BSI-DSZ-CC-0949-2017
for
Red Hat Enterprise Linux
Version 7.1
from
Red Hat
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.15
BSI-DSZ-CC-0949-2017 (*)
Operating System
Red Hat Enterprise Linux
Version 7.1
from Red Hat
PP Conformance: General-Purpose Operating System Protection
Profile Version 3.9, 6 December 2012, OSPP
Technical Community
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408
and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 4
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Common Criteria
Bonn, 15 November 2017
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Division
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0949-2017
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0949-2017 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0949-2017
Contents
A. Certification.......................................................................................................................7
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure................................................................7
2. Recognition Agreements...............................................................................................7
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification.................................................................8
4. Validity of the Certification Result..................................................................................9
5. Publication...................................................................................................................10
B. Certification Results........................................................................................................11
1. Executive Summary....................................................................................................12
2. Identification of the TOE..............................................................................................13
3. Security Policy.............................................................................................................15
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope......................................................................15
5. Architectural Information..............................................................................................15
6. Documentation............................................................................................................16
7. IT Product Testing........................................................................................................16
8. Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................19
9. Results of the Evaluation.............................................................................................20
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE......................................................23
11. Security Target...........................................................................................................23
12. Definitions..................................................................................................................23
13. Bibliography...............................................................................................................25
C. Excerpts from the Criteria...............................................................................................27
CC Part 1:.......................................................................................................................27
CC Part 3:.......................................................................................................................28
D. Annexes..........................................................................................................................35
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0949-2017 Certification Report
A. Certification
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security2
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045.
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1. European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0949-2017
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For
"Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices
with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too. In addition, certificates
issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition
agreement.
The new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of Austria, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The
current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on recognition,
and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at https://www.sogisportal.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
2.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The CCRA-2014 replaces the old CCRA signed in May 2000 (CCRA-2000). Certificates
based on CCRA-2000, issued before 08 September 2014 are still under recognition
according to the rules of CCRA-2000. For on 08 September 2014 ongoing certification
procedures and for Assurance Continuity (maintenance and re-certification) of old
certificates a transition period on the recognition of certificates according to the rules of
CCRA-2000 (i.e. assurance components up to and including EAL 4 or the assurance
family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR)) is defined until 08 September 2017.
As of September 2014 the signatories of the new CCRA-2014 are government
representatives from the following nations: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea,
Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
As the product certified has been accepted into the certification process before 08
September 2014, this certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2000, i.e.
for all assurance components selected.
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
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The product Red Hat Enterprise Linux, Version 7.1 has undergone the certification
procedure at BSI. Specific results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0754-2012
were re-used.
The evaluation of the product Red Hat Enterprise Linux, Version 7.1 was conducted by
atsec information security GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 2 June 2017. atsec
information security GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification
body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Red Hat.
The product was developed by: Red Hat.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report or in the CC itself.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods require
a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on
15 November 2017 is valid until 14 November 2022 Validity can be re-newed by re-
certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5. Publication
The product Red Hat Enterprise Linux, Version 7.1 has been included in the BSI list of
certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de
and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
Red Hat
Purkynova 99
61245 Brno
Czeck Republic
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0949-2017 Certification Report
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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1. Executive Summary
Red Hat Enterprise Linux is a highly-configurable Linux-based operating system which has
been developed to provide a good level of security as required in commercial
environments. It also meets all requirements of the Operating System protection profile [8].
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the Protection Profile
General-Purpose Operating System Protection Profile Version 3.9, 6 December 2012,
OSPP Technical Community [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the following SARs: ASE_INT.1, ASE_CCL.1, ASE_SPD.1, ASE_OBJ.2,
ASE_ECD.1, ASE_REQ.2, ASE_TSS.1, ADV_ARC.1, ADV_FSP.1, AGD_OPE.1,
AGD_PRE.1, ALC_CMC.3, ALC_CMS.3, ALC_DEL.1, ALC_FLR.3, ALC_LCD.1,
ATE_COV.2, ATE_DPT.1, ATE_FUN.1, ATE_IND.2, AVA_VAN.2.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some
of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
Auditing The Lightweight Audit Framework (LAF) is
designed to be an audit system making Linux
compliant with the requirements from Common
Criteria. LAF is able to intercept all system calls
as well as retrieving audit log entries from
privileged user space applications. The
subsystem allows configuring the events to be
actually audited from the set of all events that are
possible to be audited.
