Wickr Enterprise Client 6.10
Security Target
Version 1.0
07 March 2023
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Contents
1. SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................1
1.1 SECURITY TARGET, TOE AND CC IDENTIFICATION........................................................................................1
1.2 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS.................................................................................................................................2
1.3 CONVENTIONS ................................................................................................................................................2
1.3.1 Acronyms...............................................................................................................................................3
2. PRODUCT AND TOE DESCRIPTION............................................................................................................4
2.1 INTRODUCTION...............................................................................................................................................4
2.2 PRODUCT OVERVIEW......................................................................................................................................4
2.3 TOE OVERVIEW .............................................................................................................................................4
2.4 TOE ARCHITECTURE......................................................................................................................................5
2.4.1 Physical Boundary.................................................................................................................................6
2.4.2 Logical Boundary ..................................................................................................................................7
2.5 TOE DOCUMENTATION ..................................................................................................................................8
3. SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION ............................................................................................................9
4. SECURITY OBJECTIVES ..............................................................................................................................10
5. IT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS..................................................................................................................11
5.1 EXTENDED REQUIREMENTS..........................................................................................................................11
5.2 TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS .............................................................................................12
5.2.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS)..............................................................................................................12
5.2.2 User Data Protection (FDP).................................................................................................................14
5.2.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA) ..............................................................................................14
5.2.4 Security Management (FMT) ..............................................................................................................16
5.2.5 Privacy (FPR) ......................................................................................................................................17
5.2.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT) ................................................................................................................17
5.2.7 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)...............................................................................................................18
5.3 TOE SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS...............................................................................................18
6. TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION..............................................................................................................20
6.1 TIMELY SECURITY UPDATES ........................................................................................................................20
6.2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC SUPPORT...........................................................................................................................20
6.3 USER DATA PROTECTION .............................................................................................................................24
6.4 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION ......................................................................................................24
6.5 SECURITY MANAGEMENT.............................................................................................................................25
6.6 PRIVACY.......................................................................................................................................................26
6.7 PROTECTION OF THE TSF .............................................................................................................................26
6.8 TRUSTED PATH/CHANNELS ..........................................................................................................................27
7. PROTECTION PROFILE CLAIMS...............................................................................................................29
8. RATIONALE.....................................................................................................................................................30
8.1 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION RATIONALE................................................................................................30
APPENDIX A: TOE USAGE OF THIRD-PARTY COMPONENTS ..................................................................32
A.1 PLATFORM APIS...........................................................................................................................................32
A.2 THIRD-PARTY LIBRARIES .............................................................................................................................35
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LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES
Figure 1: Wickr Architecture.....................................................................................................................................6
Table 1 Technical Decisions........................................................................................................................................2
Table 2 TOE Security Functional Components ......................................................................................................12
Table 3 Assurance Components ...............................................................................................................................18
Table 4 Cryptographic Functions ............................................................................................................................21
Table 5 Sensitive Data ...............................................................................................................................................24
Table 6 Security Functions vs. Requirements Mapping.........................................................................................30
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1. Security Target Introduction
This section identifies the Security Target (ST) and Target of Evaluation (TOE) identification, ST conventions, ST
conformance claims, and the ST organization. The TOE is Wickr Enterprise Client 6.10.
Wickr Enterprise Client includes stand-alone executable clients for Windows, macOS, iOS, and Android systems.
These clients are installed on endpoint systems in an organization to facilitate peer communications. The Wickr
Enterprise Client interacts with an environmental Wickr Enterprise Server that is used for administration of the Wickr
Enterprise Client and communication control.
The focus of this evaluation is on the TOE functionality supporting the claims of version 1.4 of the Protection Profile
for Application Software [App PP]. The only capabilities covered by the evaluation are those specified in the
aforementioned Protection Profile; no additional security functional claims are made by this Security Target. The
security functionality specified in [App PP] includes protection of security-relevant data at rest and in transit, any
cryptographic functionality used to achieve this, and security of the interactions between the application(s) and their
underlying platform(s). Where appropriate and permitted by the [App PP], this evaluation will identify areas where
the TOE’s underlying platform is used to support the TOE’s implementation of its claimed security functionality.
The Security Target contains the following additional sections:
• Product and TOE Description (Section 2)
• Security Problem Definition (Section 3)
• Security Objectives (Section 4)
• IT Security Requirements (Section 5)
• TOE Summary Specification (Section 6)
• Protection Profile Claims (Section 7)
• Rationale (Section 8)
1.1 Security Target, TOE and CC Identification
ST Title – Wickr Enterprise Client 6.10 Security Target
ST Version – Version 1.0
ST Date – 07 March 2023
TOE Identification – Wickr Enterprise Client 6.10. The platform-specific versions of the TOE include:
1. Wickr Enterprise Client for Windows 6.10.2
Evaluated on Microsoft Windows 10.
2. Wickr Enterprise Client for macOS 6.10.2
Evaluated on macOS 12.4 Monterey.
3. Wickr Enterprise Client for iOS 6.10.0
Evaluated on iOS 15.5.
4. Wickr Enterprise Client for Android 6.10.0
Evaluated on Android 12.
TOE Developer – Wickr LLC
Evaluation Sponsor – Wickr LLC
CC Identification – Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April
2017
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1.2 Conformance Claims
This ST and the TOE it describes claim exact conformance to the following CC specifications:
• Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.4, 07 October 2021 with the following optional,
selection-based, and objective SFRs:
o FCS_CKM.1/SK
o FCS_COP.1/SKC
o FCS_RBG_EXT.2
o FIA_X509_EXT.1
o FIA_X509_EXT.2
o FPT_TUD_EXT.2
• The following NIAP Technical Decisions apply to this PP and have been accounted for in the ST development
and the conduct of the evaluation, or were considered to be non-applicable:
Table 1 Technical Decisions
TD # TD Title Applicability to Evaluation
0719 ECD for PP APP V1.3 and 1.4 Not applicable; this TD updates the App PP to include a
formal ECD which is needed for the PP itself to conform
to CC Part 3. This does not change the ST or how the
evaluation of the TOE is conducted.
0717 Format changes for PP_APP_V1.4 Applicable
0709 Number of elements for iterations of
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1
Not applicable; the TOE does not claim this SFR.
0669 FIA_X509_EXT.1 Test 4 Interpretation Applicable
0664 Testing activity for FPT_TUD_EXT.2.2 Applicable
0655 Mutual authentication in FTP_DIT_EXT.1
for SW App
Applicable
0650 Conformance claim sections updated to
allow for MOD_VPNC_V2.3 and 2.4
Not applicable; the TOE does not claim VPN client
functionality
0628 Addition of Container Image to Package
Format
Applicable
0624 Addition of DataStore for Storing and
Setting Configuration Options
Applicable
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional components,
Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
o Part 2 Extended
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance components,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
o Part 3 Extended
1.3 Conventions
The following conventions have been applied in this document:
• Security Functional Requirements – Part 2 of the CC defines the approved set of operations that may be
applied to functional requirements: iteration, assignment, selection, and refinement.
o Iteration: allows a component to be used more than once with varying operations. An iterated SFR that
is defined in [App PP] identifies this using a slash and additional characters placed at end of the
component, generally intended to be descriptive of the purpose of each iteration. For example,
FCS_CKM.1/AK and FCS_CKM.1/SK indicate that the PP includes two iterations of the FCS_CKM.1
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requirement: /AK (asymmetric keys) and /SK (symmetric keys). Depending on the specific claims made,
the ST may include some or all of the iterated components. For iterations defined by the ST author, the
same convention is used but with a sequential number following the slash.
o Assignment: allows the specification of an identified parameter. Assignments are indicated using italics
and are surrounded by brackets (e.g., [assignment item]). Note that an assignment within a selection
would be identified in both italics and underline, with the brackets themselves underlined since they are
explicitly part of the selection text, unlike the brackets around the selection itself (e.g., [selection item,
[assignment item inside selection]]).
o Selection: allows the specification of one or more elements from a list. Selections are indicated using
underlines and are surrounded by brackets (e.g., [selection item]).
o Refinement: allows the addition of details and non-technical changes to grammar and formatting.
Refinements are indicated using bold, for additions, and strike-through, for deletions (e.g., “… all objects
…” or “… some big things …”). Note that minor grammatical changes that do not involve the addition
or removal of entire words (e.g., for consistency of quantity such as changing “meets” to “meet”) do not
have formatting applied.
• Other sections of the ST – Other sections of the ST use bolding to highlight text of special interest, such as
captions.
• The ST does not highlight operations that have been completed by the PP authors, though it does preserve
brackets to show where operations have been made.
