National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Trivalent
180 Admiral Cochrane Drive, Suite 410
Annapolis, MD 21401 U.S.A.
Trivalent Android Data Protection
SDK version 2.13
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-10786-2017
Dated: April 13, 2017
Version: 0.4
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
®
TM
Trivalent Android Data Protection SDK Validation Report Version 0.4, April 11, 2017
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Ken Elliott
Stelios Melachrinoudis
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Tammy Compton
Raymond Smoley
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Catonsville, MD
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 1
2 Identification............................................................................................................... 1
3 Architectural Information ........................................................................................... 3
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms ................................................................................... 3
3.2 TOE Architecture................................................................................................ 4
3.3 Physical Boundaries............................................................................................ 4
4 Security Policy............................................................................................................ 5
4.1 Cryptographic support ........................................................................................ 5
4.2 User data protection ............................................................................................ 5
4.3 Identification and authentication......................................................................... 5
4.4 Security management.......................................................................................... 5
4.5 Privacy ................................................................................................................ 5
4.6 Protection of the TSF.......................................................................................... 6
4.7 Trusted path/channels ......................................................................................... 6
5 Assumptions................................................................................................................ 6
6 Clarification of Scope ................................................................................................. 6
7 Documentation............................................................................................................ 7
8 IT Product Testing ...................................................................................................... 7
8.1 Developer Testing............................................................................................... 7
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ............................................................... 7
9 Evaluated Configuration ............................................................................................. 7
10 Results of the Evaluation ............................................................................................ 8
10.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)............................................................ 8
10.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV).............................................................. 8
10.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD) ................................................. 8
10.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC) ..................................... 9
10.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ................. 9
10.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)......................................................... 9
10.7 Summary of Evaluation Results.......................................................................... 9
11 Validator Comments/Recommendations .................................................................... 9
12 Annexes..................................................................................................................... 10
13 Security Target.......................................................................................................... 10
14 Glossary .................................................................................................................... 10
15 Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 11
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of Trivalent Android Data Protection SDK solution
provided by Cyber Reliant Corporation d.b.a. Trivalent. It presents the evaluation results,
their justifications, and the conformance results. This Validation Report is not an
endorsement of the Target of Evaluation by any agency of the U.S. government, and no
warranty is either expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Catonsville, MD, United States of America, and was
completed in April 2017. The information in this report is largely derived from the
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer
Security Solutions. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria
Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements of EAL 1.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Trivalent Android Data Protection SDK 2.0.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for
IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 4) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 4). This Validation Report applies only to the specific
version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the
provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the
conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that
the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in
the Security Target (ST). Therefore the validation team concludes that the testing
laboratory’s findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are
correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are
consistent with the evidence produced.
The Gossamer Security Solutions evaluation team concluded that the Common Criteria
requirements for Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 1.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Trivalent Android
Data Protection SDK (ASPP12/ASFEEP10) Security Target, version 1.0, April 10, 2017 and
analysis performed by the Validation Team.
2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
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laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
Evaluation Methodology (CEM) for Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 1 through 4 in
accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program (NVLAP)
accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated Products
List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
 The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
 The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
 The conformance result of the evaluation.
 The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
 The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Trivalent Android Data Protection SDK 2.0
Protection Profile
(Specific models identified in Section 3.1)
Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.2, 22 April 2016 (ASPP12)
and Application Software Protection Profile (ASPP) Extended Package: File
Encryption: Mitigating the Risk of Disclosure of Sensitive Data on a System,
Version 1.0, 10 November 2014 (ASFEEP10)
ST Trivalent Android Data Protection SDK 2.0 Security Target, version 1.0, April 10,
2017
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Trivalent Android Data Protection SDK 2.0,
version 0.4, April 11, 2017
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 4
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Sponsor Trivalent
Developer Trivalent
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
CCEVS Validators Ken Elliott, Senior Validator
Stelios Melachrinoudis, Lead Validator
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3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
Trivalent’s Android Data Protection SDK provides file level encryption through an APK and
a library implementation. The library contains both Java and native (c/c++) interfaces in
order to support the majority of android application storage requirements. The same
implementation and functionality for both java and c/c++ are provided by the TOE. The
library offers two groups of API: one set to manipulate files and one set to manipulate SQLite
databases. While the API groups provide different abstractions for the read and write
operations, they both are ultimately simply reading and writing a single file. The library is
providing file level encryption.