Trusted Channel The TOE provides cryptographically secured
communication to allow remote entities to log into
the TOE. For interactive usage, the SSHv2
protocol is provided. The TOE provides the server
side as well as the client side applications. Using
OpenSSH, password-based and public-key-
based authentication are allowed.
Network Information Flow Control The TOE provides a stateless and stateful packet
filter for regular IP-based communication. OSI
Layer 3 (IP) and OSI layer 4 (TCP, UDP, ICMP)
network protocols can be controlled using this
packet filter. To allow virtual machines to
communicate with the environment, the TOE
provides a bridging functionality. Ethernet frames
routed through bridges are controlled by a
separate packet filter which implements a
stateless packet filter for the TCP/IP protocol
family.
Identification and Authentication User identification and authentication in the TOE
includes all forms of interactive login (e.g. using
the SSH protocol or log in at the local console) as
well as identity changes through the su or sudo
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TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
command. These all rely on explicit
authentication information provided interactively
by a user.
Discretionary Access Control (DAC) DAC allows owners of named objects to control
the access permissions to these objects. These
owners can permit or deny access for other users
based on the configured permission settings. The
DAC mechanism is also used to ensure that
untrusted users cannot tamper with the TOE
mechanisms.
Security Management The security management facilities provided by
the TOE are usable by authorized users and/or
authorized administrators to modify the
configuration of TSF.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7.3.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Red Hat Enterprise Linux, Version 7.1
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of
Delivery
1 SW Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.1 Server, x86_64 Architecture
rhel-server-7.1-x86_64-dvd.iso SHA-256 Checksum:
3685468ec6cdcb70dfc85ebbc164da427dc2d762644c3c2ee1520f4
f661c15ce
7.1 Download
2 SW Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.1 Server, ppc64 Architecture
rhel-server-7.1-ppc64-dvd.iso SHA-256 Checksum:
021d7db257ba9242e6408fbd308daacf58302d6bc32158e6bef50b1
3d7ed3f79
7.1 Download
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No Type Identifier Release Form of
Delivery
3 SW Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.1 Server, ppc64le Architecture
rhel-server-7.1-ppc64le-dvd.iso SHA-256 Checksum:
357e4df56b71356c5c9e2c916cf412a048350b386926840365b076
9894460fa1
7.1 Download
4 SW Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.1 Server, s390x Architecture
rhel-server-7.1-s390x-dvd.iso SHA-256 Checksum:
2334c1aa0bdc1be41b1c53b6a823bd98ea78b1bfd030c5587764e9
caa7fedfe9
7.1 Download
5 SW /
DOC
Evaluation package RPM EAL4_RHEL7.1, including the
"Evaluated Configuration Guide" ([10])
cc-config-rhel71-*.rpm
7.1 Download
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
2.1. Overview of Delivery Procedure
The TOE is delivered from the developer, Red Hat, using the Red Hat delivery mechanism
described below . There are several download components: the Red Hat Enterprise Linux
Server 7.1 distribution (ISO file) files, and additional packages created specifically for the
evaluation of RHEL 7.1 (containing the kickstart file, Evaluated Configuration Guide, and
configuration files), and multiple additional packages that must be installed to obtain the
TOE. The packages and ISO files are delivered via the same delivery mechanism.
RHEL 7.1 is delivered via the Red Hat Network (RHN), an online retrieval system provided
by the developer. The packages are built by the Red Hat Release Engineering Group and
immediately signed using the Red Hat PGP private Key (the public key is widely
distributed and available). ISO images are created and SHA-256 checksums of the images
are generated. The ISO images for the release are transferred to a staging area on the
web server hosting the RHN using SSH. The SHA-256 checksums for the images are
verified to ensure that the image has not been modified. The image is then moved to the
public download area and the SHA-256 checksum is checked again to verify that the
image has not been modified. Customers download the ISO images and are advised
within the [10] to verify the checksums and the signatures.
