BSI-DSZ-CC-0867-2014
for
IDeal Pass v2 - SAC/EAC JC ePassport 4.0.0 (BAC)
from
Morpho B.V.
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V4.75
BSI-DSZ-CC-0867-2014
Machine Readable Travel Document
IDeal Pass v2 - SAC/EAC JC ePassport 4.0.0 (BAC)
from Morpho B.V.
PP Conformance: Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO
Application" Basic Access Control, Version 1.10,
25 March 2009, BSI-CC-PP-0055-2009
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification
Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance
to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 7 March 2014
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Joachim Weber L.S.
Head of Division SOGIS Recognition
Agreement
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0867-2014
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0867-2014 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0867-2014
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................8
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................13
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................14
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................14
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................14
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................15
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................15
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................16
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................17
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................20
11 Security Target............................................................................................................20
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................20
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................22
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................25
CC Part 1:.......................................................................................................................25
CC Part 3:.......................................................................................................................26
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................35
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0867-2014 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● BSIG2
● BSI Certification Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN 45011 standard
● BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1]
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2]
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical
domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL1 to EAL4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher
recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined.
It includes assurance levels beyond EAL4 resp. E3 (basic). In addition, certificates issued
for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0867-2014
As of September 2011 the new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of
Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and
the United Kingdom. Details on recognition and the history of the agreement can be found
at https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of September 2011 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of:
Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved
certification schemes can be seen on the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product IDeal Pass v2 - SAC/EAC JC ePassport 4.0.0 (BAC) has undergone the
certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0866-2013
and BSI-DSZ-CC-0866-V2-2014. Specific results from the evaluation process
BSI-DSZ-CC-0866-2013 and BSI-DSZ-CC-0866-V2-2014 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product IDeal Pass v2 - SAC/EAC JC ePassport 4.0.0 (BAC) was
conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on
4 February 2014. TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the applicant is: Morpho B.V.
The product was developed by: Morpho B.V.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4 Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0867-2014 Certification Report
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5 Publication
The product IDeal Pass v2 - SAC/EAC JC ePassport 4.0.0 (BAC) has been included in the
BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
Morpho B.V.
P.O. Box 5300
2000 GH Haarlem
The Netherlands
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0867-2014 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0867-2014
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the "IDeal Pass v2 - SAC/EAC JC ePassport 4.0.0
(BAC)" which is an electronic travel document (Machine Readable Travel Document –
MRTD) representing a contactless/contact smart card integrated circuit, programmed
according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) defined in 'ICAO Doc 9303' [22] and
providing Basic Access Control according to the 'ICAO Doc 9303' [22] and the protection
profile BSI-CC-PP-0055-2009 [7]. Additionally to the protection profile
BSI-CC-PP-0055-2009 the TOE provides Active Authentication according to 'ICAO Doc
9303' [22].
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application" Basic
Access Control, Version 1.10, 25 March 2009, BSI-CC-PP-0055-2009 [7].
Please note that in consistency with the Security Target and the claimed protection profile
BSI-CC-PP-0055-2009 only the security mechanism Basic Access Control and Active
Authentication were in the focus of the evaluation process. The further security
mechanisms of the product (Password Authenticated Connection Establishment, Active
Authentication and Extended Access Control) are subjects of the separate certifications
BSI-DSZ-CC-0866-2013 [13] and BSI-DSZ-CC-0866-V2-2014 [31].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ALC_DVS.2.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and Security Target Lite [8], chapter 6.1. They are selected from
Common Criteria Part 2 and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2
extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF I&A Identification and Authentication
SF.CF Cryptographic functions support
SF.ILTB Protection against interference, logical tampering
and bypass
SF.AC Access control / Storage and protection of logical
travel document data
SF.SM Secure Messaging
SF.LCM Security and life cycle management
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and Security Target Lite [8],
chapter 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and Security
Target Lite [8], chapter 3.1.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0867-2014 Certification Report
in terms of Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in
the Security Target [6] and Security Target Lite [8], chapter 3.2 to 3.4.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG
Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
IDeal Pass v2 - SAC/EAC JC ePassport 4.0.0 (BAC)
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW The NXP J3E120_MP65
(JCOP 2.4.2R3) chip with
the embedded software
JCOP v2.4.2R3
ROM mask ID: 41h
Patch level: 1
CI / Version of IDeal Pass v2 -
SAC/EAC JC ePassport 4.0.0
applet loaded into ROM:
7103-9301-0308-01.00.59.0300
loaded into EEPROM:
7103-9301-0311-01.00.59.0300
Packed in sealed boxes, on
sealed pallets with security
transportation to the
Personalization Agent
2 Keys Personalization key set
delivered separated from
the TOE
7301-9310-605
7301-9311-605
7301-9312-605
Three key parts for each key,
printed on separate forms and
sent separately in sealed
envelopes by registered mail to
authorized key managers of the
personalization site
3 DOC Preparative procedures
[11]
1.0.0 / 7301-9302-504 Signed and encrypted (PGP)
electronic document sent by
email to the developer of the
personalization system.
