CC HUAWEI iMaster MAE-CN
V100R021C10 - Security Target
Issue 1.8
Date 2021-09-28
HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES CO., LTD.
Issue 1.8 (2021-09-28) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. i
Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 2020. All rights reserved.
No part of this document may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior written
consent of Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Trademarks and Permissions
and other Huawei trademarks are trademarks of Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
All other trademarks and trade names mentioned in this document are the property of their respective
holders.
Notice
The purchased products, services and features are stipulated by the contract made between Huawei and the
customer. All or part of the products, services and features described in this document may not be within the
purchase scope or the usage scope. Unless otherwise specified in the contract, all statements, information,
and recommendations in this document are provided "AS IS" without warranties, guarantees or
representations of any kind, either express or implied.
The information in this document is subject to change without notice. Every effort has been made in the
preparation of this document to ensure accuracy of the contents, but all statements, information, and
recommendations in this document do not constitute a warranty of any kind, express or implied.
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Address: Huawei Industrial Base
Bantian, Longgang
Shenzhen 518129
People's Republic of China
Website: https://www.huawei.com
Email: support@huawei.com
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About This Document
Change History
Version Date Change Description Author
V1.0 2021-03-04 Initial Draft Li Changxing, Rao
Lei, Yuan Baoyu,Yu
jianlei
V1.1 2021-04-02 Modified according to review
comments: Added the SAML
content in Section 5.2.3.3
Yuan Baoyu
V1.2 2021-05-19 Updated the corresponding
chapters based on the Huawei
iMaster MAE-CN ASE action item
list v1.0.docx.
Yuan Baoyu
V1.3 2021-06-02 Updated “Table 1-5 TOE software
list”
Yuan Baoyu
V1.4 2021-06-10 Updated “Table 1-5 TOE software
list”
Yuan Baoyu
V1.5 2021-07-13 Updated the FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic Key Destruction ,add
overwriting value in python.
Updated the corresponding
chapters based on the Huawei
iMaster MAE ATE action item list
v1.0
Yu Jianlei,Yuan
Baoyu
V1.6 2021-07-21 Updated the corresponding
chapters based on the Huawei
iMaster MAE ATE action item list
v2.0
Yuan Baoyu
V1.7 2021-07-22 Updated “FIA_AFL.1.2” Yuan Baoyu
V1.8 2021-07-22 Updated references Yuan Baoyu
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CC HUAWEI iMaster MAE-CN V100R021C10 - Security
Target Contents
Issue 1.8(2021-09-28) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. iv
Contents
About This Document................................................................................................................... ii
1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................................1
1.1 ST Reference .............................................................................................................................................................1
1.2 TOE Reference ..........................................................................................................................................................1
1.3 TOE Overview ............................................................................................................................................................2
1.3.1 TOE Usage and Major Security Features ...........................................................................................................3
1.3.2 TOE Type.................................................................................................................................................................3
1.3.3 Non-TOE Hardware and Software .......................................................................................................................4
1.4 TOE Description.........................................................................................................................................................9
1.4.1 TOE Definition Scope.............................................................................................................................................9
1.4.1.1 Physical Scope.....................................................................................................................................................9
1.4.1.2 Logical Scope.....................................................................................................................................................16
2 CC Conformance Claims..........................................................................................................19
3 Security Problem Definition....................................................................................................20
3.1 Assumptions .............................................................................................................................................................20
3.2 Threats ......................................................................................................................................................................21
3.2.1 Assets and Agents................................................................................................................................................21
3.2.2 Threats Addressed by the TOE ..........................................................................................................................21
3.2.2.1 T.UnauthenticatedAccess.................................................................................................................................21
3.2.2.2 T.UnauthorizedAccess......................................................................................................................................21
3.2.2.3 T.Eavesdrop .......................................................................................................................................................22
4 Security Objectives ...................................................................................................................23
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE ............................................................................................................................23
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment.........................................................................................23
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale ................................................................................................................................24
4.3.1 Coverage................................................................................................................................................................24
4.3.2 Sufficiency..............................................................................................................................................................25
5 Security Requirements for the TOE......................................................................................28
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5.1 Conventions..............................................................................................................................................................28
5.2 Security Requirements............................................................................................................................................28
5.2.1 Security Audit (FAU).............................................................................................................................................28
5.2.1.1 FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation ...............................................................................................................28
5.2.1.2 FAU_GEN.2 User Identity Association ...........................................................................................................29
5.2.1.3 FAU_SAR.1 Audit Review................................................................................................................................29
5.2.1.4 FAU_SAR.2 Restricted Audit Review.............................................................................................................30
5.2.1.5 FAU_SAR.3 Selectable Audit Review ............................................................................................................30
5.2.1.6 FAU_STG.1 Protected Audit Trail Storage ....................................................................................................30
5.2.1.7 FAU_STG.3 Action in Case of Possible Audit Data Loss............................................................................30
5.2.2 User Data Protection (FDP) ................................................................................................................................31
5.2.2.1 FDP_ACC.2 Completing Access Control .......................................................................................................31
5.2.2.2 FDP_ACF.1 Security Attribute-Based Access Control.................................................................................31
5.2.2.3 FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity ...............................................................................................................32
5.2.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA)...............................................................................................................32
5.2.3.1 FIA_UID.2 User Identification Before Any Action..........................................................................................32
5.2.3.2 FIA_UAU.2 User Authentication Before Any Action .....................................................................................32
5.2.3.3 FIA_UAU.5 Multiple Authentication Mechanisms .........................................................................................32
5.2.3.4 FIA_UAU.6 Re-authenticating..........................................................................................................................33
5.2.3.5 FIA_UAU.7 Protected Authentication Feedback...........................................................................................33
5.2.3.6 FIA_ATD.1 User Attribute Definition ...............................................................................................................33
5.2.3.7 FIA_AFL.1 Authentication Failure Handling...................................................................................................34
5.2.3.8 FIA_SOS.1 Verification of Secrets ..................................................................................................................34
5.2.4 Security Management (FMT) ..............................................................................................................................35
5.2.4.1 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions .................................................................................35
5.2.4.2 FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles.............................................................................................................................35
5.2.4.3 FMT_MOF.1 Management of Security Functions Behaviour ......................................................................36
5.2.4.4 FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF Data.........................................................................................................38
5.2.4.5 FMT_MSA.1 Management of Security Attributes..........................................................................................39
5.2.4.6 FMT_MSA.3 Static Attribute Initialization.......................................................................................................39
5.2.5 TOE Access (FTA)................................................................................................................................................39
5.2.5.1 FTA_TSE.1 TOE Session Establishment.......................................................................................................39
5.2.5.2 FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated Termination............................................................................................................40
5.2.5.3 FTA_SSL.4 User-initiated Termination...........................................................................................................40
5.2.5.4 FTA_TAH.1 TOE Access History ....................................................................................................................40
5.2.6 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP) .............................................................................................................................40
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5.2.6.1 FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path .................................................................................................................................40
5.2.6.2 FTP_ITC.1/External System Inter-TSF Trusted Channel ............................................................................41
5.2.6.3 FTP_ITC.1/NE Inter-TSF Trusted Channel....................................................................................................41
5.2.7 Cryptographic Support (FCS)..............................................................................................................................41
5.2.7.1 FCS_CKM.1/AES Cryptographic Key Generation ........................................................................................41
5.2.7.2 FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction.................................................................................................42
5.2.7.3 FCS_COP.1/AES Cryptographic operation ...................................................................................................42
5.2.7.4 FCS_COP.1/PBKDF2 Cryptographic Operation ...........................................................................................42
5.3 Security Functional Requirements Rationale.......................................................................................................42
5.3.1 Coverage................................................................................................................................................................42
5.3.2 Sufficiency..............................................................................................................................................................44
5.3.3 Security Requirements Dependency Rationale................................................................................................47
5.4 Security Assurance Requirements........................................................................................................................49
5.5 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale ......................................................................................................50
6 TOE Summary Specification...................................................................................................51
6.1 TOE Security Functionality.....................................................................................................................................51
6.1.1 User Management ................................................................................................................................................51
6.1.2 Authentication........................................................................................................................................................54
6.1.3 Access Control ......................................................................................................................................................56
6.1.4 Communication Security......................................................................................................................................57
6.1.5 User Session Management.................................................................................................................................57
6.1.6 Auditing...................................................................................................................................................................58
6.1.7 Security Management Function..........................................................................................................................59
6.1.8 Cryptographic Functions......................................................................................................................................59
7 Abbreviations, Terminology and References.....................................................................61
7.1 Abbreviations............................................................................................................................................................61
7.2 Terminology..............................................................................................................................................................63
7.3 References................................................................................................................................................................65
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1 Introduction
This Security Target is for the evaluation of HUAWEI iMaster MAE-CN.
1.1 ST Reference
Title: CC HUAWEI iMaster MAE-CN V100R021C10 - Security Target
Version: V1.8
Author: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Publication date: 2021-09-28
1.2 TOE Reference
TOE name: HUAWEI iMaster MAE-CN
TOE version: V100R021C10SPC250
TOE Developer: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
TOE release date: 2021-04-30
VRC versions are defined as follows:
- V version is the version of the software or hardware platform that a product bases.
- R version is released for customer at a specific time. It is a collection of features that is
embodied in the form of a product.
- C version is the customized version developed based on the R version to fast meet customer
demands.
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- SPC version is the cold service patch version.
1.3 TOE Overview
 Huawei’s MAE-CN Network Management system provides centralized operation and
maintenance (OM) for Huawei’s core network element management solution, provides
external interfaces for interoperability with other systems. By providing automatic
network deployment and O&M capabilities, MAE-CN can implement automate
network management capabilities.
Figure 1-1 MAE-CN network positioning
The core and base of MAE-CN is the CloudSOP platform,includes the O&M plane and
management plane.The platform version of the O&M plane is CloudSOP
V100R021C10SPC511 and that of the management plane is CloudSOP-UniEP
V100R021C10SPC511. The CloudSOP platform provides the basic framework for OSS
application deployment, monitoring and secondary development, as well as public services,
such as user management, rights management, session management, log management,
license management, alarm management, and topology management. The architecture of
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CloudSOP is highly reliable, flexible, open, and easy to be integrated, meeting the
requirements from future OSS large-scale distributed clusters.
1.3.1 TOE Usage and Major Security Features
MAE-CN is the software for managing core networks. It provides a centralized network
management platform for supporting telecom operators in their long-term network evolution
and shielding the differences between various network technologies. The MAE-CN provides
various OM solutions and meets various requirements, such as network deployment, network
monitoring, network adjustment, and service management. The MAE-CN focuses on
continuous efforts that telecom operators have made for network OM and inherits the existing
OM experience.
To cope with the TOE security threats, the TOE provides many security measures to effectively
reduce security risks. The major security features implemented by the TOE and subject to
evaluation are:
1. User management
2. Authentication
3. Access control
4. Communication security
5. User session management
6. Auditing
7. Security management function
8. Cryptographic functions
1.3.2 TOE Type
The TOE is a centralized network management software. The MAE-CN is located at the
management and control layer of the cloud network. It can manage and control Huawei
2G/3G/4G/5G mobile network devices, including LTE/EPC network devices, 5G core network
devices, NGN network devices, CS network devices, STP network devices, IoM network
devices, IMS network devices, and auxiliary networking devices used on mobile networks. It
provides open interfaces to quickly integrate with upper-layer application systems such as BSS
and OSS. Various apps can be developed and customized to accelerate service innovation
and achieve e-commerce-style operations.
