Security Target
FortiManager Appliances running Firmware 5.2.4
Common Criteria Evaluation with
Network Device Protection Profile v1.1 Errata #3
Document Version: 1.0
Date: June 14, 2016
Prepared For:
Fortinet, Inc.
326 Moodie Drive
Ottawa, ON K2H 8G3, Canada
www.fortinet.com
Prepared By:
1410 Blair Place, 7th
floor
Ottawa, ON K1J 9B9, Canada
www.cgi.com/securitylab
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Revision History
Ver # Description of changes Modified by Date
0.1 Initial draft to lab Danielle Freebourne July 4, 2014
0.2 Updates to TOE version, crypto for submission to the lab Shawn Pinet September 9, 2014
0.3 ORs and updates from lab Danielle Freebourne September 2, 2015
0.4 Updates for Errata 3 Danielle Freebourne September 25, 2015
0.5 ORs and updates from lab Danielle Freebourne December 7, 2015
0.6 ORs and updates from lab Danielle Freebourne December 22, 2015
0.7 ORs and updates from lab Danielle Freebourne April 4, 2016
0.8 ORs and updates from lab Danielle Freebourne April 22, 2016
0.9 ORs and updates from lab Danielle Freebourne April 26, 2016
1.0 ORs and updates from lab Danielle Freebourne June 14, 2016
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................................................7
1.1 ST Reference.................................................................................................................................................7
1.2 Target of Evaluation Reference....................................................................................................................7
1.3 Conventions..................................................................................................................................................7
1.4 TOE Overview ...............................................................................................................................................7
1.5 TOE Description............................................................................................................................................8
1.5.1 Physical Boundary....................................................................................................................................8
1.5.2 Logical Boundary....................................................................................................................................10
1.5.3 Hardware, firmware, and Software Supplied by the IT Environment....................................................12
1.5.4 Product Physical/Logical Features and Functions not included in the TOE Evaluation .........................13
2 Conformance Claims....................................................................................................................................14
2.1 Common Criteria Conformance Claim........................................................................................................14
2.2 Protection Profile Conformance Claim .......................................................................................................14
3 Security Problem Definition ........................................................................................................................15
3.1 Threats .......................................................................................................................................................15
3.2 Organizational Security Policies .................................................................................................................16
3.3 Assumptions...............................................................................................................................................16
4 Security Objectives......................................................................................................................................17
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE ..................................................................................................................17
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment ................................................................................17
5 EXTENDED SECURITY REQUIREMENT COMPONENTS DEFINITION........................................................................19
5.1 Extended TOE Security Functional Requirement Components.........................................................19
5.1.1 Class FAU: Security Audit .............................................................................................................19
5.1.2 Class FCS: Cryptographic Support ..............................................................................................20
5.1.3 Class FIA: Identification and Authentication............................................................................24
5.1.4 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF .................................................................................................27
5.1.5 Class FTA: TOE Access...................................................................................................................30
5.2 Extended TOE Security Assurance Requirement Components .........................................................31
6 Security Requirements ................................................................................................................................32
6.1 Security Functional Requirements..............................................................................................................32
6.1.1 Security Audit (FAU)...............................................................................................................................33
6.1.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS)..................................................................................................................35
6.1.3 User Data Protection (FDP)....................................................................................................................37
6.1.4 Identification and Authentication (FIA) .................................................................................................37
6.1.5 Security Management (FMT) .................................................................................................................37
6.1.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT) ....................................................................................................................38
6.1.7 TOE Access (FTA)....................................................................................................................................39
6.1.8 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP).....................................................................................................39
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements ..............................................................................................................40
7 TOE Summary Specification.........................................................................................................................41
7.1 Security Audit .............................................................................................................................................41
7.2 Cryptographic Support ...............................................................................................................................42
7.2.1 Entropy Source and Random Bit Generation.........................................................................................43
7.2.2 Cryptographically Trusted Paths............................................................................................................44
7.2.1 HTTPS ...................................................................................................................................................44
7.2.2 TLS.........................................................................................................................................................44
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7.2.3 Cryptographic Self Tests and TOE Update Integrity...............................................................................45
7.2.4 Conformance to NIST SP800-56.............................................................................................................45
7.2.5 Key and CSP storage and zeroization.........................................................................................46
7.3 User Data Protection..................................................................................................................................46
7.4 Identification and Authentication ..............................................................................................................46
7.4.1 Web/HTTPS............................................................................................................................................47
7.4.2 Local Console .........................................................................................................................................47
7.5 Security Management................................................................................................................................48
7.5.1 Local Console CLI ...................................................................................................................................48
7.5.2 Web UI ...................................................................................................................................................48
7.6 Protection of the TSF..................................................................................................................................48
7.6.1 Cryptographic Key and Password Storage .............................................................................................49
7.6.2 FortiManager Product Updates .............................................................................................................49
7.6.3 Self-Tests................................................................................................................................................50
7.7 TOE Access..................................................................................................................................................50
7.8 Trusted Path/Channels...............................................................................................................................51
8 Rationale.....................................................................................................................................................52
9 Acronyms ....................................................................................................................................................53
10 Appendix A –Hardware platform details .....................................................................................................54
10.1 Hardware Form Factor...............................................................................................................................54
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LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 – Threats .........................................................................................................................................................15
Table 2 – Organizational Security Policies ...................................................................................................................16
Table 3 – Assumptions.................................................................................................................................................16
Table 4 – TOE Security Objectives ...............................................................................................................................17
Table 5 – Operational Environment Security Objectives.............................................................................................17
Table 6 – TOE Security Functional Requirements........................................................................................................32
Table 7 – Auditable Events ..........................................................................................................................................33
Table 8 – Security Assurance Requirements................................................................................................................40
Table 9 – Fortimanger Cryptographic Module Algorithms..........................................................................................43
Table 10 – Acronyms ...................................................................................................................................................53
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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1 – TOE Physical Boundary .................................................................................................................................9
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1 INTRODUCTION
This section identifies the Security Target (ST), Target of Evaluation (TOE), document conventions, and
terminology. It also provides TOE overview and describes the hardware and software that make up the
TOE as well as the physical and logical boundaries of the TOE.
1.1 ST Reference
ST Title FortiManager Appliances running Firmware 5.2.4
ST Revision 1.0
ST Publication Date June 14, 2016
ST Author CGI Global IT Security Labs – Canada
1.2 Target of Evaluation Reference
TOE Developer Fortinet, Inc.
TOE Name FortiManager Appliances running Firmware 5.2.4
TOE Version 5.2.4 Build 0738 FIPS/CC build
1.3 Conventions
The Common Criteria allows for assignment, selection and iteration operations to be performed on
security functional requirements. All of these operations are used within this ST. These operations are
performed as described in Part 2 of the CC, and selected presentation choices are discussed below to aid
the Security Target reader:
 An assignment operation is indicated by [italicized text within brackets].
 Selections are denoted by [underlined text within brackets].
 of security requirements is identified using bold text. Any text removed is indicated with a
strikethrough (Example: TSF).
 Iterations are identified by appending a number in parentheses following the component title, for
example, FIA_UAU.1 (1) and FIA_UAU.1 (2) refer to two iterations of the FIA_UAU.1 security
functional requirement component.
1.4 TOE Overview
The TOE is the FortiManager Centralized Security Management appliances running version 5.2.4 of the
FortiManager code in stand-alone “FIPS/CC mode”. The TOE is designed to provide network
management to several Fortinet Network Security devices. The TOE is capable of grouping devices into
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administrative domains (ADOMs), which allows application of policies and distributing content security
with firmware updates. In addition the TOE’s versatility handles scripting, analysis, deployment,
monitoring, maintenance and numerous virtual domains (VDOMs)
The TOE is network management device which manages multiple Fortinet devices, providing updates for
firmware, virus and attack signatures, and web and email filtering. FortiManager configures devices in
the environment via SSL to deliver policies.
The TOE has extensive logging capabilities, as described by section 6.1.1 of this document. These
include, but are not limited to administrative actions and logging and tampering or misuse of the trusted
cryptographic channels. These audit logs are capable of being exported via a trusted channel to a
FortiAnalyzer which is not in scope, acting over a cryptographically protected channel for further
analysis and inspection.
The TOE implements FIPS 140-2 and CAVP validated cryptography for all interfaces. Details of the
validations are contained within Table 9 of this document. This cryptography is used to secure
communications to trusted administrators and to secure generated audit logs in transit to FortiAnalyzer
acting as an external audit server for the purposes of aggregation, analysis and review. User
administration sessions are connected over local console and to a remote administrator over HTTPS
using validated cryptography. To ensure proper random number generation the TOE has been
equipped with a dedicated hardware noise source which provides entropy collected from the ambient
environment in which the product operates. This noise source is continually monitored for its ongoing
health and proper operation.
The TOE also offers the ability to verify through cryptographic signatures that product updates are valid,
and will reject any updates without the appropriate Fortinet signature. The TOE will ensure during boot
up that the health of the TOE has not been compromised through a variety of checks. The TOE firmware
is inspected on startup as described in the FIPS 140-2 level 1 firmware integrity checks.
1.5 TOE Description
This section primarily addresses the physical and logical components of the TOE included in the evaluation.
1.5.1 Physical Boundary
The physical scope of the TOE includes:
The TOE hardware as well as the firmware as well as a Fortinet Entropy Token to provide the hardware noise source.
Details on the environment and TSFI’s are shown below:
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Figure 1 – TOE Physical Boundary
The following TOE hardware platforms are claimed for this evaluation. Each of these hardware platforms
requires a Fortinet Entropy Token to seed the TOE cryptographic system with entropy from the ambient
environment.
1.5.1.1 FortiManager Hardware Models
 FMG-200D
 FMG-1000D
 FMG-3900E
 FMG-4000D
 FMG-4000E
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1.5.1.2 Guidance Documentation
The following lists the TOE Guidance Documentation to install, configure, and maintain the TOE.
