ChipDoc v2 on JCOP 3 P60 in
ICAO BAC configuration
Security Target Lite
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020
Final
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Document information
Info Content
Keywords Common Criteria, Security Target Lite, ChipDoc v2 on JCOP 3 P60,
ICAO BAC
Abstract Security Target Lite of ChipDoc v2 application on JCOP3 P60 in ICAO
BAC configuration, which is developed and provided by NXP
Semiconductors, Business Unit Identification according to the Common
Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 3.1 at
Evaluation Assurance Level 4 augmented.
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 2 of 78
Contact information
For more information, please visit: http://www.nxp.com
For sales office addresses, please send an email to: salesaddresses@nxp.com
Revision history
Rev Date Description
1.0 2020-03-27 Initial Version of this Security Target Lite
1.1 2020-04-01 Update of Reference to Guidance Document
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 3 of 78
1. ST Introduction (ASE_INT)
1.1 ST Reference and TOE Reference
Table 1. ST Reference and TOE Reference
Title ChipDoc v2 on JCOP 3 P60 in ICAO BAC configuration Security Target
Lite
Version Revision 1.1
Date 2020-04-01
Product Type Java Card Applet
TOE Name ChipDoc v2 on JCOP 3 P60 in ICAO BAC configuration Version v7b4_2
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version
3.1, Revision 4, September 2012 (Part 1 [1], Part 2 [2] and Part 3 [3])
1.2 TOE Overview
Fig 1. Components of the TOE
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 4 of 78
The TOE consists of an applet which is executed by a software stack that is stored on a
Micro Controller. For a complete picture of the TOE see Fig 1, and for details with
regards to the different components see section 1.3.1.
The protection profile [4] defines the security objectives and requirements for the
contactless chip of machine readable travel documents (MRTD) based on the
requirements and recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO). This ST extends this PP to contact, contactless and dual interface smartcard
modules. It addresses the advanced security methods Basic Access Control (BAC) and
Extended Access Control (EAC) and Chip Authentication similar to the Active
Authentication in the Technical reports of ‘ICAO Doc 9303’[11].
ChipDoc passport application is configurable in BAC or EAC chip authentication modes,
with or without Active Authentication [11]. Also, it supports contact and contactless
communication.
This ST applies to the BAC configuration with or without Active Authentication.
Note that there is no non-TOE hardware/software/firmware that is required by the TOE.
1.2.1 TOE usage and security features for operational use
A State or Organization issues MRTDs to be used by the holder for international travel.
The traveler presents a MRTD to the inspection system to prove his or her identity. The
MRTD in context of this TOE contains (i) visual (eye readable) biographical data and
portrait of the holder, (ii) a separate data summary (MRZ data) for visual and machine
reading using OCR methods in the Machine readable zone (MRZ) and (iii) data elements
on the MRTD’s chip according to LDS for contactless machine reading. The
authentication of the traveler is based on (i) the possession of a valid MRTD
personalized for a holder with the claimed identity as given on the biographical data page
and (ii) optional biometrics using the reference data stored in the MRTD. The issuing
State or Organization ensures the authenticity of the data of genuine MRTD’s. The
receiving State trusts a genuine MRTD of an issuing State or Organization.
The issuing State or Organization implements security features of the MRTD to maintain
the authenticity and integrity of the MRTD and their data. The MRTD as the passport
book and the MRTD’s chip is uniquely identified by the Document Number.
The physical MRTD is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on
paper, security printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the MRTD’s chip) and
organizational security measures (e.g. control of materials, personalization procedures)
[11]. These security measures include the binding of the MRTD’s chip to the passport
book.
The logical MRTD is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created
by the document signer acting for the issuing State or Organization and the security
features of the MRTD’s chip.
The ICAO defines the baseline security methods (Passive Authentication) and the
optional advanced security methods (BAC to the logical MRTD, Active Authentication of
the MRTD’s chip, EAC to the logical MRTD and the Data Encryption of additional
sensitive biometrics) as optional security measure in the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [11]. The
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 5 of 78
Passive Authentication Mechanism and the Data Encryption are performed completely
and independently on the TOE by the TOE environment.
This TOE addresses the protection of the logical MRTD (i) in integrity by write only- once
access control and by physical means, and (ii) in confidentiality by the BAC Mechanism.
This TOE does not address EAC (Extended Access Control), and this TOE addresses
the AA as an optional security mechanism.
1.3 TOE Description
1.3.1 General
The TOE is an MRTD IC where application software is masked in ROM and that can be
assembled in a variety of form factors. The main form factor is the electronic passport, a
paper book passport embedding a contactless module.
The followings are an informal and non-exhaustive list of example graphic
representations of possible end products embedding the TOE:
• Contactless interface cards and modules
• Dual interface cards and modules
• Contact only cards and modules
The scope of this TOE is covered in section 1.3.1 above.
The TOE is linked to a MRTD reader via its HW and physical interfaces.
• The contactless type interface of the TOE smartcard is ISO/IEC 14443 compliant.
• The optional contact type interface of the TOE smartcard is ISO/IEC 7816 compliant.
• The optional interfaces of the TOE SOIC-8 are ISO 9141 compliant.
• The optional interfaces of the TOE QNF-44 are JEDEC compliant.
There are no other external interfaces of the TOE except the ones described above.
The antenna and the packaging, including their external interfaces, are out of the
scope of this TOE.
The TOE may be applied to a contact reader or to a contactless reader, depending on
the external interface type(s) available in its form factor. The readers are connected to a
computer and allow application programs (APs) to use the TOE.
The TOE can embed other secure functionalities, but they are not in the scope of this
TOE and subject to an evaluation in other TOEs.
1.3.2 MRTD’s chip
For this TOE the MRTD is viewed as unit of
1. The physical MRTD as travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip. It
presents visual readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the
MRTD holder
a. the biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book,
b. the printed data in the Machine Readable Zone (MRZ) and
c. the printed portrait.
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 6 of 78
2. The logical MRTD as data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data
Structure [11] as specified by ICAO on the contactless integrated circuit. It presents
contactless readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the MRTD
holder
a. the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1),
b. the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
c. the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s) (EF.DG4) or
both,
d. the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16) and
e. the Document security object.
This TOE addresses the protection of the logical MRTD:
• in integrity by write-only-once access control and by physical means, and
• in confidentiality by the Extended Access Control Mechanism.
This TOE addresses the Chip Authentication described in [12] as an alternative to the
Active Authentication stated in [11].
1.3.3 Basic Access Control
The confidentiality by Basic Access Control (BAC) is a mandatory security feature that is
implemented by the TOE. For BAC, the inspection system
(i) reads optically the MRTD,
(ii) authenticates itself as an inspection system by means of Document Basic Access
Keys.
After successful authentication of the inspection system the MRTD’s chip provides read
access to the logical MRTD by means of private communication (secure messaging) with
this inspection system [11], normative appendix 5.
In compliance with the ICAO Basic protection profile [4], this ST requires the TOE to
implement the Chip Authentication defined in [12]. The Chip Authentication prevents data
traces described in [11], informative appendix 7, A7.3.3. The Chip Authentication is
provided by the following steps:
(i) the inspection system communicates by means of secure messaging established
by Basic Access Control,
(ii) the inspection system reads and verifies by means of the Passive Authentication
the authenticity of the MRTD’s Chip Authentication Public Key using the Document
Security Object,
(iii) the inspection system generates an ephemeral key pair,
(iv) the TOE and the inspection system agree on two session keys for secure
messaging in ENC_MAC mode according to the Diffie-Hellman Primitive and
(v) the inspection system verifies by means of received message authentication
codes whether the MRTD’s chip was able or not to run this protocol properly (i.e.
the TOE proves to be in possession of the Chip Authentication Private Key
corresponding to the Chip Authentication Public Key used for derivation of the
session keys).
The Chip Authentication requires collaboration of the TOE and the TOE environment.
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 7 of 78
1.3.4 Active Authentication
This TOE offers an optional mechanism called Active Authentication and specified in [12]
section 1.2. This security feature is a digital security feature that prevents cloning by
introducing a chip-individual key pair:
(i) The public key is stored in data group DG15 and thus protected by Passive
Authentication.
(ii) The corresponding private key is stored in secure memory and may only be used
internally by the MRTD chip and cannot be read out.
Thus, the chip can prove knowledge of this private key in a challenge-response protocol,
which is called Active Authentication. In this protocol the MRTD chip digitally signs a
challenge randomly chosen by the inspection system. The inspection system recognizes
that the MRTD chip is genuine if and only if the returned signature is correct. Active
Authentication is a straightforward protocol and prevents cloning very effectively, but
introduces a privacy threat: Challenge Semantics (see Appendix F for a discussion on
Challenge Semantics).
1.3.5 TOE Components and Composite Certification
The certification of this TOE is a composite certification. This means that for the
certification of this TOE other certifications of components which are part of this TOE are
re-used. In the following sections more detailed descriptions of the components of Figure
1 are provided. In the description it is also made clear whether a component is covered
by a previous certification or whether it is covered in the certification of this TOE.
Micro Controller
The Micro Controller is a secure smart card controller from NXP from the SmartMX2
family. The Micro Controller contains a co-processor for symmetric cipher, supporting
DES operations and AES, as well as well as an accelerator for asymmetric algorithms. It
contains volatile (RAM) and non-volatile (ROM and EEPROM) memory. The Micro
Controller has been certified in a previous certification and the results are re-used for this
certification.
The exact reference to the previous certification is given in the following Table:
Table 2. Reference to certified Micro Controller
Name NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P6022y VB* including IC
Dedicated Software
Certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-1059
Reference [18]
IC Dedicated Software
• Micro Controller Firmware: The Micro Controller Firmware is used for testing of the
Micro Controller at production, for booting of the Micro Controller after power-up or
after reset, for configuration of communication devices and for writing data to non-
volatile memory. The MC FW has been certified in a previous certification. It has
been certified together with the Micro Controller and the same references ([18]) as
given for the Micro Controller also apply for the Micro Controller Firmware.
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 8 of 78
• MIFARE Implementation: The NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P6022y VB
hardware of this TOE can be configured as follows:
− P6022P VB: without MIFARE,
− P6022M VB: including MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0,
− P6022D VB: including MIFARE DESFire EV1,
− P6022J VB: including both, MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0 and MIFARE DESFire
EV1.
The MIFARE Implementation has been certified in a previous certification. It has been
certified together with the Micro Controller and the same references ([18]) as given for
the Micro Controller also apply for the MIFARE Implementation. Only the P6022J VB
configuration can be considered as certified hardware configuration for the TOE in the
scope of this Security Target.
• Crypto Library: The Crypto Lib is certified in a previous certification and the results
are re-used for this certification. The exact reference to the certification is given in the
following table:
Table 3. Reference to certified Crypto Library
Name Crypto Library V3.1.x on P6022y VB
Certification ID NSCIB-CC-67206-CR4
Reference [19]
• JCOP3 OSB: The Operating System consists of JCVM, JCRE, JCAPI and GP
framework. It is implemented according to the Java Card Specification and
GlobalPlatform and has been certified in the course of a previous certification, where
the results are re-used for this certification. The exact reference to the certification is
given in the following table:
Table 4. Reference to certified Operating System
Name JCOP 3 P60
Certification ID NSCIB-CC-98209-CR4
Reference [21]
IC Embedded Software
ChipDoc Applet: The applet as part of the TOE, programs the underlying integrated
circuit chip of machine readable travel documents (MRTD’s chip) according to the Logical
Data Structure (LDS) [11] and providing the BAC mechanism according to the ‘ICAO Doc
9303’ [11] and BSI TR-03110 [12], respectively.
The TOE comprises at least:
• the circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (P6022y VB IC)
• the IC Embedded Software (OSB Operating System)
• the MRTD application (ChipDoc applet in ICAO configuration)
• the associated guidance documentation
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 9 of 78
1.3.6 TOE Lifecycle
The TOE lifecycle is shown in Fig 2 TOE LifeCycle. Described in terms of the four life
cycle phases (subdivided to 7 steps) mentioned in PP0055, but with a refinement in pre-
personalisation, to support platform patching by the MRTD manufacturer who operates
from a CC certified site.
Phase 1 “Development”
(Step 1 – IC Design)
The IC developer develops the integrated circuit, the IC Dedicated Software and the
guidance documentation associated with these TOE components.
(Step 2 – Embedded Software Design)
The embedded software developer uses the guidance documentation for the integrated
circuit and the guidance documentation for relevant parts of the IC Dedicated Software
and develops the operating system, the MRTD application and the guidance
documentation associated with these TOE components.
Phase 2 “Manufacturing”
(Step 3 – IC Manufacturing)
In the first instance the TOE integrated circuit is produced containing the MRTD’s chip
Dedicated Software and the parts of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software in the non-
volatile non-programmable memories (ROM). The IC manufacturer programs IC
Identification Data onto the chip to control the IC as MRTD material during the IC
manufacturing and the delivery process to the MRTD manufacturer. The IC is securely
delivered from the IC manufacturer to the MRTD manufacturer.
(Step 4 – IC Initialisation)
The Embedded Software which constitutes the Operating System and the Card Content
Manager is enabled with the requisite keys loaded and transport mechanisms enabled,
which supports the secure transport of the IC from NXP manufacturing facility to the
MRTD Manufacturer facility.
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 10 of 78
Fig 2. TOE LifeCycle
(Step 5 - PrePersonalisation)
During the step Pre-Perso, the MRTD manufacturer
(i) creates the MRTD application and
(ii) equips MRTD’s chips with pre-personalization Data.
IC Pre-Personalization
Creation of the application implies applet instantiation and the creation of MF and
ICAO.DFF1.
Card Content Management is finalized in this phase – post issuance applet loading is
disabled for ICAO products. Any platform patching required as a result of CC
maintenance procedures is completed at this point and the platform closed to further
amendments.2
The pre-personalized MRTD together with the IC Identifier is securely delivered from the
MRTD manufacturer to the Personalization Agent. NXP or the MRTD Manufacturer also
provides the relevant parts of the guidance documentation to the Personalization Agent.
1
Besides the file system of the MRTD application, one or more additional file systems might be present on
the TOE.
2
The application of platform patches is only allowed on a CC certified site. If the card issuer is able to
provide such a facility NXP will supply all patching materials, otherwise the task is undertaken by NXP
trust provisioning service, prior to dispatch from NXP.
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 11 of 78
(Packaging)
The MRTD manufacturer combines the IC with hardware for the contactless interface in
the passport book.
IC Packaging
MRTD Manufacturing
This step corresponds to the integration of the hardware and firmware components into
the final product body. The TOE is protected during transfer between various parties. IC
Packaging and MRTD Manufacturing are not part of the scope of this TOE.
Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”
(Step 6 - Personalization)
The personalization of the MRTD includes:
• the survey of the MRTD holder’s biographical data,
• the enrolment of the MRTD holder biometric reference data,
• the printing of the visual readable data onto the physical MRTD,
• the writing of the TOE User Data and TSF Data into the logical MRTD and
• configuration of the TSF if necessary.
Step 6 is performed by the Personalization Agent and includes but is not limited to the
creation of the digital MRZ data (EF.DG1), the digitized portrait (EF.DG2), the biometric
reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s) (EF.DG4) or both, the other data
according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16) and the Document security object. The signing
of the Document security object by the Document signer [11] finalizes the personalization
of the genuine MRTD for the MRTD holder. The personalized MRTD (together with
appropriate guidance for TOE use if necessary) is handed over to the MRTD holder for
operational use.
Personalization – 3rd Party Personalization facility
The TOE is protected during transfer between various parties by the confidential
information which resides in the card during mask production.
The Personalization phase is not part of the scope of this TOE.
Phase 4 “Operational Use”
Where upon the card is delivered to the MRTD holder and until MRTD is expired or
destroyed.
(Step 7)
The TOE is used as MRTD chip by the traveler and the inspection systems in the
“Operational Use” phase. The user data can be read according to the security policy of
the issuing State or Organization and can be used according to the security policy of the
issuing State but they can never be modified.
The Operational Use phase is not part of the scope of this TOE.