1.3.1 Acronyms
AA Assurance Activity
API Application Programming Interface
ASLR Address Space Layout Randomization
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CC Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CEM Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security
CRL Certificate Revocation List
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
HMAC Hashed Message Authentication Code
HTTP(S) Hypertext Transfer Protocol (Secure)
IP Internet Protocol
NIAP National Information Assurance Partnership
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
OCSP Online Certificate Status Protocol
PII Publicly Identifiable Information
PP Protection Profile
RSA Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (algorithm for public-key cryptography)
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SSL Secure Socket Layer Protocol
ST Security Target
TLS Transport Layer Security
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSS TOE Security Specification
UUID Universally Unique IDentifier
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2. Product and TOE Description
The TOE is the Wickr Enterprise Client 6.10 product. This section provides an overview of the capabilities of the
product and then proceeds to describe the TOE itself in terms of its evaluated components and functional claims.
2.1 Introduction
Wickr Enterprise Client is an on-premise application providing communication with remote peers.
Wickr Enterprise Client is part of a client-server distribution. The TOE is the client portion of this distribution. It
interacts with the Wickr Enterprise Server application in its operational environment. Collectively, they make up the
Wickr Enterprise solution.
2.2 Product Overview
This sub-section describes capabilities of Wickr Enterprise. The scope of the evaluation is covered in the subsequent
sub-sections that provide the TOE overview and describe the TOE architecture and physical and logical boundaries.
Wickr Enterprise is an end-to-end encrypted service that provides communication services for client devices in a
closed-loop, zero-trust environment.
Wickr Enterprise is a client-server implementation. Users join the Wickr Enterprise Network by downloading a free
copy of their platform’s Wickr Client application. Users subscribe to the Enterprise Network by paying a monthly
subscription fee. Upon establishing a subscription, the User’s Wickr Client receives configuration information from a
Wickr Server, enabling connection to the Wickr Enterprise Network. Wickr Servers are part of the infrastructure
supporting the Wickr Enterprise Network. They exchange user information and routing information to enable
messages to traverse the network from Server to Server until the final Client is reached.
All Wickr Clients communicate through Wickr Servers for client-to-client communication. The ‘base’ configuration
of the Wickr Server runs as a Messaging Server. Wickr Client to Client communication is actually Wickr User/Wickr
Client to Wickr User/Wickr Client communication. A registered Wickr User may be registered on multiple platforms
(Client instances) and a Wickr Server may have multiple Wickr Users registered on its system. The Wickr Messaging
Server is responsible for authenticating Wickr Users and discovering routing information. On receipt of a connection
request, once authenticated, the Messaging Server discovers information about the recipient(s) by configuration
information.
A data message will be sent to each instance of the registered User. Additionally, a copy of the data message will be
sent to the sender’s additional User accounts to enable the sender to have a copy of the message as “sent” on each
client. So, if a sending User that is registered on two different platforms attempts to connect to a User that is also
registered on two different platforms, the Messaging Server will create the message to be routed to three different
User/Client destinations. If a recipient client’s system is powered off, data messages are held for that User/Client until
that instance of the User powers on. If a recipient client’s system is powered on but the User is not logged onto the
Enterprise Network, the Messaging Server will provide a push notification to notify the User a data message is
available.
Administration of the Wickr Enterprise Network is by Web access to the Messaging Server. The Messaging Server
sends configuration information to Wickr Clients. Additionally, Wickr Users may manage parameters about their
Wickr Client accounts.
2.3 TOE Overview
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) comprises the Wickr Enterprise Client software application (hereinafter referred to
as Wickr Client). The TOE may be deployed on Windows, Android, iOS or macOS.
The focus of this evaluation is on the TOE functionality supporting the claims in the Protection Profile for Application
Software, Version 1.4. Specifically, the following capabilities are within the scope of the evaluation:
• Trusted communications between Wickr Client and Wickr Server.
• The extent to which the TSF relies on platform-provided and third-party capabilities to perform its
functionality.
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• The extent to which data used to determine the behavior of the TSF is secured while at rest and in transit.
• The ability for the TOE to function on a host platform that is configured for secure operation.
• The ability of the TOE to interface with the low-level components of its host platform in such a manner that
the TOE cannot be used as an attack vector to exploit the host platform.
• The ability of the organization deploying the TOE to perform timely and trusted security updates to it.
The TSF includes all security data and configuration settings needed to support this behavior. Not all configuration
settings are security-relevant.
The Wickr Client uses the Wickr Server to broker communications with other Wickr Clients for messaging rooms.
The Wickr Client uses platform-provided TLS for security of data in transit.
2.4 TOE Architecture
The Wickr Client TOE is a software application that runs on several different platforms:
• Windows
• macOS
• iOS
• Android
The product architecture is shown in the following figure. The Wickr Client application (the TOE) is indicated by the
red box. The other items are implemented on the Wickr Servers and other systems that are part of the TOE’s
Operational Environment.
The figure depicts initial communication setup for messaging. The direction of the arrows indicates which system
initiates communication. Communication is bidirectional once a connection is established. The Wickr Client relies on
the cryptographic functions of its host platform for data in transit.
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Figure 1: Wickr Architecture
2.4.1 Physical Boundary
The TOE consists of the Wickr Client application. For this evaluation, the TOE is evaluated on the following specific
platforms:
• Windows:
o Microsoft Surface Laptop 4
o Intel i5-1145G7 (Tiger Lake) processor
o Windows 10 64-bit OS
• macOS:
o MacBook Pro
o Intel i7-9750H (Coffee Lake) processor
o macOS Monterey 12.4 OS
• iOS:
o iPhone 12
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o Apple A14 Bionic (ARMv8) processor
o iOS 15.5 OS
• Android:
o Samsung Galaxy S20 FE
o Qualcomm Snapdragon 865 (ARMv8) processor
o Android 12 OS
In addition to the platforms identified above, the TOE’s operational environment includes the following:
• A Wickr Server installed for messaging
• One or more remote Wickr Client instances to establish connections with
• A Workstation with a browser to access the Wickr Server’s Admin Console. (Wickr Clients receive
configuration information from a Wickr Server)
• An Update server (public download site).
2.4.2 Logical Boundary
This section summarizes the security functions provided by the TOE:
• Cryptographic Support
• User Data Protection
• Identification and Authentication
• Security Management
• Privacy
• Protection of the TSF
• Trusted Path/Channels
2.4.2.1 Cryptographic Support
The TOE uses NIST-validated cryptographic algorithms to secure messaging data in transit. The cryptographic
functions for this are supplied by the host platform. All platform versions of the TOE also implement their own NIST-
validated cryptographic algorithms through OpenSSL to support the protection of credential data at rest. The TOE
relies on platform-provided entropy for random number generator seeding.
The TOE uses cryptographic functionality to protect stored credential data. This is done through a combination of
TSF-provided cryptography and platform cryptography for all platform versions.
2.4.2.2 User Data Protection
The TOE provides cryptographic functionality and also leverages functionality provided by its underlying OS
platforms to secure sensitive data at rest. The TOE uses network resources provided by the underlying platforms. All
platform services are invoked at the direction of the user.
The TOE uses network connectivity to interact with a Wickr Server to establish connections with other Wickr Clients.
The TOE or its platform, depending on platform version, check for updates from an update server.
2.4.2.3 Identification and Authentication
The TOE relies on platform-provided functionality to validate X.509 certificates used to authenticate TLS servers
when establishing trusted communications except in the case where the desktop platform versions of the TOE (macOS,
Windows) are responsible for validating the crlsign bit on any certificate used to sign a CRL. Certificate validation is
performed in accordance with RFC 5280 and CRLs are used for revocation checking in all cases except for iOS, which
uses OCSP.
2.4.2.4 Security Management
Wickr Client configuration data is stored locally using mechanisms that are recommended by the respective platform
vendors. The TOE is not installed with default credentials. The Wickr Client applies configuration settings it obtains
from the Wickr Server.
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2.4.2.5 Privacy
The TOE does not process any PII. No transmission of PII occurs that is not in direct response to user activity.
2.4.2.6 Protection of the TSF
The TOE includes measures to integrate securely with its underlying OS platform. The TOE does not perform explicit
memory mapping, nor does it allocate any memory region with both write and execute permissions. Similarly, the
TOE does not write user-modifiable data to directories that contain executable files. The TOE is compatible with its
supported host OS platform when configured in a secure manner. All platform versions of the TOE are compiled with
stack overflow protection.
The TOE uses a well-defined set of platform APIs and third-party libraries.