FortiManager 5.2.4 Administration Guide 02-523-232175-20150924 September 24, 2015
FortiManager 5.2.4 CLI Reference 02-524-292599-20151130 November 30, 2015
FortiManager 5.2.4 Upgrade Guide 02-524-285629-20150924 September 24, 2015
FortiManager 5.2.4 Release Notes 02-524-292520-20151102 November 4, 2015
FIPS 140-2 and Common Criteria Compliant Operation for FortiManager 5.2.4
FortiManager Hardware Manuals
FortiManager 5.2.4 Build 738 Log Definition
1.5.2 Logical Boundary
This section outlines the boundaries of the security functionality of the TOE; the logical boundary of the
TOE includes the security functionality described in the following sections.
1.5.2.1 Security Audit
The TOE is capable of generating and securely transmitting Security Audit logs to a remote, trusted server
for further processing and review. The TOE will generate auditable events as specified in the NDPP which
may help indicate a number of potential security concerns including resonance, password guessing and
tampering with the trusted paths and channels. For all auditable events the TOE will associate a user
(either IP address or with administrative credentials) to the session and use this identifier for all logging
to the audit server.
An authorized administrator may delete the local audit trail. An authorized administrator may configure
additional auditable events, configure the back-up of audit data to an external source and manage audit
data storage.
The auditing function is supported by reliable timestamps provided by the TOE.
1.5.2.2 Cryptographic Support
The TOE’s cryptographic module is FIPS PUB 140-2 validated and meets Security Level 1 overall. The TOE
is capable of generating cryptographic keys using a properly seeded random bit generator in order to
provide cryptographic services to the network. The TOE is also capable of importing cryptographic keys
and certificates from outside the TOE boundary. These keys are zeroized when no longer required and
the TOE offers a function to zeroize these keys on demand.
The TOE is designed such that the cryptographic keys and other critical security parameters are not
exposed in plain text through the various interfaces made available to the TOE administrator(s).
Passwords including administrative passwords and pre-shared keys are stored on the TOE in the
configuration file. These passwords are encoded by the TOE. Certificates are not viewable from any
interface and may only be imported to the TOE through HTTPS which is a cryptographically protected
trusted and validated channel.
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1.5.2.3 User Data Protection
The TOE ensures that all information is zeroized on allocation of memory to ensure that all memory is
cleared of residual information prior to being written to. Keys and CSP’s are zeroized per the FIPS 140-2
module validations.
1.5.2.4 Identification and Authentication
All administration requires authentication by the user identification and password mechanism.
Administration may either be performed locally using the Local Console CLI or remotely using the
Network Web-Based GUI. When authenticating locally or remotely the TOE supports complex,
configurable password rules and supports complex character sets.
When authenticating over the GUI remote authentication data is protected via an encrypted trusted
path between the TOE and administrator. Any individual attempting to log on for an interactive session
will be shown a warning message that they must accept prior to being presented with a prompt to
attempt their authentication.
1.5.2.5 Security Management
The TOE provides remote and local administrative interfaces that permit role based administration to
configure and manage the TOE both locally and remotely. When fully initialized and configured the TOE
is connected to two or more networks and remote administration data flows from a Network
Management Station to the TOE. On the TOE hardware model there is also a Local Console which can be
connected to from within the physically secured area described within table 7 of the NDPP and consists
of a physical serial interface to the TOE.
An administrator account is associated with an access profile, which determines the permissions of the
individual administrator. Additionally, each FortiManager™ install comes with a default administrator
account with all permissions, which may not be deleted. The term ‘authorized administrator’ is used
throughout this ST to describe an administrator given the appropriate permission to perform tasks as
required.
1.5.2.6 Protection of the TSF
Inter-TSF communications are protected to ensure availability, confidentiality and detection of
modification. This is accomplished through the usage of cryptographic communications for any and all
communications with remote IT entities, other components of the TOE and remote administrators. By
default detection of modification and audit logging are enabled on TLS connections.
The TOE prevents the reading of all administrator passwords, pre-shared keys, symmetric keys and
private keys through obscuring them and storing them into the TOE configuration file. These keys are
not viewable through the TSFI’s directly. They are available only as an encrypted value within the
configuration file which may be backed up by the administrator.
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The TOE is capable of querying its current version and displaying it back to the administrator via the
trusted interfaces. The TOE also provides a method to verify updates and update the TOE through any
of the administrative interfaces. Updates to the TOE software are verified by the TOE during the initial
phase of the update process. During this process the TOE verifies that the candidate update is signed
by the developer’s 2048 bit RSA signature in order to ensure the authenticity of the update. This
cryptographic key is used for all FIPS 140-2 firmware images.
The TOE maintains its own timestamp which is free from outside interference. This timestamp is used
for the purposes of generating audit logs and other time-sensitive operations on the TOE including
cryptographic key regeneration intervals.
The TOE implements a number of self-tests on start-up to ensure the correct operation and
configuration of the TOE. These include but are not limited to hardware and entropy source self-tests,
checksums of the firmware binaries and correct operation of the FIPS approved cryptographic module.
Additionally the TOE maintains ongoing health tests associated with the FIPS cryptographic module and
the hardware noise source.
1.5.2.7 TOE Access
The TOE is capable of terminating both local and remote administrative sessions upon detection of
administrator inactivity. The TOE is also capable of terminating a remote session upon request from a
remote administrator such as when a request to logout is received. The TOE provides only administrators
with a configurable warning banner prior to initiating any interactive session.
1.5.2.8 Trusted Path/Channels
A cryptographically protected trusted communications channel is required for all communications with
the audit server. For the purposes of auditing the TOE is capable of securing its FortiAnalyzer audit
server communications via TLS. The TOE or the remote peer may initiate this cryptographically
protected channel.
The TOE will ensure that HTTPS is used for a trusted path between the TOE and the trusted remote
administrator. This path will be used for both the initial administrator authentication and all remote
administration requests and is terminated upon session timeout or explicit request from an
administrator.
1.5.3 Hardware, firmware, and Software Supplied by the IT Environment
The following hardware, firmware and software, which are supplied by the IT environment, are excluded
from the TOE boundary.
 Local management including
o Local Serial Console Software
o Supported Web Browser
 Logging Server
o FortiAnalyzer 5.2
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1.5.4 Product Physical/Logical Features and Functions not included in the TOE Evaluation
Features/Functions that are not part of the evaluated configuration of the TOE are:
The FortiManager™ appliances are capable of a variety of functions and configurations which are not
covered by the NDPP. The TOE is capable of this functionality however the following features have not
been examined as part of this evaluation:
 Centralized configurations including collection of audit messages
 Offloading audit messages via syslog
 Load Balancing
 SSH (Disabled)
 SNMP
 HTTP (Disabled)
 Web services
 telnet (Disabled)
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2 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS
2.1 Common Criteria Conformance Claim
The Security Target is conformant to Common Criteria Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012, Part 2
extended and Part 3 conformant.
2.2 Protection Profile Conformance Claim
The Security Target is conformant to the:
 Network Devices Protection Profile (NDPP) v1.1, June 08, 2012, including the following optional
requirements [TLS and TLS/HTTPS].
 The NDPP Errata #3, 3 November 2014
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3 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION
This section defines the security problem which the TOE and its operational environment are supposed to
address. Specifically, the security problem makes up the following:
 Any known or assumed threats countered by the TOE or its operational environment.
 Any organizational security policies with which the TOE must comply.
 Any assumptions about the security aspects of the environment and/or of the manner in which
the TOE is intended to be used.
This section identifies assumptions as A.assumption, threats as T.threat and policies as P.policy.
3.1 Threats
This section identifies the threats to the assets against which protection is required by the TOE or by the
security environment. The threat agents are divided into two categories:
 Attackers who are not TOE users: They have public knowledge of how the TOE operates and are
assumed to possess a low skill level, limited resources to alter TOE configuration settings or
parameters and no physical access to the TOE.
 TOE users: They have extensive knowledge of how the TOE operates and are assumed to possess
a high skill level, moderate resources to alter TOE configuration settings or parameters and
physical access to the TOE. (TOE users are, however, assumed not to be willfully hostile to the
TOE.)
The table below lists threats applicable to the TOE and its operational environment:
Table 1 – Threats
Threat Description
T.ADMIN_ERROR
An administrator may unintentionally install or configure the TOE incorrectly,
resulting in ineffective security mechanisms.
T.TSF_FAILURE Security mechanisms of the TOE may fail, leading to a compromise of the TSF.
T.UNDETECTED_ACTIONS
Malicious remote users or external IT entities may take actions that adversely
affect the security of the TOE. These actions may remain undetected and thus
their effects cannot be effectively mitigated.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS A user may gain unauthorized access to the TOE data and TOE executable code. A
malicious user, process, or external IT entity may masquerade as an authorized
entity in order to gain unauthorized access to data or TOE resources. A malicious
user, process or external IT entity may misrepresent itself as the TOE to obtain
identification and authentication data.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_UPDATE A malicious party attempts to supply the end user with an update to the product
that may compromise the security features of the TOE.
T.USER_DATA_REUSE User data may be inadvertently sent to a destination not intended by the original
sender.
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3.2 Organizational Security Policies
An organizational security policy is a set of rules, practices, and procedures imposed by an organization
to address its security needs. The following table lists Organizational Security Policies (OSP) applicable to
the TOE and its operational environment:
Table 2 – Organizational Security Policies
OSP Description
P.ACCESS_BANNER The TOE shall display an initial banner describing restrictions of use, legal
agreements, or any other appropriate information to which users consent by
accessing the TOE.
3.3 Assumptions
This section describes the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE is intended to operate.
The following specific conditions are assumed to exist in an environment where the TOE is employed.
Table 3 – Assumptions
Assumption Description
A.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE It is assumed that there are no general-purpose computing capabilities (e.g.,
compilers or user applications) available on the TOE, other than those services
necessary for the operation, administration and support of the TOE.
A.PHYSICAL Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it
contains, is assumed to be provided by the environment.
