© 2007 EMC Corporation
EMC Corporation
EMC CLARiiON FLARE v3.24 with
Navisphere v6.24 running on CX3
Series Storage Systems
Security Target
Evaluation Assurance Level: EAL2+
Document Version: 1.2
Prepared for: Prepared by:
EMC Corporation Corsec Security, Inc.
176 South Street
Hopkinton, MA 01748
10340 Democracy Lane, Suite 201
Fairfax, VA 22030
Phone: (508) 435-1000 Phone: (703) 267-6050
http://www.emc.com http://www.corsec.com
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Revision History
Version Modification Date Modified By Description of Changes
1.2 2007-09-05 Nathan Lee Final release.
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Table of Contents
REVISION HISTORY................................................................................................................................................2
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................................................................3
TABLE OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................................................4
TABLE OF TABLES ..................................................................................................................................................4
1 SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................5
1.1 PURPOSE.........................................................................................................................................................5
1.2 SECURITY TARGET, TOE AND CC IDENTIFICATION AND CONFORMANCE ......................................................5
1.3 CONVENTIONS ................................................................................................................................................6
2 TOE DESCRIPTION..........................................................................................................................................7
2.1 PRODUCT TYPE...............................................................................................................................................7
2.2 PRODUCT DESCRIPTION..................................................................................................................................8
2.2.1 CLARiiON FLARE/Navisphere Concepts..............................................................................................9
2.3 TOE BOUNDARIES AND SCOPE.....................................................................................................................10
2.3.1 Physical Boundary...............................................................................................................................10
2.3.2 Logical Boundary ................................................................................................................................10
2.3.3 Physical/Logical Features and Functionality Not Included in the Evaluated Configuration of the TOE
11
3 SECURITY ENVIRONMENT.........................................................................................................................12
3.1 ASSUMPTIONS ..............................................................................................................................................12
3.2 THREATS TO SECURITY.................................................................................................................................12
3.3 ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES ........................................................................................................13
4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES ..............................................................................................................................14
4.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE...........................................................................................................14
4.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE ENVIRONMENT...........................................................................................14
4.2.1 IT Security Objectives..........................................................................................................................14
4.2.2 Non-IT Security Objectives..................................................................................................................14
5 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.......................................................................................................................16
5.1 TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS .............................................................................................16
5.1.1 Class FDP: User Data Protection.......................................................................................................18
5.1.2 Class FIA: Identification and Authentication ......................................................................................19
5.1.3 Class FMT: Security Management ......................................................................................................21
5.1.4 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF........................................................................................................24
5.2 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ON THE IT ENVIRONMENT ............................................................25
5.2.1 Class FIA: Identification and Authentication ......................................................................................25
5.3 ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS........................................................................................................................25
6 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION..............................................................................................................27
6.1 TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONS..........................................................................................................................27
6.1.1 Identification and Authentication ........................................................................................................28
6.1.2 Protection of the TSF...........................................................................................................................28
6.1.3 Security Management ..........................................................................................................................28
6.1.4 User Data Protection...........................................................................................................................29
6.2 TOE SECURITY ASSURANCE MEASURES......................................................................................................29
6.2.1 ACM_CAP.2: Configuration Management Document.........................................................................30
6.2.2 ADO_DEL.1: Delivery and Operation Document...............................................................................30
6.2.3 ADO_IGS.1: Installation Guidance, AGD_ADM.1: Administrator Guidance, AGD_USR.1: User
Guidance30
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6.2.4 ADV_FSP.1: Informal Functional Specification, ADV_HLD.1: High Level Design, ADV_RCR.1:
Representation Correspondence..........................................................................................................................30
6.2.5 ALC_FLR.1: Basic Flaw Remediation.................................................................................................31
6.2.6 ATE_COV.1: Test Coverage Analysis, ATE_FUN.1: Functional Testing, ATE_IND.2: Independent
Testing 31
6.2.7 AVA_VLA.1: Vulnerability Analysis, AVA_SOF.1: Strength of Function Analysis.............................31
7 PROTECTION PROFILE CLAIMS...............................................................................................................32
7.1 PROTECTION PROFILE REFERENCE ...............................................................................................................32
8 RATIONALE.....................................................................................................................................................33
8.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES RATIONALE..............................................................................................................33
8.1.1 Security Objectives Rationale Relating to Threats ..............................................................................33
8.1.2 Security Objectives Rationale Relating to Assumptions ......................................................................34
8.2 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE ..................................................................................35
8.2.1 Rationale for Security Functional Requirements of the TOE Objectives.............................................35
8.2.2 Rationale for Security Functional Requirements of the IT Environment.............................................36
8.3 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE....................................................................................37
8.4 RATIONALE FOR REFINEMENTS OF SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ...............................................37
8.5 DEPENDENCY RATIONALE............................................................................................................................37
8.6 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION RATIONALE................................................................................................38
8.6.1 TOE Summary Specification Rationale for the Security Functional Requirements.............................38
8.6.2 TOE Summary Specification Rationale for the Security Assurance Requirements..............................39
8.7 STRENGTH OF FUNCTION..............................................................................................................................41
9 ACRONYMS......................................................................................................................................................42
Table of Figures
FIGURE 1 - DEPLOYMENT CONFIGURATION OF THE TOE................................................................................................8
Table of Tables
TABLE 1 - ST, TOE, AND CC IDENTIFICATION AND CONFORMANCE..............................................................................5
TABLE 3 - TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS.............................................................................................16
TABLE 4 - AUTHORIZED ROLES ....................................................................................................................................23
TABLE 5 – ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS.......................................................................................................................26
TABLE 6 – MAPPING OF TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONS TO SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS...............................27