MAE-CN is a cloud-based system that uses a service-oriented software architecture. It is
deployed on a virtualized platform and can be scaled flexibly.
Based on the cloud platform, MAE-CN implements three logical modules (network
management, network control, and network analysis) and various scenario-oriented
applications as services and components. This allows customers to deploy MAE-CN in a
flexible and modular manner to meet their specific requirements.
The MAE-CN software architecture is shown in Figure 1-2 TOE Constitution. The CloudSOP
platform is the underline platform of the MAE-CN software.
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In the northbound direction, it provides Web Portals, Northbound interface for O&M personnel
and BSS/OSS. In the southbound direction, it provides configuration and management
capabilities for Huawei network devices and provides third-party driver management to
manage and access third-party network adaptation drivers and third-party controllers outside
the trusted zone. The system also interconnects with external SFTP servers, external AAA
authentication servers, third-party Syslog servers, CA server and SMS/SMTP servers.
Figure 1-2 TOE overview
1.3.3 Non-TOE Hardware and Software
MAE-CN can be deployed in on-premises or private cloud mode. In On-premises mode,
Huawei engineers install the hardware, virtualization environment, OS, database, and MAE-CN
software in an E2E manner. In private cloud mode (OS+product), after customers configure the
virtualization environment, Huawei engineers create VMs and install OSs, databases and
MAE-CN software. Only the on premises mode is in scope of this evaluation.
MAE-CN has specific requirements on the hardware, software and client to ensure the stable
running of the system.
(This section describes the current software and hardware specifications. The specific
solution will be adjusted in R20C10. The underlying hardware platform, OS, and database may
change. The adjusted solution prevails.)
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Hardware Configurations for On-Premises Deployment:
In on-premises scenarios, the delivered server has been configured according to the MAE-CN
requirements based on the network type, functional unit, and network scale.
Hardware Configurations in the Virtual Machine Scenario:
Table 1-1 Hardware configurations of TaiShan 200 (Model 2280)
Hardware Model Requirements
384
standard-
configuratio
n server
TaiShan 200
(Model 2280)
CPU: 2 x Kunpeng 920 (2.6GHz, 48 Core)
Memory: 12 x 32 GB DDR4
Hard disk: 12 x 1200 GB HDD
RAID card: MSCC SmartRAID 3552 (2 GB cache)
NICs: 2 x 4 GE electrical ports + 2 x 4 10GE/25GE
512
standard-
configuratio
n server
TaiShan 200
(Model 2280)
CPU: 2 x Kunpeng 920 (2.6GHz, 48 Core)
Memory: 16 x 32 GB DDR4
Hard disk: 12 x 1200 GB HDD
RAID card: MSCC SmartRAID 3552 (2 GB cache)
NICs: 2 x 4 GE electrical ports + 2 x 4 10GE/25GE
512 typical-
configuratio
n server
TaiShan 200
(Model 2280)
CPU: 2 x Kunpeng 920 (2.6GHz, 48 Core)
Memory: 16 x 32 GB DDR4
Hard disk: 12 x 1800 GB HDD
RAID card: MSCC SmartRAID 3552 (2 GB cache)
NICs: 2 x 4 GE electrical ports + 2 x 4 10GE/25GE
768 typical-
configuratio
n server
TaiShan 200
(Model 2280)
CPU: 2 x Kunpeng 920 (2.6GHz, 48 Core)
Memory: 24 x 32 GB DDR4
Hard disk: 4 x 1920 GB HDD
RAID card: (Avago3408) SAS/SATA RAID Card
NICs: 2 x 4 GE electrical ports + 2 x 4 10GE/25GE
10GE
switch
CE6863 Number of 25GE ports: 48
Number of 100GE ports: 6
Version: V100R009
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Configuration for the MAE-CN Server Software:
Table 1-2 Server configuration requirements
Item Type Version Remarks
Delivere
d
software
configur
ations
OS EulerOS 2.0 SPC9 Used on the TaiShan server in
the on-premises scenario.
Database GaussDB_T_1.1.0.SP
C110
Compati
ble
software
configur
ations
Virtualization
software
FushionSphere
OpenStack 8.0.0
Used in the private cloud
scenario.
Configuration for the MAE-CN Client:
Table 1-3 Client configuration requirements
Type Requirements
PC Minimum configuration:
 CPU: 2 cores, 2.6 GHz
 Memory: 4 GB
 Hard disk: 8 GB
Recommended configuration:
 CPU: 4 cores, 3.1 GHz
 Memory: 8 GB
 Hard disk: 8 GB
Cloud
Desktop
Minimum configuration:
 CPU: 4 cores, 2.6 GHz
 Memory: 4 GB
 Hard disk: 8 GB
Recommended configuration:
 CPU: 6 cores, 3.1 GHz
 Memory: 8 GB
 Hard disk: 8 GB
OS  Windows 10 (32-bit or 64-bit)
Web  Recommended:
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Type Requirements
browser − Google Chrome 83.0or later (32-bit or 64-bit)
− Firefox ESR 68.6or later (32-bit or 64-bit)
 Compatible:
− Google Chrome 57 or later (32-bit or 64-bit)
− Firefox ESR 52 or later (32-bit or 64-bit)
Resolution 1366 x 768 px or higher; recommended resolution: 1920 x 1080 px
 Zoom ratio of the browser: 100% is recommended and 80% to 200% is
compatible.
 If the resolution is within the compatibility scope of the browser, functions
are available but the layout may not be user-friendly. If the resolution is not
within the compatibility scope of the browser, both the functions and layout
are affected.
Except the server, OS and DB as described above, the environment for TOE also comprises
the following components:
Table 1-4 Environment components
Component Required/O
ptional
Usage/Purpose Description for TOE Performance
Firewall Required Firewall used by customers to ensure communication security
between different communication planes.
Network
Elements
(NEs)
Required NEs that are managed by the TOE and support different
communication protocols with the TOE, such as
5GC,IMS,PS,STP,VIM.
Web portal,
BSSs/OSS
s
Required The web portal connects to the TOE using HTTPS. And the
BSSs/OSSs connect to the TOE through external interfaces
including SNMPv3, CORBA, Transaction Language 1(TL1),
Extensible Markup Language (XML), and some customized
RESTful interfaces.
AAA server Optional The external AAA server used to authenticate users. The TOE
can correctly leverage the services provided by this AAA
server to authenticate administrators.
The security mechanisms for remote LDAP/RADIUS
authentication depend on the third-party AAA server. Security
mechanisms, such as anti-brute force cracking, password
complexity check, and anti-DoS attack, must be enabled on the
third-party server. Especially the communication channel
between TOE and RADIUS server should be protected.
Syslog Optional Syslog server used to transmit syslog messages.
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Component Required/O
ptional
Usage/Purpose Description for TOE Performance
server
SFTP
server
Optional SFTP server used to upload performance files and back up NE
data.
SMS/SMTP
server
Optional MAE-CN sends notifications by emails or messages.
CA server Optional CA server can apply for a certificate, update the certificate, and
publish the CRL certificate revocation list (CRL) file.
NTP server Required NTP server is used to sync the time of the MAE-CN server.
SwiftDeploy Required SwiftDeploy used to install and deploy MAE-CN. The tool,
which is managed by a single user, encrypts sensitive
information such as passwords for storage and protection,
protects the software package against tampering through
digital signature verification, and ensures the security of the
tool using the SwiftDeploy security mechanism.
MAE-CN is installed using SwiftDeploy and security hardening
is performed on EulerOS by default, including OS account and
password security, system service/component minimization,
file/directory permission minimization, authentication and
authorization, kernel parameter security, and system log audit.
Figure 1-3 shows the physical environment of MAE-CN, which is the typical environment.
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Figure 1-3 TOE physical environment
1.4 TOE Description
1.4.1 TOE Definition Scope
This section will define the scope of the iMaster MAE-CN to be evaluated. MAE-CN can be
deployed in on-premises or private cloud mode. Only on-premises mode is certified. For details
about the configuration specifications for the two modes, see 1.3.3 .
