BSI-DSZ-CC-0810-V2-2014
for
NXP Secure Smart Card Controller
P60D024/016/012PVB/PVB(Y) with IC Dedicated
Software
from
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V4.75
BSI-DSZ-CC-0810-V2-2014
Smartcard Controller
NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D024/016/012PVB/PVB(Y) with
IC Dedicated Software
from NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version
1.0, 15 June 2007, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 6 augmented by
ASE_TSS.2 and ALC_FLR.1
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification
Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance
to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 4 April 2014
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department SOGIS Recognition
Agreement
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0810-V2-2014
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0810-V2-2014 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0810-V2-2014
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................13
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................16
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................16
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................16
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................17
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................17
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................18
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................19
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................21
11 Security Target............................................................................................................21
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................22
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................24
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................27
CC Part 1:.......................................................................................................................27
CC Part 3:.......................................................................................................................28
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................37
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0810-V2-2014 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● BSIG2
● BSI Certification Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN 45011 standard
● BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1]
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2]
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical
domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL1 to EAL4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher
recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined.
It includes assurance levels beyond EAL4 resp. E3 (basic). In addition, certificates issued
for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0810-V2-2014
As of September 2011 the new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of
Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and
the United Kingdom. Details on recognition and the history of the agreement can be found
at https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of September 2011 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of:
Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved
certification schemes can be seen on the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
This evaluation contains the components ADV_FSP.5, ADV_IMP.2, ADV_INT.3,
ADV_SPM.1, ADV_TDS.5, ALC_CMC.5, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_TAT.3,
ASE_TSS.2, ATE_COV.3, ATE_DPT.3, ATE_FUN.2 and AVA_VAN.5 that are not mutually
recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual recognition the
EAL4 components of these assurance families are relevant.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure,
a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D024/016/012PVB/PVB(Y) with IC
Dedicated Software has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a
re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0810-2012. Specific results from the evaluation
process BSI-DSZ-CC-0810-2012 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product NXP Secure Smart Card Controller
P60D024/016/012PVB/PVB(Y) with IC Dedicated Software was conducted by T-Systems
GEI GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 20 March 2014. T-Systems GEI GmbH is
an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: NXP Semiconductors
Germany GmbH.
The product was developed by: NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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4 Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and
certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management
needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a
regular e.g. annual basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5 Publication
The product NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D024/016/012PVB/PVB(Y) with IC
Dedicated Software has been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is
published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further
information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
Stresemannallee 101
22529 Hamburg
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0810-V2-2014 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0810-V2-2014
