eTravel v2.2 on MultiApp v4.0.1 platform, with Filter Set 1.0,
BAC and AA activated Security Target (LITE)
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eTravel v2.2 on
MultiApp v4.0.1 platform,
with Filter Set 1.0
BAC and AA activated
Common Criteria / ISO 15408
Security Target – Public version
EAL4+
eTravel v2.2 on MultiApp v4.0.1 platform, with Filter Set 1.0,
BAC and AA activated Security Target (LITE)
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CONTENT
1. SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................................4
1.1 SECURITY TARGET REFERENCE...........................................................................................................................4
1.2 TOE REFERENCE..................................................................................................................................................4
1.3 SECURITY TARGET OVERVIEW ............................................................................................................................5
1.4 REFERENCES........................................................................................................................................................6
1.4.1 External References ....................................................................................................................................6
1.4.2 Internal References.....................................................................................................................................7
2. TOE OVERVIEW ....................................................................................................................................................8
2.1 TOE DESCRIPTION ...............................................................................................................................................8
2.2 TOE BOUNDARIES ...............................................................................................................................................9
2.3 TOE USAGE AND SECURITY FEATURES FOR OPERATIONAL USE ...........................................................................9
2.4 TOE LIFE-CYCLE................................................................................................................................................10
2.4.1 Actors........................................................................................................................................................10
2.4.2 TOE Life Cycle..........................................................................................................................................11
2.4.3 Non-TOE hardware/software/firmware required by the TOE ..................................................................12
2.4.1 TOE Delivery ............................................................................................................................................13
3. CONFORMANCE CLAIMS.................................................................................................................................14
3.1 CC CONFORMANCE CLAIM................................................................................................................................14
3.2 PP CLAIM, .........................................................................................................................................................14
3.3 PACKAGE CLAIM ...............................................................................................................................................14
3.4 CONFORMANCE STATEMENT..............................................................................................................................14
4. SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION................................................................................................................15
4.1 INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................................................................15
4.1.1 Assets ........................................................................................................................................................15
4.1.2 Subjects.....................................................................................................................................................15
4.2 ASSUMPTIONS....................................................................................................................................................16
4.3 THREATS ...........................................................................................................................................................17
4.4 ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES .............................................................................................................19
5. SECURITY OBJECTIVES ...................................................................................................................................20
5.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE................................................................................................................20
5.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ........................................................................21
5.3 SECURITY OBJECTIVE RATIONALE ....................................................................................................................23
5.3.1 Rationale between objectives and threats, assumptions, OSP ..................................................................23
6. EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION......................................................................................................26
6.1 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FAU_SAS ............................................................................................................26
6.2 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FCS_RND ............................................................................................................26
6.3 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FIA_API...............................................................................................................27
6.4 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FMT_LIM ............................................................................................................28
6.5 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FPT_EMS.............................................................................................................29
7. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS............................................................................................................................31
7.1 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE TOE ....................................................................................31
7.1.1 Class FAU Security Audit .........................................................................................................................31
7.1.2 Class Cryptographic Support (FCS).........................................................................................................31
7.1.3 Class FIA Identification and Authentication.............................................................................................34
7.1.4 Class FDP User Data Protection .............................................................................................................37
7.1.5 Class FMT Security Management.............................................................................................................38
7.1.6 Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions.......................................................................................41
