BSI-DSZ-CC-0726-2012
for
Digital Tachograph EFAS-4.0, Version 02
from
intellic GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V4.6
BSI-DSZ-CC-0726-2012
Digital Tachograph EFAS-4.0
Version 02
from intellic GmbH
PP Conformance: Digital Tachograph - Vehicle Unit (VU PP) Version
1.0, 13 July 2010, BSI-CC-PP-0057-2010
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ATE_DPT.2, AVA_VAN.5
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 and guidance specific for the
technology of the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version
3.1.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 9 January 2012
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department for components up
to EAL 4
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0726-2012
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0726-2012 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0726-2012
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA).........................7
2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)...........................................8
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................8
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................13
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................14
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................14
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................16
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................18
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................18
7.1 Test Configuration..................................................................................................18
7.2 Tests of the Developer...........................................................................................18
7.3 Independent Evaluator Tests.................................................................................19
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................19
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................20
9.1 CC specific results.................................................................................................20
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment....................................................................21
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................21
11 Security Target............................................................................................................22
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................22
12.1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................22
12.2 Glossary...............................................................................................................22
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................24
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................25
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................35
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0726-2012 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● BSIG2
● BSI Certification Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN 45011 standard
● BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1]
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2]
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical
domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL1 to EAL4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher
recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined.
It includes assurance levels beyond EAL4 resp.E3 (basic). In Addition, certificates issued
for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0726-2012
As of September 2011 the new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of
Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and
the United Kingdom.Details on recognition and the history of the agreement can be found
at https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of September 2011 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of:
Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved
certification schemes can be seen on the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
This evaluation contains the components ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5 that are not mutually
recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual recognition the
EAL4 components of these assurance families are relevant.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Digital Tachograph EFAS-4.0, Version 02 has undergone the certification
procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product Digital Tachograph EFAS-4.0, Version 02 was conducted by
SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 19
December 2011. The SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH is an evaluation facility
(ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: intellic GmbH.
The product was developed by: intellic GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4 Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0726-2012 Certification Report
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following
report and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
5 Publication
The product Digital Tachograph EFAS-4.0, Version 02 has been included in the BSI list of
the certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
intellic GmbH
Fernitzerstraße 5
A-8071 Hausmannstätten
Österreich
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0726-2012 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0726-2012
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the product “EFAS-4.0 V02” provided by intellic
Germany GmbH. This is a Vehicle Unit (VU for short) in the sense of Annex 1 B of the
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1360/2002 and last amended by CR (EC) No. 68/2009
and CR (EU) No. 1266/2009 on recording equipment in road transport [9]. It is intended to
be installed in road transport vehicles and will be used within the Tachograph System to
store, display, print and output data related to driver activities in accordance with the
requirements of [9].
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Digital Tachograph - Vehicle Unit (VU PP) Version 1.0, 13 July 2010,
BSI-CC-PP-0057-2010 [7].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ATE_DPT.2, AVA_VAN.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 8.1. They are all selected from Common Criteria Part 2. Thus
the TOE is CC Part 2 conformant.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionalities:
TOE Security
Functionality
Addressed issue
SF.ACS Security Attribute Based Access Control
SF.SECAUDIT Audit
SF.EX_CONF Confidentiality of Data Exchange
SF.EX_INT Integrity and Authenticity of Data Exchange
SF.GEN_SKEYS Generation of Session Keys
SF.GEN_DIGSIG Generation of Digital Signatures optionally with Encryption
SF.VER_DIGSIG Verification of Digital Signatures optionally with Decryption
SF.DATA_INT Stored Data Integrity Monitoring and Action
SF.IA_KEY Key Based User / TOE Authentication
SF.INF_PROT Residual Information Protection
SF.FAIL_PROT Failure and Tampering Protection
SF.SELFTEST Self Test
SF.UPDATE VU Software Upgrade
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 9.1.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 5.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 5.2 to 5.4.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0726-2012 Certification Report
This certification covers the following configuration of the TOE: EFAS-4.0 V02,
Hardware/Software, for delivery configurations see chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate does not include a
rating for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption
and decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Digital Tachograph EFAS-4.0, Version 02
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Delivery Identification Date Form of Delivery
1 HW/SW Vehicle Unit EFAS-4.0
with software version
V02
The TOE’s reference
“EFAS-4.0 V02” is shown
on the machine readable
label.