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the “NXP Secure Smart Card Controller
P60D024/016/012PVB/PVB(Y) with IC Dedicated Software”. It is a hardware platform for
the implementation of smart card operating systems supporting multiple applications. The
hardware platform provides coprocessors for Triple-DES with up to three keys, AES with
different key lengths, large integer arithmetic operations and cyclic redundancy check
calculation. In addition the hardware platform includes a True Random Number Generator
suitable to generate cryptographic keys. The TOE supports the ISO/IEC 7816 contact
interface with UART and the ISO/IEC 14443 A contactless interface. The implementation
of multiple applications is supported by the CPU offering different CPU modes with gradual
permissions and memory management control supporting the separation of different
memory segments. The IC Dedicated Software provides support for the EEPROM write
operation. The TOE "NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D024/016/012PVB/PVB(Y)
with IC Dedicated Software" is referenced as P60D024/016/012PVB/PVB(Y) in the
following.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007,
BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [7].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 6
augmented by ASE_TSS.2 and ALC_FLR.1.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 6.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2
and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SS.RNG Random Number Generator
SS.HW_DES Tripple-DES coprocessor
SS.HW_AES AES coprocessor
SS.CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
SS.RECONFIG Post Delivery Configuration
SF.OPC Control of Operating Conditions
SF.PHY Protection against Physical Manipulation
SF.LOG Logical Protection
SF.COMP Protection of Mode Control
SF.MEM_ACC Memory Access Control
SF.SFR_ACC Special Function Register Access Control
SF.FFW Firmware Firewall
SF.Firmware Firmware Support
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
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For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [8],
chapter 3.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [8], chapter 3.2 to 3.4.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this
certification procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D024/016/012PVB/PVB(Y) with IC Dedicated
Software
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW NXP Secure Smart Card Controller
P60D024/016/012PVB
nameplate 9047A and a
ROM code number
between 1 to 4 or 96 to 99
wafer, module,
inlay or package
NXP Secure Smart Card Controller
P60D024/016/012PVB(Y)
Nameplate 9047A and a
ROM code number
between 5 to 95
wafer, module,
inlay or package
2 SW Test ROM Software (Security IC
Dedicated Test Software), Test-ROM on
the chip acc. to
9047A_BG002_TESTROM_v1_btos_08v
07_fos_5v0.hex
Version 08.07,
21 September, 2011
stored in ROM on
the chip
3 SW Boot ROM Software (part of the Security
IC Dedicated Support Software),
Boot-ROM on the chip acc. to
9047A_BG002_TESTROM_v1_btos_08v
07_fos_5v0.hex
Version 08.07,
21 September, 2011
stored in ROM on
the chip
4 SW Firmware Operating System (FOS) (part
of the Security IC Dedicated Support
Software), Firmware Operating System
on the chip acc. to
9047A_BG002_TESTROM_v1_btos_08v
07_fos_5v0.hex
Version 5.00,
21 September, 2011
stored in ROM on
the chip
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No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
5 DOC Product Data Sheet SmartMX2
P60D024, Secure high performance
smart card controller, NXP
Semiconductors, Business Unit
Identification
Rev. 4.2, 30 August 2013 electronic form
[12]
6 DOC Instruction set for the SmartMX2 family,
Secure smart card controller, NXP
Semiconductors, Business Unit
Identification
Rev. 3.1, 2 February 2012 electronic form
[13]
7 DOC NXP Secure Smart Card Controller
P60D024/P60D016/P60D012 VB
Guidance and Operation Manual, NXP
Semiconductors,
Rev. 1.4, 13 November
2012
electronic form
[14]
8 DOC SmartMX2 P60D024/P60D016/P60D012
VB Wafer and delivery specification, NXP
Semiconductors
Rev. 3.0, 06 February
2012
electronic form
[15]
9 DOC Product Data Sheet Addendum,
SmartMX2 family Post Delivery
Configuration, NXP Semiconductors
Rev. 3.2, 04 February
2013
electronic form
[16]
10 DOC Product Data Sheet Addendum,
SmartMX2 family Chip Health Mode,
NXP Semiconductors
Rev. 3.0, 11 May 2012 electronic form
[17]
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE can be delivered with two different versions namely VB and VB(Y). These
versions can be differentiated by the ROM Code number of each TOE. ROM Code
numbers 001 to 004 and 096 to 099 are assigned to Version VB, and ROM Code numbers
005 to 095 are assigned to version VB(Y). Note that modification according IAR [24] is
included in all devices that have a ROM Code number xxx in the range of 005 to 095. The
ROM code number can be identified unambiguously by reading Security Row bytes RCN0
(DFFF8A) and RCN1 (DFF8B), see [12]. In addition the ROM Code number is physically
visible on the dice surface according to [15].
Note that only 7 items (the hardware platform and six documents) are delivered since the
IC Dedicated Software included in the ROM is delivered on chip as part of the hardware
platform. There is one Data Sheet [12] and one Guidance and Operation Manual [14] for
all configurations of the TOE. The delivery procedures are described in the Wafer and
delivery specification [15].
