ETRAVEL EAC V1 64K SECURITY TARGET
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eTravel EAC v1 64K
MRTD EAC
Common Criteria / ISO 15408
Security Target – Public version
EAL4+
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CONTENT
1. ST INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................................................................................5
1.1 ST IDENTIFICATION .............................................................................................................................................5
1.2 ST OVERVIEW......................................................................................................................................................6
1.3 CC CONFORMANCE .............................................................................................................................................7
1.4 REFERENCES........................................................................................................................................................8
1.4.1 External References....................................................................................................................................8
1.4.2 Internal References.....................................................................................................................................9
1.5 ACRONYMS AND GLOSSARY ................................................................................................................................9
2. TOE DESCRIPTION.............................................................................................................................................15
2.1 TOE BOUNDARIES .............................................................................................................................................15
2.2 TOE INTENDED USAGE ......................................................................................................................................15
2.3 IT FEATURES OF THE TOE .................................................................................................................................16
2.4 SCOPE OF THE TOE............................................................................................................................................18
2.4.1 Physical scope of the TOE........................................................................................................................18
2.4.2 Logical scope of the TOE .........................................................................................................................20
2.5 TOE LIFE-CYCLE................................................................................................................................................23
3. TOE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT ....................................................................................................................26
3.1 ASSETS ..............................................................................................................................................................26
3.2 SUBJECTS...........................................................................................................................................................28
3.3 ASSUMPTIONS....................................................................................................................................................29
3.4 THREATS ...........................................................................................................................................................30
3.5 ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES ..............................................................................................................32
4. SECURITY OBJECTIVES ...................................................................................................................................34
4.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE ................................................................................................................34
4.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE ENVIRONMENT.................................................................................................36
4.2.1 Security Objectives for the Development and Manufacturing Environment ............................................36
4.2.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment..............................................................................36
5. IT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.......................................................................................................................38
5.1 EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION...............................................................................................................38
5.1.1 Definition of the Family FAU_SAS...........................................................................................................38
5.1.2 Definition of the Family FCS_RND..........................................................................................................38
5.1.3 Definition of the Family FIA_API ............................................................................................................39
5.1.4 Definition of the Family FMT_LIM..........................................................................................................40
5.1.5 Definition of the Family FPT_EMSEC.....................................................................................................41
5.2 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE TOE.....................................................................................43
5.2.1 Class FAU Security Audit (FAU)..............................................................................................................43
5.2.2 Class Cryptographic Support (FCS).........................................................................................................43
5.2.3 Class Identification and Authentication (FIA)..........................................................................................46
5.2.4 Class User Data Protection (FDP)...........................................................................................................50
5.2.5 Class Security Management (FMT)..........................................................................................................52
5.2.6 Class Protection of the Security Functions (FPT)....................................................................................56
5.3 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE TOE......................................................................................59
5.4 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR THE IT ENVIRONMENT ......................................................................................59
5.4.1 Passive Authentication..............................................................................................................................59
5.4.2 Extended Access Control PKI...................................................................................................................60
5.4.3 Basic Terminal..........................................................................................................................................60
5.4.4 General Inspection System........................................................................................................................62
5.4.5 Extended Inspection System......................................................................................................................65
5.4.6 Personalization Terminals........................................................................................................................66
6. TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION...................................................................................................................67
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6.1 TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONS...............................................................................................................................67
6.1.1 TSFs provided by the eTravel EAC V1 64K Software ..............................................................................67
6.1.1.1 SF.REL: Reliability ................................................................................................................................................68
6.1.1.2 SF.AC: Access Control...........................................................................................................................................68
6.1.1.3 SF.SYM_AUT: Symmetric Authentication Mechanisms.......................................................................................69
6.1.1.4 SF.SM: Secure Messaging......................................................................................................................................70
6.1.1.5 SF.CA: Chip Authentication...................................................................................................................................70
6.1.1.6 SF.TA_CER: Validity of the Certificate Chain ......................................................................................................71
6.1.1.7 SF.TA_AUT: Asymmetric Authentication Mechanism..........................................................................................71
6.1.2 TSFs provided by the Infineon SLE66CLX800PE chip ............................................................................72
6.1.2.1 SEF.1: Operating state checking.............................................................................................................................72
6.1.2.2 SEF.2: Phase management with test mode lock-out ...............................................................................................72
6.1.2.3 SEF.3: Protection against snooping ........................................................................................................................73
6.1.2.4 SEF.4: Data encryption and data disguising...........................................................................................................73
6.1.2.5 SEF.5: Random number generation........................................................................................................................73
6.1.2.6 SEF.6: TSF self test................................................................................................................................................73
6.1.2.7 SEF.7: Notification of physical attack....................................................................................................................73
6.1.2.8 SEF.8: Memory Management Unit (MMU) ...........................................................................................................73
6.1.2.9 SEF.9: Cryptographic support ................................................................................................................................73
6.2 ASSURANCE MEASURES ....................................................................................................................................74
7. PP CLAIMS ............................................................................................................................................................75
7.1 PP REFERENCE ..................................................................................................................................................75
7.2 PP TAILORING ...................................................................................................................................................75
8. RATIONALES........................................................................................................................................................76
8.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES RATIONALE...................................................................................................................76
8.2 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE .............................................................................................................79
8.2.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale ...........................................................................................79
8.2.2 Dependency Rationale..............................................................................................................................85
8.2.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale ............................................................................................91
8.2.4 Security Requirements – Mutual Support and Internal Consistency........................................................92
8.3 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION RATIONALE ......................................................................................................93
8.3.1 TOE security functions rationale..............................................................................................................93
8.3.2 Assurance measures rationale..................................................................................................................97
8.4 PP CLAIMS RATIONALE ......................................................................................................................................99
FIGURES
Figure 2-1. Basic Access Control Protocol............................................................................................................................................17
Figure 2-2. Extended Access Control Protocol .....................................................................................................................................18
Figure 2-3. Physical aspect of the TOE embedded in the MRTD environment ....................................................................................19
Figure 2-4. Physical structure of the TOE.............................................................................................................................................20
Figure 2-5. Logical data structure of the eTravel EAC V1 64K product...............................................................................................21
Figure 2-6. Life cycle phases.................................................................................................................................................................23
Figure 6-1. Manufacturer key................................................................................................................................................................70
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TABLES
Table 1-1. Card Production Life Cycle Data...........................................................................................................................................6
Table 2-1. Data Groups of the Issuer Application DF...........................................................................................................................22
Table 2-2. Identification of the actors ...................................................................................................................................................25
Table 3-1. Keys....................................................................................................................................................................................26
Table 3-2. Less-sensitive data............................................................................................................................................................27
Table 3-3. Sensitive data....................................................................................................................................................................28
Table 5-1. Cryptographic support..........................................................................................................................................................44
Table 5-2. Cryptographic key destruction .............................................................................................................................................45
Table 5-3. Overview on authentication SFR. ........................................................................................................................................47
Table 5-4. Additional overview on authentication SFR. .......................................................................................................................47
Table 5-5. Timing of identification .......................................................................................................................................................47
Table 5-6. Timing of authentication......................................................................................................................................................48
Table 5-7. Authentication failure handling............................................................................................................................................50
Table 5-8. BAC authentication failure handling....................................................................................................................................50
Table 5-9. Specification of management functions. ..............................................................................................................................55
Table 5-10. User data which shall not emit electromagnetic or current emissions................................................................................57
Table 5-11. User data which shall be protected against access through smart card circuit contacts. ....................................................57
Table 5-12. TSF testing.........................................................................................................................................................................58
Table 5-13. Resistance to physical attack..............................................................................................................................................59
Table 6-1. Security Functions provided by the eTravel EAC V1 64K Software...................................................................................67
Table 6-2. Correspondance between TOE ES life cycle states and life cycle phases............................................................................69
Table 6-3. Security Functions provided by the SLE66CLX800PE chip. ..............................................................................................72
Table 6-4. Assurance Measures.............................................................................................................................................................74
Table 8-1. Security Objective Rationale................................................................................................................................................76
Table 8-2. Coverage of Security Objective for the TOE by SFR ..........................................................................................................80
Table 8-3. Coverage of Security Objective for the IT environment by SFR .........................................................................................84
Table 8-4. Dependencies between the SFR for the TOE.......................................................................................................................88
Table 8-5. Dependencies between the SFR for the IT environment......................................................................................................90
Table 8-6. Rationale table of functional requirements and security functions ......................................................................................94
Table 8-7. Rationale table of assurance requirements and assurance measures ....................................................................................97
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1. ST INTRODUCTION
1.1 ST IDENTIFICATION
Title: eTravel EAC V1 64K public Security Target
Version: v1.0 issued 10 December 2008
ST reference: D1111225
Origin: GEMALTO
Product identification: eTravel EAC V1 64K
Security Controller: Infineon SLE66CLX800PE
TOE identification: eTravel EAC V1 64K
TOE documentation: user guide [USR] and administration guide [ADM]
The TOE identification is provided by the Card Production Life Cycle Data (CPLCD) of the TOE,
located in OTP and in EEPROM. These data are available by executing a dedicated command.
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CPLC field Length Value
IC Fabricator 2 ‘Infineon’
IC Type 2 ‘SLE66CLX800PE’
Operating System Identifier 2 n.a.
Operating System release date 2 n.a.
Operating System release level 2 n.a.
IC Fabrication Date 2 n.a.
IC Serial Number 4 Unique identification of the chip written by
the ICC Manufacturer
IC Batch Identifier 2 n.a.
IC Module Fabricator 2 n.a.
IC Module Packaging Date 2 n.a.
ICC Manufacturer 2 ‘Gemalto’
IC Embedding Date 2 n.a.
IC Pre-personalizer 2 ‘Gemalto’
IC Pre-personalization Date 2 n.a.
IC Pre-personalization Eqiopment
Identifier
4 n.a.
IC Personalizer 2 n.a.
IC Personalization Date 2 n.a.
IC Personalization Equipment Identifier 4 n.a.
Table 1-1. Card Production Life Cycle Data
IT Security Evaluation scheme: TUV Informationstechnik GmbH (TüViT)
IT Security Certification scheme: Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI)
1.2 ST OVERVIEW
The ST is based on Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO Application”,
Extended Access Control [PP-MRTD-EAC].
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the contactless integrated circuit chip of machine readable travel
documents (MRTD’s chip) based on the requirements of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).
More specifically the TOE consists of operating system of MRTD’s chip with ICAO application. The TOE is
programmed according to Logical Data Structure [LDS] and [ASM].
This Security Target defines the security requirements for the TOE. The main security objective is to provide
the secure enforcing functions and mechanisms to maintain the integrity and confidentiality of the MRTD
application and data during its life cycle.
The main objectives of this ST are:
• To introduce TOE and the MRTD application,
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• To define the scope of the TOE and its security features,
• To describe the security environment of the TOE, including the assets to be protected and
the threats to be countered by the TOE and its environment during the product development,
production and usage.
• To describe the security objectives of the TOE and its environment supporting in terms of
integrity and confidentiality of application data and programs and of protection of the TOE.
• To specify the security requirements which includes the TOE security functional
requirements, the TOE assurance requirements and TOE security functions.
1.3 CC CONFORMANCE
This security target claims conformance to:
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and general
model, August 2005, version 2.3, CCMB-2005-08-001 [CC-1],
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security functional
requirements, August 2005, version 2.3, CCMB-2005-08-002 [CC-2],
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security Assurance
Requirements, August 2005, version 2.3, CCMB-2005-08-003 [CC-3],
as follows:
- Part 2 extended,
- Part 3 conformant,
- Package conformant to EAL4 augmented with ADV_IMP.2, ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and
AVA_VLA.4.
This security target claims conformance also to the Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document
with ‘ICAO Application”. Extended Access Control [PP-MRTD-EAC].
The evaluation of the TOE uses the result of the CC evaluation of the Infineon SLE66CLX800PE chip
claiming conformance to the PP [PP-SC]. The hardware part of the composite evaluation is covered by the
certification report [CR-INFINEON].
The minimum strength level for the TOE security functions is “SOF high” (Strength of functions high).
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1.4 REFERENCES
1.4.1 External References
[ASM] Technical Guideline – Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents – Extended
Access Control (EAC),
Version 1.0, TR-03110
[BIO] BIOMETRICS DEPLOYMENT OF MACHINE READABLE TRAVEL DOCUMENTS,
Technical Report, Development and Specification of Globally Interoperable Biometric Standards for
Machine Assisted Identity Confirmation using Machine Readable Travel Documents,
Version 2.0, ICAO TAG MRTD/NTWG, 21 May 2004
[CC-1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Part 1: Introduction and general model,
CCMB-2005-08-001, version 2.3, August 2005
[CC-2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Part 2: Security Functional Requirements
CCMB-2005-08-002, version 2.3, August 2005
[CC-3] Common Criteria for Information Technology security Evaluation
Part 3: Security Assurance Requirements
CCMB-2005-08-003, version 2.3, August 2005
[CR-INFINEON] Certification Report, Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller)
BSI-DSZ-CC-0399-2007
[FIPS180-2] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-2 SECURE HASH STANDARD (+Change Notice
to include SHA-224),
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards and Technology,
2002 August 1
[FIPS46-3] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication FIPS PUB 46-3, DATA ENCRYPTION STANDARD
(DES),
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards and Technology,
Reaffirmed 1999 October 25
[ISO15946-1] ISO/IEC 15946: Information technology – Security techniques – Cryptographic techniques based on elliptic
curves – Part 1: General,
2002
[ISO15946-2] ISO/IEC 15946: Information technology – Security techniques – Cryptographic techniques based on elliptic
curves – Part 2: Digital Signatures,
2002
[ISO15946-3] ISO/IEC 15946: Information technology – Security techniques – Cryptographic techniques based on elliptic
curves – Part 3: Key establishment,
2002
[ISO7816] ISO 7816, Identification cards – Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts, Part 4: Organization, security
and commands for interchange, FDIS2004
[ISO9796-2] ISO/IEC 9797: Information technology – Security techniques – Digital Signature Schemes giving message
recovery – Part 2: Integer factorisation based mechanisms,
2002
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[ISO9797-1] ISO/IEC 9797: Information technology – Security techniques – Message Authentication Codes (MACs) –
Part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher,
1999
[LDS] MRTD, Technical Report, Development of a Logical Data Structure - LDS for Optional Capacity Expansion
Technologies
International Civil Aviation Organization
LDS 1.7 -2004-05-18, Revision 1.7, May 18 2004
[PKCS#3] PKCS #3: Diffie-Hellman Key-Agreement Standard,
An RSA Laboratories Technical Note,
Version 1.4, Revised November 1, 1993
[PKI] MRTD Technical Report, PKI for Machine Readable Travel Documents Offering ICC Read-Only Access
International Civil Aviation Organization
Version 1.1, October 01 2004
[PP-MRTD-BAC] Common Criteria Protection Profile - Machine Readable Travel Document with ICAO Application, Basic
Access Control
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-PP-0017, version 1.0, 18 August 2005
[PP-MRTD-EAC] Common Criteria Protection Profile – Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO Application”, Extended
Access Control
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-PP-0026, Version 1.1, 7
th
September 2006
[PP-SC] Smartcard IC Platform protection Profile
BSI-PP-0002, version 1.0, July 2001
[SS] ANNEX to Section III SECURITY STANDARDS FOR MACHINE READABLE TRAVEL DOCUMENTS,
Excerpts from ICAO Doc 9303, Part 1
Machine Readable Passports, Fifth Edition – 2003
[ST-INFINEON] Security Target, SLE66CLX800PE, SLE66CLX800PEM, SLE66CLX800PES, SLE66CLX360PE,
SLE66CLX360PEM, SLE66CLX360PES
Version 1.3, 2006-12-11
[TR-ECC] Elliptic Curve Cryptography according to ISO 15946,
Technical Guideline, TR-ECC,
BSI, 2006
1.4.2 Internal References
[IGS] Installation, Generation and Start Up Procedures
[ADM] Administrator Guidance
[USR] User Guidance
1.5 ACRONYMS AND GLOSSARY
Acr. Term Definition
AA Active
Authentication
Security mechanism defined in [PKI] option by which means the MTRD’s chip proves and the inspection
system verifies the identity and authenticity of the MTRD’s chip as part of a genuine MRTD issued by a known
State of organization.
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Audit records Write-only-once non-volatile memory area of the MRTDs chip to store the Initialization Data and Pre-
personalization Data.
Authenticity Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the MRTD’s chip were created by the issuing State or
Organization
BAC Basic Access
Control
Security mechanism defined in [PKI] by which means the MTRD’s chip proves and the inspection system
protect their communication by means of secure messaging with Basic Access Keys (see there).
BIS Basic Inspection
System
An inspection system which implements the terminals part of the Basic Access Control Mechanism and
authenticates themselves to the MRTD’s chip using the Document Basic Access Keys drawn form printed
MRZ data for reading the logical MRTD.
Biographical data
(biodata)
The personalized details of the bearer of the document appearing as text in the visual and machine readable
zones on the biographical data page of a passport book or on a travel card or visa. [SS]
Biometric
Reference Data
Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD holder in the MRTD’s chip as (i) digital portrait and (ii)
optional biometric reference data.
Counterfeit An unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine security document made by whatever means. [SS]
CCSCA Country Signing
CA Certificate
Self-signed certificate of the Country Signing CA Public Key (KPuCSCA) issued by CSCA stored in the
inspection system.
CPLCD Card Production
Life Cycle Data
The TOE identification is provided by the Card Production Life Cycle Data (CPLCD) of the TOE, located in OTP
and in EEPROM. These data are available by executing a dedicated command
CVCA Country Verifying
Certification
Authority
The Country Verifying Certification Authority enforces the privacy policy of the issuing Country or Organization
with respect to the protection of sensitive biometric reference data stored in the MRTD. The CVCA represents
the country specific root of the PKI of Inspection Systems.
DH Diffie-Hellman
Key Agreement
Algorithm
Algorithm for Chip Authentication protocol
DV Document Verifier The Document Verifier enforces the privacy policy of the receiving Country with respect to the protection of
sensitive biometric reference data to be handled by the Extended Inspection Systems. The DV manages the
authorization of the Extended Inspection Systems for the sensitive data of the MRTD in the limits provided by
the Issuing State or Organization in form of the Document Verifier Certificates.
EC-DH Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman
Key Agreement
Algorithm
Algorithm for Chip Authentication protocol
Document Basic
Access Keys
Pair of symmetric Triple-DES keys used for secure messaging with encryption (key KENC) and message
authentication (key KMAC) of data transmitted between the MRTD’s chip and the inspection system [PKI]. It is
drawn from the printed MRZ of the passport book to authenticate an entity able to read the printed MRZ of the
passport book.
SOD Document
Security Object
A RFC3369 CMS Signed Data Structure, signed by the Document Signer (DS). Carries the hash values of the
LDS Data Groups. It is stored in the MRTD’s chip. It may carry the Document Signer Certificate (CDS). [PKI]
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Eavesdropper A threat agent with moderate attack potential reading the communication between the MRTD’s chip and the
inspection system to gain the data on the MRTD’s chip.
Enrolment The process of collecting biometric samples from a person and the subsequent preparation and storage of
biometric reference templates representing that person's identity. [BIO]
EAC Extended Access
Control
Security mechanism identified in [PKI] by which means the MTRD’s chip (i) verifies the authentication of the
inspection systems authorized to read the optional biometric reference data, (ii) controls the access to the
optional biometric reference data and (iii) protects the confidentiality and integrity of the optional biometric
reference data during their transmission to the inspection system by secure messaging. The Personalization
Agent may use the same mechanism to authenticate themselves with Personalization Agent Authentication
Private Key and to get write and read access to the logical MRTD and TSF data.
EIS Extended
Inspection System
The EIS in addition to the General Inspection System (GIS) (i) implements the Terminal Authentication
Protocol and (ii) is authorized by the issuing State or Organization through the Document Verifier of the
receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data.
Forgery Fraudulent alteration of any part of the genuine document, e.g. changes to the biographical data or the
portrait. [SS]
GIS General
Inspection System
The GIS is a Basic Inspection System (BIS) which implements additional the Chip Authentication Mechanism.
Global
Interoperability
The capability of inspection systems (either manual or automated) in different States throughout the world to
exchange data, to process data received from systems in other States, and to utilize that data in inspection
operations in their respective States. Global interoperability is a major objective of the standardized
specifications for placement of both eye-readable and machine readable data in all MRTDs. [BIO]
IC Dedicated
Support Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which provides functions after TOE Delivery. The
usage of parts of the IC Dedicated Software might be restricted to certain phases.
IC Dedicated Test
Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which is used to test the TOE before TOE Delivery but
which does not provide any functionality thereafter.
Impostor A person who applies for and obtains a document by assuming a false name and identity, or a person who
alters his or her physical appearance to represent himself or herself as another person for the purpose of
using that person’s document. [SS]
Improperly A person who travels, or attempts to travel with: (a) an expired travel
Documented
person
document or an invalid visa; (b) a counterfeit, forged or altered travel document or visa; (c) someone else’s
travel document or visa; or (d) no travel document or visa, if required. [BIO]
Initialisation Data Any data defined by the TOE Manufacturer and injected into the non-volatile memory by the Integrated
Circuits manufacturer (Phase 2). These data are for instance used for traceability and for IC identification as
MRTD’s material (IC identification data).
Inspection The act of a State examining an MRTD presented to it by a traveler (the MRTD holder) and verifying its
authenticity. [BIO]
IS Inspection system A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining an MRTD presented
by the traveller and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveller as MRTD holder.
IC Integrated circuit Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing and/or memory functions. The MRTD’s chip is a
integrated circuit.
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Integrity Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the MRTD’s chip have not been altered from that
created by the issuing State or Organization
Issuing
Organization
Organization authorized to issue an official travel document (e.g. the United Nations Organization, issuer of
the Laissez-passer). [LDS]
Issuing State The Country issuing the MRTD. [LDS]
LDS Logical Data
Structure
The collection of groupings of Data Elements stored in the optional capacity expansion technology [LDS]. The
capacity expansion technology used is the MRTD’s chip.
Logical MRTD Data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data Structure [LDS] as specified by ICAO on the
contactless integrated circuit. It presents contactless readable data including (but not limited to) personal data
of the MRTD holder (1) the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1), (2) the digitized
portraits (EF.DG2), (3) the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s) (EF.DG4) or both
and (4) the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16).
Logical travel
document
Data stored according to the Logical Data Structure as specified by ICAO in the contactless integrated circuit
including (but not limited to) (1) data contained in the machine-readable zone (mandatory), (2) digitized
photographic image (mandatory) and (3) fingerprint image(s) and/or iris image(s) (optional).
MRTD Machine readable
travel document
Official document issued by a State or Organization which is used by the holder for international travel (e.g.
passport, visa, official document of identity) and which contains mandatory visual (eye readable) data and a
separate mandatory data summary, intended for global use, reflecting essential data elements capable of
being machine read. [LDS]
MRV Machine readable
visa
A visa or, where appropriate, an entry clearance (hereinafter collectively referred to as visas) conforming to
the specifications contained herein, formulated to improve facilitation and enhance security for the visa holder.
Contains mandatory visual (eye readable) data and a separate mandatory data summary capable of being
machine read. The MRV is normally a label which is attached to a visa page in a passport. [LDS]
MRZ Machine
Readable Zone
Fixed dimensional area located on the front of the MRTD or MRP Data Page or, in the case of the TD1, the back
of the MRTD, containing mandatory and optional data for machine reading using OCR methods. [LDS]
Machine-verifiable
biometrics feature
A unique physical personal identification feature (e.g. an iris pattern, fingerprint or facial characteristics)
stored on a travel document in a form that can be read and verified by machine. [SS]
MRTD
administrator
The Issuing State or Organization which is allowed to perform administrative commands (update data of the
MRTD application, invalidation of the application) in the phase 4 Operational Use.
