BSI-DSZ-CC-0579-2009
for
Oracle Database 11g Enterprise Edition,
Release 11.1.0.7 with Critical Patch Updates up to
and including July 2009
from
Oracle Corporation
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-327 V4.29
BSI-DSZ-CC-0579-2009
Database
Oracle Database 11g Enterprise Edition
Release 11.1.0.7 with Critical Patch Updates up to and including July 2009
from Oracle Corporation
PP Conformance: U.S. Government Protection Profile Database
Management Systems for Basic Robustness
Environments, Version 1.2, July 25, 2007
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.3
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 for conformance to the Common Criteria
for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 16 September 2009
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0579-2009 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates..................................................7
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates.........................................................8
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the certification result.....................................................................................8
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................13
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................14
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................14
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................15
5.1 Data Dictionary and Database...............................................................................15
5.2 Distributed Databases...........................................................................................15
5.3 Enterprise Users....................................................................................................15
5.4 Partitioning.............................................................................................................16
5.5 Real Application Clusters.......................................................................................16
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................16
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................16
7.1 Test configuration...................................................................................................16
7.2 Developer Testing..................................................................................................16
7.3 Evaluator Testing Effort..........................................................................................16
7.4 Evaluator Penetration Testing................................................................................17
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................17
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................17
9.1 CC specific results.................................................................................................17
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment....................................................................18
10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE........................................................18
11 Security Target............................................................................................................18
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................18
12.1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................18
12.2 Glossary...............................................................................................................19
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................20
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................21
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................31
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0579-2009 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● BSIG2
● BSI Certification Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN 45011 standard
● BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1]
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2]
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) for certificates based on ITSEC
became initially effective in March 1998.
This agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended in April
1999 to include certificates based on the Common Criteria for the Evaluation Assurance
Levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7). This agreement was signed by the national bodies of Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United
Kingdom. The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) recognises certificates
issued by the national certification bodies of France and United Kingdom, and from The
Netherlands since January 2009 within the terms of this agreement.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 19
May 2006, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0579-2009
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement.
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of January 2009 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia,
Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United
States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes
can be seen on the web site: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Oracle Database 11g Enterprise Edition, Release 11.1.0.7 with Critical Patch
Updates up to and including July 2009 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0403-2008.
The evaluation of the product Oracle Database 11g Enterprise Edition, Release 11.1.0.7
with Critical Patch Updates up to and including July 2009 was conducted by atsec
information security GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 14 September 2009. The
atsec information security GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the
certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the developer, sponsor and applicant is: Oracle Corporation
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4 Validity of the certification result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described as specified in the following
report and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods may evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods can be re-assessed if required
and the sponsor applies for the certified product being monitored within the assurance
continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme. It is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5 Publication
The product Oracle Database 11g Enterprise Edition, Release 11.1.0.7 with Critical Patch
Updates up to and including July 2009 has been included in the BSI list of the certified
products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: http:// www.bsi.bund.de and [5]).
Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
Oracle Corporation
500 Oracle Parkway
Redwood Shores,CA
USA
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0579-2009 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0579-2009
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the software application Oracle Database 11g Enterprise
Edition, Release 11.1.0.7 with all critical patch updates up to and including July 2009.
Oracle Database 11g is an object-relational database management system (O-RDBMS),
providing advanced security functionality for multi-user distributed database environments.
The security functionality in Oracle Database 11g includes:
● user identification and authentication, with password management options and support
for enterprise users (password option only). In the case of Enterprise Users this
function is partly provided by the IT-environment.
● discretionary access controls on database objects, which controls access to objects
based on the identity of the subjects or groups to which the subjects and objects
belong, and which allows authorized users to specify how the objects that they control
are protected;
● granular privileges for the enforcement of least privilege;
● user-configurable roles for privilege management, including an authorized
administration role to allow authorized administrators to configure the policies for
discretionary access control, identification and authentication, and auditing;
● quotas on the amount of processing resources a user can consume during a database
session;
● audit capture is the function that creates information on all auditable events;
● extensive and flexible auditing options;
● secure access to remote Oracle databases; and
● stored procedures, triggers and security policies for user-defined access controls and
auditing.
