Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0364-2007
for
Vanguard Enforcer
Version 7 Release 1
from
Vanguard Integrity Professionals, Inc.
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)3018 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)3018 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)3018 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-326 V3.32
Common Criteria Arrangement
BSI-DSZ-CC-0364-2007
Vanguard Enforcer
Version 7 Release 1
from
Vanguard Integrity Professionals, Inc.
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3
(ISO/IEC 15408:2005) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, Version
2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
Evaluation Results:
Functionality Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance Package: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL3 augmented by
ALC_FLR.1 – Basic flaw remediation
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme
of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, 08 March 2007
The President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Dr. Helmbrecht L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)3018 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)3018 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)3018 9582-111
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty
of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0364-2007 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
1
Under the BSIG Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
V
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0364-2007
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
VI
BSI-DSZ-CC-0364-2007 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
2
• BSIG
3
• BSI Certification Ordinance
4
• BSI Schedule of Costs
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
• DIN EN 45011 standard
• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
5
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), version 2.3
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), version 2.3
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
• Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance
components above EAL4 (AIS 34)
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger
dated 19 May 2006, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0364-2007
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective in March 1998. This agreement has been signed by
the national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United
Kingdom. This agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates
was extended to include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels
(EAL 1 – EAL 7). The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI)
recognizes certificates issued by the national certification bodies of France and
the United Kingdom within the terms of this Agreement.
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 has been signed in May 2000 (CC-MRA). It includes also the recognition
of Protection Profiles based on the CC. As of February 2007 the arrangement
has been signed by the national bodies of:
Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden,
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America.
The current list of signatory nations resp. approved certification schemes can be
seen on the web site: http:\\www.commoncriteriaportal.org
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0364-2007 Certification Report
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Vanguard Enforcer, Version 7 Release 1 has undergone the
certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product Vanguard Enforcer, Version 7 Release 1 was
conducted by atsec information security GmbH. The atsec information security
GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor, vendor and distributor is:
Vanguard Integrity Professionals, Inc.
6625 South Eastern Ave, Suite 100
Las Vegas, NV 89119-3930
USA
The certification is concluded with
• the comparability check and
• the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on 08 March 2007.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in
the following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described as specified in the
following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0364-2007
4 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-20.
The product Vanguard Enforcer, Version 7 Release 1 has been included in the
BSI list of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
http:// www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor7
of
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the above-
mentioned website.
7
Vanguard Integrity Professionals, Inc.
6625 South Eastern Ave, Suite 100
Las Vegas, NV 89119-3930
USA
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0364-2007 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0364-2007
Contents of the certification results
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification of the TOE 7
3 Security Policy 8
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 8
5 Architectural Information 10
6 Documentation 11
7 IT Product Testing 11
8 Evaluated Configuration 13
9 Results of the Evaluation 14
10 Comments/Recommendations 16
11 Annexes 16
12 Security Target 16
13 Definitions 16
14 Bibliography 19
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0364-2007 Certification Report
1 Executive Summary
The Vanguard Enforcer Version 7 Release 1 (also called Vanguard Enforcer
Version 7.1.1 in the following) provides administrative support for the IBM
Resource Access Control Facility (RACF) Security Server, running on the IBM
z/OS V1R6 operating system executing in an abstract machine on an IBM
zSeries processor.
The product is intended to provide automated surveillance and optional control
of the z/OS RACF profiles and settings. Enforcer monitors the RACF
configuration settings and modifies them (using the RACF SETROPTS
command) via the 'Security Server Options Settings’. This includes RACF
configuration settings, RACF profile definitions, and select system
configurations (APF list, Link List, Program properties table, SVC definitions).
Vanguard Enforcer monitors selected installation defined settings and operating
system settings. When discrepancies are found Enforcer will perform one or
more of the following operations:
• Log the discrepancy.
• Notify pre-determined administrators of the discrepancy.
• Optionally take automatic corrective action to restore the system to the
baseline configuration, where a “baseline” is a set of the values that
represent the system settings in the correct configuration.