A.TRUSTED_ADMIN TOE Administrators are trusted to follow and apply all administrator guidance in
a trusted manner.
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4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES
Security objectives are concise, abstract statements of the intended solution to the problem defined by
the security problem definition. This high-level solution is divided into two parts: the security objectives
for the TOE, and the security objectives for the TOE’s operational environment. This section identifies the
security objectives for the TOE and its supporting environment.
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
The IT security objectives for the TOE are as follows:
Table 4 – TOE Security Objectives
Security Objective Description
O.PROTECTED_COMMUNICA
TIONS
The TOE will provide protected communication channels for administrators,
other parts of a distributed TOE, and authorized IT entities.
O.VERIFIABLE_UPDATES The TOE will provide the capability to help ensure that any updates to the TOE
can be verified by the Administrator to be unaltered and (optionally) from a
trusted source.
O.SYSTEM_MONITORING The TOE will provide the capability to generate audit data and send those data to
an external IT entity.
O.DISPLAY_BANNER The TOE will display an advisory warning regarding use of the TOE.
O.TOE_ADMINISTRATION The TOE will provide mechanisms to ensure that only administrators are able to
log in and configure the TOE, and provide protections for logged-in
administrators.
O.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION_
CLEARING
The TOE will ensure that any data contained in a protected resource is not
available when the resource is reallocated.
O.SESSION_LOCK The TOE shall provide mechanisms that mitigate the risk of unattended sessions
being hijacked.
O.TSF_SELF_TEST The TOE will provide the capability to test some subset of its security
functionality to ensure it is operating properly.
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
The security objectives for the operational environment are addressed below:
Table 5 – Operational Environment Security Objectives
Security Objective Description
OE.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE There are no general-purpose computing capabilities (e.g., compilers or user
applications) available on the TOE, other than those services necessary for the
operation, administration and support of the TOE.
OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN TOE Administrators are trusted to follow and apply all administrator guidance in a
trusted manner.
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Security Objective Description
OE.PHYSICAL Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it
contains, is provided by the environment.
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5 EXTENDED SECURITY REQUIREMENT COMPONENTS DEFINITION
This section defines the extended Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) and extended Security
Functional Assurance Requirements (SARs) met by the TOE. All the extended components have been
drawn from the Network Device Protection Profile (NDPP) v1.1 and the interpretations and clarifications
from NDPP Errata #3.
5.1 Extended TOE Security Functional Requirement Components
This section specifies the extended SFRs for the TOE.
5.1.1 Class FAU: Security Audit
Families in this class address the requirements for functions to implement security audit as defined in CC
Part 2.
5.1.1.1 Family FAU_STG: Security audit event storage
Family Behaviour
This extended family FAU_STG_EXT is modeled after the FAU_STG family. This family defines the
requirements for the TSF to be able to create and maintain a secure audit trail. Stored audit records refers
to those records within the audit trail, and not the audit records that have been retrieved (to temporary
storage) through selection. The requirements of the extended family are focused on the secure
transmission of audit records to a remote logging server.
Components in this family address the requirements for protection audit data as defined in CC Part 2. This
section defines the extended components for the FAU_STG_EXT family.
Component Leveling
Figure 2 Extended: Security audit event storage family decomposition
FAU_STG_EXT.1 External Audit Trail Storage requires the TSF to use an external IT entity for audit data
storage. It is modeled after FAU_STG.1, and is considered to be part of the FAU_STG family.
Management: FAU_STG_EXT.1
a) There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FAU_STG_EXT.1
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a) There are no auditable events foreseen.
FAU_STG_EXT.1 External Audit Trail Storage
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
FAU_STG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to [selection: transmit the generated audit data to an
external IT entity, receive and store audit data from an external IT entity] using a
trusted channel implementing the [selection: IPsec, SSH, TLS, TLS/HTTPS]
protocol.
5.1.2 Class FCS: Cryptographic Support
Families in this class address the requirements for functions to implement cryptographic functionality as
defined in CC Part 2.
5.1.2.1 Family FCS_CKM: Cryptographic Key Management
Family Behaviour
Cryptographic keys must be managed throughout their life cycle. The FCS_CKM family, after which this
extended family is modeled, is intended to support that lifecycle and consequently defines requirements
for the following activities: cryptographic key generation, cryptographic key distribution, cryptographic
key access and cryptographic key destruction. This family should be included whenever there are
functional requirements for the management of cryptographic keys. The extended family is designed to
include CSP31s and further defines the requirements for plaintext secret and private cryptographic keys.
The requirements also further define the key destruction methods allowed, per FIPS 140-2 requirements.
Components in this family address the requirements for managing cryptographic keys as defined in CC
Part 2. This section defines the extended components for the FCS_CKM_EXT family.
Component Leveling
Figure 3 Extended: Cryptographic key management family decomposition
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Cryptographic key zeroization requires cryptographic keys and cryptographic critical
security parameters to be zeroized. It is modeled after FCS_CKM.4, and is considered to be part of the
FCS_CKM family.
Management: FCS_CKM_EXT.4
a) There are no management activities foreseen.
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Audit: FCS_CKM_EXT.4
a) There are no auditable events foreseen.
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Cryptographic Key Zeroization
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1 The TSF shall zeroize all plaintext secret and private cryptographic keys and CSPs
when no longer required.
5.1.2.2 Family FCS_HTTPS_EXT: Extended: HTTPS
Family Behaviour
Components in this family define the requirements for protecting remote management sessions between
the TOE and an authorised administrator. This family describes how HTTPS will be implemented. This is a
new family defined for the FCS Class.
Component Leveling
Figure 4 Extended: HTTPS family decomposition
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 Extended: HTTPS requires that HTTPS be implemented. It belongs to a new family
defined for the FCS Class.
Management: FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1
a) There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the ST:
a) Failure to establish a HTTPS session, and reason for failure;
b) Establishment/Termination of a HTTPS session, and non-TOE endpoint of connection (IP address)
for both successes and failures.
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 Extended: HTTPS
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FCS_TLS_EXT.1 Extended: TLS
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FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the HTTPS protocol that complies with RFC 2818.
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall implement the HTTPS protocol using TLS as specified in
FCS_TLS_EXT.1.
5.1.2.3 Family FCS_TLS_EXT: Extended: TLS
Family Behaviour
Components in this family address the requirements for protecting communications using TLS. This is a
new family defined for the FCS Class.
Component Leveling
Figure 5 Extended: TLS family decomposition
FCS_TLS_EXT.1 Extended: TLS requires that TLS be implemented. It belongs to a new family defined for
the FCS Class.
Management: FCS_TLS_EXT.1
a) There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FCS_TLS_EXT.1
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the ST:
a) Failure to establish a TLS session, and reason for failure;
b) Establishment/Termination of a TLS session, and non-TOE endpoint of connection (IP address) for
both successes and failures.
FCS_TLS_EXT.1 Extended: TLS
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic operation (for data encryption/decryption)
FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic operation (for cryptographic signature)
FCS_COP.1(3) Cryptographic operation (for cryptographic hashing)
FCS_COP.1(4) Cryptographic operation (for keyed-hash message authentication)
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Cryptographic Key Zeroization
FCS_TLS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement one or more of the following protocols [selection: TLS
1.0 (RFC 2346), TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346), TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246)] supporting the following
ciphersuites:
Mandatory Ciphersuites:
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TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
Optional Ciphersuites:
[selection:
None
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_ SHA256
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_ SHA256
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_ SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
].
5.1.2.4 Family FCS_RBG_EXT: Extended: Random Bit Generation
Family Behaviour
Components in this family address the requirements for random number/bit generation. This is a new
family defined for the FCS Class.
Component Leveling
Figure 6 Extended: Random Bit Generation family decomposition
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Extended: Random Bit Generation is the only component of this class. This component
requires random bit generation to be performed in accordance with selected standards and seeded by an
entropy source. It was modeled after FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation.
Management: FCS_RBG_EXT.1
a) There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FCS_RBG_EXT.1
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:
a) There are no auditable events foreseen.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Extended: Random Bit Generation (Random bit generation)
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Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall perform all random bit generation (RBG) services in accordance with
[selection, choose one of: NIST1
Special Publication 800-90 using [selection:
Hash_DRBG2
(any), HMAC3
_DRBG (any), CTR4
_DRBG (AES20), Dual_EC5
_DRBG
(any)]; FIPS Pub 140-2 Annex C: X9.31 Appendix 2.4 using AES] seeded by an
entropy source that accumulated entropy from [selection, one or both of a
software-based noise source; a TSF-hardware-based noise source].
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2 The deterministic RBG shall be seeded with a minimum of [selection, choose one
of: 128 bits, 256 bits] of entropy at least equal to the greatest security strength
of the keys and hashes that it will generate.
5.1.3 Class FIA: Identification and Authentication
Families in this class address the requirements for functions to establish and verify a claimed user identity
as defined in CC Part 2.
5.1.3.1 Family FIA_PMG_EXT: Password Management
Family Behaviour
This family defines the password strength rules enforced by the TSF.
This section defines the extended components for the FIA_PMG_EXT family, which is modeled after
FIA_SOS Specification of secrets.
Component Leveling
Figure 7 Extended: Password Management family decomposition
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Password Management defines the password strength requirements that the TSF will
enforce. It belongs to a new family defined for FIA class.
Management: FIA_PMG_EXT.1
a) There are no management activities foreseen.
1
NIST – National Institute of Standards and Technology
2
DRBG – Deterministic Random Bit Generator
3
HMAC – Hashed Message Authentication Code
4
CTR – Counter Mode
5
EC – Elliptical Curve
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Audit: FIA_PMG_EXT.1
a) There are no auditable events foreseen.