The package download is securely provided by the developer, reviewed and built into an
RPM, signed by Release Engineering using the signing key referenced above, and
electronically delivered by Red Hat's distribution network. Customers who download the
package are advised to verify the signature.
2.2. Identification of the TOE by the User
The customer can identify the TOE packages in the download sites by appropriate
labeling. The download page lists the release and the architecture (for example "Red Hat
Enterprise Linux Server for (v. 7.1 for x86_64)"). The downloaded ISO image is named
according to release and architecture like in rhel-server-7.1-<platform>-dvd.iso. Following
installation, the user can verify by looking at the content of file /etc/release that the
installed version is "Red Hat Enterprise Linux Server release 7.1". The evaluated
configuration is achieved, when the user follows the instructions provided in [10], which is
part of the "cc-config-rhel71-*.rpm" packages.
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For all packages, the user can verify their integrity by downloading the RedHat signing key
from the download website and running the rpm --checksig command as described in the
Evaluated Configuration Guide. To verify whether the correct versions of the packages
have been installed, users can use the rpm -qa command and search the output for the
respective packages.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
• Auditing
• Trusted Channel
• Packet filter/Network Information Flow Control
• Identification and Authentication
• Discretionary Access Control (DAC)
• Security Management
For more details please refer to Table 1 and the Security Target [6], chapter 7.3.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
• Competent and trustworthy administrators
• Trusted remote IT systems
• Procedures for information protection
• Installation and configuration in a secure manner
• Careful system maintenance
• Physical protection
• Secure recovery mechanisms
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is structured in much the same way as many other operating systems, especially
Unix-type operating systems. It consists of a kernel, which runs in the privileged state of
the processor and provides services to applications (which can be used by calling kernel
services via the system call interface). Direct access to the hardware is restricted to the
kernel, so whenever an application wants to access hardware like disk drives, network
interfaces or other peripheral devices, it has to call kernel services. The kernel then checks
if the application has the required access rights and privileges and either performs the
service or rejects the request.
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The kernel is also responsible for separating the different user processes. This is done by
the management of the virtual and real memory of the TOE which ensures that processes
executing with different attributes cannot directly access memory areas of other processes
but have to do so using the inter-process communication mechanism provided by the
kernel as part of its system call interface.
The TSF of the TOE also include a set of trusted processes, which when initiated by a
user, operate with extended privileges. The programs that represent those trusted
processes on the file system are protected by the file system discretionary access control
security function enforced by the kernel.
In addition, the execution of the TOE is controlled by a set of configuration files, which are
also called the TSF database. Those configuration files are also protected by the file
system discretionary access control security function enforced by the kernel.
Normal users – after they have been successfully authenticated by a defined trusted
process – can start untrusted applications where the kernel enforces the security policy of
the TOE when those applications request services from the kernel via the system call
interface.
The TOE includes a secure system initialization function which brings the TOE into a
secure state after it is powered on or after a reset. This function ensures that user
interaction with the TOE can only occur after the TOE is securely initialized and in a secure
state.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
7.1. Developer Testing
All the hardware platforms which are outlined in chapter 8 have been tested.
The developer did not test all machines of all families, but at least one machine for each
CPU and virtualisation type as the other differences between the machines are related to
the provided hardware environment that has no impact on the security of the TOE.
Developer Testing Approach
The test plan provided by the developer lists test cases by groups, which reflects the mix
of sources for the test cases. The provided mapping lists the SFRs and the TSFI the test
cases are associated with. The test plan is focused on the security functions of the TOE
and ignores other aspects typically found in developer test plans. The test cases are
mapped to the corresponding functional specification and HLD.