MRTD application Non-executable data defining the functionality of the operating system on the IC as the MRTD’s chip. It
includes:
- -the file structure implementing the LDS [LDS],
- the definition of the User Data, but does not include the User Data itself (i.e. content of EF.DG1 to
EF.DG14 and EF.DG16),
- - the TSF Data including the definition the authentication data but except the authentication data
itself.
MRTD Basic
Access Control
Mutual authentication protocol followed by secure messaging between the inspection system and the MRTD’s
chip based on MRZ information as key seed and access condition to data stored on MRTD’s chip according to
LDS.
MRTD holder The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization personalized the MRTD.
MRTD’s Chip A contactless integrated circuit chip complying with ISO/IEC 14443 and ICAOT, [10], p. 14. programmed
according to the Logical Data Structure as specified by ICAOT, [10], p. 14.
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MRTD’s chip
Embedded
Software
Software embedded in a MRTD’s chip and not being developed by the IC Designer. The MRTD’s chip
Embedded Software is designed in Phase 1 and embedded into the MRTD’s chip in Phase 2 of the TOE life-
cycle.
Optional biometric
reference data
Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD holder in the MRTD’s chip as (i) encoded finger
image(s) (EF.DG3) or (ii) encoded iris image(s) (EF.DG4) or (iii) both. Note that the European commission
decided to use only finger print and not to use iris images as optional biometric reference data.
Passive
authentication
- verification of the digital signature of the Document Security Object
- comparison the hash values of the read LDS data fields with the hash values contained in the
Document Security Object.
Personalization The process by which the portrait, signature and biographical data are applied to the document. [SS]
Personalization
Agent
The agent acting on the behalf of the issuing State or organisation to personalize the MRTD for the holder by
(i) establishing the identity the holder for the biographic data in the MRTD, (ii) enrolling the biometric reference
data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) or (ii) the encoded iris image(s) and (iii)
writing these data on the physical and logical MRTD for the holder.
Personalization
Agent
Authentication
Information
TSF data used for authentication proof and verification of the Personalization Agent.
Personalization
Agent
Authentication
Key
Symmetric cryptographic key used (i) by the Personalization Agent to prove their identity and get access to
the logical MRTD according to the SFR FIA_UAU.4/BT FIA_UAU.6/BT and FIA_API.1/SYM_PT and (ii) by the
MRTD’s chip to verify the authentication attempt of a terminal as Personalization Agent according to the SFR
FIA_UAU.4/MRTD, FIA_UAU.5/MRTD and FIA_UAU.6/MRTD.
Physical travel
document
Travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip using secure printing to present data including (but not
limited to):
1. biographical data,
2. data of the machine-readable zone,
3. photographic image and
4. other data.
Pre-
personalization
Data
Any data that is injected into the non-volatile memory of the TOE by the MRTD Manufacturer (Phase 2) for
traceability of non-personalized MRTD’s and/or to secure shipment within or between life cycle phases 2 and
3. It contains (but is not limited to) the Personalization Agent Key Pair.
Pre –personalized
MRTD’s chip
MRTD’s chip equipped with pre-personalization data.
PIS Primary
Inspection System
A inspection system that contains a terminal for the contactless communication with the MRTD’s chip and
does not implement the terminals part of the Basic Access Control Mechanism.
Receiving State The Country to which the MRTD holder is applying for entry. [LDS]
reference data Data enrolled for a known identity and used by the verifier to check the verification data provided by an entity to
prove this identity in an authentication attempt.
secondary image A repeat image of the holder’s portrait reproduced elsewhere in the document by whatever means. [SS]
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secure messaging
in encrypted mode
Secure messaging using encryption and message authentication code according to ISO/IEC 7816-4
Skimming Imitation of the inspection system to read the logical MRTD or parts of it via the contactless communication
channel of the TOE without knowledge of the printed MRZ data.
travel document A passport or other official document of identity issued by a State or organization, which may be used by the
rightful holder for international travel. [BIO]
traveler Person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming the identity of the MRTD holder.
TSF data Data created by and for the TOE, that might affect the operation of the TOE (CC part 1 [1 ]).
Unpersonalized
MRTD
MRTD material prepared to produce an personalized MRTD containing an initialised and pre-personalized
MRTD’s chip.
User data Data created by and for the user, that does not affect the operation of the TSF (CC part 1 [1 ]).
Verification The process of comparing a submitted biometric sample against the biometric reference template of a single
enrolee whose identity is being claimed, to determine whether it matches the enrolee’s template. [BIO]
verification data Data provided by an entity in an authentication attempt to prove their identity to the verifier. The verifier
checks whether the verification data match the reference data known for the claimed identity.
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2. TOE DESCRIPTION
2.1 TOE BOUNDARIES
Application note: The final product is a MRTD passport. A contactless integrated circuit connected to an
antenna and capacitors are mounted on a plastic film. This inlay is then embedded in the coversheet or
datapage of the MRTD passport and provides a contactless interface for the passport holder identification.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the contactless integrated circuit chip of machine readable travel
documents (MRTD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure [LDS] and [ASM] and
providing:
• the Basic Access Control (BAC) according to the ICAO document [PKI]
• the Extended Access Control according to the BSI document [ASM]
Application note: Additionally to the [PP-MRTD-EAC] a set of administrative commands for the management
of the product during the product life.
The TOE comprises of:
• the circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (the integrated circuit, IC) with hardware for the contactless
interface, e.g. antennae, capacitors,
• the IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated Support
Software,
• the IC Embedded Software (operating system),
• the MRTD application,
• the associated guidance documentation.
Application note: Components within the TOE boundary are refined in the following manner:
• the Integrated Circuit (IC) Infineon SLE66CLX800PE,
• the IC Dedicated Test Software,
• the IC Dedicated Support Software (Boot Rom Software, Mifare Operating System),
• the hardware for the contactless interface (e.g. antenna, capacitors),
• the eTravel EAC V1 64K Embedded Software (ES),
• the NVM Embedded Software,
• part of the MRTD Logical Data Structure,
• the guidance documentation of the eTravel EAC V1 64K product:
o the administrator's guide (assurance family AGD-ADM),
o the user's guide (assurance family AGD-USR).
The eTravel EAC V1 64K Embedded Software (eTravel EAC V1 64K ES) is implemented in the ROM of the
chip. This eTravel EAC V1 64K ES provides mechanisms to load executable code into the non-volatile-
memory of the chip (EEPROM). These mechanisms are included in the TOE and are part of the evaluation.
The TOE is delivered to the Personalization Agent with data and guidance documentation in order to perform
the personalization of the product. In addition the Personalization Key is delivered from the MRTD
Manufacturer to the Personalization Agent or from the Personalization Agent to the MRTD Manufacturer.
2.2 TOE INTENDED USAGE
State or organization issues MRTD to be used by the holder for international travel. The traveler presents a
MRTD to the inspection system to prove his or her identity.
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The MRTD in context of this security target contains:
• visual (eye readable) biographical data and portrait of the holder,
• a separate data summary (MRZ data) for visual and machine reading using OCR methods in the
Machine readable zone (MRZ),
• data elements on the MRTD’s chip according to [LDS] for contactless machine reading.
The authentication of the traveler is based on the possession of a valid MRTD personalized for a holder with
the claimed identity as given on the biographical data page and biometrics using the reference data stored in
the MRTD. The issuing State or Organization ensures the authenticity of the data of genuine MRTD’s. The
receiving State trusts a genuine MRTD of an issuing State or Organization.
For this security target the MRTD is viewed as unit of:
• the physical MRTD as travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip. It presents visual readable
data including (but not limited to) personal data of the MRTD holder:
o the biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book,
o the printed data in the Machine-Readable Zone (MRZ),
o the printed portrait.
• the logical MRTD as data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data Structure [LDS]
as specified by ICAO on the contactless integrated circuit. It presents contactless readable data
including (but not limited to) personal data of the MRTD holder:
o the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1),
o the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
o the optional biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s) (EF.DG4) or both,
o the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16),
o the Document Security Object (SOD).
The issuing State or Organization implements security features of the MRTD to maintain the authenticity and
integrity of the MRTD and their data. The MRTD as the passport book and the MRTD’s chip is uniquely
identified by the document number.
The physical MRTD is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on paper, security printing),
logical (e.g. authentication keys of the MRTD’s chip) and organizational security measures (e.g. control of
materials, personalization procedures) [SS]. These security measures include the binding of the MRTD’s
chip to the passport book.
This ST assumes that the issuing State or Organization uses EF.DG3 and/or EF.DG4 and protects these
data by means of Extended Access Control.
2.3 IT FEATURES OF THE TOE
The logical MRTD is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created by the document
signer acting for the issuing State or Organization and the security features of the MRTD’s chip.
The ICAO defines the baseline security methods Passive Authentication and the optional advanced security
methods Basic Access Control to the logical MRTD, Active Authentication of the MRTD’s chip, Extended
Access Control to and the Data Encryption of additional biometrics as optional security measure in the ICAO
Technical report [PKI]. The Passive Authentication Mechanism and the Data Encryption are performed
completely and independently of the TOE by the TOE environment.
This ST addresses the protection of the logical MRTD
• in integrity by write-only-once access control and by physical means and
• in confidentiality by the Basic Access Control Mechanism and the Extended Access Control
Mechanism.
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The Basic Access Control is a security feature, which shall be supported by the TOE. The Basic Access
Control mechanism checks that the inspection system has physical access to the MRTD’s datapage. This is
enforced by requiring the inspection system to derive the Document Basic Access keys KENC and KMAC from
the optically read MRZ (Machine Readable Zone). This protocol is also used to generate session keys KSENC
and KSMAC that are used to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the transmitted data by means of
secure messaging [PKI], Annex E, and [LDS]. The BAC protocol can be seen from the following picture.
Figure 2-1. Basic Access Control Protocol
The ST requires the TOE to implement the Chip Authentication defined in [ASM]. The Chip Authentication
provides evidence of the MRTD’s chip authenticity and prevents data traces described in [PKI]. The Chip
Authentication is provided by the following steps:
• the inspection system communicates by means of secure messaging established by Basic Access
Control
• the inspection system reads and verifies by means of the Passive Authentication the authenticity of
the MRTD’s Chip Authentication Public Key using the Document Security Object
• the inspection system generates a ephemeral key pair
• the TOE and the inspection system agree on two session keys for secure messaging in ENC_MAC
mode according to the Diffie-Hellman Primitive
• the inspection system verifies by means of received message authentication codes whether the
MRTD’s chip was able or not to run this protocol properly (i.e. it could apply the Chip Authentication
Private Key corresponding to the Chip Authentication Public Key for derivation of the session keys).
The Chip Aurhentication requires collaboration of the TOE environment.
The ST requires the TOE to implement the Extended Access Control as defined in [ASM]. The Extended
Access Control consists of two parts:
• a Terminal Authentication Protocol to authenticate the inspection system as entity authorized by the
Issuing State or Organization through the receiving state
• access control by the TOE to allow reading the sensitive biometric reference data only to
successfully authenticated authorized inspection systems. It requires secure messaging established
by the Chip Authentication Mechanism to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the sensitive
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biometric reference data during transmission from the TOE to the inspection system. Therefore the
Chip Authentication Mechanism must have been successfully executed before Terminal
Authentication Protocol.
The CA and the TA protocols can be seen from the following figure and more detailed information can be
found from [ASM]. When the Chip Authentication has been successfully performed secure messaging is
restarted using new session keys KSCA ENC and KSCA MAC derived from K (see picture).
READ_BINARY()
PKICC,DICC
ICC
IFD
Read Chip Authentication public key
of the ICC (PKICC) and domain
parameters DICC from the EF.DG14
MSE_SET_KAT(PKIFD)
Generate ephemeral key pair
PKIFD, SKIFD
K=KA(SKICC, PKIFD, DICC)
PASSIVE
AUTHENTICATION
K=KA(SKIFD, PKICC, DICC)
EF.CVCA
READ_BINARY()
MSE_SET_DST
PSO_VERIFY_CERTIFICATE
MSE_SET_AT
GET_CHALLENGE
EXTERNAL_AUTHENTICATE
Read CVCA references
Set the reference to the
public key
Verify certificate
Set the reference to the
public key
RICC
Calculate signature SIFD= Sign(
SKIFD, IDICC||RICC||H(PKIFD))
Verify signature
CHIP
AUTHENTICATION
TERMINAL
AUTHENTICATION
Figure 2-2. Extended Access Control Protocol
2.4 SCOPE OF THE TOE
2.4.1 Physical scope of the TOE
Figure 2-3 displays a picture of the eTravel EAC V1 64K product embedded in the datapage of a MRTD.
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Figure 2-3. Physical aspect of the TOE embedded in the MRTD environment
The physical scope of the TOE is represented by the guidance documentation and the eTravel EAC V1 64K
product (see Figure 2-4 below), which comprises the plastic film with the antenna, capacitors and the chip.
The guidance documentation consists of user guide and administrator guide. The USER of the TOE is
defined as the traveler and the inspection systems in the “Operational Use” phase. The administrator is
defined as the passport Issuing State or Organization. So the personalization tasks and the TOE
administration after personalisation are included in the administrator responsibilities. After issuance of the
TOE to the passport holder, the TOE administrator could need to read traceability information of defect
products.
Machine Readable Zone (MRZ)
Biographical Data
Printed Portrait
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TOE boundary
MRTD
Printed Machine
Readable Zone
(MRZ)
Biographical
Data
Printed Portrait
Integrated Circuit
CONTACTLESS INTERFACE
(antenna, capacitors)
HARDWARE
Plastic Film
EEPROM
Logical Data Structure
NVM ES
ROM
IC Dedicated Test
Software
IC Dedicated
Support Software
Figure 2-4. Physical structure of the TOE
2.4.2 Logical scope of the TOE
Figure 2-5 shows the logical file structure during operational use of the eTravel EAC V1 64K product.
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MF
Issuer Application DF
AID = ‘A0 00 00 02 47 10 01’
EF.COM
Common Data
(Short File ID ‘1E’)
EF.DG9
Data Group 9
(Short File ID ‘09’)
EF.DG10
Data Group 10
(Short File ID ‘0A’)
EF.DG11
Data Group 11
(Short File ID ‘0B’)
EF.DG12
Data Group 12
(Short File ID ‘0C’)
EF.DG13
Data Group 13
(Short File ID ‘0D’)
EF.DG14
Data Group 14
(Short File ID ‘0E’)
EF.DG15
Data Group 15
(Short File ID ‘0F’)
EF.DG1
Data Group 1
(Short File ID ‘01’)
EF.DG16
Data Group 16
(Short File ID ‘10’)
EF.DG2
Data Group 2
(Short File ID ‘02’)
EF.DG3
Data Group 3
(Short File ID ‘03’)
EF.DG4
Data Group 4
(Short File ID ‘04’)
EF.DG5
Data Group 5
(Short File ID ‘05’)
EF.DG6
Data Group 6
(Short File ID ‘06’)
EF.DG7
Data Group 7
(Short File ID ‘07’)
EF.DG8
Data Group 8
(Short File ID ‘08’)
EF.SOD
(Short File ID ‘1D’)
EF.ICC
(Optional)
(File ID ‘0002’)
KEY_OBJECT
BAC keys
(KENC, KMAC)
KEY_OBJECT
Chip Authentication key
(SKICC)
KEY_OBJECT
Terminal Authentication key 1
(PKCVCA)
DATA_OBJECT
Card Production Life Cycle
Data
(CPLCD)
EF.CVCA
Short File ID ’1C’
KEY_OBJECT
Terminal Authentication key 2
(PKCVCA)
DATA_OBJECT
Preissuance Data
KEY_OBJECT
Product administration
(KISK)
Figure 2-5. Logical data structure of the eTravel EAC V1 64K product
According to the issuing Organizations or States, some files are not mandatory (see Table 2-1 and [LDS]).
To allow confirmation of the authenticity and integrity of recorded details, an authenticity/Integrity object
(Security Object Document) is recorded within a separate elementary file (EF.SOD). A mandatory Header
and Data Group Presence Map are included within each implementation method, this information is stored in
EF.COM.
Data Group Mandatory (M) /
Optional (O)
Data Item
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Detail (s) Recorded in MRZ of the MRTD
1 M Machine Readable Zone (MRZ) Data
Machine Assisted Identity Confirmation Detail (s) – Encoded Identification Feature (s)
2 M Global Interchange feature – Encoded Face
3 O Additional Feature – Encoded Finger (s)
4 O Additional Feature – Encoded Iris (s)
Machine Assisted Identity Confirmation Detail (s) – Displayed Identification Feature (s)
5 O Displayed Portrait
6 O Reserved for future use
7 O Displayed Signature or Usual Mark
Machine Assisted Security Feature Verification – Encoded Security Feature (s)
8 O Data Feature (s)
9 O Structure Feature (s)
10 O Substance Feature (s)
Additional Personal Detail (s)
11 O Additional Personal Data Elements
Additional Document Detail (s)
12 O Additional Document Data Elements
Optional Detail (s)
13 O Discretionary Data Element(s) defined by issuing State
or Organization
Reserved for Future Use
14 O Chip Authentication Public Key Info
15 O Active Authentication Public Key Info
Person (s) to Notify
16 O Person (s) to Notify Data Element(s)
Table 2-1. Data Groups of the Issuer Application DF.
This ST assumes that the issuing State or Organization uses EF.DG3 and/or EF.DG4 and protects these
data by means of extended access control. This implies that EF.DG14 is used.
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2.5 TOE LIFE-CYCLE
The TOE life cycle is described in terms of the four life cycle phases (figure 2-6).
Figure 2-6. Life cycle phases
Phase 1 “Development”:
The TOE is developed in phase 1. The IC developer develops the integrated circuit, the IC Dedicated
Software and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE components.
The Embedded Software developer uses the guidance documentation for the integrated circuit and the
guidance documentation for relevant parts of the IC Dedicated Software and develops the IC Embedded
Software (operating system), the MRTD application and the guidance documentation associated with these
TOE components.
The manufacturing documentation of the IC including the IC Dedicated Software and the Embedded
Software in the non-volatile non-programmable memories (ROM) is securely delivered to the IC
manufacturer. The IC Embedded Software in the nonvolatile programmable memories, the MRTD
application and the guidance documentation is securely delivered to the MRTD manufacturer.
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Phase 2 “Manufacturing”:
In a first step the TOE integrated circuit is produced containing the MRTD’s chip Dedicated Software and the
parts of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software in the nonvolatile non-programmable memories (ROM). The
IC manufacturer writes the IC Identification Data onto the chip to control the IC as MRTD material during the
IC manufacturing and the delivery process to the MRTD manufacturer. The IC is securely delivered from the
IC manufacturer to the MRTD manufacturer.
The MRTD manufacturer has the following tasks:
• Intialization: adding the parts of the IC Embedded Software (NVM ES) to the EEPROM,
• Pre-personalization: creation of the MRTD application and equipping chip with Pre-personalization
Data,
• Inlay manufacturing: packing the IC with hardware for the contactless interface.
• Book manufacturing: manufacturing the passport book.
The pre-personalized MRTD together with the IC Identifier is securely delivered from the MRTD
manufacturer to the Personalization Agent. The MRTD manufacturer also provides the relevant parts of the
guidance documentation to the Personalization Agent.
Application note: Inlay manufacturing can be done before Initialization, before Pre-
personalization or before Book manufacturing. It is also possible that the Inlay manufacturer is
different from the MRTD manufacturer. The chip is protected by the Manufacturer Key before
Operational phase. The IC manufacturer writes Manufacturer Key to protect chip before
Initialization. During the Initialization it is possible to change the Manufacturer Key for Pre-
personalization. During the Pre-personalization it is possible to change the Manufacturer Key
for Personalization. The Manufacturer Key is blocked after three unsuccessful authentication
attempts. Moreover it is possible to check if even one unsuccessful authentication attempt has
occurred.
Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”:
The personalization of the MRTD includes:
• the survey of the MRTD holder biographical data,
• the enrolment of the MRTD holder biometric reference data (i.e. the digitized portraits and
the optional biometric reference data),
• the printing of the visual readable data onto the physical MRTD,
• the writing the TOE User Data and TSF Data into the logical MRTD,
• the writing the TSF Data into the logical MRTD and configuration of the TSF if necessary.
The step “writing the TOE User Data” is performed by the Personalization Agent and includes but is not
limited to the creation of:
• the digital MRZ data (EF.DG1),
• the digitized portrait (EF.DG2),
• the Document security object (SOD).
The signing of the Document security object by the Document signer [PKI] finalizes the personalization of the
genuine MRTD for the MRTD holder. The personalized MRTD (together with appropriate guidance for TOE
use if necessary) is handed over to the MRTD holder for operational use.
Phase 4 “Operational Use”
The TOE is used as MRTD’s chip by the traveler and the inspection systems in the “Operational Use” phase.
The user data can be read according to the security policy of the Issuing State or Organization and used
according to the security policy of the Issuing State but they can never be modified.
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Application note: In this ST, the role of the Personalization Agents is strictly limited to the phase 3
Personalization. In the phase 4 Operational Use updating and addition of the data groups of the MRTD
application is forbidden.
Actors Identification
Integrated Circuit (IC) Developer Infineon
Embedded Software Developer Gemalto
Integrated Circuit (IC) Manufacturer Infineon
MRTD Manufacturer Gemalto
Inlay manufacturer Gemalto or the agent who is acting on behalf of the
MRTD Manufacturer
Personalization Agent The agent who is acting on the behalf of the issuing
State or Organization and personalize the MRTD for the
holder by activities establishing the identity of the holder
with biographic data.
MRTD Holder The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing
State or Organization personalizes the MRTD.
Table 2-2. Identification of the actors
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3. TOE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
3.1 ASSETS
The assets to be protected by the TOE include the User Data on the MRTD’s chip.
D.LDS : Logical MRTD Data
The logical MRTD data consists of the EF.COM, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 (with different security needs)
and the Document Security Object (EF.SOD) according to [LDS]. These data are user data of the TOE.
The EF.COM lists the existing elementary files (EF) with the user data. The data groups EF.DG1 to
EF.DG13 and EF.DG16 contain personal data of the MRTD holder. The Chip Authentication Public
Key (EF.DG14) is used by the inspection system for the Chip Authentication. The Active Authentication
Public Key (EF.DG15) is used by the inspection system for the Active Authentication. The Document
Security Object is used by the inspection system for Passive Authentication of the logical MRTD.
Assets are exhaustively detailed in the following way:
• keys used for product administration and MRTD application,
• data refined in less-sensitive data (protected by BAC)
• sensitive data (protected by EAC when enabled) as proposed in [ASM].
D.LDS. KEYS : Keys
Keys are protected in integrity and confidentiality and they are TSF data.
Key name Key
abbrev.
Function
Manufacturer Key - Product administration key
Document Basic Access
Key for Encryption
KENC
Document Basic Access
Key for MAC
KMAC
Document Basic Access
Session Key for
Encryption
KSENC
Document Basic Access
Session Key for MAC
KSMAC
Access Control to less-
sensitive data of the MRTD
application
Chip Authentication
Private Key
SKICC Key used by TOE in Chip
Authentication to check
authenticity of the MRTD
chip
Chip Authentication
Session Key for
Encryption
KSCA_ENC
Chip Authentication
Session Key for MAC
KSCA_MAC
Agreed keys as a result of
Chip Authentication
Country Verifying
Certification Authority
Public Key(s)
PKCVCA TOE starts certificate chain
validation in Terminal
Authentication by using this
key
Table 3-1. Keys.
D.LDS.LESS_SENS_DATA : Less sensitive Data
All the less-sensitive data are protected in integrity and confidentiality.
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Data name Data abbrev. Location Function
eTravel EAC V1 64K administration data
Card Production Life Cycle Data CPLCD EEPROM
Data Object
and
optionally
EF.ICC
Unique identification of
MRTD’s chip (ES version,
NVM ES version…)
MRTD applicative data
Machine Readable Zone MRZ EF.DG1 Reflects the entire content of
the MRZ
Encoded Face - EF.DG2 Represents the globally
interoperable biometric for
machine assisted identity
confirmation
Security Object Document SOD EF.SOD Contains the signatures used
by the inspection system for
Passive Authentication of the
logical MRTD
Data Group Presence Map DGPM EF.COM Contains the mandatory
header and data group
presence information
Data Groups 5-16 DG5, DG6,
…, DG16
EF.DG5,
EF.DG6, …,
EF.DG16
See table 2-1
Table 3-2. Less-sensitive data.