The software version can
be displayed or printed as
“02.00”.
- The VU is delivered as
entire device (packed
together with its accessories
and the Operating Manual).
The possible variants of the
VU are a combination of
non-security relevant options
as described below.
2 DOC Operating Manual
(“Bedienungsanleitung
Digitaler Tachograph
EFAS”)
German version
document number:
1030-130-SEC-DE02
file name: 1030-130-SEC-
DE02_APPR_E4-BDA.pdf
2011 The Operating Manual is
delivered in paper form
(together with the VU) or in
electronic pdf-form.
3 DOC Service and Installation
Manual (“Digitaler
Tachograph EFAS-4.0
Werkstatt-Handbuch” for
work-shop personnel)
German version
document number:
1030-131-SEC-DE04
file name: 1030-131-SEC-
DE04_APPR_E4-WH.pdf
2011 The Service and Installation
Manual is delivered in paper
form or in electronic pdf-
form.
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The delivery of the TOE (EFAS-4.0 V02) from the production facility to the customer which
is a distributor or a workshop is described briefly in the following: At delivery the TOE is
completely assembled and the TOE's case is sealed. The TOE is packed together with its
accessories and the Operating Manual. The Service and Instruction Manual will be
delivered generally in electronic form as pdf-file embedded into a pgp-encrypted file
secured by password via email. The TOE is marked with a machine readable label which
shows the TOE’s reference, the serial number and the configuration. The serial number is
also fixed within the TOE and can be read out from outside. The firmware of the Security
Controller and the Main Controller cannot be modified any more except by means of an
update procedure based on VU specific and EU secrets (loaded into the Security
Controller during personalisation). The TOE software version (V02) is stored within the
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Security Controller, can be read out from outside and is readable on the print outs. The
consumer orders the TOE by the intellic Germany GmbH. In case of an order the
consumer is informed about the delivery process by fax or by email. The information about
the delivery process contains the serial numbers of the Vehicle Units sent to the consumer.
Furthermore the consumer is informed that he has to compare the serial numbers after
receipt.
3 Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
The data to be measured (the physical data measurement is performed by the motion
sensor which is not part of this TOE) and recorded and then to be checked by control
authorities must be available and reflect fully and accurately the activities of controlled
drivers and vehicles in terms of driving, work, availability and rest periods and in terms of
vehicle speed.
It concretely means that security of the VU aims to protect
a) the data recorded and stored in such a way as to prevent unauthorized access to
and manipulation of the data and detecting any such attempts,
b) the integrity and authenticity of data exchanged between the motion sensor and the
vehicle unit,
c) the integrity and authenticity of data exchanged between the recording equipment
and the tachograph cards, and
d) the integrity and authenticity of data downloaded (locally and remotely).
The main security features stated above are provided by the following major security
services:
a) Identification and authentication of motion sensor und tachograph cards,
b) Access control to functions and stored data,
c) Accountability of users,
d) Audit of events and faults,
e) Object reuse for secret data,
f) Accuracy of recorded and stored data,
g) Reliability of services,
h) Data exchange with motion sensor, tachograph cards and external media
(download function).
Detailed information is given in [6], chapter 8.1.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0726-2012 Certification Report
a) Design environment
OE.Development VU developers shall ensure that the assignment of
responsibilities during development is done in a
manner which maintains IT security.
b) Manufacturing environment
OE.Manufacturing VU manufacturers shall ensure that the
assignment of responsibilities during
manufacturing is done in a manner which
maintains IT security and that during the
manufacturing process the VU is protected from
physical attacks which might compromise IT
security.