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Extended: Password Management
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: None
FIA_PMG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide the following password management capabilities for
administrative passwords:
1. Passwords shall be able to be composed of any combination of upper
and lower case letters, numbers, and special characters: [selection: “!”,
“@”, “#”, “$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(“, “)”, [assignment: other characters]];
2. Minimum password length shall settable by the Security Administrator,
and support passwords of 15 characters or greater;
5.1.3.2 Family FIA_UAU_EXT: Extended: User Authentication
Family Behaviour
This family defines the types of user authentication mechanisms supported by the TSF.
This section defines the extended components for the FIA_UAU_EXT family, which is modeled after the
FIA_UAU User authentication family.
Component Leveling
Figure 8 Extended: User authentication family decomposition
FIA_UAU_EXT.2 Extended: Password-based Authentication Mechanism requires a local password-based
authentication mechanism and the capability for passwords to expire. In addition, other authentication
mechanisms can be specified. It is considered to be part of the FIA_UAU family.
Management: FIA_UAU_EXT.2
a) There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FIA_UAU_EXT.2
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the ST:
a) All use of the authentication mechanisms.
FIA_UAU_EXT.2 Extended: Password-based Authentication Mechanism
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: None
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FIA_UAU_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall provide a local password-based authentication mechanism,
[selection: [assignment: other authentication mechanism(s)], none] to perform
user authentication.
5.1.3.3 Family FIA_UIA_EXT: Extended: User Identification and Authentication
Family Behaviour
This family defines the types of user identification and authentication mechanisms supported by the TSF.
This section defines the components for the extended FIA_UIA_EXT family, which is modeled after the
FIA_UAU and FIA_UID families.
Component Leveling
Figure 9 Extended: User identification and authentication family decomposition
FIA_UIA_EXT.1 Extended: Password-based Authentication and Identification Mechanism, requires a local
password-based authentication mechanism and the capability for passwords to expire. In addition, other
authentication mechanisms can be specified. It is based on a combination of FIA_UAU.1 and FIA_UID.1,
and belongs to a new family defined for class FIA.
Management: FIA_UIA_EXT.1
a) There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FIA_UIA_EXT.1
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the ST:
a) All use of the authentication mechanism with provided user identity and origin of the attempt
(e.g. IP address).
FIA_UIA_EXT.1 Extended: Password-based Authentication and Identification Mechanism
Hierarchical to: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of Authentication
Dependencies: None
FIA_UIA_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall allow the following actions prior to requiring the non-TOE entity to
initiate the identification and authentication process:
o Display the warning banner in accordance with FTA_TAB.1;
o [selection: no other actions, [assignment: list of services, actions
performed by the TSF in response to non-TOE requests.]]
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FIA_UIA_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall require each administrative user to be successfully identified and
authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that
administrative user.
5.1.4 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF
Families in this class address the requirements for functions providing integrity and management of
mechanisms that constitute the TSF and of the TSF data as defined in CC Part 2.
5.1.4.1 Family FPT_APW_EXT: Extended: Protection of Administrator Passwords
Family Behaviour
Components in this family address the requirements for managing and protecting TSF data, such as
passwords. This is a new family modeled after the FPT_PTD family.
Component Leveling
Figure 10 Extended: Protection of administrator passwords family decomposition
FPT_APW_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of Administrator Passwords requires administrator passwords to
be stored in non-plaintext form and requires the TOE to prevent reading of plaintext passwords. It is
modeled after FPT_SSP.2, but it belongs to a new family defined for the FPT class.
Management: FPT_APW_EXT.1
a) There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FPT_APW_EXT.1
a) There are no audit activities foreseen.
FPT_APW_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of Administrator Passwords
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: None
FPT_APW_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall store passwords in non-plaintext form.
FPT_APW_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall prevent the reading of plaintext passwords.
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5.1.4.2 Family FPT_SKP_EXT: Extended: Protection of TSF Data
Family Behaviour
Components in this family address the requirements for managing and protecting TSF data, such as
cryptographic keys. This is a new family modeled after the FPT_PTD Class.
Component Leveling
Figure 11 Extended: Protection of TSF data family decomposition
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of TSF data (for reading of all symmetric keys) requires the TOE to
prevent reading of all pre-shared, symmetric, and private keys. It is modeled after FPT_SSP.1, but it
belongs to a new family defined for the FPT class.
Management: FPT_SKP_EXT.1
a) There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FPT_SKP_EXT.1
a) There are no audit activities foreseen.
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of TSF data (for reading of all symmetric keys)
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: None
FPT_SKP_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall prevent reading of all pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, and private
keys.
5.1.4.3 Family FPT_TST_EXT: Extended: TSF Self Test
Family Behaviour
Components in this family address the requirements for self-testing the TSF for selected correct operation.
The extended FPT_TST_EXT family is modeled after the FPT_TST family.
Component Leveling
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Figure 12 Extended: TSF testing family decomposition
FPT_TST_EXT.1 Extended: TSF testing requires a suite of self-tests to be run during initial start-up in order
to demonstrate correct operation of the TSF. It is modeled after FPT_TST.1, but belongs to a new family
defined for class FPT.
Management: FPT_TST_EXT.1
a) There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FPT_TST_EXT.1
a) There are no audit activities foreseen.
FPT_TST_EXT.1 Extended: TSF testing
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: None
FPT_TST_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self-tests during initial start-up (on power on) to
demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
5.1.4.4 Family FPT_TUD_EXT: Extended: Trusted Update
Family Behaviour
Components in this family address the requirements for updating the TOE firmware and/or software. This
is a new family defined for the FPT Class.
Component Leveling
Figure 13 Extended: Trusted update family decomposition
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Extended: Management of TSF Data, requires management tools be provided to update
the TOE firmware and software, including the ability to verify the updates prior to installation. It belongs
to a new family defined for the FPT class.
Management: FPT_ TUD_EXT.1
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a) There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FPT_ TUD_EXT.1
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the ST:
a) Initiation of update.
FPT_ TUD_EXT.1 Extended: Trusted Update
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic operation (for cryptographic signature)
FCS_COP.1(3) Cryptographic operation (for cryptographic hashing)
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide security administrators the ability to query the current
version of the TOE firmware/software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall provide security administrators the ability to initiate updates to TOE
firmware/software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall provide a means to verify firmware/software updates to the TOE
using a [selection: digital signature mechanism, published hash] prior to installing
those updates.
5.1.5 Class FTA: TOE Access
Families in this class specify functional requirements for controlling the establishment of a user's session
as defined in CC Part 2.
5.1.5.1 Family FTA_SSL_EXT: Extended: TSF-initiated Session Locking
Family Behaviour
Components in this family address the requirements for managing and protecting TSF data, such as
passwords. This is a new family modeled after the FPT_PTD family.
Component Leveling
Figure 14 Extended: TSF-initiated session locking family decomposition
FTA_SSL_EXT.1 Extended: TSF-initiated Session Locking requires system initiated locking of an interactive
session after a specified period of inactivity. It is part of the FTA_SSL family.
Management: FTA_SSL_EXT.1
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The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
a) Specification of the time of user inactivity after which lock-out occurs for an individual user.
Audit: FTA_SSL_EXT.1
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the ST:
a) Any attempts at unlocking an interactive session.
FTA_SSL_EXT.1 Extended: TSF-initiated Session Locking
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FIA_UIA_EXT.1 Password-based Authentication and Identification Mechanism
FTA_SSL_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall, for local interactive sessions, [selection:
 lock the session – disable any activity of the user’s data access display
devices other than unlocking the session, and requiring that the
administrator re-authenticate to the TSF prior to unlocking the session;
 terminate the session]
after a Security Administrator-specified time period of inactivity.
5.2 Extended TOE Security Assurance Requirement Components
There are no extended TOE Security Assurance Requirement Components.
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6 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
This section defines the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) and Security Functional Assurance
Requirements (SARs) met by the TOE. All the components have been drawn from the Network Device
Protection Profile (NDPP) v1.1 NDPP and clarifications and interpretations made with NDPP Errata #3.
6.1 Security Functional Requirements
The functional security requirements for this Security Target consist of the components from Part 2 of the
CC, and those that were explicitly stated, all of which are summarized in the following table:
Table 6 – TOE Security Functional Requirements
Requirement Class Requirement Name Description
FAU
Security Audit
FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation
FAU_GEN.2 User Identity Association
FAU_STG_EXT.1 External Audit Trail Storage
FCS
Cryptographic support
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation (for asymmetric keys)
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Cryptographic Key Zeroization
FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic operation (for data encryption/decryption)
FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic operation (for cryptographic signature)
FCS_COP.1(3) Cryptographic operation (for cryptographic hashing)
FCS_COP.1(4) Cryptographic operation (for keyed-hash message
authentication)
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 Explicit: HTTPS
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)
FCS_TLS_EXT.1 Explicit: TLS
FDP
User Data Protection
FDP_RIP.2 Full Residual Information Protection
FAI
Identification and
Authentication
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Password Management
FIA_UAU.7 Protected Authentication Feedback
FIA_UAU_EXT.2 Extended: Password-based Authentication Mechanism
FIA_UIA_EXT.1 User Identification and Authentication
FMT
Security Management
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data (for general TSF data)
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.2 Restrictions on Security Roles
FPT
Protection of the TSF
FPT_APW_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of Administrator Passwords
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all symmetric
keys)
FPT_STM.1 Reliable Time Stamps
FPT_TST_EXT.1 TSF testing
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Requirement Class Requirement Name Description
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Extended: Trusted Update
FTA
TOE Access
FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated Termination
FTA_SSL.4 User-initiated Termination
FTA_SSL_EXT.1 TSF-initiated session locking
FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE access banners
FTP
Trusted Path/Channels
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF Trust Channel
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path
6.1.1 Security Audit (FAU)
6.1.1.1 FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation
FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
b) All auditable events for the [not specified] level of audit;
c) [All administrative actions]; and
d) [Specifically defined auditable events listed in Table 7]
FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at last the following information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, and the outcome
(success or failure) of the event; and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the
functional components included in the PP/ST, [the information detailed in
Table 7].