The hardware platform as part of the TOE is available in different packages as listed in the
following table. The table lists in the last column the package types that are supported in
this evaluation:
P60D024PVB/
PVB(Y)
P60D016PVB/
PVB(Y)
P60D012PVB/
PVB(Y)
Ux Ux Ux Wafer not thinner than 50 μm (The letter “x” in
“Ux” stands for a capital letter or a number,
which identifies the wafer type)
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P60D024PVB/
PVB(Y)
P60D016PVB/
PVB(Y)
P60D012PVB/
PVB(Y)
Xn Xn Xn Module (The letter “n” in” Xn” stands for a
capital letter or a number, which identifies the
module type)
A4 A4 MOB4 module
A6 A6 MOB6 module
Ai Ai Inlay (The letter ‘i” in “Ai” stands for a capital
letter, which identifies both, the inlay type and
the package type inside the inlay.)
Table 3: Supported package types
The requirements for the delivery of these package types are described in Chapter 2 of the
Guidance and Operation Manual [14] and in Wafer and delivery specification [15], Chapter
4. For each delivery form of the hardware platform NXP BU ID offers two ways of delivery
of the TOE:
1. The customer collects the hardware platform himself at the NXP BU ID site.
2. The hardware platform is sent to the customer by NXP BU ID with special protective
measures.
The TOE documentation (last six items of table 2) is delivered in electronic form by the
document control center of NXP.
The commercial type name is the identification used to order the TOE in the respective
major configuration and with the evaluated package type. In consequence this means that
a full commercial product name that fits in the variable forms described in table 3
determines that the hardware platform is an evaluated product. In addition the hardware
version can be identified by the crypted nameplate "9047A" on the surface of the hardware
platform as described in sections 4.2 and 3.8.3 of the Wafer and delivery specification [15].
The nameplate is the same for all configurations. In addition each major configuration has
a different device coding described in [12]. The device coding is reproduced in the
following table 4. Identification is also possible using the Chip Health Mode. The
identification string provided by the command 00h of the Chip Health Mode comprises also
the device coding and the firmware version. Each major configuration has a dedicated
device coding as listed in the following table.
P60D024PVB/PVB(Y) P60D016PVB/PVB(Y) P60D012PVB/PVB(Y)
DC0 22 22 22
DC1 0C 0B 0A
DC2 00 00 00
DC3 17 17 17
DC4
00h / 01h depending on
the configuration
00h / 01h depending on
the configuration
00h / 01h depending on
the configuration
Table 4: Device coding of the major configurations
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3 Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. As the TOE is a security hardware platform, the security policy
of the TOE provides countermeasures against: leakage of information, physical probing,
malfunctions, physical manipulations, access to code, access to data memory, abuse of
functionality. Hence the TOE shall:
● maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the TOE
and
● maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of Security Functions
(security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the TOE.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
● Clarification of “Usage of Hardware Platform (OE.Plat-Appl)”
● Clarification of “Treatment of User Data (OE.Resp-Appl)”
● Protection during composite product manufacturing (OE.Process-Sec-IC)
● Check of initialisation data by the Security IC Embedded Software (OE.Check-Init)
Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 4.2 and 4.3.
5 Architectural Information
The P60D024/016/012PVB/PVB(Y) smartcard controller is an integrated circuit (IC)
providing a hardware platform with IC Dedicated Support Software for a Security IC
Embedded Software. A top level block diagram and a list of subsystems can be found
within the TOE description of the Security Target [6] and [8]. The complete description of
the hardware platform and the IC Dedicates Support Software as well as the complete
instruction set of the P60D024/016/012PVB/PVB(Y) smartcard controller can be found in
the “Product Data Sheet SmartMX2 P60D024”, [12] (and its addendums [16] and [17]) as
well as the “Instruction set”, [13].
The hardware platform comprises the following components: 8-bit CPU, Special Function
Registers, Triple-DES Co-Processor, AES Co-processor, CRC Coprocessor, Fame2 Co-
Processor, Memory Management Unit, Copy Machine, Random Number Generator
(RNG), Power Module and a module comprising Security Sensors and Filters. The
hardware platform comprises a contact-based interface and a contactless interface. The
CPU provides three different CPU Modes in order to separate different applications
running on the TOE. One CPU Mode is reserved for the Firmware Operating System
supporting specific functionality of the hardware platform. The security measures for
physical protection are realized within the layout of the whole circuitry.