TABLE 7 - ASSURANCE MEASURES MAPPING TO TOE SARS .......................................................................................29
TABLE 8 - FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS DEPENDENCIES .............................................................................................37
TABLE 9 - ACRONYMS..................................................................................................................................................42
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1 Security Target Introduction
This section identifies the Security Target (ST), Target of Evaluation (TOE), ST conventions, ST conformance
claims, and the ST organization. The Target of Evaluation is the EMC EMC CLARiiON FLARE v3.24 with
Navisphere v6.24 running on CX3 Series Storage Systems, and will be referred to as the TOE or the EMC
CLARiiON FLARE/Navisphere throughout this document. The TOE is a storage operating
environment/management software suite combination designed for CLARiiON storage arrays. CLARiiON storage
arrays provide midrange Storage Area Network (SAN) storage.
1.1 Purpose
This ST contains the following sections to provide mapping of the Security Environment to the Security
Requirements that the TOE meets in order to remove, diminish, or mitigate the defined threats:
• Security Target Introduction (Section 1) – Provides a brief summary of the content of the ST and describes
the organization of other sections of this document.
• TOE Description (Section 2) – Provides an overview of the TOE Security Functions (TSF) and describes the
physical and logical boundaries for the TOE.
• Security Environment (Section 3) – Describes the threats and assumptions that pertain to the TOE and its
environment.
• Security Objectives (Section 4) – Identifies the security objectives that are satisfied by the TOE and its
environment.
• Security Requirements (Section 5) – Presents the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) and Security
Assurance Requirements (SARs) met by the TOE and by the TOE’s environment.
• TOE Summary Specification (Section 6) – Describes the security functions provided by the TOE to satisfy
the security requirements and objectives.
• Protection Profile Claims (Section 7) – Provides the identification of any ST Protection Profile (PP) claims
as well as a justification to support such claims.
• Rationale (Section 8) – Presents the rationale for the security objectives, requirements, and the TOE
summary specifications as to their consistency, completeness, and suitability.
• Acronyms (Section 9) – Defines the acronyms used within this ST.
1.2 Security Target, TOE and CC Identification and Conformance
Table 1 - ST, TOE, and CC Identification and Conformance
ST Title EMC Corporation EMC CLARiiON FLARE v3.24 with Navisphere v6.24 running on CX3
Series Storage Systems Security Target
ST Version Version 1.2
Author Corsec Security, Inc.
Nathan Lee and Matthew Appler
TOE Identification EMC CLARiiON FLARE 03.24.010.5.011, FLARE 03.24.020.5.011, FLARE
03.24.040.5.011, and FLARE 03.24.080.5.011, with Navisphere v6.24.0.6.13, running on
CX3 Series Storage Systems
Common Criteria (CC)
Identification and
Conformance
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.3, August
2005 (aligned with ISO/IEC 15408:2005); CC Part 2 conformant; CC Part 3 conformant;
Parts 2 and 3 Interpretations from the Interpreted CEM as of 2006-06-29 were reviewed,
and no interpretations apply to the claims made in this ST.
PP Identification None
Evaluation Assurance
Level
EAL2+: EAL2 Augmented with ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
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Keywords Storage Area Network (SAN), storage array, data storage, CLARiiON, EMC, FLARE,
Navisphere
1.3 Conventions
There are several font variations used within this ST. Selected presentation choices are discussed here to aid the
Security Target reader.
The Common Criteria (CC) allows for several operations to be performed on security requirements: assignment,
refinement, selection, and iteration. All of these operations are used within this ST. These operations are presented
in the same manner in which they appear in Parts 2 and 3 of the CC with the following exceptions:
• Completed assignment statements are identified using [italicized text within brackets].
• Completed selection statements are identified using [underlined italicized text within brackets].
• Refinements are identified using bold text. Any text removed is stricken (Example: TSF Data) and should
be considered as a refinement.
• Iterations are identified by appending a letter in parenthesis following the component title. For example,
FAU_GEN.1(a) Audit Data Generation would be the first iteration and FAU_GEN.1(b) Audit Data
Generation would be the second iteration.
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2 TOE Description
This section provides a general overview of the TOE as an aid to understanding the general capabilities and security
functions provided by the TOE. The TOE description provides a context for the TOE evaluation by identifying the
product type and describing the evaluated configuration.
2.1 Product Type
The EMC CLARiiON is a storage device designed to provide managed storage on a SAN. The CLARiiON
hardware runs the CLARiiON FLARE/Navisphere software suite, which is the TOE. It includes a Storage
Operating Environment (SOE) providing Redundant Array of Independent Disks (RAID) and virtual storage
capability, as well as an interface by which EMC CLARiiON storage appliances in a SAN environment can be
administered and managed.
The purpose of a SAN is to allow many different application servers to share storage provided by centrally managed
storage devices. The EMC CLARiiON allows an organization to manage its storage needs separately from its
application servers. This allows greater control over storage allocation, fault tolerance, and backups versus storage
that is directly attached to individual application servers. In a typical deployment scenario, individual application
servers are attached to a SAN through a Fibre Channel switch. These application servers are then configured to use
storage on the CLARiiON, in the form of Logical Units (LUNs), as storage for their applications. CLARiiON
storage can also be used through an EMC Celerra to provide Network Attached Storage (NAS) for traditional
Internet Protocol (IP) based clients. Figure 1 below shows the details of the deployment configuration of the TOE.
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SAN
(Fibre Channel)
Celerra
ControlCenter
Agent Server
Application
Servers
CLARiiON
IP Network
EMC
EMC
CLARiiON
`
Web Browser
Legend:
TOE Boundary
Figure 1 - Deployment Configuration of the TOE
2.2 Product Description
The EMC CLARiiON running CLARiiON FLARE/Navisphere is a secure, storage management solution that
provides a complete suite of management capabilities. It provides the underlying operating environment for the
EMC CLARiiON, which provides SAN-attached storage to configured servers. The product provides the ability to
combine several individual drives into useful logical groups, provides fault tolerance for stored data, and manages
access to the data that it stores. The CLARiiON accomplishes this through purpose-built hardware and software.
They are designed to allow customers to scale both system performance and storage capacity.
The EMC Navisphere software is a management application suite designed to be the central console in a
CLARiiON-based Storage Area Network (SAN). The purpose of a SAN is to allow many different application
servers to share storage provided by centrally managed storage devices. This architecture allows an organization to
manage its storage needs separately from its application servers, allowing greater control over storage allocation,
fault tolerance, and backups versus storage that is directly attached to individual application servers.
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The TOE is managed by authorized users through the Navisphere Manager and the Navisphere Secure CLI1
interfaces. Navisphere Manager is a Java-based applet that runs within a web browser. To access the functions
available via Navisphere Manager, an authorized user must open a web browser and enter the IP address or
hostname of the desired storage system Storage Processor (SP). Navisphere Secure CLI is a command line interface
that provides access to common functions for monitoring and managing the TOE. The Secure CLI provides access
to functions for storage provisioning, status and configuration information retrieval, and other TOE administrative
functions. CLI commands can also be used to automate management functions via shell scripts and batch files.
The EMC FLARE software is a SOE optimized for implementation of RAID storage architectures, providing fault
detection, isolation, and diagnosis capabilities. It enables the use of virtual storage elements (LUNs) to improve
performance and capacity utilization. The FLARE software also provides a Navisphere-managed storage appliance
with the flexibility to support multiple generations of CLARiiON hardware and different types of interconnects with
consistent functionality. FLARE also implements a technology called Access Logix. Access Logix lets multiple
hosts share a storage system by using Storage Groups. A Storage Group is one or more LUNs within a storage
system that is reserved for one or more hosts and is inaccessible to other hosts. Access Logix enforces the host-to-
Storage Group permissions.
The TOE also performs event monitoring of system status and host registration of application servers. This is done
through the TOE’s SP Agent. The SP Agent collects event information about the state of the system, including
FLARE, the TOE’s hardware components, and the TOE’s LUNs and reports this information to authorized TOE
users. The SP Agents also communicate host registration information between the SP Agents and the application
servers. These agents periodically retrieve volume-mapping information from the storage systems and forward it to
Navisphere Manager for display.
2.2.1 CLARiiON FLARE/Navisphere Concepts
2.2.1.1 LUNs
A central concept of the CLARiiON product is a virtual memory unit called a LUN. The CLARiiON storage
appliance presents storage to the SAN is in the form of a LUN, and the CLARiiON FLARE/Navisphere software
provides for the management of LUNs. Each LUN represents a unit of storage to an application server, analogous to
a local disk drive. However, the LUN provided by the CLARiiON FLARE/Navisphere is not constrained to be a
single individual disk. In fact, a typical deployment would have LUNs that span multiple individual disks that are
grouped into a RAID Group.
2.2.1.2 Storage Processors
The central component of the CLARiiON is the SP. The Storage Processor is responsible for interfacing with the
SAN and with each of the individual disks within the CLARiiON. There are two SPs in each CLARiiON which
logically operate as a single entity to provide increased performance and fault tolerance. The SP provides
administrators with the ability to manage the CLARiiON and establish LUNs and RAID Groups.