Application note: As the CPLCD identifies uniquely the MRTD’s chip, it is possible to trace the MRTD
holder and realizing the threat T. CHIP_ID, thus access to CPLCD is protected.
D.LDS.SENS_DATA : Sensitive Data
All the sensitive data are protected in integrity and confidentiality.
Data name Data
abbrev.
Location Function
eTravel V1 64K management data, TSF data
Life cycle status LCS EEPROM Life cycle status
Send Sequence Counter SSC RAM Needed for secure messaging
protocol
Current Date CD EEPROM Needed for Terminal
Authentication
Trusted Point TP EEPROM Needed for Terminal
Authentication
BAC authentication attempts
counter
BACAC EEPROM Protects BAC keys
ISK authentication attempts
counter
ISKAC EEPROM Protects Initial Supplier Key KISK
ISK authentication attempts
status
ISKS EEPROM Protects Initial Supplier Key KISK
MRTD applicative data
Fingerprint DG3 EF.DG3 Additional biometric reference data
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Data name Data
abbrev.
Location Function
Encoded Iris DG4 EF.DG4 Additional biometric reference data
Table 3-3. Sensitive data
An additional asset is the following more general one:
D.MRTD : Authenticity of the MRTD’s chip
The authenticity of the MRTD’s chip personalized by the issuing State or Organization for the MRTD’s
holder is used by the traveler to authenticate himself as possessing a genuine MRTD.
3.2 SUBJECTS
This security target considers the following subjects:
MANUFACTURER :
The generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing the integrated circuit and the MRTD Manufacturer
completing the IC to the MRTD’s chip. The Manufacturer is the default user of the TOE during the
Phase 2 Manufacturing. The TOE does not distinguish between the users IC Manufacturer and MRTD
Manufacturer using this role Manufacturer.
MRTD_HOLDER :
The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization personalize the MRTD.
TRAVELER :
Person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming the identity of the MRTD holder.
PERSONALIZATION_AGENT :
The agent is acting on the behalf of the issuing State or Organization to personalize the MRTD for the
holder by some or all of the following activities:
• establishing the identity of the holder for the biographic data in the MRTD
• enrolling the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger
image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s)
• writing these data on the physical and logical MRTD for the holder as defined for global,
international and national interoperability
• writing the initial TSF data
• signing the Document Security Object defined in [LDS].
INSPECTION_SYSTEM (IS):
A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining an MRTD
presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as MRTD holder.
The Basic Inspection System (BIS) contains a terminal for the contactless communication with the
MRTD’s chip, implements the terminals part of the Basic Access Control Mechanism and gets the
authorization to read the logical MRTD under the Basic Access Control by optical reading the printed
data in the MRZ or other parts of the passport book providing this information.
The General Inspection System (GIS) is a Basic Inspection System which implements additionally
the Chip Authentication Mechanism.
The Extended Inspection System (EIS) in addition to the General Inspection System
• implements the Terminal Authentication Protocol
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• is authorized by the issuing State or Organization through the Document Verifier of the
receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data.
The security attributes of the EIS are defined of the Inspection System Certificates.
TERMINAL :
A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through the contactless interface.
ATTACKER :
A threat agent trying:
• to identify and to trace the movement of the MRTD’s chip remotely (i.e. without knowing or optically
reading the physical MRTD)
• to read or to manipulate the logical MRTD without authorization,
• to forge a genuine MRTD.
COUNTRY VERIFYING CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY (CVCA):
The Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA) enforces the privacy policy of the issuing Country or
Organization with respect to the protection of sensitive biometric reference data stored in the MRTD. The
CVCA represents the country specific root of the PKI of Inspection Systems and creates the Document
Verifier Certificates within this PKI. The updates of the public key of the CVCA are distributed in form of
Country Verifying CA Link-Certificates.
DOCUMENT VERIFIER (DV):
The Document Verifier (DV) enforces the privacy policy of the receiving Country with respect to the
protection of sensitive biometric reference data to be handled by the Extended Inspection Systems. The
Document Verifier manages the authorization of the Extended Inspection Systems for the sensitive data
of the MRTD in the limits provided by the Issuing State or Organization in form of the Document Verifier
Certificates.
3.3 ASSUMPTIONS
The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be used or is
intended to be used.
A.PERS_AGENT : Personalization of the MRTD’s chip
The Personalization Agent ensures the correctness of (i) the logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD
holder, (ii) the Document Basic Access Keys, (iii) the Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG14) if
stored on the MRTD’s chip, and (iv) the Document Signer Public Key Certificate (if stored on the
MRTD’s chip). The Personalization Agent signs the Document Security Object. The Personalization
Agent bears the Personalization Agent Authentication to authenticate himself to the TOE by symmetric
cryptographic mechanisms.
A.INSP_SYS : Inspection Systems for global interoperability
The Inspection System is used by the border control officer of the receiving State
i. examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and
ii. verifying the traveler as MRTD holder.
The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability
i. includes the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing
State or Organization [PKI].
ii. implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control [PKI].
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The Basic Inspection System reads the logical MRTD being under the Basic access Control and performs
the Passive Authentication to verify the logical MRTD.
The General Inspection System in addition to the Basic Inspection System implements the Chip
Authentication Mechanism. The General Inspection System verifies the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip
during inspection and establishes secure messaging with keys established by the Chip Authentication
Mechanism.
The Extended Inspection System in addition to General Inspection System
i. supports the Terminal Authentication protocol and
ii. is authorized by the issuing State or Organization through the Document Verifier of the receiving
State to read the sensitive biometric reference data.
A.SIGNATURE_PKI: PKI for Passive Authentication
The issuing and receiving States or Organizations establish a public key infrastructure for passive
authentication i.e. digital signature creation and verification for the logical MRTD. The issuing State or
Organization runs a Certification Authority (CA). The CA
i. securely generates, stores and uses the Country Signing CA Key pair
ii. manages the MRTD’s Chip Authentication Key Pairs.
The CA keeps the Country Signing CA Private Key secret and distributes the Country Signing CA Public
Key to ICAO, all receiving States maintaining its integrity.
The Document Signer
i. generates the Document Signer Key Pair
ii. hands over the Document Signer Public Key to the CA for certification
iii. keeps the Document Signer Private Key secret
iv. uses securely the Document Signer Private Key for signing the Document Security Objects of the
MRTDs.
The CA creates the Document Signer Certificates for the Document Signer Public Keys and distributes
them to the receiving States and Organizations.
A.AUTH_PKI: PKI for Inspection Systems
The issuing and receiving States or Organizations establish a public key infrastructure for card verifiable
certificates of the extended access control. The Country Verifying Certification Authorities, the Document
Verifier and Extended Inspection Systems hold authentication key pairs and certificates for their public
keys encoding the access control rights. The Country Verifying Certification Authorities of the issuing
States or Organizations are signing the certificates of the Document Verifier and the Document Verifiers
are signing the certificates of the Extended Inspection Systems of the receiving States or Organizations.
The issuing States or Organizations distributes the public key of their Country Verifying Certification
Authority to their MRTD’s chip.
3.4 THREATS
This section describes the threats to be averted by the TOE independently or in collaboration with its IT
environment. These threats result from the TOE method of use in the operational environment and the
assets stored in or protected by the TOE.
The TOE in collaboration with its IT environment shall avert the threats as specified below.
T.CHIP_ID: Identification of MRTD’s chip
An attacker trying to trace the movement of the MRTD by identifying remotely the MRTD’s chip by
establishing or listening a communication through the contactless communication interface. The attacker
can not read optically and does not know in advance the physical MRTD data page.
T.SKIMMING: Skimming the logical MRTD
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An attacker imitates the inspection system to read the logical MRTD or parts of it via the contactless
communication channel of the TOE. The attacker can not read and does not know in advance the
physical MRTD.
T.READ_SENSITIVE_DATA: Read the sensitive biometric reference data
An attacker with high attack potential knowing the Document Basic Access Keys is trying to gain
the sensitive biometric reference data through the communication interface of the MRTD’s chip.
The attack T.Read_Sensitive_Data is similar to the threat T.Skimming in respect of the attack path
(communication interface) and the motivation (to get data stored on the MRTD’s chip) but differs
from those in the asset under the attack (sensitive biometric reference data vs. digital MRZ,
digitized portrait and other data), the opportunity (i.e. knowing Document Basic Access Keys) and
therefore the possible attack methods. Note, that the sensitive biometric reference data are stored
only on the MRTD’s chip as private sensitive personal data whereas the MRZ data and the portrait
are visual readable on the physical MRTD as well.
T.FORGERY: Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip
An attacker alters fraudulently the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it including its
security related data in order to impose on an inspection system by means of the changed MRTD
holder’s identity or biometric reference data.
This threat comprises several attack scenarios of MRTD forgery. The attacker may alter the
biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book, in the printed MRZ and in
the digital MRZ to claim another identity of the traveler. The attacker may alter the printed portrait
and the digitized portrait to overcome the visual inspection of the inspection officer and the
automated biometric authentication mechanism by face recognition. The attacker may alter the
biometric reference data to defeat automated biometric authentication mechanism of the inspection
system. The attacker may combine data groups of different logical MRTD’s to create a new forged
MRTD, e.g. the attacker write the digitized portrait and optional biometric reference data of finger
read from the logical MRTD of a traveler into an other MRTD’s chip leaving their digital MRZ
unchanged to claim the identity of the holder this MRTD. The attacker may also copy the complete
unchanged logical MRTD in another contactless chip.
T.COUNTERFEIT: MRTD’s chip
An attacker with high attack potential produces an unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine
MRTD’s chip to be used as part of a counterfeit MRTD. This violates the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip
used for authentication of a traveler by possession of a MRTD.
The attacker may generate a new data set or extract completely or partially the data from a genuine
MRTD’s chip and copy them on another appropriate chip to imitate this genuine MRTD’s chip.
T.ABUSE_FUNC: Abuse of Functionality
An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in TOE operational phase in order (i)
to manipulate User Data, (ii) to manipulate (explore, bypass, deactivate or change) security features or
functions of the TOE or (iii) to disclose or to manipulate TSF Data.
This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialization and the personalization in the
operational state after delivery to MRTD holder.
T.INFORMATION_LEAKAGE : Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip
An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during its usage in order to disclose
confidential TSF data. The information leakage may be inherent in the normal operation or caused by
the attacker.
Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O characteristics, clock
frequency, or by changes in processing time requirements. This leakage may be interpreted as a covert
channel transmission but is more closely related to measurement of operating parameters, which may be
derived either from measurements of the contactless interface (emanation) or direct measurements (by
contact to the chip still available even for a contactless chip) and can then be related to the specific
operation being performed. Examples are the Differential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) and the
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Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Moreover the attacker may try actively to enforce information leakage
by fault injection (e.g. Differential Fault Analysis).
T.PHYS_TAMPER : Physical Tampering
An attacker may perform physical probing of the MRTD’s chip in order (i) to disclose TSF Data, or (ii) to
disclose/reconstruct the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. An attacker may physically modify the
MRTD’s chip in order to (i) modify security features or functions of the MRTD’s chip, (ii) modify security
functions of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software, (iii) to modify User Data or (iv) to modify TSF data.
The physical tampering may be focused directly on the disclosure or manipulation of TOE User Data (e.g.
the biometric reference data for the inspection system) or TSF Data (e.g. authentication key of the
MRTD’s chip) or indirectly by preparation of the TOE to following attack methods by modification of
security features (e.g. to enable information leakage through power analysis). Physical tampering
requires direct interaction with the MRTD’s chip internals. Techniques commonly employed in IC failure
analysis and IC reverse engineering efforts may be used. Before that hardware security mechanisms and
layout characteristics need to be identified. Determination of software design including treatment of User
Data and TSF Data may also be a prerequisite. The modification may result in the deactivation of a
security function. Changes of circuitry or data can be permanent or temporary.
T.MALFUNCTION : Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software by applying
environmental stress in order to (i) deactivate or modify security features or functions of the TOE or (ii)
circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software.
This may be achieved e.g. by operating the MRTD’s chip outside the normal operating conditions,
exploiting errors in the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software or misuse of administration function. To exploit
this an attacker needs information about the functional operation.
3.5 ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES
The TOE shall comply to the following organization security policies (OSP) as security rules, procedures,
practices, or guidelines imposed by an organization upon its operations (see CC part 1, sec. 3.2).
P.MANUFACT: Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip
The IC Manufacturer and MRTD Manufacturer ensure the quality and the security of the manufacturing
process and control the MRTD’s material in the Phase 2 Manufacturing. The Initialization Data are
written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The MRTD Manufacturer writes the Pre-
personalization Data which contains at least the Personalization Agent Key.
P.PERSONALIZATION: Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organization only
The issuing State or Organization guarantees the correctness of the biographical data, the printed portrait
and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and other data of the logical MRTD with respect to
the MRTD holder. The personalization of the MRTD for the holder is performed by an agent authorized by
the issuing State or Organization only.
P.PERSONAL_DATA: Personal data protection policy
The biographical data and their summary printed in the MRZ and stored on the MRTD’s chip (EF.DG1),
the printed portrait and the digitized portrait (EF.DG2), the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3),
the biometric reference data of iris image(s) (EF.DG4) and data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG13,
EF.DG16) stored on the MRTD’s chip are personal data of the MRTD holder. These data groups are
intended to be used only with agreement of the MRTD holder i.e. if the MRTD is presented to an
inspection system. Additional to the Basic Access Control Authentication defined by ICAO in [PKI] the
MRTD’s chip shall protect the confidentiality and integrity of the personal data during transmission to the
General Inspection System after Chip authentication.
P.SENSITIVE_DATA: Privacy of sensitive biometric reference data
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The biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) and iris image(s) (EF.DG4) are sensitive private
personal data of the MRTD holder. The sensitive biometric reference data can be used only by inspection
systems which are authorized for this access at the time the MRTD is presented to the inspection system.
The issuing State or Organization authorizes the Document Verifiers of the receiving States to manage
the authorization of inspection systems within the limits defined by the Document Verifier Certificate.
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4. SECURITY OBJECTIVES
This chapter describes the security objectives for the TOE and the security objectives for the TOE
environment. The security objectives for the TOE environment are separated into security objectives for the
development and production environment and security objectives for the operational environment.
4.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE
This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of identified threats to be
countered by the TOE and organizational security policies to be met by the TOE.
OT.AC_PERS : Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD
The TOE must ensure that the logical MRTD data groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the Document Security
Object according to [LDS] and the TSF data can be written by authorized Personalization Agents only.
The logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 and the TSF data may be written only during and can not
be changed after its personalization. The Document Security Object can be updated by authorized
Personalization Agents if data in the data groups EF.DG 3 to EF.DG16 are added.
Application note: This ST specify that in the phase 4 Operational Use updating and addition of the data
groups of the MRTD application are forbidden.
OT.DATA_INT : Integrity of personal data
The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip against physical
manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD data
during their transmission to the General Inspection System after Chip Authentication.
OT.DATA_CONF : Confidentiality of personal data
The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the data in EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 and
the Document Security Object of the logical MRTD by granting read access to terminals successfully
authenticated by as (i) Personalization Agent or (ii) Basic Inspection System or (iii) Extended Inspection
System. The TOE implements the Basic Access Control as defined by ICAO [PKI] and enforce Basic
Inspection System to authenticate itself by means of the Basic Access Control based on knowledge of the
Document Basic Access Key. The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data during
their transmission to the General Inspection System after Chip Authentication.
OT.SENS_DATA_CONF: Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference data
The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3 and EF.DG4)
by granting read access only to authorized inspection systems. The authorization of the inspection
system is drawn from the Inspection System Certificate used for the successful authentication and shall
be a non-strict subset of the authorization defined in the Document Verifier Certificate in the certificate
chain to the Country Verifier Certification Authority of the issuing State or Organization. The TOE must
ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data during their transmission to the Extended Inspection
System. The confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference data shall be protected against attacks
with high attack potential.
OT.IDENTIFICATION : Identification and Authentication of the TOE
The TOE must provide means to store IC Identification Data in its non-volatile memory. The IC
Identification Data must provide a unique identification of the IC during Phase 2 “Manufacturing” and
Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”. If the TOE is configured for use with Basic Inspection
Terminals only in Phase 4 “Operational Use” the TOE shall identify themselves only to a successful
authenticated Basic Inspection System or Personalization Agent.
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OT.CHIP_AUTH_PROOF: Proof of MRTD’s chip authenticity
The TOE must support the General Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of the
MRTD’s chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization by means of the Chip
Authentication as defined in [ASM]. The authenticity proof provided by MRTD’s chip shall be protected
against attacks with high attack potential.
The following TOE security objectives address the protection provided by the MRTD’s chip independent
on the TOE environment.
OT.PROT_ABUSE_FUNC : Protection against Abuse of Functionality
The TOE must prevent that functions of the TOE which may not be used after TOE Delivery can be
abused in order:
• to disclose critical User Data,
• to manipulate critical User Data of the Smartcard Embedded Software,
• to manipulate Soft-coded Smartcard Embedded Software,
• to bypass, deactivate, change or explore security features or functions of the TOE.
Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the capabilities of the Test Features
provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software which are not specified here.
Application note: The executable code (called NVM ES in this document for Non Volatile Memory
Embedded Software) could be loaded to rectify potential problems in the eTravel EAC V1 64K ES and/or
to add functionalities. After loading, a lock mechanism forbids any modification of the NVM ES.
OT.PROT_INF_LEAK : Protection against Information Leakage
The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in
the MRTD’s chip:
• by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between
events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption, clock,
or I/O lines,
• by forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or
• by a physical manipulation of the TOE.
OT.PROT_PHYS_TAMPER : Protection against Physical Tampering
The TOE must provide protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the TSF Data, and
the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. This includes protection against attacks with high attack potential
by means of:
• measuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical probing on the chips surface
except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage and current) or
• measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction between
charges (using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure analysis),
• manipulation of the hardware and its security features, as well as,
• controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF Data)
with a prior
• reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions.
OT.PROT_MALFUNCTION : Protection against Malfunctions
The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside the normal
operating conditions where reliability and secure operation has not been proven or tested. This is to
prevent errors. The environmental conditions may include external energy (esp. electromagnetic) fields,
voltage (on any contacts), clock frequency, or temperature.
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4.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE ENVIRONMENT
4.2.1 Security Objectives for the Development and Manufacturing Environment
OD.ASSURANCE: Assurance Security Measures in Development and Manufacturing Environment
The developer and manufacturer ensure that the TOE is designed and fabricated so that it requires a
combination of complex equipment, knowledge, skill, and time to be able to derive detailed design
information or other information which could be used to compromise security through attack. This
includes the use of the Initialization Data for unique identification of the TOE and the pre-personalization
of the TOE including the writing of the Personalization Agent Authentication key(s). The developer
provides necessary evaluation evidence that the TOE fulfils its security objectives and is resistant against
obvious penetration attacks with high attack potential.
OD.MATERIAL : Control over MRTD Material
The IC Manufacturer, the MRTD Manufacturer and the Personalization Agent must control all materials,
equipment and information to produce, to initialize, to pre-personalize genuine MRTD materials and to
personalize authentic MRTD in order to prevent counterfeit of MRTD using MRTD materials.
4.2.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
Issuing State or Organization
The Issuing State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE environment.
OE.PERSONALIZATION: Personalization of logical MRTD
The issuing State or Organization must ensure that the Personalization Agents acting on behalf of the
issuing State or Organization (i) establish the correct identity of the holder and create biographic data for
the MRTD, (ii) enrol the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger
image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s) and (iii) personalize the MRTD for the holder together with the
defined physical and logical security measures to protect the confidentiality and integrity of these data.
OE.PASS_AUTH_SIGN : Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature
The Issuing State or Organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Country Signing Key Pair, (ii)
ensure the secrecy of the Country Signing Private Key and sign Document Signer Certificates in a secure
operational environment, and (iii) distribute the Certificate of the Country Signing Public Key to receiving
States and organizations maintaining its authenticity and integrity. The Issuing State or organization must
(i) generate a cryptographic secure Document Signing Key Pair and ensure the secrecy of the Document
Signer Private Keys, (ii) sign Document Security Objects of genuine MRTD in a secure operational
environment only and (iii) distribute the Certificate of the Document Signing Public Key to receiving States
and Organizations. The digital signature in the Document Security Object relates to all data in the data in
EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 if stored in the LDS according to [LDS].
OE.AUTH_KEY_MRTD: MRTD Authentication Key
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to (i)
generate the MRTD’s Chip Authentication Key Pair, (ii) sign and store the Chip Authentication Public Key
in the Chip Authentication Public Key data in EF.DG14 and (iii) support inspection systems of receiving
States or Organizations to verify the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip used for genuine MRTD by
certification of the Chip Authentication Public Key by means of the Document Security Object.
OE.AUTHORIZ_SENS_DATA: Authorization for Use of Sensitive Biometric Reference Data
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to limit
the access to sensitive biometric reference data of MRTD’s holders to authorized receiving States or
Organizations. The Country verifying Certification Authority of the issuing State or Organization generates
card verifiable Document Verifier Certificates for the authorized Document Verifier only.
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Receiving State or organization
The Receiving State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE
environment.
OE.EXAM_MRTD : Examination of the MRTD passport book
The inspection system of the receiving State must examine the MRTD presented by the traveler to
verify its authenticity by means of the physical security measures and to detect any manipulation of the
physical MRTD. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability (i) includes the Country
Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organization, and (ii)
implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control [PKI]. Additionally General Inspection
Systems and Extended Inspection Systems perform the Chip Authentication Protocol to verify the
Authenticity of the presented MRTD’s chip.
OE.PASSIVE_AUTH_VERIF: Verification by Passive Authentication
The border control officer of the Receiving State uses the inspection system to verify the traveler as
MRTD holder. The inspection systems must have successfully verified the signature of Document
Security Objects and the integrity data elements of the logical MRTD before they are used. The
receiving States and organizations must manage the Country Signing Public Key and the Document
Signing Public Key maintaining their authenticity and availability in all inspection systems.
OE.PROT_LOGICAL_MRTD : Protection of data of the logical MRTD
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization ensures the confidentiality and integrity of
the data read from the logical MRTD. The inspection system will prevent eavesdropping to their
communication with the TOE before secure messaging is successfully established based on the Chip
Authentication Protocol.
OE.EXT_INSP_SYSTEMS: Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems
The Document Verifier of receiving States or Organizations authorize Extended Inspection Systems by
creation of Inspection System Certificates for access to sensitive biometric reference data of the logical
MRTD. The Extended Inspection System authenticates themselves to the MRTD’s chip for access to the
sensitive biometric reference data with its private Terminal Authentication Key and its Inspection System
Certificate.
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5. IT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
5.1 EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION
This ST uses components defined as extensions to CC part 2. Some of these components are defined in
protection profile [PP-SC], other components are defined in the protection profile [PP-MRTD-EAC].
5.1.1 Definition of the Family FAU_SAS
To define the security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FAU_SAS) of the Class FAU
(Security Audit) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for the storage of audit
data. It has a more general approach than FAU_GEN, because it does not necessarily require the data
to be generated by the TOE itself and because it does not give specific details of the content of the audit
records.
The family “Audit data storage (FAU_SAS)” is specified as follows.
FAU_SAS Audit data storage
Family behaviour
This family defines functional requirements for the storage of audit data.
Component leveling
FAU_SAS.1 Requires the TOE to provide the possibility to store audit data.
Management: FAU_SAS.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FAU_SAS.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorized users] with the capability to
store [assignment: list of audit information] in the audit records.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
5.1.2 Definition of the Family FCS_RND
To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE an additional family (FCS_RND) of the
Class FCS (cryptographic support) is defined here.