4 DOC Operational user guidance
[12]
1.0.0/
7301-9302-503
Secured email to the end
customer (typically the MRTD
issuing authority)
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE is finalised after initialisation / pre-personalisation and then delivered to the
personalisation site. If the personalisation site is Morpho B.V., then pre-personalisation
and personalisation take place in the same security environment of the MRTD
manufacturing. If the TOE is delivered to a personalisation site outside Morpho B.V. the
delivery takes place as described in table 2 above.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0867-2014
The Preparative Procedures [11] describe all procedures which have to be performed
during personalisation phase by the Personalisation Agent. It covers the secure
identification of the JCOP platform and the IDeal Pass v2 - SAC/EAC JC ePassport 4.0.0
application as well as the mandatory personalisation steps and commands that are to be
performed in order to establish a Common Criteria certified ICAO MRTD supporting Basic
Access Control (BAC) and optionally Active Authentication (AA).
The Operational user guidance [12] describes the secure usage of the TOE and its
security functionality in the operational life-cycle phase. This document is intended to be
used by travel document holders and inspection system manufacturers using the TOE's
command set available over its external contactless/contact interface.
3 Security Policy
The Security Policy of the TOE is defined according to the MRTD BAC PP [7] by the
Security Objectives and Requirements for the contact-less and contact-based chip of
machine readable travel documents (MRTD) based on the requirements and
recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). The Security
Policy addresses the advanced security methods for authentication and secure
communication, which are described in detail in the Security Target [6] and Security Target
Lite [8].
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance: Obligations for the MRTD Issuer and Obligations for the Terminal's PKI.
Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and Security Target Lite [8], chapter 4.2.
5 Architectural Information
The TOE consist of the following components:
● Smart Card Platform (Hardware Platform and Hardware Abstraction Layer);
● IC embedded software running on the Smart Card Platform consisting of the
sub-systems:
• Java Card virtual machine, ensuring language-level security;
• Java Card runtime environment, providing additional security features for Java card
technology enabled devices;
• Java card API, providing access to card’s resources for the Applet;
• Global Platform Card Manager, responsible for management of Applets on the card.
For this TOE post issuance loading or deletion of Applets is not allowed;
• Native Mifare application, for this TOE the Mifare application is disabled;
• IDeal Pass v2 – SAC/EAC JC ePassport 4.0.0 applet which implements the eMRTD
functionality.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0867-2014 Certification Report
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7 IT Product Testing
All tests except penetration testing were performed with IDeal Pass v2 - SAC/EAC JC
ePassport 4.0.0 applet loaded in ROM and in EEPROM.
7.1 Developer tests according to ATE_FUN
The scenarios for performing the functional tests were structured top down by the TOE
phases Manufacturing, Pre-Personalization, Personalization and Operational Use, added
by some special test cases called command scans, destructive tests, media tests and
perturbation and Morpho additional tests. The tests related to Pre-Personalization,
Personalization and Operational life-cycle phases were subdivided into tests of the
according APDUs, file handling, authentication mechanisms, and access conditions.
Most test cases started at applet instantiation or selection. Therefore the tested
functionality includes successful execution of all necessary and preparative steps for the
TOE configuration. The approach makes the tests repeatable and include aspects of
regression tests.
The test prerequisites, test steps and expected results adequately test each TSFI. They
are consistent with the descriptions of the TSFI in the functional specification.
The test plan includes all details about the set-up procedures, input parameters, the
privileges to run, the test procedures and the test execution and is suitable to test the TSF
mediated by the related interface adequately.