Oracle Database 11g Enterprise Edition is intended to be used by very large organizations
with a high volume of transactions.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile U.S. Government Protection Profile Database Management Systems for
Basic Robustness Environments, Version 1.2, July 25, 2007 [7].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL4
augmented by ALC_FLR.3.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and the PP [8], chapter 5. They are selected from Common Criteria Part
2 and some of them are newly defined in the PP [8]. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
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TOE Security Function Addressed issue
F.IA Identification and Authentication
F.LIM Resource Control – Database Resources
F.DAC Discretionary Access Control
F.APR Granting and Revoking privileges and Roles
F.PRI Effective Privileges
F.AUD Audit and Accountability
F.CON Data Consistency
Table 1: TOE Security Functions
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6. Each of the security
functions is broken down into smaller units and those units are explained in detail.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3 and
the Protection Profile [8]. Based on these assets the TOE Security Environment is defined
in terms of Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in
the Security Target [6], chapter 3.
The TOE configuration that was covered by this certification is defined by the ST and
further detailed by the guidance documentation a user has to follow. For further details on
this topic please refer to chapter 8 of this report.
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Oracle Database 11g Enterprise Edition, Release 11.1.0.7 with Critical Patch Updates
up to and including July 2009
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 SW Oracle Database 11g Release 1
(11.1.0.6.0) Media Pack for Linux
x86
11.1.0.6.0 electronic or on physical media
2 SW 11.1.0.7.0 PATCH SET FOR
ORACLE DATABASE SERVER
11.1.0.7.0 electronic
3 SW CPUJUL2009 DATABASE 11.1.0.7 11.1.0.7.0 electronic
4 Guidance Evaluated Configuration for Oracle
Database 11g Release 1 (11.1.0)
11.1.0 electronic
5 Guidance Oracle Database 11g Release 1
(11.1) Documentation
11.1 electronic
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
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The TOE is delivered either in electronic form or physically on CD-ROMs.
For electronic delivery of the TOE, deliverable No. 4 provides instructions for verifying
SHA-1 checksums provided for the software to the consumer. The availability of this
checksum data and the instructions for its use enable customers to verify the integrity of
the downloaded TOE. In order to trust the hash sums and the downloaded software
packages, trust in the web server must be established by verifying the server's SSL server
certificate. For electronic delivery of the TOE guidance, there is an available option for
consumers to verify with the developer via email that they received the correct guidance
documents.
For the delivery of physical media to consumers, the following measures contribute to
integrity and authenticity of the TOE:
● original Oracle graphics and logos on packaging material, boxes, and CD-ROMs;
● sealed CD-ROM envelopes; invoice, reference, and tracking numbers for the shipment
are communicated to the consumer;
● the product is shipped by trusted carriers.
The consumer can issue the command “opatch lsinventory -detail” in order to verify the
release and patch sets installed on a system. Deliverable No. 4 provides details about the
patches that need to be installed for the evaluated configuration.
3 Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
● Discretionary Access Control Policy
● Quota Policy
● Identification and Authentication Policy
● Auditing Policy
● Security Management Policy
● Consistency of replicated TSF Data Policy
For details on the SFRs used to implement those policies please refer to the Security
Target [6], chapter 5.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance: OE.DIR_CONTROL, OE.COM_PROT and OE.CLIENT_AP. Details can be
found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4 or in the Protection Profile the ST is claiming
conformance to [8].
5 Architectural Information
An Oracle database contains the data dictionary and two different types of database
objects:
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● schema objects that belong to a specific user schema and contain user-defined
information; and
● non-schema objects to organise, monitor, and control the database.