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 12 of 78
1.3.7 TOE Identification
TOE Delivery
The delivery comprises the following items:
Table 5. Delivery Items
Type Name Version Form of delivery
JCOP 3 P60 Platform
including ChipDoc v2
application
NXP Secure Smart Card Controller
P6022y VB
ROM Code (Platform ID)
Patch Code (Patch ID)
Micro Controller
including on-chip
software: Firmware,
Crypto Library and
JCOP 3 Operating
System
Document ChipDoc ICAO, Preparation and
Operation Manual [22]
1.9 Electronic Document
Identification of the TOE
The TOE can be identified by
• Identifying the JCOP 3 P60 platform: the IDENTIFY command shall be sent to
the TOE to verify the correct values of the Platform ID and the Patch ID as stated
in section “2.4 Platform identification” of the User Manual for this TOE [22]
• Identifying the ICAO application: The ChipDoc v2 application can be verified
according the instructions in section “2.3 Applet identification” in [22]
Evaluated Package Types
A number of package types are supported for this TOE. All package types, which are
covered by the certification of the used platform (see [21]), are also allowed to be used in
combination with each product of this TOE.
The package types do not influence the security functionality of the TOE. They only
define which pads are connected in the package and for what purpose and in which
environment the chip can be used. Note that the security of the TOE is not dependent on
which pad is connected or not - the connections just define how the product can be used.
If the TOE is delivered as wafer the customer can choose the connection on his own.
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 13 of 78
2. Conformance Claims (ASE_CCL)
2.1 CC Conformance Claim
This Security Target claims to be conformant to version 3.1 of Common Criteria for
Information Technology Security Evaluation according to
• "Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1, Version
3.1, Revision 4, September 2012" [1]
• "Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2, Version
3.1, Revision 4, September 2012" [2]
• "Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3, Version
3.1, Revision 4, September 2012" [3]
The following methodology will be used for the evaluation:
• Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation
Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 4" [20]
This Security Target claims to be CC Part 2 extended and CC Part 3 conformant. The
extended Security Functional Requirements are defined in section 6.
Extensions are based on the Protection Profiles (PP [4] and PP [5]) presented in the next
section:
• FAU_SAS.1 ‘Audit data storage’
• FCS_RND.1 ‘Generation of random numbers’
• FIA_API.1 ‘Authentication Proof of Identity’
• FMT_LIM.1 ‘Limited capabilities’
• FMT_LIM.2 ‘Limited availability’
• FPT_EMSEC.1 ‘TOE emanation’
2.2 Package Claim
This Security Target claims conformance to the assurance package EAL4 augmented.
The augmentations to EAL4 are:
• ADV_FSP.5 ‘Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional error
information’
• ADV_INT.2 ‘Well-structured internals’
• ADV_TDS.4 ‘Semiformal modular design’
• ALC_CMS.5 ‘Development tools CM coverage’
• ALC_DVS.2 ‘Sufficiency of security measures’
• ALC_TAT.2 ‘Compliance with implementation standards’
• ATE_DPT.3 ‘Testing: modular design’
2.3 PP Claim
This ST claims strict conformance to the following Protection Profile:
Protection Profile [4]
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 14 of 78
Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO Application”, Basic Access
Control
Version 1.10
Date 25th March 2009
Prepared by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
Identification PP0055
Approved by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
Registration BSI-CC-PP-0055-2009
Assurance Level Common Criteria 3.1 EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2
The ICAO BAC PP defines the security objectives and requirements for the contactless
chip of machine readable travel documents (MRTD) based on the requirements and
recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). It addresses
the advanced security methods Basic Access Control and Chip Authentication similar to
the Active Authentication in the Technical reports of ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [11].
This MRTD’s IC does not limit the TOE interfaces to contactless: both contact and
contactless interfaces are part of this TOE and the PP content has been enhanced for
this purpose.
Additions to the claims from the PP [4] have been added to the related sections of this
Security Target and are listed including rationales in section 8.4 of this Security Target.
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 15 of 78
3. Security Problem Definition (ASE_SPD)
3.1 Assets
The assets to be protected by the TOE include the User Data on the MRTD’s chip.
Logical MRTD sensitive User Data
Sensitive biometric reference data:
• EF.DG3: Biometric Finger(s)
• EF.DG4: Biometric Eye(s) Iris
Logical MRTD data
The ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [11] requires that Basic Inspection Systems must have access to:
• EF.COM: Common Data Elements, lists the existing EF with the user data
• EF.SOD: Document Security Object according to LDS [11] used by the inspection
system for Passive Authentication of the logical MRTD
• EF.DG1: document’s data (Type, Issuing State or Organization, Number, Expiry
Date, Optional Data), holder’s data (Name, Nationality, Date of Birth, Sex) and Check
Digits
• EF.DG2: Encoded Face (Global Interchange Feature)
• EF.DG5: Biometric Face
• EF.DG7: Displayed Signature or Usual Mark
• EF.DG8: Displayed Portrait
• EF.DG9: Data Feature(s)
• EF.DG10: Structure Feature(s)
• EF.DG11: Additional Personal Detail(s)
• EF.DG12: Additional Document Detail(s)
• EF.DG13: optional Detail(s)
• EF.DG14: Security Info (Chip Authentication Public Key Info)
• EF.DG15: Active Authentication Public Key Info
• EF.DG16: Person(s) to Notify
Due to interoperability reasons with ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [11], the TOE specifies the BAC
mechanisms with resistance against enhanced basic attack potential granting access to:
• Logical MRTD standard User Data (i.e. Personal Data) of the MRTD holder (EF.DG1,
EF.DG2, EF.DG5 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16) (DG6 is absent),
• Chip Authentication Public Key in EF.DG14,
• Active Authentication Public Key in EF.DG15,
• Document Security Object (SOD) in EF.SOD,
• Common data in EF.COM.
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 16 of 78
The TOE prevents read access to sensitive User Data
• Sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3, EF.DG4).
Authenticity of the MRTD’s chip
The authenticity of the MRTD’s chip personalized by the issuing State or Organization for
the MRTD holder is used by the traveler to prove his possession of a genuine MRTD.
3.2 Subjects
This Security Target considers the following subjects:
S.Manufacturer
The generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing the integrated circuit and the MRTD
Manufacturer completing the IC to the MRTD’s chip. The Manufacturer is the default user
of the TOE during the Phase 2 Manufacturing. The TOE does not distinguish between
the users IC Manufacturer and MRTD Manufacturer using this role Manufacturer.
S.Personalizer Personalization Agent
The agent is acting on behalf of the issuing State or Organization to personalize the
MRTD for the holder by some or all of the following activities: (i) establishing the identity
of the holder for the biographic data in the MRTD, (ii) enrolling the biometric reference
data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the
encoded iris image(s), (iii) writing these data on the physical and logical MRTD for the
holder as defined for global, international and national interoperability, (iv) writing the
initial TSF data and (v) signing the Document Security Object defined in [11].
S.Country Country Verifying Certification Authority
The Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA) enforces the privacy policy of the
issuing State or Organization with respect to the protection of sensitive biometric
reference data stored in the MRTD. The CVCA represents the country specific root of the
PKI of Inspection Systems and creates the Document Verifier Certificates within this PKI.
The updates of the public key of the CVCA are distributed in the form of Country
Verifying CA Link-Certificates.
S.DV Document Verifier
The Document Verifier (DV) enforces the privacy policy of the receiving State with
respect to the protection of sensitive biometric reference data to be handled by the
Extended Inspection Systems. The Document Verifier manages the authorization of the
Extended Inspection Systems for the sensitive data of the MRTD in the limits provided by
the issuing States or Organizations in the form of the Document Verifier Certificates.
S.Terminal
A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through its physical
interfaces.
S.IS Inspection system
A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining
an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 17 of 78
traveler as MRTD holder. The Basic Inspection System (BIS) (i) contains a terminal for
the communication with the MRTD’s chip, (ii) implements the terminals part of the Basic
Access Control Mechanism and (iii) gets the authorization to read the logical MRTD
under the Basic Access Control by optical reading the MRTD or other parts of the
passport book providing this information. The General Inspection System (GIS) is a
Basic Inspection System which implements additionally the Chip Authentication
Mechanism. The Extended Inspection System (EIS) in addition to the General
Inspection System (i) implements the Terminal Authentication Protocol and (ii) is
authorized by the issuing State or Organization through the Document Verifier of the
receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data. The security attributes of
the EIS are defined of the Inspection System Certificates.
S.Holder MRTD Holder
The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization personalized
the MRTD.
S.Traveler
Person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming the identity of the
MRTD holder.
3.3 Assumptions
The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will
be used or is intended to be used.
A.MRTD_Manufact MRTD manufacturing on steps 5 to 6
It is assumed that appropriate functionality testing of the MRTD is used. It is assumed
that security procedures are used during all manufacturing and test operations to
maintain confidentiality and integrity of the MRTD and of its manufacturing and test data
(to prevent any possible copy, modification, retention, theft or unauthorized use).
A.MRTD_Delivery MRTD delivery during steps 5 to 6
Procedures shall guarantee the control of the TOE delivery and storage process and
conformance to its objectives:
• Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery and
storage.
• Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper
operation in the delivery process and storage.
• Procedures shall ensure that people dealing with the procedure for delivery have got
the required skill.
A.Pers_Agent Personalization of the MRTD’s chip
The Personalization Agent ensures the correctness of
• the logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD holder,
• the Document Basic Access Keys,
• the Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG14) if stored on the MRTD’s chip, and
• the Document Signer Public Key Certificate (if stored on the MRTD’s chip).
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 18 of 78
The Personalization Agent signs the Document Security Object. The Personalization
Agent bears the Personalization Agent Authentication to authenticate himself to the TOE
by symmetric cryptographic mechanisms.
A.Pers_Agent_AA Personalization of the MRTD’s chip including Active Authentication
The Personalization Agent ensures the correctness of the Active Authentication Public
Key (EF.DG15) if stored on the MRTD’s chip.
The Personalization Agent bears the Personalization Agent Authentication to
authenticate himself to the TOE by symmetric cryptographic mechanisms.
A.Insp_Sys Inspection Systems for global interoperability
The Inspection System is used by the border control officer of the receiving State:
• examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and
• verifying the traveler as MRTD holder.
The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability
• includes the Country Signing CA Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of
each issuing State or Organization, and
• implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control [11].
The Basic Inspection System reads the logical MRTD under Basic Access Control and
performs the Passive Authentication to verify the logical MRTD.
The General Inspection System in addition to the Basic Inspection System implements
the Chip Authentication Mechanism. The General Inspection System verifies the
authenticity of the MRTD’s chip during inspection and establishes secure messaging with
keys established by the Chip Authentication Mechanism. The Extended Inspection
System in addition to the General Inspection System (i) supports the Terminal
Authentication Protocol and (ii) is authorized by the issuing State or Organization through
the Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference
data.
A.Insp_Sys_AA Inspection Systems for global interoperability with Active Authentication
The Inspection System may also implement the terminal part of the Active Authentication
Protocol.
A.BAC-Keys Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys
The Document Basic Access Control Keys being generated and imported by the issuing
State or Organization have to provide sufficient cryptographic strength. As a
consequence of the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [4], the Document Basic Access Control Keys are
derived from a defined subset of the individual printed MRZ data. It has to be ensured
that these data provide sufficient entropy to withstand any attack based on the decision
that the inspection system has to derive Document Access Keys from the printed MRZ
data with enhanced basic attack potential.
Application note: When assessing the MRZ data resp. the BAC keys entropy potential
dependencies between these data (especially single items of the MRZ) have to be
considered and taken into account. E.g. there might be a direct dependency between the
Document Number when chosen consecutively and the issuing date.
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 19 of 78
3.4 Threat agent
S.ATTACKER
A threat agent trying
(i) to identify and to trace the movement of the MRTD’s chip
remotely (i.e. without knowing or optically reading the
printed MRZ data),
(ii) to read or to manipulate the logical MRTD without
authorization, or
(iii) to forge a genuine MRTD.
Application note: An impostor is attacking the inspection system as TOE IT
environment independent on using a genuine, counterfeit or forged MRTD. Therefore the
impostor may use results of successful attacks against the TOE but the attack itself is not
relevant for the TOE.
3.5 Threats
The TOE in collaboration with its IT environment shall avert the threats as specified
below.
T.Chip_ID Identification of MRTD’s chip
An attacker trying to trace the movement of the MRTD by identifying remotely the
MRTD’s chip by establishing or listening to communications through the TOE
communication interfaces.
The attacker has enhanced basic attack potential and does not know the optically
readable MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page in advance.
Threatened asset is the user anonymity.
T.Skimming Skimming the logical MRTD
An attacker imitates an inspection system trying to establish a communication to read the
logical MRTD or parts of it via the communication channels of the TOE.
The attacker does not know the optically readable MRZ data printed on the MRTD data
page in advance.
Threatened asset is the confidentiality of logical MRTD data.
T.Eavesdropping Eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and
inspection system
An attacker is listening to an existing communication between the MRTD’s chip and an
inspection system to gain the logical MRTD or parts of it. The inspection system uses the
MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page but the attacker does not know these data in
advance.
The attacker has enhanced basic attack potential and does not know the optically
readable MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page in advance.
Threatened asset is the confidentiality of logical MRTD data.
T.Forgery Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 20 of 78
An attacker alters fraudulently the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it
including its security related data in order to deceive on an inspection system by means
of the changed MRTD holder’s identity or biometric reference data. This threat comprises
several attack scenarios of MRTD forgery. The attacker may alter the biographical data
on the biographical data page of the passport book, in the printed MRZ and in the digital
MRZ to claim another identity of the traveler. The attacker may alter the printed portrait
and the digitized portrait to overcome the visual inspection of the inspection officer and
the automated biometric authentication mechanism by face recognition. The attacker
may alter the biometric reference data to defeat automated biometric authentication
mechanism of the inspection system. The attacker may combine data groups of different
logical MRTDs to create a new forged MRTD, e.g. the attacker writes the digitized
portrait and optional biometric reference finger data read from the logical MRTD of a
traveler into another MRTD’s chip leaving their digital MRZ unchanged to claim the
identity of the holder this MRTD. The attacker may also copy the complete unchanged
logical MRTD to another chip.
The attacker has enhanced basic attack potential and is in possession of one or more
legitimate MRTDs.
Threatened asset is authenticity of logical MRTD data.
T.Counterfeit Counterfeit MRTD’s chip
An attacker produces an unauthorised copy or reproduction of a genuine MRTD’s chip to
be used as part of a counterfeit MRTD. This violates the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip
used for authentication of a traveler by possession of a MRTD. The attacker may
generate a new data set or extract completely or partially the data from a genuine
MRTD’s chip and copy them on another appropriate chip to imitate this genuine MRTD’s
chip.
The attacker is in possession of one or more legitimate MRTDs.
Threatened asset is authenticity of logical MRTD data.
The TOE shall avert the threats as specified below.
T.Abuse-Func Abuse of Functionality
An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in “Operational Use”
phase in order (i) to manipulate User Data, (ii) to manipulate (explore, bypass, deactivate
or change) security features or functions of the TOE or (iii) to disclose or to manipulate
TSF Data. This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialization and the
personalization in the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder.
The attacker has enhanced basic attack potential and is in possession of a legitimate
MRTD.
Threatened assets are confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data,
correctness of TSF.
T.Information_Leakage Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip
An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during its usage in
order to disclose confidential TSF data. The information leakage may be inherent in the
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 21 of 78
normal operation or caused by the attacker. Leakage may occur through emanations,
variations in power consumption, I/O characteristics, clock frequency, or by changes in
processing time requirements. This leakage may be interpreted as a covert channel
transmission but is more closely related to measurement of operating parameters which
may be derived either from measurements of the communication interfaces (emanation)
or direct measurements (by contact to the chip still available even for a contactless chip)
and can then be related to the specific operation being performed. Examples are the
Differential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) and the Differential Power Analysis (DPA).
Moreover the attacker may try actively to enforce information leakage by fault injection
(e.g. Differential Fault Analysis).
The attacker has enhanced basic attack potential and is in possession of a legitimate
MRTD.
Threatened asset is confidentiality of logical MRTD and TSF data.
T.Phys-Tamper Physical Tampering
An attacker may perform physical probing of the MRTD’s chip in order (i) to disclose TSF
Data, or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. An attacker
may physically modify the MRTD’s chip in order to (i) modify security features or
functions of the MRTD’s chip, (ii) modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip
Embedded Software, (iii) modify User Data or (iv) to modify TSF data. The physical
tampering may be focused directly on the disclosure or manipulation of TOE User Data
(e.g. the biometric reference data for the inspection system) or TSF Data (e.g.
authentication key of the MRTD’s chip) or indirectly by preparation of the TOE to
following attack methods by modification of security features (e.g. to enable information
leakage through power analysis). Physical tampering requires direct interaction with the
MRTD’s chip internals. Techniques commonly employed in IC failure analysis and IC
reverse engineering efforts may be used. Before that, the hardware security mechanisms
and layout characteristics need to be identified. Determination of software design
including treatment of User Data and TSF Data may also be a pre-requisite. The
modification may result in the deactivation of a security function. Changes of circuitry or
data can be permanent or temporary.