This family describes the functional requirements for random number generation used for cryptographic
purposes. The component FCS_RND is not limited to generation of cryptographic keys as the component
FCS_CKM.1 is. The similar component FIA_SOS.2 is intended for non-cryptographic use.
The family “Generation of random numbers (FCS_RND)” is specified as follows.
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FCS_RND Generation of random numbers
Family behaviour
This family defines quality requirements for the generation of random numbers which are intended to be
used for cryptographic purposes.
Component leveling:
FCS_RND.1 Generation of random numbers requires that random numbers meet a
defined quality metric.
Management: FCS_RND.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FCS_RND.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet
[assignment: a defined quality metric].
Dependencies: No dependencies.
5.1.3 Definition of the Family FIA_API
To describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE an additional family (FIA_API) of the Class
FIA (Identification and authentication) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for
the proof of a claimed identity for the authentication verification by an external entity where the other families
of the class FIA address the verification of the identity of an external entity.
Application note: This security target uses this SFR for the TOE for the Chip Authentication mechanisms.
FIA_API Authentication Proof of Identity
Family behaviour
This family defines functions provided by the TOE to prove their identity and to be verified by an external
entity in the TOE IT environment.
Component leveling:
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity.
Management: FIA_API.1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in
FMT: Management of authentication information used to prove the claimed
identity.
Audit: There are no actions defined to be auditable.
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FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_API.1.1 The TSF shall provide a [assignment: authentication mechanism] to prove
the identity of the [assignment: authorized user or rule].
Dependencies: No dependencies.
5.1.4 Definition of the Family FMT_LIM
The family FMT_LIM describes the functional requirements for the Test Features of the TOE. The new
functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because this class addresses the management of
functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical mechanism used in the TOE show that no other class is
appropriate to address the specific issues of preventing the abuse of functions by limiting the capabilities of
the functions and by limiting their availability.
The family “Limited capabilities and availability (FMT_LIM)” is specified as follows.
FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability
Family behaviour
This family defines requirements that limit the capabilities and availability of functions in a combined manner.
Note that FDP_ACF restricts the access to functions whereas the Limited capability of this family requires
the functions themselves to be designed in a specific manner.
Component leveling:
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities requires that the TSF is built to provide only the
capabilities (perform action, gather information) necessary for its genuine
purpose.
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability requires that the TSF restrict the use of functions (refer
to Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)). This can be achieved, for instance, by
removing or by disabling functions in a specific phase of the TOE’s life-
cycle.
Management: FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
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To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE an additional family (FMT_LIM) of the Class
FMT (Security Management) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for the Test
Features of the TOE. The new functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because this class
addresses the management of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical mechanism used in the
TOE show that no other class is appropriate to address the specific issues of preventing the abuse of
functions by limiting the capabilities of the functions and by limiting their availability.
The TOE Functional Requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” is specified as follows.
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that
in conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the following policy is
enforced [assignment: Limited capability and availability policy].
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.
The TOE Functional Requirement “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” is specified as follows.
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in
conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is
enforced [assignment: Limited capability and availability policy].
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.
5.1.5 Definition of the Family FPT_EMSEC
The sensitive family FPT_EMSEC (TOE Emanation) of the Class FPT (Protection of the TSF) is defined here
to describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE.
The TOE shall prevent attacks against the TOE and other secret data where the attack is based on external
observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Examples of such attacks are evaluation of TOE’s
electromagnetic radiation, simple power analysis (SPA), differential power analysis (DPA), timing attacks,
etc. This family describes the functional requirements for the limitation of intelligible emanations which are
not directly addressed by any other component of CC part 2 [CC-2].
The family “TOE Emanation (FPT_EMSEC)” is specified as follows.
Family behaviour
This family defines requirements to mitigate intelligible emanations.
Component levelling:
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE emanation has two constituents:
FPT_EMSEC.1.1 Limit of Emissions requires to not emit intelligible emissions enabling access to TSF data
or user data.
FPT_EMSEC.1.2 Interface Emanation requires to not emit interface emanation enabling access to TSF data
or user data.
Management: FPT_EMSEC.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
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Audit: FPT_EMSEC.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FPT EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_EMSEC.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of
[assignment: specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of types of
TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data].
FPT_EMSEC.1.2 The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the
following interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access to
[assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user
data].
Dependencies: No other components.
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5.2 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE TOE
This section on security functional requirements for the TOE is divided into sub-section following the main
security functionality.
5.2.1 Class FAU Security Audit (FAU)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Audit storage (FAU_SAS.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part
2).
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide the Manufacturer with the capability to store the IC Identification Data
(CPLCD) in the audit records.
5.2.2 Class Cryptographic Support (FCS)
The Table below provides an overview on the cryptographic mechanisms used.
Name SFR for the TOE SFR for the TOE
environment (terminal)
Algorithms and key sizes
according to [PKI], Annex
E, and [ASM]
Symmetric Authentication
Mechanism for Initialization,
Pre-personalization and
Personalization
FCS_CKM.1.1/KDF_MRTD
FCS_CKM.4.1/MRTD
FCS_COP.1.1/SHA_MRTD-1
FCS_COP.1.1/TDES_MRTD
FCS_COP.1.1/MAC_MRTD
FCS_RND.1.1/MRTD
FCS_CKM.1.1/PKI
FCS_CKM.1.1/KDF_BT
FCS_CKM.4.1/BT
FCS_COP.1.1/CERT_SIGN
FCS_COP.1.1/SHA_BT
FCS_COP.1.1/ENC_BT
FCS_COP.1.1/MAC_BT
FCS_RND.1.1/BT
Triple-DES, 112 bits keys,
Retail-MAC, 112 bits keys
SHA-1,
BAC Key Derivation
Mechanism
Basic Access Control
Authentication Mechanism
FCS_CKM.1.1/KDF_MRTD
FCS_CKM.4.1/MRTD
FCS_COP.1.1/SHA_MRTD-1
FCS_COP.1.1/TDES_MRTD
FCS_COP.1.1/MAC_MRTD
FCS_RND.1.1/MRTD
FCS_CKM.1.1/PKI
FCS_CKM.1.1/KDF_BT
FCS_CKM.4.1/BT
FCS_COP.1.1/CERT_SIGN
FCS_COP.1.1/SHA_BT
FCS_COP.1.1/ENC_BT
FCS_COP.1.1/MAC_BT
FCS_RND.1.1/BT
Triple-DES, 112 bits keys,
Retail-MAC, 112 bits keys
SHA-1,
BAC Key Derivation
Mechanism
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Name SFR for the TOE SFR for the TOE
environment (terminal)
Algorithms and key sizes
according to [PKI], Annex
E, and [ASM]
Extented Access Control
Authentication Mechanism
FCS_CKM.1.1/KDF_MRTD
FCS_CKM.1.1/DH_MRTD-1
FCS_CKM.1.1/DH_MRTD-2
FCS_CKM.4.1/MRTD
FCS_COP.1.1/SHA_MRTD-1
FCS_COP.1.1/SHA_MRTD-2
FCS_COP.1.1/SHA_MRTD-3
FCS_COP.1.1/SHA_MRTD-4
FCS_COP.1.1/TDES_MRTD
FCS_COP.1.1/MAC_MRTD
FCS_COP.1.1/SIG_VER-1
FCS_COP.1.1/SIG_VER-2
FCS_RND.1.1/MRTD
FCS_CKM.1.1/PKI
FCS_CKM.1.1/KDF_BT
FCS_CKM.4.1/BT
FCS_COP.1.1/CERT_SIGN
FCS_COP.1.1/SHA_BT
FCS_COP.1.1/ENC_BT
FCS_COP.1.1/MAC_BT
FCS_RND.1.1/BT
FCS_CKM.1.1/DH_GIS-1
FCS_CKM.1.1/DH_GIS-2
FCS_COP.1.1/SHA_GIS-1
FCS_COP.1.1/SHA_GIS-2
FCS_COP.1.1/SHA_GIS-3
FCS_COP.1.1/SHA_GIS-4
FCS_COP.1.1/SIG_SIGN_
EIS
Triple-DES, 112 bits keys,
Retail-MAC, 112 bits keys
SHA-1,
SHA-224,
SHA-256,
SHA-384
BAC Key Derivation
Mechanism,
RSA, 1536 and 2048 bits
keys
ECDSA, 192, 224, 256,
320 and 384 bits keys
DH, 1536 and 2048 bits
keys
ECDH, 192 , 224, 256,
320 and 384 bits keys
Table 5-1. Cryptographic support
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)” as specified below [CC-
2]. The iterations are caused by different cryptographic key generation algorithms to be implemented and
key to be generated by the TOE.
FCS_CKM.1/KDF_MRTD Cryptographic key generation – Key Derivation Function by the MRTD
FCS_CKM.1.1/KDF_MRTD The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm Document Basic Access Control Key Derivation Algorithm and
specified cryptographic key sizes 112 bit that meet the following: [PKI].
FCS_CKM.1/DH_MRTD-1 Cryptographic key generation – Diffie-Hellman Keys by the MRTD
FCS_CKM.1.1/DH_MRTD-1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm DH Key Agreement Algorithm and specified cryptographic key
sizes 1536 and 2048 bits that meet the following: [ASM], Annex A.1.
FCS_CKM.1/DH_MRTD-2 Cryptographic key generation – Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Keys by the
MRTD
FCS_CKM.1.1/DH_MRTD-2 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm ECDH Key Agreement Algorithm and specified cryptographic
key sizes 192, 224, 256, 320 and 384 bits that meet the following: [ASM], Annex A.1.
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The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4)” as specified below [CC-
2].
FCS_CKM.4/MRTD Cryptographic key destruction - MRTD
FCS_CKM.4.1/MRTD The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method [assignment: cryptographic key destruction method] that meets the
following: [assignment: list of standards].
Refinement:
Key Assignment: Cryptographic key destruction method Assignment: List of standards
All session keys Secure erasing of the value None
Table 5-2. Cryptographic key destruction
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” as specified below [CC-2].
The iterations are caused by different cryptographic algorithms to be implemented by the TOE.
FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD-1 Cryptographic operation - Hash for Key Derivation by MRTD
FCS_COP.1.1/SHA_MRTD-1 The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm SHA-1 and cryptographic key sizes none that meet the following: [FIPS180-2].
FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD-2 Cryptographic operation - Hash for Key Derivation by MRTD
FCS_COP.1.1/SHA_MRTD-2 The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm SHA-224 and cryptographic key sizes none that meet the following: [FIPS180-2].
FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD-3 Cryptographic operation - Hash for Key Derivation by MRTD
FCS_COP.1.1/SHA_MRTD-3 The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm SHA-256 and cryptographic key sizes none that meet the following: [FIPS180-2].
FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD-4 Cryptographic operation - Hash for Key Derivation by MRTD
FCS_COP.1.1/SHA_MRTD-4 The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm SHA-384 and cryptographic key sizes none that meet the following: [FIPS180-2].
Application note: The TOE implements additional hash functions SHA-224, SHA-256 and SHA-384 for the
Terminal Authentication Protocol.
FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD Cryptographic operation – Encryption / Decryption Triple DES
FCS_COP.1.1/TDES_MRTD The TSF shall perform secure messaging – encryption and decryption in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Triple-DES in CBC mode and cryptographic key
sizes 112 bits that meet the following: [FIPS46-3] and [PKI], Annex E.4.
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FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD Cryptographic operation – Retail MAC
FCS_COP.1.1/MAC_MRTD The TSF shall perform secure messaging – message authentication code in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Retail MAC and cryptographic key sizes 112 bits that
meet the following: [ISO9797] (MAC algorithm 3, block cipher DES, Sequence Message Counter,
padding mode 2).
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER-1 Cryptographic operation – Signature verification by MRTD
FCS_COP.1.1/SIG_VER-1 The TSF shall perform digital signature verification in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm RSA and cryptographic key sizes 1536 and 2048 bits that meet the following:
[ISO9796-2].
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER-2 Cryptographic operation – Signature verification by MRTD
FCS_COP.1.1/SIG_VER-2 The TSF shall perform digital signature verification in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm ECDSA and cryptographic key sizes 192, 224, 256, 320 and 384 bits that meet
the following: [ISO15946-2].
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Quality metric for random numbers (FCS_RND.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
FCS_RND.1/MRTD Quality metric for random numbers
FCS_RND.1.1/MRTD The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet K3-
DRNG ([AIS20]) with seed entropy at least 112 bits and with strength of
mechanism set to high.
5.2.3 Class Identification and Authentication (FIA)
The Table below provides an overview on the authentication mechanisms used.
Name SFR for the TOE SFR for the TOE
environment (terminal)
Algorithms and key sizes
according to [PKI], Annex E,
and [ASM]
Symmetric Authentication
Mechanism for Personalization FIA_UAU.4/MRTD FIA_API.1/PT Triple-DES with 112 bit keys
Basic Access Control
Authentication Mechanism
FIA_AFL.1
FIA_UAU.4/MRTD
FIA_UAU.6/MRTD
FIA_UAU.4/BT
FIA_UAU.6/BT
Triple-DES, 112 bit keys,
Retail-MAC, 112 bit keys
Chip Authentication Protocol
FIA_API.1/MRTD
FIA_UAU.5/MRTD
FIA_UAU.6/MRTD
FIA_UAU.4/GIS
FIA_UAU.5/GIS
FIA_UAU.6/GIS
DH or ECDH and Retail-MAC,
112 bit keys
Terminal Authentication
Protocol
FIA_UAU.5/MRTD FIA_API.1/EIS
RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 or EC-
DSA with SHA
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Table 5-3. Overview on authentication SFR.
Note the Chip Authentication Protocol include the asymmetric key agreement and the check whether the
TOE is able to generate the correct message authentication code with the expected key for any message
received by the terminal.
Application note: The Table below lists additional authentication mechanisms supported by the TOE in
comparison with the list of PP.
Name SFR for the TOE SFR for the TOE
environment (terminal)
Algorithms and key sizes
according to [PKI], Annex E,
and [ASM]
Symmetric Authentication
Mechanism for Personalization FIA_UAU.4/MRTD FIA_API.1/PT Retail-MAC with112 bit keys
Terminal Authentication
Protocol
FIA_UAU.5/MRTD FIA_API.1/EIS
RSASSA-PSS with SHA-1
and SHA-256,
EC-DSA with SHA-1, SHA-
224, SHA-256 and SHA-384
Table 5-4. Additional overview on authentication SFR.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of identification (FIA_UID.1)” as specified below [CC-2].
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow
1. to establish the communication channel,
2. to read the Initialization Data if it not disabled by TSF according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-
mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Refinement:
Assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions Refinement: Command
to read the Initialization Data in Phase 2 “Manufacturing” READ_INFO and GET_DATA
to read the CPLC Data in Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD” GET_DATA
to read the CPLC Data in Phase 4 “Operational Use” GET_DATA
Table 5-5. Timing of identification
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of authentication (FIA_UAU.1)” as specified below [CC-2].
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FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow
1. to establish the communication channel,
2. to read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS,
3. to identify themselves by selection of the authentication key
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other
TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Refinement:
Assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions Refinement: Command
to read the Initialization Data in Phase 2 “Manufacturing” READ_INFO and GET_DATA
to read the CPLC Data in Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD” GET_DATA
to read the CPLC Data in Phase 4 “Operational Use” GET_DATA
Table 5-6. Timing of authentication
The TOE shall meet the requirements of “Single-use authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.4)” as specified
below [CC-2].
FIA_UAU.4/MRTD Single-use authentication mechanisms - Single-use authentication of the Terminal
by the TOE
FIA_UAU.4.1/MRTD The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism,
2. Terminal Authentication Protocol,
3. Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Multiple authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.5)” as specified below
[CC-2].
FIA_UAU.5/MRTD Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5.1/MRTD The TSF shall provide
1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism
2. Terminal Authentication Protocol
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3. Secure Messaging in MAC-ENC mode
4. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2/MRTD The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the following rules:
1. the TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalization Agent by one of the following
mechanisms:
a) the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with Personalization Agent Keys,
b) the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with the Personalization Agent Key,
c) the Terminal Authentication Protocol with Personalization Agent Keys.
2. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Basic Inspection System only by means of the Basic
Access Control Authentication Mechanism with the Document Basic Access Keys.
3. After successful authentication as Basic Inspection System and until the completion of the Chip
Authentication Mechanism the TOE accepts only received command with correct message
authentication code sent by means of secure messaging with the key agreed upon with the
authenticated terminal by means of the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism.
4. After run of the Chip Authentication Mechanism the TOE accepts only received commands with
correct message authentication code sent by means of secure messaging with key agreed with the
terminal by means of the Chip Authentication Mechanism.
5. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt by means of the Terminal Authentication Protocol only
if the terminal uses secure messaging established by the Chip Authentication Mechanism.
Application note: The TOE does not support authentication attempt as Personalization Agent by Terminal
Authentication Protocol. The TOE is still compliant to the PP since the PP requires that the TOE accepts one
mechanism from the list.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Re-authenticating (FIA_UAU.6)” as specified below [CC-2].
FIA_UAU.6/MRTD Re-authenticating – Re-authenticating of Terminal by the TOE
FIA_UAU.6.1/MRTD The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions
1. Each command sent to the TOE after successful authentication of the terminal with Basic Access
Control Authentication Mechanism and until the completion of the Chip Authentication Mechanism
shall be verified as being sent by the authenticated BIS.
2. Each command sent to the TOE after successful run of the Chip Authentication Protocol shall be
verified as being sent by the GIS.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Authentication failure handling (FIA_AFL.1)” as specified below [CC-
2].
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when a certain number of times (see table below) unsuccessful
authentication attempts occur related to a certain authentication event (see table below).
Refinement:
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Assignment:
Number of
unsuccessful
authentication
attempts
Assignment: Specified Authentication
events
Assignment: Actions
3 Unsuccessful Mutual Authentication
Command with Initial Supplier Key KISK
Initial Supplier Key blocked
1 Unsuccessful MAC verification after
Basic Access Control Authentication
Basic Access Control session keys destroyed,
authentication status reset
1 Unsuccessful MAC verification after Chip
Authentication
Chip Authentication session keys destroyed,
authentication status reset
Table 5-7. Authentication failure handling.
FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met or surpassed,
the TSF shall perform actions specified in a following table.
Refinement:
Assignment:
Number of
consecutive
unsuccessful
authentication
attempts
Assignment: Specified Authentication
events
Assignment: Actions
i Unsuccessful Basic Access Control
authentication attempt
Exponentially increasing time delay before new
authentication attempt is possible
Table 5-8. BAC authentication failure handling.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Authentication Proof of Identity (FIA_API.1)” as specified below ([CC-
2] extended).
FIA_API.1/CAP Authentication Proof of Identity - MRTD
FIA_API.1.1/CAP The TSF shall provide a Chip Authentication Protocol according to [ASM] to prove the
identity of the TOE.
5.2.4 Class User Data Protection (FDP)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset access control (FDP _ACC.1)” as specified below (Common
Criteria Part 2). The instantiations of FDP_ACC.1 are caused by the TSF management according to
FMT_MOF.1.
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP on terminals gaining write, read and
modification access to data in the EF.COM, EF.SOD and EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD.
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Application note: The data of the EF.ICC are user data. The EF.ICC data are readable under the control of
the Basic Access Control SFP.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)” as specified
below [CC-2].
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to objects based on the following:
1. Subjects:
a) Personalization Agent,
b) Basic Inspection System,
c) Extended Inspection System,
d) Terminal,
2. Objects:
a) data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
b) data in EF.COM,
c) data in EF.SOD,
3. Security attributes
a) Authentication status of terminals,
b) Terminal Authorization.
FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled
subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
1. the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write and to read the data of the
EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
2. the successfully authenticated Basic Inspection System is allowed to read the data in EF.COM,
EF.SOD, EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
3. the successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System is allowed to read the data in EF.COM,
EF.SOD, EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
4. the successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System is allowed to read data in the EF.DG3
according to the Terminal Authorization,
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5. the successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System is allowed to read data in the EF.DG4
according to the Terminal Authorization.
FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the rules:
1. A terminal authenticated as CVCA is not allowed to read data in the EF.DG3,
2. A terminal authenticated as CVCA is not allowed to read data in the EF.DG4,
3. A terminal authenticated as DV is not allowed to read data in the EF.DG3,
4. A terminal authenticated as DV is not allowed to read data in the EF.DG4,
5. The terminals are not allowed to modify any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Basic data exchange confidentiality (FDP_UCT.1)” as specified below
[CC-2].
FDP_UCT.1/MRTD Basic data exchange confidentiality – MRTD
FDP_UCT.1.1/MRTD The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to be able to transmit and receive
objects in a manner protected from unauthorized disclosure after Chip Authentication.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Data exchange integrity (FDP_UIT.1)” as specified below [CC-2].
FDP_UIT.1/MRTD Data exchange integrity – MRTD
FDP_UIT.1.1/MRTD The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to be able to transmit and receive user
data in a manner protected from modification, deletion, insertion and replay errors after Chip
Authentication.
FDP_UIT.1.2/MRTD The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether modification,
deletion, insertion and replay has occurred after Chip Authentication.
5.2.5 Class Security Management (FMT)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF.1)” as specified
below [CC-2].
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security management functions:
1. Initialization
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2. Personalization
3. Configuration
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security roles (FMT_SMR.1)” as specified below [CC-2].
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles
1. Manufacturer,
2. Personalization Agent,
3. Country Verifier Certification Authority,
4. Document Verifier,
5. Basic Inspection System,
6. Domestic Extended Inspection System,
7. Foreign Extended Inspection System.
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” as specified below [CC-2] extended.
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with
“Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the following policy is enforced: Deploying Test Features after TOE
Delivery does not allow
• User Data to be disclosed or manipulated,
• TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated,
• software to be reconstructed and
• substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other attacks.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” as specified below [CC-2] extended.
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FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with
“Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is enforced: Deploying Test Features after TOE
Delivery does not allow
• User Data to be disclosed or manipulated,
• TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated,
• software to be reconstructed and
• substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other attacks.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1)” as specified below [CC-2].
The iterations address different management functions and different TSF data.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Management of TSF data – Writing of Initialization Data and Pre-personalization
Data
FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_ENA The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Initialization Data and Pre-
personalization Data to the Manufacturer.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Management of TSF data – Disabling of Read Access to Initialization Data and
Pre-personalization Data
FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_DIS The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable read access for users to the Initialization
Data to the Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI Management of TSF data – Initialization of CVCA Certificate and Current Date
FMT_MTD.1.1/CVCA_INI The TSF shall restrict the ability to write
1. initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key,
2. initial County Verifier Certification Authority Certificate,
3. initial Current Date
to the Manufacturer and the Personalization Agent.
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FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD Management of TSF data – Country Verifier Certification Authority
FMT_MTD.1.1/CVCA_UPD The TSF shall restrict the ability to update
1. Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key,
2. County Verifier Certification Authority Certificate
to the Country Verifier Certification Authority.
FMT_MTD.1/DATE Management of TSF data – Current Date
FMT_MTD.1.1/DATE The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify the Current Date to
1. County Verifier Certification Authority,
2. Document Verifier,
3. domestic Extended Inspection System.
FMT_MTD.1 /KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data – Key Write
FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_WRITE The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Document Basic Access Keys to
the Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1 /CAPK Management of TSF data – Chip Authentication Private Key
FMT_MTD.1.1/CAPK The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: create, load] the Chip Authentication
Private Key to [assignment: the authorized identified roles].
Refinement:
Chip Authentication
Private Key
Authorized roles
Key loading Personalization Agent
Key creation Personalization Agent
Table 5-9. Specification of management functions.
FMT_MTD.1 /KEY_READ Management of TSF data – Key Read
FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read
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1. Document Basic Access Keys,
2. Chip Authentication Private Key,
3. Personalization Agent Keys
to none.
FMT_MTD.3 Secure TSF data
FMT_MTD.3.1 The TSF shall ensure that only secure values of the certificate chain are accepted for TSF
data of the Terminal Authentication Protocol and the Access Control.