Vanguard Enforcer is accessed via the following interfaces:
• z/OS Operator Console: The MVS operator command interface is used to
start, stop and modify the operating characteristics of Enforcer.
• Interactive System Productivity Facility (ISPF) Interface: The The ISPF
interface allows the administrator to perform the operations needed to
configure Enforcer.
The IT product Vanguard Enforcer, Version 7 Release 1 was evaluated by atsec
information security GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 07 February
2007. The atsec information security GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)8
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor, vendor and distributor is
Vanguard Integrity Professionals, Inc.
6625 South Eastern Ave, Suite 100
Las Vegas, NV 89119-3930
USA
8
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0364-2007
1.1 Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see Annex C or [1], part
3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level
EAL3 (Evaluation Assurance Level 3 augmented by ALC_FLR.1). The following
table shows the augmented assurance components.
Requirement Identifier
EAL3 TOE evaluation: methodically tested and checked
+: ALC_FLR.1 Life cycle support – Basic flaw remediation
Table 1: Assurance components and EAL-augmentation
1.2 Functionality
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) selected in the Security
Target are Common Criteria Part 2 extended as shown in the following tables.
The following SFRs are taken from CC part 2:
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FAU Security Audit
FAU_ARP.1 Security audit automatic response
FMT Security Management
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Table 2: SFRs for the TOE taken from CC Part 2
The following CC part 2 extended SFRs are defined:
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FAU Security Audit
FAU_SAA.5-RACF RACF Potential Violation Analysis
Table 3: SFRs for the TOE, CC part 2 extended
Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the ST chapter 5.2.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0364-2007 Certification Report
The following Security Functional Requirements are defined for the IT-
Environment of the TOE:
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FDP User Data Protection
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FIA Identification and Authentication
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FMT Security Management
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.3 Static Attribute Initialization
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FPT Protection of the TSF
FPT_SEP.1 Domain Seperation
FPT_STM.1 Reliable Time Stamps
Table 4: SFRs for the IT-Environment
Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the ST chapter 5.5.
These Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the TOE Security
Functions:
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
F.AU Audit
F.AU.1 Sensor violation analysis and automatic response
F.MGMT TOE Management
F.MGMT.1 Security Administrators
customization.
may perform Enforcer
F.MGMT.2 Security Administrators define and select RACF profiles
monitored.
F.MGMT.3 Security Administrators may select or deselect options for
automatic RACF profile correction
F.MGMT.4 Security
options
Administrators may select general security
F.MGMT.5 Security Administrators may select notification recipients
Table 5: Security Functions
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0364-2007
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6.1.
1.3 Strength of Function
No SOF claims are made for this evaluation.
1.4 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies
(OSPs) addressed by the evaluated IT product
The following threat must be countered by security functions implemented by
the TOE:
T.ADMINISTRATIVE_ERROR: Due to the complexity of and changes to RACF
profiles and administrators are asumed to be trustworthy and trained, deviations
to a designated system configuration may arise. The purpose of the TOE is to
provide a baseline data set of the security settings that can be used to make
comparisons to RACF profiles and system configurations on an ongoing basis
so changes may be detected.
The ST [6] describes the following organisational security policies the TOE must
comply with:
• P.RACF_MONITOR_ROLLBACK: The RACF Security Server database
profiles and select system configurations shall be monitored for changes
from the predefined baseline; the default action for detected changes shall
be to roll back changes to a known state as defined in the baseline data set.
• P.RACF_MONITOR_NOTIFY: The RACF Security Server database shall be
monitored for changes from the predefined baseline; notices of detected
changes shall be sent to the designated administrator.
1.5 Special configuration requirements
The Target of Evaluation, Vanguard Enforcer Version 7.1.1, requires the
„Vanguard Date Code Software“ element to be installed. For other components
that are installed automatically please refer to chapter 5.