The TOE provides the ability for a user to check its version. The TOE platform is used to apply updates. Updates are
delivered in a format that is appropriate for the TOE’s platform. Updates to the TOE are digitally signed, and the
signature is validated prior to installation. The TOE does not modify its own code. Removal of the application removes
all executable code associated with the TOE.
2.4.2.7 Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE uses trusted channels to secure data in transit between itself and external entities. The TOE communicates
with the Wickr Server for messaging services and authentication using platform provided TLS.
2.5 TOE Documentation
Wickr provides the following product documentation in support of the installation and secure use of the TOE:
• Wickr Enterprise Administrator Guide, v426151b
• Wickr Enterprise Installation and Maintenance v1.30.0
• Wickr Enterprise Desktop User Guide v6.10
• Wickr Enterprise Client Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guide (CCECG), Version 1.0
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3. Security Problem Definition
This Security Target includes by reference the Security Problem Definition, composed of threats and assumptions,
from the [App PP]. The Common Criteria also provides for organizational security policies to be part of a security
problem definition, but no such policies are defined in the [App PP].
In general, the threat model of the [App PP] is designed to protect against the following:
• Disclosure of sensitive data at rest or in transit that the user has a reasonable expectation of security for
• Excessive or poorly-implemented interfaces with the underlying platform that allow an application to be used
as an intrusion point to a system
This threat model is applicable because the TOE processes information that may contain sensitive data that a user
expects will not be disclosed to anyone other than the remote peer, and because the TOE runs on general purpose
operating systems that may contain other data, applications, or network services that enforce their security in part
through the assumption that the underlying operating system is trusted.
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4. Security Objectives
Like the Security Problem Definition, this Security Target includes, by reference, the security objectives defined in
[App PP]. This includes security objectives for the TOE (used to mitigate threats) and for its operational environment
(used to satisfy assumptions).
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5. IT Security Requirements
This section defines the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) and Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) that
serve to represent the security functional claims for the Target of Evaluation (TOE) and to scope the evaluation effort.
The SFRs have all been drawn from the following Protection Profile (PP):
• Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.4, 07 October 2021 [App PP]
As a result, any selection/assignment/refinement operations already performed by that PP on the claimed SFRs are
not identified here (i.e., they are not formatted in accordance with the conventions specified in section 1.3 of this
Security Target). Formatting conventions are only applied on SFR text that was chosen at the ST author’s discretion.
5.1 Extended Requirements
All of the extended requirements in this ST have been drawn from the [App PP]. The PP defines the following extended
SAR and SFRs; since they have not been redefined in this ST, the [App PP] should be consulted for more information
regarding these extensions to CC Parts 2 and 3.
• ALC_TSU_EXT.1: Timely Security Updates
• FCS_CKM_EXT.1: Cryptographic Key Generation
• FCS_RBG_EXT.1: Random Bit Generation Services (iterated by ST author)
• FCS_RBG_EXT.2: Random Bit Generation from Application
• FCS_STO_EXT.1: Storage of Credentials (iterated by ST author)
• FDP_DAR_EXT.1: Encryption of Sensitive Application Data
• FDP_DEC_EXT.1: Access to Platform Resources
• FDP_NET_EXT.1: Network Communications
• FIA_X509_EXT.1: X.509 Certificate Validation (iterated by ST author)
• FIA_X509_EXT.2: X.509 Certificate Authentication
• FMT_CFG_EXT.1: Secure by Default Configuration
• FMT_MEC_EXT.1: Supported Configuration Mechanism
• FPR_ANO_EXT.1: User Consent for Transmission of Personally Identifiable Information
• FPT_AEX_EXT.1: Anti-Exploitation Capabilities
• FPT_API_EXT.1: Use of Supported Services and APIs
• FPT_IDV_EXT.1: Software Identification and Versions
• FPT_LIB_EXT.1: Use of Third Party Libraries
• FPT_TUD_EXT.1: Integrity for Installation and Update (iterated by ST author)
• FPT_TUD_EXT.2: Integrity for Installation and Update
• FTP_DIT_EXT.1: Protection of Data in Transit
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5.2 TOE Security Functional Requirements
The following table identifies the SFRs that are satisfied by the TOE.
Table 2 TOE Security Functional Components
Requirement Class Requirement Component
FCS: Cryptographic
Support
FCS_CKM_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Generation Services
FCS_CKM.1/SK Cryptographic Symmetric Key Generation
FCS_COP.1/SKC Cryptographic Operation – Encryption/Decryption
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation Services
FCS_RBG_EXT.2 Random Bit Generation from Application
FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Credentials
FDP: User Data Protection FDP_DAR_EXT.1 Encryption of Sensitive Application Data
FDP_DEC_EXT.1 Access to Platform Resources
FDP_NET_EXT.1 Network Communications
FIA: Identification and
authentication
FIA_X509_EXT.1/1 X.509 Certificate Validation (macOS, Windows)
FIA_X509_EXT.1/2 X.509 Certificate Validation (Android)
FIA_X509_EXT.1/3 X.509 Certificate Validation (iOS)
FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication
FMT: Security
Management
FMT_CFG_EXT.1 Secure by Default Configuration
FMT_MEC_EXT.1 Supported Configuration Mechanism
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FPR: Privacy FPR_ANO_EXT.1 User Consent for Transmission of Personally Identifiable
Information
FPT: Protection of the TSF FPT_AEX_EXT.1 Anti-Exploitation Capabilities
FPT_API_EXT.1 Use of Supported Services and APIs
FPT_IDV_EXT.1 Software Identification and Versions
FPT_LIB_EXT.1 Use of Third Party Libraries
FPT_TUD_EXT.1/1 Integrity for Installation and Update (macOS, Windows)
FPT_TUD_EXT.1/2 Integrity for Installation and Update (Android, iOS)
FPT_TUD_EXT.2 Integrity for Installation and Update
FTP: Trusted
Path/Channels
FTP_DIT_EXT.1 Protection of Data in Transit
5.2.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS)
FCS_CKM_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Generation Services1
1
This SFR is modified by TD0717
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FCS_CKM_EXT.1.1 The application shall [
• Generate no asymmetric cryptographic keys
].
FCS_CKM.1/SK Cryptographic Symmetric Key Generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/SK The application shall generate symmetric cryptographic keys using a Random Bit
Generator as specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1 and specified cryptographic key sizes [
• 256 bit
].
FCS_COP.1/SKC Cryptographic Operation – Encryption/Decryption2
FCS_COP.1.1/SKC The application shall perform [encryption/decryption] in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [
• AES-GCM (as defined in NIST SP 800-38D) mode
] and cryptographic key sizes [256-bit].
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation Services
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1 The application shall [
• implement DRBG functionality
] for its cryptographic functions.
FCS_RBG_EXT.2 Random Bit Generation from Application
FCS_RBG_EXT.2.1 The application shall perform all deterministic random bit generation (DRBG) services in
accordance with NIST Special Publication 800-90A using [CTR_DRBG (AES)].
FCS_RBG_EXT.2.2 The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by an entropy source that accumulates entropy
from a platform-based DRBG and [no other noise source] with a minimum of [256 bits]
of entropy at least equal to the greatest security strength (according to NIST SP 800-57)
of the keys and hashes that it will generate.
FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Credentials
FCS_STO_EXT.1.1 The application shall [
• invoke the functionality provided by the platform to securely store [client API key],
• implement functionality to securely store [database key] according to
[FCS_COP.1/SKC]
] to non-volatile memory.
2
This SFR is modified by TD0717
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5.2.2 User Data Protection (FDP)
FDP_DAR_EXT.1 Encryption of Sensitive Application Data
FDP_DAR_EXT.1.1 The application shall [
• protect sensitive data in accordance with FCS_STO_EXT.1
] in non-volatile memory.
FDP_DEC_EXT.1 Access to Platform Resources
FDP_DEC_EXT.1.1 The application shall restrict its access to [
• network connectivity,
• location services
].
FDP_DEC_EXT.1.2 The application shall restrict its access to [
• address book,
• [photos]
].
FDP_NET_EXT.1 Network Communications
FDP_NET_EXT.1.1 The application shall restrict network communication to [
• user-initiated communication for [connection to Wickr Server],
• respond to [push notifications for incoming peer connections (iOS, Android)]
• [application-initiated checking for updates (Android, iOS, macOS, and Windows)]
].
5.2.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA)
FIA_X509_EXT.1/1 X.509 Certificate Validation (macOS, Windows)
FIA_X509_EXT.1.1/1 The macOS and Windows application shall [invoke platform-provided functionality,
implement functionality] to validate certificates in accordance with the following rules:
• RFC 5280 certificate validation and certificate path validation.
• The certificate path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate.