The attacker has enhanced basic attack potential and is in possession of a legitimate
MRTD.
Threatened assets are confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data,
correctness of TSF.
T.Malfunction Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software
by applying environmental stress in order to (i) deactivate or modify security features or
functions of the TOE or (ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the
MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. This may be achieved e.g. by operating the MRTD’s
chip outside the normal operating conditions, exploiting errors in the MRTD’s chip
Embedded Software or misusing administration function. To exploit these vulnerabilities
an attacker needs information about the functional operation.
The attacker has enhanced basic attack potential and is in possession of a legitimate
MRTD.
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 22 of 78
Threatened assets are confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data,
correctness of TSF.
3.6 Organisational Security Policies
The TOE shall comply with the following Organizational Security Policies (OSP) as
security rules, procedures, practices, or guidelines imposed by an organization upon its
operations.
P.Manufact Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip
The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The
MRTD Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalization Data which contains at least the
Personalization Agent Key.
P.Personalization Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organization
only
The issuing State or Organization guarantees the correctness of the biographical data,
the printed portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and other data
of the logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD holder. The personalization of the MRTD
for the holder is performed by an agent authorized by the issuing State or Organization
only.
P.Personal_Data Personal data protection policy
The biographical data and their summary printed in the MRZ and stored on the MRTD’s
chip (EF.DG1), the printed portrait and the digitized portrait (EF.DG2), the biometric
reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3), the biometric reference data of iris image(s)
(EF.DG4)3 and data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16) stored on the
MRTD’s chip are personal data of the MRTD holder. These data groups are intended to
be used only with agreement of the MRTD holder by inspection systems to which the
MRTD is presented. The MRTD’s chip shall provide the possibility for the Basic Access
Control to allow read access to these data only for terminals successfully authenticated
based on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Keys as defined in [11].
Application note: The organizational security policy P.Personal_Data is drawn from the
ICAO ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [11]. Note that the Document Basic Access Key is defined by the
TOE environment and loaded to the TOE by the Personalization Agent.
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 23 of 78
4. Security Objectives (ASE_OBJ)
This chapter describes the security objectives for the TOE and the security objectives for
the TOE environment. The security objectives for the TOE environment are separated
into security objectives for the development and production environment and security
objectives for the operational environment.
4.1 SOs for the TOE
This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of
identified threats to be countered by the TOE and organizational security policies to be
met by the TOE.
OT.AC_Pers Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD
The TOE must ensure that the logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the Document
security object according to LDS [11] and the TSF data can be written by authorized
Personalization Agents only. The logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 and the TSF
data may be written only during and cannot be changed after its personalization. The
Document security object can be updated by authorized Personalization Agents if data in
the data groups EF.DG3 to EF.DG16 are added.
Application note: The OT.AC_Pers implies that
(1) the data of the LDS groups written during personalization for MRTD holder (at
least EF.DG1 and EF.DG2) cannot be changed by write access after
personalization,
(2) the Personalization Agents may (i) add (fill) data into the LDS data groups not
written yet, and (ii) update and sign the Document Security Object accordingly.
The support for adding data in the “Operational Use” phase is optional.
OT.Data_Int Integrity of personal data
The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip
against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure the
integrity of the logical MRTD data during their transmission to the General Inspection
System after Chip Authentication.
OT.Data_Conf Confidentiality of personal data
The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data groups EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16. Read access to EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 is granted to terminals successfully
authenticated as Personalization Agent. Read access to EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5
to EF.DG16 is granted to terminals successfully authenticated as Basic Inspection
System. The Basic Inspection System shall authenticate itself by means of the Basic
Access Control based on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Key. The TOE must
ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data during their transmission to the Basic
Inspection System.
Application note: The traveler grants the authorization for reading the personal data in
EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 to the inspection system by presenting the
MRTD. The MRTD’s chip shall provide read access to these data for terminals
successfully authenticated by means of the Basic Access Control based on knowledge of
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 24 of 78
the Document Basic Access Keys.The security objective OT.Data_Conf requires the
TOE to ensure the strength of the security function Basic Access Control Authentication.
The Document Basic Access Keys are derived from the MRZ data defined by the TOE
environment and are loaded into the TOE by the Personalization Agent. Therefore the
sufficient quality of these keys has to result from the MRZ data’s entropy. Any attack
based on decision of the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [11] that the inspection system derives
Document Basic Access is ensured by OE.BAC-Keys. Note that the authorization for
reading the biometric data in EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 is only granted after successful
Enhanced Access Control not covered by this TOE. Thus the read access must be
prevented even in case of a successful BAC Authentication.
OT.Identification Identification and Authentication of the TOE
The TOE must provide means to store IC Identification and Pre-Personalization Data in
its nonvolatile memory. The IC Identification Data must provide a unique identification of
the IC during Phase 2 “Manufacturing” and Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”. The
storage of the Pre- Personalization data includes writing of the Personalization Agent
Key(s). In Phase 4 “Operational Use” the TOE shall identify itself only to a successful
authenticated Basic Inspection System or Personalization Agent.
Application note: The TOE security objective OT.Identification addresses security
features of the TOE to support the lifecycle security in the manufacturing and
personalization phases. The IC Identification Data are used for TOE identification in
Phase 2 “Manufacturing” and for traceability and/or to secure shipment of the TOE from
Phase 2 “Manufacturing” into the Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”. The
OT.Identification addresses security features of the TOE to be used by the TOE
manufacturing. In the Phase 4 “Operational Use” the TOE is identified by the Document
Number as part of the printed and digital MRZ. The OT.Identification forbids the output of
any other IC (e.g. integrated circuit card serial number ICCSN) or MRTD identifier
through the physical interfaces before successful authentication as Basic Inspection
System or as Personalization Agent.
OT.AA_Proof Proof of MRTD’s chip authenticity by Active Authentication
The TOE may support the Basic Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity
of the MRTD’s chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization by means of
the Active Authentication as defined in [11].
The following TOE security objectives address the protection provided by the MRTD’s
chip independent of the TOE environment.
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func Protection against Abuse of Functionality
After delivery of the TOE to the MRTD Holder, the TOE must prevent the abuse of test
and support functions that may be maliciously used to (i) disclose critical User Data, (ii)
manipulate critical User Data of the IC Embedded Software, (iii) manipulate Soft-coded
IC Embedded Software or (iv) bypass, deactivate, change or explore security features or
functions of the TOE.
Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the capabilities of the
Test Features provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software which are not specified here.
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak Protection against Information Leakage
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 25 of 78
The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential TSF data stored
and/or processed in the MRTD’s chip
• by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time
between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power
consumption, clock, or I/O lines and
• by forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or
• by a physical manipulation of the TOE.
Application note: This objective pertains to measurements with subsequent complex
signal processing due to normal operation of the TOE or operations enforced by an
attacker. Details correspond to an analysis of attack scenarios which is not given here.
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper Protection against Physical Tampering
The TOE must provide protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the
TSF Data, and the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. This includes protection against
attacks with high attack potential by means of
• measuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical probing on the chips
surface except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage
and current) or
• measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction
between charges (using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure
analysis)
• manipulation of the hardware and its security features, as well as
• controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF Data)
• with a prior
• reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions.
OT.Prot_Malfunction Protection against Malfunctions
The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside
the normal operating conditions where reliability and secure operation has not been
proven or tested.
This is to prevent errors. The environmental conditions may include external energy (esp.
electromagnetic) fields, voltage (on any contacts), clock frequency, or temperature.
Application note: A malfunction of the TOE may also be caused using a direct
interaction with elements on the chip surface. This is considered as being a manipulation
(refer to the objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper) provided that detailed knowledge about the
TOE´s internals.
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 26 of 78
4.2 SOs for the Environment
4.2.1 Issuing State or Organization
The issuing State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the
TOE environment.
OE.MRTD_Manufact Protection of the MRTD Manufacturing
Appropriate functionality testing of the TOE shall be used in step 5 to 6.
During all manufacturing and test operations, security procedures shall be used through
steps 5 and 6 to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its manufacturing
and test data.
OE.MRTD_Delivery Protection of the MRTD delivery
Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery including
the following objectives:
• non-disclosure of any security relevant information,
• identification of the element under delivery,
• meet confidentiality rules (confidentiality level, transmittal form, reception
acknowledgment),
• physical protection to prevent external damage,
• secure storage and handling procedures (including rejected TOE’s),
• traceability of TOE during delivery including the following parameters:
− origin and shipment details,
− reception, reception acknowledgement,
− location material/information.
Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation
in the delivery process (including if applicable any non-conformance to the confidentiality
convention) and highlight all non-conformance to this process.
Procedures shall ensure that people (shipping department, carrier, reception department)
dealing with the procedure for delivery have got the required skill, training and knowledge
to meet the procedure requirements and be able to act fully in accordance with the above
expectations.
OE.Personalization Personalization of logical MRTD
The issuing State or Organization must ensure that the Personalization Agents acting on
behalf of the issuing State or Organization (i) establish the correct identity of the holder
and create biographical data for the MRTD, (ii) enroll the biometric reference data of the
MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris
image(s) and (iii) personalize the MRTD for the holder together with the defined physical
and logical security measures to protect the confidentiality and integrity of these data.
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature
The issuing State or Organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Country
Signing CA Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the Country Signing CA Private Key and
sign Document Signer Certificates in a secure operational environment, and (iii) distribute
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 27 of 78
the Certificate of the Country Signing CA Public Key to receiving States and
Organizations maintaining its authenticity and integrity. The issuing State or Organization
must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Document Signer Key Pair and ensure the
secrecy of the Document Signer Private Keys, (ii) sign Document Security Objects of
genuine MRTD in a secure operational environment only and (iii) distribute the Certificate
of the Document Signer Public Key to receiving States and Organizations. The digital
signature in the Document Security Object relates to all data in the data in EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16 if stored in the LDS according to [11].
OE.BAC-Keys Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys
The Document Basic Access Control Keys being generated and imported by the issuing
State or Organization have to provide sufficient cryptographic strength. As a
consequence of the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [11] the Document Basic Access Control Keys are
derived from a defined subset of the individual printed MRZ data. It has to be ensured
that these data provide sufficient entropy to withstand any attack based on the decision
that the inspection system has to derive Document Basic Access Keys from the printed
MRZ data with enhanced basic attack potential.
OE.Active_Auth_Key Active Authentication Key
The issuing State or Organization may establish the necessary public key infrastructure
in order to:
• Generate the MRTD’s Active Authentication Key Pair,
• Sign and store the Active Authentication Public Key in the Active Authentication
Public Key data in EF.DG15 and
• Support inspection systems of receiving States or Organizations to verify the
authenticity of the MRTD’s chip used for genuine MRTD by certification of the Active
Authentication Public Key by means of the Document Security Object
4.2.2 Receiving State or Organization
The receiving State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the
TOE environment.
OE.Exam_MRTD Examination of the MRTD passport book
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization must examine the MRTD
presented by the traveler to verify its authenticity by means of the physical security
measures and to detect any manipulation of the physical MRTD. The Basic Inspection
System for global interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing Public Key and the
Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organization, and (ii) implements
the terminal part of the Basic Access Control [11].
OE.Exam_MRTD_AA Examination of the MRTD passport book using Active
Authentication
During examination of the MRTD presented by the traveler, the basic inspection system
may follow the Active Authentication Protocol to verify the authenticity of the presented
MRTD’s chip.
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif Verification by Passive Authentication
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 28 of 78
The border control officer of the receiving State uses the inspection system to verify the
traveler as MRTD holder. The inspection systems must have successfully verified the
signature of Document Security Objects and the integrity data elements of the logical
MRTD before they are used. The receiving States and Organizations must manage the
Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key maintaining their
authenticity and availability in all inspection systems.
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD Protection of data from the logical MRTD
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization ensures the confidentiality
and integrity of the data read from the logical MRTD. The receiving State examining the
logical MRTD being under Basic Access Control will use inspection systems which
implement the terminal part of the Basic Access Control and use the secure messaging
with fresh generated keys for the protection of the transmitted data (i.e. Basic Inspection
Systems).
4.3 Security objectives rationale
All the security objectives described in the ST are traced back to items described in the
TOE security environment and any items in the TOE security environment are covered
by those security objectives appropriately.
4.3.1 Security Objectives Coverage
The following able indicates that all security objectives of the TOE are traced back to
threats and/or organizational security policies and that all security objectives of the
environment are traced back to threats, organizational security policies and/or
assumptions.
Threats
Assumptions
Policies
/
Security
objectives
OT.AC_Pers
OT.Data_Int
OT.Data_Conf
OT.Identification
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfunction
OT.AA_Proof
OE.MRTD_Manufact
OE.MRTD_Delivery
OE.Personalization
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
OE.BAC-Keys
OE.Exam_MRTD
OE.Exam_MRTD_AA
OE.Active_Auth_Key
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
T.Chip_ID X X
T.Skimming X X
T.Eavesdropping X
T.Forgery X X X X X X
T.Counterfeit X X X X X X X
T.Abuse-Func X X
T.Information_Leakage X
T.Phys-Tamper X
T.Malfunction X
P.Manufact X
P.Personalization X X X
P.Personal_Data X X
A.MRTD_Manufact X
A.MRTD_Delivery X
A.Pers_Agent X
A.Pers_Agent_AA X
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 29 of 78
Threats
Assumptions
Policies
/
Security
objectives
OT.AC_Pers
OT.Data_Int
OT.Data_Conf
OT.Identification
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfunction
OT.AA_Proof
OE.MRTD_Manufact
OE.MRTD_Delivery
OE.Personalization
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
OE.BAC-Keys
OE.Exam_MRTD
OE.Exam_MRTD_AA
OE.Active_Auth_Key
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
A.Insp_Sys X X
A.Insp_Sys_AA X
A.BAC-Keys X
Table 6. Security Environment to Security Objectives Mapping
4.3.2 Security Objectives Sufficiency
Policies and Security Objective Sufficiency
The OSP P.Manufact “Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip” requires a unique
identification of the IC by means of the Initialization Data and the writing of the Pre-
personalization Data as being fulfilled by OT.Identification.
The OSP P.Personalization “Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or
Organization only” addresses the (i) the enrolment of the logical MRTD by the
Personalization Agent as described in the security objective for the TOE environment
OE.Personalization “Personalization of logical MRTD”, and (ii) the access control for the
user data and TSF data as described by the security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access
Control for Personalization of logical MRTD”. Note the manufacturer equips the TOE with
the Personalization Agent Key(s) according to OT.Identification “Identification and
Authentication of the TOE”. The security objective OT.AC_Pers limits the management of
TSF data and management of TSF to the Personalization Agent.
The OSP P.Personal_Data “Personal data protection policy” requires the TOE (i) to
support the protection of the confidentiality of the logical MRTD by means of the Basic
Access Control and (ii) enforce the access control for reading as decided by the issuing
State or Organization. This policy is implemented by the security objectives OT.Data_Int
“Integrity of personal data” describing the unconditional protection of the integrity of the
stored data and during transmission. The security objective OT.Data_Conf
“Confidentiality of personal data” describes the protection of the confidentiality.
Threats and Security Objective Sufficiency
The threat T.Chip_ID “Identification of MRTD’s chip” addresses the trace of the
MRTD movement by identifying remotely the MRTD’s chip through the physical
communication interface. This threat is countered as described by the security objective
OT.Identification by Basic Access Control using sufficiently strong derived keys as
required by the security objective for the environment OE.BAC-Keys.
The threat T.Skimming “Skimming digital MRZ data or the digital portrait” and
T.Eavesdropping “Eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and
inspection system” address the reading of the logical MRTD trough the physical
communication interface or listening the communication between the MRTD’s chip and a
terminal. This threat is countered by the security objective OT.Data_Conf “Confidentiality
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 30 of 78
of personal data” through Basic Access Control using sufficiently strong derived keys as
required by the security objective for the environment OE.BAC-Keys.
The threat T.Forgery “Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip” addresses the fraudulent
alteration of the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it. The security objective
OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD“ requires the TOE to
limit the write access for the logical MRTD to the trustworthy Personalization Agent (cf.