Table 7 – Auditable Events
Requirements Auditable Events Additional Audit Record Contents
FAU_GEN.1 None None
FAU_GEN.2 None None
FAU_STG_EXT.1 None None
FCS_CKM.1 None None
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 None None
FCS_COP.1(1) None None
FCS_COP.1(2) None None
FCS_COP.1(3) None None
FCS_COP.1(4) None None
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 None None
FCS_TLS_EXT.1 Failure to establish a TLS Session
Establishment/Termination of a TLS session
Reason for failure
Non-TOE endpoint of connection (IP address)
for both successes and failures
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Requirements Auditable Events Additional Audit Record Contents
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 Failure to establish a HTTPS Session
Establishment/Termination of a HTTPS
session
Reason for failure
Non-TOE endpoint of connection (IP address)
for both successes and failures
FDP_RIP.2 None None
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 None None
FIA_UIA_EXT.1 All use of the identification and
authentication mechanism
Provided user identity, origin of the attempt
(e.g., IP address)
FIA_UAU_EXT.2 All use of the authentication mechanism Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP address )
FIA_UAU.7 None None
FMT_MTD.1 None None
FMT_SMF.1 None None
FMT_SMR.2 None None
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 None None
FPT_APW_EXT.1 None None
FPT_STM.1 Changes to the time The old and new values for the time Origin of
the attempt (e.g. IP address)
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Initiation of update No additional information
FPT_TST_EXT.1 None None
FTA_SSL_EXT.1 Any attempts at unlocking of an interactive
session
No additional information
FTA_SSL.3 The termination of a remote session by the
session locking mechanism
No additional information
FTA_SSL.4 The termination of an interactive session No additional information
FTA_TAB.1 None None
FTP_TRP.1 Initiation of the trusted path. Termination of
the trusted path. Failures of the trusted path
functions
Identification of the claimed user identity
FTP_ITC.1 Initiation of the trusted channel. Termination
of the trusted channel. Failures of the
trusted channel functions
Identification of the initiator and target of
failed trusted channels establishment
attempt
6.1.1.2 FAU_GEN.2 User Identity Association
FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to
associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.
6.1.1.3 FAU_STG_EXT.1 External Audit Trail Storage
FAU_STG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to [transmit the generated audit data to an external IT entity]
using a trusted channel implementing the [TLS] protocol.
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6.1.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS)
6.1.2.1 FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate asymmetric cryptographic keys used for key
establishment in accordance with
 NIST Special Publication 800-56B, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography” for
RSA-based key establishment schemes]
and specified cryptographic key sizes [equivalent to, or greater than, a symmetric
key strength of 112 bits].
6.1.2.2 FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Cryptographic Key Zeroization
FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1 The TSF shall zeroize all plaintext secret and private cryptographic keys and CSPs
when no longer required.
6.1.2.3 FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic Operation (for data encryption/decryption)
FCS_COP.1.1(1) Refinement: The TSF shall perform [encryption and decryption] in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm [AES operating in [CBC6
]]] and
cryptographic key sizes 128-bits and 256-bits that meets the following:
 FIPS PUB 197, “Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)”
 [NIST SP 800-38A]]
6.1.2.4 FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic operation (for cryptographic signature)
FCS_COP.1.1(2) Refinement: The TSF shall perform cryptographic signature services in
accordance with a
[(2) RSA Digital Signature Algorithm (rDSA) with a key size (modulus) of 2048
bits or greater]
that meets the following:
Case: RSA Digital Signature Algorithm
 FIPS PUB 186-2 or FIPS PUB 186-3, “Digital Signature
Standard”
6.1.2.5 FCS_COP.1(3) Cryptographic Operation (for cryptographic hashing)
FCS_COP.1.1(3) Refinement: The TSF shall perform [cryptographic hashing services] in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm [SHA-1, SHA-256], and message digest
6
CBC: Cipher Block Chaining
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sizes [160, 256] bits that meet the following: FIPS Pub 180-3, “Secure Hash
Standard.”
6.1.2.6 FCS_COP.1(4) Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-hash message authentication)
FCS_COP.1.1(4) Refinement: The TSF shall perform [keyed-hash message authentication] in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm HMAC-[ SHA-1, SHA-256],
key size [160, 256], message digest sizes [160, 256] bits that meet the following:
FIPS Pub 198-1, "The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code, and FIPS Pub
180-3, “Secure Hash Standard.”
6.1.2.7 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall perform all random bit generation (RBG) services in accordance with
[NIST Special Publication 800-90 using [CTR_DRBG (AES]] seeded by an entropy
source that accumulated entropy from [a TSF-hardware-based noise source].
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2 The deterministic RBG shall be seeded with a minimum of [256 bits] of entropy at
least equal to the greatest bit length of the keys and authorization factors that it
will generate.
6.1.2.8 FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 Extended: HTTPS
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the HTTPS protocol that complies with RFC 2818.
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall implement the HTTPS protocol using TLS as specified in
FCS_TLS_EXT.1.
6.1.2.9 FCS_TLS_EXT.1 Extended: TLS
FCS_TLS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement one or more of the following protocols [TLS 1.1 (RFC
4346), TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246)] supporting the following ciphersuites:
Mandatory Ciphersuites:
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
Optional Ciphersuites:
[
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA].
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6.1.3 User Data Protection (FDP)
6.1.3.1 FDP_RIP.2 Full Residual Information Protection
FDP_RIP.2.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made
unavailable upon the [allocation of the resource to, deallocation of the resource
from] all objects.
6.1.4 Identification and Authentication (FIA)
6.1.4.1 FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Password Management
FIA_PMG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide the following password management capabilities for
administrative passwords:
1. Passwords shall be able to be composed of any combination of upper and
lower case letters, numbers, and the following special characters: [“!”, “@”,
“#”, “$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(“, “)”];
2. Minimum password length shall settable by the Security Administrator, and
support passwords of 15 characters or greater;
6.1.4.2 FIA_UIA_EXT.1 User Identification and Authentication
FIA_UIA_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall allow the following actions prior to requiring the non-TOE entity to
initiate the identification and authentication process:
 Display the warning banner in accordance with FTA_TAB.1;
 [no other actions]
FIA_UIA_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall require each administrative user to be successfully identified and
authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that
administrative user.
6.1.4.3 FIA_UAU_EXT.2 Extended: Password-based Authentication Mechanism
FIA_UAU_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall provide a local password-based authentication mechanism, [[none]
to perform administrative user authentication.
6.1.4.4 FIA_UAU.7 Protected Authentication Feedback
FIA_UAU.7.1 The TSF shall provide only [obscured feedback] to the administrative user while
the authentication is in progress at the local console.
6.1.5 Security Management (FMT)
6.1.5.1 FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF Data (for general TSF data)
FMT_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [manage] the [TSF data] to [the Security
Administrators].
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6.1.5.2 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [
 Ability to administer the TOE locally and remotely;
 Ability to update the TOE, and to verify the updates using [digital
signature,] capability prior to installing those updates7
;
 [Ability to configure the cryptographic functionality;]
6.1.5.3 FMT_SMR.2 Restrictions on Security Roles
FMT_SMR.2.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles: [Authorized Administrator]
FMT_SMR.2.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
FMT_SMR.2.3 The TSF shall ensure that the conditions [
 Authorized Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE
locally;
 Authorized Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE
remotely;] are satisfied
6.1.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT)
6.1.6.1 FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all symmetric keys)
FPT_SKP_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall prevent reading of all pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, and private
keys.
6.1.6.2 FPT_APW_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of Administrator Passwords
FPT_APW_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall store passwords in non-plaintext form.
FPT_APW_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall prevent the reading of plaintext passwords.
6.1.6.3 FPT_STM.1 Reliable Time Stamps
FPT_STM.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps for its own use.
6.1.6.4 FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Extended: Trusted Update
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide security administrators the ability to query the current
version of the TOE firmware/software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall provide security administrators the ability to initiate updates to TOE
firmware/software.
7
FortiManager requires that the candidate firmware upgrade be uploaded to the TOE prior to the digital signature
being validated
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FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall provide a means to verify firmware/software updates to the TOE
using a [digital signature mechanism] prior to installing those updates.
6.1.6.5 FPT_TST_EXT.1: TSF Testing
FPT_TST_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self-tests during initial start-up (on power on) to
demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
6.1.7 TOE Access (FTA)
6.1.7.1 FTA_SSL_EXT.1 TSF-initiated Session Locking
FTA_SSL_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall, for local interactive sessions, [terminate the session]
after a Security Administrator-specified time period of inactivity.
6.1.7.2 TSF-initiated Termination
FTA_SSL.3.1 The TSF shall terminate a remote interactive session after a [Security
Administrator-configurable time interval of session inactivity].
6.1.7.3 FTA_SSL.4 User-initiated Termination
FTA_SSL.4.1 The TSF shall allow Administrator-initiated termination of the Administrator’s
own interactive session.
6.1.7.4 FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE Access Banners
FTA_TAB.1.1 Before establishing an administrative user session the TSF shall display a Security
Administrator-specified advisory notice and consent warning message regarding
use of the TOE.
6.1.8 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)
6.1.8.1 FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall use [TLS] to provide a trusted communication channel between
itself and authorized IT entities supporting the following capabilities: [audit
server] that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides
assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from
disclosure and detection of modification of the channel data.
FTP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall permit [the TSF] to initiate communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [logging of audit
messages, verification of user credentials].
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6.1.8.2 FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path
FTP_TRP.1.1 The TSF shall use [TLS/HTTPS] provide a trusted communication path between
itself and remote administrators that is logically distinct from other
communication paths and provides assured identification of its end points and
protection of the communicated data from [disclosure and detection of
modification of the communicated data].
FTP_TRP.1.2 The TSF shall permit remote administrators to initiate communication via the
trusted path.
FTP_TRP.1.3 The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for [initial administrator
authentication and all remote administration actions].
