BSI-DSZ-CC-1153-2021
for
fiskaly Cloud Crypto Service Provider, Version
1.0.4
from
fiskaly GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.41
BSI-DSZ-CC-1153-2021 (*)
Cryptographic Service Provider Light
fiskaly Cloud Crypto Service Provider, Version 1.0.4
from fiskaly GmbH
PP Conformance: Protection Profile Cryptographic Service Provider Light
(CSPL) Version 1.0, 12 November 2019, BSI-CC-PP-0111-
2019,
Common Criteria Protection Profile Configuration
Cryptographic Service Provider Light – Time Stamp Service
and Audit (PPC-CSPLight-TS-Au) Version 1.0, 26 February
2020, BSI-CC-PP-0112-2020,
Common Criteria Protection Profile Configuration
Cryptographic Service Provider Light - Time Stamp Service
and Audit – Clustering (PPC-CSPLight-TS-Au-Cl), Version
1.0, 26 February 2020, BSI-CC-PP-0113-2020
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 2 augmented by ALC_CMS.3, ALC_LCD.1
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security
Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC
18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the
evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no
warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other
organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Bonn, 26 February 2021
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Sandro Amendola L.S.
Head of Division
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1153-2021
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1153-2021 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification......................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication....................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results.......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary....................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE.............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy............................................................................................................13
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................13
5. Architectural Information.............................................................................................14
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................16
7. IT Product Testing.......................................................................................................16
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................17
9. Results of the Evaluation............................................................................................17
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................20
11. Security Target..........................................................................................................20
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)..............................................................20
13. Definitions.................................................................................................................20
14. Bibliography..............................................................................................................22
C. Excerpts from the Criteria..............................................................................................24
D. Annexes.........................................................................................................................25
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1153-2021
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
• Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
• BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
• BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs 3
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
• DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
• BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
• BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs - Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell
zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI-
Gesetz) - dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1153-2021 Certification Report
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2+ ALC_FLR components.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1153-2021
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product fiskaly Cloud Crypto Service Provider, Version 1.0.4 has undergone the
certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product fiskaly Cloud Crypto Service Provider, Version 1.0.4 was
conducted by SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH. The evaluation was completed
on 19 February 2021. SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH is an evaluation facility
(ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: fiskaly GmbH.
The product was developed by: fiskaly GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 26 February
2021 is valid until 25 February 2026. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1153-2021 Certification Report
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product fiskaly Cloud Crypto Service Provider, Version 1.0.4 has been included in the
BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
fiskaly GmbH
Stutterheimstraße 16-18/2/20e
1150 Wien
Österreich
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1153-2021
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1153-2021 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is fiskaly Cloud Crypto Service Provider, Version 1.0.4. It is
a Cryptographic Service Provider Light (CSPLight) claiming the Common Criteria
Protection Profile Configuration Cryptographic Service Provider Light – Time Stamp
Service and Audit – Clustering (PPC-CSPLight-TS-Au-Cl). The TOE is a pure Software
TOE provided as a Java application. It is intended to be used with products requiring a
certified Cryptographic Service Provider Light.
The TOE runs on a PrimeKey SEE hardware platform. As the TOE is a software only
product, the hardware was not part of the evaluation. A list of further requirements can be
found in chapter 8.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Protection Profile Cryptographic Service Provider Light (CSPL) Version
1.0, 12 November 2019, BSI-CC-PP-0111-2019,
Common Criteria Protection Profile Configuration Cryptographic Service Provider Light –
Time Stamp Service and Audit (PPC-CSPLight-TS-Au) Version 1.0, 26 February 2020,
BSI-CC-PP-0112-2020,
Common Criteria Protection Profile Configuration Cryptographic Service Provider Light -
Time Stamp Service and Audit – Clustering (PPC-CSPLight-TS-Au-Cl), Version 1.0, 26
February 2020, BSI-CC-PP-0113-2020 [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 2
augmented by ALC_CMS.3, ALC_LCD.1.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some
of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
Key management functionality The key management functionality covers the security
functionality related to key management and administration
which only allows management of cryptographic keys and
other management functions to authorized roles. It includes
functionality for key generation, key derivation and key
agreement, internal storage of keys, import and export of keys
with protection of their confidentiality and integrity.