Refinement:
The certificate chain is valid if and only if
1) The digital signature of the Inspection System Certificate can be verified as correct with the public
key of the Document Verifier Certificate and the expiration date of the Inspection System Certificate
is not before the Current Date of the TOE,
2) The digital signature of the Document Verifier Certificate can be verified as correct with the public
key in the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority and the expiration date of the
Document Verifier Certificate is not before the Current Date of the TOE,
3) The digital signature of the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority can be verified
as correct with the public key of the Country Verifying Certification Authority known to the TOE and
the expiration date of the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority is not before the
Current Date of the TOE.
The Inspection System Public Key contained in the Inspection System Certificate in a valid certificate
chain is a secure value for the authentication reference data of the Extended Inspection System.
The intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorization contained in the certificates of a valid certificate
chain as a secure value for Terminal Authorization of a successful authenticated Extended Inspection
System.
5.2.6 Class Protection of the Security Functions (FPT)
The TOE shall prevent inherent and forced illicit information leakage for User Data and TSF Data. The
security functional requirement FPT_EMSEC.1 addresses the inherent leakage. With respect to the forced
leakage they have to be considered in combination with the security functional requirements “Failure with
preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)” and “TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)” on the one hand and “Resistance
to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” on the other. The SFR “Non-bypassability of the TSP (FPT_RVM.1)” and
“TSF domain separation (FPT_SEP.1)” together with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)”, “Limited availability
(FMT_LIM.2)” and “Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” prevent bypassing, deactivation and
manipulation of the security features or misuse of TOE functions.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “TOE Emanation (FPT_EMSEC.1)” as specified below [CC-2],
extended:
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FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation
FPT_EMSEC.1.1 The TOE shall not emit electromagnetic and current emissions in excess of intelligible
threshold enabling access to Personalization Agent Authentication Key and Chip Authentication Private
Key and [assignment: list of types of user data].
Refinement:
Assignment: List of types of user data
Data contents of EF.DG3
Data contents of EF.DG4
Table 5-10. User data which shall not emit electromagnetic or current emissions.
FPT_EMSEC.1.2 The TSF shall ensure any users are unable to use the following interface smart card circuit
contacts to gain access to Personalization Agent Authentication Key and Chip Authentication Private Key
and [assignment: list of types of user data].
Refinement:
Assignment: List of types of user data
Data contents of EF.DG3
Data contents of EF.DG4
Table 5-11. User data which shall be protected against access through smart card circuit contacts.
The following security functional requirements address the protection against forced illicit information
leakage including physical manipulation.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)” as specified
below [CC-2].
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur:
1. exposure to operating conditions where therefore a malfunction could occur,
2. failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.1.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “TSF testing (FPT _TST.1)” as specified below [CC-2].
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests [selection: during initial start-up, periodically during
normal operation, at the request of the authorized user, at the conditions [assignment: conditions under
which self test should occur]] to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
Refinement:
Selection and Assignment: Conditions under
which self test should occur
Refinement: Description of the self test
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Selection and Assignment: Conditions under
which self test should occur
Refinement: Description of the self test
During initial start-up
RNG live test, sensor test, FA detection, Integrity Check of
NVM ES
Periodically
RNG monitoring, sensor test, FA detection
After cryptographic computation
FA detection
Before any use or update of TSF data
FA detection, Integrity Check of related TSF data
Table 5-12. TSF testing
FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of TSF data.
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of stored TSF
executable code.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” as specified below [CC-
2].
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
FPT_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing to the TSF by responding
automatically such that the TSP is not violated.
Refinement:
Application note: Related component FPT_PHP.3 information is provided in document [ST-INFINEON]. All
the potential security violations managed by the component are included in the table below. Implemented
software mechanisms provide protection against other security violations.
Assignment: Physical tampering scenarios Assignment: List of TSF devices / elements
Physical manipulation and physical probing Sensors
The external voltage supply is put out of range Supply voltage sensors
The external clock signal is put out of range Frequency sensors
The temperature is put out of range Temperature sensors
Chip is exposed to light Light sensors
Attempt to corrupt integrity of pointers Redundant logic of PC, SP/SPE, PSWH
Attempts to corrupt the TDES computation Triple-DES fault check
Attempts to run illegal instructions Exception handling
Attempts to execute unauthorized system calls Exception handling
Attempts to gain access to sensitive memory area Exception handling
Attack which generates access collisions Exception handling
Attempts to overflow the stack Exception handling
Attempts to corrupt sensitive data writing EEPROM writing check
Attempts to corrupt integrity of user data Integrity check of user data
Attempts to corrupt integrity of TSF data (file headers, security
attributes…)
Integrity check of TSF data
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Assignment: Physical tampering scenarios Assignment: List of TSF devices / elements
Attempts to corrupt the random number generator Random number generator test
Attempts to corrupt the TDES computation TDES verification
Attempts to corrupt the RSA computation RSA verification
Attempts to disrupt the code execution Software execution tracers
Table 5-13. Resistance to physical attack
The following security functional requirements protect the TSF against bypassing and support the separation
of TOE parts.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Non-bypassability of the TSP (FPT_RVM.1)” as specified below [CC-
2].
FPT_RVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP
FPT_RVM.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that TSP enforcement functions are invoked and succeed before each
function within the TSC is allowed to proceed.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “TSF domain separation (FPT_SEP.1)” as specified below [CC-2].
FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation
FPT_SEP.1.1 The TSF shall maintain a security domain for its own execution that protects it from
interference and tampering by un-trusted subjects.
FPT_SEP.1.2 The TSF shall enforce separation between the security domains of subjects in the TSC.
5.3 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE TOE
The security assurance requirements for the evaluation of the TOE and its development and operating
environment are those taken from the Evaluation Assurance Level 4 (EAL4) and augmented by taking the
following components: ADV_IMP.2, ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4.
The minimum strength of function is SOF-high.
5.4 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR THE IT ENVIRONMENT
This section describes the security functional requirements for the IT environment using components in [CC-
2].
Due to CCIMB Final Interpretation #58 these components are editorial changed to express the security
requirements for the components in the IT environment where the original components are directed for TOE
security functions. The editorial changes are indicated in italic/bold.
5.4.1 Passive Authentication
The ICAO, the Issuing States or Organizations and the Receiving States or Organization run a public key
infrastructure for the Passive Authentication. This public key infrastructure distributes and protects the
Country Signing CA Keys and the Document Signing Keys to support the signing of the User Data (EF.DG1
to EF.DG16) by means of the Document Security Object. The Technical Report [PKI] describes the
requirements to the public key infrastructure for the Passive Authentication.
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The Document Signer of the Issuing State or Organization shall meet the requirement “Basic data
authentication (FDP_DAU.1)” as specified below [CC-2].
FDP_DAU.1 /DS Basic data authentication – Passive Authentication
FDP_DAU.1.1/DS The Document Signer shall provide a capability to generate evidence that can be used as
a guarantee of the validity of logical data structure of the MRTD (EF.DG1 to EF.DG16) and the Document
Security Object.
FDP_DAU.1.2/DS The Document Signer shall provide Inspection Systems of Receiving States or
Organization with the ability to verify evidence of the validity of the indicated information.
5.4.2 Extended Access Control PKI
The CVCA and the DV shall establish a Document Verification PKI by generating asymmetric key pairs and
certificates for the CVCA, DV and IS which may be verified by the TOE.
FCS_CKM.1 /PKI-1 Cryptographic key generation – Document Verification PKI Keys -- RSA
FCS_CKM.1.1/PKI-1 The PKI shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm key generation algorithm for RSA keys and specified
cryptographic key sizes 1536 and 2048 bits that meet the following: [ASM], Annex A.
FCS_CKM.1 /PKI-2 Cryptographic key generation – Document Verification PKI Keys -- ECDSA
FCS_CKM.1.1/PKI-2 The PKI shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm key generation algorithm for ECDSA and specified
cryptographic key sizes 192, 224, 256, 320 and 384 bits that meet the following: [ASM], Annex A.
FCS_COP.1 /CERT_SIGN-1 Cryptographic operation – Certificate Signing -- RSA
FCS_COP.1.1/CERT_SIGN The TSF shall perform digital signature creation in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm RSA and cryptographic key sizes 1536 and 2048 bits that meet the following:
[ASM], Annex A.
FCS_COP.1 /CERT_SIGN-2 Cryptographic operation – Certificate Signing -- ECDSA
FCS_COP.1.1/CERT_SIGN The PKI shall perform digital signature creation in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm ECDSA and cryptographic key sizes 192, 224, 256, 320 and 384 bits that meet
the following: [ASM], Annex A.
5.4.3 Basic Terminal
This section describes common security functional requirements to the Basic Inspection Systems and the
Personalization Agent if it uses the Basic Access Control Mechanism with the Personalization Agent
Authentication Keys. Both are called “Basic Terminals” (BT) in this section.
The Basic Terminal shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)” as specified
below [CC-2].
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FCS_CKM.1/KDF_BT Cryptographic key generation – Generation of Document Basic Access Keys by
the Basic Terminal
FCS_CKM.1.1/KDF_BT The Basic Terminal shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm Document Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm and
specified cryptographic key sizes 112 bit that meet the following: [PKI].
The Basic Terminal shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4)” as specified
below [CC-2].
FCS_CKM.4/BT Cryptographic key destruction - BT
FCS_CKM.4.1/BT The Basic Terminal shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method secure erase of the key value that meets the following: none.
The Basic Terminal shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” as specified below
[CC-1]. The iterations are caused by different cryptographic algorithms to be implemented by the Basic
Terminal.
FCS_COP.1/SHA_BT Cryptographic operation – Hash Function by the Basic Terminal
FCS_COP.1.1/SHA_BT The Basic Terminal shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm SHA-1 and cryptographic key sizes none that meet the following: FIPS180-2.
FCS_COP.1/ENC_BT Cryptographic operation – Secure Messaging Encryption / Decryption by the
Basic Terminal
FCS_COP.1.1/ENC_BT The Basic Terminal shall perform secure messaging – encryption and decryption in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Triple-DES in CBC mode and cryptographic key
sizes 112 bits that meet the following: FIPS 46-3, ISO 11568-2, ISO 9797-1 (padding mode 2).
FCS_COP.1/MAC_BT Cryptographic operation – Secure messaging Message Authentication Code by
the Basic Terminal
FCS_COP.1.1/MAC_BT The Basic Terminal shall perform secure messaging – message authentication
code in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Retail MAC and cryptographic key sizes 112
bits that meet the following: FIPS 46-3, ISO 9797 (MAC algorithm 3, block cipher DES, zero IV 8 bytes,
padding mode 2).
The Basic Terminal shall meet the requirement “Quality metric for random numbers (FCS_RND.1)” as
specified below [CC-2], extended).
FCS_RND.1/BT Quality metric for random numbers by Basic Terminal
FCS_RND.1.1/BT The Basic Terminal shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meets
K3-DRNG ([AIS20]) with seed entropy at least 112 bits and with strength of
mechanism set to high.
The Basic Terminal shall meet the requirements of “Single-use authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.4)” as
specified below [CC-2].
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FIA_UAU.4/BT Single-use authentication mechanisms –Basic Terminal
FIA_UAU.4.1/BT The Basic Terminal shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to Basic Access
Control Authentication Mechanism.
The Basic Terminal shall meet the requirement “Re-authentication (FIA_UAU.6)” as specified below [CC-2].
FIA_UAU.6/BT Re-authentication - Basic Terminal
FIA_UAU.6.1/BT The Basic Terminal shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each command
sent to TOE after successful authentication of the terminal with Basic Access Control Authentication
Mechanism.
5.4.4 General Inspection System
The General Inspection System (GIS) is a Basic Inspection System which implements additional the Chip
Authentication Mechanism. Therefore it has to fulfill all security requirements of the Basic Inspection System
as described above.
The General Inspection System verifies the authenticity of the MRTD’s by the Chip Authentication
Mechanism during inspection and establishes new secure messaging with keys. The reference data for the
Chip Authentication Mechanism is the Chip Authentication Public Key read form the logical MRTD data
group EF.DG14 and verified by Passive Authentication (cf. to FDP_DAU.1/DS). Note, that the Chip
Authentication Mechanism requires the General Inspection System to verify at least one message
authentication code of a response sent by the MRTD to check the authenticity of the chip.
The General Inspection System shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)” as
specified below [CC-2].
FCS_CKM.1/DH_GIS-1 Cryptographic key generation – Diffie-Hellman Keys by the GIS
FCS_CKM.1.1/DH_GIS-1 The General Inspection System shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance
with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm DH Key Agreement Algorithm and specified
cryptographic key sizes 1536 and 2048 bits that meet the following: [ASM], Annex A.1.
FCS_CKM.1/DH_GIS-2 Cryptographic key generation – Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Keys by the GIS
FCS_CKM.1.1/DH_GIS-2 The General Inspection System shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance
with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm ECDH Key Agreement Algorithm and specified
cryptographic key sizes 192, 224, 256, 320 and 384 bits that meet the following: [ASM], Annex A.1.
FCS_COP.1/SHA_GIS-1 Cryptographic operation – Hash for Key Derivation by GIS
FCS_COP.1.1/SHA_GIS-1 The General Inspection System shall perform hashing in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm SHA-1 and cryptographic key sizes none that meet the following: [FIPS
180-2].
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FCS_COP.1/SHA_GIS-2 Cryptographic operation – Hash for Key Derivation by GIS
FCS_COP.1.1/SHA_GIS-2 The General Inspection System shall perform hashing in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm SHA-224 and cryptographic key sizes none that meet the following:
[FIPS 180-2].
FCS_COP.1/SHA_GIS-3 Cryptographic operation – Hash for Key Derivation by GIS
FCS_COP.1.1/SHA_GIS-3 The General Inspection System shall perform hashing in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm SHA-256 and cryptographic key sizes none that meet the following:
[FIPS 180-2].
FCS_COP.1/SHA_GIS-4 Cryptographic operation – Hash for Key Derivation by GIS
FCS_COP.1.1/SHA_GIS-4 The General Inspection System shall perform hashing in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm SHA-384 and cryptographic key sizes none that meet the following:
[FIPS 180-2].
The General Inspection System shall meet the requirement “Single-use authentication mechanisms
(FIA_UAU.4)” as specified below [CC-2].
FIA_UAU.4/GIS Single-use authentication mechanisms - Single-use authentication of the Terminal
by the GIS
FIA_UAU.4.1/GIS The General Inspection System shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism,
2. Chip Authentication Protocol.
The General Inspection System shall meet the requirement “Multiple authentication mechanisms
(FIA_UAU.5)” as specified below [CC-2].
FIA_UAU.5/GIS Multiple authentication mechanisms – General Inspection System
FIA_UAU.5.1/GIS The General Inspection System shall provide
1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism,
2. Chip Authentication
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2/GIS The General Inspection System shall authenticate any user’s claimed identity according to
the following rules:
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1. The General Inspection System accepts the authentication attempt as MRTD only by means of the
Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with the Document Basic Access Keys.
2. After successful authentication as MRTD and until the completion of the Chip Authentication
Mechanism the General Inspection System accepts only response codes with correct message
authentication code sent by means of secure messaging with key agreed with the authenticated
MRTD by means of the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism.
3. After run of the Chip Authentication Mechanism the General Inspection System accepts only
response codes with correct message authentication code sent by means of secure messaging with
key agreed with the terminal by means of the Chip Authentication Mechanism.
The General Inspection System shall meet the requirement “Re-authenticating (FIA_UAU.6)” as specified
below [CC-2].
FIA_UAU.6/GIS Re-authenticating – Re-authenticating of Terminal by the General Inspection System
FIA_UAU.6.1/GIS The General Inspection System shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions
1. Each response sent to the General Inspection System after successful authentication of the MRTD
with Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism and until the completion of the Chip
Authentication Mechanism shall have a correct MAC created by means of secure messaging keys
agreed upon by the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism.
2. Each response sent to the General Inspection System after successful run of the Chip
Authentication Protocol shall have a correct MAC created by means of secure messaging keys
generated by Chip Authentication Protocol.
The General Inspection System shall meet the requirement “Basic data exchange confidentiality
(FDP_UCT.1)” as specified below [CC-2].
FDP_UCT.1/GIS Basic data exchange confidentiality - General Inspection System
FDP_UCT.1.1/GIS The General Inspection System shall enforce the Access Control SFP to be able to
transmit and receive objects in a manner protected from unauthorized disclosure after Chip
Authentication.
The General Inspection System shall meet the requirement “Basic data exchange confidentiality
(FDP_UCT.1)” as specified below [CC-2].
FDP_UIT.1/GIS Data exchange integrity - General Inspection System
FDP_UIT.1.1/GIS The General Inspection System shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP to be able to
transmit and receive user data in a manner protected from modification, deletion, insertion and replay
errors after Chip Authentication.
FDP_UIT.1.2/GIS The General Inspection System shall be able to determine on receipt of user data,
whether modification, deletion, insertion and replay has occurred after Chip Authentication.
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5.4.5 Extended Inspection System
The Extended Inspection System (EIS) in addition to the General Inspection System (i) implements the
Terminal Authentication Protocol and (ii) is authorized by the issuing State or Organization through the
Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data.
FCS_COP.1/SIG_SIGN_EIS-1 Cryptographic operation – Signature creation by EIS -- RSA
FCS_COP.1.1/SIG_SIGN_EIS-1 The Extended Inspection System shall perform signature creation in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm RSA and cryptographic key sizes 1536 and 2048
bits that meet the following: [ASM], Annex A.1.
FCS_COP.1/SIG_SIGN_EIS-2 Cryptographic operation – Signature creation by EIS -- ECDSA
FCS_COP.1.1/SIG_SIGN_EIS-2 The Extended Inspection System shall perform signature creation in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm ECDSA and cryptographic key sizes 192, 224, 256,
320 and 384 bits that meet the following: [ASM], Annex A.1.
FCS_COP.1/SHA_EIS-1 Cryptographic operation – Hash for Key Derivation by EIS
FCS_COP.1.1/SHA_EIS-1 The Extended Inspection System shall perform hashing in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm SHA-1 and cryptographic key sizes none that meet the following: FIPS
180-2.
FCS_COP.1/SHA_EIS-2 Cryptographic operation – Hash for Key Derivation by EIS
FCS_COP.1.1/SHA_EIS-2 The Extended Inspection System shall perform hashing in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm SHA-224 and cryptographic key sizes none that meet the following:
FIPS 180-2.
FCS_COP.1/SHA_EIS-3 Cryptographic operation – Hash for Key Derivation by EIS
FCS_COP.1.1/SHA_EIS-3 The Extended Inspection System shall perform hashing in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm SHA-256 and cryptographic key sizes none that meet the following:
FIPS 180-2.
FCS_COP.1/SHA_EIS-4 Cryptographic operation – Hash for Key Derivation by EIS
FCS_COP.1.1/SHA_EIS-4 The Extended Inspection System shall perform hashing in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm SHA-384 and cryptographic key sizes none that meet the following:
FIPS 180-2.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Authentication Proof of Identity (FIA_API.1)” as specified
below [CC-2], extended.
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FIA_API.1/EIS Authentication Proof of Identity – Extended Inspection System
FIA_API.1.1/EIS The Extended Inspection System shall provide a Terminal Authentication Protocol
according to [ASM] to prove the identity of the Extended Inspection system.
5.4.6 Personalization Terminals
The TOE supports different authentication and access control mechanisms which may be used for the
Personalization Agent depending on the personalization scheme of the Issuing State or Organization:
1. The Basic Access Control Mechanism which may be used by the Personalization Terminal with a
Personalization Agent Secret Key Pair. The Basic Access Control Mechanism establishes strong
cryptographic keys for the secure messaging to ensure the confidentiality by Triple-DES and
integrity by Retail-MAC of the transmitted data. This approach may be used in a personalization
environment where the communication between the MRTD’s chip and the Personalization Terminal
may be listened or manipulated.
2. The Personalization Terminal may use the Terminal Authentication Protocol like a Extended
Inspection System but using the Personalization Agent Keys to authenticate themselves to the TOE.
This approach may be used in a personalization environment where (i) the Personalization Agent
want to authenticate the MRTD’s chip and (ii) the communication between the MRTD’s chip and the
Personalization Terminal may be listened or manipulated.
3. In a centralized personalization scheme the major issue is high productivity of personalization in a
high secure environment. In this case the personalization agent may wish to reduce the protocol to
symmetric authentication of the terminal without secure messaging. Therefore the TOE and the
Personalization Terminal support a simple the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with
Personalization Agent Key as requested by the SFR FIA_UAU.4/MRTD and FIA_API.1/SYM_PT.
The Personalization Terminal shall meet the requirement “Authentication Prove of Identity (FIA_API)” as
specified below ([CC-2], extended) if it uses the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with Personalization
Agent Key.
FIA_API.1/SYM_PT Authentication Proof of Identity - Personalization Terminal Authentication with
Symmetric Key
FIA_API.1.1/SYM_PT The Personalization Terminal shall provide an Authentication Mechanism based on
Triple-DES to prove the identity of the Personalization Agent.
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6. TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION
6.1 TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONS
TOE Security Functions are provided by the eTravel EAC V1 64K embedded software (including the optional
NVM ES) and by the chip.
6.1.1 TSFs provided by the eTravel EAC V1 64K Software
SF Description SSF SOF
claim
SF.REL.RNG_TEST
SF.REL.SENSOR_TEST
SF.REL.INTEGRITY
SF.REL.CORR_EXEC
SF.REL.PROT_SENS_DATA
SF.REL Reliability
SF.REL.FAULT_REACTION
-
SF.AC.LIFE_CYCLE
SF.AC.STATE
SF.AC Access Control
SF.AC.FILE_AC
-
SF.SYM_AUT.RNG
SF.SYM_AUT.MANUF
SF.SYM_AUT.MANUF_PROT
SF.SYM_AUT.MANUF_KEY_CHANGE
SF.SYM_AUT.BAC
SF.SYM_AUT Symmetric Authentication
Mechanisms
SF.SYM_AUT.BAC_RESTR
High
SF.SM Secure Messaging -
SF.CA Chip Authentication -
SF.TA_CER.VERIFY
SF.TA_CER.TRUST_UPDATE
SF.TA_CER.TRUST_ATOMIC
SF.TA_CER Validity of the Certificate Chain
SF.TA_CER.CURRENT_DATE
-
SF.TA_AUT.RNG
SF.TA_AUT Asymmetric Authentication
Mechanism
SF.TA_AUT.EXT_AUT
High
Table 6-1. Security Functions provided by the eTravel EAC V1 64K Software.
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6.1.1.1 SF.REL: Reliability
The SF.REL security function is divided to the following SSFs:
1. SF.REL.RNG_TEST
2. SF.REL.SENSOR_TEST
3. SF.REL.INTEGRITY
4. SF.REL.CORR_EXEC
5. SF.REL.PROT_SENS_DATA
6. SF.REL.FAULT_REACTION.
SSFs SF.REL.RNG_TEST and SF.REL.SENSOR_TEST executes tests to insure that the TOE is in
secure state. The SF.REL.RNG_TEST SSF tests random number generator and the
SF.REL.SENSOR_TEST SSF tests environment sensors.
The SF.REL.INTEGRITY SSF checks the integrity of following assets:
o Keys
o application files (EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, EF.SOD, EF.COM)
o access rights flags
o NVM ES
o anti-tearing area
o life cycle status.
The SF.REL.CORR_EXEC consists of measures to detect Fault Attacks (FA), involving:
• performing twice and checking the consistency of the certain security critical operations,
• security tests near branching to protect a sensitive conditional branch against perturbation,
• step control to ensure that critical functional steps of a command are really executed and not
skipped.
The SF.REL.PROT_SENS_DATA SSF provides several mechanisms ensuring the confidentiality of
sensitive data during their manipulation. These mechanisms counter the exploitation of electrical or
electromagnetic emissions which are generated during the treatment of data. They are mainly based on
clock desynchronisation and/or random order treatments. This security function involve: random order
processing mechanism, secured DES operation, secured ECC operation and software desynchronisation
mechanism.
