Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0431-2007
for
Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller)
SLE66CL180PE / m1585-e12, SLE66CL180PEM /
m1584-e12, SLE66CL180PES / m1586-e12,
SLE66CL81PE / m1594-e12, SLE66CL81PEM /
m1595-e12, SLE66CL80PE / m1591-e12,
SLE66CL80PEM / m1592-e12, SLE66CL80PES /
m1593-e12, SLE66CL41PE / m1583-e12 with
specific IC Dedicated Software
from
Infineon Technologies AG
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)3018 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)3018 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)3018 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-326 V3.4
BSI-DSZ-CC-0431-2007
Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller)
SLE66CL180PE / m1585-e12, SLE66CL180PEM /
m1584-e12, SLE66CL180PES / m1586-e12,
SLE66CL81PE / m1594-e12, SLE66CL81PEM /
m1595-e12, SLE66CL80PE / m1591-e12,
SLE66CL80PEM / m1592-e12, SLE66CL80PES /
m1593-e12, SLE66CL41PE / m1583-e12 with
specific IC Dedicated Software
from
Infineon Technologies AG
Common Criteria Arrangement
for components up to EAL4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, version 2.3
(ISO/IEC 15408:2005) extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL4
and smart card specific guidance for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security
Evaluation, version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
Evaluation Results:
PP Conformance: Protection Profile BSI-PP-0002-2001
Functionality: BSI-PP-0002-2001 conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance Package: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL5 augmented by:
ALC_DVS.2 (Life cycle support - Sufficiency of security measures),
AVA_MSU.3 (Vulnerability assessment - Analysis and testing for insecure states),
AVA_VLA.4 (Vulnerability assessment - Highly resistant)
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme
of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, 30. August 2007
The Vice President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Hange L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)3018 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)3018 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)3018 9582-111
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption
and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2)
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty
of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0431-2007 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
V
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0431-2007
VI
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
Part D: Annexes
BSI-DSZ-CC-0431-2007 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
• BSIG2
• BSI Certification Ordinance3
• BSI Schedule of Costs4
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
• DIN EN 45011 standard
• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), version 2.35
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), version 2.3
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
• Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance
components above EAL4 (AIS 34)
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger
dated 19 May 2006, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0431-2007
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective in March 1998. This agreement has been signed by
the national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United
Kingdom. This agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates
was extended to include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels
(EAL 1 – EAL 7). The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI)
recognizes certificates issued by the national certification bodies of France and
the United Kingdom within the terms of this Agreement.
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 has been signed in May 2000 (CC-MRA). It includes also the recognition
of Protection Profiles based on the CC. As of February 2007 the arrangement
has been signed by the national bodies of:
Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden,
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America.
The current list of signatory nations resp. approved certification schemes can be
seen on the web site: http:\\www.commoncriteriaportal.org
This evaluation contains the components ACM_SCP.3, ADV_FSP.3,
ADV_HLD.3, ADV_INT.1, ADV_RCR.2, ADV_SPM.3, ALC_DVS.2,
ALC_LCD.2, ALC_TAT.2, ATE_DPT.2, AVA_CCA.1, AVA_MSU.3 and
AVA_VLA.4 that are not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions
of the CCRA. For mutual recognition the EAL4-components of these assurance
families are relevant.
A-2
BSI-DSZ-CC-0431-2007 Certification Report
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The products Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller) SLE66CL180PE /
m1585-e12, SLE66CL180PEM / m1584-e12, SLE66CL180PES / m1586-e12,
SLE66CL81PE / m1594-e12, SLE66CL81PEM / m1595-e12, SLE66CL80PE /
m1591-e12, SLE66CL80PEM / m1592-e12, SLE66CL80PES / m1593-e12,
SLE66CL41PE / m1583-e12 with specific IC Dedicated Software has
undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on
BSI-DSZ-CC-0399-2007.
The evaluation of the products Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller)
SLE66CL180PE / m1585-e12, SLE66CL180PEM / m1584-e12,
SLE66CL180PES / m1586-e12, SLE66CL81PE / m1594-e12, SLE66CL81PEM /
m1595-e12, SLE66CL80PE / m1591-e12, SLE66CL80PEM / m1592-e12,
SLE66CL80PES / m1593-e12, SLE66CL41PE / m1583-e12 with specific IC
Dedicated Software was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor, vendor and distributor is:
Infineon Technologies AG , Am Campeon 1-12 , D-85579 Neubiberg, Germany
The certification is concluded with
• the comparability check and
• the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on 30. August 2007.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in
the following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the
following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
A-3
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0431-2007
A-4
4 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-28 and D1 to D-4.
The products Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller) SLE66CL180PE /
m1585-e12, SLE66CL180PEM / m1584-e12, SLE66CL180PES / m1586-e12,
SLE66CL81PE / m1594-e12, SLE66CL81PEM / m1595-e12, SLE66CL80PE /
m1591-e12, SLE66CL80PEM / m1592-e12, SLE66CL80PES / m1593-e12,
SLE66CL41PE / m1583-e12 with specific IC Dedicated Software has been
included in the BSI list of the certified products, which is published regularly
(see also Internet: http:// www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtained
from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor7
of
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the above-
mentioned website.
7
Infineon Technologiel AG
Am Campeon 1-12
D-85579 Neubiberg, Germany
BSI-DSZ-CC-0431-2007 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the Security Target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0431-2007
Contents of the certification results
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification of the TOE 12
3 Security Policy 15
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 15
5 Architectural Information 16
6 Documentation 16
7 IT Product Testing 17
8 Evaluated Configuration 18
9 Results of the Evaluation 18
9.1 Evaluation of the TOE 18
9.2 Additional Evaluation Results 21
10 Comments/Recommendations 21
11 Annexes 23
12 Security Target 23
13 Definitions 23
14 Bibliography 26
B-2
BSI-DSZ-CC-0431-2007 Certification Report
1 Executive Summary
The product type of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Infineon Smart Card
IC (Security Controller) SLE66CL180PE / m1585-e12, SLE66CL180PEM /
m1584-e12, SLE66CL180PES / m1586-e12, SLE66CL81PE / m1594-e12,
SLE66CL81PEM / m1595-e12, SLE66CL80PE / m1591-e12, SLE66CL80PEM /
m1592-e12, SLE66CL80PES / m1593-e12, SLE66CL41PE / m1583-e12 with
specific IC Dedicated Software.
Compared to the product SLE66CLX800PEx / SLE66CLX360PEx (BSI-DSZ-
CC-0399) the TOE has different memory sizes for ROM, RAM and EEPROM,
and the Advanced Crypto Engine is not implemented. The TOE is implemented
with UCP (Unified Channel Programming) technology. This TOE, comprising
the group of derivates listed on the title page, is principally based on the same
hardware as the first contactless PE-derivate group comprising the derivates
with the 80 kByte and 36 kByte EEPROM which have successfully passed the
EAL5+ evaluation as well. This was the BSI internal process BSI-DSZ-CC-
0399-2007. The security policy of this product is unchanged. The Security
Target [6] was updated.