Data encryption The TOE provides the symmetric data encryption and
decryption algorithm AES with standardized key lengths of 128
and 256 bits.
Hybrid encryption with message
authentication code
The TOE provides hybrid data encryption/decryption and MAC
calculation/verification of user data.
Data integrity mechanisms The TOE provides data integrity protection by symmetric and
asymmetric cryptography.
Authentication, attestation, trusted
channel
The TOE provides a cryptographically protected trusted
communication channel between the TOE and external entities
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as well as the authentication of external entities.
User identification and authentication The TOE implements user identification and authentication, all
subsystems implementing TSFI must perform this before giving
access to the specific TOE services.
Access control The TOE enforces a strict role based access control. The roles
associated with the authenticated user and user’s current
status define the authorization and allowed use of services and
objects.
Security management The TOE provides administrative services such as
management of security functions, roles and attributes.
TOE security functionality protection The TOE performs tests of the TOE integrity, TSF data
integrity, access control system and cryptographic functionality
Update Code Package The TOE supports downloading, integrity and authenticity
verification and decryption of Update Code Packages (UCP).
The functionality requires to be authenticated by a user with
the Update Agent role.
Time stamping The TOE provides a time stamp service. All time-related
services take place using access to the TOE’s internal system
clock which is synchronized using a secure local trusted
Network Time Protocol (NTP) Server.
Clustering of TOEs for scalability of
performance and availability
The TOE supports clustering of a single master node and
multiple slave nodes to improve the availability of the TOE.
Generation of audit records The TOE generates audit records on selected user activities
and security events of the TOE. Audit records are exported by
the TOE in signed and time stamped form.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapters 3.4, 3.2 and 3.3 respectively.
This certification covers the configuration of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
fiskaly Cloud Crypto Service Provider, Version 1.0.4
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1153-2021 Certification Report
Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
SW Software as JAR file:
cspl.jar
Version 1.0.4
The TOE is delivered with an
accompanying detached
signature file cspl.jar.minisig
using the public key
RWRUupxsFLBrtFlb7g2ZWVFS
QE23BvMEtPszqNu2E8Q32U4L
99AKexpl
Physical delivery via fiskaly
GmbH representative
DOC Associated guidance
documentation:
Preparative Procedures
& Operational User
Guidance
Documentation fiskaly
Cloud Crypto Service
Provider, TOE Version
1.0.4
Version 1.2.4, 30 January 2021
SHA256:
D7EF2ED783A66C0E9D2F82C0
A4FF2919AEDA80A011A504CD
A77E1277DE297A5E
Google Cloud storage download
and E-Mail
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE is delivered internally by a fiskaly GmbH representative to another fiskaly GmbH
representative. After acceptance, the customer installs the TOE on the hardware platform
according to the preparative procedures. The guidance documentation is distributed by
Google Cloud storage download and E-Mail. All deliverables are signed by the developer
who describes the verification procedure in [6], chapter 8: Code and Document Signing.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
• authentication of users
• authentication and attestation of the TOE to entities
• data authentication and non-repudiation including time stamps
• encryption and decryption of user data
• trusted channel functionality
• management of cryptographic keys
• generation of random bits
• time service, time stamp service
• secure auditing functionality and
• clustering
Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policies can be found in chapter
7 of the Security Target [6].
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
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specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
• OE.CommInf: Communication infrastructure,
• OE.AppComp: Support of the Application component,
• OE.SecManag: Security management,
• OE.SecComm: Protection of communication channel,
• OE.SUCP: Signed Update Code Packages,
• OE.SecPlatform: Secure Hardware Platform,
• OE.Audit: Review and availability of audit records,
• OE.TimeSource: External time source,
• OE.ClusterCtrl: Control of the cluster, and
• OE.TSFdataTrans: Transfer of TSF data within the CSPLight cluster.