The SF.REL.FAULT_REACTION consists of detecting faults either by hardware reaction or by software
detection based on the SF.REL.SENSOR_TEST, SF.REL.INTEGRITY and SF.REL.CORR_EXEC. When
a fault is detected, the card goes to mute state, either immediately or after a delay.
This function has no strength.
6.1.1.2 SF.AC: Access Control
The SF.AC security function is divided to the following SSFs:
1. SF.AC.LIFE_CYCLE
2. SF.AC.STATE
3. SF.AC.FILE_AC
The TOE has four life cycle phases: development, manufacturing, personalization and operational. The
TOE ES has the following life cycle states:
VIRGIN: the state in which chip is received from chip manufacturer
RE_INITIALIZATION: the state in which initialization can be repeated and conditionally erased all
previously initialized or pre-personalized information
PRE_PERSONALIZATION: the state after (re-)initialization in which personalization commands are
available, but where file access conditions do not apply
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PERSONALIZATION: the state after (re-)initialization or pre-personalization in which personalization
commands are available
OPERATIONAL: the state of normal usage after personalization in which the usage phase commands
are available
TERMINATED: the state in which no commands are available.
The following table shows correspondence between life cycle states of the ES and lice cycle phases.
Life cycle state Life cycle phase
VIRGIN MANUFACTURING
RE_INITIALIZATION MANUFACTURING
PRE_PERSONALIZATION MANUFACTURING
PERSONALIZATION PERSONALIZATION
OPERATIONAL OPERATIONAL
TERMINATED -
Table 6-2. Correspondance between TOE ES life cycle states and life cycle phases.
During initial startup life cycle status is read. Each life cycle state has own set of available commands and
particular command may have different behaviour depending on life cycle. The SF.AC.LIFE_CYCLE
function manages the lifecycle status and ensures that the status is set in an irreversible way from the
phase 2 “Manufacturing” to the phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD” and from the phase 3 to the
phase 4 “Operational Use”. The phases 2, 3 and 4 have dedicated commands. Life cycle status can be
changed through END PERSO command. This command is used to finalize the pre-personalization or
the personalization process. If the current life cycle status is PRE_PERSONALIZATION, the next state
will be PERSONALIZATION or OPERATIONAL after execution of this command. If the current state is
PERSONALIZATION, the next state will be OPERATIONAL after execution of this command. The chip
becomes mute after END_PERSO command and initial startup is needed.
The SF.AC.LIFE_CYCLE function manages the high-level life cycle steps of the chip. The SF.AC.STATE
function manages the run-time volatile states. The SF.AC.STATE controls the set of available commands
through a state machine and the related state transitions. For each life cycle state there exist a specific
and finite set of volatile states. A volatile state is characterized by the set of available commands and the
available state transitions to other volatile states. The state transitions are implemented by the relevant
commands.
The SF.AC.FILE_AC function ensures that the assets (keys, Data Groups, TSF data) can only be
accessed under the control of the operating system and as defined by the access rights written during the
personalization process. This SF controls the reading and writing access in personalization (Mutual
Authenticate Access Control) and user phases (Basic Access Control and Extended Access Control).
This function has no strength.
6.1.1.3 SF.SYM_AUT: Symmetric Authentication Mechanisms
The SF.SYM_AUT security function is divided to the following SSFs:
1. SF.SYM_AUT.RNG
2. SF.SYM_AUT.MANUF
3. SF.SYM_AUT.MANUF_PROT
4. SF.SYM_AUT.MANUF_KEY_CHANGE
5. SF.SYM_AUT.BAC
6. SF.SYM_AUT.BAC_RESTR
The SF.SYM_AUT.RNG SSF provides pseudo-random numbers.
The SF.SYM_AUT.MANUF SSF enforces mutual authentication with Manufacturer Key during
manufacturing phase. The SF.SYM_AUT.MANUF_KEY_CHANGE manages the Manufacturer Key
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changes between the terminal and the TOE. The key can be changed in previous phase for next
phase as is shown in the following picture.
Figure 6-1. Manufacturer key
The SF.SYM_AUT.MANUF detects each unsuccessful authentication attempt. In such a case it
warns the connected terminal.
The SF.SYM_AUT.MANUF_PROT protects Manufacturer Key. After three consecutive false
authentication attempts the key is locked.
SF.SYM_AUT.BAC enforces mutual authentication during Basic Access Control mechanism and
manages the key exchanges between the terminal and the TOE. The SSF detects each unsuccessful
authentication attempt. In such a case it warns the connected terminal. In case of successful
termination of the protocol it stores appropriate keys for the secure messaging.
SF.SYM_AUT.BAC_RESTR restricts false Basic Access Control authentication attempts. After
unsuccessful BAC authentication there is delay before next authentication attempt is possible. Every
consecutive false attempt increases the delay until maximum value is reached.
The strength of function is high because the random number generation is based on probabilistic and/or
permutational mechanisms.
6.1.1.4 SF.SM: Secure Messaging
The SF.SM function provides the management of the secure channel for the sensitive data exchange with
the terminal. The integrity and authenticity of the communication is handled by using encryption and
Message Authentication Codes. The authentication procedures differ between life cycles states, but once
the session keys are generated, the SM processing is equal in all of them. If a SM error occurs, the
session keys are cleared and the SM is aborted. Defined authentication status information is also cleared
upon such event. A SM error may be due to not using SM, having too few or wrong SM fields, incorrect
order of SM fields or having MAC or padding errors in SM fields.
This function has no strength.
6.1.1.5 SF.CA: Chip Authentication
SF.CA enforces Chip Authentication protocol. It is a Diffie-Hellman key agreement procedure. This
function provides new session keys for secure messaging.
This function has no strength.
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6.1.1.6 SF.TA_CER: Validity of the Certificate Chain
The SF.TA_CER security function is divided to the following SSFs:
1. SF.TA_CER.VERIFY
2. SF.TA_CER.TRUST_UPDATE
3. SF.TA_CER.TRUST_ATOMIC
4. SF.TA_CER.CURRENT_DATE
The SF.TA_CER.VERIFY enforces the Verify Certificate function during Terminal Authentication process
through PSO: VERIFY CERTIFICATE command. The public key of the certification authority (PKCVCA) to
be used in the first verification process shall be present in the card (in EF.CVCA and in a key object) and
is referenced with a prior MSE: SET DST command. This public key is called a trustpoint. At least two
chained certificates are expected to be provided: CDV and CIS.
Additionally, if there exists a newer trustpoint(s) and the corresponding link certificate(s) CCVCA are stored
in the terminal, there may be an indefinite number of trustpoint updates before the presentation of the
certificate chain. The function SF.TA_CER.TRUST_UPDATE enforces management of the trust point.
When receiving a new PKCVCA, PSO VERIFY CERTIFICATE must perform the following operations:
o Search for an unused CVCA public key object (detected by checking if the object contains a key
and if the key is listed in EF.CVCA).
o Write the new key into that key object (no backup management required as long as an
interruption cannot corrupt the object).
o Update EF.CVCA to list the new key in the beginning of the file, and the younger one of the
possible previous keys, unless it has expired (backup management required). This process
practically disables the oldest key and any expired key.
The SF.TA_CER.TRUST_ATOMIC ensures that the operations for enabling or disabling a PKCVCA public
key (including key object manipulation and EF.CVCA modification) constitute one atomic operation.
SF.TA_CER.CURRENT_DATE manages Current Date. This information is updated in the case that the
effective date of the received certificate (CCVCA, CDV or CIS) is later than the Current Date, and the
certificate has been signed by the CVCA or a domestic DV.
This function has no strength.
6.1.1.7 SF.TA_AUT: Asymmetric Authentication Mechanism
The SF.TA_CER security function is divided to the following SSFs:
1. SF.TA_AUT.RNG
2. SF.TA_AUT.EXT_AUT
The SF.TA_AUT.RNG provides pseudo-random numbers.
The SF.TA_AUT.EXT_AUT allows the authentication of a terminal by the mean of an external
authentication using asymmetric keys. This SF completes the Terminal Authentication procedure. It
detects each unsuccessful authentication attempt. In such a case it warns the connected terminal.
The strength of function is high because the random number generation is based on probabilistic and/or
permutational mechanisms.
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6.1.2 TSFs provided by the Infineon SLE66CLX800PE chip
The evaluation is a composite evaluation and uses the results of the CC evaluation provided by [CR-
INFINEON]. The IC and its primary embedded software have been evaluated at level EAL 5 with a minimum
strength level for its security functions of SOF-high.
SF Description
SEF.1 Operating state checking
SEF.2 Phase management with test mode lock-out
SEF.3 Protection against snooping
SEF.4 Data encryption and data disguising
SEF.5 Random number generation
SEF.6 TSF self test
SEF.7 Notification of physical attack
SEF.8 Memory Management Unit (MMU)
SEF.9 Cryptographic support
Table 6-3. Security Functions provided by the SLE66CLX800PE chip.
6.1.2.1 SEF.1: Operating state checking
Correct function of the TOE is only given in the specified range of the environmental operating
parameters. To prevent an attack exploiting those circumstances it is necessary to detect if the specified
range is left.
All operating signals are filtered to prevent malfunction.
In addition the operating state is monitored with sensors for the operating voltage, clock signal frequency,
and temperature and electro magnetic radiation. The TOE falls into the defined secure state in case of a
specified range violation. The defined secure state causes the chip internal reset process.
The parameters for the filters and sensors are set during production and not accessible by the Embedded
Software after TOE finishing.
The data in the EEPROM are automatically monitored. In order to prevent accidental bit faults during
production in the ROM, over the data stored in ROM a CRC-Checksum is calculated.
6.1.2.2 SEF.2: Phase management with test mode lock-out
The life cycle of the TOE is split-up in several phases. Chip development and production (phase 2,
3, 4) and final use (phase 4-7) is a rough split-up from TOE point of view. These phases are implemented
in the TOE as test mode (phase 2, 3, 4) and user mode (phase 1, 4-7). In addition a chip identification
mode exists which is active in all phases.
During start-up of the TOE the decision for the user mode or the test mode is taken dependent on several
phase identifiers (phase management). If test mode is the active phase the TOE requests authentication
before any action (test mode lock-out).
If the chip identification mode is requested the chip identification data (O.Identification) stored in a non
modifiable EEPROM area is reported.
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6.1.2.3 SEF.3: Protection against snooping
Several mechanisms protect the TOE against snooping the design or the user data during operation and
even it is out of operation (power down).
There are topological design measures for disguise, such as the use of the top metal layer with active
signals for protecting critical data. The entire design is kept in a non standard way to prevent attacks
using standard analysis methods. A Smartcard dedicated CPU with a non public bus protocol is used
which makes analysis complicated.
6.1.2.4 SEF.4: Data encryption and data disguising
The readout of data can be controlled with the use of encryption. An attacker can not use the data
obtained by espionage due to their encryption.
The memory contents of the TOE are encrypted on chip to protect against data analysis on stored data
as well as on internally transmitted data. In addition the data transferred over the bus to and from (bi-
directional encryption) the special SFRs (CRC, RNG, ACE, DDES) is encrypted automatically with a
dynamic key change. The encryption is performed by a simple XOR but with the key change in short
intervals the security level of a strong one-time pad is given.
To prevent interpretation of leaked processed or transferred information randomness is inserted in the
information. In addition important parts of the CPU and the complete DES component are especially
designed to counter leakage attacks like DPA or EMA. The current consumption is independent of the
processed data.
The information leakage is kept low with special design measures. An interpretation of leaked data is not
possible as all the data is encrypted.
6.1.2.5 SEF.5: Random number generation
Random data is essential for cryptography as well as for physical security mechanisms. The TOE is
equipped with a true random generator based on physical probabilistic controlled effects. The random
data can be used from the Smartcard Embedded Software as well as from the security enforcing
functions. It should fulfill the requirements from the functionality class P2 of [AIS31].
The generated numbers are true random due to the construction principle.
The SEF5 uses a special metric as defined in [AIS31].
6.1.2.6 SEF.6: TSF self test
The TSF of the TOE has either a hardware controlled self test which can be started from the
Smartcard Embedded Software by a RMS function call or can be tested directly from the
Smartcard Embedded Software for the active shield. The tested security enforcing functions are SEF1,
SEF5 and SEF7.
6.1.2.7 SEF.7: Notification of physical attack
The entire surface of the TOE is protected with the active shield. Attacks over the surface are detected
when the shield lines are cut or get contact.
6.1.2.8 SEF.8: Memory Management Unit (MMU)
The MMU in the TOE gives the Smartcard Embedded Software the possibility to define different access
rights for memory areas and components. In case of an access violation the MMU will generate a non
maskable interrupt (NMI). Then an interrupt service routine (ISR) can react on the access violation.
6.1.2.9 SEF.9: Cryptographic support
The TOE is equipped with several hardware accelerators to support the standard cryptographic
operations. This security enforcing function is introduced to include the cryptographic operation in the
scope of the evaluation as the cryptographic function itself is not used from the TOE security policy. On
the other hand these functions are of special interest for the use of the hardware as platform for the
software. The component is a hardware DES encryption unit. The key for the cryptographic 3DES
operations are provided from the Smartcard Embedded Software (environment).
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6.2 ASSURANCE MEASURES
Assurance Measure Document title
AM_ASE eTravel EAC V1 Security Target
AM_ADV_FSP Functional Specifications eTravel EAC V1
AM_ALC Class ALC eTravel EAC V1
AM_ACM Class ACM eTravel EAC V1
AM_ADO Class ADO eTravel EAC V1
AM_ADV_HLD High Level Design eTravel EAC V1
AM_ADV_LLD Low Level Design eTravel EAC V1
AM_AGD_ADM Administrator Guidance eTravel EAC V1
AM_AGD_USR User Guidance eTravel EAC V1
AM_ATE Class ATE eTravel EAC V1
AM_AVA_MSU Misuse eTravel EAC V1
AM_AVA_VLA_SOF Vulnerability analysis – SOF eTravel EAC V1
AM_CODE Source Code for eTravel EAC V1
Table 6-4. Assurance Measures.
The development team uses a configuration management system that supports the generation of the TOE.
The configuration management system is well documented and identifies all different configuration items.
The configuration management tracks the implementation representation, design documentation, test
documentation, user documentation, administrator documentation. The security of the configuration
management is described in detail in a separate document.
The delivery process of the TOE is well defined and follows strict procedures. Several measures prevent the
modification of the TOE based on the developer’s master copy and the user's version. The Administrator and
the User are provided with necessary documentation for initialization and start-up of the TOE.
The implementation is based on an informal high-level and low-level design of the components of the TOE.
The description is sufficient to generate the TOE without other design requirements.
The correspondence of the Security Functional Requirements (SFR) with less abstract representations will
be demonstrated in a separate document. This addresses ADV_FSP, ADV_HLD, ADV_LLD. ADV_IMP and
ADV_RCR.
The tools used in the development environment are appropriate to protect the confidentiality and integrity of
the TOE design and implementation. The development is controlled by a life cycle model of the TOE. The
development tools are well defined and documented.
The Gemalto R&E organization is equipped with organizational and personnel means that are necessary to
develop the TOE.
As the evaluation is identified as a composite evaluation based on the CC evaluation of the hardware, the
assurance measures related to the hardware (IC) will be provided by documents of the IC manufacturer.
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7. PP CLAIMS
7.1 PP REFERENCE
The eTravel EAC V1 64K security target is conformant with the Protection Profile “Machine Readable Travel
Document with ICAO Application, Extended Access Control” BSI-PP-0026 version 1.1.
7.2 PP TAILORING
The main refinement and tailoring operated on the PP is inlay manufacturing as described in chapter 2.5.
The refinements to the security functional requirements of the TOE:
1. FCS_CKM.4/MRTD: Cryptographic key destruction
2. FIA_UID.1.2: Timing of identification
3. FIA_UAU.1.2: Timing of authentication
4. FIA_AFL.1.1: Authentication failure handling
5. FIA_AFL.1.2: BAC authentication failure handling
6. FMT_MTD.1.1/CAPK: Specification of management functions
7. FPT_EMSEC.1.1: User data which shall not emit electromagnetic or current emissions
8. FPT_EMSEC.1.2: User data which shall be protected against access through smart card circuit
contacts
9. FPT_TST.1.1: TSF testing
10. FPT_PHP.3: Resistance to physical attack
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8. RATIONALES
8.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES RATIONALE
The following table provides an overview for security objectives coverage.
OT.AC_PERS
OT.DATA_INT
OT.DATA_CONF
OT.SENS_DATA_CONF
OT.IDENTIFICATION
OT.CHIP_AUTH_PROOF
OT.PROT_ABUSE_FUNC
OT.PROT_INF_LEAK
OT.PROT_PHYS_TAMPER
OT.PROT_MALFUNCTION
OD.ASSURANCE
OD.MATERIAL
OE.PERSONALIZATION
OE.PASS_AUTH_SIGN
OE.AUTH_KEY_MRTD
OE.AUTHORIZ_SENS_DATA
OE.EXAM_MRTD
OE.PASSIVE_AUTH_VERIF
OE.PROT_LOGICAL_MRTD
OE.EXT_INSP_SYSTEM
T.CHIP_ID X X X
T.SKIMMING X
T.READ_SENSITIVE_DATA X X X
T.FORGERY X X X X X X
T.COUNTERFEIT X X X X
T.ABUSE_FUNC X
T.INFORMATION_LEAKAGE X
T.PHYS_TAMPER X
T.MALFUNCTION X
P.MANUFACT X X
P.PERSONALIZATION X X X
P.PERSONAL_DATA X X X
P.SENSITIVE_DATA X X X
A.PERS_AGENT X
A.INSP_SYS X X
A.SIGNATURE_PKI X X
A.AUTH_PKI X X
Table 8-1. Security Objective Rationale
The OSP P.Manufact “Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip” requires the quality and integrity of the
manufacturing process and control the MRTD’s material in the Phase 2 Manufacturing including unique
identification of the IC by means of the Initialization Data and the writing of the Pre-personalization Data. The
security objective for the TOE environment OD.Assurance “Assurance Security Measures in Development
and Manufacturing Environment” address these obligations of the IC Manufacturer and MRTD Manufacturer.
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OD.Material “Control over MRTD material” ensures that materials, equipment and tools used to produce
genuine and authentic MRTDs must be controlled in order to prevent their usage for production of counterfeit
MRTDs.
The OSP P.Personalization “Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organization only” addresses
(i) the enrolment of the logical MRTD by the Personalization Agent as described in the security objective for
the TOE environment OE.Personalization “Personalization of logical MRTD”, and (ii) the access control for
the user data and TSF data as described by the security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for
Personalization of logical MRTD”. Note, the manufacturer equips the TOE with the Personalization Agent
Authentication key(s) according to OD.Assurance “Assurance Security Measures in Development and
Manufacturing Environment”. The security objective OT.AC_Pers limits the management of TSF data and
the management of TSF to the Personalization Agent.
The OSP P.Personal_Data “Personal data protection policy” requires that the logical MRTD can be used
only with agreement of the MRTD holder i.e. if the MRTD is presented to an inspection system. This OSP is
covered by security objectives for the TOE and the TOE environment depending on the use of the Chip
Authentication Protocol and the secure messaging based on session keys agreed in this protocol. The
security objective OT.Data_Conf requires the TOE to implement the Basic Access Control as defined by
ICAO [PKI] and enforce Basic Inspection System to authenticate itself by means of the Basic Access Control
based on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Key. The security objective OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
“Protection of data of the logical MRTD” requires the inspection system to protect their communication with
the TOE before secure messaging is successfully established based on the Chip Authentication Protocol.
After successful Chip Authentication the security objective OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” ensure
the integrity of the logical MRTD data during their transmission to the General Inspection System.
The OSP P.Sensitive_Data “Privacy of sensitive biometric reference data” is fulfilled and the threat
T.Read_Sensitive_Data “Read the sensitive biometric reference data” is countered by the TOE-objective
OT.Sens_Data_Conf “Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference data” requiring that read access to
EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 (containing the sensitive biometric reference data) is only granted to authorised
inspection systems. Furthermore it is required that the transmission of these data ensures the data’s
confidentiality. The authorisation bases on Document Verifier certificates issued by the issuing state or
organisation as required by OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data “Authorisation for use of sensitive biometric reference
data”. The Document Verifier of the receiving state has to authorize Extended Inspection Systems by
creating appropriate Inspection System certificates for access to the sensitive biometric reference data as
demanded by OE.Ext_Insp_Systems “Authorisation of Extended Inspection Systems”.
The threat T.Chip_ID “Identification of MRTD’s chip” addresses the trace of the MRTD movement by
identifying remotely the MRTD’s chip through the contactless communication interface. This threat is
countered by security objectives for the TOE and the TOE environment depending on the use of the Chip
Authentication Protocol and the secure messaging based on session keys agreed in this protocol. The
security objective OT.Identification “Identification and Authentication of the TOE” by limiting the TOE chip
identification to the Basic Inspection System. The security objective OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD “Protection of
data of the logical MRTD” requires the inspection system to protect to their communication (as Basic
Inspection System) with the TOE before secure messaging based on the Chip Authentication Protocol is
successfully established. After successful Chip Authentication the security objective OT.Data_Conf
“Confidentiality of personal data” ensures the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data during their
transmission to the General Inspection System.
The threat T.Skimming “Skimming digital MRZ data or the digital portrait” addresses the reading of the
logical MRTD trough the contactless interface outside the communication between the MRTD’s chip and
Inspection System. This threat is countered by the security objective OT.Data_Conf “Confidentiality of
personal data” through Basic Access Control allowing read data access only after successful authentication
of the Basic Inspection System.
The threat T.Forgery “Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip” address the fraudulent alteration of the complete
stored logical MRTD or any part of it. The security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for
Personalization of logical MRTD“ requires the TOE to limit the write access for the logical MRTD to the
trustworthy Personalization Agent (cf. OE.Personalization). The TOE will protect the integrity of the stored
logical MRTD according the security objective OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” and OT.Prot_Phys-
Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering”. The examination of the presented MRTD passport book
according to OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport book” shall ensure that passport book
does not contain a sensitive contactless chip which may present the complete unchanged logical MRTD.
The TOE environment will detect partly forged logical MRTD data by means of digital signature which will be
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created according to OE.Pass_Auth_Sign “Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature” and verified by
the inspection system according to OE.Passive_Auth_Verif “Verification by Passive Authentication”.
The threat T.Counterfeit “MRTD’s chip” addresses the attack of unauthorised copy or reproduction of the
genuine MRTD chip. This attack is thwarted by chip an identification and authenticity proof required by
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof “Proof of MRTD’s chip authentication” using a authentication key pair to be generated
by the issuing state or organisation. The Public Chip Authentication Key has to be written into EF.DG14 and
signed by means of Documents Security Objects as demanded by OE.Auth_Key_MRTD “MRTD
Authentication Key”. According to OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport book” the General
Inspection system has to perform the Chip Authentication Protocol to verify the authenticity of the MRTD’s
chip. MRTDs must be controlled in order to prevent their usage for production of counterfeit MRTDs targeted
on by OD.Material.
The threat T.Abuse-Func “Abuse of Functionality” addresses attacks of misusing MRTD’s functionality to
disable or bypass the TSFs. The security objectives for the TOE OT.Prot_Abuse_Func “Protection against
buse of functionality” ensure that the usage of functions which may not be used in the operational phase is
effectively prevented. Therefore attacks intending to abuse functionality in order to disclose or manipulate
critical (User) Data or to affect the TOE in such a way that security features or TOE’s functions may be
bypassed, deactivated, changed or explored shall be effectively countered.
The threats T.Information_Leakage “Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip”, T.Phys-Tamper “Physical
Tampering” and T.Malfunction “Malfunction due to Environmental Stress” are typical for integrated circuits
like smart cards under direct attack with high attack potential. The protection of the TOE against these
threats are addressed by the directly related security objectives OT.Prot_Inf_Leak “Protection against
Information Leakage”, OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering” and
OT.Prot_Malfunction “Protection against Malfunctions”.