Additionally, the TOE is required to run on IBM zSeries hardware equivalent to
the Common Criteria evaluated configuration of the zSeries operating system
as described in [12], restricted to the Discretionary Access Control mode of
operation. All required, optional, and restricted software configurations
described in that document must be followed.
Vanguard Enforcer Version 7.1.1 requires the following PTFs (Program
Temporary Fixes) to be installed (please refer to [11]): VED6306, VED6301,
VED6300, VED6299, VED6298, VED6297, VED6296, VED6294, VED6293,
VED6291, VED6290, VED6285, VED6284, VED6283, VED6279, VED6277,
VED6272, VED6259.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0364-2007 Certification Report
1.6 Assumptions about the operating environment
The following assumptions about the environment of the TOE are made:
• A.AUTHORIZE: Procedures exist for granting only authorized users access
to TOE controls.
• A.TIMESTAMP: The environment will provide reliable timestamps.
1.7 Disclaimers
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Vanguard Enforcer, Version 7 Release 1
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 SW Vanguard Enforcer product Version 7,
Release 1
Tape
2 SW PTFs:
VED6306, VED6301,
VED6300, VED6299,
VED6298, VED6297,
VED6296, VED6294,
VED6293, VED6291,
VED6290, VED6285,
VED6284, VED6283,
VED6279, VED6277,
VED6272, VED6259
Tape
3 DOC Vanguard Enforcer™
Administrator Guide
November 2006 PDF (VENF-111606-710U)
4 DOC Vanguard Security
Solutions™ Installation
Guide
November 2006 PDF (VSS-111606-710I)
5 DOC Vanguard Enforcer™
Secure Installation and
Operations for Common
Criteria
November 2006 PDF (VENF-111606-710I)
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No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
6 DOC Vanguard Enforcer™ Cover PDF (VENFC -111606-710C)
Letter for Common Criteria
Table 6: Deliverables of the TOE
3 Security Policy
The Vanguard Enforcer provides administrative support for the IBM Resource
Access Control Facility (RACF) Security Server.
Therefore its main purose is to provide mechanisms for security audit and
security management.
The security policy of the TOE is defined by the following TOE security
functional requirements:
• SFR components of the class FAU define the mechanisms for security audit
and the reaction of the TOE in case of a violation of a predefined system
configuration.
• SFR components of the class FMT define the management functions the
TOE provides.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The security aspects of the environment in which the TOE is expected to be
used are described in terms of assumptions. The assumptions for the
environment are divided into assumptions about the intended usage of the TOE
and assumptions about the environment the TOE is going to be used in.
4.1 Usage assumptions
• A.ADMINISTRATION: There will be one or more competent individuals
assigned to manage the TOE and the security of the information it contains,
however, no assumption is made that an administrator cannot make errors.
• A.NO_EVIL_ADM: The personnel responsible for the administration of the
TOE are not careless, willfully negligent, or hostile, and will follow and abide
by the instructions provided by the administrator documentation.
• A.SECURITY_ADMINISTRATOR: There will be an individual assigned to
administer TOE security that is different that the individual assigned to
administer IT environment security. The intention is to have the
administration of TOE security functions separated from that of the IT
environment security administration, thereby preventing one administrator
from duplicating errors made in the setup of the IT environment RACF
database and the TOE baseline data set.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0364-2007 Certification Report
4.2 Environmental assumptions
• A.MULTIPLE_SENSOR_SESSION: The administration of multiple TOE
Sensor sessions must ensure each is session monitors different aspects of
the system and that overlap between sessions is eliminated.
• A.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS: The TOE code, configuration, audit files, log
files, and baseline data sets are protected from unauthorized access using
the access control functions of the underlying operating system.
• A.CAPP_MODE: z/OS as part of the IT environment is operated using only
Discretionary Access Control (as defined by the z/OS Security Target); the
use of Mandatory Access Control is not allowed.
• A.LOCATE: The processing resources of the TOE will be located within
controlled access facilities, which will prevent unauthorized physical access
to the hardware the TOE is running on.
