BSI-DSZ-CC-1026-2017
for
S3FV9VH 32-Bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart
Cards, Revision 0 including specific IC Dedicated
Software
from
Samsung Electronics
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.2
BSI-DSZ-CC-1026-2017 (*)
Smart Card Controller
S3FV9VH 32-Bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Cards, Revision 0
including specific IC Dedicated Software
from Samsung Electronics
PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile with
Augmentation Packages Version 1.0, 13 January
2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 6 augmented by ASE_TSS.2
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended and by Scheme Interpretations by advice of the Certification Body for
components beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification
Report for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version
3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 4
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 8 December 2017
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Joachim Weber L.S.
Head of Branch
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1026-2017
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1026-2017 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification.......................................................................................................................7
1. Preliminary Remarks.....................................................................................................7
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure................................................................7
3. Recognition Agreements...............................................................................................8
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification.................................................................9
5. Validity of the Certification Result..................................................................................9
6. Publication...................................................................................................................10
B. Certification Results........................................................................................................11
1. Executive Summary....................................................................................................12
2. Identification of the TOE..............................................................................................13
3. Security Policy.............................................................................................................14
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope......................................................................14
5. Architectural Information..............................................................................................15
6. Documentation............................................................................................................15
7. IT Product Testing........................................................................................................15
8. Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................16
9. Results of the Evaluation.............................................................................................16
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE......................................................17
11. Security Target...........................................................................................................18
12. Definitions..................................................................................................................18
13. Bibliography...............................................................................................................19
C. Excerpts from the Criteria...............................................................................................23
D. Annexes..........................................................................................................................25
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1026-2017 Certification Report
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
• Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
• BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
• BSI Schedule of Costs3
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
• DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
• BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
• BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1026-2017
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045.
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogisportal.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2+ ALC_FLR components.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1026-2017 Certification Report
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product S3FV9VH 32-Bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Cards, Revision 0 including
specific IC Dedicated Software has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product S3FV9VH 32-Bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Cards,
Revision 0 including specific IC Dedicated Software was conducted by TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 29 September 2017. TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification
body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Samsung Electronics.
The product was developed by:Samsung Electronics.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 8 December
2017 is valid until 7 December 2022. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1026-2017
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product S3FV9VH 32-Bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Cards, Revision 0 including
specific IC Dedicated Software has been included in the BSI list of certified products,
which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further
information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
Samsung Electronics
B zone,17 Floor, B Tower, 1-1, Samsungjeonja-ro
Hwaseong-si, Gyeonggi-do, 45-330
South Korea
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1026-2017 Certification Report
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1026-2017
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE), the S3FV9VH microcontroller featuring the a 32-bit SC300
ARM core, a TORNADO-H coprocessor for big integer arithmetic, AES/DES engines for
symmetric cryptography and a true random number generator is a smartcard integrated
circuit which is composed of a central processing unit (CPU), security components, contact
based I/O ports, contactless based I/O ports, hardware circuit for testing purpose during
the manufacturing process and volatile and non-volatile memories (hardware). The SC300
CPU architecture of the S3FV9VH microcontroller follows the Harvard style, that is, it has
dedicated buses for program memory and data memory. Both instruction and data can be
fetched simultaneously without causing a pipeline stall because there are separate paths
for memory access. The TOE also includes any IC Designer/Manufacturer proprietary IC
Dedicated Software as long as it physically exists in the smartcard integrated circuit after
being delivered by the IC Manufacturer. Such software (also known as IC firmware) is
used for testing purpose during the manufacturing process but also provides additional
services to facilitate the usage of the hardware and/or to provide additional services, e.g.,
an AIS31 PTG.2-compliant true random number generator.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages
Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 6
augmented by ASE_TSS.2.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 6.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2
and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
TSF1 Environmental Security Violation Recording and Reaction
TSF2 Access Control
TSF3 Non Reversibility of Test and Normal Modes
TSF4 Hardware Countermeasures for Unobservability
TSF5 Cryptography
TSF6 Bootloader
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 7.1.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [9],
chapter 3.1 . Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [9], chapter 3.2 – 3.4.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1026-2017 Certification Report
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
S3FV9VH 32-Bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Cards, Revision 0 including specific
IC Dedicated Software
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Version Form of Delivery
1 HW S3FV9VH 32-Bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart
Card
0 Wafer or Module
2 SW Test ROM Code 1.0 Included in S3FV9VH Test
ROM (part of physical cope
but not logical scope of the
TOE)
3 SW Secure Bootloader code
(S3FV9VH_Bootloader_v0.0.zip)
0.0 Included in S3FV9VH ROM
4 SW DTRNG FRO M Library
(S3FV9VH_PTG2_DTRNG_library_v1.0.lib)
1.0 Software Library. This
library is delivered as object
file and is optionally
integrated into user NVM
code.