The internal interfaces are represented by and correspond to TSFI. All TSF subsystem and
SFR-enforcing module behaviour is covered. The analysis of the test procedures show
that all interfaces of SFR-enforcing modules are tested. All TSFI are covered and mapped
to the tests. The testing approach allows to demonstrate that the interactions among
subsystems work as described in the TOE design.
The actual test results correspond to the expected test results. The TOE has passed all
tests so that all TSF listed above have been successfully tested against the assurance
components ADV_FSP.5 and ADV_TDS.4. The developer’s testing results demonstrate
that the TSF perform as specified.
7.2 Independent evaluator tests according to ATE_IND
The TOE and test configuration and the test tools are identical to the developer tests. Most
tests performed with the test tool start at applet instantiation or selection which means that
most tests include successful execution of all previously necessary and preparative steps
like personalization and configuration of the different authentication types.
Therefore the tests and their results were repeatable, the tests include aspects of
regression, integration testing, negative tests, code inspection, stress tests, and electrical
interface tests.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0867-2014
The tests cover tests of the TSFI related to
● Manufacturing (applet loading, installing and selection)
● Identification and Authentication (interfaces of different authentication mechanisms),
● Protection against interference, logical tampering and bypass (disturbance of interface
execution),
● Secure Messaging (test of interface commands using secure messaging),
● Preparative procedures, performed by the evaluator according to the guidance.
The design of test cases and the choice of the subset of interfaces used for testing has
been done including the repetition and augmentation of developer tests of interfaces and
supplementation of the developer testing strategy for interfaces. The susceptibility to
vulnerabilities of interfaces and related functionality was also a criterion.
The rigour of the tested interfaces is sufficient and the evaluator found that all TSFI are
properly implemented.
The test prerequisites, test steps, and results are consistent with the descriptions of the
TSFI in the functional specification. The actual test results correspond to the expected test
results. The independent test results demonstrate that the TSF perform as specified.
7.3 Penetration Testing according to AVA_VAN
No separate penetration tests were produced for this TOE because penetration testing of
the base evaluations
• BSI-DSZ-CC-0866-2013 with the IDeal Pass v2 – SAC/EAC JC ePassport 4.0.0
applet loaded into EEPROM and
• BSI-DSZ-CC-0866-V2-2014 with applet in ROM8
with resistance against high attack potential covers also this TOE with resistance to
enhanced-basic attack potential.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential High was actually
successful in the TOE’s operational environment as defined in [6] provided that all
measures required by the developer are applied.
8 Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
IDeal Pass v2 - SAC/EAC JC ePassport 4.0.0 (BAC)
It comprises of:
● the NXP J3E120_MP65 (JCOP 2.4.2R3) Secure Smartcard Controller, comprising of
• the circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (the NXP P5CD145V0B integrated circuit, IC) with
hardware for the contact and contactless interface;
8
The evaluation of BSI-DSZ-CC-0866-V2-2014 is a re-evaluation of BSI-DSZ-CC-0866-2013, whereby
the only impact is that testing inclusive penetration testing was performed with IDeal Pass v2 -
SAC/EAC JC ePassport 4.0.0 applet loaded in ROM.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0867-2014 Certification Report
• the IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC
Dedicated Support Software;
• the IC Embedded Software (operating system): JCOP v2.4.2 R3;
● the MRTD application IDeal Pass v2 - SAC/EAC JC ePassport 4.0.0 Applet version
1.0.59.300 loaded into ROM/EEPROM;
● the associated guidance documentation.
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [9] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
● The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits (see [4], AIS 25),
● Application of Attack Potential to Smart Cards (see [4], AIS 26),
● Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices (see AIS 36).
According to this concept the relevant guidance documents of the underlying platform
and the documents ETR for Composition from the platform evaluations (i.e. on hardware
[14], [15]) have been applied in the TOE evaluation.
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20 was used (see [4]). The TOE
uses platform for true random number generation, which provides random number
generation in accordance with class DRG.3 of [4]
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_DVS.2 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a
re-evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0866-2013 [13] and
BSI-DSZ-CC-0866-V2-2014 [31], re-use of specific evaluation tasks was possible. The
focus of this re-evaluation was on the differences regarding the evaluation against the
BAC PP [7].