2.2.1.3 RAID Groups
A RAID Group is a collection of individual disks. The CLARiiON supports a variety of disk types and capacities
(chosen by the customer when the product is purchased). In a RAID Group, disks of a similar type are typically
grouped together. This RAID Group can then be configured by an administrator with various attributes, such as
which RAID level to provide. In this manner, an administrator can manage the CLARiiON through successive
levels of abstraction.
1
CLI – Command Line Interface
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2.2.1.4 Storage Groups
The CLARiiON manages access to LUNs through a component of the SP called Access Logix. Access Logix
allows an administrator to group LUNs together in a Storage Group. Each Storage Group can then be mapped to
one or more application servers, identified by their Fibre Channel World Wide Name (WWN). When this
mechanism is used, only the LUNs that are present in a Storage Group that a particular application server has been
given access to are made accessible to that application server. These LUNs are then available for exclusive use by
that application server.
It is also possible that multiple application servers are given access to the same Storage Group. This is used in cases
where the application server has been deployed in such a way as to manage multiple servers accessing the same
LUN, for example, in a clustered environment.
2.3 TOE Boundaries and Scope
This section will primarily address the physical and logical components of the TOE that are included in the
evaluation.
2.3.1 Physical Boundary
Figure 1 illustrates the physical scope and the physical boundary of the overall solution and ties together all of the
components of the TOE and the constituents of the TOE Environment. The TOE is the EMC CLARiiON FLARE
v3.24 with Navisphere v6.24 running on CX3 Series Storage Systems software suite. The TOE runs on the EMC
CLARiiON CX3 UltraScale Series hardware, models 10, 20, 40, and 80.
2.3.1.1 TOE Environment
The TOE is intended to be deployed in a secure data center that protects physical access to the TOE. The TOE is
intended to be connected to a SAN with the constituent servers managed by administrators operating under a
consistent security policy with the administrators that manage the TOE.
The TOE provides access control to individual LUNs through its Access Logix component. For this to operate
correctly, the WWN that is provided to the TOE must be accurate and must not be spoofed. The TOE Environment
is required to provide this.
2.3.2 Logical Boundary
The TOE is a software-only TOE consisting of EMC CLARiiON FLARE v3.24 with Navisphere v6.24 running on
CX3 Series Storage Systems. The TOE runs the Navisphere software suite, which includes Navisphere Storage-
System Initialization Utility, Navisphere Host and SP Agents, Navisphere Server Utility, Navisphere Manger,
Navisphere Integrator, Navisphere Storage Management Server, and Navisphere Secure CLI. The TOE also
includes the following FLARE versions: FLARE 03.24.010.5.011, FLARE 03.24.020.5.011, FLARE
03.24.040.5.011, and FLARE 03.24.080.5.011.
The TOE is managed by authorized users through the Navisphere Manager and the Navisphere Secure CLI.
Navisphere Manager is a Java applet that runs within a web browser. Navisphere Secure CLI is a command line
interface that provides access to common functions for monitoring and managing the TOE.
The TOE logical boundary is defined by the security functions that it implements. The security functions
implemented by the TOE are usefully grouped under the following Security Function Classes:
• Identification and Authentication
• Protection of the TSF
• Security Management
• User Data Protection
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2.3.2.1 Identification and Authentication
The TOE provides the ability for administrators to manage the security functions of the TOE. The Identification and
Authentication security function allows the TOE to identify and authenticate administrators of the TOE.
Administrators are assigned a role to determine what aspects of the TOE they are allowed to manage.
2.3.2.2 Protection of the TSF
The Protection of the TSF function provides the integrity and management of the mechanisms that provide the TSF.
The security functional requirements in this evaluation are impossible to bypass because the TOE is designed in
such a way that no access is possible without passing through key security features, such as identification and
authentication and access control mediation. The TOE maintains its own domain for execution and does not share
any hardware with other applications.
2.3.2.3 Security Management
The Security Management function provides administrators with the ability to properly manage and configure the
TOE to store user data. Administrators are assigned a role that governs what aspects of the TOE they are authorized
to manage. Configuration of RAID settings, Storage Group membership, and administrator access is all supported
through this security function.
2.3.2.4 User Data Protection
The User Data Protection function implements functionality necessary to protect User Data which is entrusted to the
TOE. The TOE protects user data primarily in two ways. First, it ensures that only the application servers that have
been granted access to a LUN have access to that LUN. Second, it ensures the integrity of the data entrusted to it
through its use of RAID levels.
2.3.3 Physical/Logical Features and Functionality Not Included in the Evaluated
Configuration of the TOE
Features/Functionality that are not part of the evaluated configuration of the TOE are:
• CLARiiON storage appliance hardware
• internet Small Computer System Interface (iSCSI) with Challenge-Handshake Authentication Protocol
(CHAP) authentication
• EMCRemote
• Classic Command Line Interface (CLI)
• Navisphere Analyzer
• Navisphere SnapView
• Navisphere MirrorView/Asynchronous
• Navisphere MirrorView/Synchronous
• Navisphere SAN Copy
• Navisphere Quality of Service Manager (NQM)
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3 Security Environment
This section describes the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be used and the manner in
which the TOE is expected to be employed. It provides the statement of the TOE security environment, which
identifies and explains all:
• Assumptions about the secure usage of the TOE, including physical and personnel aspects
• Known and presumed threats countered by either the TOE or by the security environment
• Organizational security policies with which the TOE must comply
3.1 Assumptions
This section describes the security aspects of the intended environment for the evaluated TOE. The operational
environment must be managed in accordance with assurance requirement documentation for delivery, operation, and
user guidance. The following specific conditions are required to ensure the security of the TOE and are assumed to
exist in an environment where this TOE is employed.
Name Description
A.MANAGE There are one or more competent individuals assigned to manage the TOE and
the security of the information it contains.
A.NOEVIL Administrators are non-hostile, appropriately trained, and follow all
administrator guidance.
A.PHYSICAL Physical security will be provided for the TOE and its environment.
3.2 Threats to Security
This section identifies the threats to the Information Technology (IT) assets against which protection is required by
the TOE or by the security environment. The threat agents are divided into two categories:
• Attackers who are not TOE users: They have public knowledge of how the TOE operates and are assumed
to possess a low skill level, limited resources to alter TOE configuration settings/parameters and no physical
access to the TOE.
• TOE users: They have extensive knowledge of how the TOE operates and are assumed to possess a high
skill level, moderate resources to alter TOE configuration settings/parameters and physical access to the
TOE. (TOE users are, however, assumed not to be willfully hostile to the TOE)
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The following threats are applicable:
Name Description
T.DATA_CORRUPTION Data could become corrupted due to hardware failure or incorrect system
access
T.IMPROPER_SERVER A system connected to the TOE could access data to which it was not intended
to gain access by bypassing the protection mechanisms of the TOE
3.3 Organizational Security Policies
There are no Organizational Security Policies.
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4 Security Objectives
This section identifies the security objectives for the TOE and its supporting environment. The security objectives
identify the responsibilities of the TOE and its environment in meeting the TOE’s security needs.
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
The specific security objectives are as follows:
Name Description
O.ADMIN The TOE must provide a method for administrative control of the TOE.
O.BYPASS The TOE must ensure that the TSF cannot be bypassed.
O.PROTECT The TOE must protect data that it has been entrusted to protect.
4.2 Security Objectives for the Environment
4.2.1 IT Security Objectives
The following IT security objectives are to be satisfied by the environment:
Name Description
OE.PROPER_NAME_ASSIGNMENT The TOE environment must provide accurate World Wide Names for each
system that communicates with the TOE.
OE.SECURE_COMMUNICATIONS The TOE environment must provide secure communications between
systems connected to the Storage Area Network.
OE.SECURE_SERVERS The TOE environment must provide properly configured application servers
to communicate with the TOE.
4.2.2 Non-IT Security Objectives
The following non-IT environment security objectives are to be satisfied without imposing technical requirements
on the TOE. That is, they will not require the implementation of functions in the TOE hardware and/or software.
Thus, they will be satisfied largely through application of procedural or administrative measures.
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Name Description
OE.MANAGE Sites deploying the TOE will provide competent TOE administrators who will
ensure the system is used securely.
OE.NOEVIL Sites using the TOE shall ensure that TOE administrators are non-hostile,
appropriately trained and follow all administrator guidance.
OE.PHYSICAL The TOE will be used in a physically secure site that protects it from
interference and tampering by untrusted subjects.
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5 Security Requirements
This section defines the SFRs and SARs met by the TOE as well as Security Functional Requirements met by the
TOE IT environment. These requirements are presented following the conventions identified in Section 1.3.
5.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements
This section specifies the SFRs for the TOE. This section organizes the SFRs by CC class. Table 2 identifies all
SFRs implemented by the TOE and indicates the ST operations performed on each requirement.
Table 2 - TOE Security Functional Requirements
Name Description S A R I
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control 

FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control 
 

FDP_SDI.2 Stored data integrity 
 

FIA_UAU.2(a) User authentication before any action 

FIA_UID.2(a) User identification before any action 

FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes 
 

FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation 
 

FMT_MTD.1(a) Management of TSF data 
 
 

FMT_MTD.1(b) Management of TSF data 
 
 

FMT_MTD.1(c) Management of TSF data 
 
 

FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions 

FMT_SMR.1 Security roles 

FPT_RVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP
FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation
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Note: S=Selection; A=Assignment; R=Refinement; I=Iteration
Section 5.1 contains the functional components from the CC Part 2 with the operations completed. For the
conventions used in performing CC operations please refer to Section 1.3.
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5.1.1 Class FDP: User Data Protection
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_ACC.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the [Discretionary Access Control SFP] on
[ a] Subjects: Application Servers;
b) Objects: LUNs
c) Operations: Read and Write
].
Application note: The Subjects are Application Servers connected to the SAN acting on behalf of an
authorized user.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_ACF.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the [Discretionary Access Control SFP] to objects based on the following:
[
Subject attributes:
1. World Wide Name
2. Storage Group Membership
Object attributes:
1. LUN ID
2. Storage Group Membership
].
FDP_ACF.1.2
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and
controlled objects is allowed:
[
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A valid Subject of the TOE is allowed to Read and Write to a LUN if the Subject and the LUN are members
of the same Storage Group
].
FDP_ACF.1.3
The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following no additional rules:
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects].
FDP_ACF.1.4
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on no additional rules the [assignment:
rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects].
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FDP_SDI.2 Stored data integrity monitoring and action
Hierarchical to: FDP_SDI.1
FDP_SDI.2.1
The TSF shall monitor user data stored within the TSC for [integrity errors] on all user data objects, based
on the following attributes: [parity data for RAID 3 and RAID 5].
FDP_SDI.2.2
Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall [reconstruct the user data and notify an
administrator].
Dependencies: No dependencies
5.1.2 Class FIA: Identification and Authentication
FIA_UAU.2(a) User authentication before any action
Hierarchical to: FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UAU.2.1
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated
actions on behalf of that user.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UID.2(a) User identification before any action
Hierarchical to: FIA_UID.1
FIA_UID.2.1
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The TSF shall require each user to identify itself before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf
of that user.
Dependencies: No dependencies
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5.1.3 Class FMT: Security Management
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MSA.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the [Discretionary Access Control SFP] to restrict the ability to [query, modify,
delete] the security attributes [membership in a Storage Group] to [the Administrator and Manager roles].
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MSA.3.1
The TSF shall enforce the [Discretionary Access Control SFP] to provide [permissive] default values for
security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2
The TSF shall allow the [Administrator and Manager roles] to specify alternative initial values to override
the default values when an object or information is created.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1(a) Management of TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1.1
The TSF shall restrict the ability to [query] the [storage system information] to [the Administrator,
Manager, and Monitor roles].
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_MTD.1(b) Management of TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1.1
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The TSF shall restrict the ability to [query, modify, delete, [create]] the [LUNs, RAID Groups, and Storage
Groups] to [the Administrator and Manager roles].
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_MTD.1(c) Management of TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1.1
The TSF shall restrict the ability to [query, modify, delete, [create]] the [user accounts] to [the
Administrator role].
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_SMF.1.1
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security management functions:
[
a) Management of security functions behaviour;
b) Management of TSF data;
c) Management of security attributes
].
Dependencies: No Dependencies
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_SMR.1.1
The TSF shall maintain the roles [as the authorized identified roles in Table 3].
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Table 3 - Authorized Roles
Roles Description
Administrator This role can access all administrative and management interfaces and
data, can change a user’s role, can add or delete users, and depending
on the scope of the account can add or delete information from a domain.
Manager This role can view all storage system information and perform storage-
system operations (such as binding LUNs), but cannot add, modify, or
delete user or domain information.
Monitor This role can view all storage-system information, but cannot add, modify,
or delete information from a domain or perform configuration operations
such as binding LUNs.
FMT_SMR.1.2
The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
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5.1.4 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF
FPT_RVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_RVM.1.1
The TSF shall ensure that TSP enforcement functions are invoked and succeed before each function within
the TSC is allowed to proceed.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_SEP.1.1
The TSF shall maintain a security domain for its own execution that protects it from interference and
tampering by untrusted subjects.
FPT_SEP.1.2
The TSF shall enforce separation between the security domains of subjects in the TSC.
Dependencies: No dependencies
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5.2 Security Functional Requirements on the IT Environment
The TOE has the following security requirements for its IT environment. The stated Security Functional
Requirement on the IT Environment of the TOE presented in this section has been drawn from Part 2 of CC Version
2.3 and hence conformant to CC Version 2.3 Part 2.
Name Description S A R I
FIA_UAU.2(b) User authentication before any action 
 