● In an Oracle database there are two types of connections for users of the database:
● Administrator connection. This covers users who connect to the database via AS
SYSOPER or AS SYSDBA by virtue of possessing either the SYSOPER or SYSDBA
system privilege. Users making a connection AS SYSOPER are allowed to perform
operator administrative tasks (e.g. database startup and shutdown, and ALTER
DATABASE commands). Users making a connection AS SYSDBA are allowed to
perform all administrative tasks (including granting and/or revoking object privileges on
other users’ objects);
● Normal connection (note that this includes users SYS and SYSTEM). This covers
users who are authorised to access the database by virtue of being explicitly defined
and identified to an instance of the Oracle database server.
5.1 Data Dictionary and Database
At the centre of an Oracle database is the data dictionary - a set of internal Oracle tables
that contain all of the information the Oracle database server needs to manage the
database. The data dictionary tables are owned by the user SYS and can only be modified
by highly privileged users. A set of read-only views is provided to display the contents of
the internal tables in a meaningful way and also allow Oracle users to query the data
dictionary without the need to access it directly.
All of the information about database objects is stored in the data dictionary and is updated
by the SQL DDL commands that create, alter, and drop database objects. Other SQL
commands also insert, update, and delete information in the data dictionary in the course
of their processing. Technically, a set of server processes (a so-called instance) operates
on a database, i.e., the files which contain the data. Users employ interface products to
establish database connections with a database instance, and to query the database using
the Structured Query Language (SQL) and Oracle-specific extensions of it.
5.2 Distributed Databases
In a distributed environment, a user may access database objects from multiple
databases. After establishing an initial database session on one instance, the user can
transparently establish database sessions on other (remote) database instances using
database links. A database link identifies a remote database and provides authentication
information. By qualifying references to database objects with the name of a database link,
a user can access remote database objects.
5.3 Enterprise Users
The TOE supports Enterprise Users. If configured, users are authenticated against a
centrally managed directory in the TOE environment, rather than against the TOE's local
database.
5.4 Partitioning
The TOE supports Partitioning, which addresses key issues in supporting very large tables
and indexes by letting you decompose them into smaller and more manageable pieces
called partitions. SQL queries and DML statements do not need to be modified in order to
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access partitioned tables. However, after partitions are defined, DDL statements can
access and manipulate individual partitions rather than entire tables or indexes.
5.5 Real Application Clusters
Real Application Clusters (RAC) comprises several Oracle instances running on multiple
clustered computers, which communicate with each other by means of a so-called
interconnect. RAC uses cluster software to access a shared database that resides on
shared disk. RAC combines the processing power of these multiple interconnected
computers to provide system redundancy, near linear scalability, and high availability.
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7 IT Product Testing
7.1 Test configuration
The Security Target defines the following operating system platforms for the TOE:
● Red Hat Enterprise Linux AS (version 5) (RHEL)
● SuSE Linux Enterprise Server 10 SP1 (SLES10)
● Oracle Enterprise Linux Version 4 Update 5 (OEL)
The developer has performed his tests on the above listed operating system platforms.
The software was installed and configured as defined in [9].
7.2 Developer Testing
Developer testing provided coverage for all TSFs and all TSF related subsystems. The
evaluator was satisfied with the results witnessed for both the automated tests and manual
tests and confirmed all tests passed successfully.
7.3 Evaluator Testing Effort
The evaluator followed a threefold, non-symmetric approach to test the TOE. The following
test configurations were used:
The evaluator test environment set up in Munich. The evaluator's test environment set up
in the Munich lab consisted of a OEL, RHEL and SLES10 installation of the TOE in a Non-
RAC configuration.
Furthermore, the evaluator witnessed a controlled run of the vendor's test suites.