7.2 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE TOE......................................................................................42
7.3 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE.............................................................................................................43
7.3.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale............................................................................................43
7.3.2 Dependency Rationale ..............................................................................................................................46
7.3.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale ............................................................................................47
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7.3.4 Security Requirements – Mutual support and internal consistency ..........................................................47
8. TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION...................................................................................................................48
8.1 TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONS...............................................................................................................................48
8.1.1 TSFs provided by the MultiApp V4.0.1 Software......................................................................................48
8.1.2 TSFs provided by the SLE78 (M7892 G12) ..............................................................................................49
9. ACRONYMS AND GLOSSARY ..........................................................................................................................50
FIGURES
Figure 1: TOE Boundaries.......................................................................................................................................................................9
TABLES
Table 1: Identification of the actors.......................................................................................................................................................10
Table 2: Security objective rationale .....................................................................................................................................................23
Table 3: FCS_CKM.1/AA refinement...................................................................................................................................................32
Table 4: FCS_COP.1/AA refinements...................................................................................................................................................34
Table 5: Overview on authentication SFR.............................................................................................................................................34
Table 6: FIA_AFL.1 refinement............................................................................................................................................................36
Table 7: Security functional requirement rationale................................................................................................................................43
Table 8: Security functional requirement dependencies ........................................................................................................................47
Table 10: Security Functions provided by the MultiApp V4.0.1 Software............................................................................................48
Table 11: Security Functions provided by the Infineon M7892 G12.....................................................................................................49
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1. SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION
1.1 SECURITY TARGET REFERENCE
Title : eTravel v2.2 on MultiApp v4.0.1 platform, with Filter Set 1.0, BAC and AA
activated (LITE)
Version : 1.2
ST Reference : D1514254_LITE
Publication date: 09/07/2020
Origin : Thales DIS
IT Security Evaluation
scheme :
Serma Safety & Security
IT Security
Certification scheme :
Agence Nationale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d’Information (ANSSI)
1.2 TOE REFERENCE
Product Name : eTravel 2.2 on MultiApp v4.0.1 platform, with Filter Set 1.0
Security Controllers : M7892 G12
TOE Name : eTravel 2.2 BAC on MultiApp v4.0.1 platform, with Filter Set 1.0
TOE Reference/version : Release 1.0
TOE documentation : Guidance [AGD]
The TOE identification is provided by the Card Production Life Cycle Data (CPLCD). These data are available
by executing a dedicated command.
The TOE and the product differ, as further explained in §2 TOE Overview
 The TOE is the eTravel 2.2 application on MultiApp V4.0.1 (with filter set 1.0).
 The MultiApp V4.0.1 product also includes other applets.
The chip M7892 G12 is delivered in two configurations:
 Configuration 1: M7892 G12 in RF capacitance of 56pF (IC Type: 7879)
 Configuration 2: M7892 G12 in RF capacitance of 27pF (IC Type: 7897)
The current certificate [CR-IC-M7892] is covering the both chip configurations.
CPLC eTravel values
The following values from eTravel CPLC data can be used for product identification.
(The format of eTravel CPLC value is different from the platform MAV4.0.1). See table below
Using Get data command in eTravel application with tag 9F7F
Name Length Value Description Usable for
identification
IC Fabricator 2 4090 Infineon Yes
IC Type
Configuration 1:
Configuration 2:
2
7879
7897
SLE78CLFX4007PHM
SLE78CLFX400VPHM
Yes
Operating system identifier
Configuration 1:
Configuration 2:
3
B0560D
B05611
MAV 4.0.1
Yes
Configuration 1 Var 01 No
Operating system release level 2 0100 MAV 4.0.1 with filter Set 1.0 Yes
Other values set at pre-
personalization and
personalization
x xx…xx Pre-perso and perso values
No
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READ INFO value
The following information is returned by a eTravel specific command “Read Info” to return information
characterizing the application and the chip. This information can be used for tracking and key diversification
purposes. This command is accessible in personalization phase only.
Name Length Value Description Usable for
identification
Hardmask Identifier
Configuration 1:
Configuration 2:
3
B0560D
B05611
MAV 4.0.1 with Filter Set 1.0
Yes
Softmask Number 1 00 Yes
Softmask Version 1 10 MAV 4.0.1 CNIe – final version Yes
Chip ID 8 Var No
ISK KCV 3 Var No
Amount of available NVM 3 Var No
Chip Life Cycle Status 1 13 No
ISK Retry Counter 1 03 No
1.3 SECURITY TARGET OVERVIEW
This Security Target defines the security objectives and requirements for the contact/contactless chip of
machine readable travel documents (MRTD) based on the requirements and recommendations of the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). It addresses the advanced security methods Basic Access
Control and the Active Authentication specified in the Technical reports of ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [ICAO-9303].
The Security Target is based on Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO
Application”, Basic Access Control [PP-MRTD-BAC].
The Security Target defines the security requirements for the TOE. The main security objective is to provide
the secure enforcing functions and mechanisms to maintain the integrity and confidentiality of the MRTD
application and data during its life cycle.
The main objectives of this ST are:
 To introduce TOE and the MRTD application,
 To define the scope of the TOE and its security features,
 To describe the security environment of the TOE, including the assets to be protected and the
threats to be countered by the TOE and its environment during the product development,
production and usage.