The TOE is manufactured in IC fabrication in Altis, France, indicated by the
production line indicator “5” (see part D, Annex A of this report).
The differences in the contactless interface area are responsible for the different
naming extensions “M”, “S” or coming without extension. The derivates without
extension communicate with the contact-based interface according to ISO
7816/ETSI/EMV and with the contactless interface according to ISO 14443 type
A and type B. The extended “M” is used for the Mifare® contactless interface
protocol and related memory management (classic 1k emulation), whereas the
“S” nominates the derivates with the ISO 18092 passive mode. The TOE will be
identified by SLE66CL180PEx if we speak of the three derivates
SLE66CL180PE / m1585-e12, SLE66CL180PEM / m1584-e12,
SLE66CL180PES / m1586-e12 with an EEPROM of 18 kBytes. The same
applies for SLE66CL81PEx (stand for the two derivates SLE66CL81PE /
m1594-e12, SLE66CL81PEM / m1595-e12 with an EEPROM of 8 kBytes) and
the SLE66CL80PEx (stand for the three derivates SLE66CL80PE / m1591-e12,
SLE66CL80PEM / m1592-e12, SLE66CL80PES / m1593-e12 with an EEPROM
of 8 kBytes). The SLE66CL41PE / m1583-e12 has only one derivate with an
EEPROM of 4kByte.
All nine products are identically from hardware perspective and produced with
the same masks with the exception of the first metal mask (called M1 mask)
which contains the derivate specific information (e. g. development code, design
step, memory size).
The hardware part of the TOE is the complete chip, composed of:
• Microcontroller type ECO 2000 (CPU) with the subcomponents memory
encryption and decryption unit (MED), memory management unit (MMU)
and 256 bytes of internal RAM (IRAM),
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0431-2007
• External memory comprising 2 kBytes extended RAM (XRAM), 128 Bits
PROM, 1728 Bits Map-RAM, 92 kBytes user ROM including the routines for
chip management (RMS) (the derivates SLE66CL180PEM,
SLE66CL81PEM and SLE66CL80PEM have 88 kBytes), 16 kBytes test
ROM containing the test routines (STS) (the derivates SLE66CL180PEM,
SLE66CL81PEM and SLE66CL80PEM have 20 kBytes), and a total of 18
kBytes non-volatile memory (EEPROM) for the derivates SLE66CLX180PEx
with error detection (EDC) and error correction (ECC), a total of 8 kBytes
non-volatile memory (EEPROM) for the derivates SLE66CL81PEx and
SLE66CL80PEx with error detection (EDC) and error correction (ECC), a
total of 4 kBytes non-volatile memory (EEPROM) for the derivate
SLE66CL41PE with error detection (EDC) and error correction (ECC),
• Security logic (SEC), Memory Control Unit (MCU) with FCURSE distributes
the data to and from memory components while the FCURSE provides
camouflage access operation, true random number generator (RNG),
Checksum module (CRC), Interrupt module (INT), Input Logic (INP), Timer
(TIM), Dual Key DES (Data encryption according to single-DES and 3DES
standard, single DES is out of scope of the evaluation) and Cryptographic
Unit (DDC),
• The RF interface (radio frequency power and signal interface) enables
contactless communication between a Proximity Integrated Chip Card
(PICC) and a reader/writer Proximity Coupling Device (PCD). The power
supply and data are received by an antenna which consists of a coil with a
few turns directly connected to the IC,
• Address and data bus (ADBUS), SFR bus (SBUS), Memory bus (MBUS),
• Extended configuration (CFG_EXT), extended SFR registers for general
purposes and chip configuration.
The firmware part of the TOE consists of the RMS (Resource Management
System) routines stored in a reserved area of the normal user ROM for
EEPROM programming, security function testing, random number online testing
and Mifare protocol (only the derivates SLE66CL180PEM and
SLE66CL80PEM) and consists of STS (Self Test Software) stored in the
especially protected test ROM consisting of test and initialization routines. The
RMS is part of the IC Dedicated Support Software and the STS is part of the IC
Dedicated Test Software as defined in Protection Profile [9].
The smart card operating system and the application stored in the User ROM
and in the EEPROM are not part of the TOE.
The TOE provides an ideal platform for applications requiring non-volatile data
storage. The TOE is intended for use in a range of high security applications,
including high speed security authentication, data encryption or electronic
signature. Several security features independently implemented in hardware or
controlled by software will be provided to ensure proper operations and integrity
and confidentiality of stored data. This includes for example measures for
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0431-2007 Certification Report
memory protection, leakage protection and sensors to allow operations only
under specified conditions.
The Security Target is written using the Smart card IC Platform Protection
Profile, Version 1.0, July 2001, BSI registration ID: BSI-PP-0002-2001 [9]. With
reference to this Protection Profile, the smart card product life cycle is described
in 7 phases. The development, production and operational user environment
are described and referenced to these phases. TOE delivery is defined at the
end of phase 3 as wafers or phase 4 as modules.
The assumptions, threats and objectives defined in this Protection Profile [9] are
used. To address additional security features of the TOE (e.g cryptographic
services), the security environment as outlined in the PP [9] is augmented by an
additional policy, an assumption and security objectives accordingly.
The IT products the Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller)
SLE66CL180PE / m1585-e12, SLE66CL180PEM / m1584-e12,
SLE66CL180PES / m1586-e12, SLE66CL81PE / m1594-e12, SLE66CL81PEM
/ m1595-e12, SLE66CL80PE / m1591-e12, SLE66CL80PEM / m1592-e12,
SLE66CL80PES / m1593-e12, SLE66CL41PE / m1583-e12 with specific IC
Dedicated Software were evaluated by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The
evaluation was completed on 20. July 2007. The TÜV Informationstechnik
GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)8
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor, vendor and distributor is
Infineon Technologies AG
Am Campeon 1-12
D-85579 Neubiberg, Germany
1.1 Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see Annex C or [1],
part 3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance
level EAL5+ (Evaluation Assurance Level 5 augmented). The following table
shows the augmented assurance components.
Requirement Identifier
EAL5 TOE evaluation: Semiformally designed and tested
+: ALC_DVS.2 Life cycle support – Sufficiency of security measures
+: AVA_MSU.3 Vulnerability assessment - Analysis and testing for insecure
states
+: AVA_VLA.4 Vulnerability assessment - Highly resistant
Table 1: Assurance components and EAL-augmentation
8
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0431-2007
1.2 Functionality
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) selected in the Security
Target are Common Criteria Part 2 extended as shown in the following tables.
The following SFRs are taken from CC part 2:
Security
Functional
Requirement
Identifier
Source
from PP or
added in ST
FCS Cryptographic support
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation ST
FDP User data protection
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control ST
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control ST
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control PP
FDP_ITT.1 Basic internal transfer protection PP
FDP_SDI.1 Stored data integrity monitoring ST
FDP_SDI.2 Stored data integrity monitoring and action ST
FMT Security Management
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes ST
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation ST
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions ST
FPT Protection of the TOE Security Functions
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state PP
FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection PP
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack PP
FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation PP
FRU Resource utilisation
FRU_FLT.2 Limited fault tolerance PP
Table 2: SFRs for the TOE taken from CC Part 2
The following CC part 2 extended SFRs are defined:
Security
Functional
Requirement
Identifier
Source
from PP or
added in ST
FAU Security Audit
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage PP / ST
9
9
PP/ST: component is described in the PP but operations are performed in the ST.