• The application shall validate a certificate path by ensuring the presence of the
basicConstraints extension, that the CA flag is set to TRUE for all CA certificates, and
that any path constraints are met.
• The application shall validate that any CA certificate includes caSigning purpose in
the key usage field
• The application shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using [CRL as
specified in RFC 5280 Section 6.3]
• The application shall validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following
rules:
o Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification
shall have the Code Signing Purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the
extendedKeyUsage field.
o Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication purpose
(id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the EKU field.
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o Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose
(id-kp 2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the EKU field.
o S/MIME certificates presented for email encryption and signature shall have the
Email Protection purpose (id-kp 4 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4) in the EKU field.
o OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP Signing
purpose (id-kp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the EKU field.
o Server certificates presented for EST shall have the CMC Registration Authority
(RA) purpose (id-kp-cmcRA with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.28) in the EKU field.
FIA_X509_EXT.1.2/1 The application shall treat a certificate as a CA certificate only if the basicConstraints
extension is present and the CA flag is set to TRUE.
Application Note: The macOS and Windows platform versions of the TOE rely on the platform for X.509
validation for all functions except for determining whether a CRL is valid based on the
presence of the crlsign key usage bit of the certificate used to sign the CRL.
FIA_X509_EXT.1/2 X.509 Certificate Validation (Android)
FIA_X509_EXT.1.1/2 The Android application shall [invoke platform-provided functionality] to validate
certificates in accordance with the following rules:
• RFC 5280 certificate validation and certificate path validation.
• The certificate path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate.
• The application shall validate a certificate path by ensuring the presence of the
basicConstraints extension, that the CA flag is set to TRUE for all CA certificates, and
that any path constraints are met.
• The application shall validate that any CA certificate includes caSigning purpose in
the key usage field
• The application shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using [CRL as
specified in RFC 5280 Section 6.3]
• The application shall validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following
rules:
o Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification
shall have the Code Signing Purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the
extendedKeyUsage field.
o Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication purpose
(id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the EKU field.
o Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose
(id-kp 2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the EKU field.
o S/MIME certificates presented for email encryption and signature shall have the
Email Protection purpose (id-kp 4 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4) in the EKU field.
o OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP Signing
purpose (id-kp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the EKU field.
o Server certificates presented for EST shall have the CMC Registration Authority
(RA) purpose (id-kp-cmcRA with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.28) in the EKU field.
FIA_X509_EXT.1.2/2 The application shall treat a certificate as a CA certificate only if the basicConstraints
extension is present and the CA flag is set to TRUE.
Application Note: The Android platform version of the TOE relies fully on the platform for X.509 validation
and uses CRL for revocation checking.
FIA_X509_EXT.1/3 X.509 Certificate Validation (iOS)
FIA_X509_EXT.1.1/3 The iOS application shall [invoke platform-provided functionality] to validate certificates
in accordance with the following rules:
• RFC 5280 certificate validation and certificate path validation.
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• The certificate path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate.
• The application shall validate a certificate path by ensuring the presence of the
basicConstraints extension, that the CA flag is set to TRUE for all CA certificates, and
that any path constraints are met.
• The application shall validate that any CA certificate includes caSigning purpose in
the key usage field
• The application shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using [OCSP as
specified in RFC 6960]
• The application shall validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following
rules:
o Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification
shall have the Code Signing Purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the
extendedKeyUsage field.
o Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication purpose
(id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the EKU field.
o Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose
(id-kp 2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the EKU field.
o S/MIME certificates presented for email encryption and signature shall have the
Email Protection purpose (id-kp 4 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4) in the EKU field.
o OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP Signing
purpose (id-kp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the EKU field.
o Server certificates presented for EST shall have the CMC Registration Authority
(RA) purpose (id-kp-cmcRA with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.28) in the EKU field.
FIA_X509_EXT.1.2/3 The application shall treat a certificate as a CA certificate only if the basicConstraints
extension is present and the CA flag is set to TRUE.
Application Note: The iOS platform version of the TOE relies fully on the platform for X.509 validation and
uses OCSP for revocation checking.
FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication
FIA_X509_EXT.2.1 The application shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support
authentication for [TLS].
FIA_X509_EXT.2.2 When the application cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a
certificate, the application shall [accept the certificate].
5.2.4 Security Management (FMT)
FMT_CFG_EXT.1 Secure by Default Configuration
FMT_CFG_EXT.1.1 The application shall only provide enough functionality to set new credentials when
configured with default credentials or no credentials.
FMT_CFG_EXT.1.2 The application shall be configured by default with file permissions which protect the
application’s binaries and data files from modification by normal unprivileged users.
FMT_MEC_EXT.1 Supported Configuration Mechanism
FMT_MEC_EXT.1.1 The application shall [invoke the mechanisms recommended by the platform vendor for
storing and setting configuration options].
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions [
• [configure logging,
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• delete stored logs,
• secure shredder,
• configuration of authentication lockout]
].
5.2.5 Privacy (FPR)
FPR_ANO_EXT.1 User Consent for Transmission of Personally Identifiable Information
FPR_ANO_EXT.1.1 The application shall [not transmit PII over a network].
5.2.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT)
FPT_AEX_EXT.1 Anti-Exploitation Capabilities
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.1 The application shall not request to map memory at an explicit address except for [no
exceptions].
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.2 The application shall [not allocate any memory region with both write and execute
permissions].
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.3 The application shall be compatible with security features provided by the platform
vendor.
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.4 The application shall not write user-modifiable files to directories that contain executable
files unless explicitly directed by the user to do so.
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.5 The application shall be compiled with stack-based buffer overflow protection enabled.
FPT_API_EXT.1 Use of Supported Services and APIs
FPT_API_EXT.1.1 The application shall only use documented platform APIs.
Application Note: The list of supported platform APIs has been provided in Appendix A.1 for readability
purposes.
FPT_IDV_EXT.1 Software Identification and Versions
FPT_IDV_EXT.1.1 The application shall be versioned with [[major.minor.release]].
FPT_LIB_EXT.1 Use of Third Party Libraries
FPT_LIB_EXT.1.1 The application shall be packaged with only [the third-party libraries listed in Section A.2].
Application Note: The list of supported third-party libraries has been provided in Appendix A.2 for
readability purposes.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1/1 Integrity for Installation and Update (macOS, Windows)
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1/1 The application shall [provide the ability] to check for updates and patches to the
application software.
Application Note: The macOS and Windows platform versions of the TOE use their own mechanism to
check for the availability of software updates.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2/1 The application shall [provide the ability] to query the current version of the application
software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3/1 The application shall not download, modify, replace or update its own binary code.
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FPT_TUD_EXT.1.4/1 Application updates shall be digitally signed such that the application platform can
cryptographically verify them prior to installation.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.5/1 The application is distributed [as an additional software package to the platform OS].
FPT_TUD_EXT.1/2 Integrity for Installation and Update (Android, iOS)
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1/2 The application shall [leverage the platform] to check for updates and patches to the
application software.
Application Note: The Android and iOS platform versions of the TOE use platform mechanisms to check for
the availability of software updates.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2/2 The application shall [provide the ability] to query the current version of the application
software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3/2 The application shall not download, modify, replace or update its own binary code.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.4/2 Application updates shall be digitally signed such that the application platform can
cryptographically verify them prior to installation.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.5/2 The application is distributed [as an additional software package to the platform OS].
FPT_TUD_EXT.2 Integrity for Installation and Update3
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.1 The application shall be distributed using [the format of the platform-supported package
manager].
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.2 The application shall be packaged such that its removal results in the deletion of all traces
of the application, with the exception of configuration settings, output files, and audit/log
events.
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.3 The application installation package shall be digitally signed such that its platform can
cryptographically verify them prior to installation.
5.2.7 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)
FTP_DIT_EXT.1 Protection of Data in Transit 4
FTP_DIT_EXT.1.1 The application shall [
• invoke platform-provided functionality to encrypt all transmitted data with [TLS]
] between itself and another trusted IT product.
5.3 TOE Security Assurance Requirements
The security assurance requirements for the TOE are included by reference to [App PP].
Table 3 Assurance Components
Requirement Class Requirement Component
ADV: Development ADV_FSP.1 Basic Functional Specification
AGD: Guidance Documents AGD_OPE.1: Operational User Guidance
AGD_PRE.1: Preparative Procedures
ALC: Life-Cycle Support ALC_CMC.1: Labelling of the TOE
3
This SFR is modified by TD0628
4
This SFR is modified by TD0655
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ALC_CMS.1: TOE CM coverage
ALC_TSU_EXT.1: Timely Security Updates
ATE: Tests ATE_IND.1 Independent Testing – Conformance
AVA: Vulnerability Assessment AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability Survey
Consequently, the evaluation activities specified in the [App PP] apply to the TOE evaluation, including any changes
made to them by subsequent NIAP Technical Decisions as summarized in section 1.2 above.