OE.Personalization). The TOE will protect the integrity of the stored logical MRTD
according the security objective OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” and
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering”. The examination of the
presented MRTD passport book according to OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the
MRTD passport book” shall ensure that passport book does not contain a sensitive chip
which may present the complete unchanged logical MRTD. The TOE environment will
detect partly forged logical MRTD data by means of digital signature which will be
created according to OE.Pass_Auth_Sign “Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature”
and verified by the inspection system according to OE.Passive_Auth_Verif “Verification
by Passive Authentication”.
The threat T.Abuse-Func “Abuse of Functionality” addresses attacks using the
MRTD’s chip as production material for the MRTD and misuse of the functions for
personalization in the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder to disclose or to
manipulate the logical MRTD. This threat is countered by OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
“Protection against Abuse of Functionality”. Additionally this objective is supported by the
security objective for the TOE environment: OE.Personalization “Personalization of
logical MRTD” ensuring that the TOE security functions for the initialization and the
personalization are disabled and the security functions for the operational state after
delivery to MRTD holder are enabled according to the intended use of the TOE.
The threats T.Information_Leakage “Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip”,
T.Phys-Tamper “Physical Tampering” and T.Malfunction “Malfunction due to
Environmental Stress” are typical for integrated circuits like smart cards under direct
attack with high attack potential. The protection of the TOE against these threats is
addressed by the directly related security objectives OT.Prot_Inf_Leak “Protection
against Information Leakage”, OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical
Tampering” and OT.Prot_Malfunction “Protection against Malfunctions”.
The threat T.Counterfeit “MRTD’s chip” addresses the attack of unauthorised copy or
reproduction of the genuine MRTD chip. This attack is thwarted by a set of objectives
that ensure that MRTD’s chip data are not copied from the TOE: OT.Prot_Abuse-Func,
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak, OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper, and OT.Prot_Malfunction. In addition, when
the MRTD supports Active Authentication, the TOE addresses additional protections
against this threat: OT.AA_Proof “Proof of MRTD’s chip authenticity by Active
Authentication”, OE.Exam_MRTD_AA “Examination of the MRTD passport book using
Active Authentication” and OE.Active_Auth_Key “Active Authentication Key” all
participate in the detection of counterfeit MRTD’s chip by the inspection system.
These objectives ensure that no data may be copied from the TOE.
Assumptions and Security Objective Sufficiency
The assumption A.MRTD_Manufact “MRTD manufacturing on step 5 to 6” is covered
by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.MRTD_Manufact “Protection of the
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 31 of 78
MRTD Manufacturing” that requires to use security procedures during all manufacturing
steps.
The assumption A.MRTD_Delivery “MRTD delivery during step 5 to 6” is covered by
the security objective for the TOE environment OE.MRTD_ Delivery “Protection of the
MRTD delivery” that requires to use security procedures during delivery steps of the
MRTD.
The assumption A.Pers_Agent “Personalization of the MRTD’s chip” is covered by
the security objective for the TOE environment OE.Personalization “Personalization of
logical MRTD” including the enrolment, the protection with digital signature and the
storage of the MRTD holder personal data.
The assumption A.Pers_Agent_AA “Personalization of the MRTD’s chip including
Active Authentication” is covered by the security objective for the TOE environment
OE.Personalization “Personalization of logical MRTD” including the protection with a
digital signature (SOD signing), the storage of the MRTD holder personal data and the
support of Active Authentication Protocol according to the decision of the issuing State or
Organization.
The examination of the MRTD passport book addressed by the assumption A.Insp_Sys
“Inspection Systems for global interoperability” is covered by the security objectives
for the TOE environment OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport book”.
The security objectives for the TOE environment OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD “Protection of
data from the logical MRTD” will require the Basic Inspection System to implement the
Basic Access Control and to protect the logical MRTD data during the transmission and
the internal handling.
The examination of the MRTD passport book addressed by the assumption
A.Insp_Sys_AA “Inspection Systems for global interoperability with Active
Authentication” is covered by the security objectives for the TOE environment
OE.Exam_MRTD_AA “Examination of the MRTD passport book using Active
Authentication” which requires the Basic Inspection System to implement and to enforce
Active Authentication of the MRTD as part of the MRTD’s inspection.
The assumption A.BAC-Keys “Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys”
is directly covered by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.BAC-Keys
“Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys” ensuring the sufficient key quality
to be provided by the issuing State or Organization.
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 32 of 78
5. Extended Components Definition (ASE_ECD)
This ST contains the following extended components defined as extensions to CC part 2
in the claimed PP [4]:
• SFR FAU_SAS ‘Audit data storage’
• SFR FCS_RND ‘Generation of random numbers’
• SFR FIA_API ‘Authentication Proof of Identity’
• SFR FMT_LIM ‘Limited capabilities and availability’
• SFR FPT_EMSEC.1 ‘TOE emanation’
5.1 Audit data storage (FAU_SAS)
To define the security functional requirements of the TOE, a sensitive family (FAU_SAS)
of the Class FAU (Security Audit) is defined here. This family describes the functional
requirements for the storage of audit data. It has a more general approach than
FAU_GEN, because it does not necessarily require the data to be generated by the TOE
itself and because it does not give specific details of the content of the audit records.
The family “Audit data storage (FAU_SAS)” is specified as follows.
FAU_SAS Audit data storage
Family behavior
This family defines functional requirements for the storage of audit data.
Component leveling:
FAU_SAS.1 Requires the TOE to provide the possibility to store audit data.
Management: FAU_SAS.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FAU_SAS.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorized users] with the
capability to store [assignment: list of audit information] in the
audit records.
FAU_SAS Audit data storage 1
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 33 of 78
5.2 Generation of random numbers (FCS_RND)
To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE, a sensitive family
(FCS_RND) of the Class FCS (cryptographic support) is defined here. This family
describes the functional requirements for random number generation used for
cryptographic purposes. The component FCS_RND is not limited to generation of
cryptographic keys unlike the component FCS_CKM.1. The similar component
FIA_SOS.2 is intended for non-cryptographic use.
The family “Generation of random numbers (FCS_RND)” is specified as follows.
FCS_RND Generation of random numbers
Family behavior
This family defines quality requirements for the generation of random numbers which are
intended to be used for cryptographic purposes.
Component leveling:
FCS_RND.1 Generation of random numbers requires that random numbers meet a
defined quality metric.
Management: FCS_RND.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FCS_RND.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random
numbers that meet [assignment: a defined quality metric].
FCS_RND Generation of random numbers 1
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 34 of 78
5.3 Authentication Proof of Identity (FIA_API)
To describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family
(FIA_API) of the Class FIA (Identification and authentication) is defined here. This family
describes the functional requirements for the proof of the claimed identity for the
authentication verification by an external entity where the other families of the class FIA
address the verification of the identity of an external entity.
Application note: The other families of the Class FIA describe only the authentication
verification of users’ identity performed by the TOE and do not describe the functionality
of the user to prove their identity. The following paragraph defines the family FIA_API in
the style of the Common Criteria part 2 (cf. [3]], chapter “Extended Components definition
(ASE_ECD)”) from a TOE point of view.
FIA_API Authentication Proof of Identity
Family behavior
This family defines functions provided by the TOE to prove their identity and to be
verified by an external entity in the TOE IT environment.
Component leveling:
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity.
Management: FIA_API.1
The following actions could be considered for the management
functions in FMT: Management of authentication information used to
prove the claimed identity.
Audit: FIA_API.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_API.1.1 The TSF shall provide a [assignment: authentication mechanism]
to prove the identity of the [assignment: authorized user or role].
FIA_API Authentication Proof of Identity 1
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 35 of 78
5.4 Limited capabilities and availability (FMT_LIM)
The family FMT_LIM describes the functional requirements for the Test Features of the
TOE.
The new functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because this class
addresses the management of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical
mechanism used in the TOE show that no other class is appropriate to address the
specific issues of preventing the abuse of functions by limiting the capabilities of the
functions and by limiting their availability.
The family “Limited capabilities and availability (FMT_LIM)” is specified as follows.
FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability
Family behavior
This family defines requirements that limit the capabilities and availability of functions in a
combined manner. Note, that FDP_ACF restricts the access to functions whereas the
Limited capability of this family requires the functions themselves to be designed in a
specific manner.
Component leveling:
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities requires that the TSF is built to provide only the
capabilities (perform action, gather information) necessary for its
genuine purpose.
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability requires that the TSF restrict the use of functions
(refer to Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)). This can be achieved, for
instance, by removing or by disabling functions in a specific phase of
the TOE’s lifecycle.
Management: FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family
(FMT_LIM) of the Class FMT (Security Management) is defined here. This family
describes the functional requirements for the Test Features of the TOE. The new
functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because this class addresses the
management of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical mechanism used in
the TOE show that no other class is appropriate to address the specific issues of
preventing the abuse of functions by limiting the capabilities of the functions and by
limiting their availability.
The TOE Functional Requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” is specified as
follows.
FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability
1
2
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 36 of 78
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their
capabilities so that in conjunction with “Limited availability
(FMT_LIM.2)” the following policy is enforced [assignment:
Limited capability and availability policy].
The TOE Functional Requirement “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” is specified as
follows.
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their
availability so that in conjunction with “Limited capabilities
(FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is enforced [assignment:
Limited capability and availability policy].
Application note: The functional requirements FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 assume that
there are two types of mechanisms (limited capabilities and limited availability) which
together shall provide protection in order to enforce the policy. This also allows that:
i. the TSF is provided without restrictions in the product in its user
environment but its capabilities are so limited that the policy is enforced
or conversely
ii. the TSF is designed with test and support functionality that is removed
from, or disabled in, the product prior to the Operational Use Phase.
The combination of both requirements shall enforce the policy.
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 37 of 78
5.5 TOE emanation (FPT_EMSEC.1)
The sensitive family FPT_EMSEC (TOE Emanation) of the Class FPT (Protection of the
TSF) is defined here to describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE. The
TOE shall prevent attacks against the TOE and other secret data where the attack is
based on external observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Examples of such
attacks are evaluation of TOE’s electromagnetic radiation, simple power analysis (SPA),
differential power analysis (DPA), timing attacks, etc. This family describes the functional
requirements for the limitation of intelligible emanations which are not directly addressed
by any other component of CC part 2 [2].
The family “TOE Emanation (FPT_EMSEC)” is specified as follows.
FPT_EMSEC TOE Emanation
Family behavior
This family defines requirements to mitigate intelligible emanations.
Component leveling:
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation has two constituents:
FPT_EMSEC.1.1 Limit of Emissions requires to not emit intelligible emissions enabling
access to TSF data or user data.
FPT_EMSEC.1.2 Interface Emanation requires not to emit interface emanation enabling
access to TSF data or user data.
Management: FPT_EMSEC.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FPT_EMSEC.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_EMSEC.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in
excess of [assignment: specified limits] enabling access to
[assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of
types of user data].
FPT_EMSEC.1.2 The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to
use the following interface [assignment: type of connection] to
gain access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and
[assignment: list of types of user data].
FPT_EMSEC TOE emanation 1
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 38 of 78
6. Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)
This chapter gives the security functional requirements and the security assurance
requirements for the TOE.
Some security functional requirements represent extensions to [2].
Operations for assignment, selection and refinement have been made and are
designated by an underline (e.g. none), in addition, where operations that were
uncompleted in the PP [4] are also identified by italic underlined type.
The TOE security assurance requirements statement given in section 6.2 is drawn from
the security assurance components from Common Criteria part 3 [3].
The definition of the subjects “Manufacturer”, “Personalization Agent”, “Basic Inspection
System” and “Terminal” used in the following chapter is given in section 3.2. Note, that all
these subjects are acting for homonymous external entities. All used objects are defined
in section 9. The operations “write”, “read”, “modify”, and “disable read access” are used
in accordance with the general linguistic usage. The operations “transmit”, “receive” and
“authenticate” are originally taken from [2].
Definition of security attributes:
Security
attribute
Values Meaning
Terminal
authentication
status
none (any
Terminal)
default role (i.e. without authorisation after start-
up)
Basic Inspection
System
Terminal is authenticated as Basic Inspection
System after successful Authentication in
accordance with the definition in rule 2 of
FIA_UAU.5.2.
Personalisation
Agent
Terminal is authenticated as Personalisation
Agent after successful Authentication in
accordance with the definition in rule 1 of
FIA_UAU.5.2.
The following table provides an overview of the keys used:
Name Data
Active
Authentication
Key Pair
The Active Authentication asymmetric Key Pair (KPrAA, KPuAA) is
used for the Active Authentication Protocol: allowing the chip to be
authenticated as genuine by the inspection system.
Active
Authentication
Private Key
(KPrAA)
The Active Authentication Private Key (KPrAA) is used by the TOE
to be authenticated as a genuine MRTD’s chip by the inspection
system. It is part of the TSF data.
Active
Authentication
Public Key
(KPuAA)
The Active Authentication Public Key (KPuAA) is stored in the
EF.DG15 Active Authentication Public Key of the TOE’s logical
MRTD and used by the inspection system for Active Authentication
of the MRTD’s chip. It is part of the user data provided by the TOE
for the IT environment.
Country Signing
Certification
Country Signing Certification Authority of the issuing State or
Organization signs the Document Signer Public Key Certificate with
the Country Signing Certification Authority Private Key and the
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 39 of 78
Name Data
Authority Key
Pair
signature will be verified by receiving State or Organization (e.g. a
Basic Inspection System) with the Country Signing Certification
Authority Public Key.
Document
Signer Key
Pairs
Document Signer of the issuing State or Organization signs the
Document Security Object of the logical MRTD with the Document
Signer Private Key and the signature will be verified by a Basic
Inspection Systems of the receiving State or Organization with the
Document Signer Public Key.
Document Basic
Access Keys
The Document Basic Access Key is created by the Personalization
Agent, loaded to the TOE, and used for mutual authentication and
key agreement for secure messaging between the Basic Inspection
System and the MRTD’s chip.
BAC Session
Keys
Secure messaging TDES key and Retail-MAC key agreed between
the TOE and a Basic Inspection System in result of the Basic
Access Control Authentication Protocol.
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 40 of 78
6.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements
6.1.1 Security Audit (FAU)
Audit Storage (FAU_SAS.1)
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide the Manufacturer with the capability to
store the IC Identification Data in the audit records.
Application note: The Manufacturer role is the default user identity assumed by the
TOE in the Phase 2 Manufacturing. The IC manufacturer and the MRTD manufacturer in
the Manufacturer role write the Initialization Data and/or Pre-personalization Data as TSF
Data of the TOE. The audit records are write-only-once data of the MRTD’s chip (see
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS).
6.1.2 Cryptographic support (FCS)
Function Algorithm Key Size(s)
Basic Access Authentication TDES CBC 112 bits
Active
Authentication
Signature
generation
RSA signature based
on ISO9796-2 scheme
1 [13]
1024, 1280, 1536,
2048
Secure Messaging ENC/DEC TDES CBC 112 bits
MAC Retail MAC 112 bits
Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)
→ Generation of Document Basic Access Keys by the TOE
FCS_CKM.1.1/
BAC
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm Document Basic
Access Key Derivation Algorithm and specified cryptographic key
sizes 112 bit that meet the following: [12], normative appendix 5.
Application note: The TOE is equipped with the Document Basic Access Key generated
and downloaded by the Personalization Agent. The Basic Access Control Authentication
Protocol described in [12], normative appendix 5, A5.2, produces agreed parameters to
generate the Triple- DES (TDES) key and the Retail-MAC message authentication keys
for secure messaging by the algorithm in [12], Normative appendix A5.1. The algorithm
uses the random number RND.ICC generated by TSF as required by FCS_RND.1.
→ Generation of Active Authentication Key Pair by the TOE
FCS_CKM.1.1/
KP
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm RSA key pair
generation and specified cryptographic key sizes RSA 1024-
1280-1536-2048 bits that meet the following: PKCS#1 v1.5 as per
Algorithms and parameters for algorithms [17].
Application note: The component FMT_MTD.1/AAPK defines an operation “create” that
means that the Active Authentication Private Key is generated by the TOE itself. This
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 41 of 78
resulted in this instantiation of the component FCS_CKM.1 as SFR for this key
generation.
Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key destruction method zeroization that
meets the following: none.
Application note: The TOE shall destroy the TDES encryption key and the Retail-MAC
message authentication keys for secure messaging.
Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)
→ Hashing for Key Derivation
FCS_COP.1.1/
SHA
The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm SHA-1 or SHA-256 and cryptographic key
sizes none that meet the following: FIPS 180-2 [14].
Application note: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the hash function SHA-1
for the cryptographic primitive of the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism
(see also FIA_UAU.4) according to [12].
→ SM Encrypt/Decrypt
FCS_COP.1.1/
ENC
The TSF shall perform secure messaging (BAC) – encryption and
decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
TDES in CBC mode and cryptographic key sizes 112 bit that meet
the following: FIPS 46-3 [15] and [12]; normative appendix 5, A5.3.
Application note: The TOE implements the cryptographic primitives (e.g. TDES) for
secure messaging with encryption of the transmitted data. The keys are agreed
between the TOE and the terminal as part of the Chip Authentication Protocol
according to the FCS_CKM.1. Furthermore the SFR is used for authentication
attempts of a terminal as Personalization Agent by means of the symmetric
authentication mechanism.
→ Authentication
FCS_COP.1.1/
AUTH
The TSF shall perform symmetric authentication – encryption and
decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
TDES and cryptographic key sizes 112 bits that meet the following:
FIPS 46-3 [15].
Application note: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic
primitive for authentication attempt of a terminal as Personalization Agent by means
of the symmetric authentication mechanism (cf. FIA_UAU.4).
→ SM - MAC
FCS_COP.1.1/
MAC
The TSF shall perform secure messaging – message
authentication code in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm Retail MAC and cryptographic key sizes 112 bits that
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 42 of 78
meet the following: ‘ISO 9797 (MAC algorithm 3, block cipher DES,
Sequence Message Counter, padding mode 2).
Application note: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic
primitive for secure messaging with encryption and message authentication code
over the transmitted data. The key is agreed between the TSF by the Basic Access
Control Authentication Mechanism according to the FCS_CKM.1 and FIA_UAU.4.
→ Signature generation
FCS_COP.1.1/
SIG_GEN
The TSF shall perform digital signature generation in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm RSA and cryptographic
key sizes RSA 1024-1280-1536-2048 bits that meet the following:
ISO/IEC 9796-2 [13].
Application note: For signature generation in the Active Authentication mechanism,
the TOE uses ISO/IEC 9796-2 compliant cryptography (scheme 1).
Random Number Generation (FCS_RND.1)
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers
that meet AIS31 class DRG.3.
Application note: This SFR requires the TOE to generate random numbers used for
the authentication protocols as required by FIA_UAU.4.
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 43 of 78
6.1.3 User data protection (FDP)
Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)
FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP on terminals
gaining write, read and modification access to data in the EF.COM,
EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD.
Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP to objects
based on the following:
1. Subjects:
a. Personalization Agent,
b. Basic Inspection System
c. Terminal,
2. Objects:
a. data EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
b. data in EF.COM,
c. data in EF.SOD,
3. Security attributes:
a. authentication status of terminals.
FDP_ACF.1.2
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an
operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is
allowed:
1. the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed
to write and to read the data of the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1
to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
2. the successfully authenticated Basic Inspection System is
allowed to read the data in EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1, EF.DG2
and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD.
FDP_ACF.1.3
The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects
based on the following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on
the rule:
1. Any terminal is not allowed to modify any of the EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD.
2. Any terminal is not allowed to read any of the EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD.
3. The Basic Inspection System is not allowed to read the data in
EF.DG3 and EF.DG4.
Application note: The inspection system needs special authentication and
authorization for read access to DG3 and DG4 not defined in this TOE (cf. [13] for
details).
Basic data exchange confidentiality (FDP_UCT.1)
Application note: FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1 require the protection of the User Data
transmitted from the TOE to the terminal by secure messaging with encryption and
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 44 of 78
message authentication codes after successful authentication of the terminal. The
authentication mechanisms as part of Basic Access Control Mechanism include the key
agreement for the encryption and the message authentication key to be used for secure
messaging.
FDP_UCT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP to be able to
transmit and receive user data in a manner protected from
unauthorised disclosure.
Data exchange integrity (FDP_UIT.1)
Application note: See application in FDP_UCT.1.
FDP_UIT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP to be able to
transmit and receive user data in a manner protected from
modification, deletion, insertion and replay errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2 The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data,
whether modification, deletion, insertion and replay has occurred.
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 45 of 78
6.1.4 Identification and authentication (FIA)
The following table provides an overview on the authentication mechanisms used:
Name SFR for the TOE Cryptography
Basic Access Control
Authentication
Mechanism
FIA_UAU.4,
FIA_UAU.6
TDES, 112 bit keys (cf.
FCS_COP.1/ENC) and Retail-MAC,
112 bit keys (cf. FCS_COP.1/MAC)
Symmetric
Authentication
Mechanism for
Personalization Agent
FIA_UAU.4 TDES with 112 bit keys (cf.
FCS_COP.1/AUTH)
Active Authentication FIA_API.1,
FIA_UAU.4
RSA signature based on ISO9796-2
scheme 1, with Keys 1024, 1280,
1536, 2048 bits (cf. FCS_COP.1.1/
SIG_GEN)
Authentication Failure handling (FIA_AFL.1)
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when an administrator configurable positive
integer within [0..255] of consecutive unsuccessful authentication
attempts occur related to failure of a BAC Authentication.
FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts
has been met, the TSF shall block the BAC cryptographic key.
Application note: The terminal challenge eIFD and the TSF response eICC are
described in [12], Appendix C. The refinement by inclusion of the word “consecutive”
allows the TSF to return to normal operation of the BAC authentication protocol
(without time out) after successful run of the BAC authentication protocol. The
unsuccessful authentication attempt shall be stored in non-volatile memory in the TOE
thus the “consecutive unsuccessful authentication attempts” are count independent on
power-on sessions but reset to zero after successful authentication only.
Authentication Proof of Identity (FIA_API.1)
FIA_API.1.1 The TSF shall provide an Active Authentication Protocol according
to [11] to prove the identity of the TOE.
Application note: The TOE may implement the Active Authentication Mechanism
specified in [11] Part 1 Appendix 4 to section IV. This mechanism is a challenge
response protocol where TOE challenge response is calculated being digital signature
over the terminal’s 8 bytes nonce.
Timing of authentication (FIA_UAU.1)
FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow
1. to read the Initialization Data in Phase 2 “Manufacturing”,
2. to read the random identifier in Phase 3 “Personalization of
the MRTD”,
3. to read the random identifier in Phase 4 “Operational Use”
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is
authenticated.
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 46 of 78
FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated
before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that
user.
Application note: The Basic Inspection System and the Personalization Agent
authenticate themselves.
Single-use authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.4)
FIA_UAU.4.1 The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism,
2. Authentication Mechanism based on TDES,
3. Active Authentication Protocol.
Application note: The authentication mechanisms may use either a challenge freshly
and randomly generated by the TOE to prevent reuse of a response generated by a
terminal in a successful authentication attempt. However, the authentication of
Personalisation Agent may rely on other mechanisms ensuring protection against
replay attacks, such as the use of an internal counter as a diversifier.
Application note: The Basic Access Control Mechanism is a mutual device
authentication mechanism defined in [12]. In the first step the terminal authenticates
itself to the MRTD’s chip and the MRTD’s chip authenticates to the terminal in the
second step. In this second step the MRTD’s chip provides the terminal with a
challenge-response-pair which allows a unique identification of the MRTD’s chip with
some probability depending on the entropy of the Document Basic Access Keys.
Therefore the TOE shall stop further communications if the terminal is not successfully
authenticated in the first step of the protocol to fulfil the security objective
OT.Identification and to prevent T.Chip_ID.
Multiple authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.5)
FIA_UAU.5.1 The TSF shall provide
1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism,
2. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on TDES
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2 The TSF shall authenticate any user’s claimed identity according to
the following rules:
1. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as
Personalization Agent by the Symmetric Authentication
Mechanism with Personalization Agent Key.
2. the TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Basic
Inspection System only by means of the Basic Access Control
Authentication Mechanism with the Document Basic Access
Keys
Application note: The Basic Access Control Mechanism includes the secure
messaging for all commands exchanged after successful authentication of the
inspection system. The Personalization Agent may use Symmetric Authentication
Mechanism without secure messaging mechanism as well if the personalization
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 47 of 78
environment prevents eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and
personalization terminal. The Basic Inspection System may use the Basic Access
Control Authentication Mechanism with the Document Basic Access Keys
Re-authenticating (FIA_UAU.6)
FIA_UAU.6.1 The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each
command sent to the TOE during a BAC mechanism based
communication after successful authentication of the terminal with
Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism.
Application note: The Basic Access Control Mechanism specified in [11] includes the
secure messaging for all commands exchanged after successful authentication of the
Inspection System. The TOE checks by secure messaging in MAC_ENC mode each
command based on Retail-MAC whether it was sent by the successfully authenticated
terminal (see FCS_COP.1/MAC for further details). The TOE does not execute any
command with incorrect message authentication code. Therefore the TOE re-
authenticates the user for each received command and accepts only those commands
received from the previously authenticated BAC user.
Application note: Note that in case the TOE should also fulfil [5] the BAC
communication might be followed by a Chip Authentication mechanism establishing a
new secure messaging that is distinct from the BAC based communication. In this
case the condition in FIA_UAU.6 above should not contradict to the option that
commands are sent to the TOE that are no longer meeting the BAC communication
but are protected by a more secure communication channel established after a more
advanced authentication process.
Timing of identification (FIA_UID.1)
FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow
1. to read the Initialization Data in Phase 2 “Manufacturing”,
2. to read the random identifier in Phase 3 “Personalization of the
MRTD”,
3. to read the random identifier in Phase 4 “Operational Use”
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Application note: The IC manufacturer and the MRTD manufacturer write the
Initialization Data and/or Pre-personalization Data in the audit records of the IC during
the Phase 2 “Manufacturing”. The audit records can be written only in the Phase 2
Manufacturing of the TOE. At this time the Manufacturer is the only user role available
for the TOE. The MRTD manufacturer may create the user role Personalization Agent
for transition from Phase 2 to Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”. The users in
role Personalization Agent identify themselves by means of selecting the
authentication key. After personalization in the Phase 3 (i.e. writing the digital MRZ
and the Document Basic Access Keys) the user role Basic Inspection System is
created by writing the Document Basic Access Keys. The Basic Inspection System is
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 48 of 78
identified as default user after power up or reset of the TOE i.e. the TOE will use the
Document Basic Access Key to authenticate the user as Basic Inspection System.
Application note: In the “Operational Use” phase the MRTD must not allow anybody
to read the ICCSN, the MRTD identifier or any other unique identification before the
user is authenticated as Basic Inspection System (cf. T.Chip_ID). Note that the
terminal and the MRTD’s chip use a randomly chosen identifier for the communication
channel to allow the terminal to communicate with more than one RFID. This identifier
is randomly selected and it does not violate the OT.Identification.
6.1.5 Security management (FMT)
Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities
so that in conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the
following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow,
1. User Data to be disclosed or manipulated
2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
3. software to be reconstructed and
4. substantial information about construction of TSF to be
gathered which may enable other attacks.
Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability
so that in conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the
following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow,
1. User Data to be disclosed or manipulated,
2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
3. software to be reconstructed and
4. substantial information about construction of TSF to be
gathered
5. which may enable other attacks.
Application note: The formulation of “Deploying Test Features …” in FMT_LIM.2.1
might be a little bit misleading since the addressed features are no longer available
(e.g. by disabling or removing the respective functionality). Nevertheless the
combination of FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 is introduced to provide an optional
approach to enforce the same policy.
Note that the term “software” in item 3 of FMT_LIM.1.1 and FMT_LIM.2.1 refers to
both IC Dedicated and IC Embedded Software.
Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1)
→ Writing of Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 49 of 78
FMT_MTD.1.1/
INI_ENA
The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Initialization Data and
Pre-personalization Data to the Manufacturer.
Application note: The pre-personalization Data includes but is not limited to the
authentication reference data for the Personalization Agent which is the symmetric
cryptographic Personalization Agent Key.
→ Disabling of Read Access to Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data
FMT_MTD.1.1/
INI_DIS
The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable read access for users to
the Initialization Data to the Personalization Agent.
Application note: According to P.Manufact the IC Manufacturer and the MRTD
Manufacturer are the default users assumed by the TOE in the role Manufacturer
during the Phase 2 “Manufacturing” but the TOE is not requested to distinguish
between these users within the role Manufacturer. The TOE may restrict the ability to
write the Initialization Data and the Pre-personalization Data by (i) allowing to write
these data only once and (ii) blocking the role Manufacturer at the end of the Phase 2.
The IC Manufacturer may write the Initialization Data which includes but are not limited
to the IC Identifier as required by FAU_SAS.1. The Initialization Data provides a
unique identification of the IC which is used to trace the IC in the Phase 2 and 3
“personalization” but is not needed and may be misused in the Phase 4 “Operational
Use”. Therefore the external read access shall be blocked. The MRTD Manufacturer
will write the Pre-personalization Data.
→ Key Write
FMT_MTD.1.1/
KEY_WRITE
The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Document Basic
Access Keys to the Personalization Agent.
Application note: The Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key is the TSF
data for verification of the certificates of the Document Verifier and the Extended
Inspection Systems including the access rights for the Extended Access Control.
→ Key Read
FMT_MTD.1.1/
KEY_READ
The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the Document Basic
Access Keys, Active Authentication Private Key and
Personalization Agent Keys to none.
Application note: The Personalization Agent generates, stores and ensures the
correctness of the Document Basic Access Keys.
→ Active Authentication Private Key
FMT_MTD.1.1/
AAPK
The TSF shall restrict the ability to create the Active Authentication
Private Key to the Terminal.
Application note: The verb “create” means here that the Terminal (after successful
authentication of the Personalization Agent) is requesting the creation of the Active
Authentication Key on the TOE and is requesting the secure generation of the Active
Authentication Private Key by the TOE itself. See the instantiation of the component
FCS_CKM.1 as SFR for this key generation.
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 50 of 78
Specifications of Management Functions (FMT_SMF.1)
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security
management functions:
1. Initialization,
2. Pre-personalization,
3. Personalization,
4. Configuration.
Security roles (FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles
1. Manufacturer,
2. Personalization Agent,
3. Basic Inspection System.
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
6.1.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT)
TOE Emanation (FPT_EMSEC.1)
FPT_EMSEC.1.1 The TOE shall not emit information of IC Power consumption in
excess of State of the Art values enabling access to
Personalization Agent Key(s) and Active Authentication Private
Key.
FPT_EMSEC.1.2 The TSF shall ensure any users are unable to use the following
interface smart card circuit contacts to gain access to
Personalization Agent Key(s) and Active Authentication Private
Key.
Application note: The TOE prevents attacks against the listed secret data where the
attack is based on external observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Such attacks
may be observable at the interfaces of the TOE or may be originated from internal
operation of the TOE or may be caused by an attacker that varies the physical
environment under which the TOE operates. The set of measurable physical
phenomena is influenced by the technology employed to implement the smart card.
The MRTD’s chip provides a smart card contactless interface but may have also (not
used by the terminal but maybe by an attacker) sensitive contacts according to
ISO/IEC 7816-2 as well. Examples of measurable phenomena include, but are not
limited to variations in the power consumption, the timing of signals and the
electromagnetic radiation due to internal operations or data transmissions.
Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)
FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of
failures occur:
1. Exposure to out-of-range operating conditions where therefore
a malfunction could occur,
2. failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.1.
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 51 of 78
Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)
FPT_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist Physical manipulation and physical probing to
the TSF by responding automatically such that the SFRs are
always enforced.
Application note: The TOE implements appropriate measures to continuously
counter physical manipulation and physical probing. Due to the nature of these attacks
(especially manipulation) the TOE can by no means detect attacks on all of its
elements. Therefore, permanent protection against these attacks is required ensuring
that the TSP could not be violated at any time. Hence, “automatic response” means
here (i) assuming that there might be an attack at any time and (ii) countermeasures
are provided at any time.
Application note: The SFRs “Non-bypassability of the TSF FPT_RVM.1” and “TSF
domain separation FPT_SEP.1” are no longer part of [2]. These requirements are now
an implicit part of the assurance requirement ADV_ARC.1.
TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests during initial start-up to
demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify
the integrity of TSF data.