• A.PROTECT: The TOE software, which is critical to security policy
enforcement, will be protected from unauthorized modification.
4.3 Clarification of scope
The TOE environment must comply with the following OSP:
• PE.AUTHORIZED_USERS: The TOE environment must ensure that only
those users who have been authorized to access the information within the
system may access the system and the TOE code and configuration data
sets are protected from unauthorized access.
• PE.AUTHENTICATE: The TOE environment must ensure that all users are
identified and authenticated before being granted access to the TOE
mediated resources. Such limited access to the TOE is configured by the
administrator and should be conformant with the security policies of the
organization responsible for the operations of the TOE.
• PE.MANAGE: Those responsible for the TOE environment must ensure that
the underlying operating system and hardware is configured and managed
in a secure way.
• PE.INSTALL: Those responsible for the TOE environment must ensure that
the TOE is installed in a secure manner, as specified in the Installation,
Generation, and Secure Installation guidance.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0364-2007
5 Architectural Information
The TOE is comprised of Startup code, Option Interface code, Sensor code,
Vanguard Date Code Software, and guidance documentation. The TOE is
intended to be used as an audit tool on an IBM zSeries z/OS system.
This means in detail that the TOE software is comprised of the following major
components:
1. Startup and Option Interface Components
a. Enforcer REXX execs (Restructured Extended Executor executable
code)
b. Enforcer ISPF Dialogs
2. Sensor Component
a. The Sensor Task
3. Vanguard Date Code Software
The Sensor Task is used to monitor the system wide options and the RACF
security server database, detect changes to selected profiles, and by default,
rollback changes, where possible, to the settings contained in a data set that is
generated specifically to establish a “baseline” set of the values that represent
the system settings in the correct configuration.
Multiple TOE Sensor Tasks (or sessions) may be run concurrently; however,
each must maintain its own required baseline data set.
The TOE requires that Vanguard Date Code Software validate the Enforcer
software license prior to and during execution, and although it is part of the
TOE, it has no security functionality.
The following figure - TOE and TOE Environment - shows the major
components of TOE software within its intended environment, although it is not
intended to be a detailed representation of the product, but is intended to show
the general structure only. It shows only one Sensor Task, as all TOE Sensor
tasks act independently without knowledge of or communication to others. The
administration of multiple TOE Sensor tasks must ensure each is monitoring
different aspects of the system and overlap is eliminated.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0364-2007 Certification Report
Figure 1: TOE and TOE Environment
6 Documentation
For a listing of the documentation delivered with the TOE please refer to
chapter 2 or chapter 14 of this report.
7 IT Product Testing
7.1 Developer testing
TOE test configuration: The TOE was tested on a system equivalent the
evaluated configuration described in the Security Target for IBM z/OS Version 1
Release 6 [12] with the following specifications:
xSeries 255 with 3.0 GHz processors (4), and
• RedHat Linux base OS
9
• FLEX-ES z/Series emulation software
• z/VM 4.4 (64bit)
• z/OS 1.6 EAL3 Certified OS
The evaluated configuration was installed following the guidance in the Secure
Installation and Operations for Common Criteria manual, the Installation Guide
and Administrators Guide ([8]-[11]).
9
FLEX-ES is a software-based emulation of a z/Series mainframe. FLEX-ES runs on Intel
based architectures and allows to execute z/OS on top of it without any necessary modifications
or configuration particularities. It was ensured that the FLEX-ES establishes an equivalent
implementation of the z/Architecture to fulfil the requirements of z/OS.
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Testing approach: The developer employed the strategy to create specific
individual test cases for each TSF aspect modeled in the Security Target. This
resulted in every sensor being thoroughly tested: all potential discrepancies that
a sensor would be able to identify between system configuration and Enforcer's
baselines are covered by the tests. All aspects of the security management
functionality defined in the ST are covered as well, including all relevant
configuration options for the TOE. Positive verification testing was augmented
by negative testing (for example, making sure that the TOE does not accept
values out of the specified range).