1.4.1.1 Physical Scope
The TOE is a 'software only', TOE consists of MAE-CN application software and the CloudSOP
platform software, but not the hardware, which MAE-CN and the CloudSOP platform is running
on. In addition, the software package, signature file, and the guidance documentation are
delivered by Huawei support portal:
Table 1-5 TOE software list
Type Delivery Item Version
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Software MAE_V100R021C10SPC250_Access_EulerOS-
aarch64.zip
MAE_V100R021C10SPC250_Access_EulerOS-x86-
64.zip
MAE_V100R021C10SPC250_Common_EulerOS-
aarch64.zip
MAE_V100R021C10SPC250_Common_EulerOS-x86-
64.zip
MAE_V100R021C10SPC250_Evaluation_EulerOS-
aarch64.zip
MAE_V100R021C10SPC250_Evaluation_EulerOS-
x86-64.zip
MAE_V100R021C10SPC250_InferKPI-EulerOS-X86-
64.zip
MAE_V100R021C10SPC250_InferKPI-EulerOS-
aarch64.zip
MAE_V100R021C10SPC250_Jre_EulerOS-
aarch64.zip
MAE_V100R021C10SPC250_Jre_EulerOS-x86-64.zip
MAE_V100R021C10SPC200_CNNSSMF-EulerOS-
aarch64.zip
MAE_V100R021C10SPC200_CNNSSMF-EulerOS-
X86-64.zip
MAE_V100R021C10SPC200_Orchestrator-EulerOS-
X86-64.zip
MAE_V100R021C10SPC200_Orchestrator-EulerOS-
aarch64.zip
MAE_V100R021C10SPC200_UDMC-EulerOS-
aarch64.zip
MAE_V100R021C10SPC200_UDMC-EulerOS-x86-
64.zip
MAE_V100R021C10SPC200_VNFLCM-EulerOS-X86-
64.zip
V100R021C10S
PC250
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MAE_V100R021C10SPC200_VNFLCM-EulerOS-
aarch64.zip
MAE-OSMU_V100R021C10SPC250_EulerOS-
aarch64_pkg.tar
MAE-OSMU_V100R021C10SPC250_EulerOS-x86-
64_pkg.tar
MAE-
OSMU_V100R021C10SPC250_DeployCN_EulerOS-
aarch64_pkg.tar
MAE-
OSMU_V100R021C10SPC250_DeployCN_EulerOS-
x86-64_pkg.tar
MAE-
OSMU_V100R021C10SPC250_Deploy_SpeedupTool
_EulerOS.zip
MAE_V100R021C10SPC200_MDAF-EulerOS-
aarch64.zip
MAE_V100R021C10SPC200_MDAF-EulerOS-X86-
64.zip
MAE_V100R021C10SPC200_AutoTest-EulerOS-X86-
64.zip
MAE_V100R021C10SPC200_AutoTest_EulerOS-
aarch64.zip
MAE_V100R021C10SPC250_KPI_EulerOS-
aarch64.zip
MAE_V100R021C10SPC250_KPI_EulerOS-x86-
64.zip
MAE_V100R021C10SPC250_SSA-EulerOS-
aarch64.zip
MAE_V100R021C10SPC250_SSA-EulerOS-X86-
64.zip
FusionSphereTemplate_V100R021C10SPC251_WLO
SS_EulerOS-aarch64.zip
FusionSphereTemplate_V100R021C10SPC251_WLO
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SS_EulerOS-x86-64.zip
Software
Signature
File
MAE_V100R021C10SPC250_Access_EulerOS-
aarch64.zip.cms
MAE_V100R021C10SPC250_Access_EulerOS-
aarch64.zip.crl
MAE_V100R021C10SPC250_Access_EulerOS-x86-
64.zip.cms
MAE_V100R021C10SPC250_Access_EulerOS-x86-
64.zip.crl
MAE_V100R021C10SPC250_Common_EulerOS-
aarch64.zip.cms
MAE_V100R021C10SPC250_Common_EulerOS-
aarch64.zip.crl
MAE_V100R021C10SPC250_Common_EulerOS-x86-
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MAE_V100R021C10SPC250_Common_EulerOS-x86-
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MAE_V100R021C10SPC250_Evaluation_EulerOS-
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MAE_V100R021C10SPC250_Evaluation_EulerOS-
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MAE_V100R021C10SPC250_Evaluation_EulerOS-
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MAE_V100R021C10SPC250_Evaluation_EulerOS-
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MAE_V100R021C10SPC250_InferKPI-EulerOS-X86-
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V100R021C1
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CC HUAWEI iMaster MAE-CN V100R021C10 - Security
Target 1 Introduction
Issue 1.8(2021-09-28) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 13
MAE_V100R021C10SPC250_Jre_EulerOS-
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MAE_V100R021C10SPC200_CNNSSMF-EulerOS-
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MAE_V100R021C10SPC200_CNNSSMF-EulerOS-
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MAE_V100R021C10SPC200_CNNSSMF-EulerOS-
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MAE_V100R021C10SPC200_CNNSSMF-EulerOS-
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MAE_V100R021C10SPC200_Orchestrator-EulerOS-
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MAE_V100R021C10SPC200_UDMC-EulerOS-
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MAE-OSMU_V100R021C10SPC250_EulerOS-
aarch64_pkg.tar.asc
MAE-OSMU_V100R021C10SPC250_EulerOS-x86-
64_pkg.tar.asc
MAE-
OSMU_V100R021C10SPC250_DeployCN_EulerOS-
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MAE-
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MAE-
OSMU_V100R021C10SPC250_Deploy_SpeedupTool
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MAE_V100R021C10SPC200_MDAF-EulerOS-
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MAE_V100R021C10SPC200_AutoTest-EulerOS-X86-
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CC HUAWEI iMaster MAE-CN V100R021C10 - Security
Target 1 Introduction
Issue 1.8(2021-09-28) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 15
MAE_V100R021C10SPC200_AutoTest_EulerOS-
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MAE_V100R021C10SPC250_SSA-EulerOS-X86-
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SS_EulerOS-aarch64.zip.cms
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Platform
Software
MAE_V100R021C10SPC250_CloudSOP_EulerOS-
aarch64.zip
MAE_V100R021C10SPC250_CloudSOP_EulerOS-
x86-64.zip
V100R021C1
0SPC250
Platform
Software
Signature
File
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CC HUAWEI iMaster MAE-CN V100R021C10 - Security
Target 1 Introduction
Issue 1.8(2021-09-28) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 16
x86-64.zip.cms
MAE_V100R021C10SPC250_CloudSOP_EulerOS-
x86-64.zip.crl
Product
Guidance
(For Customer)iMaster MAE Product Documentation
(EulerOS, x86)-(V100R021C10_02)(HDX)-EN
V100R021C1
0SPC250
Issue: 02
(For Customer)iMaster MAE Product Documentation
(EulerOS, TaiShan)-(V100R021C10_03)(HDX)-EN
V100R021C1
0SPC250
Issue: 03
(For Customer)iMaster MAE Product Documentation
(EulerOS, 2288X)-(V100R021C10_02)(HDX)-EN
V100R021C1
0SPC250
Issue: 02
CC HUAWEI iMaster MAE-CN V100R021C10 - CC
Certification AGD_OPE
V1.2
CC HUAWEI iMaster MAE-CN V100R021C10 - CC
Certification AGD_PRE
V1.3
Users can log in to the HUAWEI support website to read the document directly or download the
product documentation in accordance with the version of the TOE. The download file formats
are *.hdx and *.pdf, user can download the *.hdx and *.pdf reader from the same website.
1.4.1.2 Logical Scope
The TOE boundary from a logical point of view is represented by the elements that are
displayed with a red frame within the rectangle in the figure below. The TOE is a software
running on the Euler OS.
CC HUAWEI iMaster MAE-CN V100R021C10 - Security
Target 1 Introduction
Issue 1.8(2021-09-28) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 17
Figure 1-4 TOE logical scope
The major security features of MAE-CN that are subject to evaluation are:
User Management
Both On the O&M plane and management plane, the TOE provides user management based
on role management. On the management plane, it has the default user groups including
Administrators, SMManagers, Monitors and Operators, while on the O&M plane, it has the
default user groups including Administrators, SMManagers, NBI User Group, Maintenance
Group, Operator Group, Guests, VNFMAccessRole, WebNIC User Group and mAOS
User Group, EMSRole, NFVORole,VNFManagers, Southbound System Access,
Organization Administrator, Organization Monitor, Tenant Monitor, Assurance User
Group, Monitoring Group,APP the role of operation and maintenance, HOFS Group, IT-
APP the role of operation and maintenance, NFVO System Maintainer, VNF the role of
operation and maintenance, adminOrganization Managed Objects Role and
VNFMAgentRole. It also defines user groups for different user roles.
Authentication
The TOE authenticates all users who access the TOE by username and password. The TOE
provides a local authentication mode both on the management plane and the O&M plane. The
TOE optionally provides authentication decisions obtained from an external AAA in the IT
environment on the O&M plane.
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Target 1 Introduction
Issue 1.8(2021-09-28) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 18
Access Control
The TOE supports SMManagers to grant permissions to users by means of security
management. Then users can access and perform operations on the TOE and NEs based on
their permissions.
The TOE offers a feature access control list (ACL) based on IP addresses for controlling which
terminals can access the TOE through the TOE client.
Communication Security
The TOE supports encrypted transmission within the MAE-CN server, between NEs and the
MAE-CN server, between a browser and the MAE-CN server, and between an OSS/service
application and the MAE-CN server.
User Session Management
The TOE monitors and presents all online user sessions in real time. The TOE also provides
session establishment, TSF-initiated session termination, user-initiated session termination.
Auditing
The TOE generates audit records for security-relevant management and stores the records in
the database.
Logs record routine maintenance events of the TOE. For security purposes, the TOE provides
security logs and operation logs.
Security logs record operation events related to account management, such as modification of
passwords and addition of accounts.
Operation logs record events related to system configurations, such as modification of IP
addresses and addition of services.
The TOE provides a Syslog solution to resolve the problem of limited storage space. Both
security logs and operation logs can be saved on an external Syslog server.
The TOE also collects operation and security audit logs from managed network elements, and
stores the logs in the database.
The query and filter functions are provided on the GUI, which allow authorized users to inspect
audit logs.
Security Management Functions
The TOE offers security management for all management aspects of the TOE. Security
management includes not only authentication and access control management, but also
management of security-related data consisting of configuration profiles and runtime
parameters. Security management can be customized.
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Target 2 CC Conformance Claims
Issue 1.8(2021-09-28) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 19
Cryptographic Function
Cryptographic functions are dependencies required by security features. The TOE supports
cryptographic algorithms as described in section 5.2.7 Cryptographic Support.
2 CC Conformance Claims
This ST is CC Part 2 conformant [CC] and CC Part 3 conformant [CC]. The CC version of [CC]
is 3.1 Revision 5.
This ST is EAL4+ALC_FLR.2-conformant as defined in [CC] Part 3.
The methodology to be used for evaluation is CEM3.1 R5.
No conformance to a Protection Profile is claimed.
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Target 3 Security Problem Definition
Issue 1.8(2021-09-28) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 20
3 Security Problem Definition
3.1 Assumptions
A.PhysicalProtection The hardware that the TOE is running on is operated in a physically
secure and well managed environment.
This document assumes that the software platform of the server that the TOE is running on (as
listed in section 1.4.1 Error! Bookmark not defined.) is protected against unauthorized
physical access.
This document assumes that the database is protected against data file damage.
A.NetworkSegregation This document assumes that the network interface of the server and
the TOE client will be accessed only through subnets where the TOE hosts are installed. The
subnet is separate from public networks. Communications with the TOE server are performed
through a firewall.
A.AdministratorBehaviour This document assumes that the super user admin, a user that
belongs to the SMManagers and Administrators groups and the users of the underlying
operating system will behave correctly and will not perform any harmful operation on the TOE.
A.NTP This document assumes that operating environment should provide an accurate time
source, in order to ensure normal operations of the TOE server.
A.NetworkElements This document assumes that the managed network elements are trusted
and can support the TLS /SNMPv3 /SSHv2 /SFTP connection with the TOE, and the private
interface defined by Huawei.
A.Components It is assumed that the 3
rd
party components (like NTP server, SFTP server,
AAA server, syslog server, SMS/SMTP server, and CA server) are considered trusted and will
not attack the TOE and the communication to 3
rd
party components is under protection.
A.TrustedPlatform This document assumes that the platform like OS, DB, hardware, virtual
machine used by the TOE is trusted, and is properly hardened by the Administrator.
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Target 3 Security Problem Definition
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3.2 Threats
The threats described in this chapter are addressed by the TOE.
3.2.1 Assets and Agents
Asset Description
TOE security function
(TSF) data
The integrity and confidentiality of TSF data (such as user
account information, passwords and audit records) should be
protected against threat agents.
OM data The confidentiality and integrity of the OM data of NEs (such
as configuration data) should be protected against threat
agents.
Agent Description
Attacker An external attacker, who is not a user of the TOE.
Eavesdropper An eavesdropper, who has access to communication
channels through which the OM and TSF data are
transferred.
Unauthorized user An unauthorized user of the TOE, who gains unauthorized
access to the TOE.
3.2.2 Threats Addressed by the TOE
3.2.2.1 T.UnauthenticatedAccess
Threat: T.UnauthenticatedAccess
Attack An attacker who is not a user of the TOE, gains access to the
TOE, modifies and compromises the confidentiality of the TSF
and OM data.
Asset TSF and OM data
Agent An attacker
3.2.2.2 T.UnauthorizedAccess
Threat: T.UnauthorizedAccess
Attack An unauthorized user who gains unauthorized access to the TOE
CC HUAWEI iMaster MAE-CN V100R021C10 - Security
Target 3 Security Problem Definition
Issue 1.8(2021-09-28) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 22
and compromises the confidentiality and integrity of the TSF and OM
data. The user also performs unauthorized operations on NEs
through the TOE.
Asset TSF and OM data
Agent An unauthorized user
3.2.2.3 T.Eavesdrop
Threat: T.Eavesdrop
Attack An eavesdropper (remote attacker) in the management network
served by the TOE, who is able to intercept, modify, or re-use
information assets that are exchanged between the TOE and NEs,
between the TOE client and server, and between the TOE server
and OSS/service orchestrator/service application client.
Asset TSF and OM data
Agent An eavesdropper
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Target 4 Security Objectives
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4 Security Objectives
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
The following objectives must be met by the TOE:
1. O.Communication The TOE implements logical protection measures for network
communication between the TOE and NEs from the operational environment, also for
the network communication between the TOE server and OSS/service
orchestrator/service application client.