B-6
BSI-DSZ-CC-0431-2007 Certification Report
Security
Functional
Requirement
Identifier
Source
from PP or
added in ST
FCS Cryptographic support
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers PP / ST
FMT Security management
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities PP
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability PP
FPT Protection of the TOE Security Functions
FPT_TST.2 Subset TOE testing ST
Table 3: SFRs CC part 2 extended
Note: Only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 5.1 and 7.2.
These Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the TOE Security
Functions:
TOE Security
Functions
Description
SF1 Operating state checking
SF2 Phase management with test mode lock-out
SF3 Protection against snooping
SF4 Data encryption and data disguising
SF5 Random number generation
SF6 TSF self test
SF7 Notification of physical attack
SF8 Memory Management Unit (MMU)
SF9 Cryptographic support
Table 4: TOE Security Functions
SF1: Operating state checking
Correct function of the TOE is only given in the specified range. To
prevent an attack exploiting that circumstance, it is necessary to detect if
the specified range is left.
All operating signals are filtered to prevent malfunction and the operating
state is monitored with sensors for the operating voltage, clock signal,
frequency, temperature and electromagnetic radiation including light.
This function includes also mechanisms to detect and correct specific
EEPROM memory errors. In order to prevent accidental bit faults during
production in the ROM, over the data stored in ROM a CRC-Checksum is
calculated.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0431-2007
SF2: Phase management with test mode lock-out
During start-up of the TOE the decision for the user mode or the test
mode is taken dependent on several phase identifiers. In addition a chip
identification mode exists which is active in all phases. If test mode is the
active phase, the TOE requests authentication before any action (test
mode lock-out). If the chip identification mode is requested the chip
identification data stored in a non modifiable EEPROM area is reported.
The phase management is used to provide the separation between the
security enforcing functions and the user software. The TOE is set to
user mode before TOE delivery.
SF3: Protection against snooping
Several mechanisms, like topological design measures for disguise,
protect the TOE against snooping the design or the user data during
operation and even it is out of operation (power down).
SF4: Data encryption and data disguising
The memory contents of the TOE are encrypted on chip to protect
against data analysis on stored data as well as on internally transmitted
data. In addition the data transferred over the bus to and from the special
SFRs (CRC, RNG, DDES) is encrypted automatically with a dynamic key
change. Important parts of the CPU and the complete DES component
are especially designed to counter leakage attacks like DPA or EMA.
SF5: Random number generation
Random data is essential for cryptography as well as for physical security
mechanisms. The TOE is equipped with a true random generator based
on physical probabilistic controlled effects. The random data can be used
from the user software as well as from the security enforcing functions.
SF6: TSF self test
As part of the TSF, a hardware controlled self-test can be started from
the user software or can be started directly to test SF1, SF5 and SF7.
Any attempt to modify the sensor devices will be detected from the test.
SF7: Notification of physical attack
The entire surface of the TOE is protected with the active shield. Attacks
over the surface are detected when the shield lines are cut or get
contacted.
SF8: Memory Management Unit (MMU)
The MMU in the TOE gives the user software the possibility to define
different access rights for memory areas and components. In case of an
access violation the MMU will generate a non maskable interrupt (NMI).
Then an interrupt service routine can react on the access violation. The
policy of setting up the MMU and specifying the memory ranges is
defined by the user software.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0431-2007 Certification Report
If the TOE supports the Mifare® protocol, a special area of the EEPROM
is reserved and can only be accessed by the Mifare® Operating System.
SF9: Cryptographic Support
Cryptographic operations are provided by the TOE. The TOE is equipped
with a hardware accelerator to support the standard cryptographic
operations. The DES is supported completely in hardware.
As the final transition from test mode to user mode is performed before TOE
delivery, all TOE Security Functions are applicable from TOE delivery at the end
of phase 3 or 4 (depending on when TOE delivery takes place in a specific
case) to phase 7.
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6.
1.3 Strength of Function
The TOE’s strength of functions is claimed ‘high’ (SOF-high) for specific
functions as indicated in the Security Target [6], chapter 6.
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
For details see chapter 9 of this report.
1.4 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies
(OSPs) addressed by the evaluated IT product
The threats which were assumed for the evaluation and averted by the TOE
and the Organisational Security Policies defined for the TOE are specified in the
Security Target [6] and can be summarised as follows.
It is assumed that the attacker is a human being or a process acting on behalf
of him.
So-called standard high-level security concerns defined in the Protection Profile
[9] were derived from considering the end-usage phase (Phase 7 of the life
cycle as described in the Security Target) as follows:
• manipulation of User Data and of the Smart card Embedded Software (while
being executed/processed and while being stored in the TOE’s memories),
• disclosure of User Data and of the Smart card Embedded Software (while
being processed and while being stored in the TOE’s memories) and
• deficiency of random numbers.
These high-level security concerns are refined in the Protection Profile [9] and
used by the Security Target [6] by defining threats on a more technical level for
• Inherent Information Leakage,
• Physical Probing,
• Physical Manipulation,
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0431-2007
• Malfunction due to Environmental Stress,
• Forced Information Leakage,
• Abuse of Functionality and
• Deficiency of Random Numbers.
Phase 1 and the Phases from TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6 are
covered by assumptions (see below).
The development and production environment starting with Phase 2 up to TOE
Delivery are covered by an Organisational Security Policy outlining that the IC
Developer / Manufacturer must apply the policy “Protection during TOE
Development and Production (P.Process-TOE)” so that no information is
unintentionally made available for the operational phase of the TOE. The policy
ensures confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its related design
information and data. Access to samples, tools and material must be restricted.
A specific additional security functionality Triple-DES-encryption and -decryption
must be provided by the TOE according to an additional Security Policy defined
in the Security Target.
Objectives are taken from the Protection Profile plus additional ones related to
the additional policy.
1.5 Special configuration requirements
The TOE has two different operating modes, user mode and test mode. The
application software being executed on the TOE can not use the test mode. The
TOE is delivered as a hardware unit at the end of the IC manufacturing process
(Phase 3) or at the end of IC Packaging (Phase 4). At this point in time the
operating system including the RMS routines for the SLE66CLxxxPEM
derivatives which support the Mifare® protocol is already stored in the non-
volatile memories of the chip and the test mode is disabled.
The SLE66CL180PEx, the SLE66CL81PEx, the SLE66CL80PEx and the
SLE66CL41PE are identically from hardware perspective and produced with the
same masks with the exception of the first metal mask which contains the
derivate specific information. The difference is that in the SLE66CL81PEx, the
SLE66CL80PEx and the SLE66CL41PE the memory is blocked to smaller size.
This configuration is done before TOE delivery.