FIA_UID.2(b) User identification before any action 
 

Note: S=Selection; A=Assignment; R=Refinement; I=Iteration
5.2.1 Class FIA: Identification and Authentication
FIA_UAU.2(b) User authentication before any action
Hierarchical to: FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UAU.2.1
The TSF shall require each user of an Application Server to be successfully authenticated to the TOE
Environment before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UID.2(b) User identification before any action
Hierarchical to: FIA_UID.1
FIA_UID.2.1
The TSF shall require each user of an Application Server to identify itself to the TOE Environment
before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Dependencies: No dependencies
5.3 Assurance Requirements
This section defines the assurance requirements for the TOE. Assurance requirements are taken from Part 3 of the
CC at EAL2+ augmented with ALC_FLR.1. Table 4 – Assurance Requirements summarizes the requirements.
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Table 4 – Assurance Requirements
Assurance Requirements
Class ACM: Configuration management ACM_CAP.2 Configuration items
ADO_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
Class ADO: Delivery and operation
ADO_IGS.1 Installation, generation, and start-up procedures
ADV_FSP.1 Informal functional specification
ADV_HLD.1 Descriptive high-level design
Class ADV: Development
ADV_RCR.1 Informal correspondence demonstration
AGD_ADM.1 Administrator guidance
Class AGD: Guidance documents
AGD_USR.1 User guidance
Class ALC: Flaw Remediation ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
Class ATE: Tests
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
AVA_SOF.1 Strength of TOE security function evaluation
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment
AVA_VLA.1 Developer vulnerability analysis
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6 TOE Summary Specification
This section presents information to detail how the TOE meets the functional and assurance requirements described
in previous sections of this ST.
6.1 TOE Security Functions
Each of the security requirements and the associated descriptions correspond to the security functions. Hence, each
function is described by how it specifically satisfies each of its related requirements. This serves to both describe
the security functions and rationalize that the security functions are suitable to satisfy the necessary requirements.
Table 5 – Mapping of TOE Security Functions to Security Functional Requirements
TOE Security Function SFR ID Description
FIA_UAU.2(a) User authentication before any action
Identification and Authentication
FIA_UID.2(a) User identification before any action
FPT_RVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP
Protection of TOE Security
Functions
FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FMT_MTD.1(a) Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1(b) Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1(c) Management of TSF data
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management
functions
Security Management
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
User Data Protection
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access
control
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TOE Security Function SFR ID Description
FDP_SDI.2 Stored data integrity
6.1.1 Identification and Authentication
The Identification and Authentication security function provides the TOE with the ability to govern access by
Administrators. Administrators of the TOE can access the TOE in one of two methods. An Administrator can
manage the TOE through the Navisphere Manager, a web-based graphical user interface. An Administrator can also
manage the TOE through the Navisphere Secure CLI, a command line interface application. Prior to allowing
access through these interfaces, the TOE requires an Administrator to be identified using a username and password.
Before successful completion of the security function, an Administrator is unable to perform any management
function.
Identification and Authentication of application servers connecting to the TOE to access LUNs is provided by the
TOE Environment through the proper assignment and use of WWNs.
6.1.2 Protection of the TSF
Protection of the TSF provides for the integrity of the mechanisms that protect the TOE. The TOE runs on a
purpose-built hardware appliance. It does not share memory or processors with any other application or system.
The TOE maintains its own domain for its execution. Interfacing with the TOE is only done through well-defined
interfaces, each utilizing security functions to maintain the security of that interface. The TOE relies on its
environment to provide protection from physical tampering.
Non-bypassability of the TSP is provided through basic configuration and enforcement of the security mechanisms.
All Administrators and Users of the TOE must be authenticated prior to performing any security functionality. Once
authenticated, Administrators and Users can only perform operations which they have been explicitly granted
permission to perform. The TOE uses unique sessions for each operator and maintains separation between
concurrent operators.
6.1.3 Security Management
The purpose of the TOE is to provide a storage system to application servers attached to a SAN. The TOE provides
mechanisms to govern which application servers can access which LUNs. The Security Management function
allows Administrators to properly configure this functionality.
Management of the TOE occurs through either the Navisphere Manager or the Navisphere Secure CLI.
Administrators of the TOE are assigned one of three roles. These three roles are hierarchical in nature; the higher
level role is a superset of the previous (lower) roles’ functionality. The following description of the Security
Management function is described through the capabilities of each of the roles, starting with the least privileged role.
The Monitor role allows an Administrator to query information about the TOE. The Monitor role may view
information about individual disk drives, RAID Groups, LUNs, and Storage Groups. This functionality is provided
through the Navisphere interfaces.
The Manager role can perform all of the functionality of the Monitor role and can configure and modify storage
system objects. The Manager role can:
• add and remove individual disk drives to a RAID Group
• create and modify LUNs
• administer membership of LUNs and application servers in a Storage Group
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The Administrator role can perform all of the functionality of the Monitor and Manager roles and can manage user
accounts. This includes creating, deleting, and changing the role of any user account on the TOE.
6.1.4 User Data Protection
The TOE provides the User Data Protection security function to manage access from application servers to
configured LUNs. The purpose of SAN attached storage is to allow high speed, scalable, fault-tolerant storage
separate from individual application servers. The TOE provides this functionality for servers connected to the SAN.
Using the Security Management security function, Administrators of the TOE can configure LUNs to provide
storage to application servers. These LUNs are then placed into Storage Groups, which allows an Administrator to
limit access to each LUN to one or more application servers. When an application server requests a list of available
LUNs from the TOE, the TOE Environment provides a WWN. This WWN is used to identify the application server
to the TOE. The TOE then provides a list of LUNs that the application server has been granted access to. With each
successive request to read or write information to a LUN, the TOE ensures that only authorized application servers
have access to the LUNs to which they have been given access.
The TOE also provides for the integrity of user data. When creating RAID Groups from individual disk drives, an
Administrator can configure RAID levels 0, 1, 1+0, 3, or 5. Each of these, except RAID level 0, provides fault
tolerance for integrity errors or individual disk drive failure. The TOE provides mechanisms to check data integrity
continuously while reading and writing data to individual disks. Integrity errors or drive errors are fixed on-the-fly.