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6. TOE Summary Specification
This chapter describes the security functions of the TOE:
• Cryptographic Support
• User Data Protection
• Identification and Authentication
• Security Management
• Privacy
• Protection of the TSF
• Trusted Path/Channels
It also describes the process put in place by the TOE vendor to provide timely security updates to the TOE as per the
ALC_TSU_EXT.1 requirements of the [App PP].
6.1 Timely Security Updates
Wickr normally provides releases on a quarterly basis. Bugs may result in additional releases on accelerated schedules.
The releases include bug fixes and security updates for all platform versions of the TOE. Additionally, when updates
are made to bundled third-party capabilities, they are obtained by Wickr and included in releases. Wickr support
personnel contact the POCs for affected customers. The only mechanism to deploy security updates is through
maintenance releases. Upon discovery of a vulnerability, the impact will be assessed for priority based on the severity
of the bug. The target timeline for releases ranges from 48 hours for critical bugs to 90 days for low severity bugs.
Security reports are communicated from customers to Customer Support through an HTTPS form on the HackerOne
platform.
6.2 Cryptographic Support
The TOE invokes platform-provided cryptography to secure data in transit. All cryptographic services used for data
in transit protection are implemented by the platform cryptographic library for the respective platforms.
The TOE implements its own cryptography (Wickr OpenSSL version 2.0.16) for use in credential storage protection.
Credential storage is accomplished through a combination of platform cryptography and TSF cryptography.
The following table identifies the cryptographic functions implemented and invoked by the TOE and the NIST
algorithm certificates that demonstrate the validity of these functions.
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Table 4 Cryptographic Functions
Platform Function Standard Library Certificate
Windows ECC key generation
(P-384, P-521)
FIPS PUB 186-4 Windows 10
SymCrypt
#A2677
ECC based key
establishment
NIST SP 800-56A Windows 10
SymCrypt
#A2677
SHA-256, SHA-384 FIPS PUB 180-4 Windows 10
SymCrypt
#A2677
HMAC-SHA-256,
HMAC-SHA-384
FIPS PUB 198-1, FIPS
PUB 180-4
Windows 10
SymCrypt
#A2677
RSA (2048-bit or
greater)
ECDSA (P-256, P-
384)
FIPS PUB 186-4,
Section 4; FIPS PUB
186-4, Section 5
Windows 10
SymCrypt
#A2677
AES-CBC (256
bits), AES-GCM
(128 bits, 256 bits)
NIST SP 800-38 Windows 10
SymCrypt
#A2677
AES-GCM (256
bits)
Wickr
OpenSSL
Version 2.0.16
#A3372
CTR_DRBG(AES) NIST SP 800-90A Windows 10
SymCrypt
#A2677
Wickr
OpenSSL
Version 2.0.16
#A3372
macOS ECC key generation
(P-384, P-521)
FIPS PUB 186-4 Apple
coreCrypto
Module [User]
#A2820
ECC based key
establishment
NIST SP 800-56A Apple
coreCrypto
Module [User]
#A2820
SHA-256, SHA-384 FIPS PUB 180-4 Apple
coreCrypto
Module [User]
#A2820
HMAC-SHA-256,
HMAC-SHA-384
FIPS PUB 198-1, FIPS
PUB 180-4
Apple
coreCrypto
Module [User]
#A2820
RSA (2048-bit or
greater)
ECDSA (P-256, P-
384)
FIPS PUB 186-4,
Section 4; FIPS PUB
186-4, Section 5
Apple
coreCrypto
Module [User]
#A2820
AES-CBC (256
bits), AES-GCM
(128 bits, 256 bits)
NIST SP 800-38 Apple
coreCrypto
Module [User]
#A2820
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AES-GCM (256
bits)
Wickr
OpenSSL
Version 2.0.16
#A3372
CTR_DRBG(AES) NIST SP 800-90A Apple
coreCrypto
Module [User]
#A2820
Wickr
OpenSSL
Version 2.0.16
#A3372
iOS ECC key generation
(P-384, P-521)
FIPS PUB 186-4 Apple
coreCrypto
Module [User]
#A2788
ECC based key
establishment
NIST SP 800-56A Apple
coreCrypto
Module [User]
#A2786
SHA-256, SHA-384 FIPS PUB 180-4 Apple
coreCrypto
Module [User]
#A2789 (SHA-256),
#A2788 (SHA-384)
HMAC-SHA-256,
HMAC-SHA-384
FIPS PUB 198-1, FIPS
PUB 180-4
Apple
coreCrypto
Module [User]
#A2789 (HMAC-SHA-256),
#A2788 (HMAC-SHA-384)
RSA (2048-bit or
greater)
ECDSA (P-256, P-
384)
FIPS PUB 186-4,
Section 4; FIPS PUB
186-4, Section 5
Apple
coreCrypto
Module [User]
#A2788
AES-GCM (128
bits, 256 bits)
NIST SP 800-38 Apple
coreCrypto
Module [User]
#A2787
AES-GCM (256
bits)
Wickr
OpenSSL
Version 2.0.16
#A3372
CTR_DRBG(AES) NIST SP 800-90A Apple
coreCrypto
Module [User]
#A2787
Wickr
OpenSSL
Version 2.0.16
#A3372
Android ECC key generation
(P-384, P-521)
FIPS PUB 186-4 Samsung
BoringSSL
Android
#A2351
ECC based key
establishment
NIST SP 800-56A Samsung
BoringSSL
Android
#A2351
SHA-256, SHA-384 FIPS PUB 180-4 Samsung
BoringSSL
Android
#A2351
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HMAC-SHA-256,
HMAC-SHA-384
FIPS PUB 198-1, FIPS
PUB 180-4
Samsung
BoringSSL
Android
#A2351
RSA (2048-bit or
greater)
ECDSA (P-256, P-
384)
FIPS PUB 186-4,
Section 4; FIPS PUB
186-4, Section 5
Samsung
BoringSSL
Android
#A2351
AES-CBC (256
bits), AES-GCM
(128 bits, 256 bits)
NIST SP 800-38 Samsung
BoringSSL
Android
#A2351
AES-GCM (256
bits)
Wickr
OpenSSL
Version 2.0.16
#A3372
CTR_DRBG(AES) NIST SP 800-90A Samsung
BoringSSL
Android
#A2351
Wickr
OpenSSL
Version 2.0.16
#A3372
To ensure sufficient strength for the keys generated for credential storage, all versions of the TOE implement DRBG
functionality for key generation, using the AES-256 CTR mode. For all key generation functionality, whether
performed by the TOE or invoked from the operational environment, the proprietary Entropy Analysis Report (EAR)
describes how the platform extracts random data from its pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) to ensure that an
amount of entropy that is at least equal to the strength of the generated keys is present when seeding the DRBG for
key generation purposes. The TOE relies on the OS platform as the entropy source. Specifically, random numbers are
obtained from the following platform APIs, depending on the platform used:
• Windows: ProcessPRNG
• Android, macOS, iOS: /dev/random
It is assumed that these platform DRBGs provide at least 256 bits of entropy.
The TOE maintains a unique API key that is used as a credential for server communications. This API key, along
with sensitive data regarding messaging history and contacts, is stored in an encrypted SQL database. All platform
versions of the TOE use platform-provided AES to encrypt the database; iOS uses Coredata, which uses Apple
CoreCrypto to encrypt the database using AES-256-GCM, and all other platforms use SQLCipher which call the
respective platform cryptographic libraries to encrypt the database using AES-256-CBC. The DEK that encrypts the
database is generated randomly. The DEK is encrypted by a KEK, which is not persistently stored, using AES-256-
GCM. The generation of the DEK/KEK and encryption of the KEK are performed by the TSF.
The Cryptographic Support security function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:
• FCS_CKM_EXT.1 – The TOE relies on platform-provided cryptographic functionality. As such, the TOE
does not implement asymmetric key generation.
• FCS_CKM.1/SK – The TOE generates symmetric keys for protection of locally-stored credential data.
• FCS_COP.1/SKC – The TOE uses a NIST-validated implementation to perform AES encryption and
decryption in support of storage of credential data.
• FCS_RBG_EXT.1 – The TOE implements a random bit generation function for the purpose of symmetric
key generation.
• FCS_RBG_EXT.2 – The TOE uses a NIST-validated implementation to generate pseudo-random bits and
this implementation is seeded with sufficiently strong entropy collected from the platform DRBG.