Thus, there are no special procedures for generation or installation that are
important for a secure use of the TOE. The further production and delivery
processes, like the Smart Card Finishing Process, Personalisation and the
delivery of the smart card to an end user, have to be organised in a way that
excludes all possibilities of physical manipulation of the TOE.
There are no special security measures for the start-up of the TOE besides the
requirement that the controller has to be used under the well-defined operating
conditions and that the requirements on the software have to be applied as
described in the user documentation and chapter 10 of this Report.
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1.6 Assumptions about the operating environment
Since the Security Target claims conformance to the Protection Profile [9], the
assumptions defined in section 3.2 of the Protection Profile are valid for the
Security Target of this TOE. With respect to the life cycle defined in the Security
Target, Phase 1 and the Phases from TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6
are covered by these assumptions from the PP:
The developer of the Smart card Embedded Software (Phase 1) must ensure:
• the appropriate “Usage of Hardware Platform (A.Plat-Appl)” while developing
this software in Phase 1. Therefore, it has to be ensured, that the software
fulfils the assumptions for a secure use of the TOE. In particular the
assumptions imply that developers are trusted to develop software that fulfils
the assumptions.
• the appropriate “Treatment of User Data (A.Resp-Appl)” while developing
this software in Phase 1. The smart card operating system and the smart
card application software have to use security relevant user data of the TOE
(especially keys and plain text data) in a secure way. It is assumed that the
Security Policy as defined for the specific application context of the
environment does not contradict the Security Objectives of the TOE. Only
appropriate secret keys as input for the cryptographic function of the TOE
have to be used to ensure the strength of cryptographic operation.
Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation (A.Process-Card) is
assumed after TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6, as well as during the
delivery to Phase 7.
The following additional assumption is assumed in the Security Target:
• Key-dependent functions (if any) shall be implemented in the Smart card
Embedded Software in a way that they are not susceptible to leakage
attacks (A.Key-Function).
1.7 Disclaimers
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
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2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller) SLE66CL180PE / m1585-e12,
SLE66CL180PEM / m1584-e12, SLE66CL180PES / m1586-e12,
SLE66CL81PE / m1594-e12, SLE66CL81PEM / m1595-e12, SLE66CL80PE /
m1591-e12, SLE66CL80PEM / m1592-e12, SLE66CL80PES / m1593-e12,
SLE66CL41PE / m1583-e12 with specific IC Dedicated Software
The following tables outline the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Date Form of Delivery
1 HW SLE66CL180PE Smart
Card IC
GDS-file-ID:
m1585-e12 with
production line
indicator: “5” (Altis)
Wafer or packaged
module
SLE66CL180PEM Smart
Card IC
GDS-file-ID:
m1584-e12 with
production line
indicator: “5” (Altis)
Wafer or packaged
module
SLE66CL180PES Smart
Card IC
GDS-file-ID:
m1586-e12 with
production line
indicator: “5” (Altis)
Wafer or packaged
module
SLE66CL81PE Smart
Card IC
GDS-file-ID:
m1594-e12 with
production line
indicator: “5” (Altis)
Wafer or packaged
module
SLE66CL81PEM Smart
Card IC
GDS-file-ID:
m1595-e12 with
production line
indicator: “5” (Altis)
Wafer or packaged
module
SLE66CL80PE Smart
Card IC
GDS-file-ID:
m1591-e12 with
production line
indicator: “5” (Altis)
Wafer or packaged
module
SLE66CL80PEM Smart
Card IC
GDS-file-ID:
m1592-e12 with
production line
indicator: “5” (Altis)
Wafer or packaged
module
SLE66CL80PES Smart
Card IC
GDS-file-ID:
m1593-e12 with
production line
indicator: “5” (Altis)
Wafer or packaged
module
SLE66CL41PE Smart
Card IC
GDS-file-ID:
m1583-e12 with
production line
indicator: “5” (Altis)
Wafer or packaged
module
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No Type Identifier Release Date Form of Delivery
2 FW STS Self Test Software
(the IC Dedicated Test
Software)
V57.08.07 Stored in Test ROM
on the IC
3 FW RMS-E Resource
Management System (the
IC Dedicated Support
Software)
RMS_E V06 Stored in reserved
area of User ROM on
the IC
Table 5: Delivered hardware and software of the TOE
No Type Identifier Release Date Form of Delivery
4 DOC Data Book -
SLE66CL(X)xxxPE(M/S)
Security Controller Family
incl. the errata & delta
Sheet [36]
10.06 October
2006
Hardcopy and
pdf-file
5 DOC Errarta & delta Sheet -
SLE66CL(X)xxxPE(M/S)
Controllers- Products and
Boundout [37]
03.07 March
2007
Hardcopy and
pdf-file
6 DOC Security Programmers’
Manual -
SLE66C(L)xxxP(E)
Controllers [33]
12.06 December
2006
Hardcopy and
pdf-file
7 DOC Security & Chip Card ICs
– SLE66CxxxPE –
Instruction Set [34]
07.04 July 2004 Hardcopy and
pdf-file
8 DOC Chip Card & Security ICs
-SLE66CL(X)xxxPE(M/S)
– Instruction Set and
Special Function
Registers – Quick
Reference [35]
11.06 November
2006
Hardcopy and
pdf-file
9 DOC Application Notes
[10] – [32]
See chapter 14
below
Hardcopy and
pdf-file
Table 6: Delivered documents of the TOE
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The hardware part of the TOE is identified by SLE66CL180PE / m1585-e12,
SLE66CL180PEM / m1584-e12, SLE66CL180PES / m1586-e12,
SLE66CL81PE / m1594-e12, SLE66CL81PEM / m1595-e12, SLE66CL80PE /
m1591-e12, SLE66CL80PEM / m1592-e12, SLE66CL80PES / m1593-e12 and
SLE66CL41PE / m1583-e12. For identification of a specific chip, the Chip
Identification Number stored in the EEPROM can be used (see [36], chapter
7.9).
The chip type byte identifies the different versions in the following manner:
• B3 hex for version m1585e1(x),
• B4 hex for version m1584e1(x),
• B5 hex for version m1586e1(x),
• B1 hex for version m1594e1(x),
• B2 hex for version m1595e1(x),
• A7 hex for version m1591e1(x),
• A3 hex for version m1592e1(x),
• B0 hex for version m1593e1(x),
• AF hex for version m1583e1(x).
Using the additional detailed production parameter bytes, one can reconstruct
the last character (x) of the version number of a specific chip via a database
system at Infineon Logistic Department.
The first nibble of the batch number (see [36], chapter 7) gives the production
line indicator which is "5" for both chip versions manufactured in Infineons IC
fabrication in Corbeil Essonnes (Altis), France.
The STS is identified by its unique version number which is stored in three
additional control bytes of the Chip Identification Number.
The delivery process from the TOE Manufacturer to the Card Manufacturer (to
Phase 4 or Phase 5 of the life cycle) guarantees, that the customer is aware of
the exact versions of the different parts of the TOE as outlined above.