The developer uses one test suite which pulls in tests from older test suites (LTP) for some
specific cases, but the actual handling of this is transparent to the user. The test suite has
a common framework for the automated tests in which individual test cases adhere to a
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common structure for setup, execution and cleanup of tests. Each test case may contain
several tests of the same function, stressing different parts (for example, base functionality,
behavior with illegal parameters and reaction to missing privileges). Each test within a test
case reports PASS, OK or FAIL and the test case summary in batch mode reports PASS if
all the tests within the test case passed, otherwise FAIL. All the tests were executed
successfully (pass).
Developer Testing Results
The test results provided by the developer were generated on the hardware platform listed
above. As described in the testing approach, the test results of all the automated tests are
written to files.
All test results from all tested environments show that the expected test results are
identical to the actual test results.
Developer Test Coverage
The functional specification has identified the following different TSFI:
• system calls (which applies to most other resource like files, IPC, network socket)
• security critical configuration files (TSF databases)
• trusted programs and the corresponding network protocol SSH v2 or program-
specific local protocols (DBus)
The mapping provided by the developer shows that the tests cover all individual TSFI
identified for the TOE. An extension to this mapping developed by the evaluator as
documented in the test case coverage analysis document shows that also significant
details of the TSFI have been tested with the developer’s test suite.
Developer Test Depth
In addition to the mapping to the functional specification, the developer provided a
mapping of test cases to subsystems of the TOE design and the internal interfaces
described in the TOE design at subsystem level. This mapping shows that all subsystems
and the internal interfaces are covered by test cases. To show evidence that the internal
interfaces have been called, the developer provided the description of the internal
interfaces as part of the TOE design. The interfaces are clear enough to allow the
evaluator to assess whether they have been covered by testing.
Not all the internal interfaces mentioned in the TOE design at subsystem level could be
covered by direct test cases. Due to the restrictions of the evaluated configuration, some
internal interfaces can only be invoked during system startup. This especially includes
internal interfaces to load and unload kernel modules, to register / de-register device
drivers and install / de-install interrupt handlers. Since the evaluated configuration does not
allow to dynamically load and unload device drivers as kernel modules, those interfaces
are only used during system startup and are, therefore, implicitly tested there.
7.2. Evaluator Testing Effort
The evaluator verified the test systems according to the documentation in the Evaluated
Configuration Guide [10] and the test plan. The test setup for the independent testing
consisted of developer test systems only (accessed remotely), and the configuration
contained both Base and MLS systems.
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The evaluator testing effort consisted of two parts. The first one was the execution of the
developer tests and the second one was the execution of the tests created by the
evaluator. The evaluator did not rerun all tests on all machines, but a reasonable sample
size with a focus on 64bit as this is the typical usage for the TOE to gain confidence in the
developer tests. Therefore, not all permutations where run.
In addition to repeating the tests that were provided by the developer according to the test
plan from the developer, the evaluator decided to run some additional test cases on the
provided test systems:
• Permission settings of relevant configuration files
• Capability test
• Netlink restrictions
• Verification of code vulnerability protection functions:
• return address modification on the stack
• program section overwrite
• kernel code execution in user space
• NSS protocol tests
• OpenSSL and NSS timing tests
• additional dm-crypt cipher tests
• SSH cipher tests
All tests passed.
Evaluator Penetration Testing
The following parts of the TOE were scheduled for testing:
1. "Seccomp Filtering" (Not present on POWER architecture)
2. "Stack Canaries can be guessed"
3. "DBus fuzzing"
4. "OpenSSH authentication"
5. "syscall thrashing"
6. "CVE-2015-5157"
7. Virtual filesystem permissions
The evaluator chose a mix of source code based assessment, fuzzing of complex
interfaces as well as directed testing of possible flaws to identify flaws within the TOE.
The TOE was in its evaluated configuration, as indicated in AVA_VAN.2-1: Application level
tests ran on a virtualized x86 platform, system call level tests ran on the actual platforms
(x86, s390, ppc64 and ppc64le) and source code level tests were made using an editor.
The evaluator chose a mix of kernel level (system calls) and application level interfaces
(DBus, OpenSSH, virtual filesystems) covering authentication and authorization to perform
penetration testing.