2. O.Authorization The TOE authorizes different roles that can be assigned to
administrators in order to restrict the functions available to individual administrators,
including limitation to session establishment and to actions performed on NEs.
(The TOE authorizes different roles that can be assigned to users in order to restrict
the functions available to a specific user.)
3. O.Authentication The TOE authenticates users before access to data and security
functions is granted. The TOE provides configurable system policies to restrict user
session establishment.
4. O.Audit The TOE generates, stores and reviews audit records for security-relevant
administrator actions.
5. O.SecurityManagement The TOE manages security functions that it provides.
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
1. OE.NetworkElements The operational environment ensures that the trusted NEs
support the TLS /SNMPv3/SSHv2/SFTP/HTTPS connection with the TOE and private
interface defined by Huawei.
2. OE.Physical The TOE is protected against unauthorized physical access.
3. OE.NetworkSegregation The operational environment protects the network where
the TOE hosts are installed by separating it from the application (or public) network. A
firewall is installed between the TOE server and untrusted domain to filter unused
communication ports.
4. OE.Database The operational environment protects the database against
unauthorized physical access and data file damage.
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5. OE.AdministratorBehaviour The super user admin, the users who belong to the
SMManagers and Administrators groups and the users of the underlying operating
system will behave correctly and will not perform any harmful operation on the TOE.
6. OE.NTP The operational environment provides an accurate time source, in order to
ensure normal operations on the TOE server.
7. OE.TrustedPlatform The operation environment provides a trusted platform like OS,
DB, hardware, virtual machine.
8. OE.Components The 3rd
party components are considered trusted and will not
attack the TOE. The administrator shall ensure the communication between the TOE
and the NTP server, SFTP server, AAA server, syslog server, SMS/SMTP server,
and CA server is secured when these servers are used.
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale
4.3.1 Coverage
The following table provides a mapping of security objectives for the TOE to threats, showing
that each security objective is at least covered by one threat.
Security Objective for the TOE Threat
O.Communication T.Eavesdrop
O.Authentication T.UnauthenticatedAccess and
T.UnauthorizedAccess
O.Authorization T.UnauthorizedAccess
O.Audit T.UnauthorizedAccess and
T.UnauthenticatedAccess
O.SecurityManagement T.UnauthenticatedAccess,
T.UnauthorizedAccess and T.Eavesdrop
The following table provides a mapping of security objectives for the operational environment
to assumptions and threats, showing that each security objective for the operational
environment is at least covered by one assumption or threat.
Security Objective for the
Operational Environment
Threat / Assumption
OE.NetworkElements T.Eavesdrop
A.NetworkElements
OE.Physical A.PhysicalProtection
T.UnauthenticatedAccess
OE.NetworkSegregation A.NetworkSegregation
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Target 4 Security Objectives
Issue 1.8(2021-09-28) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 25
Security Objective for the
Operational Environment
Threat / Assumption
OE.Database A.PhysicalProtection
T.UnauthenticatedAccess
T.UnauthorizedAccess
OE. AdministratorBehaviour A.AdministratorBehaviour
OE.NTP A.NTP
OE.TrustedPlatform A.TrustedPlatform
OE.Componets A.Components
4.3.2 Sufficiency
The following rationale justifies that security objectives can counter each individual threat and
that the achievement of each security objective can contribute to the removal, diminishing or
mitigation of a specific threat:
Threat Rationale for Security Objectives
T.UnauthenticatedAccess The threat of unauthenticated access to the TOE is
countered by requiring the TOE to implement an
authentication mechanism for its users
(O.Authentication).
Authentication mechanisms can be configured by users
with sufficient permissions (O.SecurityManagement).
The audit records record modification of usernames and
passwords, user logins and logouts, login successes
and failures (O. Audit).
And the threat is countered by requiring the system and
database to implement an authentication mechanism for
its users (OE.Physical and OE.Database).
T.UnauthorizedAccess The threat of unauthorized access is countered by
requiring the TOE to implement an access control
mechanism checking the operations that may be
performed on the TOE and NEs (O.Authorization). The
threat is also countered by authenticating the users in
the TOE (O.Authentication).
Access control mechanisms (including user levels and
command levels) can be configured by users with
sufficient permissions (O.SecurityManagement).
The threat is also countered by audit records showing
that if someone indeed performs unauthorized
operations, they can be traced to (O.Audit).
CC HUAWEI iMaster MAE-CN V100R021C10 - Security
Target 4 Security Objectives
Issue 1.8(2021-09-28) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 26
Threat Rationale for Security Objectives
In addition, OE.Database ensures that user account
data stored in the database will not be altered
maliciously.
T.Eavesdrop The threat of eavesdropping is countered by requiring
security communications:
- Securing network communication between the portal
and MAE-CN server over SFTP/HTTPS
(O.Communication).
- Over TLS/SSHv2/SFTP between the MAE-CN server
and NEs (O.Communication and OE.NetworkElements).
- Over TLS/SNMPv3/SSHv2/SFTP/HTTPS between the
MAE-CN server and the OSS/service
orchestrator/service application client
(O.Communication).
Management of secure communication channels can be
performed by users with sufficient permissions
(O.SecurityManagement).
The following rationale justifies that security objectives for the operational environment can
cover each individual assumption and that the achievement of each security objective can
contribute to the consistency between a specific assumption and environment. If all security
objectives for the operational environment are achieved, the intended usage is realized:
Assumption Rationale for Security Objectives
A.PhysicalProtection The assumption that the TOE will be protected against
unauthorized physical access is addressed by
OE.Physical and OE.Database.
A.NetworkSegregation The assumption that the TOE is not accessible through
the application networks hosted by the networking
device is addressed by OE.NetworkSegregation.
A.AdministratorBehaviour The assumption that super user admin and the users
who belong to the SMManagers and Administrators
groups and the users of the underlying operating
system will behave correctly and will not perform any
harmful operation is addressed by
OE.AdministratorBehaviour.
A.NTP The assumption that the operational environment
provides an accurate time source is addressed by
OE.NTP
A.NetworkElements The assumption that the managed network elements
are trusted and support secure channel is addressed
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Target 4 Security Objectives
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Assumption Rationale for Security Objectives
by OE.NetworkElements.
A.Components The assumption that the 3
rd
party components are
trusted and support secure channel is addressed by
OE.Components.
A.TrustedPlatform The assumption that the platform used by the TOE is
trusted, and is properly hardened by Administrators is
addressed by OE. TrustedPlatform.
The following table provides a matrix of TOE objectives and threats.
T.Eavesdrop T.UnauthenticatedAcces
s
T.UnauthorizedAc
cess
O.Communication X
O.Authentication X X
O.Authorization X
O.Audit X X
O.SecurityManagemen
t
X X X
CC HUAWEI iMaster MAE-CN V100R021C10 - Security
Target 5 Security Requirements for the TOE
Issue 1.8(2021-09-28) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 28
5 Security Requirements for the TOE
5.1 Conventions
The following conventions are used for the completion of operations:
 Strikethrough indicates text removed as a refinement
 (Underlined text in parentheses) indicates additional text provided as a refinement.
 Bold text indicates the completion of an assignment.
 Italicized and bold text indicates the completion of a selection.
 Iteration/N indicates an element of the iteration, where N is the iteration
number/character.
5.2 Security Requirements
5.2.1 Security Audit (FAU)
5.2.1.1 FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation
FAU_GEN.1.1
The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
b) All auditable events for the [not specified] level of audit; and
c) [The following auditable events:
1. User login and logout
2. User account management
a. Creating, deleting, and modifying user accounts
b. Changing user passwords, mobile numbers and email addresses
c. Granting access rights to user accounts
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3. User group (role) management
a. Creating, deleting, and modifying user groups
b. Granting access rights to user groups
4. Security policy management
a. Modifying password policies
b. Modifying user account policies
5. User session management
a. Kicking out individual user sessions
6. ACL management
a. Creating, deleting, and modifying ACLs
b. Specifying ACLs for individual user account.
7. Region, operation set and device set management
8. Audit log management
9. Certificate management
10. NE management
11. Security Configuration].
FAU_GEN.1.2
The TSF shall records within each audit record at least the following information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome (success or
failure) of the event; and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included
in the PP/ST, [none].
5.2.1.2 FAU_GEN.2 User Identity Association
FAU_GEN.2.1
For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to associate each auditable
event with the identity of the user that caused the event.
5.2.1.3 FAU_SAR.1 Audit Review
FAU_SAR.1.1
The TSF shall provide [users attached to SMManagers, users with log query rights] with the capability to
read [correspondent information] from the audit records.
FAU_SAR.1.2
The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the information.
Application Note:
Operation rights required for querying and exporting logs vary based on log types.
CC HUAWEI iMaster MAE-CN V100R021C10 - Security
Target 5 Security Requirements for the TOE
Issue 1.8(2021-09-28) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 30
Log Type Permission
Security logs generated by all users Query Security Log
System logs Query System Log
Operation logs generated by all users Query Operation Log
Operation logs generated by the current user Query Personal Operation Log
5.2.1.4 FAU_SAR.2 Restricted Audit Review
FAU_SAR.2.1
The TSF shall prohibit all users read access to the audit records, except the users who have been granted
explicit read-access.
5.2.1.5 FAU_SAR.3 Selectable Audit Review
FAU_SAR.3.1
The TSF shall provide the ability to apply [selection] of audit data based on [filter criteria of audit fields
including start time, end time, operation, level, operator, terminal IP address, result, operation object
and details].
5.2.1.6 FAU_STG.1 Protected Audit Trail Storage
FAU_STG.1.1
The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorized deletion.
FAU_STG.1.2
The TSF shall be able to [prevent] unauthorized modifications to the stored audit records in the audit trail.
5.2.1.7 FAU_STG.3 Action in Case of Possible Audit Data Loss
FAU_STG.3.1
The TSF shall [store audit records in the database and export them into files] if the audit trail [occupies
over the default value of 80% of the database capacity and lasts for over the default duration of 45
days].
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5.2.2 User Data Protection (FDP)
5.2.2.1 FDP_ACC.2 Completing Access Control
FDP_ACC.2.1
The TSF shall enforce the [MAE-CN access control policy] on [subjects: users, roles; objects: NE, NE
attributes and System data; operation: access, query, create, modify, delete, start, and stop
operations on the object] and all operations among subjects and objects covered by SFP.
FDP_ACC.2.2 The TSF shall ensure that all operations between any subject controlled by the TSF and any
object controlled by the TSF are covered by an access control SFP.
5.2.2.2 FDP_ACF.1 Security Attribute-Based Access Control
FDP_ACF.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the [MAE-CN access control policy] to objects based on the following: [
1. Subjects
Users and their following security attributes:
a. User ID
b. User type
c. User role assignment
Roles and their following security attributes:
a. Role name
2. Objects:
NE and their security attributes:
a. Device ID
MML command groups and their security attributes:
a. Command group name
]
FDP_ACF.1.2
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and
controlled objects is allowed: [
a) Only authorized users are permitted access to operation.
b) Authorized roles are permitted access to operation.
c) Users can be configured with different user role to control the MAE-CN
access permission.
d) An operation set contains many operation rights that are assigned to
specific user roles.]