OE.Sec_Data_Generation Security data generation algorithms shall be
accessible to authorised and trusted persons only.
OE.Sec_Data_Transport Security data shall be generated, transported, and
inserted into the TOE, in such a way to preserve
its appropriate confidentiality and integrity.
OE.Delivery VU manufacturers, vehicle manufacturers and
fitters or workshops shall ensure that handling of
the TOE is done in a manner which maintains IT
security.
OE.Software_Upgrade Software revisions shall be granted security
certification before they can be implemented in the
TOE. The software parts for updates have to be
secured during the generation and transport to the
VU.
OE.Sec_Data_Strong Security data inserted into the TOE shall be as
cryptographically strong as required by [10].
OE.Test_Points All commands, actions or test points, specific to
the testing needs of the manufacturing phase of
the VU shall be disabled or removed before the
VU activation by the VU manufacturer during the
manufacturing process.
Please note that the design and the manufacturing environments are not the intended
usage environments for the TOE. The security objectives for these environments being
due to the current security policy (OE.Development, OE.Manufacturing, OE.Test_Points,
OE.Delivery) are the subject to the assurance class ALC. Hence, the related security
objectives for the design and the manufacturing environments do not address any potential
TOE user and, therefore, cannot be reflected in the documents of the assurance class
AGD.
The remaining security objectives for the manufacturing environment
(OE.Sec_Data_Generation, OE.Sec_Data_Transport, OE.Sec_Data_Strong and
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OE.Software_Upgrade) are subject to the ERCA and MSA Policies and, therefore, are not
specific for the TOE.
c) Workshops environment
OE.Activation Vehicle manufacturers and fitters or workshops
shall activate the TOE after its installation before
the vehicle leaves the premises where installation
took place.
OE.Approved_Workshops Installation, calibration and repair of recording
equipment shall be carried by trusted and
approved fitters or workshops.
OE.Faithful_Calibration Approved fitters and workshops shall enter proper
vehicle parameters in recording equipment during
calibration.
d) End-user environment
OE.Card_Availability Tachograph cards shall be available to TOE users
and delivered by Member State Authorities to
authorised persons only.
OE.Card_Traceability Card delivery shall be traceable (white lists, black
lists), and black lists must be used during security
audits.
OE.Controls Law enforcement controls shall be performed
regularly and randomly, and must include security
audits.
OE.Driver_Card_Uniquen
ess
Drivers shall possess, at one time, one valid driver
card only.
OE.Faithful_Drivers Drivers shall play by the rules and act responsibly
(e.g. use their driver cards; properly select their
activity for those that are manually selected).
OE.Regular_Inspections Recording equipment shall be periodically
inspected and calibrated.
OE.Type_Approved_MS The Motion Sensor of the recording equipment
connected to the TOE shall be type approved
according to Annex I B.
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 6.2.
5 Architectural Information
The TOE is a composite product. It is composed from the Security Controller hardware
including crypto library provided by INFINEON (Subsystem SC-HW), the software of the
Security Controller developed by intellic Germany GmbH (Subsystem SC-SW), and all
other components of the TOE (Subsystem VU Plattform) as Main Controller (MC) including
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0726-2012 Certification Report
its soft-ware, MC-Flash ROM as well as MC-RAM, power supply, Case Open Supervision
(COS) and Real Time Clock (RTC).
Figure 1 - External Interfaces EFAS 4.0
For details concerning the CC evaluation of the Infineon Security Controller (SC-HW) see
the evaluation documentation under the certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0727-2011.
Figure 1 shows the external interfaces of the TOE: power supply connector, connector to
the motion sensor, CAN connectors, K-line connector, info interface connector, other
vehicle connectors, calibration/downloading connector, interface to card readers for
tachograph cards and user interface. Only the subsystem (VU Platform) has externally
visible interfaces.