The Special Function Registers that can be controlled by the Security IC Embedded
Software provide one interface to the security functionality of the TOE. The
P60D024/016/012PVB/PVB(Y) provides different levels of access control to the SFR with
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the different CPU Modes and additional – configurable – access control to Special
Function Registers for the User Mode and the Firmware Mode.
The Fame2 does not provide a cryptographic algorithm itself. The modular arithmetic
functions are suitable to implement different asymmetric cryptographic algorithms. The
coprocessor implements security features to support the protection against fault attacks
and timing attacks as described in [6] and [8].
The TOE executes the IC Dedicated Support Software (Boot Software) during the start up
to configure and initialise the hardware. This software is executed in the Boot Mode. After
the start-up is finished and the CPU Mode changed to System Mode it is not possible to
re-enter the Boot Mode without forcing a reset.
The Firmware Operating System provides several functions to the Security IC Embedded
Software. The functions can be grouped in support of the EEPROM write operation and
support for the contactless communication. Note that Mifare emulations are not part of the
current TOE and the related functions provide only dummy interfaces which return an error
message. The EEPROM write support performs an additional re-trimming process in order
to ensure the endurance of the EEPROM module. The Firmware can be used to activate
and maintain the contactless ISO 14443 protocol. A strict separation between this IC
Dedicated Support Software and the Security IC Embedded Software is ensured since the
Firmware is executed in the Firmware Mode. The System Mode and the User Modes
support the partitioning of the memories and can configure a shared memory area in the
RAM. The Firmware is able to access the Security IC Embedded Software and the User
Data stored in the EEPROM area to support the EEPROM write operation. Code and data
of the Firmware Operating System cannot be accessed by the Security IC Embedded
Software running in System Mode or User Mode.
The hardware platform comprises a contact based interface and a contactless interface.
Both interfaces can be used independent from each other. Depending on the major
configuration the contactless interface is disabled, refer to table 5. Based on a specific
minor configuration and an associated clock configuration both interfaces could be used
simultaneously also.
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7 IT Product Testing
The TOE is a Security IC hardware platform with IC Dedicated Software. It is defined
uniquely by the name P60D024PVB//PVB(Y), P60D016PVB/PVB(Y) and
P60D012PVB/PVB(Y) related to the major configuration. Its implementation representation
and their (unique) configurations are exactly specified by the Configuration Lists [11] for
the hardware platform and [18] for the IC Dedicated Support Software.
The tests performed by the developer can be divided into the following categories:
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1. Tests which are performed in a simulation environment with different tools for the
analogue circuitries and for the digital parts of the TOE;
2. Functional tests which are performed with special software to test all TSFIs;
3. Characterisation and verification tests to release the hardware platform for
production including tests with different operating conditions as well as special
verification tests for security services and security features of the hardware;
4. Functional tests at the end of the production process using IC Dedicated Test
Software. These tests are executed for every chip to check its correct functionality
and individually trim each device as last step of phase 3 of the life-cycle defined in
[7].
The developer tests cover all TSFIs identified in the functional specification as well as in
the test documentation. The evaluators were able to repeat the tests of the developer. The
tests are repeated and verified against the test protocols provided by the developer. The
tests of the developer are repeated by sampling. In addition the evaluators performed
independent tests to supplement, augment and to verify the tests performed by the
developer. The tests of the evaluators comprise special tests and examination of the
hardware platform and the Firmware using open samples. In addition the evaluators
perform tests of the hardware platform and the Firmware using different major
configurations according to table 5. Minor configuration options were characterised
performing the same test under similar conditions for different minor configuration options.
The evaluation provides evidence that the actual version of the hardware platform
provides the TOE Security Functionality as specified by the developer. The test results
confirm the correct implementation of the TOE Security Functionality.