The delivery of the TOE to the customer (card manufacturer) is done in the
following ways:
1. The customer picks up the TOE directly in Großostheim (DC-E), Singapore
(DC-A), Wuxi (DC-C), Tokyo (DC-J) or Hayward (DC-U),
2. The production sites send the TOE to one of the distribution centers
Großostheim (DC-E), Singapore (DC-A), Wuxi (DC-C), Tokyo (DC-J) and
Hayward (DC-U). The distribution centers send the TOE to the customer.
TOE documentation is delivered either as hardcopy or as softcopy (encrypted)
according to defined mailing procedures.
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Defined procedures at the development and production sites guarantee that the
right versions of the RMS and STS are implemented into a specific ROM mask
for a TOE IC.
3 Security Policy
The Security Policy of the TOE is to provide basic Security Functions to be used
by the smart card operating system and the smart card application thus provi-
ding an overall smart card system security. Therefore, the TOE will implement a
symmetric cryptographic block cipher algorithm to ensure the confidentiality of
plain text data by encryption and to support secure authentication protocols and
it will provide a random number generator.
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the Security Policy of the TOE is
also to provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the
confidentiality of cryptographic keys during Triple-DES cryptographic functions
performed by the TOE), against physical probing, against malfunctions, against
physical manipulations and against abuse of functionality. Hence the TOE shall
• maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of
the TOE and
• maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of Security
Functions (security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the
TOE.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The smart card operating system and the application software stored in the
User ROM and in the EEPROM are not part of the TOE. The code in the Test
ROM of the TOE (IC Dedicated Test Software) is used by the TOE
manufacturer to check the chip function before TOE delivery. This was
considered as part of the evaluation under the CC assurance aspects ALC for
relevant procedures and under ATE for testing.
The TOE is delivered as a hardware unit at the end of the chip manufacturing
process (phase 3 of the life cycle defined) or at the end of the IC packaging into
modules (phase 4 of the life cycle defined). At these specific points in time the
operating system software is already stored in the non-volatile memories of the
chip and the test mode is completely disabled.
The smart card applications need the Security Functions of the smart card
operating system based on the security features of the TOE. With respect to
security the composition of this TOE, the operating system, and the smart card
application is important. Within this composition the security functionality is only
partly provided by the TOE and causes dependencies between the TOE
Security Functions and the functions provided by the operating system or the
smart card application on top. These dependencies are expressed by environ-
mental and secure usage assumptions as outlined in the user documentation.
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Within this evaluation of the TOE several aspects were specifically considered
to support a composite evaluation of the TOE together with an embedded smart
card application software (i.e. smart card operating system and application).
This was necessary as Infineon Technologies AG is the TOE developer and
manufacturer and responsible for specific aspects of handling the embedded
smart card application software in its development and production environment.
For those aspects refer to part B, chapter 9.2 of this report.
The full evaluation results are applicable only for TOE chips from the
semiconductor factory in Altis, labelled by the production line indicator „5“.
5 Architectural Information
The Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller) by SLE66CL180PE / m1585-
e12, SLE66CL180PEM / m1584-e12, SLE66CL180PES / m1586-e12,
SLE66CL81PE / m1594-e12, SLE66CL81PEM / m1595-e12, SLE66CL80PE /
m1591-e12, SLE66CL80PEM / m1592-e12, SLE66CL80PES / m1593-e12 and
SLE66CL41PE / m1583-e12 with the specific IC Dedicated Software are
integrated circuits (IC) providing a platform to a smart card operating system
and smart card application software. A top level block diagram and a list of
subsystems can be found within the TOE description of the Security Target. The
complete hardware description and the complete instruction set of the TOE is to
be found in the Data Book [36] and other guidance documents delivered to the
customer, see table 6.
For the implementation of the TOE Security Functions basically the components
processing unit (CPU) with memory management unit (MMU), RAM, ROM,
EEPROM, security logic, interrupt module, bus system, Random Number
Generator (RNG) and the two modules for cryptographic operations of the chip
are used. Security measures for physical protection are realised within the
layout of the whole circuitry.
The Special Function Registers, the CPU instructions and the various on-chip
memories provide the interface to the software using the Security Functions of
the TOE.
The TOE IC Dedicated Test Software (STS), stored on the chip, is used for
testing purposes during production only and is completely separated from the
use of the embedded software by disabling before TOE delivery.
The TOE IC Dedicated Support Software (RMS), stored on the chip, is used for
EEPROM programming and Security Function testing. It is stored by the TOE
manufacturer in a reserved area of the normal user ROM and can be used by
the users embedded software.
6 Documentation
The documentations [10] – [35] are provided with the products by the developer
to the customer for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security
Target.
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Note that the customer who buys the TOE is normally the developer of the
operating system and/or application software which will use the TOE as hard-
ware computing platform to implement the software (operating system /
application software) which will use the TOE.
7 IT Product Testing
The tests performed by the developer were divided into five categories:
(i) Simulation tests: These tests are performed before starting the
production to develop the technology for the production and to define the
process parameters.
(ii) Qualification tests: These tests are performed after the first production of
chips with a new mask. The tests are performed in test mode.
(iii) Verification tests: These tests are performed in user mode and check the
functionality in the end user environment. The results of the qualification
and verification tests are the basis on which it is decided, whether the
TOE is released to production.
(iv) Security evaluation tests: These tests are performed in user mode and
check the security mechanisms aiming on the security functionality and
the effectivness of the mechanisms. The random numbers are tested as
required by AIS 31 and fulfil the criteria.
(v) Production tests: These tests are performed at each TOE before
delivery. The test program stored in the test ROM is carried out for every
chip. The aim of the production tests is to check whether each chip is
functioning correctly.
The developer tests cover all Security Functions and all security mechanisms
as identified in the functional specification, the high level design and the low
level design. Chips from the production site in Altis (see part D, annex A of this
report) were used for tests.
The evaluators testing effort can be summarised into the following classes of
tests: Module tests, Simulation tests, Emulation tests, Tests in user mode, Tests
in test mode and Hardware tests. The evaluators performed independent tests
to supplement, augment and to verify the tests performed by the developer by
sampling. Besides repeating exactly the developers tests, test parameters were
varied and additional analysis was done. With these kind of tests performed in
the developer’s testing environment the entire security functionality of the TOE
was verified. Overall the evaluators have tested the TSF systematically against
the functional specification, the high-level design and the low-level design.
The evaluators supplied evidence that the actual version of the TOE with
production line indicator “5” (Altis) provides the Security Functions as specified.
For this re-evaluation the evaluators re-assessed the penetration testing and
confirmed the results from the previous certification procedure BSI-DSZ-CC-
0399-2007 where they took all Security Functions into consideration. Intensive
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penetration testing was performed at that time to consider the physical
tampering of the TOE using highly sophisticated equipment and expertised
know-how. Specific additional penetration attacks were performed in the course
of this evaluation.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is identified by the version Infineon Smart Card IC (Security
Controller) by SLE66CL180PE / m1585-e12, SLE66CL180PEM / m1584-e12,
SLE66CL180PES / m1586-e12, SLE66CL81PE / m1594-e12, SLE66CL81PEM
/ m1595-e12, SLE66CL80PE / m1591-e12, SLE66CL80PEM / m1592-e12,
SLE66CL80PES / m1593-e12 and SLE66CL41PE / m1583-e12 with the
specific IC Dedicated Software and with production line indicator “5” (Altis).