Additionally, Administrators can configure “hot spare” disk drives. These “hot spares” are used when a disk failure
has been detected by the system. Once a failure has been detected, the drive that has been lost will be recreated on
the “hot spare”. The Administrator can then replace the failed drive and configure it as a new “hot spare”. This
process is provided while real-time access to user data continues.
6.2 TOE Security Assurance Measures
EAL2+ was chosen to provide a basic level of independently assured security. This section of the Security Target
maps the assurance requirements of the TOE for a CC EAL2+ level of assurance to the assurance measures used for
the development and maintenance of the TOE. The following table provides a mapping of the appropriate
documentation to the TOE assurance requirements.
Table 6 - Assurance Measures Mapping to TOE SARs
Assurance
Component
Assurance Measure
ACM_CAP.2 EMC CLARiiON FLARE/Navisphere - Configuration Management: Capabilities
ADO_DEL.1 EMC CLARiiON FLARE/Navisphere - Delivery and Operation: Secure Delivery
ADO_IGS.1 [Installation and Setup Procedure]
ADV_FSP.1 EMC CLARiiON FLARE/Navisphere - TOE Architecture: High Level Design, Functional Specification,
and Representation Correspondence
ADV_HLD.1 EMC CLARiiON FLARE/Navisphere - TOE Architecture: High Level Design, Functional Specification,
and Representation Correspondence
ADV_RCR.1 EMC CLARiiON FLARE/Navisphere - TOE Architecture: High Level Design, Functional Specification,
and Representation Correspondence
AGD_ADM.1 [Administrator Guides]
AGD_USR.1 [User Guides]
ALC_FLR.1 EMC CLARiiON FLARE/Navisphere – Life Cycle Support: Flaw Remediation
ATE_COV.1 EMC CLARiiON FLARE/Navisphere – Functional Tests and Coverage
ATE_FUN.1 EMC CLARiiON FLARE/Navisphere – Functional Tests and Coverage
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Assurance
Component
Assurance Measure
ATE_IND.2 Provided by laboratory evaluation
AVA_SOF.1 EMC CLARiiON FLARE/Navisphere - Vulnerability Assessment
AVA_VLA.1 EMC CLARiiON FLARE/Navisphere - Vulnerability Assessment
6.2.1 ACM_CAP.2: Configuration Management Document
The Configuration Management document provides a description of the various tools used to control the
configuration items and how they are used internally at EMC. This document provides a complete configuration
item list and a unique referencing scheme for each configuration item. Additionally, the configuration management
system is described including procedures that are used by developers to control and track changes that are made to
the TOE. The documentation further details the TOE configuration items that are controlled by the configuration
management system.
6.2.2 ADO_DEL.1: Delivery and Operation Document
The Delivery and Operation document provides a description of the secure delivery procedures implemented by
EMC to protect against TOE modification during product delivery. The Installation Documentation provided by
EMC details the procedures for installing the TOE and placing the TOE in a secure state offering the same
protection properties as the master copy of the TOE. The Installation Documentation provides guidance to the TOE
Users(s) on configuring the TOE and how they affect the TSF.
6.2.3 ADO_IGS.1: Installation Guidance, AGD_ADM.1: Administrator Guidance,
AGD_USR.1: User Guidance
The installation guidance document provides the procedures necessary for the secure installation, generation, and
start-up of the TOE for administrators and users of the TOE.
The administrator guidance documentation provides detailed procedures for the administration of the TOE and
description of the security functions provided by the TOE.
The User Guidance documentation provided directs users on how to operate the TOE in a secure manner.
Additionally, User Guidance explains the user-visible security functions and how they need to be exercised.
6.2.4 ADV_FSP.1: Informal Functional Specification, ADV_HLD.1: High Level
Design, ADV_RCR.1: Representation Correspondence.
The EMC design documentation consists of several related design documents that address the components of the
TOE at different levels of abstraction. The following design documents address the Development Assurance
Requirements:
• The Functional Specification provides a description of the security functions provided by the TOE and a
description of the external interfaces to the TSF. The Functional Specification covers the purpose and
method of use and a list of effects, exceptions, and errors message for each external TSF interface.
• The High-Level Design provides a top level design specification that refines the TSF functional
specification into the major constituent parts (subsystems) of the TSF. The high-level design identifies the
basic structure of the TSF, the major elements, a listing of all interfaces, and the purpose and method of use
for each interface.
• The Representation Correspondence demonstrates the correspondence between each of the TSF
representations provided. This mapping is performed to show the functions traced from the ST description
to the High-Level Design.
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6.2.5 ALC_FLR.1: Basic Flaw Remediation
The Flaw Remediation document outlines the steps taken at EMC to capture, track, and remove bugs. The
documentation shows that all flaws are recorded and that the system tracks them to completion.
6.2.6 ATE_COV.1: Test Coverage Analysis, ATE_FUN.1: Functional Testing,
ATE_IND.2: Independent Testing
There are a number of components that make up the Test documentation. The Coverage Analysis demonstrates that
testing is performed against the functional specification. The Coverage Analysis demonstrates the extent to which
the TOE security functions were tested as well as the level of detail to which the TOE was tested. Test Plans and
Test Procedures, which detail the overall efforts of the testing effort and break down the specific steps taken by a
tester, are also provided in order to meet the assurance requirement Functional Testing.
6.2.7 AVA_VLA.1: Vulnerability Analysis, AVA_SOF.1: Strength of Function
Analysis
A Vulnerability Assessment is provided to demonstrate ways in which an entity could violate the TSP and provide a
list of identified vulnerabilities. Additionally, this document provides evidence of how the TOE is resistant to
obvious attacks.
The Strength of TOE Security Function Analysis demonstrates the strength of the probabilistic or permutational
mechanisms employed to provide security functions within the TOE and how they exceed the minimum Strength of
Function (SOF) requirements.
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7 Protection Profile Claims
This section provides the identification and justification for any Protection Profile conformance claims.
7.1 Protection Profile Reference
There are no protection profile claims for this security target.
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8 Rationale
This section provides the rationale for the selection of the security requirements, objectives, assumptions, and
threats. In particular, it shows that the security requirements are suitable to meet the security objectives, which in
turn are shown to be suitable to cover all aspects of the TOE security environment.
8.1 Security Objectives Rationale
This section provides a rationale for the existence of each assumption, threat, and policy statement that compose the
ST. The following tables demonstrate the mapping between the assumptions, threats, and polices to the security
objectives is complete. The following discussion provides detailed evidence of coverage for each assumption,
threat, and policy.
8.1.1 Security Objectives Rationale Relating to Threats
Threats Objectives Rationale
O.ADMIN
The TOE must provide a method for
administrative control of the TOE.
O.ADMIN supports the mitigation of
this threat by allowing an administrator
to properly configure the mechanisms
of the TOE designed to mitigate this
threat.
O.BYPASS
The TOE must ensure that the TSF
cannot be bypassed.
The objective O.BYPASS ensures that
the protection mechanisms of the TOE
designed to mitigate this threat cannot
be bypassed.
T.DATA_CORRUPTION
Data could become corrupted due
to hardware failure or incorrect
system access