For penetration testing the evaluators took all TOE Security Functionality into
consideration. Extensive penetration testing was performed to test the security
mechanisms used to provide the Security Services and Security Features. The tests for
the hardware platform and the Firmware comprise the use of bespoke equipment and
expert knowledge. The penetration tests considered physical tampering of the hardware
platform including information that can be gathered by reverse engineering to support
other attacks. Further on attacks that do not modify the hardware platform physically such
as side channel analysis for the coprocessors (AES, Triple-DES) and perturbation attacks
were performed. The test of the hardware platform and the Firmware comprises attacks
that must be averted by the combination of the hardware platform and the Security IC
Embedded Software as well as attacks against the hardware platform and the Firmware
directly.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The P60D024/016/012PVB/PVB(Y) can be delivered in different major configurations. All
major configurations listed in the following table are covered by the evaluation. Due to the
naming conventions of the SmartMX2 family the configured TOEs have different names.
P60D024PVB/PVB(Y) P60D016PVB/PVB(Y) P60D012PVB/PVB(Y)
accessible
EEPROM for the
Security IC
Embedded
24 kBytes except for 512
Bytes reserved for
Security Rows and
configuration data of the
16 kBytes except for 512
Bytes reserved for
Security Rows and
configuration data of the
12 kBytes except for 512
Bytes reserved for
Security Rows and
configuration data of the
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P60D024PVB/PVB(Y) P60D016PVB/PVB(Y) P60D012PVB/PVB(Y)
Software manufacturer and 768
Bytes reserved for IC
Dedicated Support
Software (Firmware OS)
manufacturer and 768
Bytes reserved for IC
Dedicated Support
Software (Firmware OS)
manufacturer and 768
Bytes reserved for IC
Dedicated Support
Software (Firmware OS)
Table 5: Overview of major configurations
The P60D024/016/012PVB/PVB(Y) hardware platform was tested including all major
configurations as well as all minor configuration options that can be selected based on
table 4 in section 1.4.2.2 of [6] and [8]. All major and minor configurations are available to
the evaluator. Besides the differences listed in table 5 there are no other differences
between the major configurations. The major configuration does not have dependencies to
security features. All minor configuration options that are part of the evaluation were
tested. The minor configuration options behave as specified and described in [12] and
[14]. Therefore the results described in this document are applicable for the major
configurations P60D024PVB/PVB(Y), P60D016PVB/PVB(Y) and the
P60D012PVB/PVB(Y) as well as for all minor configurations described in [6] and [8].
The major and minor configurations cannot be influenced by the customer. They are
selected by the customer according to the Order Entry Form [21] or the related Order
Entry Forms for the major configured types (refer to [22] or [23]). The configuration cannot
be changed in the Application Mode after delivery of the TOE.
The documentation of the configuration comprises two parts. The general configuration list
is included in [19]. The customer specific configuration settings of a product according to
the order entry form are listed in [20]. For the customer specific configuration information a
configuration template (refer to [20]) is used which is adapted regarding the customer
selectable configuration options.
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [9] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
(i) The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
(ii) Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards
(iii) Guidance, Smartcard Evaluation
(see [4], AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 37).
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 31 was used (see [4]).
To support composite evaluations according to AIS 36 the document ETR for composite
evaluation [10] was provided and approved. This document provides details of this
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platform evaluation that have to be considered in the course of a composite evaluation on
top.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 6 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ASE_TSS.2 and ALC_FLR.1 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a
re-evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0810-2012, re-use of specific
evaluation tasks was possible. The analogue block of the hardware platform
P60D024/016/012PVB/PVB(Y) includes an adjustment within the analogue block (cf. [24]).
This change was implemented for yield improvement. In addition a minor configuration
option was added to allow a start up of the TOE only if the operating conditions specified
in ISO/IEC 7816 and/or ISO/IEC 14443 A are provided to the TOE. Further on the Product
Data Sheet SmartMX2 P60D024 was updated with respect to the additional minor
configuration option. The evaluators performed additional dedicated functional and
penetration testing of the adapted analogue block. The different versions VB and VB(Y) of
the TOE reflect the unpatched and patched versions of the analogue block. The evaluators
found no indication that the change of the analogue block has an impact on the
functionality or the side channel behaviour of the TOE.Therefore, parts of the test results
of the former hardware evaluation were reused.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007,
BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [7]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 6 augmented by ASE_TSS.2 and ALC_FLR.1
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this
certification procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But Cryptographic
Functionalities with a security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as
secure without considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it
shall be checked whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended
system. Some further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie
BSI TR-02102' (https://www.bsi.bund.de).