The Management Service Application is a straight Java Data Protection SDK APK, while
the library is intended to be included into one’s mobile application (and then the mobile
application can use the library’s APIs). The Management Service Application runs in the
background and uses both Android and BouncyCastle keystores to provide the File
Encryption Key Encryption Key (FEKEK) to each of the applications. The Data Protection
SDK also uses the Android keystore to store an RSA key pair used by the Management
Service, and a per application Android keystore to store each application’s RSA keypair to
wrap the AES-wrapped FEKEK. The Management Service handles necessary authentication
and key management. The file level encryption suite is an API designed to support the use
of specialized file level encryption for Android applications. Encryption is provided by the
SPX Core (Security First, Secure Parser Library).
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Trivalent’s Android Data Protection SDK Version 2.13
software application package residing on evaluated mobile devices running Android 5.1 and
Android 6.0. The TOE is a software solution providing the capability to handle file
encryption on mobile devices.
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms
The evaluated configuration consists of the application package residing on an evaluated
mobile device running Android 5.1 or Android 6.0. During evaluation testing, Gossamer
tested the Trivalent Android Data Protection SDK on the Samsung Galaxy S7 running
Android 6.0.1 and the Galaxy Note 5 running Android 5.5.1.
Any of the products below utilize the Snapdragon 800 family processor and are appropriate
for use with the TOE.
Device Name Chipset/CPU Architecture Android
Version
Samsung Galaxy S7 & S7 Edge Exynos 8890 A64 6.0.1
Samsung Galaxy S7 & S7 Edge Qualcomm MSM 8996 A64 6.0.1
Galaxy S6 & S6 Edge Exynos 7420 A64 6.0.1
Galaxy Note 5 Exynos 7420 A64 5.1.1
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3.2 TOE Architecture
The TOE is software installed on an evaluated mobile device running Android 5.1 or Android
6.0. The TOE software is installed as a Management Service as well as a TSF interface library
that is compiled into other applications. References to applications noted in this Security
Target are regarded as applications that are compiled with the TSF interface API library. The
Management Service is responsible for handling the File Encryption Key Encryption Keys
(FEKEKs) necessary to unwrap the FEK. The Management Service obtains the Android Data
Protection SDK password (hereafter referred to as the DaR password) from the user and
double wraps the FEKEK by using RSA-2048 first and then wrapping it again using AES-
256.
The TOE’s interface library is compiled into another application’s package. The library
allows the other application to invoke the TOE’s services. This library allows the application
to call the TOE’s file encryption services. The application must register itself with the
Management Service. Applications registered to the TOE have a unique RSA public/private
keypair, so applications pass their RSA public keys to the Management Service along with a
certificate fingerprint (which is what the application uses as the password to the application’s
BouncyCastle key store). Android’s keystore protects keys by storing them in a container
with limited access to the keys through Android’s keystore API. The TOE allows only a
single user at a time.
The TOE stores the double wrapped FEKEKs in the Management Service’s BouncyCastle
keystore and the single wrapped FEKEKs in the Application’s specific BouncyCastle
keystore. The keys are protected by requiring a password to load both the Management
Service and Application’s BouncyCastle keystore. In order for other applications to access
its FEK, the application must use the TOE’s interface library API in order to request the
Management Service’s functions. The Management Service uses the application’s public key
to wrap the FEKEK (via RSA-OAEP) so that it can be passed to the Application by placing
the single wrapped FEKEK into the Application’s BouncyCastle keystore. The wrapped
FEKEKs in each application’s BouncyCastle keystore are ephemeral. The Management
Service has a configurable timer in which all BouncyCastle keystores will be wiped once the
timer expires.