A RAC cluster running on Linux has been set up by the evaluator at the developer's site in
Reading, UK. The evaluator used this configuration to directly assess the provided
installation guidance for RAC clusters as well as to perform some RAC related tests. The
RAC results, although run against a pre-TOE patchlevel are considered to be valid
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because, after examination of the details of all applied changes, the evaluator determined
that they did not have any impact on RAC-functionality.
In summary, the evaluator successfully covered all of the TOE Security Functions by either
evaluator defined tests or a re-run of a selected set of vendor tests.
The evaluators conclude that sufficient functional testing has been achieved on the TOE to
give the appropriate level of assurance that the TOE software has no security functionality
flaws when running on Red Hat Enterprise Linux AS Version 5, Oracle Enterprise Linux
Version 4 Update 5 and SuSE Linux Enterprise Server 10 SP1 operating systems.
7.4 Evaluator Penetration Testing
The evaluator used the information on potential vulnerabilities collected by the evaluators
during the evaluation that should be considered in the vulnerability analysis.
In addition, the evaluator took into account the ST, guidance documentation, functional
specification, TOE design, security architecture description and implementation
representation to identify possible potential vulnerabilities in the TOE.
As result of these activities, the evaluator defined a penetration test framework and
produced penetration tests to verify the vulnerabilities. None of the penetration test were
successful.
The evaluator used a commercial scanner to scan the TOE for known vulnerabilities. No
applicable vulnerabilities were detected.
The penetration was carried out using the external interfaces of the TOE, namely the OCI
interface stack as well as the "sqlplus" command interface. The subsystems subject to
penetration testing are all parts of the TOE.
In summary, no exploitable vulnerabilities were identified.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE subject of this report is Oracle Database 11g Enterprise Edition, Release
11.1.0.7 with all critical patch updates up to and including July 2009. The conditions set by
the documents [6] (the Security Target) and [9] (the evaluated configuration guide) have to
be met in order to result in an evaluated configuration of the TOE.
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL4.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
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● The components ALC_FLR.3 - Systematic flaw remediation augmented for this TOE
evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0403-2008, re-use of specific evaluation
tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on the integration of new and
modified features from the previously evaluated version of the Oracle database.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: U.S. Government Protection Profile Database Management
Systems for Basic Robustness Environments, Version 1.2, July
25, 2007 [8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions Common
Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant EAL 4 augmented by
ALC_FLR.3
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The TOE does not include cryptoalgorithms. Thus, no such mechanisms were part of the
assessment.
10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE
The operational documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the
usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered.
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Errichtungsgesetz
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
IT Information Technology
ITSEC Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria
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ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon
which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a
TOE type.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied
by guidance.
TOE Security Functionality - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and firmware of
the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 1, September 2006
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 2, September 2007
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 2, September 2007
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 2, September 2007
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
.
[5] German IT Security Certifcates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically updated list
published also in the BSI Website
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-0579, Version 5.0, September 2009, Security Target for
Oracle Database 11g Release 1 (11.1.0) Enterprise Edition, Oracle Corporation
[7] Evaluation Technical Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0579, Version 2, 2009-09-11, atsec
information security GmbH (confidential document)
[8] U.S. Government Protection Profile for Database Management Systems in Basic
Robustness Environments, Version 1.2, July 25, 2007
[9] Evaluated Configuration for Oracle Database 11g Release 1 (11.1.0), Issue 0.7, July
2009, Oracle Corporation
[10] Configuration list for the TOE, July 28, 2009 (confidential document)
[11] Oracle Database 11g Release 1 (11.1) Documentation, Version 11.1, Documentation
part number B28359-01
8
specifically
• AIS 38, Version 2.0, 28 September 2007, Reuse of evaluation results
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 9.4)
„The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that PP
or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in that
PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that PP
or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in that
PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package (e.g.
EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least one
additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least one
additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in which
PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more information on
this Conformance Statement, see Annex A.
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development
ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal high-
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
level design presentation
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE: Tests
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“ The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 2 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the
TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through
security objectives.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
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Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0579-2009 Certification Report
D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
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