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FDP_ACF.1.3
The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules:
[none].
FDP_ACF.1.4
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: [none].
5.2.2.3 FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity
FDP_UIT.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s)] to
[transmit and receive] user data (certificate to/from CA server) in a manner protected from [modification,
insertion] errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2
The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data (certificate to/from CA server), whether
[modification, insertion] has occurred.
5.2.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA)
5.2.3.1 FIA_UID.2 User Identification Before Any Action
FIA_UID.2.1
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated
actions on behalf of that user.
5.2.3.2 FIA_UAU.2 User Authentication Before Any Action
FIA_UAU.2.1
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated
actions on behalf of that user.
5.2.3.3 FIA_UAU.5 Multiple Authentication Mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5.1
The TSF shall provide [local, remote LDAP, remote RADIUS, CAS and SAML SSO capability] to support
user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2 The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the [
1. When local authentication is enabled, user authentication is implemented by
TOE itself.
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2. When LDAP authentication is enabled, user authentication is implemented by
a remote LDAP server.
3. When RADIUS authentication is enabled, user authentication is implemented
by a remote RADIUS server.
4. When CAS or SAML SSO configuration is enabled, user authentication is
implemented by the SSO server of the TOE, and the user can log into all
trusted SSO clients of other TOE instances without being authenticated again
after logging in to one of the trusted TOEs.]
5.2.3.4 FIA_UAU.6 Re-authenticating
FIA_UAU.6.1
The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions [changing the password].
5.2.3.5 FIA_UAU.7 Protected Authentication Feedback
FIA_UAU.7.1
The TSF shall provide only [an obscured feedback] to the user while the authentication is in progress.
5.2.3.6 FIA_ATD.1 User Attribute Definition
FIA_ATD.1.1
The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to individual users: [
1. User ID
2. Username
3. Password
4. User type
5. Mobile number, optional
6. Email address, optional
7. Welcome message, optional
8. Account enable status
9. Login time policy
10. Client IP address policy
11. User role assignment
12. Maximum online sessions, optional
13. Account validity period (days), optional
14. The number of allowed login times, optional
15. Select the policy (Disable user, Delete user, Unlimited) if no login within a
period (configurable days), optional
16. Auto-logout if no activity within configurable period, optional
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17. Compulsory password renewal (Password validity period (days), In advance
warning before password expires (days), Minimum password usage period
(days)), optional].
5.2.3.7 FIA_AFL.1 Authentication Failure Handling
FIA_AFL.1.1
The TSF shall detect when [an administrator configurable positive integer within [1,99]] unsuccessful
authentication attempts occur related to [consecutive failed logins].
FIA_AFL.1.2
When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been [met], the TSF shall [lock the
user account or IP address for 30 minutes by default].
Application Note:
The TOE has a super user admin that by default is locked for 10 minutes.
5.2.3.8 FIA_SOS.1 Verification of Secrets
FIA_SOS.1.1
The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets meet: [
1. Min. password length
2. Max. system administrator password length
3. Max. password length
4. Configurable number of latest passwords that cannot be reused
5. Password repetition not allowed within configurable number of months
6. Min. password usage period (days)
7. Password validity period (days)
8. Force logout upon password reset
9. Min. characters different between new and old passwords
10. Min. number of letters
11. Min. number of uppercase letters
12. Min. number of lowercase letters
13. Min. number of digits
14. Min. number of special characters
15. Password that cannot contain spaces
16. Password that cannot contain its username in reverse order
17. Password that cannot be an increasing, decreasing, or interval sequence of
digits or letters
18. Policy about max. consecutive characters used in both username and
password
19. Policy that the password cannot contain repeated character sequences
20. Max. times a character can consecutively occur
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21. Password that cannot contain user's mobile number or email address
22. Password that cannot contain words in the uploaded password dictionary file
or hacker language dictionary configured in the backend file]
5.2.4 Security Management (FMT)
5.2.4.1 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [
1. Authentication mode configuration
2. User management
3. Role management
4. Account policy
5. Password policy
6. Audit log management
7. Certificate management
8. NE management
9. Client IP Address Policies (ACL)
10. Login time policy
11. Configuration of the time interval of user inactivity for terminating an
interactive session
12. Command group management
13. Configuration of trusted channels for connecting to the external entities
14. Security Configuration
].
5.2.4.2 FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
FMT_SMR.1.1
The TSF shall maintain the roles: [
1. Administrators both on the management and O&M plane
2. SMManagers both on the management and O&M plane
3. Monitors only on the management plane
4. Operators only on the management plane
5. NBI User Group only on the O&M plane
6. Guest only on the O&M plane
7. Maintenance Group only on the O&M plane
8. Operator Group only on the O&M plane
9. VNFMAccessRole only on the O&M plane
10. WebNIC User Group only on the O&M plane
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11. mAOS User Group only on the O&M plane
12. EMSRole only on the O&M plane
13. NFVORole only on the O&M plane
14. VNFManagers only on the O&M plane
15. Southbound System Access only on the O&M plane
16. Organization Administrator only on the O&M plane
17. Organization Monitor only on the O&M plane
18. Tenant Monitor only on the O&M plane
19. Assurance User Group only on the O&M plane
20. Monitoring Group only on the O&M plane
21. APP the role of operation and maintenance only on the O&M plane
22. HOFS Group only on the O&M plane
23. IT-APP the role of operation and maintenance only on the O&M plane
24. NFVO System Maintainer only on the O&M plane
25. VNF the role of operation and maintenance only on the O&M plane
26. adminOrganization Managed Objects Role only on the O&M plane
27. VNFMAgentRole only on the O&M plane
28. user-defined User Group].
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
5.2.4.3 FMT_MOF.1 Management of Security Functions Behaviour
FMT_MOF.1.1
The TSF shall restrict the ability to [determine the behaviour of, disable, enable] the functions [all the
security functions defined in FMT_SMF.1] to [users assigned with roles as defined in FMT_SMR.1 or
with explicitly assigned security functions].
Application Note:
The detail privilege of each role is defined in the following table:
Role Name Security Functions
Administrators Certificate management
Command group management
NE management
SMManagers Authentication mode configuration
User management
Role management
Account policy
Password policy
Audit log management
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Client IP Address Policies (ACL)
Login time policy
Configuration of the time interval of user inactivity
for terminating an interactive session
Monitors The user group has permission to monitor non-
security operations of backup and restore,
deployment, system monitoring, maintenance,
system settings, alarms, the disaster recovery
(DR) system, product planning, trace server
product tool, configure NAT tool, information
collection, trouble shooting, emergency system,
cloud service management,infrastructure,
commissioning wizard, etc.
Operators The user group has permission to perform non-
security operations of backup and restore,
deployment, system monitoring, maintenance,
system settings, alarms, the disaster recovery
(DR) system, product planning, trace server
product tool, configure NAT tool, information
collection, trouble shooting, emergency system,
cloud service management,infrastructure,
commissioning wizard, etc.
NBI User Group Configuration of trusted channels for connecting
to the external entities
Guest Granted by SMManagers
Maintenance Group NE Management
Configuration of trusted channels for connecting
to the external entities
Operator Group NE Management
Command group management
Configuration of trusted channels for connecting
to the external entities
VNFMAccessRole Configuration of trusted channels for connecting
to the external entities
WebNIC User Group Configuration of trusted channels for connecting
to the external entities
mAOS User Group Configuration of trusted channels for connecting
to the external entities
EMSRole Has the right of EMS Operation Management,
that is, interface access provided by VNF LCM to
EMS.
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NFVORole Has the right of NFVO Operation Management,
that is, interface access provided by VNF LCM to
NFVO
VNFManagers Has the right of VNF Operation Management
Southbound System Access Has the NFVO operation and management
permission, that is, the interface access
permission provided by the NFVO for southbound
systems
Organization Administrator Organizational management staff (NFVO)
Organization Monitor Organize surveillance personnel (NFVO)
Tenant Monitor Tenant surveillance Personnel (NFVO)
Assurance User Group Has MAE-Optimization/MAE-Evaluation system
services-related permissions, such as querying
OSS basic information, managing threshold
alarms, and issuing MML commands to NEs.
Monitoring Group System Monitoring Group
APP the role of operation and
maintenance
Business operations Personnel of APP (NFVO)
HOFS Group System HOFS group
IT-APP the role of operation and
maintenance
IT operation and maintenance personnel (NFVO)
NFVO System Maintainer Manages system interconnection (NFVO)
VNF the role of operation and
maintenance
Business operations Personnel (NFVO)
adminOrganization Managed
Objects Role
adminOrganization Managed Objects Role
(NFVO)
VNFMAgentRole Has the right of VNFM-Agent Registration, that is,
registration access provided by VNF LCM to
VNFM-Agent.
user-defined User Group Granted by SMManagers
5.2.4.4 FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF Data
FMT_MTD.1.1
The TSF shall restrict the ability to [query, modify, delete] the [certificates, private keys, and symmetric
keys] to [Users assigned with roles as defined in FMT_SMR.1 or with explicitly assigned security
functions].
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5.2.4.5 FMT_MSA.1 Management of Security Attributes
FMT_MSA.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the [MAE-CN access control policy] to restrict the ability to [query, modify] the
security attributes [all the security attributes defined in FDP_ACF.1 and FIA_ATD.1] to [Users assigned
with roles as defined in FMT_SMR.1 or with explicitly assigned security functions].
5.2.4.6 FMT_MSA.3 Static Attribute Initialization
FMT_MSA.3.1
The TSF shall enforce the [MAE-CN access control policy] to provide [restrictive] default values for
security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2
The TSF shall allow [Users assigned with roles as defined in FMT_SMR.1 or with explicitly assigned
security functions] to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or
information is created.
5.2.5 TOE Access (FTA)
5.2.5.1 FTA_TSE.1 TOE Session Establishment
FTA_TSE.1.1
The TSF shall be able to deny session establishment based on [
a. User identity (username and password)
b. Client IP address policies (IP address range for login)
c. Login time policies (limited time segment for account login)
d. User lock status and enablement status
e. Password validity period (days)
f. Maximum online sessions
g. System login mode]
Application Note:
System login mode only affects local user login from web interfaces, and does not affect third-party user
login.
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5.2.5.2 FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated Termination
FTA_SSL.3.1
The TSF shall terminate an interactive session after an [administrator-configured time interval, by default
30 minutes of user inactivity].
5.2.5.3 FTA_SSL.4 User-initiated Termination
FTA_SSL.4.1
The TSF shall allow user-initiated termination of the user's own interactive session.
5.2.5.4 FTA_TAH.1 TOE Access History
FTA_TAH.1.1
Upon successful session establishment, the TSF shall display the [date, time, location] of the last
successful session establishment to the user.
FTA_TAH.1.2
Upon successful session establishment, the TSF shall display the [date, time, location] of the last
unsuccessful attempt to session establishment and the number of unsuccessful attempts since the last
successful session establishment.
FTA_TAH.1.3
The TSF shall not erase the access history information from the user interface without giving the user an
opportunity to review the information.
5.2.6 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)
5.2.6.1 FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path
FTP_TRP.1.1
The TSF shall provide a communication path between itself and remote users that is logically distinct from
other communication paths and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the
communicated data from disclosure and modification.
FTP_TRP.1.2
The TSF shall permit remote users to initiate communication via the trusted path.
FTP_TRP.1.3
The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for [remote management].