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8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
The evaluated configuration is documented in the Evaluated Configuration Guide [10]. It is
based on Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.1 (RHEL 7.1) with additional packages as listed in
Table 2.The software may be used on the following hardware platforms specified in the
Security Target [6]:
• HP based on x86 64bit Intel Xeon processors:
• HP ProLiant ML series G7, Gen8, Gen9 product line
• HP ProLiant DL series G7, Gen8, Gen9 product line
• HP ProLiant BL series G7, Gen8, Gen9 product line
• HP ProLiant SL series G7, Gen8, Gen9 product line
• HP based on AMD64 processors:
• HP ProLiant ML series G7, Gen8 product line
• HP ProLiant DL series G7, Gen8 product line
• HP ProLiant BL series G7, Gen8 product line
• HP ProLiant SL series G7, Gen8 product line
• Dell based on x86 64bit Intel:
• Dell PowerEdge R920
• Dell PowerEdge R930
• Dell PowerEdge M620, M520, M420
• Dell PowerEdge T430, T630, R430, R530, R630, R730, R730xd, M630,
M830, FC430, FC630, FC830, C6320, and Precision R7910
• IBM System p based on Power 8 processors providing execution environments with
PowerVM:
• Big Endian with PowerVM: Tuleta BE model number - Power 835 model
8286-41A
• Little Endian with RHEV for Power 3.6: Power 835 model 8284-22A
• IBM System z based on z/Architecture processors:
• zEnterprise EC12 (zEC12)
• zEnterprise BC12 (zBC12)
• zEnterprise 196 (z196)
• zEnterprise 114 (z114)
The following virtual environment has also been tested:
• KVM on x86 hardware as provided by RHEL 7 or later
• KVM on POWER LE hardware as provided by RHEV-H 3.6 or later
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This Evaluated Configuration Guide specifies a number of constraints, such as
configuration values for various configuration files, specific steps to be taken during
installation and information to administrators on how to manage the TOE.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used.
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20 was used (see [4]).
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components claimed in the PP [7], Part 2: General Approach and Assurance Activities
for OSPP Evaluations [12] and defined in the CC (see also part C of this report).
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0754-2012, re-use of specific evaluation
tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was the conformance to General-
Purpose Operating System Protection Profile Version 3.9, 6 December 2012, OSPP
Technical Community [8].
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: General-Purpose Operating System Protection Profile Version
3.9, 6 December 2012, OSPP Technical Community [8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But Cryptographic Functionalities with
a security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 100 Bits'
of the following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general
context).
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# Purpose Cryptographic Mechanisms Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
[Bits]
Sec.
Level
100
≧
Bits
Comment
1 Authentication RSA signature generation and
verification
RSASSA-PKCS1-v1.5 using SHA-1
(ssh-rsa)
[RFC3447],
PKCS#1 v2.1
sec.8.2 (RSA)
[FIPS180-4]
(SHA)
[RFC4253]
(SSH-TRANS)
for host
authentication
[RFC4252],
sec. 7
(SSH-AUTH) for
user
authentication
Modulus length:
1024,
2048, 3072
and 4096
no Pubkeys are
exchanged
trustworthily out
of band, e.g.
checking
fingerprints.
Authenticity is
not part of the
TOE.
(no certificates
are used)
2 Authentication DSA signature generation and
verification using SHA-1 (ssh-dss)
[FIPS186-4]
(DSA)
[FIPS180-4]
(SHA)
[RFC4253]
(SSH-TRANS)
for host
authentication
[RFC4252] ,
sec. 7
(SSH-AUTH)
for user
authentication
plength= 1024
(L)
qlength= 160
(N)
no
3 Authentication User name and password-based
authentication
[RFC4252] ,
sec. 5
(SSH-AUTH) for
user
authentication
Guess success
prob.
ε ≤ 2-20
yes PAM is used
centrally. Thus if
the
authentication is
aborted the
counter for failed
logins is
increased and
remains as is for
the next login.