O.PROTECT
The TOE must protect data that it has
been entrusted to protect.
O.PROTECT mitigates this threat by
providing mechanisms to protect the
data that has been entrusted to the
TOE
O.ADMIN
The TOE must provide a method for
administrative control of the TOE.
O.ADMIN supports the mitigation of
this threat by allowing an administrator
to properly configure the mechanisms
of the TOE designed to mitigate this
threat.
O.BYPASS
The TOE must ensure that the TSF
cannot be bypassed.
The objective O.BYPASS ensures that
the protection mechanisms of the TOE
designed to mitigate this threat cannot
be bypassed.
O.PROTECT
The TOE must protect data that it has
been entrusted to protect.
O.PROTECT ensures that the TOE
provides adequate mechanisms to
give only authorized servers access to
the appropriately authorized data.
T.IMPROPER_SERVER
A system connected to the TOE
could access data to which it was
not intended to gain access by
bypassing the protection
mechanisms of the TOE
OE.PROPER_NAME_ASSIGNMENT
The TOE environment must provide
OE.PROPER_NAME_ASSIGNMENT
ensures that the World Wide Names
provided to the TOE are accurate.
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Threats Objectives Rationale
accurate World Wide Names for each
system that communicates with the
TOE.
This allows the mechanisms provided
by O.PROTECT to properly protect
data.
OE.SECURE_COMMUNICATIONS
The TOE environment must provide
secure communications between
systems connected to the Storage
Area Network.
OE.SECURECOMMUNICATIONS
ensures that all communications with
the TOE are secure for administration
of the TOE, internal TOE
communications, and data sent to or
from the TOE.
OE.SECURE_SERVERS
The TOE environment must provide
properly configured application
servers to communicate with the TOE.
OE.SECURE_SERVERS mitigates
this threat by ensuring that each
server connected to the Storage Area
Network operates properly and does
not intentionally compromise data.
8.1.2 Security Objectives Rationale Relating to Assumptions
Assumptions Objectives Rationale
A.PHYSICAL
Physical security will be provided
for the TOE and its environment.
OE.PHYSICAL
The TOE will be used in a physically
secure site that protects it from
interference and tampering by
untrusted subjects.
Physical security is provided within the
domain for the value of the IT
resources protected by the operating
system and the value of the stored,
processed, and transmitted
information. OE.PHYSICAL satisfies
this assumption.
A.MANAGE
There are one or more competent
individuals assigned to manage
the TOE and the security of the
information it contains.
OE.MANAGE
Sites deploying the TOE will provide
competent TOE administrators who
will ensure the system is used
securely.
Those responsible for the TOE will
provide competent individuals to
perform management of the security
of the environment, and restrict these
functions and facilities from
unauthorized use. OE.MANAGE
satisfies this assumption.
A.NOEVIL
Administrators are non-hostile,
appropriately trained, and follow all
administrator guidance.
OE.NOEVIL
Sites using the TOE shall ensure that
TOE administrators are non-hostile,
appropriately trained, and follow all
administrator guidance.
Sites using the TOE ensure that
administrators are non-hostile,
appropriately trained, and follow all
administrator guidance. OE.NOEVIL
satisfies this assumption.
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8.2 Security Functional Requirements Rationale
The following discussion provides detailed evidence of coverage for each security objective.
8.2.1 Rationale for Security Functional Requirements of the TOE Objectives
Objective Requirements Addressing the Objective Rationale
FIA_UAU.2(a)
User authentication before any action
The TOE shall successfully
authenticate each administrator before
allowing them to manage the TOE.
FIA_UID.2(a)
User identification before any action
The TOE will properly identify and
authenticate all administrators.
FMT_MTD.1(c)
Management of TSF data
The ability to modify TSF data is
granted only to certain roles managed
by the TOE.
FMT_MTD.1(b)
Management of TSF data
The ability to modify TSF data is
granted only to certain roles managed
by the TOE.
FMT_SMR.1
Security roles
Specific roles are defined to govern
management of the TOE.
FMT_SMF.1
Specification of management
functions
FMT_SMF specifies each of the
management functions that are
utilized to securely manage the TOE.
FMT_MTD.1(a)
Management of TSF data
The ability to modify TSF data is
granted only to certain roles managed
by the TOE.
FMT_MSA.3
Static attribute initialisation
Permissive values for data access are
provided, and the TOE administrator
can change them when a data object
is created.
O.ADMIN
The TOE must provide a method
for administrative control of the
TOE.
FMT_MSA.1
Management of security attributes
Security attributes of the TOE can
only be changed by authorized
administrators.
O.BYPASS
The TOE must ensure that the
FPT_SEP.1
TSF domain separation
The TOE maintains a security domain
for its execution that protects it from
interference and tampering.
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Objective Requirements Addressing the Objective Rationale
TSF cannot be bypassed.
FPT_RVM.1
Non-bypassability of the TSP
The TOE ensures that policy
enforcement functions are invoked
and succeed before each function is
allowed to proceed
FDP_SDI.2
Stored data integrity
FDP_ACF.1
Security attribute based access
control
The TOE provides access control
functionality to manage access to data
within the TOE.
O.PROTECT
The TOE must protect data that it
has been entrusted to protect.
FDP_ACC.1
Subset access control
The TOE has an access control policy
which ensures that only authorized
servers gain access to data within the
TOE.
8.2.2 Rationale for Security Functional Requirements of the IT Environment
Objective Requirements Addressing the Objective Rationale
OE.SECURE_COMMUNICATION
S
The TOE environment must
provide secure communications
between systems connected to the
Storage Area Network.
FIA_UAU.2(b)
User authentication before any action
Users are not able to access the TOE
until the environment has properly
authenticated the user.
OE.SECURE_SERVERS
The TOE environment must
provide properly configured
application servers to
communicate with the TOE.
FIA_UAU.2(b)
User authentication before any action
The TOE will not give access to a user
until the environment has properly
authenticated the user.
OE.PROPER_NAME_ASSIGNME
NT
The TOE environment must
provide accurate World Wide
Names for each system that
communicates with the TOE.
FIA_UID.2(b)
User identification before any action
The TOE will not give access to a user
until the environment has properly
identified the user.
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8.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
EAL2+ was chosen to provide a low to moderate level of assurance that is consistent with good commercial
practices. As such, minimal additional tasks are placed upon the vendor assuming the vendor follows reasonable
software engineering practices and can provide support to the evaluation for design and testing efforts. The chosen
assurance level is appropriate with the threats defined for the environment. At EAL2+, the TOE will have incurred a
search for obvious flaws to support its introduction into the non-hostile environment.
8.4 Rationale for Refinements of Security Functional Requirements
The following refinements of Security Functional Requirements from CC version 2.3 have been made to clarify the
content of the SFRs, and make them easier to read:
The words “no additional rules” was added, and others stricken, to FDP_ACF.1.
The word “objects” was changed to “user data” to specify more precisely what is protected with FDP_SDI.2.
The words “to the TOE Environment” have been added to FIA_UAU.2(b) and FIA_UID.2(b).
8.5 Dependency Rationale
This ST does satisfy all the requirement dependencies of the CC. Table 7 lists each requirement to which the TOE
claims conformance with a dependency and indicates whether the dependent requirement was included. As the table
indicates, all dependencies have been met.
Table 7 - Functional Requirements Dependencies
SFR ID Dependencies
Dependency
Met Rationale
FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACF.1 