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify
the integrity of stored TSF executable code.
Application note: self test for the verification of the integrity of stored TSF executable
code are executed during initial start-up in the Phase 3 “Personalization” and Phase 4
“Operational Use”.
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 52 of 78
6.2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements
TOE Security Assurance Requirements as stated in section 6.2 of the claimed PP [4].
The augmentations compared to the CC V3.1 package for EAL4 are:
• ADV_FSP: augmented from 4 to 5
• ADV_INT: added at level 2
• ADV_TDS: augmented from 3 to 4
• ALC_CMS: augmented from 4 to 5
• ALC_DVS: augmented from 1 to 2
• ALC_TAT: augmented from 1 to 2
• ATE_DPT: augmented from 1 to 3
6.2.1 SARs Measures
The assurance measures that satisfy the TOE security assurance requirements are the
following:
Assurance Class Component Description
ADV:
Development
ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.5
Complete Semi-formal functional
specification with additional error
information
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_TDS.4 Semi-formal modular design
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC:
Lifecycle support
ALC_CMC.4
Production support, acceptance procedures
and automation
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined lifecycle model
ALC_TAT.2
Compliance with implementation
standards
ASE:
Security Target
evaluation
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 53 of 78
Assurance Class Component Description
ATE:
Test
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample
AVA:
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.3 Methodical vulnerability analysis
Table 7. Assurance Requirements: EAL 4 augmented
6.2.2 SARs Rationale
The EAL4 was chosen to permit a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources.
EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an
existing product line. EAL4 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or
users require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional
commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur sensitive security specific engineering costs.
Augmentation results from the selection of:
ADV_FSP.5 Complete Semi-formal functional specification with additional error
information
The selection of the component ADV_FSP.5 provides a better coverage of the functional
specification with semi-formal modelling and additional error information.
The component ADV_FSP.5 has the following dependencies: ADV_TDS.4 Semi-formal
modular design and ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF.
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
The selection of the component ADV_INT.2 provides additional information regarding the
TSF internals by analysing the complexity to justify it is well-structured.
The component ADV_INT.2 has the following dependencies: ADV_IMP.1 Implementation
representation of the TSF, ADV_TDS.4 Semi-formal modular design, and ALC_TAT.1
Well-defined development tools.
ADV_TDS.4 Semi-formal modular design
The selection of the component ADV_TDS.4 provides enhanced design of the TOE
introducing semi-formal modelling of the subsystems and differentiating the roles of the
modules regarding each TSF.
The component ADV_TDS.4 has the following dependency: ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-
formal functional specification with additional error information.
ALC_DVS.2 Life-cycle support- Sufficiency of security measures
The selection of the component ALC_DVS.2 provides a higher assurance of the security
of the MRTD’s development and manufacturing especially for the secure handling of the
MRTD’s material.
The component ALC_DVS.2 has no dependencies.
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 54 of 78
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
The selection of the component ALC_CMS.5 provides improved configuration
management by covering the development tools (compiler options, build options etc…).
The component ALC_CMS.5 has no dependencies.
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
The selection of the component ALC_TAT.2 provides additional information on the
implementation standards applied by the developer.
The component ALC_TAT.2 has the following dependency: ADV_IMP.1 Implementation
representation of the TSF.
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
The selection of the component ATE_DPT.3 provides improved testing depth by
requiring modular testing versus testing focused on the TSF-enforcing modules.
The component ATE_DPT.3 has the following dependencies: ADV_ARC.1 Security
architecture description, ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design, and ATE_FUN.1
Functional testing.
All of these are met or exceeded in the EAL4 assurance package.
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 55 of 78
6.3 Security Requirements Rationale
6.3.1 Security Requirement Coverage
The following able indicates the association of the SFRs and the SOs of the TOE. The
Security Requirements of the TOE correspond to at least one security objective of the
TOE. Moreover, some requirements correspond to the security objectives of the TOE in
combination with other objectives.
TOE Security Functional Requirement
/
TOE Security objectives
OT.AC_Pers
OT.Data_Int
OT.Data_Conf
OT.Identification
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfunction
OT.AA_Proof
FAU_SAS.1 X
FCS_CKM.1/ BAC X X X
FCS_CKM.1/ KP X
FCS_CKM.4 X X
FCS_COP.1/ SHA X X X X
FCS_COP.1/ ENC X X X
FCS_COP.1/ AUTH X X
FCS_COP.1/ MAC X X X
FCS_COP.1/ SIG_GEN X
FCS_RND.1 X X X
FDP_ACC.1 X X X
FDP_ACF.1 X X X
FDP_UCT.1 X X X
FDP_UIT.1 X X X
FIA_API.1 X
FIA_UID.1 X X
FIA_UAU.1 X X
FIA_UAU.4 X X X
FIA_UAU.5 X X X
FIA_UAU.6 X X X
FIA_AFL.1 X X
FMT_LIM.1 X
FMT_LIM.2 X
FMT_MTD.1/ INI_ENA X
FMT_MTD.1/ INI_DIS X
FMT_MTD.1/ KEY_WRITE X X X
FMT_MTD.1/ KEY_READ X X X
FMT_MTD.1/ AAPK X
FMT_SMF.1 X X X
FMT_SMR.1 X X X
FPT_EMSEC.1 X X
FPT_FLS.1 X X X
FPT_PHP.3 X X X
FPT_TST.1 X X
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 56 of 78
Table 8. Functional Requirement to TOE Security Objective Mapping
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 57 of 78
6.3.2 Security Requirements Sufficiency
TOE Security Requirements Sufficiency
OT.AC_Pers (Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD) addresses the
access control of the writing the logical MRTD. The write access to the logical MRTD
data are defined by the SFR FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 as follows: only the
successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write the data of the
groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD only once.
The authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent shall be performed by TSF
according to SRF FIA_UAU.4 and FIA_UAU.5. The Personalization Agent can be
authenticated either by using the BAC mechanism (FCS_CKM.1, FCS_COP.1/SHA,
FCS_RND.1 (for key generation), and FCS_COP.1/ENC as well as FCS_COP.1/MAC)
with the personalization key or for reasons of interoperability with the [4] by using the
symmetric authentication mechanism (FCS_COP.1/ AUTH).
In case of using the BAC mechanism the SFR FIA_UAU.6 describes the re-
authentication and FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1 the protection of the transmitted data by
means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_RND.1 (for key generation), and
FCS_COP.1/ENC as well as FCS_COP.1/MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode.
The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including Personalization Agent) and the SFR
FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions (including Personalization) setting the
Document Basic Access Keys according to the SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE as
authentication reference data. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ prevents read access
to the secret key of the Personalization Agent Keys and ensure together with the SFR
FCS_CKM.4, FPT_EMSEC.1, FPT_FLS.1 and FPT_PHP.3 the confidentially of these
keys.
OT.Data_Int (Integrity of personal data) requires the TOE to protect the integrity of the
logical MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip against physical manipulation and unauthorized
writing. The write access to the logical MRTD data is defined by the SFR FDP_ACC.1
and FDP_ACF.1 in the same way: only the Personalization Agent is allowed to write the
data of the groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD (FDP_ACF.1.2, rule 1) and
terminals are not allowed to modify any of the data groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the
logical MRTD (cf. FDP_ACF.1.4). The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including
Personalization Agent) and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions
(including Personalization). The authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent
shall be performed by TSF according to SRF FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.5 and FIA_UAU.6
using either FCS_COP.1/ENC and FCS_COP.1/MAC or FCS_COP.1/AUTH.
OT.Data_Int (Integrity of personal data) requires the TOE to ensure that the inspection
system is able to detect any modification of the transmitted logical MRTD data by means
of the BAC mechanism. The SFR FIA_UAU.6, FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1 requires the
protection of the transmitted data by means of secure messaging implemented by the
cryptographic functions according to FCS_CKM.1, FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_RND.1 (for
key generation), and FCS_COP.1/ENC and FCS_COP.1/MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode.
The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE requires the Personalization Agent to establish the
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 58 of 78
Document Basic Access Keys in a way that they cannot be read by anyone in
accordance to FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ.
OT.Identification (Identification and Authentication of the TOE) address the storage
of the IC Identification Data uniquely identifying the MRTD’s chip in its non-volatile
memory. This will be ensured by TSF according to SFR FAU_SAS.1.
Furthermore, the TOE shall identify itself only to a successful authenticated Basic
Inspection System in Phase 4 “Operational Use”. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA allows
only the Manufacturer to write Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data (including
the Personalization Agent key). The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS allows the
Personalization Agent to disable Initialization Data if their usage in the phase 4
“Operational Use” violates the security objective OT.Identification. The SFR FIA_UID.1
and FIA_UAU.1 do not allow reading of any data uniquely identifying the MRTD’s chip
before successful authentication of the Basic Inspection Terminal and will stop
communication after unsuccessful authentication attempt (cf. Application note 30). In
case of failed authentication attempts FIA_AFL.1 enforces additional waiting time
prolonging the necessary amount of time for facilitating a brute force attack.
OT.Data_Conf (Confidentiality of personal data) requires the TOE to ensure the
confidentiality of the logical MRTD data groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16. The SFR
FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 allow only those actions before identification respective
authentication which do not violate OT.Data_Conf. In case of failed authentication
attempts FIA_AFL.1 enforces additional waiting time prolonging the necessary amount of
time for facilitating a brute force attack. The read access to the logical MRTD data is
defined by the FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1.2: the successful authenticated
Personalization Agent is allowed to read the data of the logical MRTD (EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16). The successful authenticated Basic Inspection System is allowed to read the
data of the logical MRTD (EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16). The SFR
FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including Personalization Agent and Basic Inspection
System) and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions (including
Personalization for the key management for the Document Basic Access Keys).
The SFR FIA_UAU.4 prevents reuse of authentication data to strengthen the
authentication of the user. The SFR FIA_UAU.5 enforces the TOE to accept the
authentication attempt as Basic Inspection System only by means of the Basic Access
Control Authentication Mechanism with the Document Basic Access Keys. Moreover, the
SFR FIA_UAU.6 requests secure messaging after successful authentication of the
terminal with Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism which includes the
protection of the transmitted data in ENC_MAC_Mode by means of the cryptographic
functions according to FCS_COP.1/ENC and FCS_COP.1/MAC (cf. the SFR
FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1). (for key generation), and FCS_COP.1/ENC and
FCS_COP.1/MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode. The SFR FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4,
FCS_COP.1/SHA and FCS_RND.1 establish the key management for the secure
messaging keys. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE addresses the key management
and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ prevents reading of the Document Basic Access Keys.
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 59 of 78
Note, neither the security objective OT.Data_Conf nor the SFR FIA_UAU.5 requires the
Personalization Agent to use the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism or
secure messaging.
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func (Protection against Abuse of Functionality) is ensured by the
SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 which prevent misuse of test functionality of the TOE or
other features which may not be used after TOE Delivery.
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak (Protection against Information Leakage) requires the TOE to
protect confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the MRTD’s chip against
disclosure
• by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time
between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power
consumption, clock, or I/O lines, which is addressed by the SFR FPT_EMSEC.1,
• by forcing a malfunction of the TOE, which is addressed by the SFR FPT_FLS.1 and
FPT_TST.1, and/or
• by a physical manipulation of the TOE, which is addressed by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper (Protection against Physical Tampering) is covered by the
SFR FPT_PHP.3.
OT.Prot_Malfunction (Protection against Malfunctions) is covered by (i) the SFR
FPT_TST.1 which requires self tests to demonstrate the correct operation and tests of
authorized users to verify the integrity of TSF data and TSF code, and (ii) the SFR
FPT_FLS.1 which requires a secure state in case of detected failure or operating
conditions possibly causing a malfunction.
OT.AA_Proof (Proof of MRTD’s chip authenticity by Active Authentication) is
ensured by the Active Authentication Protocol provided by FIA_API.1 enforcing the
identification and authentication of the MRTD’s chip. The Active Authentication protocol
requires FCS_RND.1 (for the generation of the challenge), and FCS_COP.1/SHA (for the
host challenge hashing) and FCS_COP.1/SIG_GEN (for the signature generation). The
Active Authentication private Key is used. This TOE secret data is created during
Personalization (Phase 3) according to FCS_CKM.1/KP (for Key generation mechanism),
and by authorized agent as required by FMT_MTD.1/ AAPK.
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 60 of 78
7. TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS)
This set of TSFs manages the identification and/or authentication of the external user
and enforces role separation.
7.1 SF.Access Control
This function checks that for each operation initiated by a user, the security attributes for
user authorization and data communication required are satisfied.
7.2 SF.Card Personalization
This TSF provides Card initialization and pre-personalization services as per
GlobalPlatform. This includes but is not restricted to card initialization, patch loading,
applet installation and instantiation. This TSF also provides MRTD’s chip personalization
functions to allow the Personalization Agent to create and set the initial MRTD’s LDS
data.
7.3 SF.Personalizer Authentication
The Personalization Agent is authenticated by the TOE using its symmetric key, by which
the PA is able to read the random identifier in that phase.
7.4 SF.BAC Authentication
This TSF provides the Basic Access Control passive authentication protocol. The
Terminal is then allowed to select this authentication key and proceed with BAC.
7.5 SF.Active Authentication
Active Authentication is provided by this TSF based on the availability of DG15 in the
MRTD’s chip information data.
7.6 SF.Secure Messaging
Commands and responses are exchanged between the TOE and the external device.
This TSF provides a secure mean for the terminal and the card to exchange data.
7.7 SF.Crypto
This Security Function is responsible for providing cryptographic support to all the other
Security Functions including secure key generation, secure random generator, and data
hashing.
7.8 SF.Protection
This Security Function is responsible for protection of the TSF data, user data, and TSF
functionality.
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 61 of 78
8. Additional Rationale
8.1 Dependencies Rationale
8.1.1 SFR Dependencies
Requirement Dependencies
Functional Requirements
FAU_SAS.1 No dependencies
FCS_CKM.1/ BAC FCS_COP.1/MAC, FCS_COP.1/ENC, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/ KP FCS_COP.1/SIG_GEN, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.4 FCS_CKM.1/BAC, FCS_CKM.1/KP
FCS_COP.1/ SHA
FCS_CKM.4, unsupported dependencies, see 8.1.3 for
justification
FCS_COP.1/ ENC FCS_CKM.1/BAC, FCS_CKM.1/KP, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/ AUTH unsupported dependencies, see 8.1.3 for justification
FCS_COP.1/ MAC FCS_CKM.1/BAC, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/
SIG_GEN
FCS_CKM.1/BAC, FCS_CKM.1/KP, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_RND.1 No dependencies
FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACC.1, unsupported dependencies, see 8.1.3 for
justification
FDP_UCT.1
FDP_ACC.1, unsupported dependencies, see 8.1.3 for
justification
FDP_UIT.1
FDP_ACC.1, unsupported dependencies, see 8.1.3 for
justification
FIA_AFL.1 FIA_UAU.1
FIA_API.1 No dependencies
FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UID.1
FIA_UAU.4 No dependencies
FIA_UAU.5 No dependencies
FIA_UAU.6 No dependencies
FIA_UID.1 No dependencies
FMT_LIM.1 FMT_LIM.2
FMT_LIM.2 FMT_LIM.1
FMT_MTD.1/ AAPK FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/
INI_ENA
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/
INI_DIS
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/
KEY_WRITE
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/
KEY_READ
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1 No dependencies
FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1
FPT_EMSEC.1 No dependencies
FPT_FLS.1 No dependencies
FPT_PHP.3 No dependencies
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 62 of 78
FPT_TST.1 No dependencies
Table 9. SFR Dependencies
8.1.2 SAR Dependencies
The functional and assurance requirements dependencies for the TOE are completely
fulfilled.