After delivery the TOE only features one fixed configuration (user mode), which
cannot be altered by the user. The TOE was tested in this configuration. All the
evaluation and certification results therefore are only effective for this version of
the TOE. For all evaluation activities performed in test mode, there was a
rationale why the results are valid for the user mode, too.
Every information of how to use the TOE and its Security Functions by the
software is provided within the user documentation.
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 Evaluation of the TOE
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), [7] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as
relevant for the TOE.
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components identical
with EAL4. For components beyond EAL4 the methodology was defined in co-
ordination with the Certification Body [4], AIS 34). For smart card IC specific
methodology the CC supporting documents
(i) The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
(ii) Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards
(see [4], AIS 25 and AIS 26) and [4], AIS 31 (Functionality classes and
evaluation methodology for physical random number generators) were used.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the
course of the evaluation of the TOE.
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL5
augmented and the class ASE for the Security Target evaluation) are
summarised in the following table.
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Assurance classes and components Verdict
Security Target evaluation CC Class ASE PASS
TOE description ASE_DES.1 PASS
Security environment ASE_ENV.1 PASS
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
PP claims ASE_PPC.1 PASS
IT security requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements ASE_SRE.1 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Configuration management CC Class ACM PASS
Partial CM automation ACM_AUT.1 PASS
Generation support and acceptance procedures ACM_CAP.4 PASS
Development tools CM coverage ACM_SCP.3 PASS
Delivery and operation CC Class ADO PASS
Detection of modification ADO_DEL.2 PASS
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures ADO_IGS.1 PASS
Development CC Class ADV PASS
Semiformal functional specification ADV_FSP.3 PASS
Semiformal high-level design ADV_HLD.3 PASS
Implementation of the TSF ADV_IMP.2 PASS
Modularity ADV_INT.1 PASS
Descriptive low-level design ADV_LLD.1 PASS
Semiformal correspondence demonstration ADV_RCR.2 PASS
Formal TOE Security Policy model ADV_SPM.3 PASS
Guidance documents CC Class AGD PASS
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM.1 PASS
User guidance AGD_USR.1 PASS
Life cycle support CC Class ALC PASS
Sufficiency of security measures ALC_DVS.2 PASS
Standardised life-cycle model ALC_LCD.2 PASS
Compliance with implementation standards ALC_TAT.2 PASS
Tests CC Class ATE PASS
Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS
Testing: low-level design ATE_DPT.2 PASS
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
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Assurance classes and components Verdict
Independent testing – sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
Vulnerability assessment CC Class AVA PASS
Covert channel analysis AVA_CCA.1 PASS
Analysis and testing for insecure states AVA_MSU.3 PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_SOF.1 PASS
Highly resistant AVA_VLA.4 PASS
Table 7: Verdicts for the assurance components
The evaluation has shown that
• the TOE is conform to the Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, BSI-PP-
0002-2001 [9]
• Security Functional Requirements specified for the TOE are Common
Criteria Part 2 extended
• the assurance of the TOE is Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL5
augmented by ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4
• The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function:
SF 2 (Phase management with test mode lock-out),
SF 3 (Protection against snooping),
SF 4 (Data encryption and data disguising) and
SF 5 (Random number generation)
The scheme interpretations AIS 26 and AIS 31 (see [4]) were used.
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
This holds for
(i) the TOE Security Function SF9 which is the Triple DES encryption and
decryption by the hardware co-processor and
(ii) for other usage of encryption and decryption within the TOE.
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production
environment see annex A in part D of this report.
The code in the Test ROM of the TOE (IC Dedicated Test Software) is used by
the TOE manufacturer to check the chip function before TOE delivery. This was
considered as part of the evaluation under the CC assurance aspects ALC for
relevant procedures and under ATE for testing.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as identified in table
5, produced in the semiconductor factory in Altis, labelled by the production line
indicator „5“ within the chip identification number in the EEPROM, and the
firmware and software versions as indicated in table 5 and the documentation
listed in table 6.
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The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product or to
chips from other production and manufacturing sites, provided the sponsor
applies for re-certification or assurance continuity of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation of the
modified product does not reveal any security deficiencies.
9.2 Additional Evaluation Results
• The evaluation confirmed specific results of a previous smart card IC
evaluation regarding assurance aspects for the development and production
environment. This is outlined in part D of this report, annex A.
• To support a composite evaluation of the TOE together with a specific smart
card embedded software additional evaluator actions were performed during
the TOE evaluation. The results are documented in the ETR-lite [8]
according to [4], AIS 36. Therefore, the interface between the smart card
embedded software developer and the developer of the TOE was examined
in detail.
10 Comments/Recommendations
The TOE is delivered to the Smartcard Embedded Software Developer and the
Card Manufacturer. The actual end user obtains the TOE from the Card
Manufacturer together with the application which runs on the TOE.
The Smartcard Embedded Software Developer receives all necessary
recommendations and hints to develop his software in form of the delivered
application notes.
• All security hints described in [33], [36] and the delivered application notes
[10] – [32] have to be considered.
• Especially the recommendation in [33], chapter 4 should be followed.
In addition the following assumptions and requirements concerning external
security measures, explicitly documented in the singles evaluation reports, have
to be fulfilled:
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• Requirement resulting from ADO_DEL:
As the TOE is under control of the user software, the chip manufacturer can
only guarantee the integrity up to the delivery procedure. It is in the
responsibility of the Smartcard Embedded Software Developer to include
mechanisms in the implemented software which allows detection of
modifications after the delivery.
The Smartcard Embedded Software Developer should not accept
deliverables from Infineon he had not requested. All confidential information
sent in electronic form has to be accepted only in encrypted form.
• Requirement resulting from AGD_ADM and AGD_USR:
In the environment the following assumption has to be fulfilled:
• “Protection during packaging, finishing and personalisation” resulting from
A.Process-Card (It is assumed that security procedures are used after
delivery of the TOE by the TOE Manufacturer up to delivery to the end-
user to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and of its
manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copy, modification,
retention, theft or unauthorised use). This means that the Phases after
TOE Delivery are assumed to be protected appropriately).
• In addition the development environment of the operating system
developer has to be protected adequately, in order to be able to
guarantee the security of the TOE on the whole.
• Requirement resulting from AGD_ADM and AGD_USR:
The following requirements of the environment defined in [6] has to be taken
into consideration from the Smartcard Embedded Software Developer:
• “Cryptographic key generation“ resulting from FCS_CKM.1 (for 3DES), or
“Import of user data without security attributes” resulting from FDP_ITC.1
(for 3DES), or “Import of user data with security attributes” resulting from
FDP_ITC.2 (for 3DES),
• “Cryptographic key destruction“ resulting from FCS_CKM.4 (for 3DES),
and
• “Secure security attributes” resulting from FMT_MSA.2 (for 3DES).