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements
This section defines the Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) for the TOE. The assurance requirements
are taken from NDPP v1.1. The assurance components are summarized in the following table:
Table 8 – Security Assurance Requirements
Assurance Classes Assurance Component Description
Security Target ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2 Security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
Development ADV_FSP.1 Basic Functional Specification
Guidance Documents AGD_OPE.1 Operational User Guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative Procedures
Lifecycle Support ALC_CMC.1 Labeling of the TOE
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM Coverage
Tests ATE_IND.1 Independent Testing – Conformance
Vulnerability Assessment AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability Analysis
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7 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION
This section presents information to detail how the TOE meets the security functional requirements
described in previous sections of this ST.
7.1 Security Audit
For all administrative actions including management of the TOE authentication is required before any
actions can occur on the TOE. When an action identified in Table 7 is triggered the TOE will write the
event including the date and time, administrative username of the user triggering the event and the
success or failure of the event to the audit log.
The event log is always considered to be on and logging to the remote audit server once the TOE is fully
installed, initialized and services are available in normal operation. The TOE logs the startup and shutdown
of the TOE, and this can be considered to be equivalent to the startup and shutdown of the audit system.
The TOE is capable of logging the audit messages both locally and remotely, and has configurable actions
when the audit logs are filled. By default the TOE will log locally and will block further traffic from
occurring should the local storage become exhausted. Guidance is provided to the administrator to
modify this behavior to overwrite the oldest audit logs upon hitting a threshold of memory capacity. The
most recent audit records are stored locally using one of the following device configurations: 1x1TB,
2x2TB, 4x2TB, 8x2TB. Full listing of all the audit messages is available through the interactive CLI applet
provided on the main page of the Web GUI. The TOE offers no ability to modify or delete these audit
records to any role and requires administrative privileges in order to gain access to modify the audit log
behavior.
The TOE also has configurable options for the remote storage of the audit events. These events are sent
at a configurable time each day to one or more capable audit servers. In the evaluated configuration
these audit servers consist of the FortiAnalyzer analytics suite secured through TLS. Details as to the
placement of this component of the IT environment is provided in Figure 1 of this document. Audited
events are stored locally on the TOE in between scheduled transfers to the remote FortiAnalyzer server.
The TOE will compile the entire log and send it to the FortiAnalyzer and maintains the audited events if
the transfer is not successful. The devices within the evaluation provide local storage on the HDD, ranging
from 1TB to 16TB of space. The FMG-200D provides 1TB of capacity, the FMG-1000D provides 8TB of
capacity, the FMG-3900E provides 15TB, and the FMG-4000D and FMG-4000E provide 16TB of capacity.
If a connection to the audit server is not successful, the TOE will try three more immediate connections,
every 30 seconds, to attempt in transferring the logged information. If the logs are not successfully sent
at that time, the audits will continue to be logged locally and sent at the scheduled time the following day.
The TOE is capable of logging messages to the audit log for interactions which occur on the remote
interfaces. These events include attempts to establish or terminate sessions and errors detected during
decryption or validation of data.
A number of factors can impact the performance of the Fortinet appliances and their ability to mediate
traffic between networks. FortiManager appliances are rated for their capacity to forward and filter traffic
during normal operations. Should this capacity be exceeded the packet processing engine will write an
audit event to the audit log. The TOE will then drop packets on the affected interface until such a time
that there are sufficient resources to resume inspection of packets and information flows.
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When the TOE uses TLS 1.1 or 1.2 for the purposes of protecting the audit logs during transit over the
network the TOE will negotiate an appropriate cipher suite based on the approved list of ciphers. Audit
logs are sent at scheduled times and for each auditable event which is to be written to the audit server
the TOE will verify that the RSA certificate present on the audit server matches the certificate which was
presented when the TOE was registered with the audit server. The TOE then negotiates a suitable claimed
cipher with the audit server, generates and sends the DH public value for keying and encrypts the audit
message which is to be sent to the TOE.
The TOE is capable of logging messages to the audit log for the interactions listed in Table 7. These events
include attempts to establish or terminate sessions and errors detected during decryption or validation of
data.
If assistance is needed on the interpretation of the audit records, the administrator can request the vendor
provide a document8
that provides clarification on each event. The Log Reference document provides
information including Log ID, severity, subcategory, and a high-level description along with an explanation
of each name, variable type, and description of the contents of the audit.
SFRs satisfied: FAU_GEN.1, FAU_GEN.2, FAU_STG_EXT.1
7.2 Cryptographic Support
The TOE uses FIPS-approved cryptography that has been implemented in the FIPS 140-2 validated
cryptographic module. The FIPS-validated cryptographic module implemented in the TSF meet Security
Level 1 overall. Cryptographic key destruction by the TOE meets the key zeroization requirements of Key
Management Security Level 1 from FIPS PUB 140-2. The TOE only stores ephemeral keys in memory, either
in RAM or Flash memory. Persistent keys are encrypted using AES-128 with a key generated when the
TOE is initialized and written to the TOE configuration file. The AES key cannot be viewed or backed up
through any of the TOE interfaces. The configuration file can be exported or backed up with the passwords
remaining in the encrypted format.
Cryptographic keys for the TOE which are no longer required are destroyed by overwriting the key storage
area with an alternating pattern at least once. Session requests that use these keys are received, the
encryption function is run on them and the obscured results are compared with the value in the
configuration file. The credential provided is then zeroized through overwriting the storage area
following the completion of the authentication request.
The TOE is capable of generating 256 bits of entropy using a dedicated hardware noise source and using
this to seed random bit generator in order to provide cryptographic services with up to 256 bits of
strength. The TOE is also capable of importing cryptographic keys and certificates from outside the TOE
boundary. These keys are zeroized when no longer required and the TOE offers a function to zeroize these
keys on demand. For additional information please reference CMVP validation # 2515.
A detailed design of the cryptographic subsystems and entropy noise sources provided by the TOE has
been conducted and was used to design the TOE to ensure strong seeding of the DRBG. The following
certificates have been issued by the CMVP and CAVP for FortiManager 5.2.4 firmware running on the
listed platforms in section 1.5.3 and are implemented accordingly in the TOE.
8
FortiManager 5.2.4 Build 738 Log Definition
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Table 9 – Fortimanger Cryptographic Module Algorithms
Cryptographic
Operations
Cryptographic
Algorithm
Key Sizes (bits)
Message Digest
Size
Standards
Compliance
Certificate #
Symmetric
Encryption
and
Decryption
AES
operating in
CBC
128, 256 N/A
FIPS PUB 197 (AES)
NIST SP800-38A
CAVP Certificate #
(3594)
Random Bit
Generation
CTR DRBG 256 N/A NIST SP 800-90A
CAVP Certificate #
(929)
Cryptographic
Hashing
SHA-1, SHA-
256
128, 256 160, 256
FIPS Pub
198-1 (HMAC)
FIPS Pub
180-3 (SHS)
CAVP Certificate #
(2956)
Keyed-Hash
message
authentication
(HMAC)
SHA-1, SHA-
256
128, 256 160, 256
FIPS Pub 180-3
(SHS)
CAVP Certificate #
(2291)
Signature
Verification
rDSA 2048, 3072 N/A
FIPS PUB
186-3 (DSS)
FIPS PUB
186-2 (DSS)
CAVP Certificate #
(1848)
Signature
Generation
rDSA 2048, 3072 N/A
FIPS PUB
186-3 (DSS)
FIPS PUB
186-2 (DSS)
CAVP Certificate #
(1848)
As part of the CMVP testing the FIPS lab validated the implementation for both the “DRBG” and “SSL” cryptographic libraries via
the CAVS tool for the correctness of the implementation. These libraries are included within the CMVP certificate for the FIPS
140-2 Level 1 validation. For additional details on the cryptographic operations, it is encouraged to reference the appropriate
certificate as stated in Table 9.
SFRs satisfied: FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM_EXT.4, FCS_COP.1(1), FCS_COP.1(2), FCS_COP.1(3), FCS_COP.1(4)
7.2.1 Entropy Source and Random Bit Generation
The TOE implements an entropy collection system from a hardware based noise source which is derived
from wide-band RF white noise which is then pooled and conditioned prior to being used. The raw
unconditioned noise from this source has been analyzed using a Fortinet supplied development build
based on the TOE version. This data was analyzed using a NIAP supplied entropy test tool to determine
the entropy rate present in the samples. This analysis confirmed the claim that during typical operating
conditions the TOE generates appropriate entropy for the random number generation to provide
protection up to 256 bits of strength.
The Fortinet Cryptographic Module contains a CTR_DRBG implemented per NIST SP 800-90A and is seeded
with an entropy source derived from the hardware source. Entropy from the noise source are extracted
and conditioned through a NIST SP 800-90B approved conditioning function to seed the DRBG 256 bits of
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entropy. A failure of the entropy source is a blocking event for the reseeding of the cryptographic system
and the health of the entropy source is continually monitored. The noise source health tests are
constructed to ensure that a catastrophic failure of the noise source will keep the TOE from reseeding
with weak entropy and a prolonged failure will halt the operation of the TOE. The CTR_DRBG
implementation has been CAVP tested to ensure correct operation.
SFRs satisfied: FCS_RBG_EXT.1
7.2.2 Cryptographically Trusted Paths
Trusted paths are used to protect remote administrator authentication and all remote administrator
actions. Remote administration sessions apply to the Network Web-Based GUI (HTTPS) only.
7.2.1 HTTPS
The Network Web-Based GUI uses the HTTPS protocol for secure administrator communications. With
respect to the TOE implementation of HTTPS, TLS version 1.1 (RFC 4346) TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246) can be used
to encrypt and authenticate administration sessions between the remote browser and TOE. The TOE
supports ciphersuites; TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
SFRs satisfied: FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1
7.2.2 TLS
The TLS ciphersuites mean that the keying material is determined when the session is established
through a Diffie-Hellman (DH) exchange which consists of:
· Server sends 2048-bit RSA public certificate
· Server generates, signs (RSA PKCS#1) and sends DH parameters and DH public value
· Client generates and sends DH public value. The keying material is then used to encrypt/decrypt
(AES128 and AES256) and authenticate (HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA256) the data exchange.