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is a software TOE running on dedicated non-TOE hardware (PrimeKey SEE
server) as well as dedicated non-TOE software (Alpine Linux, JVM), building the non-TOE
platform. The TOE is operated on a hardware platform, namely “PrimeKey SEE”, which is
certified according to FIPS 140-2 Level 3. The non-TOE PrimeKey SEE platform is
expected to provide protection against physical intrusion and tampering. Additionally, the
TOE protects itself from tampering by untrusted entities due to its SFR-enforcing
subsystems. The non-TOE software is an Alpine Linux distribution with a minimal
functionality. The JVM is configured to allow only JAR files signed by the fiskaly GmbH to
access the net and any data on the disk.
The SFR-enforcing subsystems of the TOE are:
• Server subsystem
• Cryptographic subsystem
Server Subsystem
The server subsystem provides the following security functionality:
Regular time synchronization
The server runs a timer that triggers the synchronization of date and time every 12 hours.
Access control
The server system will check for each implemented function if the calling user has the role
that is required for the operation. If this is not the case, an error will be returned and the
function will be terminated.
Auditing functionality
The server system will provide the audit log messages for the function implementations.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1153-2021 Certification Report
Key management
The server system has functions implemented for key related functionality, e.g. such as
derivation, deleting, export generation of keys.
Role management
The server system provides functionality for managing the timeout values for roles.
Attestation
The server system can verify the identity and functionality of the TOE.
Cluster management
The server system has functions implemented for cluster related tasks, e.g. such as data
export, master and slave assignment and deletion and cluster status retrieval.
Encryption / Decryption
The server system provides the functionality to encrypt and decrypt data via an ECKA-EG
or RSA-AES scheme.
Random number generation
The server system provides the functionality to return random bytes to the requesting
caller.
Signature
The server system provides the functionality to generate and verify signatures.
Authentication
The server system implements functions to manage the authentication of users, e.g. such
as resetting and updating entity passwords.
PACE
The server system identifies a client to the TOE and sets up the parameters of PACE that
shall be used in further communication, thus establishing a secure communication channel
with the client.
UCP
The server system provides the functionality to update the TOE.
Cryptographic Subsystem
The cryptographic subsystem provides the following functionality to the server subsystem:
• Hash generation for SHA-2
• RSA based signature creation and verification
• RSA key generation
• EC key generation
• ECDSA generation and verification
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• Parsing of X.509 certificate
• Random Number Generation
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
7.1. TOE test configuration
The tests were performed on a test system running two virtual machines, the TOE VM and
the Testing VM operated at the developer’s site. The tested TOE version was 1.0.4.
For testing, the TOE was running on a hardware platform different from chapter 8 and 5.
The RNG seed was created on the PrimeKey SEE and manually transferred into the
testing environment. After reviewing the architecture and development documentation of
the TOE as well as the PrimeKey SEE’s hardware documentation, this approach was
deemed sufficient for testing in this particular evaluation.
The configuration respectively the version of the TOE can be retrieved from the test
environment via the test function cc.tsfi.basic.VersionTest.TestAuthorized().
The evaluators verified that the tested version, 1.0.4, of the TOE is compliant with the
provided documentation.
7.2. Testing approach and coverage
Developer Testing
The developer created a suite of tests which can be categorized into three groups: unit
tests, TSFI tests an manual tests. These amount to 3110 automated tests and 6 manual
tests covering all interfaces and the random number generator of the underlying hardware
platform.
The testing is fully automated and requires no interaction after starting. For manual tests,
manual steps like disconnecting the TOE from the network via unplugging need to be
performed when prompted.
All test cases were executed successfully by the developer and ended up with the
expected result.
Independent Testing
The developer provided access to a preconfigured test environment to the evaluator.
During a dedicated workshop, the developer presented the installation of the test
environment using the TOE’s guidance documentation.