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application"
Basic Access Control, Version 1.10, 25 March 2009,
BSI-CC-PP-0055-2009 [7]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
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● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The following cryptographic algorithms are used by the TOE to enforce its security policy:
Algorithm Bit Length Application Portion of
the TSF
Implementation
Standard
Application
Standard
Comments9
TDES in CBC
mode
[k]=112 en-/decryption SF.CF.1 FIPS 46-3 (DES), SP
800-38A (CBC),
ICAO 9303, Vol. 2,
Appendix 5, A 5.3
ICAO 9303
[22],
ICAO-SAC
[21]
Used for PACE
and CA
TR-03110-3 [26]
TDES in Retail
MAC mode
[k]=112 Key generation/
Key derivation
SF.CF.1 FIPS 46-3 (DES),
ISO 9797 (Retail
MAC)
ICAO 9303
[22],
ICAO-SAC
[21]
Used for PACE
and CA
TR-03110-3 [26]
AES in CBC
mode
[k]=128, 192,
256
en-/decryption SF.CF.1 FIPS 197 (AES) [31]
SP 800-38A (CBC)
ICAO-SAC
[21]
Used for PACE
and CA
TR-03110-3 [26]
AES in CMAC
mode
[k]=128, 192,
256
Key generation/
Key derivation
SF.CF.1 FIPS 197 (AES) [31]
SP 800-38A (CBC)
ICAO-SAC
[21]
Used for PACE
and CA
TR-03110-3 [26]
TDES in CBC
mode
[k]=112 Key generation/
Key derivation
SF.CF.6 - ICAO 9303
[22],
TR-03110-3
[26]
Used for PACE
and CA
TR-03110-3 [26]
SHA-1 - PACE, CAv1,
AA
SF.CF.2 FIPS180-2 ICAO-SAC
[21],
TR-03110-3
[26]
Used for key
derivation,
CAv1
[TR-3110], AA
signature
[ICAO]
SHA-224 - AA SF.CF.2 FIPS180-2 TR-03110-3
[26]
until 2015
SHA-256 - PACE, CAv1,
AA
SF.CF.2 FIPS180-2 TR-03110-3
[26]
until 2019
RSA RSA signature
Modulus-length=
1536, 1792,
2048
using
SHA-{1,224,256}
AA Signature
generation
SF.CF.3 ISO9796-2 (RSA) ICAO 9303
[22],
Used for AA
according to
[ICAO-9303]
ECDH Key sizes
corresponding to
the used elliptic
Key derivation SF.CF.5 ISO15946-3 ICAO-SAC
[21],
TR03110-3
Used for PACE
and CA
[TR-03110-3
9
Information from TR-02102 [23] and Overview of Suitable Algorithms [24], if not referenced to other
references
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0867-2014 Certification Report
Algorithm Bit Length Application Portion of
the TSF
Implementation
Standard
Application
Standard
Comments
curve
brainpoolP{192,
224,256,320}r1
(RFC 5639),
secp{192,224,25
6}r1 (SEC2) and
ANSSI
FRP256r1
Using SHA-{1,
256}
[26] [26]
Diffie-Hellman plength= 2048
using
SHA-{1, 256}
Key derivation SF.CF.5 RSA-PKCS#3 ICAO-SAC
[21],
TR-03110-3
[26]
Used for PACE
and CA
TR-03110-3 [26]
RSA RSA signature
Modulus-length=
1536, 1792,
2048
using
SHA-{1,224,256}
AA signature
generation
SF.CF.3 ISO9796-2 (RSA) ICAO 9303
[22]
Used for AA
acording to
ICAO-9303
ECDSA Key sizes
192, 224 256
and 320 bits
supported used
elliptic curves
Brainpool 192r1,
224 r1, 256 r1,
320r1/
secp 192r1,
224r1,256r1
ANSI FRP256r1
AA signature
generation
SF.CF.3 ISO15946-2
(ECDSA)
ICAO 9303
[22]
ECDSA: 224 bit
until end of
2015, 256 bit
until end of
2019
ECDSA Key sizes
192, 224 256
and 320 bits
supported used
elliptic curves
Brainpool 192r1,
224 r1, 256 r1,
320r1/
secp 192r1,
224r1,256r1
ANSI FRP256r1
Signature
verification,
TAv1
SF.CF.4 ISO15946-2
(ECDSA), FIPS 180-2
(SHA)
ECDSA is according
to [JCOP_ST]
implemented in the
platform according to
ISO 14888-3 and
FIPS 186-3.