5 DOC DTRNG FRO M H/W and DTRNG FRO M library
application note
(S3FV9VH_DTRNG_FRO_M_AN_v1.2.pdf)
1.2 Softcopy
6 DOC Hardware User’s manual (S3FV9VH_UM_REV0.4) 0.4 Softcopy
7 DOC Security Application Note
(SAN_S3FV9VH_v0.5.pdf)
0.5 Softcopy
8 DOC Chip Delivery Specification (S3FV9VH_DV12.pdf) 1.2 Softcopy
9 DOC Boot Loader Specification
(S3FV9VH_for_Bootloader_Specification_v0.2.pdf)
0.2 Softcopy
10 DOC SC300_Reference_Manual
(SC300_Reference_Manual_v0.0.pdf)
0.0 Softcopy
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE or parts of it are delivered between the following three parties (defined in [8]):
• IC Embedded Software Developer,
• TOE Manufacturer (compromises all roles before TOE delivery),
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1026-2017
• Composite Product Manufacturer (compromises all roles after TOE delivery except the
end consumer).
Therefore three different delivering procedures have to be taken into consideration:
• Delivery of the IC dedicated software components (IC dedicated SW, guidance) from the
TOE manufacturer to the IC Embedded Software Developer.
• Delivery of the IC Embedded Software (SW object file, ROM / Flash data) from the IC
Embedded Software Developer to the TOE Manufacturer.
• Delivery of the final TOE (wafer or module) from the TOE Manufacturer to the Composite
Product Manufacturer. After phase 3 the TOE is delivered in form of wafers or sawn
wafers, after phase 4 in form of modules.
A processing step during LSI testing incorporates the chip-individual features into the TOE.
Each individual TOE is uniquely identified by its product code.
This product code in the FLASH Security area is TOE specific as among others it includes
the core, application category, serial number, version, internal development code, and cus-
tomer ROM code. In [14], chapter 5, it is described how the customer can retrieve this in-
formation. Each individual TOE can therefore be traced unambiguously and thus assigned
to the entire development and production process.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
• maintain the integrity of User Data and of the Security IC Embedded Software (when
being executed/processed and when being stored in the TOE’s memories) as well as
• maintain the confidentiality of User Data and of the Security IC Embedded Software
(when being processed and when being stored in the TOE’s memories).
The Security IC may not distinguish between User Data which are public known or
kept confidential. Therefore the security IC shall protect the confidentiality and
integrity of the User Data, unless the Security IC Embedded Software chooses to
disclose or modify it.
In particular integrity of the Security IC Embedded Software means that it is
correctly being executed which includes the correct operation of the TOE’s
functionality. Though the Security IC Embedded Software (normally stored in the
ROM) will in many cases not contain secret data or algorithms, it must be protected
from being disclosed, since for instance knowledge of specific implementation
details may assist an attacker.
• maintain the correct operation of the security services provided by the TOE for the
Security IC Embedded Software.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance: OE.TOE_Auth, OE.Resp-Appl, OE.Process-Sec-IC and
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1026-2017 Certification Report
OE.Lim_Block_Loader and OE.Loader_Usage. Details can be found in the Security Target
[6] and [9], chapter 4.2 and 4.3.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE consists of the hardware of the smart card security controller S3FV9VH and the
the True Random Number Generator (DTRNG FRO M) library for AIS31 PTG.2 compliant
Random Number Generation.
The hardware of the TOE consists of the following parts:
• ARM SC300 32-bit core,
• Memory (512 kB NOR FLASH, 56 kB User ROM for Bootloader, 12 kB Test ROM, 16 kB
SRAM, 7 kB Crypto RAM, 4 kB CLRAM for contactless operation, 2 kB Cache for code),
• TORNADO-H coprocessor supporting Montgomery multiplication for public key
cryptography,
• TDES accelerator supporting 112/168-bit keys in ECB mode,
• AES accelerator supporting 128/192/256-bit keys in ECB mode,
• Detectors and Filters,
• Interrupt Controller,
• Serial I/O interfaces (UART ISO 7816 and UART ISO 14443),
• Power-on reset and external reset,
• Digital True Random Number Generator (DTRNG FRO M),
• Memory Protection Unit (MPU),
• Timers,
• Parity / CRC-32 calculators,
• Internal Clock up to 50 MHz,
as shown in [6] and [9] figure 1.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
The tests performed by the developer were divided into six classes:
• Simulation tests,
• Production tests,
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1026-2017
• Characterization tests,
• Application tests,
• Qualification tests,
• Penetration tests.
The developer tests cover all security functionalities, modules, subsystems and interfaces
as defined in the functional specification.