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• FCS_STO_EXT.1 – The TOE uses a combination of platform-provided functionality and its own
functionality to securely store credential data at rest.
6.3 User Data Protection
The [App PP] defines ‘sensitive data’ as follows: “Sensitive data may include all user or enterprise data or may be
specific application data such as emails, messaging, documents, calendar items, and contacts. Sensitive data must
minimally include PII, credentials, and keys. Sensitive data shall be identified in the application’s TSS by the ST
author.”
The table below lists the data that is considered to be ‘sensitive data’ for this TOE along with where that data resides.
Table 5 Sensitive Data
Sensitive
Data
Stored On Exchange Protection At Rest
Protection In
Transit
Client API
key
Encrypted
client database
Issued from TOE to
Wickr server at user
direction
Encrypted by FCS_STO_EXT.1
(see DEK reference in section 6.2)
TLS
Database
Key
OS file system,
encrypted
n/a Encrypted by FCS_STO_EXT.1
(see KEK reference in section 6.2)
n/a
Message
history
Encrypted
client database
n/a Encrypted by FCS_STO_EXT.1
(see DEK reference in section 6.2)
n/a
Contacts Encrypted
client database
n/a Encrypted by FCS_STO_EXT.1
(see DEK reference in section 6.2)
n/a
The underlying platform functionality that the TOE interacts with is the system’s network connectivity. Network usage
of the TOE is authorized implicitly through user guidance; it does not make any specific requests on its own to use
network services once installed. The TOE restricts network connectivity to the following uses only:
• User-initiated: connections to the Wickr Server
o Note that a Wickr Client receives an inbound message/call through the connection it initially
established to a Wickr Server.
• Remotely-initiated: push notifications for incoming connections (iOS and Android)
• Application-initiated: checking for updates (Android, iOS, macOS, and Windows)
In support of peer connections, the TOE may access the following platform hardware or other resources: location
services, photos, and address book.
The User Data Protection security function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:
• FDP_DAR_EXT.1 – Sensitive data at rest is protected by the mechanisms claimed in the iterations of
FCS_STO_EXT.1.
• FDP_DEC_EXT.1 – The TOE’s use of platform services is well understood by users prior to authorizing the
TOE activity.
• FDP_NET_EXT.1 – The TOE communicates over the network for well-defined purposes. Depending on the
function, the use of network resources is user-initiated or initiated by the TOE itself.
6.4 Identification and Authentication
The TOE relies on platform-provided functionality for validation of X.509 certificates for authenticating the Wickr
Server in almost all cases. The sole exception to this is that desktop versions of the application (macOS and Windows)
are responsible for checking that the certificate used to sign a CRL is valid by the presence or absence of the crlsign
key usage bit on the signing certificate.
Certificates are validated in the following manner:
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• Certificate validation and certificate path validation are performed in accordance with RFC 5280.
• The certificate path is checked to ensure that it terminates with a trusted CA certificate.
• The certificate path is validated by ensuring the presence of the basicConstraints extension and that the CA
flag is set to TRUE for all CA certificates.
• iOS uses OCSP (RFC 6960) for revocation checking. All other platforms use CRL (RFC 5280).
• The application shall validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following rules:
o Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification shall have the Code
Signing purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
o Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication purpose (id-kp 1 with OID
1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
o Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose (id-kp 2 with OID
1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
o S/MIME certificates presented for email encryption and signature shall have the Email Protection
purpose (id-kp 4 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
Certificate revocation status is checked using CRLs. In the event that the revocation status of a certificate cannot be
verified, the certificate will be accepted.
Because the purpose of certificate validation function is to validate the authenticity of a TLS server, the TOE platform
chooses what certificates to use based on what is presented by the server as part of establishing the TLS session.
The Identification and Authentication security function is designed to satisfy the following security functional
requirements:
• FIA_X509_EXT.1/1 – X.509 certificates are validated for desktop applications (Windows, macOS) by a
combination of the TOE and the platform when establishing trusted communications. CRL is used for
revocation checking.
• FIA_X509_EXT.1/2 – X.509 certificates are validated for Android by the platform when establishing trusted
communications. CRL is used for revocation checking.
• FIA_X509_EXT.1/3 – X.509 certificates are validated for iOS by the platform when establishing trusted
communications. OCSP is used for revocation checking.
• FIA_X509_EXT.2 – When revocation status of a certificate cannot be determined, the certificate is treated
as invalid.
6.5 Security Management
All TOE components are protected from unauthorized access via the host platform’s file system. No default credentials
are present in the TOE. The platform administrator registers the user. By default, application binaries and data files
are stored in directories where they are not able to be modified by any unauthorized users.
The Wickr Server connection is established as part of initial configuration of the TOE. Once the TOE is in an
operational state and connected to the Wickr Server, the server can interface with the client to communicate
configuration changes through a JSON API on the client. Specifically, the server can be used to configure the number
of authentication failures that are allowed for a user to access the client.
The TOE allows local users to configure logging, which includes whether logging is enabled, whether enhanced
logging is enabled, and where logs are stored. The user can also delete stored logs through the TOE. The TOE also
has a ‘secure shredder’ function which will overwrite all memory and disk space used by files that are opened through
the application.
Configuration settings that are not sensitive are stored by platform in the manner specified below. This includes user
identification information (username/email), the current invalid password retry count, flags for whether the user is
registered, needs to be shown a different onboarding screen, or (for iOS/Android) whether the user has granted
permission for the application to use device features, and basic key/value data such as recently used emoji characters.
Android
The TOE stores all data other than user credentials in a custom SharedPreferences implementation that stores an
encrypted blob (as opposed to plaintext key/value pairs) using the JNI library by providing the device UUID and
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generated salt. The files are all in the protected/private app folder which would require root to access outside of the
TOE.
iOS
Configuration settings are stored using the user defaults system. The app folder uses
FileProtectionCompleteUntilFirstUserAuthentication to enable encryption. Registration configuration information is
stored as a JSON-encoded file in the app document folder. This file is saved with the
NSDataWritingFileProtectionCompleteUntilFirstUserAuthentication flag, so the file is only decrypted if the user has
unlocked the phone.
macOS
The data path for the TOE is /Users/[USER]/Library/Application Support/Wickr, LLC/WickrEnterprise.
Configuration settings are stored using the NSUserDefaults plist format.
Windows
Configuration settings are stored in the registry under HKEY_USERS\[USER ID]\Software\Wickr Enterprise
The Security Management security function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:
• FMT_CFG_EXT.1 – The TOE is protected against direct modification by untrusted users via the host OS
platform.
• FMT_MEC_EXT.1 – Locally-modifiable configuration settings for each TOE platform version are stored in
appropriate locations for each host OS platform.
• FMT_SMF.1 – The TOE makes some configuration options available to the user through the application
itself, while some configuration is pushed down to it from an environmental Wickr Server.
6.6 Privacy
The TOE never transmits known PII over a network. The user may direct the TOE to transmit data that contains PII.
The Privacy security function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:
• FPR_ANO_EXT.1 – the TOE prevents the unnoticed/unauthorized transmission of PII across a network by
ensuring that any such transmission is the result of explicit user action.
6.7 Protection of the TSF
For readability purposes, the list of APIs used on each platform is provided in Section A.1 and the list of third-party
libraries is provided in Section A.2.
The TOE implements several mechanisms to protect against exploitation. The TOE implements address space layout
randomization (ASLR) using the dynamicbase flag and relies fully on its underlying host platform to perform memory
mapping. There is no situation where the TSF maps memory to an explicit address. There is no allocation of memory
with both write and execute permissions. The TOE does not invoke mprotect with the PROT_EXEC permission. All
platform versions of the TOE are compiled with stack overflow protection. For Windows, the /GS flag is used. For
macOS, stack_chk_fail and stack_chk_guard are used. For all other platforms, -fstack-protector-all is used.
The TOE is compatible with platform security features. In particular:
• The Android platform version of the TOE is compatible with Google Android OS
• The iOS platform version of the TOE can be run without disabling any iOS security features.
• The macOS platform version of the TOE can be run without disabling any macOS security features.
• The Windows platform version of the TOE can run successfully with Windows Defender Exploit Guard
Exploit Protection configured with the following mitigations enabled: Control Flow Guard (CFG),
Randomize memory allocations (Bottom-Up ASLR), Import address filtering (IAF), and Data Execution
Prevention (DEP).
The TOE only writes user-modifiable files to directories that contain executable files when explicitly directed to do
so by the user.
