12
4 Definitions 12
5 Bibliography 13
Page: 4/13 of report number: NSCIB-CC-16-99111-CR, dated 10 August 2016
®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. has the task of issuing
certificates for IT security products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the
Interior and Kingdom Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TÜV Rheinland
Nederland B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a license is
accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation
of calibration and testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. asserts that the product or
site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that
the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common
Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification
document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the security target or protection profile, in addition to this certification
report, in order to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product satisfies the security requirements stated in the security
target.
Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.
Page: 5/13 of report number: NSCIB-CC-16-99111-CR, dated 10 August 2016
®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
Recognition of the certificate
Presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement and SOG-IS logos on the certificate
would indicate that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and the
SOG-IS agreement and will be recognised by the participating nation
International recognition
The CCRA has been signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC. Starting 8 September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide
mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance
components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR. The current list of signatory nations and approved
certification schemes can be found on: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The European SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) version 3 effective from April
2010 provides mutual recognition of Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation
level for all products. A higher recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (resp. E3-basic) is
provided for products related to specific technical domains. This agreement was initially signed by
Finland, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy
joined the SOGIS-MRA in December 2010. The current list of signatory nations, approved certification
schemes and the list of technical domains for which the higher recognition applies can be found on:
http://www.sogisportal.eu.
Page: 6/13 of report number: NSCIB-CC-16-99111-CR, dated 10 August 2016
®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the NXP
JCOP 3 SECID P60 (OSA). The developer of the NXP JCOP 3 SECID P60 (OSA) is NXP
Semiconductors GmbH located in Hamburg, Germany, and they also act as the sponsor of the
evaluation and certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when
judging the suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their particular requirements.
The TOE is a composite TOE, consisting of a Java Card smart card operating system, a library which
provides cryptographic functions, and an underlying platform, which is a secure micro controller. The
TOE provides Java Card 3.0.4 functionality with post-issuance applet loading, card content
management and secure channel features as specified in Global Platform 2.2.1 including SCP03.
Cryptographic functionality includes AES, DES, Triple-DES (3DES), RSA, RSA-CRT, RSA key-
generation, ECC over GF(p), ECC over GF(P) key generation, ECC over GF(p) secure point addition,
and SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 hash algorithms and includes MAC, CMAC and
various modes of operation (e.g. ECB, CBC). Furthermore, the TOE provides random number
generation according to class DRG.3 of AIS 20. Finally, it provides three communication protocols, i.e.
ISO/IEC 7816 T=1, T=0 and ISO/IEC 14443 T=CL (contactless) over two physical interfaces (i.e.
ISO/IEC 7816 and ISO/IEC 14443).
Note that Match-on-Card (MoC) libraries are included in the TOE, but as there are no security claims
on these, the biometric functionality has not been assessed, only the self-protection of the TSF.
The TOE has been evaluated by Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands. The evaluation
was completed on August 8
th
2016 with the approval of the ETR. The certification procedure has been
conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of
IT Security [NSCIB].
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the NXP JCOP 3 SECID P60 (OSA), the security
requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the product is
intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the NXP JCOP 3 SECID P60 (OSA) are
advised to verify that their own environment is consistent with the security target, and to give due
consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR]
1
for this product provide sufficient
evidence that it meets the EAL5augmented (EAL5(+)) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ASE_TSS.2 (ST TOE Summary
Specification), ALC_FLR.1 (Flaw remediation), ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security measures) and
AVA_VAN.5 (Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4 [CEM], for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, version 3.1 Revision 4 [CC].
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the NXP JCOP 3
SECID P60 (OSA) evaluation meets all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria
Certificates and that the product will be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list. It should be noted
that the certification results only apply to the specific version of the product as evaluated.
1
The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not releasable for public review.