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Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 100 Bits'
of the following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general
context).
Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Security Level
above 100 Bits
Cryptographic
Primitives
Two-key TDES [FIPS-46-3] (DES) |K| = 112 no
Three-key TDES [FIPS-46-3] (DES) |K| = 168 yes
AES [FIPS-197] (AES) |K| = 128, 192,
256
yes
Table 6: TOE cryptographic functionality
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of
the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
Some security measures are partly implemented in the hardware and the IC Dedicated
Support Software. These security measures require additional configuration or control or
measures to be implemented by the Security IC Embedded Software.
For this reason the TOE includes guidance documentation (see table 2) for the developer
of the Security IC Embedded Software on how to securely use the microcontroller chip and
the IC Dedicated Support Software. In order to fulfil the security requirements of the
Security Target of the TOE the measures have to be implemented by the Security IC
Embedded Software as described in the guidance documentation.
In the course of the evaluation of the composite product or system it must be examined if
the required measures have been correctly and effectively implemented by the software.
Additionally, the evaluation of the composite product or system must also consider the
evaluation results as outlined in the document ETR for composite evaluation [10].
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [8] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
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12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CPU Central Processing Unit
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
DES Data Encryption Standard
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IC Integrated Circuit
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
ISO International Organization for Standardization
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
RAM Random Access Memory
ROM Read Only Memory
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TSFI TOE Security Functionality Interface
UART Universal Asynchronous Receiver Transmitter
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
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Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on
well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon
which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a
TOE type.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied
by guidance.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 3, July 2009
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 3, July 2009
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
in the BSI Website
[6] NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D024/016/012PVB/PVB(Y) Security Target,
NXP Semiconductors, Business Unit Identification, Rev. 2.2, 04 November 2013
(confidential document)
[7] Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007,
BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007
[8] NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D024/016/012PVB/PVB(Y) Security Target
lite, NXP Semiconductors, Business Unit Identification, Rev. 2.2, 04 November 2013
(sanitised public document)
[9] Evaluation Technical Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0810, Version 1.7, 20 March 2014,
T-Systems GEI GmbH (confidential document)
[10] ETR for composition according to AIS36, NXP P60D024/016/012PVB, T-Systems
GEI GmbH, Version 1.7, 11 March 2014 (confidential document)
[11] NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D024/016/012eVB/PVB(Y) Configuration
List for the hardware platform, NXP Semiconductors, Rev. 2,20, 04 November 2013
(confidential document)
8
specifically
• AIS 25, Version 8, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 9, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+ (CCv2.3 & CCv3.1)
and EAL6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 35, Version 1, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and
CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 36, Version 4, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
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[12] Product Data Sheet SmartMX2 P60D024, Secure high performance smart card
controller, NXP Semiconductors, Business Unit Identification, Rev. 4.2, 30 August
2013 (confidential document)
[13] Instruction set for the SmartMX2 family, Secure smart card controller, NXP
Semiconductors, Business Unit Identification, Rev. 3.1, 2 February 2012
(confidential document)
[14] NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D024/P60D016/P60D012 VB Guidance and
Operation Manual, NXP Semiconductors, Rev. 1.4, 13 November 2012 (confidential
document)