The evaluators were able to repeat the tests of the developer, either using the tools and
TOE samples delivered to the evaluator, or at the developer’s site.
They performed independent tests to supplement, augment and verify the tests performed
by the developer. The evaluator included all security features and related interfaces into
the testing subset. For the developer tests repeated by the evaluators other test
parameters were used and the test equipment was varied.
The evaluation has shown that the actual version of the TOE provides the security
functionalities as specified by the developer. The test results confirm the correct
implementation of the TOE security functionalities.
For penetration testing the evaluators took all security functionalities into consideration.
Intensive penetration testing was planned based on the analysis results and performed for
the underlying mechanisms of security functionalities. The penetration tests considered
both the physical tampering of the TOE and attacks which do not modify the TOE
physically. The penetration tests results confirm that the TOE is resistant to attackers with
high attack potential in the intended environment for the TOE.
8. Evaluated Configuration
The configuration under evaluation is the S3FV9VH in Revision 0 as described in [6], [9]
and [14].
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits,
The Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards,
Functionality classes and evaluation methodology of physical random number generators,
Terminology and preparation of Smartcard evaluations,
(see [4] AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 31, as well as AIS 37).
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1026-2017 Certification Report
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 31 was used (see [4]).
To support composite evaluations according to AIS 36 the document ETR for composite
evaluation [10] was provided and approved. This document provides details of this
platform evaluation that have to be considered in the course of a composite evaluation on
top.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
• All components of the EAL 6 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
• The components ASE_TSS.2 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
• PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation
Packages Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
[8]
• for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
• for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 6 augmented by ASE_TSS.2
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a
security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The table in annex C of part D of this report gives an overview of the cryptographic
functionalities inside the TOE to enforce the security policy and outlines its rating from
cryptographic point of view. Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column
'Security Level above 100 Bits' of the following table with 'no' achieves a security level of
lower than 100 Bits (in general context) only.
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1026-2017
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
Some security measures are partly implemented in this certified TOE, but require
additional configuration or control or measures to be implemented by a product layer on
top, e.g. the IC Dedicated Support Software using the TOE. For this reason the TOE
includes guidance documentation (see table 2) which contains obligations and guidelines
for the developer of the product layer on top on how to securely use this certified TOE and
which measures have to be implemented in order to fulfil the security requirements of the
Security Target of the TOE. In the course of the evaluation of the composite product or
system it must be examined if the required measures have been correctly and effectively
implemented by the product layer on top. Additionally, the evaluation of the composite
product or system must also consider the evaluation results as outlined in the document
"ETR for composite evaluation" [10].
At the point in time when evaluation and certification results are reused there might be an
update of the document "ETR for composite evaluation" available. Therefore, the certified
products list on the BSI website has to be checked for latest information on
reassessments, recertifications or maintenance result available for the product.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
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ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
LSI Large-scale Integrated Circuit
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 4, September 2012
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Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 4, September 2012
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012,
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1026-2017, Project Kiowa2 Security Target of
Samsung S3FV9VH 32-bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card with specific IC
Dedicated Software, Version 2.0, 2017-08-31, Samsung Electronics (confidential
document)
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 2, 2017-09-29, Evaluation Technical Report
Summary (ETR SUMMARY), TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH, (confidential
document)
[8] Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages Version 1.0, 13
January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
[9] Security Target Lite BSI-DSZ-CC-1026-2017, Security Target Lite Samsung
S3FV9VH 32-bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card with specific IC Dedicated
Software, Version 1.1, 2017-08-31, Samsung Electronics (sanitised public
document)
7
specifically
• AIS 1, Durchführung der Ortsbesichtigung in der Entwicklungsumgebung des Herstellers, Version
13, 2008-08-14
• AIS 25, Version 9, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 9, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 35, Version 2, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and
CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 36, Version 5, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
• AIS 46, Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und ergänzende
Hinweise für die Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 2013-12-04
• AIS 47 Regelungen zu Site Certification, Version 1.1, 2013-12-04
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[10] Evaluation Technical for Composite Evaluation (ETR COMP) for the S3FV9VH
Revision 0, version 2, 2017-09-29, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. (confidential
document)
[11] S3FV9VH HW DTRNG FRO M and DTRNG FRO M Library Application Note,
Version 1.2, 2016-10-07, Samsung Electronics
[12] User's Manual S3FV9VH CMOS Microcontroller for Smart Card, Version 0.4, 2017-
05-04, Samsung Electronics
[13] Security Application Note for S3FV9VH, Version 0.5, 2017-08-31, Samsung
Electronics
[14] S3FV9VH Chip Delivery Specification, Version 1.2, 2017-06-05 Samsung
Electronics
[15] Bootloader Specification for S3FV9VH, Version 0.2, 2017-05-31, Samsung
Electronics
[16] SC300 Reference Manual, Version 0.0, 2014-05-12, Samsung Electronics
[17] Common Criteria Information Technology Security Evaluation Kiowa2, Class:
ALC_CMC.5/CMS.5, Version 3.2, 2017-09-04, Samsung Electronics
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.4
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 11
• On the detailled definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 12 to 16
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
Annex C: Overview and rating of cryptographic functionalities implemented in the TOE
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1026-2017
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product S3FV9VH 32-Bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Cards, Revision 0
including specific IC Dedicated Software (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated
at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security
Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by Scheme Interpretations by advice of the
Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 8 December 2017, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria
assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.5, ALC_CMS.5,
ALC_DEL.1, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.3)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
Name of site /
Company name
Address Type of site
Samsung Giheung Samsung Electronics. Co., Ltd.