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5.2.6.2 FTP_ITC.1/External System Inter-TSF Trusted Channel
FTP_ITC.1.1
The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product that is
logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and
protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2
The TSF shall permit the TSF and (the external system including the OSS, service orchestrator,
service application and 3
rd
party component) to initiate communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3
The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [authentication, dumping audit logs,
backing up NE Data and restoring NE data].
5.2.6.3 FTP_ITC.1/NE Inter-TSF Trusted Channel
FTP_ITC.1.1
The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product that is
logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and
protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2
The TSF shall permit the TSF and (the NEs) to initiate communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3
The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [managing NE devices].
5.2.7 Cryptographic Support (FCS)
5.2.7.1 FCS_CKM.1/AES Cryptographic Key Generation
FCS_CKM.1.1
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation
algorithm [PBKDF2] and specified cryptographic key sizes [128 bits] that meet the following: [RFC8018
chapter 5.2]
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5.2.7.2 FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction
FCS_CKM.4.1
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction
method [overwriting with 0 in java or overwriting with 0xcc in python] that meets the following:
[none].
5.2.7.3 FCS_COP.1/AES Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1
The TSF shall perform [symmetric de- and encryption] in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm [AES CBC Mode] and cryptographic key sizes [128 bits] that meet the following: [FIPS 197
chapter 5, NIST SP 800-38A chapter 6.2]
5.2.7.4 FCS_COP.1/PBKDF2 Cryptographic Operation
FCS_COP.1.1
The TSF shall perform [password hashing] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
[PBKDF2 (SHA256)] and cryptographic key sizes [None] that meet the following: [RFC8018 chapter 5.2].
5.3 Security Functional Requirements Rationale
5.3.1 Coverage
The following table provides a mapping of SFR to the security objectives, showing that each security
functional requirement addresses at least one security objective.
Security Functional Requirements Objectives
FAU_GEN.1 O.Audit
FAU_GEN.2 O.Audit
FAU_SAR.1 O.Audit
FAU_SAR.2 O.Audit
FAU_SAR.3 O.Audit
FAU_STG.1 O.Audit
FAU_STG.3 O.Audit
FDP_ACC.2 O.Authorization
FDP_ACF.1 O.Authorization
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FDP_UIT.1 O.Communication
FIA_UID.2 O.Audit
O.Authentication
O.Authorization
FIA_UAU.2 O.Authentication
O.Authorization
FIA_UAU.5 O.Authentication
O.Authorization
FIA_UAU.6 O.Authentication
O.Authorization
FIA_UAU.7 O.Authentication
FIA_ATD.1 O.SecurityManagement
FIA_AFL.1 O.Authentication
O.Authorization
FIA_SOS.1 O.Authentication
O.SecurityManagement
FMT_SMF.1 O.Audit
O.Authentication
O.Authorization
O.Communication
O.SecurityManagement
FMT_SMR.1 O.Authorization
FMT_MOF.1 O.SecurityManagement
FMT_MTD.1 O.SecurityManagement
FMT_MSA.1 O.Authorization
FMT_MSA.3 O.Authorization
FTA_TSE.1 O. Authentication
FTA_SSL.3 O.Authentication
FTA_SSL.4 O.SecurityManagement
FTA_TAH.1 O.Authentication
FTP_TRP.1 O.Communication
FTP_ITC.1/ External System O.Communication
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FTP_ITC.1/NE O.Communication
FCS_CKM.1/AES O.SecurityManagement
FCS_CKM.4 O.SecurityManagement
FCS_COP.1/AES O.SecurityManagement
FCS_COP.1/PBKDF2 O.Authentication
O.SecurityManagement
5.3.2 Sufficiency
The following rationale provides justification for each security objective for the TOE, showing that the security
functional requirements are suitable to meet and achieve the security objectives.
Security objectives Rationale
O.Audit The generation of audit records is implemented by
(FAU_GEN.1). Audit records are supposed to include user
identities (FAU_GEN.2) where applicable, which are supplied
by the identification mechanism (FIA_UID.2). Audit records
are stored in the database, and are filtered to read and
search with conditions, and restricted audit review requires
authorized users (FAU_SAR.1, FAU_SAR.2, FAU_SAR.3).
Management functionality for the audit mechanism is spelled
out in (FMT_SMF.1). The audit record is stored in the
database, and exported into a file if the size of the audit
record exceeds the configured maximum size (FAU_STG.1,
FAU_STG.3).
O.Communication Communication security is implemented by data integrity
protection (FDP_UIT.1) between TOE and the CA server,
trusted channels (FTP_ITC.1/External System,
FTP_ITC.1/NE) between TOE and external servers, and
(FTP_TRP.1) between TOE and the web clients.
Performance and inventory text files are transmitted to the
OSS/service application. (FTP_TRP.1)
Management functionality to configure the trusted channel for
NE communication is provided in (FMT_SMF.1).
O.Authentication User authentication (including re-authentication) is
implemented by (FIA_UAU.2, FIA_UAU.5, FIA_UAU.6) and
supported by individual user identities in (FIA_UID.2). The
necessary user attributes (passwords) are spelled out in
(FIA_ATD.1). The authentication mechanism supports
authentication failure handling (FIA_AFL.1), restrictions as to
the validity of accounts for login (FTA_TSE.1), and a
password policy (FIA_SOS.1). Management functionality is
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provided in (FMT_SMF.1). The TOE logs off sessions when
they are inactive for a configured period of time (by default 30
minutes) (FTA_SSL.3). The session establishment shall be
denied based on security attributes (FTA_TSE.1).
Authentication feedback information is protected by
(FIA_UAU.7). TOE shall display access history of the last
successful and unsuccessful logins (FTA_TAH.1).
For password verification hash values of passwords are used
which are generated using FCS_COP.1/PBKDF2.
The authentication mechanism for NBIs and NEs to connect
to MAE-CN is also implemented by FIA_UAU.2.
O.Authorization The requirement for access control is spelled out in
(FDP_ACC.2), and the access control policies are modeled in
(FDP_ACF.1) for accessing the MAE-CN server.
Unique user IDs are necessary for access control
(FIA_UID.2), and user authentication (FIA_UAU.2,
FIA_UAU.5). User-related attributes are spelled out in
(FIA_ATD.1). Access control is based on the definition of
roles as subjects and functions as objects (FMT_SMR.1).
Management functionality for the definition of access control
policies is provided (FMT_MSA.1, FMT_MSA.3,
FMT_SMF.1).
User re-authentication is implemented by (FIA_UAU.6)
If a user fails to log in to the system for multiple consecutive
times, the locking policy for the account and IP address is
executed (FIA_AFL.1).
O.SecurityManageme
nt
Management functionality is provided in
(FMT_SMF.1/FIA_ATD.1/FIA_SOS.1/FMT_SMF.1/FMT_MOF
.1/FTM_MTD.1/FTA_SSL.4).
The AES algorithm is used to encrypt sensitive information
such as users' mobile numbers and email addresses.
(FCS_CKM.1/AES, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/AES,
FCS_COP.1/PBKDF2)
The following table provides a matrix of SFRs and the security objectives.
O.Audit O.Authorization O.Authentication O.Communicatio
n
O.SecurityMana
gement
FAU_GEN.1 X
FAU_GEN.2 X
FAU_STG.3 X
FAU_SAR.1 X
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FAU_SAR.2 X
FAU_SAR.3 X
FAU_STG.1 X
FAU_STG.3 X
FDP_ACC.2 X
FDP_ACF.1 X
FDP_UIT.1 X
FIA_UID.2 X X X
FIA_UAU.2 X X
FIA_UAU.5 X X
FIA_UAU.6 X X
FIA_UAU.7 X
FIA_ATD.1 X
FIA_AFL.1 X X
FIA_SOS.1 X X
FMT_SMF.1 X X X X X
FMT_SMR.1 X
FMT_MOF.1 X
FMT_MTD.1 X
FMT_MSA.1 X
FMT_MSA.3 X
FTA_TSE.1 X
FTA_SSL.3 X
FTA_SSL.4 X
FTA_TAH.1 X
FTP_ITC.1/E
xternal
System
X
FTP_ITC.1/N
E
X
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FCS_CKM.1/
AES
X
FCS_CKM.4 X
FCS_COP.1/
AES
X
FCS_COP.1/
PBKDF2
X X
5.3.3 Security Requirements Dependency Rationale
Dependencies within the EAL4 package selected for the security assurance requirements have been
considered by the authors of CC Part 3 and are not analyzed here again.
The security functional requirements in this Security Target do not introduce dependencies on any security
assurance requirement; neither do the security assurance requirements in this Security Target introduce
dependencies on any security functional requirement.
The following table demonstrates the dependencies of SFRs modeled in CC Part 2 and how the SFRs for the
TOE resolve those dependencies.
Security Functional Requirement Dependencies Resolution
FAU_GEN.1 FPT_STM.1 Resolved by external
time source.
The audit time
depends on the
reliable time stamp.
Reliable time stamp
depends on external
time sources
FAU_GEN.2 FAU_GEN.1
FIA_UID.1
FAU_GEN.1
FIA_UID.1
FAU_STG.1 FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.1
FAU_STG.3 FAU_STG.1 FAU_STG.1
FAU_SAR.1 FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.1
FAU_SAR.2 FAU_SAR.1 FAU_SAR.1
FAU_SAR.3 FAU_SAR.1 FAU_SAR.1
FDP_ACC.2 FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACC.2
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACF.1
FMT_MSA.3
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FDP_UIT.1 [FDP_ACC.1, or
FDP_IFC.1], [FTP_ITC.1,
or FTP_TRP.1]
FDP_ACC.1 and
FDP_IFC.1 are not
applicable because
there is no access
control or information
flow control enforced.
FTP_ITC.1 and
FTP_TRP.1 are not
applicable because
there is no
confidentiality issue
and no trusted path.
FIA_UID.2 None None
FIA_UAU.2 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1
FIA_UAU.5 None None
FIA_UAU.6 None None
FIA_UAU.7 FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.2
FIA_ATD.1 None None
FIA_AFL.1 FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.2
FIA_SOS.1 None None
FMT_SMF.1 None None
FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1
FMT_MOF.1 FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MTD.1 FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.1 [FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1]
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
FDP_ACC.2
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.3 FMT_MSA.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MSA.1
FMT_SMR.1
FTA_TSE.1 None None
FTA_SSL.3 None None
FTA_SSL.4 None None
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FTA_TAH.1 None None
FTP_TRP.1 None None
FTP_ITC.1/ External System None None
FTP_ITC.1/NE None None
FCS_CKM.1/AES [FCS_CKM.2, or
FCS_COP.1]
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.4 [FDP_ITC.1, or
FDP_ITC.2, or
FCS_CKM.1]
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_COP.1/AES [FDP_ITC.1, or
FDP_ITC.2, or
FCS_CKM.1]
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/PBKDF2 [FDP_ITC.1, or
FDP_ITC.2, or
FCS_CKM.1]
FCS_CKM.4
PBKDF2 is a hash
algorithm with no key.
5.4 Security Assurance Requirements
The security assurance requirements for the TOE are the Evaluation Assurance Level 4 components as
specified in [CC] Part 3. The following table provides an overview of the assurance components that form the
assurance level for the TOE.