For independent testing, the ITSEF repeated all developer tests. In addition, some tests
were repeated with changed parameters. The entropy of random numbers was tested
using the SP-800-90B entropy assessment tool. The evaluators determined that all tests
were executed successfully.
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7.3. Penetration Testing
For penetration testing, the same environment was used as for independent testing. The
overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the actual
test results; moreover, no attack scenario with the attack potential “Basic” was actually
successful.
Vulnerability Analysis Approach
The evaluator devised an attack scenario exploitable in the TOE’s operational environment
by an attacker with the attack potential “Basic”.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
• fiskaly Cloud Crypto Service Provider Version 1.0.4
• Associated guidance documentation: Preparative Procedures & Operational User
Guidance Documentation fiskaly Cloud Crypto Service Provider, TOE Version 1.0.4,
Version 1.2.4 [10]
For the non-TOE platform:
• Alpine Linux v3.12
• OpenJDK 11 as provided by Alpine Linux
• Busybox 1.31.1
The non-TOE hardware platform is a PrimeKey SEE.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used.
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20 was used (see [4]).
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
• All components of the EAL 2 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
• The components ALC_CMS.3, ALC_LCD.1 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1153-2021
• PP Conformance: Protection Profile Cryptographic Service Provider Light (CSPL)
Version 1.0, 12 November 2019, BSI-CC-PP-0111-2019,
Common Criteria Protection Profile Configuration Cryptographic Service Provider
Light – Time Stamp Service and Audit (PPC-CSPLight-TS-Au) Version 1.0, 26
February 2020, BSI-CC-PP-0112-2020,
Common Criteria Protection Profile Configuration Cryptographic Service Provider
Light - Time Stamp Service and Audit – Clustering (PPC-CSPLight-TS-Au-Cl),
Version 1.0, 26 February 2020, BSI-CC-PP-0113-2020 [8]
• for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
• for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 2 augmented by ALC_CMS.3, ALC_LCD.1
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a
security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The following table gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to
enforce the security policy and outlines its rating from cryptographic point of view. Each
Cryptographic Functionality achieves a security level of at least 100 Bits (in general
context).
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
in Bits
Security Level
above 100 Bits
Comments
1
Hashing SHA-256, SHA-384,
SHA-512
FIPS 180-4 none yes
2
Random
Number
Generation
RNG NIST SP-800-90A
R1; DRG.3
≥ 125 bits
of entropy
yes Seed
length 256
bits
3
Key
Generation
AES ISO 18033-3, NIST
SP800-56C
128, 256 yes
4
Key
Derivation
AES NIST SP800-56C 128, 256 yes
5
Key
Generation
ECC Curve P-256 FIPS PUB 186-4 B.4
and D.1.2.3
256 yes
6
Key
Derivation
ECC Curve P-256
with X9.63 Key
Derivation Function
FIPS PUB
186-4 B.4 and
D.1.2.374, TR-03111
(Section 4.3.3)
256 yes
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No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
in Bits
Security Level
above 100 Bits
Comments
7
Key
Generation
RSA PKCS #1 v2.2 4096 yes
8
Key
Agreement
ECDHE
Curve P-256 and
256-bit random ECP
group
TR-03111 128, 256 yes
9
Key
Derivation
ECKA-EG
Curve P-256 with
X9.63 Key Derivation
Function
TR-03111, chapter
4.3.2.2
128, 256 yes
10
Key
Generation
ECKA-EG
Curve P-256
FIPS PUB 186-4 B.4
and D.1.2.3
256 yes
11
Key
Generation
AES-RSA Key
generation and RSA
encryption
ISO/IEC18033-3,
PKCS #1 v2.2
128, 256 yes
12
Key
Derivation
AES-RSA key
derivation and
decryption
ISO/IEC 14888-2 128, 256 yes
13
Key
Wrapping
AES Key Wrap with
padding
NIST SP800-38F 128, 256 yes
14
Confidentialit
y Protection
AES in CBC mode NIST SP800-38A,
ISO 18033-3, ISO
10116
128, 256 yes
15
Confidentialit
y with MAC
AES in CBC mode
with CMAC
NIST SP800-38A,
NIST SP800-38B
128, 256
yes
16
MAC AES with CMAC NIST SP800-38B 128, 256 yes
17
Digital
Signatures
ECDSA
Curve P-256
FIPS PUB 186-4 B.4
and D.1.2.3
256 yes
18
Digital
Signatures