Test cases in general are executed manually, with JCL scripts supporting the
configuration and de-configuration of conditions in the underlying system. The
relevant interfaces have been triggered directly and indirectly as appropriate.
Test results: Test results were observed by analysis of the output generated by
the TOE in its log file and via emails to administrators, and if necessary by
verifying that the TOE had taken the corrective action in the underlying system
as expected. All tests have been successfully executed.
7.2 Evaluator testing
TOE test configuration: The TOE was tested on the same system used for
developer testing.
Independent testing covered aspects of all TOE SFRs and security functions.
The security functions tested by independent tests include:
• F.AU.1.1 - System APF Sensor
• F.AU.1.2 - System Critical Data Sets Sensor
• F.AU.1.4 - Access List Expiration Processing Sensor
• F.AU.1.8 - System Program Properties (PPT) Sensor
• F.AU.1.11 - System Security Server Options Sensor
• F.AU.1.13 - System SVC Sensor
• F.AU.1.15 - Installation Critical Data Set Profiles Sensor
• F.MGMT.1 - TSF administration
• F.MGMT.3 - Warning/nowarning mode
The evaluator demonstrated that a reasonable sample size of developer tests
have been witnessed. Selection criteria included functions that were noticed
during the course of the evaluation as being of particular interest to the
evaluators, tests covering both typical and untypical sensor architectures, and
the coverage of both management and sensor functionality.
Test results: Aspects of all SFRs were represented in the sample. All tests
have been successfully executed.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0364-2007 Certification Report
7.3 Penetration testing
While some of the penetration tests devised by the evaluator directly address
security functional behavior as specified in the ST, a number of penetration
tests were carried out that targeted the TOE architecture as a whole rather than
individual security functions. This included aspects like the internal scheduling
of sensor execution and suspected concurrency issues. The evaluators devised
both automated as well as manual tests, as appropriate, and carried them out in
conjunction with the independent test activities.
The security functions tested during penetration testing include:
• F.AU.1.3 - Installation Critical Groups Sensor
• F.AU.1.5 - Installation Critical General Resource Profiles Sensor
• F.AU.1.6 - System Link List Sensor
• F.AU.1.13 - System SVC Sensor
• F.AU.1.14 - Installation Critical DASD Volumes Sensor
• F.MGMT.1 - TSF administration
As a result of the evaluation, no exploitable obvious vulnerabilities and no
residual vulnerabilities for the TOE in its intended environment were identified.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated version of the TOE is Vanguard Enforcer 7.1.1 as described in
the ST [6]. The TOE has to be set up in accordance to the guidance
documentation as described in chapter 2 of this report and the Security Target.
Both the developer and the evaluator have tested the TOE on an underlying
system equivalent the evaluated configuration described in the Security Target
for IBM z/OS Version 1 Release 6 [12] with the following specifications:
xSeries 255 with 3.0 GHz processors (4), and
• RedHat Linux base OS
• FLEX-ES z/Series emulation software
• z/VM 4.4 (64bit)
• z/OS 1.6 EAL3 Certified OS
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), [7] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as
relevant for the TOE.
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components identical
with EAL3.
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL3
augmented by ALC_FLR.1 and the class ASE for the Security Target
evaluation) are summarised in the following table.