When a connection is first established, the server presents the 2048-bit RSA certificate to the connecting
web browser. The administrator can examine the certificate to validate the identity of the TOE and then
choose to continue with the connection if the certificate conforms to the expected values. Only after the
certificate has been explicitly accepted as valid does the above TLS 1.1 or 1.2 authentication with the
administrator’s web browser occur with the TOE to establish the trusted channel. After this channel is
established the administrator will be presented with a warning banner which must be accepted. Next
the login page is presented over this channel, where the user and password credentials can be submitted
back to the TOE for verification of the administrator authentication.
The TOE supports ciphersuites;
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
SFRs satisfied: FCS_TLS_EXT.1
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7.2.3 Cryptographic Self Tests and TOE Update Integrity
The TSF provides a cryptographic function that an administrator may use to verify the integrity of the TSF
executable code. When performing an update to the TOE the image is first uploaded to the TOE by a
trusted administrator using the HTTPS interface or USB media. The candidate update’s digital signature
is then verified by the TOE prior to beginning the installation procedure. Details on this process are
provided in section 7.6.2 of the ST.
During a normal boot-up sequence the TOE administrator can see on the local console the following types
of integrity and self-tests in the following order:
 Configuration file tests
 FIPS AES, SHA, 3DES and RSA tests
 Firmware integrity tests
 Entropy tests
 RNG tests
Indication of successful tests would appear as follows:
Running <test>... passed
Completion of all self-tests is indicated by:
Self-tests passed
The TOE is capable of running these tests at the request of an administrator, and periodically at an
administrator-specified interval not less than once a day to demonstrate the correct operation of the
cryptographic components of the TSF. The TOE will enter into a FIPS Error Mode when failure of a self-
test (integrity verification self-test, or cryptographic self-test) is detected. This mode allows the TOE to
enter into a secure state. These self-tests are executed on initial start-up or at the request of an
administrator. Upon successful completion of these tests an audit log will be generated by the TOE and
sent to the remote audit server.
The TOE provides a USB interface which may be used by an authorized administrator to load private keys
from a USB token. For example the 2048-bit RSA certificate used by the Network Web-Based GUI can be
replaced by certificates trusted by an authorized administrator. These keys/certificates are to be placed
on the USB token and the load operation can be executed via a Network CLI or Network Web-Based GUI
administrator session.
SFRs satisfied: FPT_TUD_EXT.1
7.2.4 Conformance to NIST SP800-56
The TOE fulfills all of the NIST SP 800-56B requirements without extensions. The TOE does not implement
any functionality within this standard that is listed as “should not” and “shall not”.
Specifically the TOE claims conformance to 5.1 (Cryptographic Hash Functions), 5.2 (Message
Authentication Code Algorithm), 5.3 (Random Bit Generation), 5.4 (Prime Number Generators), 5.5
(Primality Testing Methods), 5.6 (Nonces), 5.9 (Key Derivation Functions for Key Establishment Schemes),
6.1 (RSA Key Pairs - General Requirements), 6.2 (Criteria for RSA Key Pairs for Key Establishment), 6.3 (RSA
Key Pair Generators), 6.4 (Assurance of Validity), 6.5 (Assurance of Private Key Possession), 6.6 (Key
Confirmation), and 8 (Key Agreement Schemes). The TOE complies with RSA key pair generation according
to FIPS 186-2 and FIPS 186-3 in SP 800-56B.
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SFRs satisfied: FCS_CKM.1.1
7.2.5 Key and CSP storage and zeroization
The TOE maintains a number of keys and CSPs related to its secure operation. Administrative passwords
are stored in the configuration file on the flash drive of the TOE and are encoded via a hash function to
ensure their confidentiality. These keys are capable of being zeroized either through a format of the flash
memoryor through a factory reset of the TOE.
Certificates for the purposes of HTTPS and TLS connections are maintained on the flash filesystem and are
not viewable through the TOE interfaces. When these keys are no longer required the administrator can
remove the keys through the formatting of the flash memory. Details on this process are contained in
the FIPS level 1 security policy of the TOE.
Additionally the TOE stores a number of CSPs in volatile memory during normal operation of the FIPS
cryptographic module. These CSPs include the ephemeral keys and copies of the persistent keys described
above are loaded into memory during normal operation. The TOE maintains these keys in its volatile
memory in order to support the TLS and HTTPS connections to the TOE. These CSPs include:
 The RSA signature generation key
 The RSA private key decryption key
 AES encryption/decryption key
 AES CMAC generation/verification key
 HMAC Key
 Diffie-Hellman Private agreement key
 RNG Seed
These CSPs are cleared when the process terminates. Each of the CSPs are protected from unauthorized
access via the FortiOS memory management which disallows any memory reads from other processes
within the OS ensuring that the CSPs are only available to the calling application.
SFRs satisfied: FCS_CKM.1.1
7.3 User Data Protection
The TOE ensures that no information from previously processed information flows is transferred to
subsequent information flows. This applies both to information that is input to the TOE from an external
source and to information (e.g., padding bits) that might be added by the TOE during processing of the
information from the external source. The removal of any previous residual information is done through
the zeroization of data when the memory structure is initially created and strict bounds checking on the
data prior to it being assigned in memory.
SFRs satisfied: FDP_RIP.2
7.4 Identification and Authentication
The TOE uses a local password database for all of its credentials by default. The TOE supports local and
remote users to authenticate to this local password database using a pre-shared key. Passwords can be
created through the usage of mixed case characters, digits and the special characters “!”, “@”, “#”, “$”,
“%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(“ and “)”. The configuration file passwords are obscured from their ASCII form by
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encrypting the configuration file using 128-bit keys. This AES key is unique to the TOE and generated
when the TOE enters FIPS mode and uses the hardware based entropy source and FIPS approved module
to generate it.
The TOE supports only local authentication sources and no administrative action is possible prior to
authentication. The TOE will consult the locally configured credential storage to ensure the provided
credentials match the same one-way function as are stored in the TOE configuration files for a pre-shared
key.
SFR’s satisfied: FIA_PMG_EXT.1
7.4.1 Web/HTTPS
By default the web/HTTPS interface is enabled on the TOE LAN ports. The TOE may also be configured to
allow or disallow access to this TSFI on a per-network port basis in either the CLI or the web UI. The HTTPS
web interface is accessed by going to the TOE IP on port 443. Once connected to the port and the HTTPS
session is established the TOE provides a warning banner according to FTA_TAB.1 which the administrator
must accept prior to proceeding. Following this banner the administrator will then be presented with a
username and login screen. The administrator will then provide their credentials which are protected in
transit and accepted by the webserver. Once the authentication has been received the local credential
store is consulted for the pre-shared key and if the entries match access is granted to the TOE.
Unsuccessful attempts to authenticate on this TSFI will be logged to the audit log. During the
authentication process the user’s password is entered in a “password” input box. A failed authentication
attempt will be met with the ‘’ Authentication failure. Please try again...” error message.
Successful authentication may be observed in one of two ways. The administrator may be met with a
post authentication warning forcing them to accept the warning prior to proceeding. If this configuration
option is not enabled the main login dashboard will be presented. By default this dashboard will contain
the hostname, serial number and a number of other pieces of information regarding the TOE.
SFRs satisfied: FIA_UIA_EXT.1 (remote), FIA_UAU_EXT.2, FIA_UAU.7
7.4.2 Local Console
The local console is only accessible through the use of the dedicated serial management port present on
the TOE and requires that the management station be appropriately configured. For details regarding
the software requirements including the console software requirements in the IT environment please see
section 1.6.3
By default the local access is enabled and may not be disabled. An administrator is required to identify
themselves over this interface via usage of a username text prompt. Next the pre-login warning banner
is displayed as configured by the administrator. Following the banner display the user is requested to put
in their password which is hidden and provides no feedback indicating any progress. Once the
identification and authentication has been received the password is encrypted by the TOE’s AES-128 key
and compared to the local credential store. If the provided credentials match access is granted to the TOE
and a CLI session is established. Next a post-login warning may be seen and the TOE will change the
command prompt to the hostname followed by # and be ready to accept CLI commands from the serial
console.
SFRs satisfied: FIA_UIA_EXT.1 (local), FIA_UAU_EXT.2, FIA_UAU.7
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7.5 Security Management
The security management for the TOE is implemented on a per-interface basis. Regardless of the
interface no management functionality is possible prior to authentication. The TOE is capable of having
custom roles defined however, only the Authorized Administrator role who can administer all
functionality of the TOE is defined.
7.5.1 Local Console CLI
The CLI requires identification and authentication prior to any administrative session being established
with the TOE as described in section 7.4.2. Sessions are terminated after inactivity to ensure that stale
sessions may not be hijacked through physical access to the serial port or through an unattended
administrator workstation. Any attempt by an administrator to access the CLI without a valid session
will be rejected and the administrator will be forced to authenticate.
Once authenticated by the CLI the administrator has the ability to create and manage all TSF data both
locally and remotely. This includes querying the TOE version, uploading and validating an update prior to
installation, installing updates, generation and maintenance of all user and administrative accounts and
the configuration of cryptographic module and protocols.
SFRs satisfied: FMT_MTD.1 (local), FMT_SMF.1 (local), FMT_SMR.2
7.5.2 Web UI
The TOE tracks administrative sessions on the Web UI through the use of cookies and a session database
on the TOE. When an administrator logs onto the TOE the environment supplied cookie is compared
against an internally stored session database to determine if there is already an open session for this
instance which has a valid session life. In the event that there is no pre-existing session established or
the established session has timed out for the management of the TOE the user is redirected to the login
banner which must be accepted prior to being presented the login page. Stale administrative sessions are
removed from the session database in the TOE after a period of inactivity to ensure that unattended
administrator sessions can’t be hijacked.