San #24, Nongseo-dong,
Giheung-gu, Yongin-City,
Gyeonggi-do, 449-711, Korea
Wafer Fab, Warehouse/Delivery
Samsung Hwasung Samsung Electronics. Co., Ltd.
San #16, Banwol-Ri, Hwasung-
Eup, Gyeonggi-Do, 445-701,
Korea
DSR Building, B-Tower, 17-floor,
Samsungjeonja-ro, Hwaseong-si,
Gyeonggi-do, 445-330, Korea
Development, IT (Server room),
Mask data preparation
Samsung Onyang Samsung Electronics. Co., Ltd.
San #74, Buksoo-Ri, Baebang-
Myun, Asan-City,
Chungcheongnam-Do, 449-711,
Korea
Warehouse/Delivery, Grinding,
Sawing, Assembly, Module
Testing
PKL Cheonan PKL Co., Ltd.
493-3 Sungsung-Dong, Cheonan-
City, Choongcheongnam-Do, 330-
300, Korea
Mask House
Hanamicron Asan HANAMICRON Co., Ltd.
#95-1, Wonnam-Li, Umbong-
Myeon, Asan-City,
Choongcheongnam-Do, 449-711,
Korea
Grinding, Sawing, Assembly,
Module testing
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Name of site /
Company name
Address Type of site
Inesa Shanghai Inesa Co., Ltd.
No. 818 Jin Yu Road, Jin Qiao
Export Processing Zone Pudong,
Shanghai, China
Grinding, Sawing, Assembly,
Warehouse/Delivery
Eternal Shanghai ETERNAL Co., Ltd.
No.1755, Hong Mei South Road,
Shanghai, China
Sawing, Assembly,
Warehouse/Delivery
Tesna Pyeungtaek TESNA Co., Ltd.
No. 450-2 Mogok-Dong,
Pyeungtaek-City, Gyeonggi, Korea
Wafer Testing, Initialization and
Pre-personalization
ASE Korea ASE Korea Co., Ltd.
Sanupdanjigil 76, Paju, Korea
Grinding, Sawing, Assembly
Table 3: Relevant development/production sites
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [9]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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Annex C of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1026-2017
Overview and rating of cryptographic functionalities implemented
in the TOE
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Security Level
above 100 Bits
1 Cryptographic
Primitive
Triple DES in ECB
mode
[NIST_SP800-67],
NIST_SP800-38A]
112 and 168 No
2 AES in ECB mode [FIPS197],
[NIST_SP800-38A]
128, 192, and 256 No
3 PTG.2 Random
number generator
[AIS31] - -
4 Bootloader
Authentication
Authentication
Protocol based on
CBC-MAC using
AES
[ISO9797-1], [FIPS197],
[MRTD_3, Appendix
A5.1 and A5.2 using
AES instead of TDES]
128 No
Table 4: TOE cryptographic functionality
[NIST_SP800-67] NIST Special Publication 800-67, Recommendation for the Triple
Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher, Revised January
2012, Revision 1, National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST), Technology Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce.
[AIS31] Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS),
AIS 31, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für
physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 2013-05-15,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
[FIPS197] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197,
November 26, 2001, Announcing the ADVANCED ENCRYPTION
STANDARD (AES), National Institute of Standards and Technology.
[NIST_SP800-38A] NIST Special Publication 800-38A, Recommendation for Block
Cipher Modes of Operation, 2001-12, National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST), Technology Administration, U.S. Department
of Commerce.
[ISO9797-1] ISO/IEC 9797-1 Information technology – Security techniques –
Message Authentication Codes (MACs) – Part 1: Mechanisms using
a block cipher.
[MRTD_3] ICAO, Machine Readable Travel Documents, Part 3: Machine
Readable Official Travel Documents, Volume 2: Specifications for
Electronically Enabled MRtds with Biometric Identification Capability,
3rd Edition, 2008.
Note: End of report
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