FDP_ACC.1 

FDP_ACF.1
FMT_MSA.3 

FDP_SDI.2 No Dependencies 

FIA_UAU.2(a) FIA_UID.1 
 FIA_UID.2 is hierarchical to FIA_UID.1 and
therefore satisfies this dependency.
FIA_UAU.2(b) FIA_UID.1 
 FIA_UID.2 is hierarchical to FIA_UID.1 and
therefore satisfies this dependency.
FIA_UID.2(a) No Dependencies 

FIA_UID.2(b) No Dependencies 

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SFR ID Dependencies
Dependency
Met Rationale
FDP_ACC.1 

FMT_SMF.1 

FMT_MSA.1
FMT_SMR.1 

FMT_MSA.1 

FMT_MSA.3
FMT_SMR.1 

FMT_SMF.1 

FMT_MTD.1(a)
FMT_SMR.1 

FMT_SMF.1 

FMT_MTD.1(b)
FMT_SMR.1 

FMT_SMF.1 

FMT_MTD.1(c)
FMT_SMR.1 

FMT_SMF.1 No Dependencies 

FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 
 FIA_UID.2 is hierarchical to FIA_UID.1 and
therefore satisfies this dependency.
FPT_RVM.1 No Dependencies 

FPT_SEP.1 No Dependencies 

8.6 TOE Summary Specification Rationale
8.6.1 TOE Summary Specification Rationale for the Security Functional
Requirements
Each subsection in the TOE Summary Specification (TSS) (Section 6) describes a security function of the TOE.
Each description is organized by set of requirements with rationale that indicates how these requirements are
satisfied by aspects of the corresponding security function. These sets of security functions work together to satisfy
all of the security functional requirements. Furthermore, all of the security functions are necessary in order for the
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TSF to meet the security functional requirements. This section, in conjunction with the TOE Summary
Specification section, provides evidence that the security functions are suitable to fulfill the TOE security
requirements.
Table 5 identifies the relationship between security requirements and security functions, showing that all security
requirements are addressed and all security functions are necessary (i.e., they correspond to at least one security
requirement).
8.6.2 TOE Summary Specification Rationale for the Security Assurance
Requirements
EAL2+ was chosen to provide a basic level of independently assured security in the absence of ready availability of
the complete development record from the vendor. The chosen assurance level is consistent with the postulated
threat environment.
8.6.2.1 Configuration Management
The EMC EMC CLARiiON FLARE v3.24 with Navisphere v6.24 running on CX3 Series Storage Systems -
Configuration Management: Capabilities documentation provides a description of tools used to control the
configuration items and how they are used at the EMC. The documentation provides a complete configuration item
list and a unique reference for each item. Additionally, the configuration management system is described including
procedures that are used by developers to control and track changes that are made to the TOE. The documentation
further details the TOE configuration items that are controlled by the configuration management system.
Corresponding CC Assurance Components:
• Configuration Items
8.6.2.2 Delivery and Operation
The EMC EMC CLARiiON FLARE v3.24 with Navisphere v6.24 running on CX3 Series Storage Systems - Delivery
and Operation: Secure Delivery documentation provides a description of the secure delivery procedures
implemented by EMC to protect against TOE modification during product delivery. The Installation Documentation
provided by EMC details the procedures for installing the TOE and placing the TOE in a secure state offering the
same protection properties as the master copy of the TOE. The Installation Documentation provides guidance to the
administrator on the TOE configuration parameters and how they affect the TSF.
Corresponding CC Assurance Components:
• Delivery Procedures
• Installation, Generation and Start-Up Procedures
8.6.2.3 Development
The EMC EMC CLARiiON FLARE v3.24 with Navisphere v6.24 running on CX3 Series Storage Systems - TOE
Architecture: High Level Design, Functional Specification, and Representation Correspondence design
documentation consists of several related design documents that address the components of the TOE at different
levels of abstraction. The following design documents address the Development Assurance Requirements:
• The Functional Specification provides a description of the security functions provided by the TOE and a
description of the external interfaces to the TSF. The Functional Specification covers the purpose and
method of use and a list of effects, exceptions, and errors message for each external TSF interface.
• The High-Level Design provides a top level design specification that refines the TSF functional
specification into the major constituent parts (subsystems) of the TSF. The high-level design identifies the
basic structure of the TSF, the major elements, a listing of all interfaces, and the purpose and method of use
for each interface.
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• The Correspondence Analysis demonstrates the correspondence between each of the TSF representations
provided. This mapping is performed to show the functions traced from the ST description to the High-
Level Design.
Corresponding CC Assurance Components:
• Informal Functional Specification
• Descriptive High-Level Design
• Informal Representation Correspondence
8.6.2.4 Guidance Documentation
The EMC Guidance documentation provides administrator and user guidance on how to securely operate the TOE.
The administrator Guidance provides descriptions of the security functions provided by the TOE. Additionally, it
provides detailed accurate information on how to administer the TOE in a secure manner and how to effectively use
the TSF privileges and protective functions. The User Guidance provided directs users on how to operate the TOE
in a secure manner. Additionally, User Guidance explains the user-visible security functions and how they are to be
used and explains the user’s role in maintaining the TOE’s Security. EMC provides single versions of documents
which address the administrator Guidance and User Guidance; there are not separate guidance documents
specifically for non-administrator users of the TOE.
Corresponding CC Assurance Components:
• Administrator Guidance
• User Guidance
8.6.2.5 Life Cycle Support
The EMC EMC CLARiiON FLARE v3.24 with Navisphere v6.24 running on CX3 Series Storage Systems – Life
Cycle Support: Flaw Remediation documentation describes the processes that EMC follows to capture, track, and
correct flaws (or “bugs”) that are found within the TOE. The documentation demonstrates that all discovered flaws
are recorded and that the process ensures that flaws are tracked through their entire life cycle.
Corresponding CC Assurance Components:
• Basic Flaw Remediation
8.6.2.6 Tests
There are a number of components that make up the EMC EMC CLARiiON FLARE v3.24 with Navisphere v6.24
running on CX3 Series Storage Systems – Tests; Coverage Functional Tests documentation. The Coverage Analysis
demonstrates the testing performed against the functional specification. The Coverage Analysis demonstrates the
extent to which the TOE security functions were tested as well as the level of detail to which the TOE was tested.
EMC Test Plans and Test Procedures, which detail the overall efforts of the testing effort and break down the
specific steps taken by a tester, are also provided.
Corresponding CC Assurance Components:
• Evidence of Coverage
• Functional Testing
8.6.2.7 Vulnerability and TOE Strength of Function Analyses
The EMC EMC CLARiiON FLARE v3.24 with Navisphere v6.24 running on CX3 Series Storage Systems -
Vulnerability Assessment: Strength of TOE Security Functions documentation is provided to demonstrate ways in
which an entity could violate the TSP and provide a list of identified vulnerabilities. Additionally, the document
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provides evidence of how the TOE is resistant to obvious attacks. The Strength of TOE Security Function Analysis
demonstrates the strength of the probabilistic or permutational mechanisms employed to provide security functions
within the TOE and how they exceed the minimum SOF requirements.
Corresponding CC Assurance Components:
• Strength of TOE Security Function analysis
• Vulnerability Analysis
8.7 Strength of Function
A SOF rating of SOF-basic was claimed for this TOE to meet the EAL2+ assurance requirements. This SOF is
sufficient to resist the threats identified in Section 3 of the Security Target. Section 8 of the Security Target
demonstrates that the security objectives for the TOE and the TOE environment are satisfied by the security
requirements. Section 8.1 of the Security Target provides evidence that demonstrates that TOE threats are countered
by the TOE security objectives. Section 8.2 of the Security Target demonstrates that the security objectives for the
TOE and the TOE environment are satisfied by the security requirements. The evaluated TOE is intended to operate
in commercial and Department of Defense (DoD) low robustness environments processing unclassified information.
The relevant security functions and security functional requirements which have probabilistic or permutational
functions are:
• Identification and Authentication: FIA_UAU.2 - User Authentication before any action
The only mechanisms within the TOE that are probabilistic and permutational in nature are the passwords used to
authenticate users to the TOE.
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9 Acronyms
Table 8 - Acronyms
Acronym Definition
CC Common Criteria
CHAP Challenge-Handshake Authentication Protocol
CLI Command Line Interface
DoD Department of Defense
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
IP Internet Protocol
iSCSI Internet Small Computer System Interface
ISO International Organization for Standardization
IT Information Technology
LUN Logical Unit
NAS Network Attached Storage
NQM Navisphere Quality of Service Manager
PP Protection Profile
RAID Redundant Array of Independent Disks
SAN Storage Area Network
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Functional Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SOE Storage Operating Environment
SOF Strength of Function
SP Storage Processor
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Function
TSS Toe Summary Specification
WWN World Wide Name