[15] SmartMX2 P60D024/P60D016/P60D012 VB Wafer and delivery specification, NXP
Semiconductors, Rev. 3.0, 06 February 2012 (confidential document)
[16] Product Data Sheet Addendum, SmartMX2 family Post Delivery Configuration, NXP
Semiconductors, Rev. 3.2, 04 February 2013 (confidential document)
[17] Product Data Sheet Addendum, SmartMX2 family Chip Health Mode, NXP
Semiconductors, Rev. 3.0, 11 May 2012 (confidential document)
[18] NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D024/016/012PVB Configuration List for the
firmware, NXP Semiconductors, Rev. 1.2, 16 July 2012 (confidential document)
[19] NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D024/016/012eVB/PVB(Y) Appendix of the
Configuration List for composite evaluation, NXP Semiconductors, Rev. 2.20, 04
November 2013 (confidential document)
[20] NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D024/016/012eVB Customer specific
Appendix of the Configuration List, NXP Semiconductors, Rev. 2.10, 30 August
2013 (confidential document)
[21] Order Entry Form P60D024, NXP Semiconductors, Business Unit Identification,
online document, Release: 2.13
[22] Order Entry Form P60D016, NXP Semiconductors, Business Unit Identification,
online document, Release: 2.11
[23] Order Entry Form P60D012, NXP Semiconductors, Business Unit Identification,
online document, Release: 2.11
[24] Impact Analysis Report (Change of the Analogue Block and Run mode),
P60D024/016/012PVB NXP Secure Smart Card Controller, NXP Semiconductors,
Rev. 1.5, 20 November 2013
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0810-V2-2014 Certification Report
C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal
high-level design presentation
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational
use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the
TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through
security objectives.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter
8.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
“Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0810-V2-2014
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D024/016/012PVB/PVB(Y) with IC
Dedicated Software (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an approved
evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM),
Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5
and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance to the Common
Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 4 April 2014, the following results regarding the
development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.5, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.2, ALC_FLR.1, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.3)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
Development site Task within the evaluation
NXP Semiconductors Hamburg
Business Unit Identification (BU ID)
Stresemannallee 101
2569 Hamburg
Germany
Development, Delivery and customer support
TSMC, Fab 2 and 5
No. 121 Park Ave. III
Hsinchu Science Park
Hsinchu, Taiwan 300, R.O.C.
Mask data preparation
TSMC, Fab 7
No. 6, Creation Rd. II
Hsinchu Science Park
Hsinchu, Taiwan 300, R.O.C.
Mask data preparation
TSMC, Fab 6 and Fab 14
No. 1, Nan-Ke North Rd.
Tainan Science Park
Tainan, Taiwan 741, R.O.C.
Mask and wafer production
Chipbond Technology Corporation
No. 3, Li-Hsin Rd. V
Science Based Industrial Park
Hsin-Chu City
Taiwan, R.O.C.
Bumping
NXP Semiconductors GmbH Hamburg Test Center and configuration of the Fabkey
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Development site Task within the evaluation
Test Center Europe - Hamburg (TCE-H)
Stresemannallee 101
22569 Hamburg
Germany
Assembly Plant Bangkok
303 Moo 3 Chaengwattana Rd.
Laksi, Bangkok 10210
Thailand
Test Center, Delivery and Module assembly
Assembly Plant Kaohsiung
NXP Semiconductors Taiwan Ltd
#10, Jing 5th Road, N.E.P.Z, Kaohsiung 81170
Taiwan, R.O.C
Test Center and Module assembly
SMARTRAC Technology Ltd.
142 Moo 1 Hi-Tech Industrial Estate
Tambon Ban Laean, Amphor Bang-Pa-In
13160 Ayutthaya
Thailand
Inlay assembly
SMARTRAC Technology Wehnrath GmbH
Gewerbeparkstr. 10
51580 Reichshof-Wehnrath
Germany
Inlay assembly
HID Global Teoranta
Paic Tionscail na Tulaigh
Balle na hAbhann
Co. Galway
Ireland
Inlay assembly
NXP Semiconductors Austria GmbH Styria
Business Unit Identification (BU ID)
Mikron-Weg 1
8108 Gratkorn
Austria
Document control
NedCard B.V.
Bijsterhuizen 25-29
6604 LM Wijchen
The Netherlands
Module assembly
NedCard (Shanghai) Microelectronics Co. Ltd.
Standardized Plant Building #8
No. 789 Puxing Road
Caohejing Hi-Tech Park, EPZ
201114 Shanghai
People’s Republic of China
Module assembly
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
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and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [8]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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