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The TOE is distributed as an additional software package to the platform. The TOE platform provides the means to
apply and verify software updates, while the TOE can display its current version (in major.minor.release format). With
respect to checking for updates, the implementation of this (TOE vs platform) is dependent on the platform version of
the TOE. The macOS and Windows platform versions of the TOE periodically check for updates on the vendor’s
support site. The Android and iOS platform versions of the TOE periodically check for updates through a check by
the TOE to their respective app stores. For these platforms, updates are checked hourly. Regardless of the platform
version, the TOE never downloads, modifies, replaces, or updates its own binary code. Updates to the TOE are always
performed by the platform.
When an installation package is downloaded by the platform, it is verified prior to installation. Updates for the Android
platform version of the TOE are digitally signed using a 4096-bit RSA key; updates for the iOS, macOS and Windows
platform versions of the TOE are digitally signed using a 2048-bit RSA key.
Installation packages are in the standard format for updates on their platforms. In particular, Windows updates use
MSI format, while macOS updates use DMG format. Android updates use Android App Bundle (AAB) format. iOS
updates are distributed as an ipa file (iOS App Store Package). In all cases, uninstalling the TOE fully removes all
traces of it from the platform.
The Protection of the TSF security function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:
• FPT_AEX_EXT.1 – The TOE interacts with its host OS platform in a manner that does not expose the system
to memory-related exploitation.
• FPT_API_EXT.1 – The TOE uses documented platform APIs.
• FPT_IDV_EXT. 1 – The TOE is versioned as major.minor.release.
• FPT_LIB_EXT.1 – The set of third-party libraries used by the TOE is well-defined.
• FPT_TUD_EXT.1/1 – The TOE can be updated through installation packages whose availability is checked
by the TOE. Updates are signed by the vendor and validated by the host OS platform prior to installation.
• FPT_TUD_EXT.1/2 – The TOE can be updated through installation packages whose availability is checked
by the platform. Updates are signed by the vendor and validated by the host OS platform prior to installation.
• FPT_TUD_EXT.2 – The TOE is packaged using a standardized format for the supported OS platform and
removal of the TOE does not preserve any executable code on the platform.
6.8 Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE relies on TLS to secure data in transit over trusted channels. The TOE uses platform-provided TLS for
authentication and messaging communication. The protocol implementation is supported by NIST-validated
cryptographic mechanisms provided by the platform. Refer to section 6.2 for the specific NIST validation information.
The macOS and Windows versions of the TOE invoke the following platform TLS interfaces through calls made by
the Qt library included with the TOE:
• macOS: Apple Secure Transport
• Windows: Schannel
The iOS version of the TOE calls the URLSession API, which implements cryptographic functionality using the
CoreCrypto library. The Android platform version of the TOE uses the okhttp third-party library which makes calls
to the platform BoringSSL for protocol and cryptographic functionality.
The platform-provided TLS implementation uses the following cipher suites:
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
The Trusted Path/Channels security function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:
• FTP_DIT_EXT.1 – The TOE invokes platform-provided functionality to protect sensitive data in transit
using TLS.
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7. Protection Profile Claims
This ST claims exact conformance to the Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.4, 7 October 2021
[App PP] along with all applicable errata and interpretations from the certificate issuing scheme.
As explained in section 3, Security Problem Definition, the Security Problem Definition of [App PP] has been included
by reference into this ST.
As explained in section 4, Security Objectives, the Security Objectives of [App PP] have been included by reference
into this ST.
All claimed SFRs are defined in [App PP]. All mandatory SFRs are claimed. A subset of the optional and objective
SFRs are claimed. Selection-based SFR claims are consistent with the selections made in the mandatory SFRs that
prompt their inclusion.
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8. Rationale
This Security Target includes by reference the [App PP] Security Problem Definition, Security Objectives, and
Security Assurance Requirements. The Security Target does not add, remove, or modify any of these items. Security
Functional Requirements have been reproduced with the Protection Profile operations completed. All selections,
assignments, and refinements made on the claimed Security Functional Requirements have been performed in a
manner that is consistent with what is permitted by the [App PP]. The proper set of selection-based requirements have
been claimed based on the selections made in the mandatory requirements. Consequently, the claims made by this
Security Target are sufficient to address the TOE’s security problem. Rationale for the sufficiency of the TOE
Summary Specification is provided below.
8.1 TOE Summary Specification Rationale
Each subsection in Section 6, the TOE Summary Specification, describes a security function of the TOE. Each
description is followed with rationale that indicates which requirements are satisfied by aspects of the corresponding
security function. The set of security functions work together to satisfy all of the security functions and assurance
requirements. Furthermore, all of the security functions are necessary in order for the TSF to provide the required
security functionality.
This section in conjunction with Section 6, the TOE Summary Specification, provides evidence that the security
functions are suitable to meet the TOE security requirements. The collection of security functions work together to
provide all of the security requirements. The security functions described in the TOE summary specification are all
necessary for the required security functionality in the TSF. The table below demonstrates the relationship between
security requirements and security functions.
Table 6 Security Functions vs. Requirements Mapping
Cryptographic
Support
User
Data
Protection
Identification
and
Authentication
Security
Management
Privacy
Protection
of
the
TSF
Trusted
Path/Channels
FCS_CKM_EXT.1 X
FCS_CKM.1/SK X
FCS_COP.1/SKC X
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 X
FCS_RBG_EXT.2 X
FCS_STO_EXT.1 X
FDP_DAR_EXT.1 X
FDP_DEC_EXT.1 X
FDP_NET_EXT.1 X
FIA_X509_EXT.1/1 X
FIA_X509_EXT.1/2 X
FIA_X509_EXT.1/3 X
FIA_X509_EXT.2 X
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Cryptographic
Support
User
Data
Protection
Identification
and
Authentication
Security
Management
Privacy
Protection
of
the
TSF
Trusted
Path/Channels
FMT_CFG_EXT.1 X
FMT_MEC_EXT.1 X
FMT_SMF.1 X
FPR_ANO_EXT.1 X
FPT_AEX_EXT.1 X
FPT_API_EXT.1 X
FPT_IDV_EXT.1 X
FPT_LIB_EXT.1 X
FPT_TUD_EXT.1/1 X
FPT_TUD_EXT.1/2 X
FPT_TUD_EXT.2 X
FTP_DIT_EXT.1 X
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Appendix A: TOE Usage of Third-Party Components
This Appendix lists the platform APIs and third-party libraries that are used by the TOE:
A.1 Platform APIs
Listed below are the platform APIs used by each platform version.