• RE.Phase-1: Design and Implementation of the Smartcard Embedded
Software
• RE.Process-Card: Protection during Packaging, Finishing and
Personalisation
• RE.Cipher: Cipher Schemas
• Requirement resulting from AVA_MSU:
During development of the Smartcard Embedded Software the correct
configuration of the following parameters has to be checked:
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• Wait states functionality is activated for all operations of the Embedded
Software critical for side channel attacks (e.g. SPA/DPA),
• FCURSE functionality is activated for all operations of the Embedded
Software critical for side channel attacks (e.g. SPA/DPA),
• parameters for memory encryption E0ADR, E2ADR and E2ENC (XKEY)
which configure the ranges of encryption,
• if the SW comparison of random numbers to/with regard to the active
shielding is correctly implemented [28],
• MMU is configured correct,
• calls of the self test of the TSF implemented in the RMS routines to
detect failures of the sensors are implemented. Depending on the
application (e.g. time between possible resets) the developer of the
Smartcard Embedded Software has to decide how often this function has
to be executed during normal operation. The self test shall be executed
at least once during security relevant operation (e.g. key generation).
• call of the test of the random number generation to detect failures of the
RNG is implemented.
• Application of the security advices given in [36], chapter 19.9, [33], and
[27].
• Recomendation resulting from AVA_VLA [33,chapter 4]
11 Annexes
Annex A: Evaluation results regarding the development and production
environment (see part D of this report).
12 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the target of evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document.
13 Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
3DES Symmetric block cipher algorithm based on the DES
API Application Programming Interface
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
DES Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
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DPA Differential Power Analysis
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ECB Electrical Code Block
EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
EMA Electro magnetic analysis
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IC Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
RAM Random Access Memory
RNG Random Number Generator
ROM Read Only Memory
RSA Rivest, Shamir, Adelmann – a public key encryption algorithm
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
Triple-DES Symmetric block cipher algorithm based on the DES
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
TSS TOE Summary Specification
13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0431-2007 Certification Report
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
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14 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, version
2.3, August 2005
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Evaluation Methodology, version 2.3, August 2005
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[6] Security Target, Infineon Technologies AG, Security and Chipcard ICs,
SLE66CL180PE / m1585-e12, SLE66CL180PEM / m1584-e12,
SLE66CL180PES / m1586-e12, SLE66CL81PE / m1594-e12,
SLE66CL81PEM / m1595-e12, SLE66CL80PE / m1591-e12,
SLE66CL80PEM / m1592-e12, SLE66CL80PES / m1593-e12 and
SLE66CL41PE / m1583-e12, 20. February 2007, Version 1.2,
(confidential document)
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 3, 13. July 2007, for the Product
Smart Card IC (Security Controller) SLE66CL180PE / m1585-e12,
SLE66CL180PEM / m1584-e12, SLE66CL180PES / m1586-e12,
SLE66CL81PE / m1594-e12, SLE66CL81PEM / m1595-e12,
SLE66CL80PE / m1591-e12, SLE66CL80PEM / m1592-e12,
SLE66CL80PES / m1593-e12 and SLE66CL41PE / m1583-e12,
(confidential document)
[8] ETR-lite for composition, according to AIS 36, Version 3, 13. July 2007,
for the Product Smart Card IC (Security Controller) SLE66CL180PE /
m1585-e12, SLE66CL180PEM / m1584-e12, SLE66CL180PES / m1586-
e12, SLE66CL81PE / m1594-e12, SLE66CL81PEM / m1595-e12,
SLE66CL80PE / m1591-e12, SLE66CL80PEM / m1592-e12,
SLE66CL80PES / m1593-e12 and SLE66CL41PE / m1583-e12
(confidential document)
[9] Smart card IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July 2001, BSI
registration ID: BSI-PP-0002-2001, developed by Atmel Smart Card ICs,
Hitachi Ltd., Infineon Technologies AG, Philips Semiconductors
[10] SLE66CLxxxP - Anticollision Type A, Version 03.03, March 2003,
Infineon Technologies AG
[11] SLE66CLxxxP - Anticollision Type B, Version 03.03, March 2003 Infineon
Technologies AG
[12] SLE66CLxxxP - Card Coil Design Guide, Version 10.05, October 2005,
Infineon Technologies AG
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0431-2007 Certification Report
[13] SLE66CLXxxxPE – Implementation of Transmission Protocol according
to ISO/IEC 14443 Part 3 and 4, Version 02.06, February 2006, Infineon
Technologies AG
[14] SLE66CLxxxP - Implementation of Transmission Protocol according to
ISO/IEC 14443 Part 4, Version 03.03, March 2003, Infineon
Technologies AG
[15] Application Note, SLE66CXxxS Using CRC (PDF+SW), Version 03.01,
March 2001, Infineon Technologies AG
[16] Application Note, SLE66CXxxP, Infineon Chipcard Crypto API
(PDF+SW), Version 05.02, May 2002, Infineon Technologies AG
[17] Application Note, SLE66CxxxP, DDES - EC2 confidential, Version 02.04,
February 2004, Infineon Technologies AG
[18] Complementary Application Note SLE66CxxxPE, DDES – EC2
confidential, Version 07.05, July 2005, Infineon Technologies AG
[19] Application Note, SLE66CxxxPE, Using MicroSlim NVM (cLib),
confidential, Version 05.05, May 2005, Infineon Technologies AG
[20] Application Note, SLE66CxxxP/PE, Memory Encryption Decryption
confidential, Version 11.04, November 2004, Infineon Technologies AG
[21] Application Note, SLE66CxxxPE, MMU-Memory Management Unit
(PDF+SW) confidential, Version 12.04, December 2004, Infineon
Technologies AG
[22] Application Note, SLE66CxxxP, MMU Security Issues (PDF) confidential,
Version 01.02, January 2002, Infineon Technologies AG
[23] SLE66CLxxxP - Optimized Contactless Energy performance, Version
01.07, January 2007, Infineon Technologies AG
[24] SLE66C(L)xxxPE - Optimized Usage of Data NVM Above 64k, Version
08.05, August 2005, Infineon Technologies AG
[25] Application Note, SLE66CxxxP/PE, Testing the RNG, confidential,
Version 11.04, November 2004, Infineon Technologies AG
[26] Application Note, SLE66CxxxP/PE, Using RNG a.t. FIPS140 (PDF+SW),
confidential, Version 02.04, February 2004, Infineon Technologies AG
[27] Application Note, SLE66CxxxPE, Security Advice 05.04 (PDF+SW)
confidential, Version 05.04, May 2004, Infineon Technologies AG
[28] Application Note, SLE66CxxxPE, Using the active shield, confidential,
Version 12.04, December 2004 Infineon Technologies AG
[29] Application Note, DES – software version (PDF+SW), confidential,
Version 09.97, September 1997, Infineon Technologies AG
[30] Application Note, SLE66CxxxP, UART (PDF+SW), confidential, Version
10.03, October 2003, Infineon Technologies AG
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B-28
[31] Application Note, SLE66CxxxPE - UART basic (PDF), Version 02.07,
February 2007
[32] Application Note, SLE66CxxxPE - UART static (PDF), Version 01.07,
January 2007
[33] Security Programmers’ Manual - SLE66C(L)xxxP(E) Controllers, Version
12.06, December 2006
[34] Security & Chip Card ICs – SLE66CxxxPE – Instruction Set, Version
07.04, July 2004, Infineon Technologies AG
[35] Chip Card & Security ICs - SLE66CL(X)xxxPE(M/S) – Instruction Set and
Special Function Registers – Quick Reference, Version 11.06, November
2006, Infineon Technologies AG
[36] Data Book – SLE66CL(X)xxxPE(M/S) Security Controller, Version 10.06,
31 October 2006, Infineon Technologies AG
[37] Errarta & delta Sheet – SLE66CL(X)xxxPE(M/S) Controllers – Products
and Boundout, Version 03.07, March 2007, Infineon Technologies AG
BSI-DSZ-CC-0431-2007 Certification Report
C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements
that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result
is presented with respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3
(assurance requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of
requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
a) CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the
functional requirements are based only upon functional components in
CC Part 2.
b) CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the
functional requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
a) CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the
assurance requirements are based only upon assurance components in
CC Part 3.
b) CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the
assurance requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part
3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect
to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
a) Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-
defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) include all components in the
packages listed as part of the conformance result.
b) Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-
defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all
components in the packages listed as part of the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect
to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
a) PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of
the conformance result.“
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CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are
shown in Table 1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
ACM: Configuration management CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
ADV: Development TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security Policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
Development security (ALC_DVS)
ALC: Life cycle support Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
Coverage (ATE_COV)
ATE: Tests Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that
balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of
acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate
concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of
maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are
included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful
and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and
components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and
STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a
hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families.
Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component
where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation
assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance.
They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more
assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is
accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component
from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth)
and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no
more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance
dependencies of every component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other
combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the
addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already
included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another
hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an
EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be
augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component”
is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it
the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of
the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended
with explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance Class Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but
the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where
independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has
been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer,
including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the
guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could
be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE,
and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a
manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection
against identified threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of
design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the
part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such
it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the
absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a
situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the
developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from
positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of
existing sound development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough
investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-
engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other
resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically
feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in
conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-
specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security
engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported
by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a
TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5
assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5
requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of
specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development
and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable
costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to
produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant
risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for
application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets
justifies the additional costs.”
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0431-2007 Certification Report
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies
the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with
tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal
analysis.“
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C-8
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted,
it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept
of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their
security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical
analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required
to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE
security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of
the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to
violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover
flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the
ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised
capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of
all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance
level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified
vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found
useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by
the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the
TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a
low (for AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for
AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant)
attack potential.”
BSI-DSZ-CC-0431-2007 Certification Report
D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment D-3
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0431-2007 Certification Report
Annex A of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0431-2007
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller) SLE66CL180PE /
m1585-e12, SLE66CL180PEM / m1584-e12, SLE66CL180PES / m1586-e12,
SLE66CL81PE / m1594-e12, SLE66CL81PEM / m1595-e12, SLE66CL80PE /
m1591-e12, SLE66CL80PEM / m1592-e12, SLE66CL80PES / m1593-e12,
SLE66CL41PE / m1583-e12 with specific IC Dedicated Software (Target of
Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/ approved
evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation,
version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005), extended by advice of the Certification Body
for components beyond EAL4 and smart card specific guidance, for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, version 2.3
(ISO/IEC15408: 2005).
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 08. August 2007, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common
Criteria assurance requirements
• ACM – Configuration management (i.e. ACM_AUT.1, ACM_CAP.4,
ACM_SCP.3),
• ADO – Delivery and operation (i.e. ADO_DEL.2, ADO_IGS.1) and
• ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.2, ALC_TAT.2),
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
a) Infineon Technologies AG, Secure Mobile Solutions, Alter Postweg
101, 86159 Augsburg, Germany (Development)
b) Altis Semiconductor S.N.C., Boulevard John Kennedy 224, 91105
Corbeil Essonnes, France (Production)
c) Altis Toppan (former DuPont), Toppan Photomask, Inc, European
Technology Center, Boulevard John Kennedy 224, 91105 Corbeil-
Essonnes Cedex, France (Mask Center)
d) Amkor Technology Philippines, Km. 22 East Service Rd., South
Superhighway, Muntinlupa City 1702, Philipines, and Amkor
Technology Philippines, 119 North Science Avenue, Laguna
Technopark, Binan, Laguna 4024, Philipines (Module Mounting)
e) Infineon Technologies Austria AG, Development Center Graz,
Babenbergerstr. 10, 8020 Graz, Austria, and Infineon Technologies
Austria AG, Siemensstr. 2, 9500 Villach, Austria (Development)
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0431-2007
D-4
f) Infineon Technologies Dresden GmbH & Co. OHG, Königsbrücker
Str. 180, 01099 Dresden, Germany (Production)
g) Toppan Photomask Inc., Rähnitzer Allee 9, 01109 Dresden, Germany
(Mask Center)
h) Assa Abloy Identification Technologies GmbH (former Sokymat
GmbH), In den Weiden 4b, 99099 Erfurt, Germany (Antenna inlay
mounting)
i) Kuehne & Nagel, 30805 Santana Street, Hayward, CA 94544 U.S.A.
(Distribution Center)
j) Infineon Technologies AG, Am Campeon 1-12, 85579 Neubiberg,
and Infineon Technologies AG, Otto-Hahn-Ring 6, 81739 München
(Perlach), Germany (Development)
k) Infineon Technologies AG, Leibnizstrasse 6, 93055 Regensburg
(Burgweinting), Germany (Module Mounting (with inlay antenna
mounting), warehouse)
l) Exel Singapore Pte Ltd, Exel Supply Chian Hub, 81, ALPS Avenue,
Singapore (Distribution Center)
m) Kintetsu World Express, Inc., Tokyo Import Logistics Center, Narita
Terminal, Tokyo, Japan (Distribution Center)
n) Infineon Technologies (Wuxi) Co. Ltd., No. 118, Xing Chuang San
Lu, Wuxi-Singapore Industrial Park, Wuxi 214028, Jiangsu, P.R.
China (Module Mounting, Delivery)
The hardware part of the TOE produced in the semiconductor factory in Altis,
France, is labelled by the production line indicator „5“.
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in
accordance with the Security Target, BSI-DSZ-0431-2007, Version 1.2, 20.
February 2007, Security and Chipcard ICs, SLE66CL180PE / m1585-e12,
SLE66CL180PEM / m1584-e12, SLE66CL180PES / m1586-e12,
SLE66CL81PE / m1594-e12, SLE66CL81PEM / m1595-e12, SLE66CL80PE /
m1591-e12, SLE66CL80PEM / m1592-e12, SLE66CL80PES / m1593-e12 and
SLE66CL41PE / m1583-e12, Infineon Technologies AG [6].
The evaluators verified, that the threats and the security objective for the life
cycle phases 2, 3 and 4 up to delivery at the end of phases 3 or 4 as stated in
the Security Target [6] are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.