The assumption A.Pers_Agent “Personalization of the MRTD’s chip” is covered by the security objective for
the TOE environment OE.Personalization “Personalization of logical MRTD” including the enrolment, the
protection with digital signature and the storage of the MRTD holder personal data and the enabling of
security features of the TOE according to the decision of the Issuing State or Organization concerning the
Basic Access Control.
The examination of the MRTD passport book addressed by the assumption A.Insp_Sys “Inspection
Systems for global interoperability” is covered by the security objectives for the TOE environment
OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport book” which requires the inspection system to
examine physically the MRTD, the Basic Inspection System to implement the Basic Access Control, and the
General Inspection Systems and Extended Inspection Systems to implement and to perform the Chip
Authentication Protocol to verify the Authenticity of the presented MRTD’s chip. The security objectives for
the TOE environment OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD “Protection of data of the logical MRTD” require the
Inspection System to protect the logical MRTD data during the transmission and the internal handling.
The assumption A.Signature_PKI “PKI for Passive Authentication” is directly covered by the security
objective for the TOE environment OE.Pass_Auth_Sign “Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature”
covering the necessary procedures for the Country Signing CA Key Pair and the Document Signer Key
Pairs. The implementation of the signature verification procedures is covered by OE.Exam_MRTD
“Examination of the MRTD passport book”.
The assumption A.Auth_PKI “PKI for Inspection Systems” is covered by the security objective for the TOE
environment OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data “Authorisation for use of sensitive biometric reference data” requires
the CVCA to limit the read access to sensitive biometric by issuing Document Verifier certificates for
authorised receiving States or Organisations only. The Document Verifier of the receiving state is required
by OE.Ext_Insp_Systems “Authorisation of Extended Inspection Systems” to authorise Extended Inspection
Systems by creating Inspection System Certificates. Therefore, the receiving issuing State or Organisation
has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure.
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8.2 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE
8.2.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale
The following table provides an overview for security functional requirements coverage.
OT.AC_PERS
OT.DATA_INT
OT.DATA_CONF
OT.SENS_DATA_CONF
OT.IDENTIFICATION
OT.CHIP_AUTH_PROOF
OT.PROT_ABUSE_FUNC
OT.PROT_INF_LEAK
OT.PROT_PHYS_TAMPER
OT.PROT_MALFUNCTION
FAU_SAS.1 X
FCS_CKM.1/KDF_MRTD X X X X X
FCS_CKM.1/DH_MRTD-1 X X X X
FCS_CKM.1/DH_MRTD-2 X X X X
FCS_CKM.4/MRTD X X X X
FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD-1 X X X X X
FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD-2 X X X X X
FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD-3 X X X X X
FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD-4 X X X X X
FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD X X X X
FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD X X X X X
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER-1 X X
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER-2 X X
FCS_RND.1/MRTD X X
FIA_UID.1 X X X X X
FIA_UAU.1 X X X X X
FIA_UAU.4/MRTD X X X X
FIA_UAU.5/MRTD X X X X
FIA_UAU.6/MRTD X X X X
FIA_AFL.1 X
FIA_API.1/CAP X
FDP_ACC.1 X X X X
FDP_ACF.1 X X X X
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OT.AC_PERS
OT.DATA_INT
OT.DATA_CONF
OT.SENS_DATA_CONF
OT.IDENTIFICATION
OT.CHIP_AUTH_PROOF
OT.PROT_ABUSE_FUNC
OT.PROT_INF_LEAK
OT.PROT_PHYS_TAMPER
OT.PROT_MALFUNCTION
FDP_UCT.1/MRTD X X
FDP_UIT.1/MRTD X X
FMT_SMF.1 X X X
FMT_SMR.1 X X X
FMT_LIM.1 X
FMT_LIM.2 X
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA X
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS X
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI X
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD X
FMT_MTD.1/DATE X
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE X X
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK X X X X
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ X X X X X
FMT_MTD.3 X
FPT_EMSEC.1 X X
FPT_TST.1 X X
FPT_RVM.1 X
FPT_FLS.1 X X
FPT_PHP.3 X X
FPT_SEP.1 X X
Table 8-2. Coverage of Security Objective for the TOE by SFR
The security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD” addresses the
access control of the writing the logical MRTD and the management of the TSF for Basic Access Control.
The write access to the logical MRTD data are defined by the SFR FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1, FDP_ACC.1 and
FDP_ACF.1 in the same way: only the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write
the data of the groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD only once. The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the
roles (including Personalization Agent) and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions
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(including Personalization). The Personalization Agent handles the Document Basic Access Keys according
to the SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE as authentication reference data for Basic Access Control.
The authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent shall be performed by TSF according to SRF
FIA_UAU.4/MRTD and FIA_UAU.5/MRTD. If the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with the
Personalization Agent Authentication Key is used the TOE will use the FCS_RND.1/MRTD (for the
generation of the challenge), FCS_CKM.1/KDF_MRTD, FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD-1 (for the derivation of the
session keys), and FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD and FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD (for the ENC_MAC_Mode
secure messaging). and FIA_UAU.6/MRTD (for the re-authentication). If the Personalization Terminal want
to authenticate themselves to the TOE by means of the Terminal Authentication Protocol (after Chip
Authentication) with the Personalization Agent Keys the TOE will use TSF according to the
FCS_RND.1/MRTD (for the generation of the challenge), FCS_CKM.1/DH_MRTD-1,
FCS_CKM.1/DH_MRTD-2, FCS_CKM.1/KDF_MRTD, FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD-1,
FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD-2, FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD-3, FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD-4 (for the derivation of
the new session keys after Chip Authentication), and FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD and
FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD (for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging), FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER-1,
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER-2 (as part of the Terminal Authentication Protocol) and FIA_UAU.6/MRTD (for the re-
authentication). If the Personalization Terminal want to authenticate themselves to the TOE by means of the
Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with Personalization Agent Key the TOE will use TSF according to the
FCS_RND.1/MRTD (for the generation of the challenge) and FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD (to verify the
authentication attempt). The session keys are destroyed according to FCS_CKM.4 after use.
The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ prevents read access to the secret key of the Personalization Agent
Keys and ensures together with the SFR FPT_EMSEC.1 the confidentially of these keys.
The security objective OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” requires the TOE to protect the integrity of the
logical MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The write
access to the logical MRTD data is defined by the SFR FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 in the same way: only
the Personalization Agent is allowed to write the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD
(FDP_ACF.1.2, rule 1) and terminals are not allowed to modify any of the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the
logical MRTD (cf. FDP_ACF.1.4). The Personalization Agent must identify and authenticate themselves
aaccording to FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 before accessing these data. The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles
and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions.
The TOE supports the inspection system detect any modification of the transmitted logical MRTD data after
Chip Authentication. The authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent shall be performed by TSF
according to SRF FIA_UAU.4/MRTD, FIA_UAU.5/MRTD and FIA_UAU.6/MRTD. The SFR
FIA_UAU.6/MRTD and FDP_UIT.1/MRTD requires the integrity protection of the transmitted data after chip
authentication by means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to
FCS_CKM.1/DH_MRTD-1, FCS_CKM.1/DH_MRTD-2 (for the generation of shared secret),
FCS_CKM.1/KDF_MRTD, FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD-1, FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD-2,
FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD-3, FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD-4 (for the derivation of the new session keys), and
FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD and FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging. The
session keys are destroyed according to FCS_CKM.4 after use.
The SFR FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ requires that the Chip Authentication Key cannot
be written unauthorized or read afterwards.
The security objective OT.Data_Conf “Confidentiality of personal data” requires the TOE to ensure the
confidentiality of the logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16. The SFR FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 allow
only those actions before identification respective authentication which do not violate OT.Data_Conf. The
read access to the logical MRTD data is defined by the FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1.2: only the successful
authenticated Personalization Agent, Basic Inspection Systems117 and Extended Inspection Systems are
allowed to read the data of the logical MRTD. The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including Personalization
Agent and Basic Inspection System) and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions
(including Personalization for the key management for the Document Basic Access Keys). The SFR
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE addresses the key management and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ prevents reading
of the Document Basic Access Keys.
The SFR FIA_AFL.1 strengthens the authentication function as terminal part of the Basic Access Control
Authentication Protocol or other authentication functions if necessary. The SFR FIA_UAU.4/MRTD prevents
reuse of authentication data to strengthen the authentication of the user. The SFR FIA_UAU.5/MRTD
enforces the TOE (i) to accept the authentication attempt as Basic Inspection System only by means of the
Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with the Document Basic Access Keys and (ii) to accept
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chip authentication only after successful authentication as Basic Inspection System. Moreover, the SFR
FIA_UAU.6/MRTD requests secure messaging after successful authentication of the terminal with Basic
Access Control Authentication Mechanism.
After Chip authentication the TOE and the General Inspection System establish protection of the
communication by secure messaging (cf. the SFR FDP_UCT.1/MRTD and FDP_UIT.1/MRTD) in
ENC_MAC_Mode by means of the cryptographic functions according to FCS_CKM.1/DH_MRTD-1 and
FCS_CKM.1/DH_MRTD-2 (for the generation of shared secret), FCS_CKM.1/KDF_MRTD,
FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD-1, FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD-2, FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD-3,
FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD-4 (for the derivation of the new session keys), and FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD and
FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging. The session keys are destroyed
according to FCS_CKM.4 after use. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ requires
that the Chip Authentication Key cannot be written unauthorized or read afterwards.
Note, neither the security objective OT.Data_Conf nor the SFR FIA_UAU.5/MRTD requires the
Personalization Agent to use the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism or secure messaging.
The security objective OT.Sense_Data_Conf “Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference data” is
enforced by the Access Control SFP defined in FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 allowing the data of EF.DG3
and EF.DG4 only to be read by successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System being authorised by
a validly verifiable certificate according FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER-1 or FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER-2.
The SFR FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 requires authentication of the inspection systems. The SFR
FIA_UAU.5/MRTD requires the successful Chip Authentication before any authentication attempt as
Extended Inspection System. The SFR FIA_UAU.6/MRTD and FDP_UCT.1/MRTD requires the
confidentiality protection of the transmitted data after chip authentication by means of secure messaging
implemented by the cryptographic functions according to FCS_RND.1/MRTD (for the generation of the
terminal authentication challenge), FCS_CKM.1/DH_MRTD-1 and FCS_CKM.1/DH_MRTD-2 (for the
generation of shared secret), FCS_CKM.1/KDF_MRTD, FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD-1,
FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD-2, FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD-3, FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD-4 (for the derivation of
the new session keys), and FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD and FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD for the
ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging. The session keys are destroyed according to FCS_CKM.4 after use.
The SFR FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ requires that the Chip Authentication Key cannot
be written unauthorized or read afterwards.
To allow a verification of the certificate chain as in FMT_MTD.3 the CVCA’s public key and certificate as well
as the current date are written or update by authorised identified role as of FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI,
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD and FMT_MTD.1/DATE.
The security objective OT.Identification “Identification and Authentication of the TOE” address the storage
of the IC Identification Data uniquely identifying the MRTD’s chip in its non-volatile memory. This will be
ensured by TSF according to SFR FAU_SAS.1.
The TOE shall identify itself only to a successful authenticated Basic Inspection System in Phase 4
“Operational Use”. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA allows only the Manufacturer to write Initialization Data
and Pre-personalization Data. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS allows the Personalization Agent to disable
Initialization Data if their use in the phase 4 “Operational Use” violates the security objective
OT.Identification. The SFR FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 do not allow reading of any data uniquely identifying
the MRTD’s chip before successful authentication of the Basic Inspection Terminal and will stop
communication after unsuccessful authentication attempt.
The security objective OT.Chip_Auth_Proof “Proof of MRTD’s chip authenticity” is ensured by the Chip
Authentication Protocol provided by FIA_API.1/CAP proving the identity of the TOE. The Chip Authentication
Protocols defined by FCS_CKM.1/DH_MRTD-1 and FCS_CKM.1/DH_MRTD-2 are performed using a TOE
internally stored confidential private key as required by FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ.
The Chip Authentication Protocol [25] requires additional TSF according to FCS_CKM.1/KDF_MRTD,
FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD-1, FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD-2, FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD-3,
FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD-4 (for the derivation of the session keys), FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD and
FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD (for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging).
The security objective OT.Prot_Abuse-Func “Protection against Abuse of Functionality” is ensured by (i) the
SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 which prevent misuse of test functionality of the TOE or other which may
not be used after TOE Delivery, (ii) the SFR FPT_RVM.1 which prevents by monitoring the bypass and
deactivation of security features or functions of the TOE, and (iii) the SFR FPT_SEP.1 which prevents
change or explore security features or functions of the TOE by means of separation the other TOE functions.
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The security objective OT.Prot_Inf_Leak “Protection against Information Leakage” requires the TOE to
protect confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the MRTD’s chip against disclosure
• by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between events
found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption, clock, or I/O lines
which is addressed by the SFR FPT_EMSEC.1,
• by forcing a malfunction of the TOE which is addressed by the SFR FPT_FLS.1 and FPT_TST.1,
and/or
• by a physical manipulation of the TOE which is addressed by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.
The security objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering” is covered by the
SFR FPT_PHP.3.
The security objective OT.Prot_Malfunction “Protection against Malfunctions” is covered by (i) the SFR
FPT_TST.1 which requires self tests to demonstrate the correct operation and tests of authorized users to
verify the integrity of TSF data and TSF code, (ii) the SFR FPT_FLS.1 which requires a secure state in case
of detected failure or operating conditions possibly causing a malfunction, and (iii) the SFR FPT_SEP.1
limiting the effects of malfunctions due to TSF domain separation.
The security objectives OD.Assurance and OD.Material for the IT environment will be supported by non-IT
security measures only.
The security objective OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data is directed to establish the Document Verifier PKI and will
be supported by non-IT security measures only.
The following table provides an overview how security functional requirements for the IT environment cover
security objectives for the TOE environment. The protection profile describes only those SFR of the IT
environment directly related to the SFR for the TOE.
OE.PERSONALIZATION
OE.PASS_AUTH_SIGN
OE.AUTH_KEY_MRTD
OE.AUTHORIZ_SENS_DATA
OE.EXAM_MRTD
OE.PASS_AUTH_VERIF
OE.PROT_LOGICAL_MRTD
OE.EXT_INSP_SYSTEM
Document Signer
FDP_DAU.1/DS X X X X
Document Verification PKI
FCS_CKM.1/PKI X
FCS_COP.1/CERT_SIGN X
Basic Inspection System
FCS_CKM.1/KDF_BT X X X
FCS_CKM.4/BT X X
FCS_COP.1/SHA_BT X X X
FCS_COP.1/ENC_BT X X X
FCS_COP.1/MAC_BT X X X
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OE.PERSONALIZATION
OE.PASS_AUTH_SIGN
OE.AUTH_KEY_MRTD
OE.AUTHORIZ_SENS_DATA
OE.EXAM_MRTD
OE.PASS_AUTH_VERIF
OE.PROT_LOGICAL_MRTD
OE.EXT_INSP_SYSTEM
FCS_RND.1/BT X X X
FIA_UAU.4/BT X X X
FIA_UAU.6/BT X X X
General Inspection System
FCS_CKM.1/DH_GIS X X
FCS_COP.1/SHA_GIS X X
FIA_UAU.4/GIS X
FIA.UAU.5/GIS X X
FIA_UAU.6/GIS X X
FDP_UCT.1/GIS X X X
FDP_UIT.1/GIS X X X
Extended Inspection System
FCS_COP.1/SIG_SIGN_EIS X X
FCS_COP.1/SHA_EIS X X
FIA_API.1/EIS X X
Personalization Agent
FIA_AP I.1 /SYM_PT X
Table 8-3. Coverage of Security Objective for the IT environment by SFR
The OE.Personalization “Personalization of logical MRTD” requires the Personalization Terminal to
authenticate themselves to the MRTD’s chip to get the write authorization.
If the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with the Personalization Agent Authentication Key is
used the Personalization Terminal will use the FCS_RND.1/BT (for the generation of the challenge),
FCS_CKM.1/KDF_BT, FCS_COP.1/SHA_BT (for the derivation of the session keys), and
FCS_COP.1/TDES_BT and FCS_COP.1/MAC_BT (for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging) to
authenticate themselves and to protect the personalization data during transfer.
If the Personalization Terminal want to authenticate themselves to the TOE by means of the Terminal
Authentication Protocol (after Chip Authentication) with the Personalization Agent Keys the Personalization
Terminal will use TSF according to the FCS_RND.1/BT (for the generation of the challenge),
FCS_CKM.1/DH_GIS, FCS_CKM.1/KDF_BT, FCS_COP.1/SHA_GIS (for the derivation of the new session
keys after Chip Authentication), and FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD and FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD (for the
ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging), FCS_COP.1/SIG_SIGN_EIS, FCS_COP.1/SHA_EIS and
FIA_API.1/EIS (as part of the Terminal Authentication Protocol). If the Personalization Terminal want to
authenticate themselves to the TOE by means of the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with
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Personalization Agent Key the TOE will use TSF according to the FCS_RND.1/MRTD (for the generation of
the challenge) and FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD (to verify the authentication attempt). Using the keys derived
by means of the Chip Authentication Mechanism the Personalisation Agent will transfer MRTD holder’s
personalisation data (identity, biographic data, correctly enrolled biometric reference data) in a confidential
and integrity protected manner as required by FDP_UCT.1/GIS and FDP_UIT.1/GIS.
If the Personalization Terminal uses the Symmetric Authentication Protocol to authenticate themselves to the
TOE it shall implement the TSF according to the SFR FIA_API.1/SYM_PT.
The OE.Pass_Auth_Sign “Authentication of logical MRTD Signature” is covered FDP_DAU.1/DS by
requires the Document Signer to provide a capability to generate evidence for the validity of EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16 and the Document Security Objects and therefore, to support the inspection system to verify the
logical MRTD.
The OE.Auth_Key_MRTD “MRTD Authentication Key” is covered FDP_DAU.1/DS by requires the
Document Signer to provide a capability to generate evidence for the validity of chip authentication public
key in EF.DG14.
The OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data “Authorization for Use of Sensitive Biometric Reference Data” address the
establishment of the Document Verification PKI which include cryptographic key generation for the
Document Verification PKI Keys and the signing of the certificates. The SFR FCS_CKM.1/PKI and
FCS_COP.1/CERT_SIGN enforce that these cryptographic functions fit the signature verification function for
the certificates and the terminal authentication addressed by FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER-1 and
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER-2.
The OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport book” requires the Basic Inspection System for
global interoperability to implement the terminal part of the Basic Access Control [6] as required by
FCS_CKM.1/KDF_BT, FCS_CKM.4/BT, FCS_COP.1/SHA_BT, FCS_COP.1/ENC_BT,
FCS_COP.1/MAC_BT, FCS_RND.1/BT, FIA_UAU.4/BT and FIA_UAU.6/BT. The verification of the
authenticity of the MRTD’s chip by General Inspection Systems and Extended Inspection Systems (including
the functionality of the GIS) is covered by the FCS_CKM.1/DH_GIS, FCS_COP.1/SHA_GIS,
FIA_UAU.4/GIS, FIA_UAU.5/GIS and FIA_UAU.6/GIS providing the Chip Authentication Protocol and
checking continuously the messages received from the MRTD’s chip. The authenticity of the Chip
Authentication Public Key (EF.DG14) is ensured by FDP_DAU.1/DS.
The OE.Pass_Auth_Verif “Verification by Passive Authentication” is covered by the SFR FDP_DAU.1/DS.
The security objective OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD “Protection of data of the logical MRTD“ addresses the
protection of the logical MRTD during the transmission and internal handling. The SFR FIA_UAU.4/BT,
FIA_UAU.5/GIS and FIA_UAU.6/BT address the terminal part of the Basic Access Control Authentication
Mechanism and FDP_UCT.1/GIS and FDP_UIT.1/BT the secure messaging established by the Chip
Authentication mechanism. The SFR FCS_CKM.1/KDF_BT, FCS_COP.1/SHA_BT, FCS_COP.1/ENC_BT,
FCS_COP.1/MAC_BT and FCS_RND.1/BT as well as FCS_CKM.4/BT are necessary to implement this
mechanism. The BIS shall destroy the Document Access Control Key and the secure messaging keys after
inspection of the MRTD according to FCS_CKM.4 because they are not needed any more.
The OE.Ext_Insp_System “Authorisation of Extended Inspection Systems” is covered by the Terminal
Authentication Protocol proving the identity of the EIS as required by FIA_API.1/EIS basing on signature
creation as required by FCS_COP.1/SIG_SIGN_EIS and including a hash calculation according
FCS_COP.1/SHA_EIS.
8.2.2 Dependency Rationale
The dependency analysis for the security functional requirements shows that the basis for mutual support
and internal consistency between all defined functional requirements is satisfied. All dependencies between
the chosen functional components are analyzed, and non-dissolved dependencies are appropriately
explained.
The table below shows the dependencies between the SFR and of the SFR to the SAR of the TOE.
SFR Dependencies Support of the Dependencies
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SFR Dependencies Support of the Dependencies
FAU_SAS.1 No dependencies -
FCS_CKM.1/KDF_MRTD [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation], FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key destruction, FMT_MSA.2 Secure
security attributes
FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD,
FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD justification 1 for non-
satisfied dependencies
FCS_CKM.1/DH_MRTD-1 [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation], FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key destruction, FMT_MSA.2 Secure
security attributes
FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD,
FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD justification 2 for non-
satisfied dependencies
FCS_CKM.1/DH_MRTD-2 [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation], FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key destruction, FMT_MSA.2 Secure
security attributes
FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD,
FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD justification 2 for non-
satisfied dependencies
FCS_CKM.4/MRTD [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security
attributes or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with
security attributes or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic
key generation], FMT_MSA.2 Secure security
attributes
FCS_CKM.1, justification 1 for non-satisfied
dependencies
FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD-1 [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security
attributes or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with
security attributes or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic
key generation], FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction, FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4, justification 3 for non-
satisfied dependencies
FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD-2 [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security
attributes or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with
security attributes or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic
key generation], FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction, FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4, justification 3 for non-
satisfied dependencies
FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD-3 [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security
attributes or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with
security attributes or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic
key generation], FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction, FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4, justification 3 for non-
satisfied dependencies
FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD-4 [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security
attributes or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with
security attributes or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic
key generation], FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction, FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4, justification 3 for non-
satisfied dependencies
FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security
attributes or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with
security attributes or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic
key generation], FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction, FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4, justification 4 for non-
satisfied dependencies
FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security
attributes or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with
security attributes or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic
key generation], FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction, FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4, justification 4 for non-
satisfied dependencies
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER-1 [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security
attributes or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with
security attributes or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic
key generation], FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction, FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4, justification 5 for non-
satisfied dependencies
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SFR Dependencies Support of the Dependencies
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER-2 [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security
attributes or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with
security attributes or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic
key generation], FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction, FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4, justification 5 for non-
satisfied dependencies
FCS_RND.1/MRTD No dependencies -
FIA_UID.1 No dependencies -
FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication Fulfilled
FIA_UAU.4/MRTD No dependencies -
FIA_UAU.5/MRTD No dependencies -
FIA_UAU.6/MRTD No dependencies -
FIA_AFL.1 FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication Fulfilled
FIA_API.1/CAP No dependencies -
FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control fulfilled by FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, FMT_MSA.3
Static attribute initialization
FDP_ACC.1, justification 6 for non-satisfied
dependencies
FDP_UCT.1/MRTD [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP
_TRP.1 Trusted path], [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access
control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow
control]
FDP_ACC.1 justification 7 for non-satisfied
dependencies
FDP_UIT.1/MRTD [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP
_TRP.1 Trusted path], [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access
control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow
control]
FDP_ACC.1 justification 7 for non-satisfied
dependencies
FMT_SMF.1 No dependencies -
FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification Fulfilled
FMT_LIM.1 FMT_LIM.2 Fulfilled
FMT_LIM.2 FMT_LIM.1 Fulfilled
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management
functions, FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management
functions, FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management
functions, FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled
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SFR Dependencies Support of the Dependencies
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management
functions, FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled
FMT_MTD.1/DATE FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management
functions, FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management
functions, FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management
functions, FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management
functions, FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled
FMT_MTD.3 ADV_SPM.1, FMT_MTD.1 Fulfilled
FPT_EMSEC.1 No dependencies -
FPT_FLS.1 ADV_SPM.1 fulfilled by EAL4
FPT_PHP.3 No dependencies -
FPT_RVM.1 No dependencies -
FPT_SEP.1 No dependencies -
FPT_TST.1 FPT_AMT.1 Abstract machine testing See justification 8 for non-satisfied dependencies
Table 8-4. Dependencies between the SFR for the TOE
Justification for non-satisfied dependencies between the SFR for TOE:
No. 1: The SFR FCS_CKM.1/KDF_MRTD uses only the Document Basic Access Keys or other shared
secrets to generate the secure messaging keys used for FCS_COP.1/TDES and FCS_COP.1/MAC. The
SFR FCS_CKM.4/MRTD destroys these keys automatically. These simple processes do not need any
special security attributes for the secure messaging keys.