Page: 7/13 of report number: NSCIB-CC-16-99111-CR, dated 10 August 2016
®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the NXP JCOP 3 SECID P60 (OSA) from NXP
Semiconductors GmbH located in Hamburg, Germany.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Type Name Version Date Form of delivery
Hardware NXP Secure Smart Card
Controller P6022y VB
P6022J VB
Nameplate “9072B”
18 January 2016 Based on [HW-ST] Section
1.4.1.3: TOE Components
Security IC Dedicated Software
Test ROM software 10.1D 25-04-2015
Boot ROM software 10.1D 25-04-2015
Firmware Operating System
(FOS)
0C.22,
0C.32
01-2016
01-2016
Security IC Embedded Software
ROM Code (Platform ID) JxHyyy0005860400
(SVN 0x0586=1414)
-
Patch Code (Patch ID) 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
(Patch 02)
-
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided together with the NXP JCOP 3
SECID P60 (OSA). Details can be found in section 2.5 of this report.
For a detailed and precise description of the TOE lifecycle refer to the [ST], section 1.3.2.
2.2 Security Policy
The TOE is a composite TOE, consisting of a Java Card smart card operating system, a library which
provides cryptographic functions, and an underlying platform, which is a secure micro controller. The
TOE provides Java Card 3.0.4 functionality with post-issuance applet loading, card content
management and secure channel features as specified in Global Platform 2.2.1 including SCP03.
Cryptographic functionality includes AES, DES, Triple-DES (3DES), RSA, RSA-CRT, RSA key-
generation, ECC over GF(p), ECC over GF(P) key generation, ECC over GF(p) secure point addition,
and SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 hash algorithms and includes MAC, CMAC and
various modes of operation (e.g. ECB, CBC). Furthermore, the TOE provides random number
generation according to class DRG.3 of AIS 20. Finally, it provides three communication protocols, i.e.
ISO/IEC 7816 T=1, T=0 and ISO/IEC 14443 T=CL (contactless) over two physical interfaces (i.e.
ISO/IEC 7816 and ISO/IEC 14443).
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment.
Details can be found in the Security Target [ST] section 4.8.
Page: 8/13 of report number: NSCIB-CC-16-99111-CR, dated 10 August 2016
®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
Note that the MoC libraries are included in the TOE, but as there are no security claims on these, the
biometric functionality has not been assessed, only the self-protection of the TSF.
2.4 Architectural Information
The logical architecture of the TOE can be depicted as follows (based on [ST]):
The TOE is a composite TOE consisting of the following components:
•
•
•
• Hardware “NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P6022y VB including IC Dedicated Software” used
as evaluated platform [HW-CERT];
•
•
•
• Cryptographic Library: “Crypto Library V3.1.x on P6022y VB” built upon this hardware platform
(NSCIB-CC-15-67206) [CL-CERT];
•
•
•
• JCOP OS “svn1414” which is built upon this hardware platform and using the Crypto Library;
•
•
•
• Patch code “0200000000000000”.
The respective identifiers for the hardware and the Crypto Library (platform) are as follows:
•
•
•
• Hardware: “NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P6022y VB including IC Dedicated Software”
where only the P6022J VB configuration is allowed for this TOE;
•
•
•
• Cryptographic Library: “Crypto Library V3.1.x on P6022y VB” where only the V3.1.2 version is
allowed for this TOE.
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Page: 9/13 of report number: NSCIB-CC-16-99111-CR, dated 10 August 2016
®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
Type Name Version Date Form of delivery
Document User Guidance and Administrator Manual 1.5 26-07-2016 Electronic document
ES_JCOP 3 SECID P60 (OSA) Errata Sheet, 1.2 26-07-2016 Electronic document
ES_JCOP 3 SECID P60 (OSA) Errata Sheet for Morpho, 1.1 26-07-2016 Electronic document
Objective Data Sheet SmartMX2 family P6022y VB
Secure high-performance smart card controller
2.0 15-01-2016 Electronic document
HW Wafer and delivery specification 2.2 08-03-2016 Electronic document
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The developer has performed extensive testing on FSP, subsystem, module and module interface
level. The tests are performed by NXP through execution of the test scripts using an automated and
distributed system. Test tools and scripts are extensively used to verify that the tests return expected
values.
All parameter choices, also for the module interface level, have been addressed at least once; all the
cryptographic operations with keys of all key sizes have been tested at least once. All boundary cases
identified have been tested explicitly, and additionally the near-boundary conditions have been
covered probabilistically.