 To describe the security objectives of the TOE and its environment supporting in terms of
integrity and confidentiality of application data and programs and of protection of the TOE.
 To specify the security requirements which includes the TOE security functional requirements,
the TOE assurance requirements and TOE security functions.
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1.4 REFERENCES
1.4.1 External References
[ASM-EAC] Technical Guideline – Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel
Documents – Extended Access Control (EAC),
Version 1.0, TR-03110
[BIO] BIOMETRICS DEPLOYMENT OF MACHINE READABLE TRAVEL DOCUMENTS,
Technical Report, Development and Specification of Globally Interoperable Biometric
Standards for Machine Assisted Identity Confirmation using Machine Readable Travel
Documents,
Version 2.0, ICAO TAG MRTD/NTWG, 21 May 2004
[CC-1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Part 1: Introduction and general model,
CCMB-2017-04-001, version 3.1 rev 5, April 2017
[CC-2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Part 2: Security functional components,
CCMB-2017-04-002, version 3.1 rev 5, April 2017
[CC-3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Part 3: Security assurance components,
CCMB-2012-04-003, version 3.1 rev 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Evaluation Methodology
CCMB-2017-04-004, version 3.1 rev 5, April 2017
[JIL_CPE] Joint Interpretation Library: Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar
devices, Version 1.5.1 May 2018
[ST-IC] [ST-IC-M7892]
[ST-IC-M7892] Security Target Common Criteria EAL6 augmented / EAL6+ M7892 Design Steps D11
and G12 Revision 2.1 as of 2019-11-25
[CR-IC] [CR-IC-M7892]
[CR-IC-M7892] Certification Report, M7892 D11 & G12 BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V4-2019
[FIPS180-2] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-2 SECURE HASH
STANDARD (+Change Notice to include SHA-224),
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards and Technology,
2002 August 1
[FIPS46-3] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication FIPS PUB 46-3, DATA
ENCRYPTION STANDARD (DES),
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards and Technology,
Reaffirmed 1999 October 25
[ISO15946-1] ISO/IEC 15946: Information technology – Security techniques – Cryptographic techniques
based on elliptic curves – Part 1: General,
2002
[ICAO-9303] 9303 ICAO Machine Readable Travel Document 7th edition, 2015 Part 1-12
[PKI] MRTD Technical Report, PKI for Machine Readable Travel Documents Offering ICC
Read-Only Access
International Civil Aviation Organization
Version 1.1, October 01 2004
[PP-IC-0084] Security IC Platform Protection Profile with augmentation Packages– BSI-CC-PP-0084-
2014
[PP-MRTD-EAC] Common Criteria Protection Profile – Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO
Application”, Extended Access Control
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-PP-0056, Version 1.10, 25th March 2009
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[PP-MRTD-SAC] Protection Profile, Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard Inspection
Procedure with PACE, version 1.01, 22 juillet 2014. Certified and maintained by BSI
(Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik) under reference BSI-CC-PP-0068-
V2-2011-MA-01.
[PP-MRTD-BAC] Protection Profile, Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO Application”, Basic
Access Control, version 1.10, 25 mars 2009. Certified by BSI (Bundesamt für Sicherheit
in der Informationstechnik) under reference BSI-PP-0055-2009.
[SS] ANNEX to Section III SECURITY STANDARDS FOR MACHINE READABLE TRAVEL
DOCUMENTS,
Excerpts from ICAO Doc 9303, Part 1
Machine Readable Passports, Fifth Edition – 2003
[TR-ECC] Elliptic Curve Cryptography according to ISO 15946,
Technical Guideline, TR-ECC,
BSI, 2006
1.4.2 Internal References
[ST-BAC] D1514254 BAC Security Target - MultiApp V4.0.1 with filter set 1.0
[ST-Platform] D1514215 MultiApp V4.0.1 with filter set 1.0 Javacard Platform Security Target
[AGD] :
[OPE_MRTD]
[PRE_MRTD]
[USR_MRTD]
TOE Guidance documentation
AGD OPE document - eTravel v2.2 & Digital Identity 1.0 on MultiApp v4.0.1 with filter set 1.0 - D1433279
AGD PRE document - eTravel v2.2 & Digital Identity on MultiApp v4.0.1 with filter set 1.0 - D1433280
eTravel 2 2 Filter 1 0 Reference Manual – D1516624B
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2. TOE OVERVIEW
2.1 TOE DESCRIPTION
The TOE is the module designed to be the core of an MRTD passport. The TOE is a contact/contactless
integrated circuit. The TOE is connected to an antenna and capacitors and is mounted on a plastic film. This
inlay is then embedded in the coversheet or datapage of the MRTD passport and provides a contactless
interface for the passport holder identification.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the integrated circuit chip of machine readable travel documents (MRTD’s
chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure [ICAO-9303] and [ASM-EAC] and providing:
 the Basic Access Control (BAC) according to the ICAO document [ICAO-9303]
 the Active Authentication (AA) mechanism according to the ICAO document [ICAO-9303]

Additionally to the [PP-MRTD-BAC], the TOE has a set of administrative commands for the management of
the product during the product life.