Besides the mentioned physical interfaces/connectors the following logical interfaces are
defined:
● vehicle connection to power supply
● vehicle connection to motion sensor
● external interfaces to calibration/diagnosis equipment, company server, local down-
loading equipment, visual instruments and other vehicle connections
● tachograph card readers
● user interface (display, keypad and printer, LED and buzzer as warning elements)
The security functionality is enforced by the SC subsystems and supported by the VU
platform. The following Figure 2 shows the decomposition of the TOE into subsystems. It
shows the interfaces between the subsystems and that the sub-systems depend on each
other.
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Figure 2 - High Level Design EFAS-4.0
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7 IT Product Testing
7.1 Test Configuration
The developer used for their tests a simulated environment (including motion sensor and
tachograph cards and different software tools for simulation of their behaviour).
7.2 Tests of the Developer
The test configuration is based on the TOE as described in [6]. For testing the developer
provided two software versions, namely release versions R419 and R422. The tests
conducted are based on R419 except the additional PSWUPDATE tests. The TOE's
software version V02.00 is identical to the actual and proved release version R422.
The developer's tests can be categorised into tests according to the requirements of [10]
(functional tests) and tests of the security requirements which are described in the test
specification. The behaviour of each security function is covered by test cases using these
different approaches.
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There are three different kinds of test procedures used by the developer. The first
procedure is to test the TOE through a python script which automatically starts the
tachograph card simulator and triggers all operations. The second procedure is to prove
the behaviour of the TOE by conducting a code review. Therefore the relevant classes of
the TOE are analysed and commented by the developer. The third type of tests is debug-
testing. They are conducted with a special version of the TOE software where the
developer can use break-points and hooks.
7.3 Independent Evaluator Tests
The independent testing of the TOE was performed using the developer’s testing
environment. All configurations of the TOE being intended to be covered by the current
evaluation were tested. The overall test result is that no deviations were found between
the expected and the actual test results.
Independent testing approach:
The independent evaluator tests were conducted at SRC in Bonn using the test equipment
of the developer. The components – hardware and software – used for testing as well as
the configuration of the test environment and the TC-Card Simulation are described within
the developer's documents. Furthermore these documents contain examples of use of the
test environment.
The evaluators centred their test activities with tests on
● Commands and operations / sequences according to the identification and
authentication process
● Access control according to rights to functions
● Accountability by holding identification data permanently available
● Audit capabilities in case of security breaches
● Object re-use of temporary storage objects
● Reliability on the availability of data
● Cryptographic support
8 Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
The TOE EFAS-4.0 V02 is an electronic device, consisting of hardware and software, and
additionally of documentations.
The hardware components include the Main Controller (ET-AUT040E-3IN) with Flash and
RAM, the Security Controller (SLE78CFX1600P), the Real Time Clock (DS3234SN), the
Case Open Supervision, the Card Readers #1 and #2 (C702 10M008 925 4), the Printer
(ELM 208-LV-EFK), the Display, the Keypad, LED and Buzzer, the Power Supply hardware
and the battery as well as the metal case.
The TOE software V02 is divided into the following three parts:
● SC Software EUSC, identifier "V2.00_00027"
● MC Boot Software EUBootcode, identifier "V2.00_00032"
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● MC Application Software EUApplication, identifier "V2.00_00024" (which includes
EUBaseSoftware, identifier "V0.05_00024")
Possible variants of the Vehicle Unit EFAS-4.0 V02 may be derived through combinations
of the following non-security relevant options:
Code Option Description
OP_NOACCEL Acceleration sensor The 3-axis acceleration sensor is not populated.