(ECDSA),
TR-03110-1
[25]
(Brainpool-cu
rves,
NIST-curves),
[ANSSI-Ref]
(ANSSI
FRP256r1)
ECDSA:
224 bit until end
of 2015,
256 bit until end
of 2019
SHA:
1, 224 bit until
end of 2015,
256 bit until end
of 2019
see [24]
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). According to technical guideline
BSI-TR-03110-1 [25] and ICAO 9303 [22] the algorithms are suitable to protect the
authenticity (including integrity), authenticity, and confidentiality of the data stored on the
radio frequency chip embedded in the travel document (MRTD chip).
The validity period of each algorithm is mentioned in the official catalogues [23 ] / [24].
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0867-2014
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process.
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [8] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
AA Active Authentication
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BAC Basic Access Control
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
EAC Extended Access Control
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
MRTD Machine Readable Travel Document
PACE Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0867-2014 Certification Report
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on
well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a
TOE type.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied
by guidance.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0867-2014
13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 4, September 2012
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 4, September 2012
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE10
.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
in the BSI Website
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0867-2014, Version 1.00, Date: 2012-12-18, Security
Target for the IDeal Pass v2 - SAC/EAC JC ePassport 4.0.0, BAC Configuration,
Morpho B.V. (confidential document)
[7] Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application" Basic Access Control,
Version 1.10, 25 March 2009, BSI-CC-PP-0055-2009
[8] Security Target Lite BSI-DSZ-CC-0867-2014, Version 1.0, Date: 2014-01-22,
Security Target Lite for the IDeal Pass v2 - SAC/EAC JC ePassport 4.0.0, BAC
configuration, Morpho B.V. (sanitised public document)
[9] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1, Date: 2014-01-25, TÜV Informationstechnik
GmbH – Evaluation Body for IT Security, (confidential document)
[10] Configuration list for the TOE, Version 1.2.0, Date: 2014-01-24, IDeal Pass v2 -
SAC/EAC JC ePassport in BAC configuration (confidential document)
[11] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 1.0.0, Date: 2014-01-22, Preparative
Guidance for the IDeal Pass v2 - SAC/EAC JC ePassport 4.0.0 in BAC
configuration, Morpho B.V.
10
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 25, Version 8, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 9, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+ (CCv2.3 & CCv3.1)
and EAL6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 35, Version 1, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and
CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 36, Version 4, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
22 / 38
BSI-DSZ-CC-0867-2014 Certification Report
[12] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 1.0.0, Date: 2014-01-22,Operational
Guidance for the IDeal Pass v2 - SAC/EAC JC ePassport 4.0.0 in BAC
configuration, Morpho B.V.
[13] Certification report BSI-DSZ-CC-0866-2013 for IDeal Pass v2 - SAC/EAC JC
ePassport 4.0.0 from Morpho B.V., 20 December 2013, Federal Office for
Information Security, Germany
[14] Certification Report NXP J3E145_M64, J3E120_M65, J3E082_M65, J2E145_M64,
J2E120_M65, and J2E082_M65 Secure Smart Card Controller Revision 3,
NSCIB-CC-13-37760, August 12th, 2013, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V.