Assurance class Assurance components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
AGD: Guidance
documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life-cycle support ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures
and automation
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
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ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ASE: Security Target
evaluation
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ATE: Tests ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
5.5 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
The evaluation assurance level has been commensurate with the threat environment that is experienced by
typical consumers of the TOE.
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6 TOE Summary Specification
6.1 TOE Security Functionality
6.1.1 User Management
The TOE supports user management. User management involves user permission
management, region management, and user maintenance and monitoring. User management
grants permissions to users with different responsibilities, and adjusts the permissions based
on service changes. This ensures that users have the necessary permissions to perform tasks
and that other management tasks are carried out in order, avoiding unauthorized and insecure
operations.
Security administrators can create roles, assign operation rights to the roles, and attach users
to roles to grant them corresponding operation rights based on service requirements. This
implements quick user authorization, improving O&M efficiency.
The management plane is responsible for managing products, such as installation,
deployment, upgrade, and backup and restoration. The management plane does not manage
NEs. Therefore, the management plane provides only application permissions. The role
Administrators is to administer the TOE, the role SMManagers is the security role of the
TOE, who can complete security management of TSF data, user management, audit review
and authorization.
On the O&M plane, to improve management efficiency, security administrators divide the
network into regions based on service requirements and allow different personnel to manage
users and services in different regions. The role Administrators is to administer the TOE, the
role SMManagers is the security role of the TOE, who can complete security management of
TSF data, user management, audit review and authorization.
On every plane, there is a default and super user admin. The super user admin can
complete all the functions, including security and administrative functions. During user
permission maintenance period, security administrators can view and modify user, role, user
group, and operation set information, and monitor user sessions and operations in real time,
ensuring system security.
(FMT_MSA.1, FMT_MSA.3, FMT_SMF.1, and FMT_SMR.1)
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The default roles on the management plane are listed in the table below.
Role Name Description
Administrators The user group has all the permissions except user
management, query security log, query personal security log
and view online users.
SMManagers The user group has permission to manage users, manage
licenses, query security logs, view online users, and update
ACL policies.
Monitors The user group has permission to monitor non-security
operations of backup and restore, deployment, system
monitoring, maintenance, system settings, alarms, the disaster
recovery (DR) system, product planning, trace server product
tool, configure NAT tool, information collection, trouble
shooting, emergency system, cloud service management,
infrastructure, commissioning wizard, etc.
Operators The user group has permission to perform non-security
operations of backup and restore, deployment, system
monitoring, maintenance, system settings, alarms, the disaster
recovery (DR) system, product planning, trace server product
tool, configure NAT tool, information collection, trouble
shooting, emergency system, cloud service management,
infrastructure, commissioning wizard, etc.
The default roles on the O&M plane are listed in the table below.
Role Name Description
Administrators The user group has all the permissions except User
Management, Query Security Log, View Online Users, and
Query Personal Security Log.
SMManagers The user group has the User Management, License
Manager, View Online Users, and Query Security Log
permissions.
NBI User Group The user group has the permission to configure the
northbound interfaces such as SNMP, CORBA, XML, TEXT
and RESTful NBIs.
Guest The domain of this user group is All Objects, and it has
operation rights for default monitor operation sets. They can
perform query operations, such as querying statistics, but
cannot create or configure objects.
Maintenance Group The domain of this user group is All Objects, and it has
operation rights for default maintenance operation sets. In
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Role Name Description
addition to the rights of Guests and Operator Group, users in
this group have the rights to create services and perform
configurations that affect the running of MAE-CN and NEs.
Operator Group The domain of this user group is All Objects, and it has
operation rights for default operator operation sets. In addition
to the rights of Guests group, users in this group have the
rights to modify (rights to perform potentially service-affecting
operations are not involved). For example, they can change
alarm severities.
VNFMAccessRole This user group has the operation rights on all northbound
APIs, that is, the user group provided for the LCM to invoke
the northbound interface.
WebNIC User Group This user group has WebNIC-related permissions, such as
collecting network information, querying all operation logs, and
managing tasks
mAOS User Group This user group has MAE-Optimization/MAE-Evaluation
system services-related permissions, such as querying OSS
basic information, managing threshold alarms, and issuing
MML commands to NEs.
EMSRole This user group has EMS Operation Management
permissions, that is, interface access provided by VNF LCM to
EMS.
NFVORole This user group has NFVO Operation Management
permissions, that is, interface access provided by VNF LCM to
NFVO
VNFManagers This user group has VNF Operation Management permissions
Southbound System
Access
This user group has NFVO operation and management
permission, that is, the interface access permission provided
by the NFVO for southbound systems
Organization
Administrator
Organizational management staff (NFVO)
Organization Monitor Organize surveillance personnel (NFVO)
Tenant Monitor Tenant surveillance Personnel (NFVO)
Assurance User
Group
This user group has MAE-Optimization/MAE-Evaluation
system services-related permissions, such as querying OSS
basic information, managing threshold alarms, and issuing
MML commands to NEs.
Monitoring Group System Monitoring Group
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Role Name Description
APP the role of
operation and
maintenance
Business operations Personnel of APP (NFVO)
HOFS Group System HOFS group
IT-APP the role of
operation and
maintenance
IT operation and maintenance personnel (NFVO)
NFVO System
Maintainer
Manages system interconnection (NFVO)
VNF the role of
operation and
maintenance
Business operations Personnel (NFVO)
adminOrganization
Managed Objects
Role
adminOrganization Managed Objects Role (NFVO)
VNFMAgentRole Has the right of VNFM-Agent Registration, that is, registration
access provided by VNF LCM to VNFM-Agent.
6.1.2 Authentication
The TOE identifies administrators by a unique ID and enforces their authentication before
granting them access to any TSF management interfaces.
The TOE authenticates users based on the user attributes defined in FIA_ATD.1. The
passwords should meet the defined password policy; otherwise the input of password shall be
refused. When a user uses an expired password for login, the system will refuse the login
request, the user must request the administrator to reset the password (the administrator can
deactivate the password expiration policy).
The TOE shall verify that the password meets the following password policies: [
1. Min. password length
2. Max. system administrator password length
3. Max. password length
4. Configurable number of latest passwords that cannot be reused
5. Password repetition not allowed within the configurable number of months
6. Min. password usage period (days)
7. Password validity period (days)
8. Force logout upon password reset
9. Min. characters different between new & old passwords
10. Min. number of letters
11. Min. number of uppercase letters
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12. Min. number of lowercase letters
13. Min. number of digits
14. Min. number of special characters
15. Password that cannot contain spaces
16. Password that cannot contain its username in reverse order
17. Password that cannot be an increasing, decreasing, or interval sequence of digits or
letters
18. Policy about max. consecutive characters used in both the username and password
19. Policy that the password cannot contain repeated character sequences
20. Max. times a character can consecutively occur
21. Password that cannot contain user's mobile number or email address
22. Password that cannot contain words in the password dictionary or hacker language
dictionary]
Advanced parameters have such as Min. Different characters between new and old
passwords, Min. Letter, Min. Lowercase, Min. Numbers.
User IDs are unique within the TOE and are stored together with associated passwords and
other attributes including extended security attributes in the TOE's configuration database. If
the user is in the disabled status, the login will be refused.
Authentication based on security attributes is enforced prior to any other interaction with the
TOE for all interfaces of the TOE.
If you enter the password for the admin user incorrectly for five consecutive times within
10 minutes, the client IP address will be locked for 10 minutes.
The TOE supports the account and IP address lockout policy on the Account Policy
page. The default account lockout policy is that when you enter the password incorrectly for
example 5 consecutive times within 10 minutes, the account will be locked for 30 minutes and
automatically unlocked afterwards. The default IP address lockout policy is that when you enter
the password incorrectly for 10 consecutive times within 1 minute, the IP address will be locked
for 30 minutes and automatically unlocked afterwards.
If three accounts using a client IP address are locked within 10 minutes, this client IP address
will be locked for 30 minutes.
All users can log in to the O&M plane again after the lockout period expires. Local users
can also contact security administrators to unlock their accounts for re-login.
(FIA_AFL.1, FIA_ATD.1, FIA_SOS.1, FIA_UAU.2, FIA_UAU.7, FIA_UID.2, FTA_TSE.1).
The management plane only supports local authentication, and don’t need to support
SSO. On the O&M plane, the user authentication modes include local authentication and
remote authentication. In remote authentication mode, users are authenticated by an AAA
server through AAA protocols. The O&M plane supports Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
(LDAP) and Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS) for AAA authentication. The
O&M plane supports CAS and SAML SSO. SSO configuration allows users to access multiple
mutually trusted application systems after only one login authentication. For supporting the
SAML SSO, the O&M plane can be SP or IdP. (FIA_UAU.5).
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The TOE can re-authenticate the user under the condition of changing passwords
(FIA_UAU.6).
The TOE displays the asterisk (*) that has the same length as the entered password, and
returns a username or password error when login failed (FIA_UAU.7).
6.1.3 Access Control
The TOE enforces an authorization policy by defining access rights that are assigned to
users and roles by the security roles or the super user admin.
The TOE enforces the access control policy on users and groups as subjects, domains as
objects, functional operations issued by subjects on objects. The domains as objects shall
define the scope of NEs. Operations shall not be performed on NEs not contained in domains.
The access control is based on users or groups and objects, and the security attribute
object ID of an object must have a domain, including the specified NE, device type, and NEs in
the subnet.
The access control is used to identify all the operations over objects through the MAE-CN
client if the operation rights have been assigned by the SMManagers or the super user admin
(identification and authentication of operation rights)
(FDP_ACC.2, FDP_ACF.1, FMT_SMR.1, FMT_MSA.1, and FMT_MSA.3)
The MML commands defined by the managed NEs, are used to directly perform the
operations on the corresponding NE through the channel between the NE and TOE. The
access rights with MML command group (containing some MML commands) can be assigned
to users and roles. The MML command groups are classified into System Command, Alarm
Query, Alarm Management, Performance Query, Performance Management, Device Query,
Device Management, Trace Query, Trace Management, Wireless Query, Wireless
Management, Transport Query, Transport Management, Security Query, Sucurity
Management, Time Query, Time Management, Software Query, Software Management, Test
Query, Test Management, Fault Information Collection. The MML command access control is
only used to identify the commands through the MML client function of the MAE-CN client.
And before any operations through the client of TOE, the access rights related with these
operations shall be authenticated with the token of corresponding user session.
(FDP_ACC.2, FDP_ACF.1, FMT_SMR.1, FMT_MSA.1, FMT_MSA.3)
The TOE can offer an access control list (ACL) of features based on IP addresses for
controlling which terminals can access the TOE through the TOE client. The ACL is based on
IP addresses. The security role SMManagers and the super user admin can specify each
individual IP address or IP address range in the ACL of a specified user ID. The user can log in
to the TOE only from terminals whose IP addresses are in the ACL.
(FMT_SMF.1 and FTA_TSE.1)
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6.1.4 Communication Security
The TOE supports encrypted transmission between NEs and the TOE, the external
system and the TOE, remote user and the TOE. It provides secure protocols, such as TLS,
SNMPv3, SSHv2 and SFTP, for data transmission.
 Communication Security between NEs and the TOE:
As a client, the TOE can initiate SSHv2 and TLS connections to establish secure
channels with the NEs.
As a server, the TOE also provides secure channels for the communication with NEs to
perform performance data bulk collection and software backup and update. The secure
channels are based on TLS connections initiated by NEs.