The TOE utilizes Security First’s Secure Parser Library (SPX Core) for cryptographic
services. The TOE uses the SPX Core for generating 256 bit AES keys.
During evaluation testing, Gossamer tested the Trivalent Android Data Protection SDK on
the Samsung Galaxy S7 running Android 6.0.1 and the Galaxy Note 5 running Android 5.5.1.
3.3 Physical Boundaries
The physical boundary of the TOE is the physical perimeter of the evaluated device (Android
5.1 or Android 6.0) on which the TOE resides.
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4 Security Policy
This section summaries the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Cryptographic support
2. User data protection
3. Identification and authentication
4. Security Management
5. Privacy
6. Protection of the TSF
7. Trusted path/channels
4.1 Cryptographic support
The evaluated platform runs Android 5.1 or Android 6.0 operating system. Android’s APIs
allow generation of keys through KeyGenerator, and random numbers are generated using
SecureRandom. Keys are used to protect data belonging to the applications that use the TOE.
The TOE uses Security First’s SPX Core (Security First, Secure Parser Library) for
cryptographic algorithms. The SPX Core supports encryption via AES and random number
generation via an SP 800-90 AES-256 CTR DRBG. The TOE uses the platform’s
cryptographic API to perform AES key wrapping and keyed hashing via HMAC.
4.2 User data protection
The TOE protects user data by providing encryption services for applications to encrypt their
data. The TOE allows encryption of data using AES-256 bit keys.
4.3 Identification and authentication
The TOE authenticates applications by requiring a PIN/passphrase to unlock the
application’s file encryption key. A wrong password results in the unsuccessful loading of
the application’s BouncyCastle keystore. Without the correct keystore, the application
cannot load the keys necessary for file encryption/decryption.
4.4 Security management
The TOE’s services/options are inaccessible until a configuration has been created. The TOE
does not allow invocation of its services without configuration of the TOE’s settings upon
first start up. The TOE allows the changing of passwords for management purposes.
4.5 Privacy
The TOE does not transmit Personally Identifiable Information over any network interfaces.
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4.6 Protection of the TSF
The TOE relies on the physical boundary of the evaluated platform as well as the Android
operating system for the protection of the TOE’s application components.
The TOE checks for updates by selecting the check current version option on its menu. If an
update is needed, Trivalent shall deliver, via email or other agreed upon method, an updated
application. The TOE’s software is digitally signed by Trivalent. Each update is accompanied
by documentation outlining changes to the overall service, as well as compatible versions of
the Trivalent API.
The native Android cryptographic library, which provides the TOE’s cryptographic services,
have built-in self-tests that are run at power-up to ensure that the algorithms are correct. If
any self-tests fail, the TOE will not be able to perform its cryptographic services.
4.7 Trusted path/channels
The TOE does not transmit any data between itself and another product. All of the data
managed by the TOE resides on the evaluated platform (Android 5.1 or Android 6.0).
5 Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
 Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.2, 22 April 2016 (ASPP12)
with the following extended package:
 Extended Package: File Encryption: Mitigating the Risk of Disclosure of Sensitive
Data on a System, Version 1.0, 10 November 2014 (ASFEEP10)
That information has not been reproduced here and the ASPP12/ASFEEP10 should be
consulted if there is interest in that material.
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
ASPP12/ASFEEP10 as described for this TOE in the Security Target. Other functionality
included in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other functionality
provided by the devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further conclusions can be
drawn about their effectiveness.
6 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that
need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications
of this evaluation. Note that:
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 As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance
activities specified in the Application Software Protection Profile and Application
Software Protection Profile Extended Package: File Encryption and performed by the
evaluation team).