Once authenticated the Web UI gives administrators full remote control over all aspects of the TOE. This
includes querying the TOE version, uploading and validating an update prior to installation, installing
updates, generation and maintenance of all user and administrative accounts and the configuration of
cryptographic module and protocols.
SFRs satisfied: FMT_MTD.1 (remote), FMT_SMF.1 (remote), FMT_SMR.2
7.6 Protection of the TSF
The FortiManager™ appliance uses a number of methods to protect itself and the communications
channels which it provides from potentially hostile entities. The TOE maintains its own timestamp which
is used for time-sensitive operations for generating audit logs and cryptographic key regeneration
intervals. This includes an internal clock source provided by the kernel of the TOE which allows the
auditable events to be reviewed in a reliable manner to reproduce the sequence of events that was
observed.
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7.6.1 Cryptographic Key and Password Storage
The TOE itself is a FIPS 140-2 level 1 overall cryptographically validated module. This means that it has a
number of physical security protections in place including but not limited to the protection of any keys
provided to or stored within the cryptographic module. Cryptographic keys within this module are
generated and destroyed per the FIPS guidelines and are not capable of being viewed through the CLI or
Web interface. The TOE does not provide any method of direct access to view these keys over either of
these interfaces.
Cryptographic keys related to the HTTPS GUI and audit interfaces are stored in encrypted form on the
local filesystem of the TOE. An authorized administrator can generate a certificate signing request from
the TOE and import the signed certificate back into the TOE for the HTTPS GUI interface. Once the
certificate is imported into the TOE this information cannot be viewed again through any of the TSFI’s.
Pre-shared keys related to administrator passwords and other credentials for the secure operation of the
TOE are stored in the TOE’s encrypted configuration file. Authorized administrators are allowed to enter
configuration information through one of the protected communications paths such as the CLI or HTTPS
GUI. Once the password is entered the TOE encrypts the password using AES-128 to the configuration
file permanently obscuring the contents. The TOE will only display this encrypted cipher text upon a
backup of the configuration file. Verification of credentials is done against this encrypted password by
encrypting the passphrase entered on the TSFI and comparing it to the encrypted cipher text in the
configuration file. This configuration file with the encrypted password hashes is available through
downloading the configuration file using the local console or HTTPS GUI.
SFRs satisfied: FPT_SKP_EXT.1, FPT_APW_EXT.1
7.6.2 FortiManager Product Updates
The TOE protects itself during updates through the use of a cryptographic signature. The update process
goes as follows. The administrator downloads the TOE to their workstation from
https://support.fortinet.com. The administrator can then verify the integrity of the update by initiating
the update process. To do this the administrator will then copy the file to the TOE via a trusted path such
as the HTTPS GUI.
Once the firmware update is uploaded to the TOE a 2048 bit RSA signature is verified for any TOE firmware
build. The signature is compared to a known key value stored on the TOE and hardcoded into the previous
firmware image. Before proceeding with a firmware upgrade via the GUI or Serial CLI, the following
process is followed when in the evaluated mode of operation:
 If signature is not present-> abort upgrade
 Extract public key and signature from the firmware
 Validate that public key is same as is stored previously on the TOE. If the public keys do not match
abort the upgrade.
 Validate image signature using public key from the update. If the image validation using the public
key fails abort upgrade.
If the firmware load test fails, the error message displayed is “File is not an update file.” Otherwise the
TOE displays “upgrade successful” and reboots.
SFRs satisfied: FPT_TUD_EXT.1
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7.6.3 Self-Tests
The TOE performs a number of self-tests at start-up and on an ongoing basis. At start-up the TOE
undergoes the following tests in order:
 CPU and Memory BIOS self-test – CPU and memory are initialized by exercising a set of known
answer tests and the BIOS is compared against a known checksum of the image. The memory is
zeroized and then has a random pattern written and read from the memory.
 Boot loader image verification – the boot loader will compare the image of the TOE to a known
checksum of the image prior to booting.
 Noise source tests – the noise source is started and pattern analysis is done on the output to
ensure that the source is not stuck in a cryptographically weak state. These include both the
repetition and adaptive proportion tests.
 FIPS 140-2 Known Answer Tests (KAT) – comparison of a number of cryptographic functions
against an expected set of values
The TOE is also capable of performing the following tests on-demand
 FIPS 140-2 KAT (as described above)
 Noise source (as described above)
The TOE also performs the following ongoing self-tests
 Noise source pattern analysis (as described above)
The self-tests listed above provide assurance that the TOE is operating correctly by checking to ensure the
CPU, BIOS, noise sources, TOE image, and FIPS 140-2 KAT are functioning as expected. Any failures would
result in the TOE entering error mode and shutting down. If the tests successfully complete, the
administrator has sufficient assurance to know that the hardware components are functioning as
expected and the software image that has been loaded matches the appropriate digital signature.
SFRs satisfied: FPT_TST_EXT.1
7.7 TOE Access
The TOE has a number of methods to restrict access to only those administrators who are authorized to
administer the TOE. The first is a login warning prior to allowing a user to log in stating that this is a
restricted access system and only authorized administrators should attempt to login. This prompt is
present on the local console as well as the HTTPS GUI.
The TOE also provides a method for both local and remote sessions to be protected in the event of an
Administrator leaving their session unattended. An authorized administrator can configure the TOE to
terminate inactive local and remote sessions following a specified period of time. By default in the
evaluated configuration this timeout value is the same and it is set to 5 minutes. Finally should an
administrator wish to terminate their session the TOE is able to terminate their session from the TOE side.
On the local console and the HTTPS GUI the user’s session is terminated and removed from the session
database prior to the user being taken back to the warning banner stating that this is a restricted access
system which they are forced to accept prior to going to the login page.
SFRs satisfied: FTA_TAB.1, FTA_SSL_EXT.1, FTA_SSL.3, FTA_SSL.4
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7.8 Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE is designed for secure operation from a trusted administrator to ensure correct operation of the
TOE. The TOE can also secure network traffic using TLS for the purposes of logging via FortiAnalyzer.
A trusted path for an administrator to communicate with the TOE is implemented through the HTTPS GUI.
When in the evaluated configuration this is the only method of remote communication which is possible
with the TOE. When a remote administrator initiates a connection on this interface the TOE will respond
with a cryptographically secured communication path to the workstation of the administrator which will
be used for all communication between the TOE and the authorized administrator. The TOE will detect,
log and reject any packets which indicate that the communications of this path have been tampered with
or modified.
When the TOE is properly configured, communications with the remote FortiAnalyzer audit server are
secured using TLS to ensure that the messages are protected in transit. The TOE will negotiate an
appropriate cipher and confirm the identity of the remote server prior to sending the communication to
the FortiAnalyzer audit server. All communications are validated against the server identity provided
during initial registration of the TOE with the audit server. Should an auditable event be generated the
TOE will consult the known identity of the FortiAnalyzer and encrypt the audit message appropriately.
To properly secure the communications to the remote FortiAnalyzer, the administrator must configure
the FortiManager to upload the audit record log to the FortiAnalyzer at a specific time (scheduled upload).
The TOE is capable of detecting modification or tampering of the communications on the TLS channel. In
the event that a tampered or modified packet is observed on the channel the TOE will discard the packet.
SFRs satisfied: FTP_ITC.1, FTP_TRP.1
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8 RATIONALE
This ST claims Exact Conformance to Network Devices Protection Profile v1.1 and the NDPP Errata #3.
Hence, conformance claim rationale, security objectives rationale, extended SFR rationale, and security
requirements rationale (including dependency rationale, SAR choice rationale) are explicitly addressed by
the Protection Profile, without further elaboration in this ST.
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9 ACRONYMS
Table 10 – Acronyms
Acronym Definition
ADOM Administrative Domain
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CC Common Criteria
CEM Common Evaluation Methodology
CSP Critical Security Parameters
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
FDN FortiGuard Distribution Network
FDS FortiGuard Distribution Servers
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
NDPP Network Device Protection Profile
OSP Organizational Security Policy
PP Protection Profile
RAID Redundant Array of Inexpensive Disks
RBG Random Bit Generator
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
VDOM Virtual Domain
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10 APPENDIX A –HARDWARE PLATFORM DETAILS
The following section describes a high level overview of the various claimed and supported FortiManager
products examined during this evaluation.
Additional detail with regards to the various product models including performance characteristics for
each model are listed on Fortinet's webpage.
The products below are listed based on their physical form factor. For additional information on the
various hardware models including the number of ports and compatible expansion options please see
http://www.fortinet.com/products/index.html.
10.1 Hardware Form Factor
Model CPU Interface RAM Flash Storage
FMG-200D Intel Celeron
G540 Sandy
Bridge, 2.50GHz,
C202
4 x 10/100/1000 RJ45
ports
4GB (DDR3-1333
2GBx2)
2GB
1TB
FMG-1000D Intel Xeon E3-
1225v2 Ivy
Bridge Quad
Cores, 3.20GHz,
C202
6 x 10/100/1000 RJ45
Ports, 2 x SFP Ports
16GB (DDR3-1333
4GBx4)
2GB
8TB (4x 2TB)
FMG-3900E Intel Xeon E5-
2630v2, 6 Cores,
2.6GHz x 2
2 x 10/100/1000 RJ45
Ports, 2 x 10GbE SFP+
Ports
128GB (DDR3
8Gx16)
2 GB
15 TB SSD (15x 1
TB SSD)
FMG-4000D Intel Xeon E5-
2620, 6 Cores,
2.0GHz x 2
4 x 10/100/1000 RJ45
Ports, 2 x GbE SFP
Ports
16GB (DDR3
2GBx8)
2 GB
16TB (2TB x 8)
FMG-4000E Intel Xeon E5-
2620v2, 6 Cores,
2.1GHz x 2
4 x 10/100/1000 RJ45
Ports, 2 x GbE SFP
Ports
64GB (DDR3
4GBx16)
2 GB
16TB (2TB x 8)