 Communication Security between the external system and the TOE:
As a client, the TOE can establish secure channels with the external system (like AAA
server, syslog server) over TLS, SNMPv3, or SSH.
As a client, the TOE can initiate SSH connections to establish secure channels with the
OSS, service orchestrator or service application.
As a server, the TOE can receive the TLS, HTTPS, and SNMPv3 connections initiated by
the OSS, service orchestrator, or service application to establish secure channels.
 Communication Security between remote users and the TOE:
The remote users access MAE-CN through web portal by initiating HTTPS connections.
(FTP_TRP.1, FTP_ITC.1/NE, FTP_ITC.1/ External System)
The TOE supports communicating with a CA server to apply the certificates. To prevent
modification, insertion and replay, the communication uses CMPv2 protocol over an HTTP
channel with RSA or ECDSA signature protection of the certificate. (FDP_UIT.1)
6.1.5 User Session Management
The TOE provides user session management. The function includes the following functions:
1) Session establishment
The session will be established after successful login authentication. When more than
three unsuccessful login attempts are detected since the last successful login, The TOE will
generate an alarm. The session establishment will be denied based on the policy below
(FTA.TSE.1).
Upon successful session establishment, the TOE will display the welcome message, last
successful login date, time and IP address, last unsuccessful login date, time and IP address,
login failure times since last successful login (FTA_TAH.1).
2) TSF-initiated session Termination
If a user does not perform any operation within the period of the default value 30 mins)
specified by this parameter, the user will be logged out. The setting takes effect only for local
and remote users and does not take effect for third-party users. If this parameter is set to
Unlimited, user sessions will not be automatically logged off (FTA_SSL.3).
3) User-initiated session termination
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Login user can click the user name in the upper right corner of the page and choose
Logout (FTA_SSL.4).
1. Users and their following security attributes:
a. Time segment for login, which means that the user shall log in to the TOE within a
specific time segment.
b. ACL, addressed in the previous section.
c. Maximum online sessions, which indicates that the number of online sessions shall
not exceed the maximum sessions, otherwise the user login requests after the
maximum online sessions shall be refused by the TOE. The default is none.
d. Disabled status, which means the user cannot log in to the TOE in the disabled status.
2. System security policy, which is prior to the security attributes of individual users
a. System login mode, which supports the multi-user login mode and single-user login
mode. During system operation and maintenance, the single-user mode is
recommended to prevent other users from logging in to the system and performing
operations that may affect O&M efficiency. When the single-user login mode is
selected, the TOE refuses all login requests including those for online sessions except
that of the super user admin. The multi-user login mode is a normal mode and has no
special limits.
6.1.6 Auditing
The TOE can generate audit records for security-relevant events as described in
FAU_GEN.1. The audit record has the following information: the activity name, level, user ID,
operation type, operation date and time, terminal, object, operation result, and details.
The audit review can be implemented with filter criteria on the MAE-CN client by users
attached to SMManagers, users with log query rights. Any user cannot delete and modify the
audit records.
Conditions for dumping logs: The number of logs in the database exceeds 1 million, the
size of the logs in the database exceeds 80% of the capacity, or the number of days for storing
the logs exceeds 45 days. To ensure sufficient database space, the system checks logs every
hour and saves logs that meet the requirements to the hard disk of a server. Then the dumped
logs are automatically deleted from the database.
Conditions for deleting log files: The size of the log files is greater than 1024 MB (default
value), the log files are stored for more than 45 days (default value), or the total number of log
files exceeds 1000 (default value). To ensure sufficient disk space, the system checks log files
every hour and deletes log files meeting the requirements from the hard disk.
By default, a maximum of 1 million logs can be stored in the database. If the database
space of log management is greater than or equal to 16 GB. The logs that exceed the
maximum number of logs stored in the database will be dumped.
The values in the preceding log dump conditions are default values.
Log service start/stop of the O&M plane will be recorded in audit logs of the management
plane. Log service start/stop of the management plane will be recorded in the
/var/log/messages directory of the OS.
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(FAU_GEN.1, FAU_GEN.2, FAU_SAR.1, FAU_SAR.2, FAU_SAR.3, FAU_STG.1, FAU_STG.3)
6.1.7 Security Management Function
The TOE provides security management if necessary. Only administrators have the privilege to
manage the behaviors of TOE security functions. This is partially already addressed in more
details in the previous sections of the TSS. It includes security attributes below.
1. Users and their following security attributes:
a. User ID, which is a user identifier, defined as a username in the TOE.
b. User Group, which is the same as a role definition.
c. Password, which should meet the predefined password policy, is encrypted with
PBKDF2 and stored in the database.
d. Time segment for login, addressed in the previous section.
e. ACL, addressed in the previous section.
f. Maximum online sessions, addressed in the previous section.
g. Disabled status, addressed in the previous section.
2. System security policy, which is prior to the security attributes of individual users
a. System login mode, addressed in the previous section.
b. Password policy, which has basic parameters and advanced parameters. Basic
parameters include the following items: Min. Length of common user password,
Min. Length of super user password, Max. Length of password, Max. Period for
password repetition (months), Password validity period (days), Minimum validity
period of the password (days), Number of days warning given before password
expiry, The Password Cannot Be Similar to History Passwords. Advanced
parameters include the following items: Min. Different characters between new
and old passwords, Min. Letter, Min. Lowercase, Min. Numbers. Account policy,
which has an upper threshold for legal login times and the excessive login
attempts cause account locking. Super user admin is not allowed to be locked.
All the users should meet the account policy defined in the TOE.
The TOE restricts the ability to manage the certificates, private keys, and symmetric keys
to SMManagers and users with sufficient user permissions.
(FMT_MSA.1, FMT_MSA.3, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_MOF.1, FMT_MTD.1)
6.1.8 Cryptographic Functions
Cryptographic functions are required by security features as dependencies. The following
cryptographic algorithms are supported:
1. The TOE supports symmetric encryption and decryption using the AES128-CBC
algorithm to protect sensitive data. (FCS_COP.1/AES).
2. The TOE shall release the cryptographic key memory by overwriting the byte or char
array with 0 if the key is no longer used (FCS_CKM.4).
3. The TOE supports a two-layer key management structure of root key + working key.
The root key is generated by PBKDF2 (HMACSHA2) algorithm from root key
materials. The working key is encrypted and protected by the root key. The working
key is used to provide confidential and complete protection for sensitive data saved in
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a local PC or data transferred through insecure channels. Both the two keys can be
updated manually (FCS_CKM.1/AES).
4. The TOE supports hashing of data using PBKDF2 (SHA256) algorithm according to
[RFC8018] for password hashing. The iteration number is at least 10,000 times. The
salt used in PBKDF2 is a 16-byte random number obtained from the TOE's
deterministic random number generator (FCS_COP.1/PBKDF2).
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7 Abbreviations, Terminology and
References
7.1 Abbreviations
Abbreviations Full Spelling
AAA Authentication Authorization Accounting
ACL Access Control List
CA Certificate Authority
CAS Central Authentication Service
CC Common Criteria
CHR Call History Record
CMP Certificate Management Protocol
CORBA Common Object Request Broker Architecture
E-UTRAN Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network
eNodeB E-UTRAN NodeB
EPC Evolved Packet Core
FTP File Transfer Protocol
FTPs FTP over SSL
GSM Global System for Mobile Communications
HTTP Hyper Text Transfer Protocol
HTTPS Hyper Text Transfer Protocol Secure
IMS Information Management System
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LTE Long term evolution
MAE MBB Automation Engine
MBB Mobile broadband
MML Man-Machine Language
MR Measurement Report
NE Network Element
NGN Next Generation Network
NMS Network Management System
NTP Network Time Protocol
OM Operation and Maintenance
OSS Operations Support System
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PP Protection Profile
RAN Radio Access Network
RAT Radio Access Technology
REST Representational State Transfer
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SFTP SSH File Transfer Protocol
SIG LTE-cell-level signaling tracing messages of the medium depth
for signaling correction
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
SNMPv3 SNMP version 3
SSH Secure Shell
SSHv2 SSH version 2
SSL Security Socket Layer
SSO Single Sign-on
ST Security Target
STP Signaling Transfer Point
TCP Transfer Control Protocol
TOE Target of Evaluation
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TLS Transport Layer Security
TSF TOE Security Functions
PP Protection Profile
UGW User Gateway
USN User Sequence Number
WebNIC Web Based Network Information Collection
VIM Virtualized Infrastructure Manager
EPC Evolved Packet Core
5GC 5G Core Network
IMS IP Multimedia Subsystem
PS Packet Switched
VNF Virtual Network Function
VNFM Virtualized Network Function Manager
NFVO Network Functions Virtualisation Orchestrator
SAML Security Assertion Markup Language
SP Service Provider
IdP Identity Provider
7.2 Terminology
This section contains definitions of technical terms that are used with a meaning specific to this
document. Terms defined in the [CC] are not reiterated here, unless stated otherwise.
Terminology Explanation
Administrator An administrator is a user of the TOE who may have been
assigned specific administrative privileges within the TOE. This ST
may use the term administrator occasionally in an informal context,
and not in order to refer to a specific role definition. From the TOE's
point of view, an administrator is simply a user who is authorized to
perform certain administrative actions on the TOE and the objects
managed by the TOE.
Operator See User.
User A user is a human or a product/application using the TOE.
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Terminology Explanation
Access Network In telecommunications, an access network is a network that
connects subscribers to telecommunication service providers over
public ground. It can be considered the route between the
subscriber's home and the ISP itself. The access network is
composed of the carrier's station and the end user.
OM data Data user for system operation and maintenance.
Access Domain Also called MAE-Access. MAE-Access manages Huawei mobile
network devices in a centralized manner, including WRAN, GBSS,
SingleRAN, LTE/EPC, WLAN, SingleDAS, eRelay, NGN, STP,
IoM, and IMS network devices, and auxiliary networking devices
(such as microwave devices and IP devices) used in mobile
networks. MAE-Access provides basic network management
functions, such as configuration management, performance
management, fault management, security management, log
management, topology management, software management, and
system management. It also provides a variety of optional
functions.
VNFM Domain Also called MAE-VNFLCM. MAE-VNFLCM is used for VNF
lifecycle management. It manages the lifecycles of virtualized and
containerized VNFs, including VNF deployment, VNF scaling, and
VNF self-healing.
NFVO Domain Also called MAE-orchestrator. MAE-orchestrator is a network
function virtualization service orchestration system. It orchestrates
and schedules NFV network services and resources, quickly
provisions services in an E2E manner, implements automatic
network deployment and unified O&M, and meets diversified
service requirements of various users.
NSSMF Domain Also called MAE-NSSMF. MAE-NSSMF provides slice subnet
management. It manages and orchestrates slice subnet instances.
With the NSSMF, operators can design the network slice subnet
template (NSST), define the SLA parameter range (such as the
uplink and downlink rates, delay, and maximum number of
subscribers) of the slice subnet, and define the associated network
service descriptor (NSD) file.
UDMC Domain Also called Unified Data Management Center or MAE-UDMC.
MAE-UDMC provides a capability platform for data collection,
storage, analysis, and governance within the MAE-CN autonomous
driving coverage. It does not provide features for customers and
only serves service features of MAE-CN.
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7.3 References
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation. Part 1-3. September
2019. Version 3.1 Revision 5.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation. September
2012. Version 3.1 Revision 5.