(FIA_SOS.1)
4 Key
agreement
(key
exchange)
DH with
DH group1-sha1
[RFC4253]
(SSH-TRANS)
supported by
[RFC2409] (DH
groups IKE)
[FIPS180-4]
(SHA)
plength=1024 no
5 Key
agreement
(key
exchange)
DH with
DH group14-sha1
[RFC4253]
(SSH-TRANS)
supported by
[RFC3526] (DH
groups IKE)
plength=2048 yes
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# Purpose Cryptographic Mechanisms Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
[Bits]
Sec.
Level
100
≧
Bits
Comment
[FIPS180-4]
(SHA)
6 Confidentiality Three-key TDES in CBC mode
(3des-cbc)
[SP800-67]
(TDES/TDEA),
[SP800-38A]
(CBC),
[RFC4253]
(SSH-TRANS
using 3DES with
CBC mode)
|k|=168 yes Binary packet
protocol (BPP):
encryption
7 Confidentiality AES in CBC mode (aes128-cbc,
aes192-cbc, aes256-cbc)
[FIPS197]
(AES),
[SP800-38A]
(CBC),
[RFC4253]
(SSH-TRANS
using AES with
CBC mode),
|k|=128, 192,
256
yes
8 Integrity and
Authenticity
HMAC-SHA-1
HMAC-SHA1-96
[FIPS180-4]
(SHA)
[RFC2104]
(HMAC),
[RFC2404]
(HMAC using
truncated SHA-
1)
[RFC4251] /
[RFC4253]
(SSH HMAC
support)
[RFC6668]
(SHA-2 in SSH)
|k|= 160, yes BPP: Message
authentication
8 Confidentiality AES in GCM mode
(aes128-gcm@openssh.com,
aes256-gcm@openssh.com)
[RFC5647] |k|=128, 256 yes
10 Key generation RSA key generation with key size:
1024, 2048, 3072, 4096 bits
[FIPS186-4],
B.3.3 and
C.3 for Miller
Rabin primality
tests.
n/a n/a Host keys and
user keys
11 Key generation DSA key generation with key size:
{L=1024, N=160},
[FIPS186-4],
B.1
n/a n/a n/a
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality
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10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process.
In addition, the following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the TOE: To mitigate the
TOEs flaws as documented in CVE-2017-2636 and CVE-2017-6074, the following two
commands must be issued after the installation by an authorized administrator (root):
# echo "install n_hdlc /bin/true" >> /etc/modprobe.d/disable-n_hdlc.conf
# echo "install dccp /bin/true" >> /etc/modprobe.d/disable-dccp.conf
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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KVM Kernel-based Virtual Machine.
MLS Multi-level security
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SSL Secure Sockets Layer
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
SELinux - Linux kernel LSM module that is able to implement arbitrary security policies.
An SELinux policy distributed with the TOE implements multi-level or multi-category
security.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 4, September 2012
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 4, September 2012,
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0949-2017, Version 0.8, Date 2016-09-15, Red Hat
Enterprise Linux, Version 7.1, Red Hat, Inc.
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 4, Date 2017-06-02, Final Evaluation Technical
Report, atsec information security GmbH (confidential document)
[8] General-Purpose Operating System Protection Profile Version 3.9, 6 December
2012, OSPP Technical Community
[9] Configuration list for the TOE: CI list for source, Date 2016-12-02, File name
rhel-71-brew-logs-20161201.tar.bz2 (confidential document)
[10] EAL4 Evaluated Configuration Guide for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.1, Version 0.25,
Date 2016-06-09
8
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 38, Version 2, 28 September 2007, Reuse of evaluation results
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
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Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal high-
level design presentation
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
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component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL 1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL 1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL 1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that
the TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions
through security objectives.
EAL 1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL 1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL 2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL 2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL 2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL 3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL 3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
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EAL 3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL 4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL 4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL 4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL 4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL 5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter
8.7)
“Objectives
EAL 5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL 5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL 5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL 5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL 6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL 6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL 6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL 7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL 7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL 7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL 1 EAL 2 EAL 3 EAL 4 EAL 5 EAL 6 EAL 7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
“Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
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