No. 2: The SFRs FCS_CKM.1/DH_MRTD-1 and FCS_CKM.1/DH_MRTD-2 calculate shared secrets to
generate the secure messaging keys used for FCS_COP.1/TDES and FCS_COP.1/MAC. The SFR
FCS_CKM.4/MRTD destroys these keys automatically. These simple processes do not need any special
security attributes for the secure messaging keys.
No. 3: The cryptographic algorithm SHA-1 does not use any cryptographic key. Therefore none of the listed
SFRs are needed to be defined for this specific instantiation of FCS_COP.1.
No. 4: The SFR FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD and FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD use the automatically generated
secure messaging keys assigned to the session with the successfully authenticated BIS only. There is no
need for any special security attributes for the secure messaging keys.
No. 5: The SFRs FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER-1 and FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER-2 use the initial public key Country
Verifying Certification Authority and the public keys in certificates provided by the terminals as TSF data for
the Terminal Authentication Protocol and Access Control. Their validity verified according to FMT_MDT.3
and their security attributes are managed by FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI, FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD and
FMT_MTD.1/DATE. There is no need to import user data or manage their security attributes.
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No. 6: The access control TSF according to FDP_ACF.1 uses security attributes which are defined during
the personalization and are fixed over the whole life time of the TOE. No management of these security
attribute (i.e. SFR FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.2) is necessary here.
No. 7: The SFR FDP_UCT.1/MRTD and FDP_UIT.1/MRTD require the use secure messaging between the
MRTD and the BIS. There is no need for sensitive SFR FTP_ITC.1, e.g. to require this communication
channel to be logically distinct from other communication channels it is the only one.
No. 8: The TOE consists of the software and its underlying hardware on which it is running. Thus there is no
abstract machine to be tested.
The table below shows the dependencies between the SFR for the IT environment and of the SFR to the
SAR of the TOE.
SFR Dependencies Support of the
Dependencies
FDP_DAU.1 No dependencies -
FCS_CKM.1/PKI [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or FCS_COP.1
Cryptographic operation], FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction, FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
justification 9 for non- satisfied
dependencies
FCS_COP.1/CERT_SIGN [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation], FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key destruction, FMT_MSA.2 Secure security
attributes
justification 9 for non- satisfied
dependencies
FCS_CKM.1/KDF_BT [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or FCS_COP.1
Cryptographic operation], FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction, FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/TDES_BT,
FCS_COP.1/MAC_BT justification 10
for non-satisfied dependencies
FCS_CKM.4/BT [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation], FMT_MSA.2 Secure
security attributes
FCS_CKM.1, justification 10 for non-
satisfied dependencies
FCS_COP.1/SHA_BT [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation], FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key destruction, FMT_MSA.2 Secure security
attributes
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4, justification
11 for non- satisfied dependencies
FCS_COP.1/ENC_BT [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation], FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key destruction, FMT_MSA.2 Secure security
attributes
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4, justification
12 for non- satisfied dependencies
FCS_COP.1/MAC_BT [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation], FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key destruction, FMT_MSA.2 Secure security
attributes
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4, justification
12 for non- satisfied dependencies
FCS_RND.1/BT No dependencies -
FIA_UAU.4/BT No dependencies -
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SFR Dependencies Support of the
Dependencies
FIA_UAU.6/BT No dependencies -
FCS_CKM.1/DH_GIS [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or FCS_COP.1
Cryptographic operation], FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction, FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FCS_COP.1/MAC_BT,
FCS_CKM.4/BT, justification 13 for
non-satisfied dependencies
FCS_COP.1/SHA_GIS [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation], FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key destruction, FMMT_MSA.2 Secure security
attributes
FCS_COP.1/MAC_BT,
FCS_CKM.4/BT, justification 13 for
non-satisfied dependencies
FIA_UAU.4/GIS No dependencies -
FIA_UAU.5/GIS No dependencies -
FIA_UAU.6/GIS No dependencies -
FDP_UCT.1/GIS [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP _TRP.1 Trusted
path], [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1
Subset information flow control]
justification 14 for non- satisfied
dependencies
FDP_UIT.1/GIS [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP _TRP.1 Trusted
path], [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1
Subset information flow control]
justification 14 for non- satisfied
dependencies
FCS_COP.1/SIG_SIGN_EI
S
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation], FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key destruction, FMT_MSA.2 Secure security
attributes
Justification 15 for non-satisfied
dependencies
FCS_COP.1/SHA_EIS [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation], FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key destruction, FMT_MSA.2 Secure security
attributes
Justification 15 for non-satisfied
dependencies
FIA_API.1/EIS No Dependencies -
FIA_API.1/SYM_PT No dependencies -
Table 8-5. Dependencies between the SFR for the IT environment
Justification for non-satisfied dependencies between the SFR for the IT environment:
No. 9: The TOE does not have specific functional security requirements to the IT environment establishing
Document Verification PKI which have to be described by the listed dependency here.
No. 10: The SFR FCS_CKM.1/BT derives the Document Basic Access Keys and uses this key to generate
the secure messaging keys used for FCS_COP.1/TDES and FCS_COP.1/MAC. The SFR FCS_CKM.4/BT
destroys these keys. These processes do not need any special security attributes for the secure messaging
keys.
No. 11: The cryptographic algorithm SHA-1 does not use any cryptographic key. Therefore none of the listed
SFR is needed to be defined for this specific instantiation of FCS_COP.1.
No. 12: The SFR FCS_COP.1/ENC_BT and FCS_COP.1/MAC_BT use the automatically generated secure
messaging keys assigned to the session with the successfully authenticated MRTD only. There is no need
for any special security attributes for the secure messaging keys.
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No. 13: The SFR FCS_CKM.1/DH_GIS and FCS_COP.1/SHA_GIS are used for generation of secure
messaging session keys (cf. FCS_COP.1/SHA_GIS) by means of the Chip Authentication Protocol. These
session keys are destroyed by the same function as for the Basic Terminal (cf. FCS_CKM.4/BT). There is no
need for import or management of security attributes of these session keys.
No. 14: The SFR FDP_UCT.1/MRTD and FDP_UIT.1/MRTD require the use secure messaging between the
MRTD and the GIS as described by the FDP_UCT.1/GIS and FDP_UIT.1/GIS. There is no need to provide
further description of this communication.
No. 15: The SFR FCS_COP.1/SIGN_EIS and FCS_COP.1/SHA_EIS are used by the Extended Inspection
System for the proof of identity to the TOE by means of the Terminal Authentication Key Pair. The TOE does
not have any specific requirements for the method of importing (cf. FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2) or generation
(cf. FCS_CKM.1) of the Terminal Authentication Key Pair, which is completely up to the IT environment.
8.2.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
The EAL4 was chosen to permit a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous, do not require substantial
specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be
economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line. EAL4 is applicable in those circumstances where
developers or users require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional
commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur sensitive security specific engineering costs.
The selection of component ADV_IMP.2 provides a higher assurance for the implementation of the MRTD’s
chip especially for the absence of unintended functionality.
The selection of the component ALC_DVS.2 provides a higher assurance of the security of the MRTD’s
development and manufacturing especially for the secure handling of the MRTD’s material.
The selection of the component AVA_MSU.3 provides a higher assurance of the security of the MRTD’s
usage especially in phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD” and Phase 4 “Operational Use”. It is imperative
that misleading, unreasonable and conflicting guidance is absent from the guidance documentation, and that
secure procedures for all modes of operation have been addressed. Insecure states should be easy to
detect.
The minimal strength of function “high” was selected to ensure resistance against direct attacks on functions
based on probabilistic or permutational mechanisms. The SOF requirement applies to the identification and
authentication functionality within the TOE to fulfil the OT.Sens_Data_Conf and OT.Chip_Auth_Proof. This is
consistent with the security objective OD.Assurance.
The selection of the component AVA_VLA.4 provides a higher assurance of the security by vulnerability
analysis to assess the resistance to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a high attack
potential. This vulnerability analysis is necessary to fulfil the security objectives OT.Sens_Data_Conf,
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof and OD.Assurance.
The component ADV_IMP.2 has the following dependencies:
- ADV_LLD.1 Descriptive low-level design
- ADV_RCR.1 Informal correspondence demonstration
- ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
All of these are met or exceeded in the EAL4 assurance package.
The component ALC_DVS.2 has no dependencies.
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The component AVA_MSU.3 has the following dependencies:
- ADO_IGS.1 Installation, generation, and start-up procedures
- ADV_FSP.1 Informal functional specification
- AGD_ADM.1 Administrator guidance
- AGD_USR.1 User guidance
All of these are met or exceeded in the EAL4 assurance package.
The component AVA_VLA.4 has the following dependencies:
- ADV_FSP.1 Informal functional specification
- ADV_HLD.2 Security enforcing high-level design
- ADV_IMP.1 Subset of the implementation of the TSF
- ADV_LLD.1 Descriptive low-level design
- AGD_ADM.1 Administrator guidance
- AGD_USR.1 User guidance
All of these are met or exceeded in the EAL4 assurance package.
8.2.4 Security Requirements – Mutual Support and Internal Consistency
The following part of the security requirements rationale shows that the set of security requirements for the
TOE consisting of the security functional requirements (SFRs) and the security assurance requirements
(SARs) together forms a mutually supportive and internally consistent whole.
The analysis of the TOE´s security requirements with regard to their mutual support and internal consistency
demonstrates:
The dependency analysis in section Dependency Rationale for the security functional requirements shows
that the basis for mutual support and internal consistency between all defined functional requirements is
satisfied. All dependencies between the chosen functional components are analyzed, and non-satisfied
dependencies are appropriately explained.
The assurance class EAL4 is an established set of mutually supportive and internally consistent assurance
requirements. The dependency analysis for the additional assurance components in section Security
Assurance Requirements Rationale shows that the assurance requirements are mutually supportive and
internally consistent as all (sensitive) dependencies are satisfied and no inconsistency appears.
Inconsistency between functional and assurance requirements could only arise if there are functional-
assurance dependencies which are not met, a possibility which has been shown not to arise in sections
Dependency Rationale and Security Assurance Requirements Rationale. Furthermore, as also discussed in
section Security Assurance Requirements Rationale, the chosen assurance components are adequate for
the functionality of the TOE. So the assurance requirements and security functional requirements support
each other and there are no inconsistencies between the goals of these two groups of security requirements.
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8.3 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION RATIONALE
8.3.1 TOE security functions rationale
SF.REL
SF.AC
SF.SYM_AUT
SF.SM
SF.CA
SF.TA_CER
SF.TA_AUT
SEF.1
SEF.2
SEF.3
SEF.4
SEF.5
SEF.6
SEF.7
SEF.8
SEF.9
FAU_SAS.1
X X X
FCS_CKM.1/KDF_MRTD
X
FCS_CKM.1/DH_MRTD-1
X
FCS_CKM.1/DH_MRTD-2
X
FCS_CKM.4/MRTD
X
FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD-1
X X X X
FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD-2
X X
FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD-3
X X
FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD-4
X X
FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD
X X X
FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD
X X
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER-1
X X
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER-2
X X
FCS_RND.1/MRTD
X X X
FIA_UID.1
X
FIA_UAU.1
X
FIA_UAU.4/MRTD
X X X
FIA_UAU.5/MRTD
X X X X X
FIA_UAU.6/MRTD
X X
FIA_AFL.1
X X
FIA_API.1/CAP
X
FDP_ACC.1
X
FDP_ACF.1
X
FDP_UCT.1/MRTD
X
FDP_UIT.1/MRTD
X
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SF.REL
SF.AC
SF.SYM_AUT
SF.SM
SF.CA
SF.TA_CER
SF.TA_AUT
SEF.1
SEF.2
SEF.3
SEF.4
SEF.5
SEF.6
SEF.7
SEF.8
SEF.9
FMT_SMF.1
X
FMT_SMR.1
X
FMT_LIM.1
X
FMT_LIM.2
X
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA
X
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
X
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI
X
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD
X X
FMT_MTD.1/DATE
X X
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE
X
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK
X
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
X
FMT_MTD.3
X
FPT_EMSEC.1
X X X
FPT_TST.1
X X
FPT_RVM.1
X X
FPT_FLS.1
X X
FPT_PHP.3
X X X
FPT_SEP.1
X X
Table 8-6. Rationale table of functional requirements and security functions
The security functional requirement FAU_SAS.1 is fulfilled by the TOE security functions SF.AC “Access
Control” and IC security functions SEF.2 “Phase management with test mode lock-out” and SEF.8 “Memory
Management Unit” which provide initialization data accessible for reading and writing action to the pre-
personalizer and the personalizer.
The security functional requirement FCS_CKM.1/KDF_MRTD is fulfilled by TOE security function
SF.SYM_AUT “Symmetric Authentication Mechanisms” which enforces Basic Access Control mechanism.
The security functional requirements FCS_CKM.1/DH_MRTD-1 and FCS_CKM.1/DH_MRTD-2 are fulfilled
by the TOE security function SF.CA “Chip Authentication” which enforces Chip Authentication protocol.
The security functional requirement FCS_CKM.4/MRTD is fulfilled by the TOE security function SF.SM
“Secure Messaging” which manages session key destruction.
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The security functional requirements FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD-1, FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD-2,
FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD-3 and FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD-4 are fulfilled by the TOE security functions
SF.TA_CER “Validity of the Certificate Chain” and SF.TA_AUT “Asymmetric Authentication Mechanism”
which implement SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256 and SHA-384 hash algorithms. FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD-1 is
also fulfilled by SF_SYM_AUT “Symmetric Authentication Mechanisms” and SF_CA “Chip Authentication”
which also implement SHA-1 hash algorithm.
The security functional requirement FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD is fulfilled by the TOE security functions
SF.SYM_AUT “Symmetric Authentication Mechanisms” and SF.SM “Secure Messaging” and IC security
function SEF.9 “Cryptographic support” which provides TDES cryptographic algorithm.
The security functional requirement FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD is fulfilled by the TOE security function SF.SM
“Secure Messaging” and IC security function SEF.9 “Cryptographic support” which provides TDES
cryptographic mechanism for MAC computation.
The security functional requirement FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER-1 and FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER-2 are fulfilled by
the TOE security functions SF.TA_CER “Validity of the Certificate Chain” and SF.TA_AUT “Asymmetric
Authentication Mechanism” which implement digital signature verification with RSA and ECDSA algorithms
and required key sizes.
The security functional requirement FCS_RND.1/MRTD is fulfilled by the TOE security functions
SF.SYM_AUT “Symmetric Authentication Mechanisms” and SF.TA_AUT “Asymmetric Authentication
Mechanism” and IC security function SEF.5 “Random number generation” which generates true random
numbers based on physical probabilistic controlled effects.
The security functional requirements FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 are fulfilled by the TOE security function
SF.AC “Access Control” which manages access to user and TSF data.
The security functional requirement FIA_UAU.4/MRTD is fulfilled by the TOE security functions
SF.SYM_AUT “Symmetric Authentication Mechanisms” and SF.TA_AUT “Asymmetric Authentication
Mechanism” and the IC security function SEF.5 “Random number generation” which prevent reuse of
authentication data by using new random number for each authentication event.
The security functional requirement FIA_UAU.5/MRTD is fulfilled by the TOE security functions
SF.SYM_AUT “Symmetric Authentication Mechanisms”, SF.SM “Secure Messaging”, SF.TA_CER “Validity
of the Certificate Chain”, SF.TA_AUT “Asymmetric Authentication Mechanism” and SF.AC “Access Control”
which together provide authentication mechanisms with required rules.
The security functional requirement FIA_UAU.6/MRTD is fulfilled by the TOE security functions SF.AC
“Access Control” and SF.SM “Secure Messaging”. The SF.AC requires re-authentication and the SF.SM
enforces it as required by the FIA_UAU.6/MRTD.
The security functional requirement FIA_AFL.1 is fulfilled by the TOE security functions SF.SYM_AUT
“Symmetric Authentication Mechanisms” and SF.SM “Secure Messaging” which detect unsuccessful
authentication attempts with required consequences.
The security functional requirement FIA_API.1/CAP is fulfilled by TOE security function SF.CA “Chip
Authentication”.
The security functional requirements FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 are fulfilled by TOE security function
SF.AC “Access Control”.
The security functional requirements FDP_UCT.1/MRTD and FDP_UIT.1/MRTD are fulfilled by TOE security
function SF.SM “Secure Messaging”.
The security functional requirements FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1 are fulfilled by the TOE security function
SF.AC “Access Control” which maintain the different roles according to the life cycle status.
The security functional requirements FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 are fulfilled by TOE security function
SF.AC “Access Control” which limits the capabilities and availability of the TSF after TOE delivery.
The security functional requirements FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA, FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS are fulfilled by the TOE
security function SF.AC “Access Control” which restricts the ability to write the initialization data and Pre-
personalization data to the manufacturer and the ability to disable read access for users to the Initialization
Data to the Personalization Agent.
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The security functional requirement FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI is fulfilled by the TOE security function SF.AC
“Access Control” which restricts the ability to write initial CVCA Public Key, initial CVCA Certificate and initial
Current Date to the Manufacturer and the Personalization agent.
The security functional requirement FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD is fulfilled by the TOE security functions
SF.AC “Access Control” and SF.TA_CER “Validity of the Certificate Chain” which restrict the ability to update
CVCA Public Key and CVCA Certificate to the CVCA.
The security functional requirement FMT_MTD.1/DATE is fulfilled by the TOE security functions SF.AC
“Access Control” and SF.TA_CER “Validity of the Certificate Chain” which restrict the ability to modify the
Current Date to the CVCA, DV and domestic EIS.
The security functional requirements FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE, FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ are fulfilled by the TOE security function SF.AC “Access Control”.
The security functional requirement FMT_MTD.3 is fulfilled by the TOE security function SF.TA_CER
“Validity of the Certificate Chain”.
The security functional requirement FPT_EMSEC.1 is fulfilled by the TOE security function SF.REL
”Reliability” and IC security functions SEF.1 “Operating State Checking” and SEF.4 “Data encryption and
data disguising” which implement measures to limit information contained in electromagnetic and current
emissions.
The security functional requirement FPT_TST.1 is fulfilled by the TOE security function SF.REL ”Reliability”
and IC security function SEF.6 “TSF self test” which implement measures to limit information contained in
electromagnetic and current emissions.
The security functional requirement FPT_RVM.1 is fulfilled by the TOE security function SF.AC “Access
Control” which ensures that enforcement functions are succeeded before execution of functions and by the
IC security function SEF.8 “Mamory Management Unit” which manages the privileges associated to the
system and user modes.
The security functional requirements FPT_FLS.1 are fulfilled by the TOE security function SF.REL
“Reliability” and by IC security function SEF.1 “Operating state checking” which preserves secure state and
correct operation of the TOE by running tests and by detecting failures and potential security violations.
The security functional requirement FPT_PHP.3 is fulfilled by the TOE security function SF.REL “Reliability”
and the IC security functions SEF.3 “Protection against snooping” and SEF.7 “Notification of physical attack”
which protect the TOE from physical attacks against the IC, dedicated software, ES, user data and TSF
data.
The security functional requirement FPT_SEP.1 is fulfilled by the TOE security function SF.AC ”Access
Control” and by the IC security function SEF.1 “Operating state checking”.
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8.3.2 Assurance measures rationale
AM_ASE
AM_ADV_FSP
AM_ALC
AM_ACM
AM_ADO
AM_ADV_HLD
AM_ADV_LLD
AM_AGD_ADM
AM_AGD_USR
AM_ATE
AM_AVA_MSU
AM_AVA_VLA_SOF
AM_CODE
ACM_AUT.1 X
ACM_CAP.4 X
ACM_SCP.2 X
ADO_DEL.2 X
ADO_IGS.1 X
ADV_FSP.2 X
ADV_HLD.2 X
ADV_LLD.1 X
ADV_RCR.1 X X X X X
ADV_SPM.1 X
ADV_IMP.2 X
AGD_ADM.1 X
AGD_USR.1 X
ALC_LCD.1 X
ALC_TAT.1 X
ALC_DVS.2 X
ATE_COV.2 X
ATE_DPT.1 X
ATE_FUN.1 X X
ATE_IND.2 X X
AVA_MSU.3 X
AVA_SOF.1 X
AVA_VLA.4 X
Table 8-7. Rationale table of assurance requirements and assurance measures
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ACM_AUT.1, ACM_SCP.2 and ACM_CAP.4 are fulfilled by AM_ACM which involves a dedicated document
and also corporate documents related to configuration management, product life-cycle and project
tracking.
ADO_DEL.2 and ADO_IGS.1 are fulfilled by AM_ADO which involves dedicated documents, corporate
documents and chip manufacturer documents related to chip specification and chip deliveries.
ADV_FSP.2 is fulfilled by AM_ADV_FSP. It describes the external interfaces of the TOE.
ADV_HLD.2 is fulfilled by AM_ADV_HLD.: High level design document which provides an architecture
description in terms of subsystems and the interfaces specifications between subsystems.
ADV_LLD.1 is fulfilled by AM_ADV_LLD: Low level design document which provides a description in terms
of modules and the interfaces specifications between modules.
ADV_IMP.2 is fulfilled by AM_CODE: source code of the product implementation.
ADV_RCR.1 is fulfilled by AM_ASE, AM_ADV_FSP, AM_ADV_HLD, AM_ADV_LLD and AM_CODE:
through these documents Security Functional Requirements defined in the ST are tracked to the
implementation level.
ADV_SPM.1 is fulfilled by AM_ASE: this Security Target details the security policy model of the TOE in an
informal way.
AGD_ADM.1 is fulfilled by AM_AGD_ADM which is related to the Administrator guidance.
AGD_USR.1 is fulfilled by AM_AGD_USR, a User guide provide recommendations to the MRTD holder
about the MRTD passport manipulation.
ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1 and ALC_TAT.1. are fulfilled by AM_ALC which involves a dedicated document
and also corporate documents related to personnel, organizational and physical security measures.
ATE_COV.2, ATE_DPT.1, ATE_FUN.1 and ATE_IND.2. are fulfilled by AM_ATE and which involves all
tests scripts and documents related to the functional and security tests of the TOE. In addition
ATE_FUN.1 and ATE_IND.2 are fulfilled by AM_CODE which provides the possibility for alternative
testing approach “source code review”.
AVA_MSU.2 is fulfilled by AM_AVA_MSU, a dedicated document provides a full analysis of user and
administrator guidance.
AVA_SOF.1 and AVA_VLA.2 is fulfilled by AM_AVA_VLA_SOF: a dedicated document which analyses the
vulnerabilities of the TOE according to attacker state of the art level and evaluate the strength of
functions.
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8.4 PP CLAIMS RATIONALE
This Security Target is conformant with the Protection Profile “Machine Readable Travel Document with
ICAO Application, Extended Access Control”, BSI-PP-0026, version 1.1.