 This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in
this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
 This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities
that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The
CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a
minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
 The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the ASPP and ASFEEP and applicable Technical
Decisions. Any additional security related functional capabilities of the TOE were
not covered by this evaluation.
7 Documentation
The following documents were available with the TOE for evaluation:
 Trivalent Android Data Protection SDK Operations & Maintenance Manual, Version
2.13, December 2016
8 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is
derived from information contained in the Detailed Test Report (ASPP12/ASFEEP10) for
Android Data Protection SDK 2.0, Version 0.4, April 11, 2017 (DTR).
8.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according a Common Criteria Certification
document and ran the tests specified in the ASPP12/ASFEEP10 including the tests associated
with optional requirements.
9 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration consists of the Trivalent Android Data Protection SDK Version
2.13 residing on an evaluated mobile device running Android 5.1 or Android 6.0.
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10 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all
EAL1 work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC
version 3.1 rev 4 and CEM version 3.1 rev 4. The evaluation determined the Product Name
TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to meet the Part 3 Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL 1).
10.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement
of security requirements claimed to be met by the Trivalent Android Data Protection SDK
2.0 products that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security function
descriptions that support the requirements.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
10.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides
the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification
contained in the Security target and Guidance documents. Additionally the evaluator
performed the assurance activities specified in the ASPP12 & ASFEEP10 related to the
examination of the information contained in the TSS.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
10.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally,
the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how
to securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and testing
phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
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conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
10.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the
TOE was identified.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
10.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of
tests specified by the assurance activities in the ASPP12 & ASFEEP10 and recorded the
results in a Test Report, summarized in the Assurance Activities Report.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
10.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The evaluation team performed a
public search for vulnerabilities and did not discover any public issues with the TOE.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
10.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the accuracy
of the claims in the ST.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
11 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements
specified in the Security Target, and only the functionality implemented by the SFR’s within
the Security Target was evaluated. All other functionality provided by the Trivalent Android
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Data Protection SDK, to include software or components that was not part of the evaluated
configuration, needs to be assessed separately and no further conclusions can be drawn about
their effectiveness.
This was one of the first evaluations performed against the Protection Profile for Application
Software, Version 1.2 and Application Software Protection Profile (ASPP) Extended
Package: File Encryption: Mitigating the Risk of Disclosure of Sensitive Data on a System,
Version 1.0. As such, there were multiple issues identified by evaluators and validators that
needed to be addressed by the appropriate Technical Rapid Response Teams. Generally,
issues resulted in formal Technical Decisions published on the NIAP web site. The Technical
Decisions that apply to this evaluation are clearly marked in the ST and AAR. For TRRT
decisions made for this evaluation that haven’t been finalized, they will be published in
further TDs and/or are noted in the applicable section of the Assurance Activity Report.
12 Annexes
Not applicable
13 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: Trivalent Android Data Protection SDK
(ASPP12/ASFEEP10) Security Target, Version 1.0, April 10, 2017.
14 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
 Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
 Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
 Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using
the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more TOEs that may be evaluated.
 Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
 Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
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 Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an
IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
 Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue
of a Common Criteria certificate.
 Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
15 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2102.
[4] Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.2, 22 April 2016 (ASPP12)
and Application Software Protection Profile (ASPP) Extended Package: File
Encryption: Mitigating the Risk of Disclosure of Sensitive Data on a System, Version
1.0, 10 November 2014 (ASFEEP10)
[5] Trivalent Android Data Protection SDK (ASPP12/ASFEEP10) Security Target,
Version 1.0, April 10, 2017 (ST)
[6] Assurance Activity Report (ASPP12/ASFEEP10) for Android Data Protection SDK
2.0, Version 0.4, April 11, 2017 (AAR)
[7] Detailed Test Report (ASPP12/ASFEEP10) for Android Data Protection SDK 2.0,
Version 0.4, April 11, 2017 (DTR)
[8] Evaluation Technical Report for Trivalent Android Data Protection SDK, Version
0.4, April 11, 2017 (ETR)