Assurance classes and components Verdict
Security Target evaluation CC Class ASE PASS
TOE description ASE_DES.1 PASS
Security environment ASE_ENV.1 PASS
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
PP claims ASE_PPC.1 PASS
IT security requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements ASE_SRE.1 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Configuration management CC Class ACM PASS
Authorisation controls ACM_CAP.3 PASS
TOE CM coverage ACM_SCP.1 PASS
Delivery and operation CC Class ADO PASS
Delivery procedures ADO_DEL.1 PASS
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures ADO_IGS.1 PASS
Development CC Class ADV PASS
Informal functional specification ADV_FSP.1 PASS
Security enforcing high-level design ADV_HLD.2 PASS
Informal correspondence demonstration ADV_RCR.1 PASS
Guidance documents CC Class AGD PASS
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM.1 PASS
User guidance AGD_USR.1 PASS
Life cycle support CC Class ALC PASS
Identification of security measures ALC_DVS.1 PASS
Basic flaw remediation ALC_FLR.1 PASS
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Assurance classes and components Verdict
Tests CC Class ATE PASS
Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS
Testing: high-level design ATE_DPT.1 PASS
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
Independent testing – sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
Vulnerability assessment CC Class AVA PASS
Examination of guidance AVA_MSU.1 PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_SOF.1 PASS
Developer vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA.1 PASS
Table 7: Verdicts for the assurance components
The evaluation has shown that:
• the Security Functional Requirements specified for the TOE are Common
Criteria Part 2 extended
• the assurance of the TOE is Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL3
augmented by ALC_FLR.1
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the Vanguard Enforcer
Version 7.1.1 as described in chapter 2 of this report.
The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification or assurance continuity of the
modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the
evaluation of the modified product does not reveal any security deficiencies.
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10 Comments/Recommendations
The operational documents [8] - [11] contain necessary information about the
usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered.
11 Annexes
None.
12 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the security target [6] of the target of evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document.
13 Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
IT Information Technology
PP Protection Profile
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
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13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
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TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
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14 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.3, August 2005
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Evaluation Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-0364-2007, Version 1.39, 01.12.2006,
Vanguard Enforcer™ Version 7.1 Common Criteria Security Target
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 3, 07.02.2007, (confidential
document)
[8] Vanguard Enforcer Administrator Guide, Document Number VENF-
111606-710U, November 2006
[9] Vanguard Enforcer Secure Installation and Operations for Common
Criteria, Document Number VENF-111606-710I, November 2006
[10] Vanguard Security Solutions Installation Guide, Document Number VSS-
111606-710I
[11] Cover Letter to Customers who have ordered Vanguard Enforcer 7.1
Common Criteria EAL3+ Evaluated Configuration, Document Number
VENFC -111606-710C
[12] Security Target for IBM z/OS Version 1 Release 6, V1.15, February
2005, http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/public/files/epfiles/0247b.pdf
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements
that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result
is presented with respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3
(assurance requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of
requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
a) CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the
functional requirements are based only upon functional components in
CC Part 2.
b) CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the
functional requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
a) CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the
assurance requirements are based only upon assurance components in
CC Part 3.
b) CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the
assurance requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part
3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect
to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
a) Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-
defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) include all components in the
packages listed as part of the conformance result.
b) Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-
defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all
components in the packages listed as part of the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect
to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
a) PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of
the conformance result.“
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CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are
shown in Table 1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
ACM: Configuration management CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
ADV: Development TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
Development security (ALC_DVS)
ALC: Life cycle support Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
Coverage (ATE_COV)
ATE: Tests Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that
balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of
acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate
concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of
maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are
included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful
and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and
components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and
STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a
hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families.
Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component
where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation
assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance.
They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more
assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is
accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component
from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth)
and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no
more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance
dependencies of every component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other
combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the
addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already
included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another
hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an
EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be
augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component”
is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it
the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of
the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended
with explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance Class Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but
the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where
independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has
been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer,
including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the
guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could
be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE,
and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a
manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection
against identified threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of
design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the
part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such
it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the
absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a
situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the
developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from
positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of
existing sound development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough
investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-
engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other
resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically
feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in
conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-
specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security
engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported
by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a
TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5
assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5
requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of
specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development
and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable
costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to
produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant
risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for
application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets
justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies
the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with
tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal
analysis.“
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Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted,
it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept
of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their
security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical
analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required
to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE
security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of
the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to
violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover
flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the
ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised
capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of
all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance
level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified
vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found
useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by
the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the
TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a
low (for AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for
AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant)
attack potential.”
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