RSA and EMSA-PSS ISO/IEC 14888-2,
PKCS#1, v2.2
4096 yes
19
Trusted
Channel
Chip Authentication
Version 2
TR-03110, section
3.3 and 3.4
128, 256 yes
20
Trusted
Channel
Terminal
Authentication
Version 2
TR-03110, section
3.3 and 3.4
128, 256 yes
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No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
in Bits
Security Level
above 100 Bits
Comments
21
Trusted
Channel
PACE
Curve P-256
ICAO Doc9303,
Part 11, section 4.4
128, 256 yes
22
Trusted
Channel
AES in CBC mode NIST SP800-38A,
FIPS197
128, 256 yes
23
Trusted
Channel
AES CMAC NIST SP800-38B,
FIPS197
128, 256 yes
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
ACPI Advanced Configuration and Power Interface
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
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BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CMAC Cryprographic Message Authentication Code
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
CSPLight Cryptographic Service Provider Light
DHCP Dynamic Host Control Protocol
DRG Deterministic RNG
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ECC Elliptic-curve cryptography
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
ECDHE Elliptic-Curve Diffie–Hellman
EMSA-PSS Encoding Method for Signature Appendix, Probabilistic Signature Scheme
ECKA-EG Elliptic Curve ElGamal Key Agreement
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
JAR Java Archive
JVM Java Virtual Machine
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NTP Network Time Protocol
PACE Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PP Protection Profile
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest–Shamir–Adleman
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SMAERS Security Module Application for Electronic Record-keeping Systems
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SQL Simple Query Language
ST Security Target
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TOE Target of Evaluation
TR Technische Richtlinie
TSF TOE Security Functionality
UCP Update Code Package
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
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[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1153-2021, Version 1.1.7, 4 February 2021, Document
Title Security Target fiskaly Cloud Crypto Service Provider, fiskaly GmbH
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.9, 18 February 2021, Evaluation Technical
Report (ETR) – Summary, SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH,
(confidential document)
[8] Base-PP: Protection Profile Cryptographic Service Provider Light (CSPL)
Version1.0, 12. November 2019, BSI-CC-PP-0111-2019, BSI
PP-Configuration: Common Criteria Protection Profile Configuration
CryptographicService Provider Light – Time Stamp Service and Audit (PPC-
CSPLight-TS-Au)Version 1.0, 26 February 2020, BSI-CC-PP-0112-2020, BSI
PP-Configuration: Common Criteria Protection Profile Configuration
CryptographicService Provider Light - Time Stamp Service and Audit – Clustering
(PPC-CSPLight-TS-Au-Cl), Version 1.0, 26 February 2020, BSI-CC-PP-0113-2020,
BSI
[9] Configuration list for the TOE, no Version, provided on 1 February 2021, cl.xlsx,
SHA256:
75521C22AE667029C1C3CC7B7468EF0210EACEC22D7B2D2B81A584D4FB55B
05F (confidential document)
[10] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 1.2.4, January 30 2021, Document
Title Preparative Procedures & Operational User Guidance Documentation fiskaly
Cloud Crypto Service Provider TOE version 1.0.4, fiskaly GmbH
7
specifically
• AIS 14, Version 7, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt von Einzelprüfberichten für Evaluationen
nach CC
• AIS 19, Version 9, Gliederung des ETR
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 31, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 46, Version 3, Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und
ergänzende Hinweise für die Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC Part
3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3 chapter 12
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation refer to
CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the evaluation
assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
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