The developer tests are extensive and as such evaluator testing would lead to tests that are only
superficially different from testing performed by the developer. As a result, the evaluator judged that
tests should be defined that are supplementing the developer’s tests and should be based on how
adequate the TOE security functions are implemented rather than on how well the various industry
standards are met. Further focus of the defined tests was on proprietary functionality and behaviour of
disabled functionality (since some Java Card functions are disabled on this TOE).
2.6.2 Independent Penetration Testing
The penetration tests are devised after performing the Evaluator Vulnerability Analysis. The reference
for attack techniques against smart card-based devices such as the TOE must be protected against is
the document named "Attack methods for smart cards" and referenced as [JIL-AM]. The susceptibility
of the TOE to these attacks has been analysed in a white box investigation conforming to
AVA_VAN.5. This analysis has followed the following steps:
1. Inventory of required resistance
This step uses the JIL attack list as described in [JIL-AM] as a reference for completeness and
studies the ST claims to decide which attacks in the JIL attack list apply for the TOE.
2. Validation of security functionalities
This step identifies the implemented security functionalities and performs tests to verify
implementation and to validate proper functioning (ATE).
3. Vulnerability analysis
This step first gives an overview against which attacks the implemented security functionalities are
meant to provide protection. Secondly, in this step the design of the implemented security
functionalities is studied. Thirdly, an analysis is performed to determine whether the design
contains vulnerabilities against the attacks of step 1 (AVA).
4. Analysis of input from other evaluation activities
This step first analyses the input from other CC-evaluation classes expressed as possible
vulnerabilities. Secondly, the evaluators made an analysis of the TOE in its intended environment
Page: 10/13 of report number: NSCIB-CC-16-99111-CR, dated 10 August 2016
®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
to check whether the developer vulnerability analysis provides sufficient assurance or whether
penetration testing is needed to provide sufficient assurance (AVA).
5. Design assurance evaluation
This step analyses the results from an attack perspective as defined in step 1. Based on this
design analysis the evaluators determine whether the design provides sufficient assurance or
whether penetration testing is needed to provide sufficient assurance (AVA).
6. Penetration testing
This step performs the penetration tests identified in step 4 and step 5 (AVA).
7. Conclusions on resistance
This step performs a [JIL-AM] compliant rating on the results of the penetration tests in relation
with the assurance already gained by the design analysis. Based on the ratings the evaluators
draw conclusions on the resistance of the TOE against attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
A number of penetration tests were performed on an earlier TOE version. For this evaluation an
analysis was performed that allowed full use of the penetration test results. For a summary of VA
results (AVA_VAN.5-5), see [ETR].
The TOE is a composite with the hardware IC and Crypto Library. As a result a high degree of
assurance originates from these two composite parts and they provide assurance for protection
against attacks.
2.6.3 Test Configuration
Testing was performed on the following TOE test configurations:
Component Versions
Hardware IC P6022y VB where y = J (P6022J VB) in DIL24 and CLCC68 packaging
Crypto Library “Crypto Library V3.1.x on P6022y VB” with minor version (x = 2) resulting in V3.1.2
JCOP OS “JxHyyy0005860400 (SVN 1414)”
Patch code “E1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 (Patch 01 + attack counter patch )” or
“E2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 (Patch 02 + attack counter patch)”
Table 1. Test configuration
Testing was performed by employing test applets using TSFIs: JC_A and GP_CAD over the IEO/IEC
7816 T=0 interface.
2.6.4 Testing Results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its ST and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e. from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
The algorithmic security level exceeds 100 bits for all evaluated cryptographic functionality as required
for high attack potential (AVA_VAN.5).
The strength of the implementation of the cryptographic functionality has been assessed in the
evaluation, as part of the AVA_VAN activities. These activities revealed that for some cryptographic
functionality the security level could be reduced. As the remaining security level still exceeds 80 bits,
this is considered sufficient. So no exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent
penetration tests.