Requirement Dependencies
ADV_ARC.1 ADV_FSP.5, ADV_TDS.4
ADV_FSP.5 ADV_TDS.4, ADV_IMP.1
ADV_IMP.1 ADV_TDS.4, ALC_TAT.2
ADV_INT.2 ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.4, ALC_TAT.2
ADV_TDS.4 ADV_FSP.5
AGD_OPE.1 ADV_FSP.5
AGD_PRE.1 No dependencies
ALC_CMC.4 ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1
ALC_CMS.5 No dependencies
ALC_DEL.1 No dependencies
ALC_DVS.2 No dependencies
ALC_LCD.1 No dependencies
ALC_TAT.2 ADV_IMP.1
ASE_CCL.1 ASE_ECD.1, ASE_INT.1, ASE_REQ.2
ASE_ECD.1 No dependencies
ASE_INT.1 No dependencies
ASE_OBJ.2 ASE_SPD.1
ASE_REQ.2 ASE_ECD.1, ASE_OBJ.2
ASE_SPD.1 No dependencies
ASE_TSS.1 ADV_FSP.5, ASE_INT.1, ASE_REQ.2
ATE_COV.2 ADV_FSP.5, ATE_FUN.1
ATE_DPT.3 ADV_ARC.1, ADV_TDS.4, ATE_FUN.1
ATE_FUN.1 ATE_COV.2
ATE_IND.2 ADV_FSP.5, AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1, ATE_COV.2, ATE_FUN.1
AVA_VAN.3
ADV_ARC.1, ADV_FSP.5, ADV_TDS.4, ADV_IMP.1, AGD_OPE.1,
AGD_PRE.1
Table 10. SAR Dependencies
8.1.3 Justification of Unsupported Dependencies
The security functional dependencies for the TOE are not completely supported:
FCS_COP.1/
SHA
The hash algorithm required by the SFR FCS_COP.1/SHA does
not need any key material. Therefore neither a key generation
(FCS_CKM.1) nor an import (FDP_ITC.1/2) is necessary.
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 63 of 78
FCS_COP.1/
AUTH
The SFR FCS_COP.1/AUTH uses the symmetric Personalization
Key permanently stored during the Pre-Personalization process (cf.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA) by the manufacturer. Thus there is neither
the necessity to generate or import a key during the addressed
TOE lifecycle by the means of FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC. Since the
key is permanently stored within the TOE there is no need for
FCS_CKM.4, too.
FDP_ACF.1
The access control TSF according to FDP_ACF.1 uses security
attributes which are defined during the personalization and are
fixed over the whole life time of the TOE. No management of these
security attributes (i.e. SFR FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.3) is
necessary here.
FDP_UCT.1
The SFR FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1 require the use secure
messaging between the MRTD and the GIS. There is no need for
the SFR FTP_ITC.1, e.g. to require this communication channel to
be logically distinct from other communication channels since there
is only one channel. Since the TOE does not provide a direct
human interface a trusted path as required by FTP_TRP.1 is not
applicable here.
FDP_UIT.1
Table 11. Unsupported Dependencies
8.2 TOE Summary Specifications Rationale
8.2.1 Rationale for assurance measures
Each assurance requirement is covered by an assurance measure.
Assurance Requirements
/
Assurance Measures
AM_ADV
AM_AGD
AM_ALC
AM_ATE
AM_AVA
ADV x
AGD x
ALC x
ATE x
AVA x
Table 12. Mapping Assurance Requirements to Assurance Measures
8.3 Rationale for Extensions
Extensions are based on the Protection Profile [4] and have all been adopted by the
developer of the TOE:
• FAU_SAS.1 ‘Audit data storage’
• FCS_RND.1 ‘Generation of random numbers’
• FIA_API.1 ‘Authentication Proof of Identity’
• FPT_EMSEC.1 ‘TOE emanation’
• FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 ‘limited capability and availability’
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 64 of 78
8.4 PP Claim Rationale
This ST includes all the security objectives and requirements claimed by PP [4] and all of
the operations applied to the SFRs are in accordance with the requirements of this PP.
8.4.1 PP Additions
Some SFRs have been added to the set of SFRs proposed by PP [4].
The following SFRs have been added in relation to the addition of Active Authentication:
• FCS_CKM.1/KP: AA Key Pair generation
• FCS_COP.1/SIG_GEN: Data Signature Generation using the AA Private Key
• FIA_API.1: Active Authentication Protocol
• FMT_MTD.1/AAPK: AA Keys access control
8.4.2 PP compliancy
The TOE type is compliant with the claimed PP: the TOE is an ICAO MRTD’s chip
providing all means of identification and authentication of the TOE itself, the MRTD’s
traveler and possibly the Terminal.
The TOE is compliant with the representation provided in the ICAO Machine Readable
Travel Document Chip with Basic Access Control PP [4].
The compliance is strict: the addition of specific TOE security mechanisms to the security
principles of this Security Target required only the addition of one Threat and three TOE
Objectives.
These additions do not affect the concept defined in the PP [4] and this ST is a suitable
solution to the generic security problem described in the PP.
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 65 of 78
9. Terminology
Term Definition
Active
Authentication
Security mechanism defined in [11] option by which means the
MRTD’s chip proves and the inspection system verifies the
identity and authenticity of the MRTD’s chip as part of a genuine
MRTD issued by a known State of Organization.
Application note
Optional informative part of the PP containing sensitive
supporting information that is considered relevant or useful for
the construction, evaluation, or use of the TOE.
Audit records
Write-only-once non-volatile memory area of the MRTDs chip to
store the Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data.
Authenticity
Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the MRTD’s
chip were created by the issuing State or Organization.
Basic Access
Control (BAC)
Security mechanism defined in [11] by which means the MRTD’s
chip proves and the inspection system protects their
communication by means of secure messaging with Document
Basic Access Keys (see there).
Basic Inspection
System (BIS)
An inspection system which implements the terminals part of the
Basic Access Control Mechanism and authenticates itself to the
MRTD’s chip using the Document Basic Access Keys derived
from the printed MRZ data for reading the logical MRTD.
Biographical data
(biodata)
The personalized details of the MRTD holder of the document
appearing as text in the visual and machine readable zones on
the biographical data page of a passport book or on a travel card
or visa. [11]
Biometric
reference data
Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD holder in
the MRTD’s chip as (i) digital portrait and (ii) optional biometric
reference data.
Certificate chain
Hierarchical sequence of Inspection System Certificate (lowest
level), Document Verifier Certificate and Country Verifying
Certification Authority Certificates (highest level), where the
certificate of a lower level is signed with the private key
corresponding to the public key in the certificate of the next
higher level. The Country Verifying Certification Authority
Certificate is signed with the private key corresponding to the
public key it contains (self-signed certificate).
Counterfeit
An unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine security
document made by whatever means. [11]
Country Signing
CA Certificate
(CCSCA)
Certificate of the Country Signing Certification Authority Public
Key (KPuCSCA) issued by Country Signing Certification
Authority stored in the inspection system.
Country Verifying
Certification
Authority
The country specific root of the PKI of Inspection Systems and
creates the Document Verifier Certificates within this PKI. It
enforces the Privacy policy of the issuing State or Organization in
respect to the protection of sensitive biometric reference data
stored in the MRTD.
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 66 of 78
Term Definition
Current date
The maximum of the effective dates of valid CVCA, DV and
domestic Inspection System certificates known to the TOE. It is
used the validate card verifiable certificates.
CVCA link
Certificate
Certificate of the new public key of the Country Verifying
Certification Authority signed with the old public key of the
Country Verifying Certification Authority where the certificate
effective date for the new key is before the certificate expiration
date of the certificate for the old key.
Document Basic
Access Key
Derivation
Algorithm
The [11], normative appendix 5, A5.1 describes the Document
Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm on how terminals may
derive the Document Basic Access Keys from the second line of
the printed MRZ data.
Document Basic
Access Keys
Pair of symmetric (two-key) TDES keys used for secure
messaging with encryption (key KENC) and message
authentication (key KMAC) of data transmitted between the
MRTD’s chip and the inspection system [11]. It is drawn from the
printed MRZ of the passport book to authenticate an entity able
to read the printed MRZ of the passport book.
Document
Security Object
(SOD)
A RFC3369 CMS Signed Data Structure, signed by the
Document Signer (DS). Carries the hash values of the LDS Data
Groups. It is stored in the MRTD’s chip. It may carry the
Document Signer Certificate (CDS). [11]
Document Verifier
Certification authority creating the Inspection System Certificates
and managing the authorization of the Extended Inspection
Systems for the sensitive data of the MRTD in the limits provided
by the issuing States or Organizations.
Eavesdropper
A threat agent with Enhanced-Basic attack potential reading the
communication between the MRTD’s chip and the inspection
system to gain the data on the MRTD’s chip.
Enrolment
The process of collecting biometric samples from a person and
the subsequent preparation and storage of biometric reference
templates representing that person's identity. [11]
Extended Access
Control
Security mechanism identified in [11] by which means the
MRTD’s chip (i) verifies the authentication of the inspection
systems authorized to read the optional biometric reference data,
(ii) controls the access to the optional biometric reference data
and (iii) protects the confidentiality and integrity of the optional
biometric reference data during their transmission to the
inspection system by secure messaging. The Personalization
Agent may use the same mechanism to authenticate itself with
Personalization Agent Private Key and to get write and read
access to the logical MRTD and TSF data.
Extended
Inspection System
A General Inspection System which (i) implements the Chip
Authentication Mechanism, (ii) implements the Terminal
Authentication Protocol and (iii) is authorized by the issuing State
or Organization through the Document Verifier of the receiving
State to read the sensitive biometric reference data.
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 67 of 78
Term Definition
Extended
Inspection System
(EIS)
A role of a terminal as part of an inspection system which is in
addition to Basic Inspection System authorized by the issuing
State or Organization to read the optional biometric reference
data and supports the terminals part of the Extended Access
Control Authentication Mechanism.
Forgery
Fraudulent alteration of any part of the genuine document, e.g.
changes to the biographical data or the portrait. [11]
General
Inspection System
A Basic Inspection System which implements sensitively the Chip
Authentication Mechanism.
Global
Interoperability
The capability of inspection systems (either manual or
automated) in different States throughout the world to exchange
data, to process data received from systems in other States, and
to utilize that data in inspection operations in their respective
States. Global interoperability is a major objective of the
standardized specifications for placement of both eye-readable
and machine readable data in all MRTDs. [11]
IC Dedicated
Support Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which
provides functions after TOE Delivery. The usage of parts of the
IC Dedicated Software might be restricted to certain phases.
IC Dedicated Test
Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which is
used to test the TOE before TOE Delivery but which does not
provide any functionality thereafter.
IC Identification
Data
The IC manufacturer writes a unique IC identifier to the chip to
control the IC as MRTD material during the IC manufacturing and
the delivery process to the MRTD manufacturer.
Impostor
A person who applies for and obtains a document by assuming a
false name and identity, or a person who alters his or her
physical appearance to represent himself or herself as another
person for the purpose of using that person’s document. [11]
Improperly
documented
person
A person who travels, or attempts to travel with: (a) an expired
travel document or an invalid visa; (b) a counterfeit, forged or
altered travel document or visa; (c) someone else’s travel
document or visa; or (d) no travel document or visa, if required.
[11]
Initialization
Process of writing Initialization Data (see below) to the TOE
(cf.1.3.6.2, TOE lifecycle phase 2 step 3).
Initialization Data
Any data defined by the TOE Manufacturer and injected into the
non-volatile memory by the Integrated Circuits manufacturer
(Phase 2). These data are for instance used for traceability and
for IC identification as MRTD’s material (IC identification data).
Inspection
The act of a State examining an MRTD presented to it by a
traveler (the MRTD holder) and verifying its authenticity. [11]
Inspection system
(IS)
A technical system used by the border control officer of the
receiving State (i) examining an MRTD presented by the traveler
and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as
MRTD holder.
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 68 of 78
Term Definition
Integrated circuit
(IC)
Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing and/or
memory functions. The MRTD’s chip is an integrated circuit.
Integrity
Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the MRTD’s
chip have not been altered from that created by the issuing State
or Organization.
Issuing
Organization
Organization authorized to issue an official travel document (e.g.
the United Nations Organization, issuer of the Laissez-passer).
[11]
Issuing State The Country issuing the MRTD. [11]
Logical Data
Structure (LDS)
The collection of groupings of Data Elements stored in the
optional capacity expansion technology [11]. The capacity
expansion technology used is the MRTD’s chip.
Logical MRTD
Data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data
Structure [11] as specified by ICAO on the contactless integrated
circuit. It presents contactless readable data including (but not
limited to)
a. personal data of the MRTD holder
b. the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data,
EF.DG1),
c. the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
d. the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris
image(s) (EF.DG4) or both and
e. the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16)
f. EF.COM and EF.SOD
Logical travel
document
Data stored according to the Logical Data Structure as specified
by ICAO in the contactless integrated circuit including (but not
limited to)
(1) data contained in the machine-readable zone (mandatory),
(2) digitized photographic image (mandatory) and
(3) fingerprint image(s) and/or iris image(s) (optional).
Machine readable
travel document
(MRTD)
Official document issued by a State or Organization which is
used by the holder for international travel (e.g. passport, visa,
official document of identity) and which contains mandatory
visual (eye readable) data and a separate mandatory data
summary, intended for global use, reflecting essential data
elements capable of being machine read. [11]
Machine readable
visa (MRV)
A visa or, where appropriate, an entry clearance (hereinafter
collectively referred to as visas) conforming to the specifications
contained herein, formulated to improve facilitation and enhance
security for the visa holder. Contains mandatory visual (eye
readable) data and a separate mandatory data summary capable
of being machine read. The MRV is normally a label which is
attached to a visa page in a passport. [11]
Machine readable
zone (MRZ)
Fixed dimensional area located on the front of the MRTD or MRP
Data Page or, in the case of the TD1, the back of the MRTD,
containing mandatory and optional data for machine reading
using OCR methods. [11]
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 69 of 78
Term Definition
Machine-verifiable
biometrics feature
A unique physical personal identification feature (e.g. an iris
pattern, fingerprint or facial characteristics) stored on a travel
document in a form that can be read and verified by machine.
[11]
MRTD application
Non-executable data defining the functionality of the operating
system on the IC as the MRTD’s chip. It includes
- the file structure implementing the LDS [11],
- the definition of the User Data, but does not include the User
Data itself (i.e. content of EF.DG1 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16,
EF.COM and EF.SOD) and
- the TSF Data including the definition the authentication data
but except the authentication data itself.
MRTD Basic
Access Control
Mutual authentication protocol followed by secure messaging
between the inspection system and the MRTD’s chip based on
MRZ information as key seed and access condition to data
stored on MRTD’s chip according to LDS.
MRTD holder
The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or
Organization personalized the MRTD.
MRTD’s Chip
A contactless integrated circuit chip complying with ISO/IEC
14443 and programmed according to the Logical Data Structure
as specified by ICAO.
MRTD’s chip
Embedded
Software
Software embedded in a MRTD’s chip and not being developed
by the IC Designer. The MRTD’s chip Embedded Software is
designed in Phase 1 and embedded into the MRTD’s chip in
Phase 2 of the TOE life-cycle.
Optional biometric
reference data
Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD holder in
the MRTD’s chip as (i) encoded finger image(s) (EF.DG3) or (ii)
encoded iris image(s) (EF.DG4) or (iii) both. Note, that the
European commission decided to use only fingerprint and not to
use iris images as optional biometric reference data.
Passive
authentication
(i) verification of the digital signature of the Document Security
Object and
(ii) comparing the hash values of the read LDS data fields with
the hash values contained in the Document Security Object
Personalization
The process by which the portrait, signature and biographical
data are applied to the document. This may also include the
optional biometric data collected during the “Enrolment” (cf.
1.3.6.3, TOE lifecycle phase 3 step 6).
Personalization
Agent
The agent acting on the behalf of the issuing State or
Organization to personalize the MRTD for the holder by (i)
establishing the identity the holder for the biographic data in the
MRTD, (ii) enrolling the biometric reference data of the MRTD
holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) or (ii) the
encoded iris image(s) and (iii) writing these data on the physical
and logical MRTD for the holder.
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 70 of 78
Term Definition
Personalization
Agent
Authentication
Information
TSF data used for authentication proof and verification of the
Personalization Agent.
Personalization
Agent Key
Symmetric cryptographic authentication key used (i) by the
Personalization Agent to prove his identity and to get access to
the logical MRTD and (ii) by the MRTD’s chip to verify the
authentication attempt of a terminal as Personalization Agent
according to the SFR FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.5 and FIA_UAU.6.
Physical travel
Document
Travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip using secure
printing to present data including (but not limited to)
(1) biographical data,
(2) data of the machine-readable zone,
(3) photographic image and
(4) other data
Pre-
Personalization
Process of writing Pre-Personalization Data (see below) to the
TOE including the creation of the MRTD Application (cf.1.3.6.2,
TOE lifecycle phase 2 step 5)
Pre-
personalization
Data
Any data that is injected into the non-volatile memory of the TOE
by the MRTD Manufacturer (Phase 2) for traceability of non-
personalized MRTD’s and/or to secure shipment within or
between lifecycle phases 2 and 3. It contains (but is not limited
to) the Active Authentication Key Pair and the Personalization
Agent Key Pair.