[15] ETR for Composite Evaluation NXP J3E145_M64, J3E120_M65, J3E082_M65,
J2E145_M64, J2E120_M65, and J2E082_M65 Secure Smart Card Controller
Revision 3 EAL5+, report ID 13-RPT-208, NSCIB-13-37760, version 5.0, 9 August
2013 , Brightsight
[16] Certification Report Crypto Library V2.7/2.9 on SmartMX, P5Cx128/P5Cx145 V0v/
V0B(s) from NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH,BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-2011, 11
April 2011, BSI
[17] Assurance Continuity Maintenance Report, BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-2011-MA-02, Crypto
Library V2.7/2.9 on SmartMX, P5Cx128/P5Cx145 V0v/ V0B(s) from NXP
Semiconductors Germany GmbH, 04 July 2013, BSI
[18] ETR for Composition Crypto Library V2.7 on NXP P5CD145V0A, MSO /
P5CC145V0A, MSO / P5CD128V0A, MSO / P5CC128V0A, MSO according to
AIS36, BSI-DSZ-CC-750, version 8.0, 02 August 2012, Brighsight
[19] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0858-2013 for NXP Secure PKI Smart Card
Controllers P5CD128V0v/ V0B(s), P5CC128V0v/ V0B(s), P5CD145V0v/ V0B(s),
P5CC145V0v/ V0B(s), P5CN145V0v/V0B(s), each including IC Dedicated Software
from NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH, 12th June 2013, BSI
[20] ETR for composition according to AIS36, P5CD128V0A/B, P5CD128V0B(s),
P5CC128V0A/B, P5CC128V0B(s), P5CD145V0A/B, P5CD145V0B(s),
P5CC145V0A/B, P5CC145V0B(s), P5CN145V0A/B, P5CN145V0B(s), each
including IC Dedicated Software of NXP Semiconductors, BSI-DSZ-CC-858, Version
1.0, Date April 22th, 2013, T-Systems GEI GmbH
[21] Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, Supplemental Access
Control for Machine Readable Travel Documents, International Civil Aviation
Organization, Version 1.01, 11 November 2010
[22] ICAO Doc 9303, Part 1, “Machine Readable Passports”, Volume 2, "Specifications
for Electronically Enabled Passports with Biometric Identification Capability" sixth
edition, 2006, and Part 3, “Machine Readable Official Travel Documents”, Volume 2,
“Specifications for Electronically Enabled MRTDs with Biometric Identification
Capability” third edition, 2008, ICAO
[23] TR-02102, BSI – Technische Richtlinie, Kryptographische Verfahren: Empfehlungen
und Schlüssellängen, Version 2013.02, 09.01.2013, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik
[24] Notification with regard to electronic signatures in accordance with the Electronic
Signatures Act and the Electronic Signatures Ordinance( Overview of Suitable
Algorithms) of 18 February 2013, To be published in Federal Gazette.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0867-2014
[25] TR-03110-1, Technical Guideline TR-03110-1, Advanced Security Mechanisms for
Machine Readable Travel Documents –Part 1 – eMRTDs with BAC/PACEv2 and
EACv1, Version 2.10, 20.03.2012
[26] TR-03110-3, Technical Guideline TR-03110-3, Advanced Security Mechanisms for
Machine Readable Travel Documents – Part 3 –Common Specifications,
Version 2.11, 12.07.2013
[27] TR-03111, BSI – Technical Guideline, Elliptic Curve Cryptography, Version 2.0,
28.06.2012 Federal Office for Information Security
[28] FIPS 180-4, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication FIPS PUB180-4,
Secure, Secure Hash Standard (SHS), March 2012, Information Technology
Laboratory National Institute of Standards and Technology
[29] FIPS186-3, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication FIPS PUB 186-3,
Digital Signature Standard (DSS), June 2009, U.S. department of Commerce /
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
[30] FIPS 197, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, November
26, 2001, Announcing the ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES), National
Institute of Standards and Technology
[31] Certification report BSI-DSZ-CC-0866-V2-2014 for IDeal Pass v2 - SAC/EAC JC
ePassport 4.0.0 from Morpho B.V., 07 March 2014, Federal Office for Information
Security, Germany
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0867-2014 Certification Report
C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0867-2014
CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0867-2014 Certification Report
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal
high-level design presentation
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0867-2014
Assurance Class Assurance Components
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0867-2014 Certification Report
Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0867-2014
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0867-2014 Certification Report
Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the
TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through
security objectives.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
“Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0867-2014 Certification Report
D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0867-2014
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product IDeal Pass v2 - SAC/EAC JC ePassport 4.0.0 (BAC) (Target of Evaluation,
TOE) has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common
Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the
Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology
of the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC),
Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 7 March 2014, the following results regarding the
development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.2)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
a) Morpho B.V., Oudeweg 32, 2031 CC Haarlem, The Netherlands (Developer,
MRTD Manufacturer)
b) HID Global Ireland Teoranta Pairc Tionscail na Tulaigh, Baile na Abhann,
Co.Galway, Ireland (Inlay Manufacturer)
c) SMARTRAC TECHNOLOGY Ltd., Bangkok, Thailand, 142 Moo, Hi-Tech
Industrial Estate, Tambon Ban Laean, Amphor Bang-Pa-In, 13160 Ayutthaya,
Thailand (Inlay Manufacturer)
d) PAV Card GmbH Hamburger Strasse 6, D-22952 Lütjensee, Germany (Inlay
Manufacturer)
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and Security Target Lite [8]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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