Page: 11/13 of report number: NSCIB-CC-16-99111-CR, dated 10 August 2016
®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
For composite evaluations, please consult the [ETRfC] for details.
2.7 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number NXP JCOP 3 SECID P60 (OSA).
2.8 Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR]
2
which references the ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents. To support composite evaluations according to
[CCDB-2007-09-01] a derived document [ETRfC] was provided and approved. This document
provides details of the TOE evaluation that have to be considered when this TOE is used as platform
in a composite evaluation.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the NXP JCOP 3 SECID P60
(OSA) to be CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant, to meet the requirements of EAL 5
augmented with AVA_VAN.5, ALC_DVS.2, ASE_TSS.2 and ALC_FLR.1.This implies that the
product satisfies the security technical requirements specified in Security Target [ST].
Security Target claims demonstrable conformance to the Java Card Protection Profile - Open
Configuration, Version 3.0, Certified by ANSSI, the French Certification Body May, 2012. This TOE
does not support the optional Java Card RMI.
2.9 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 contains necessary information about the usage of the
TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the countermeasures against
attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the software and the hardware
part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations for the user apart from
following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant details with respect to
the resistance against certain attacks.
In addition all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he
should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from
the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the implemented cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. To fend off attackers with high attack potential appropriate cryptographic algorithms with
adequate key lengths must be used (references can be found in national and international documents
and standards).
2
The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not releasable for public review.
Page: 12/13 of report number: NSCIB-CC-16-99111-CR, dated 10 August 2016
®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
3 Security Target
The JCOP 3 SECID P60 (OSA) Security Target, revision 1.4, dated 2016-08-08 [ST] is included here
by reference
Please note that for the need of publication a public version [ST-Lite] has been created and verified
according to [ST-SAN].
4 Definitions
This list of Acronyms and the glossary of terms contains elements that are not already defined by the
CC or CEM:
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CBC Cipher Block Chaining (a block cipher mode of operation)
DES Data Encryption Standard
ECB Electronic Code Book (a block cipher mode of operation)
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
IC Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
MAC Message Authentication Code
NSCIB Nederlands Schema voor Certificatie op het gebied van IT-Beveiliging
PP Protection Profile
RMI Remote Method Invocation
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
TOE Target of Evaluation
Page: 13/13 of report number: NSCIB-CC-16-99111-CR, dated 10 August 2016
®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report:
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and III,
version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, version 3.1,
Revision 4, September 2012.
[CL-CERT] Certification Report Crypto Library V3.1.x on P6022y VB, document reference
NSCIB-CC-15-67206-CR, dated July 28
th
, 2016.
[CL-ETRfC] ETR for Composite Evaluation Crypto Library V3.1.x on P6022y VB EAL6+/5+,
Document reference 16-RPT-208, version 2.0, dated 2016-07-04.
[CL-ST] Crypto Library V3.1.x on P6022y VB Security Target, Rev. 1.5, June 27, 2016.
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report NXP JCOP 3 SECID P60 (OSA) EAL5+, document
reference 16-RPT-287 version 2.0, dated 8 August 2016.
[ETRfC] ETR for Composition Evaluation NXP JCOP 3 SECID P60 (OSA) EAL5+,
document reference 16-RPT-288 version 6.0, dated 8 August 2016.
[HW-CERT] Certification report NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P6022y VB including IC
Dedicated Software, BSI-DSZ-CC-0973-2016, 17 June 2016.
[HW-ETRfC] ETR for Composite Evaluation - P6022y VB, version 2, 14 June 2016.
[HW-ST] NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P6022y VB, Security Target, Rev. 1.11, 14
June 2016.
[JIL-AM] JIL Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices (controlled distribution),
Version 2.2, January 2013.
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.2,
August 10
th
, 2015.
[ST] JCOP 3 SECID P60 (OSA) Security Target, revision 1.4, dated 2016-08-08.
[ST-lite] JCOP 3 SECID P60 (OSA) Security Target Lite, revision 1.2, dated 2016-08-08.
[ST-SAN] ST sanitising for publication, CC Supporting Document CCDB-2006-04-004, April
2006.
(This is the end of this report).