OP_D6OCL D6 as Open-Collector The Pin D6 is configured as Open-Collector
OP_D7INF D7 as Info-Interface The Pin D7 is configured as Info-Interface
OP_SPI SPI Interface The plug for the SPI-Interface is populated
OP_FJPRN Fujitsu Printing Device The Mainboard is populated for use of a Fujitsu Printing
Device
OP_SCNOHT SC without heating No heating for Security Controller
OP_D6HWD D6 hard-wired with B6/B7 Impulse at D6 = B6/B7 (no scaling factor possible)
OP_NOCANAD No CAN_A-Bus inductor No CAN-Bus inductor at CAN_A
OP_NOCANCD No CAN_C-Bus inductor No CAN-Bus inductor at CAN_C
Table 3: Variant options
Code Color Display Color Keyboard
CL_YY Yellow Yellow
CL_AA Amber Amber
CL_GG Green Green
CL_BR Blue Red
Table 4: Color options
These options may be combined freely on demand of a customer. Whenever such a
variant is to be manufactured on demand of a customer, a Product Code is assigned to the
variant. The following example shows combinations of options:
Produkt name Product code Color code OP_NOACCEL OP_D6OCL ...
E4 AMO Standard PCE400001 CL_YY - - ...
E4 AMO w/o 2nd Source internal PCE400002 CL_YY X - ...
PCE400003 ...
Table 5: Combinations of options
The TOE includes all possible combinations of options.
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [8] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
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The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components used up to EAL4
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
(i) The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
(ii) The Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards
(see [4], AIS 25, AIS 27, AIS 36) were used.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Digital Tachograph - Vehicle Unit (VU PP) Version 1.0, 13 July
2010, BSI-CC-PP-0057-2010 [7]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The evaluation facility has examined that the analysis of used cryptographic algorithm
(Triple DES, AES and RSA) meets all the requirements with regard to the specification of
Annex 1B defined by the European Commission [9]. The cryptographic algorithms,
mentioned above, are used by the TOE to enforce its security policy. For more details (e.g.
key length) please refer to Security target [6], chapter 9. For further information please
refer to [10] to [14].
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the
TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
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techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEC Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionalities
VU Vehicle Unit
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
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Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon
which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a
TOE type.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied
by guidance.
TOE Security Functionality - combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs
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13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 3, July 2009
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 3, July 2009
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
in the BSI Website
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0726-2012, Version 18, 10.11.2011, Security Target
EFAS-4.0, intellic Germany GmbH
[7] Digital Tachograph - Vehicle Unit (VU PP) Version 1.0, 13 July 2010, BSI-CC-PP-
0057-2010
[8] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.1, 02.12.2011, SRC Security Research &
Consulting GmbH, (confidential document)
[9] Annex 1B of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3821/85 amended by CR (EC) No.
1360/2002, CR (EC) No. 432/2004 and corrigendum dated from 13.03.2004 (OJ L
77) and last amended by CR (EU) No.1266/2009
[10] Appendix 11 of Annex I B of Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 1360/2002 –
Common Security Mechanisms
[11] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197 (FIPS PUB 197).
Advances Encryption Standard (AES), 2001
[12] NIST. Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods and
Techniques, Special Publication SP800-38A, National Institute of Standards and
Technology, Technology Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 2001
[13] NIST. Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for
Authentication, Special Publication SP800-38B, National Institute of Standards and
Technology, Technology Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 2001
[14] ISO 16844-3 Road vehicles. Tachograph systems. Motion Sensor Interface . WD 3-
20/05/99. and ISO 16844-4 Road vehicles, Tachograph systems. CAN interface
8
specifically
• AIS 25, Version 6, 7 September 2009, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 7, 3 August 2010, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen
including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 32, Version 6, 3 August 2010, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 36, Version 3, 19 October 2010, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal high-
level design presentation
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the
TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through
security objectives.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0726-2012
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Digital Tachograph EFAS-4.0, Version 02 (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has
been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by guidance specific for the technology
of the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC),
Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 9 January 2012, the following results regarding
the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.4, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
a) intellic Germany GmbH, Voltastr. 5, 13335 Berlin (Development)
b) Funkwerk Dabendorf GmbH, Märkische Str. 15806, Dabendorf (Production)
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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