Android
androidx.multidex:multidex:2.0.1
androidx.annotation:annotation:1.1.0
androidx.appcompat:appcompat:1.1.0
androidx.legacy:legacy-support-v4:1.0.0
androidx.legacy:legacy-support-v13:1.0.0
com.google.android.material:material:1.2.1
androidx.exifinterface:exifinterface:1.0.0
androidx.constraintlayout:constraintlayout:1.1.3
androidx.biometric:biometric:1.0.1
androidx.sqlite:sqlite:2.1.0
androidx.dynamicanimation:dynamicanimation:1.0.0
androidx.browser:browser:1.2.0
androidx.lifecycle:lifecycle-extensions:2.1.0
androidx.lifecycle:lifecycle-viewmodel:2.1.0
androidx.lifecycle:lifecycle-livedata:2.1.0
androidx.lifecycle:lifecycle-common-java8:2.1.0
com.google.android.gms:play-services-auth:17.0.0
com.google.android.gms:play-services-location:17.0.0
com.google.android.gms:play-services-maps:17.0.0
com.googlecode.libphonenumber:libphonenumber:8.9.16
com.google.firebase:firebase-iid:20.0.2
com.google.firebase:firebase-messaging:20.1.0
iOS
Accelerate
AddressBook
AddressBookUI
AssetsLibrary
AudioToolbox
AVFoundation
CFNetwork
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CoreAudio
CoreGraphics
CoreData
CoreLocation
CoreMedia
CoreVideo
Contacts
ContactUI
CallKit
Foundation
ImageIO
MapKit
MediaPlayer
MessageUI
MobileCoreServices
OpenGLES
QuartzCore
SafariServices
Security
SystemConfiguration
UIKit
URLSession
PushKit
XCTest
macOS
/usr/lib/libobjc.A.dylib (compatibility version 1.0.0, current version 228.0.0)
/System/Library/Frameworks/QTKit.framework/Versions/A/QTKit (compatibility version 1.0.0, current version
1.0.0)
/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreVideo.framework/Versions/A/CoreVideo (compatibility version 1.2.0, current
version 1.5.0)
/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreAudio.framework/Versions/A/CoreAudio (compatibility version 1.0.0, current
version 1.0.0)
/System/Library/Frameworks/AudioToolbox.framework/Versions/A/AudioToolbox (compatibility version 1.0.0,
current version 1000.0.0)
/System/Library/Frameworks/AudioUnit.framework/Versions/A/AudioUnit (compatibility version 1.0.0, current
version 1.0.0)
/System/Library/Frameworks/AVFoundation.framework/Versions/A/AVFoundation (compatibility version 1.0.0,
current version 2.0.0)
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/System/Library/Frameworks/ApplicationServices.framework/Versions/A/ApplicationServices (compatibility
version 1.0.0, current version 52.0.0)
/System/Library/Frameworks/VideoDecodeAcceleration.framework/Versions/A/VideoDecodeAcceleration
(compatibility version 1.0.0, current version 1.0.0)
/System/Library/Frameworks/VideoToolbox.framework/Versions/A/VideoToolbox (compatibility version 1.0.0,
current version 1.0.0)
/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreMedia.framework/Versions/A/CoreMedia (compatibility version 1.0.0, current
version 1.0.0)
/System/Library/Frameworks/Carbon.framework/Versions/A/Carbon (compatibility version 2.0.0, current version
162.0.0)
/System/Library/Frameworks/AddressBook.framework/Versions/A/AddressBook (compatibility version 1.0.0,
current version 2421.0.0)
/System/Library/Frameworks/SystemConfiguration.framework/Versions/A/SystemConfiguration (compatibility
version 1.0.0, current version 1061.40.2)
/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreFoundation.framework/Versions/A/CoreFoundation (compatibility version
150.0.0, current version 1673.126.0)
/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreGraphics.framework/Versions/A/CoreGraphics (compatibility version 64.0.0,
current version 1348.12.4)
/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreText.framework/Versions/A/CoreText (compatibility version 1.0.0, current
version 1.0.0)
/System/Library/Frameworks/Foundation.framework/Versions/C/Foundation (compatibility version 300.0.0, current
version 1673.126.0)
/System/Library/Frameworks/AppKit.framework/Versions/C/AppKit (compatibility version 45.0.0, current version
1894.10.126)
/System/Library/Frameworks/Security.framework/Versions/A/Security (compatibility version 1.0.0, current version
59306.41.2)
/usr/lib/libbsm.0.dylib (compatibility version 1.0.0, current version 1.0.0)
/System/Library/Frameworks/DiskArbitration.framework/Versions/A/DiskArbitration (compatibility version 1.0.0,
current version 1.0.0)
/System/Library/Frameworks/IOKit.framework/Versions/A/IOKit (compatibility version 1.0.0, current version
275.0.0)
/System/Library/Frameworks/OpenGL.framework/Versions/A/OpenGL (compatibility version 1.0.0, current version
1.0.0)
/System/Library/Frameworks/AGL.framework/Versions/A/AGL (compatibility version 1.0.0, current version 1.0.0)
/usr/lib/libc++.1.dylib (compatibility version 1.0.0, current version 800.7.0)
/usr/lib/libSystem.B.dylib (compatibility version 1.0.0, current version 1281.0.0)
Windows
ADVAPI32.dll
USER32.dll
dwmapi.dll
MSVCP140.dll
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ole32.dll
KERNEL32.dll
VCRUNTIME140.dll
api-ms-win-crt-runtime-l1-1-0.dll
api-ms-win-crt-string-l1-1-0.dll
api-ms-win-crt-convert-l1-1-0.dll
api-ms-win-crt-stdio-l1-1-0.dll
api-ms-win-crt-heap-l1-1-0.dll
api-ms-win-crt-time-l1-1-0.dll
api-ms-win-crt-math-l1-1-0.dll
api-ms-win-crt-filesystem-l1-1-0.dll
api-ms-win-crt-locale-l1-1-0.dll
SHELL32.dll
A.2 Third-Party Libraries
Listed below are the third-party libraries used by the TOE.
All Platforms
openssl: OpenSSL License; Original SSLeay License
Android
Apache 2:
All official Google-provided Android libraries (Support libs, UI libs, FCM, etc)
Kotlin - https://github.com/JetBrains/kotlin/tree/master/license
Kotlin coroutines - https://github.com/Kotlin/kotlinx.coroutines/blob/master/LICENSE.txt
Anko - https://github.com/Kotlin/anko/blob/master/LICENSE
Leak Canary - https://github.com/square/leakcanary/blob/main/LICENSE.txt
Butterknife - https://github.com/JakeWharton/butterknife/blob/master/LICENSE.txt
Otto - https://github.com/square/otto/blob/master/LICENSE.txt
Timber - https://github.com/JakeWharton/timber/blob/master/LICENSE.txt
OkHttp - https://github.com/square/okhttp/blob/master/LICENSE.txt
Retrofit - https://github.com/square/retrofit/blob/master/LICENSE.txt
RxJava - https://github.com/ReactiveX/RxJava/blob/3.x/LICENSE
RxBindings - https://github.com/JakeWharton/RxBinding/blob/master/LICENSE.txt
AppAuth - https://github.com/openid/AppAuth-Android/blob/master/LICENSE
ZXing - https://github.com/zxing/zxing/blob/master/LICENSE
Process Phoenix - https://github.com/JakeWharton/ProcessPhoenix/blob/master/LICENSE.txt
Gson - https://github.com/google/gson/blob/master/LICENSE
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CircleImageView - https://github.com/hdodenhof/CircleImageView/blob/master/LICENSE.txt
PhotoView - https://github.com/chrisbanes/PhotoView/blob/master/LICENSE
Slidr - https://github.com/r0adkll/Slidr/blob/master/LICENSE.md
AndroidPdfViewer - https://github.com/barteksc/AndroidPdfViewer/blob/master/LICENSE
SpyGlass - https://github.com/linkedin/Spyglass/blob/master/LICENSE
MjolnirRecyclerView - https://github.com/infinum/MjolnirRecyclerView/blob/master/LICENSE
Transitions Everywhere - https://github.com/andkulikov/Transitions-Everywhere/blob/master/LICENSE
Country Code Picker - https://github.com/hbb20/CountryCodePickerProject/blob/master/License.txt
GreenRobot EventBus - https://github.com/greenrobot/EventBus/blob/master/LICENSE
FlowLayout - https://github.com/ApmeM/android-flowlayout
nv-i18n - https://github.com/TakahikoKawasaki/nv-i18n/blob/master/LICENSE
CWAC Camera - Unavailable now (mirror here https://wkrnjpgit.wickrlan.net/android-dev/cwac-camera)
MIT:
BugSnag - https://github.com/bugsnag/bugsnag-android/blob/master/LICENSE
JSoup - https://github.com/jhy/jsoup/blob/master/LICENSE
Gif Drawable - https://github.com/koral--/android-gif-drawable/blob/dev/LICENSE
Countly - https://github.com/Countly/countly-sdk-android/blob/master/LICENSE
Microsoft AppCenter - https://github.com/microsoft/appcenter-sdk-android/blob/develop/license.txt
eBson - https://github.com/kohanyirobert/ebson/blob/master/LICENSE.txt
GPLv3:
Psiphon - https://github.com/Psiphon-Labs/psiphon-tunnel-core/blob/master/LICENSE
Other:
SQLCipher - https://www.zetetic.net/sqlcipher/license/
Protobuf - https://github.com/protocolbuffers/protobuf/blob/master/LICENSE (BSD according to
Wikipedia)
iOS
AFNetworking
AppAuth
Almofire
Bugsnag
CocoaLumberjack
Countly
Differentiator
Kingfisher
MBProgressHUD
Moya
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Nimble
NVActivityIndicatorView
PanModel
Quick
RxBiBinding
RxSwift
RxCocoa
RxDataSource
RxStartScream
StartScream
SSkeychain
SwiftTryCatch
SwiftyJSON
ProtocolBuffer
PopupDialog
PsiphoneTunnel
ZXingObjc
macOS, Windows:
sentry-crashpad: Apache-2.0 License
googlemaps: MIT License
Hunspell: LGPL 2.1
libbson: Apache-2.0 License
protobuf: https://github.com/protocolbuffers/protobuf/blob/master/LICENSE
Qt: LGPLv3 (commercial support)
QuaZip: LGPL 2.1
qzxing: Apache-2.0 License
sparkle: https://github.com/sparkle-project/Sparkle/blob/master/LICENSE
SQLCipher: https://github.com/sqlcipher/sqlcipher/blob/master/LICENSE
Twitter twemoji: MIT license
winsparkle: https://github.com/vslavik/winsparkle/blob/master/COPYING
YAJL: ISC License
zlib: https://zlib.net/zlib_license.html
zxing: Apache-2.0 License