Pre-personalized
MRTD’s chip
MRTD’s chip equipped with a unique identifier and a unique
asymmetric Active Authentication Key Pair of the chip.
Receiving State The Country to which the Traveler is applying for entry. [11]
Reference data
Data enrolled for a known identity and used by the verifier to
check the verification data provided by an entity to prove this
identity in an authentication attempt.
Secondary image
A repeat image of the holder’s portrait reproduced elsewhere in
the document by whatever means. [11]
Secure
messaging in
encrypted mode
Secure messaging using encryption and message authentication
code according to ISO/IEC 7816-4 Skimming Imitation of the
inspection system to read the logical MRTD or parts of it via the
contactless communication channel of the TOE without
knowledge of the printed MRZ data.
Terminal
Authorization
Intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorizations defined by
the Inspection System Certificate, the Document Verifier
Certificate and Country Verifying Certification Authority which
shall be all valid for the Current Date.
Travel document
A passport or other official document of identity issued by a State
or Organization which may be used by the rightful holder for
international travel.
Traveler
Person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and
claiming the identity of the MRTD holder.
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 71 of 78
Term Definition
TSF data
Data created by and for the TOE that might affect the operation
of the TOE.
Un-personalized
MRTD
The MRTD that contains the MRTD Chip holding only
Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data as delivered to
the Personalization Agent from the Manufacturer.
User data
Data created by and for the user that does not affect the
operation of the TSF.
Verification
The process of comparing a submitted biometric sample against
the biometric reference template of a single enrollee whose
identity is being claimed, to determine whether it matches the
enrollee’s template. [11]
Verification data
Data provided by an entity in an authentication attempt to prove
their identity to the verifier. The verifier checks whether the
verification data match the reference data known for the claimed
identity.
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 72 of 78
10. References
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - CCMB-2012-09-
001 - Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 4, September 2012.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - CCMB-2012-09-
002 - Part 2: Security functional requirements, Revision 4, September 2012.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - CCMB-2012-09-
003 - Part 3: Security assurance requirements, Revision 4, September 2012.
[4] BSI-CC-PP0055 – Protection Profile - Machine Readable Travel Document with
“ICAO Application”, Basic Access Control – EAL 4+ – Version: 1.10, 25th March
2009
[5] BSI-CC-PP0056-V2-2012 – Protection Profile - Machine Readable Travel
Document with „ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control with PACE (EAC PP)
– EAL 4+ – Version: 1.3.0, 20th January 2012
[6] BSI-PP-0035-2007 – Security IC Platform Protection Profile – version 1.0 – EAL4+
[7] PKCS#1: RSA Cryptography Standard, Version 1.5
[8] Specifications for the Java Card 3 Platform, Version 3.0.4 Classic Edition, Sept.
2011
- Virtual Machine Specification [JCVM]
- Application Programming Interface [JCAPI]
- Runtime Environment Specification [JCRE]
[9] - GlobalPlatform, Card Specification, Version 2.2.1, Jan. 2011 [GPC_SPE_034]
- GlobalPlatform Card ID Configuration, Version 1.0, Dec. 2011 [GPC_GUI_039]
- Confidential Card Content Management – Amendment A, v1.0.1, Jan 2011
- Secure Channel Protocol 03 – Amendment D, v1.1, Sept. 2009
[10] CCDB-2007-09-001 – Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar
devices – Version: 1.0, revision 1, September 2007
[11] ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, part 1 – Machine Readable
Passports, Sixth Edition, 2006, International Civil Aviation Organization
[12] TR-03110, Technical Guideline Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine
Readable Travel Documents – Extended Access Control (EAC), Version 1.11, BSI
[13] ISO/IEC 9796-2: Information technology — Security techniques — Signature
Schemes giving message recovery — Part 2: Integer factorization based
mechanisms, 2002
[14] FIPS PUB 180-2, FIPS Publication – Secure hash standard (+ Change Notice to
include SHA-224), 2002, NIST
[15] FIPS PUB 46-3, FIPS Publication – Data Encryption Standard (DES), Reaffirmed
1999 October 25, U.S. Department of Commerce/NIST
[16] IEEE 1363-2000 – IEEE Standard Specification for Public-Key Cryptography
[17] PKCS#1: RSA Cryptography Standard, Version 1.5
[18] NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P6022y VB, Security Target, Rev. 2.2, 2018-11-
27
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 73 of 78
[19] Crypto Library V3.1.x on P6022y VB, Security Target, Rev. 2.0, 2018-03-22
[20] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Evaluation
Methodology, Version 3.1 CCMB-2012-09-004, Revision 4, September 2012
[21] JCOP 3 P60, Security Target, Rev. 4.0, 2019-08-23
[22] ChipDoc v7b4 applet in ICAO configuration – Preparation and Operation Manual,
Rev. 1.9, 01 April 2020
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 74 of 78
11. Legal information
11.1 Definitions
Draft — The document is a draft version only. The content is still under
internal review and subject to formal approval, which may result in
modifications or additions. NXP Semiconductors does not give any
representations or warranties as to the accuracy or completeness of
information included herein and shall have no liability for the consequences
of use of such information.
11.2 Disclaimers
Limited warranty and liability — Information in this document is believed to
be accurate and reliable. However, NXP Semiconductors does not give any
representations or warranties, expressed or implied, as to the accuracy or
completeness of such information and shall have no liability for the
consequences of use of such information.
In no event shall NXP Semiconductors be liable for any indirect, incidental,
punitive, special or consequential damages (including - without limitation -
lost profits, lost savings, business interruption, costs related to the removal
or replacement of any products or rework charges) whether or not such
damages are based on tort (including negligence), warranty, breach of
contract or any other legal theory.
Notwithstanding any damages that customer might incur for any reason
whatsoever, NXP Semiconductors’ aggregate and cumulative liability
towards customer for the products described herein shall be limited in
accordance with the Terms and conditions of commercial sale of NXP
Semiconductors.
Right to make changes — NXP Semiconductors reserves the right to make
changes to information published in this document, including without
limitation specifications and product descriptions, at any time and without
notice. This document supersedes and replaces all information supplied prior
to the publication hereof.
Suitability for use — NXP Semiconductors products are not designed,
authorized or warranted to be suitable for use in life support, life-critical or
safety-critical systems or equipment, nor in applications where failure or
malfunction of an NXP Semiconductors product can reasonably be expected
to result in personal injury, death or severe property or environmental
damage. NXP Semiconductors accepts no liability for inclusion and/or use of
NXP Semiconductors products in such equipment or applications and
therefore such inclusion and/or use is at the customer’s own risk.
Applications — Applications that are described herein for any of these
products are for illustrative purposes only. NXP Semiconductors makes no
representation or warranty that such applications will be suitable for the
specified use without further testing or modification.
Customers are responsible for the design and operation of their applications
and products using NXP Semiconductors products, and NXP
Semiconductors accepts no liability for any assistance with applications or
customer product design. It is customer’s sole responsibility to determine
whether the NXP Semiconductors product is suitable and fit for the
customer’s applications and products planned, as well as for the planned
application and use of customer’s third party customer(s). Customers should
provide appropriate design and operating safeguards to minimize the risks
associated with their applications and products.
NXP Semiconductors does not accept any liability related to any default,
damage, costs or problem which is based on any weakness or default in the
customer’s applications or products, or the application or use by customer’s
third party customer(s). Customer is responsible for doing all necessary
testing for the customer’s applications and products using NXP
Semiconductors products in order to avoid a default of the applications and
the products or of the application or use by customer’s third party
customer(s). NXP does not accept any liability in this respect.
Export control — This document as well as the item(s) described herein
may be subject to export control regulations. Export might require a prior
authorization from competent authorities.
Evaluation products — This product is provided on an “as is” and “with all
faults” basis for evaluation purposes only. NXP Semiconductors, its affiliates
and their suppliers expressly disclaim all warranties, whether express,
implied or statutory, including but not limited to the implied warranties of non-
infringement, merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. The entire
risk as to the quality, or arising out of the use or performance, of this product
remains with customer.
In no event shall NXP Semiconductors, its affiliates or their suppliers be
liable to customer for any special, indirect, consequential, punitive or
incidental damages (including without limitation damages for loss of
business, business interruption, loss of use, loss of data or information, and
the like) arising out the use of or inability to use the product, whether or not
based on tort (including negligence), strict liability, breach of contract, breach
of warranty or any other theory, even if advised of the possibility of such
damages.
Notwithstanding any damages that customer might incur for any reason
whatsoever (including without limitation, all damages referenced above and
all direct or general damages), the entire liability of NXP Semiconductors, its
affiliates and their suppliers and customer’s exclusive remedy for all of the
foregoing shall be limited to actual damages incurred by customer based on
reasonable reliance up to the greater of the amount actually paid by
customer for the product or five dollars (US$5.00). The foregoing limitations,
exclusions and disclaimers shall apply to the maximum extent permitted by
applicable law, even if any remedy fails of its essential purpose.
11.3 Licenses
ICs with DPA Countermeasures functionality
NXP ICs containing functionality
implementing countermeasures to
Differential Power Analysis and Simple
Power Analysis are produced and sold
under applicable license from
Cryptography Research, Inc.
11.4 Trademarks
Notice: All referenced brands, product names, service names and
trademarks are property of their respective owners.
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 75 of 78
12. List of figures
Fig 1. Components of the TOE ...................................3
Fig 2. TOE LifeCycle.................................................10
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
All information provided in this document is subject to legal disclaimers. © NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation
PUBLIC
Rev. 1.1 — 01 April 2020 76 of 78
13. List of tables
Table 1. ST Reference and TOE Reference...................3
Table 2. Reference to certified Micro Controller..............7
Table 3. Reference to certified Crypto Library ................8
Table 4. Reference to certified Operating System ..........8
Table 5. Delivery Items .................................................12
Table 6. Security Environment to Security Objectives
Mapping ..........................................................29
Table 7. Assurance Requirements: EAL 4 augmented .53
Table 8. Functional Requirement to TOE Security
Objective Mapping ..........................................56
Table 9. SFR Dependencies.........................................62
Table 10. SAR Dependencies.........................................62
Table 11. Unsupported Dependencies............................63
Table 12. Mapping Assurance Requirements to Assurance
Measures ........................................................63
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
Please be aware that important notices concerning this document and the product(s)
described herein, have been included in the section 'Legal information'.
© NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
For more information, visit: http://www.nxp.com
For sales office addresses, please send an email to: salesaddresses@nxp.com
Date of release: 01 April 2020
Document identifier:
14. Contents
1. ST Introduction (ASE_INT) .................................3
1.1 ST Reference and TOE Reference ....................3
1.2 TOE Overview....................................................3
1.2.1 TOE usage and security features for operational
use .....................................................................4
1.3 TOE Description.................................................5
1.3.1 General ..............................................................5
1.3.2 MRTD’s chip.......................................................5
1.3.3 Basic Access Control .........................................6
1.3.4 Active Authentication..........................................7
1.3.5 TOE Components and Composite Certification..7
Micro Controller..................................................7
IC Dedicated Software .......................................7
IC Embedded Software ......................................8
1.3.6 TOE Lifecycle.....................................................9
Phase 1 “Development” .....................................9
Phase 2 “Manufacturing”....................................9
Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”...........11
Phase 4 “Operational Use”...............................11
1.3.7 TOE Identification.............................................12
TOE Delivery....................................................12
Identification of the TOE...................................12
Evaluated Package Types................................12
2. Conformance Claims (ASE_CCL) ....................13
2.1 CC Conformance Claim ...................................13
2.2 Package Claim.................................................13
2.3 PP Claim ..........................................................13
3. Security Problem Definition (ASE_SPD) .........15
3.1 Assets ..............................................................15
3.2 Subjects ...........................................................16
3.3 Assumptions.....................................................17
3.4 Threat agent.....................................................19
3.5 Threats.............................................................19
3.6 Organisational Security Policies.......................22
4. Security Objectives (ASE_OBJ).......................23
4.1 SOs for the TOE...............................................23
4.2 SOs for the Environment ..................................26
4.2.1 Issuing State or Organization ...........................26
4.2.2 Receiving State or Organization.......................27
4.3 Security objectives rationale.............................28
4.3.1 Security Objectives Coverage ..........................28
4.3.2 Security Objectives Sufficiency ........................29
Policies and Security Objective Sufficiency......29
Threats and Security Objective Sufficiency ......29
Assumptions and Security Objective Sufficiency
.........................................................................30
5. Extended Components Definition (ASE_ECD)32
5.1 Audit data storage (FAU_SAS).........................32
5.2 Generation of random numbers (FCS_RND) ...33
5.3 Authentication Proof of Identity (FIA_API)........34
5.4 Limited capabilities and availability (FMT_LIM) 35
5.5 TOE emanation (FPT_EMSEC.1) ....................37
6. Security Requirements (ASE_REQ) .................38
6.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements ...........40
6.1.1 Security Audit (FAU).........................................40
Audit Storage (FAU_SAS.1).............................40
6.1.2 Cryptographic support (FCS)............................40
Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1) ...40
Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4)...41
Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)............41
Random Number Generation (FCS_RND.1) ....42
6.1.3 User data protection (FDP)...............................43
Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1) ...............43
Security attribute based access control
(FDP_ACF.1)....................................................43
Basic data exchange confidentiality
(FDP_UCT.1) ...................................................43
Data exchange integrity (FDP_UIT.1) ..............44
6.1.4 Identification and authentication (FIA) ..............45
Authentication Failure handling (FIA_AFL.1)....45
Authentication Proof of Identity (FIA_API.1).....45
Timing of authentication (FIA_UAU.1)..............45
NXP Semiconductors ChipDoc v2 ICAO BAC on JCOP 3 P60
Security Target Lite
Please be aware that important notices concerning this document and the product(s)
described herein, have been included in the section 'Legal information'.
© NXP B.V. 2020. All rights reserved.
For more information, visit: http://www.nxp.com
For sales office addresses, please send an email to: salesaddresses@nxp.com
Date of release: 01 April 2020
Document identifier:
Single-use authentication mechanisms
(FIA_UAU.4).....................................................46
Multiple authentication mechanisms
(FIA_UAU.5).....................................................46
Re-authenticating (FIA_UAU.6)........................47
Timing of identification (FIA_UID.1) .................47
6.1.5 Security management (FMT)............................48
Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1) .....................48
Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2) ......................48
Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1) .........48
Specifications of Management Functions
(FMT_SMF.1)...................................................50
Security roles (FMT_SMR.1)............................50
6.1.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT) .............................50
TOE Emanation (FPT_EMSEC.1)....................50
Failure with preservation of secure state
(FPT_FLS.1) ....................................................50
Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3).....51
TSF testing (FPT_TST.1).................................51
6.2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements...........52
6.2.1 SARs Measures ...............................................52
6.2.2 SARs Rationale................................................53
6.3 Security Requirements Rationale.....................55
6.3.1 Security Requirement Coverage ......................55
6.3.2 Security Requirements Sufficiency...................57
TOE Security Requirements Sufficiency ..........57
7. TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS) .........60
7.1 SF.Access Control ...........................................60
7.2 SF.Card Personalization ..................................60
7.3 SF.Personalizer Authentication........................60
7.4 SF.BAC Authentication ....................................60
7.5 SF.Active Authentication ..................................60
7.6 SF.Secure Messaging......................................60
7.7 SF.Crypto.........................................................60
7.8 SF.Protection ...................................................60
8. Additional Rationale..........................................61
8.1 Dependencies Rationale ..................................61
8.1.1 SFR Dependencies..........................................61
8.1.2 SAR Dependencies..........................................62
8.1.3 Justification of Unsupported Dependencies .....62
8.2 TOE Summary Specifications Rationale...........63
8.2.1 Rationale for assurance measures...................63
8.3 Rationale for Extensions...................................63
8.4 PP Claim Rationale ..........................................64
8.4.1 PP Additions.....................................................64
8.4.2 PP compliancy..................................................64
9. Terminology.......................................................65
10. References .........................................................72
11. Legal information ..............................................74
11.1 Definitions.........................................................74
11.2 Disclaimers.......................................................74
11.3 Licenses ...........................................................74
11.4 Trademarks ......................................................74
12. List of figures.....................................................75
13. List of tables ......................................................76
14. Contents.............................................................77