The TOE comprises of at least
 the circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (the integrated circuit, IC),
 the IC Embedded Software (operating system),
 the eTravel 2.2 BAC application on MultiApp V4.0.1 Embedded Software
 the GDP Applet (optional)
 the associated guidance documentation.
 A cryptographic library developed by Thales (the cryptographic library proposed by the chip supplier
is not used)
Note: The TOE comprises as well the MultiApp v4.0.1 Open Platform [ST-Platform]. It uses it services but has
been evaluated separately.
TOE Delivery:
The TOE can be delivered under 2 configurations:
 The configuration called “Standalone” meaning eTravel 2.2 is the only applet selectable on the platform
(GP221 “Final application” privilege).
 The configuration called “Open” meaning eTravel 2.2 is selectable among other applets on the
platform.
The TOE is delivered to the Personalization Agent with data and guidance documentation in order to perform
the personalization of the product. In addition the Personalization Key is delivered from the MRTD
Manufacturer to the Personalization Agent or from the Personalization Agent to the MRTD Manufacturer.
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2.2 TOE BOUNDARIES
The eTravel 2.2 BAC on MultiApp V4.0.1 Embedded Software (ES) is located in the flash code area.
The figure below gives a description of the TOE and its boundaries (red dash line)
Figure 1: TOE Boundaries
2.3 TOE USAGE AND SECURITY FEATURES FOR OPERATIONAL USE
A State or Organization issues MRTDs to be used by the holder for international travel. The traveller
presents a MRTD to the inspection system to prove his or her identity. The MRTD in context of this security
target contains (i) visual (eye readable) biographical data and portrait of the holder, (ii) a separate data
summary (MRZ data) for visual and machine reading using OCR methods in the Machine readable zone
(MRZ) and (iii) data elements on the MRTD’s chip according to LDS for contactless machine reading. The
authentication of the traveler is based on (i) the possession of a valid MRTD personalized for a holder with
the claimed identity as given on the biographical data page and (ii) optional biometrics using the reference
data stored in the MRTD.
The issuing State or Organization ensures the authenticity of the data of genuine MRTD’s. The receiving
State trusts a genuine MRTD of an issuing State or Organization.
For this security target the MRTD is viewed as unit of
(a) the physical MRTD as travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip. It presents visual readable
data including (but not limited to) personal data of the MRTD holder
(1) the biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book,
(2) the printed data in the Machine Readable Zone (MRZ) and
(3) the printed portrait.
(b) the logical MRTD as data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data Structure [ICAO-
9303] as specified by ICAO on the contactless integrated circuit. It presents contactless readable
data including (but not limited to) personal data of the MRTD holder
(1) the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1),
(2) the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
(3) the optional biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s) (EF.DG4) or both1
(4) the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16) and
(5) the Document security object.
1 These additional biometric reference data are optional
Plug-ins
Plug-ins - Applets
Global
Platfor
GAP
Pace
C
v1 v2 V3 T
v1 v2
eTr
avel
Core
NEL - Native Environment Layer
JavaCard
3.0.4 API
Global
FileSyst
GAP
Service
Drivers
JavaCard API
Applet
Layer
Platform
Layer
IC Infineon M7892
IC
Layer
TOE
eTravel
I
A
S
Bio
PIN
Mn
MP
COS
OA
TH
eI
D
P
U
RE
Pl
u
g
eSi
gn
G
DP
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The issuing State or Organization implements security features of the MRTD to maintain the authenticity and
integrity of the MRTD and their data. The MRTD as the passport book and the MRTD’s chip is uniquely
identified by the Document Number.
The physical MRTD is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on paper, security printing),
logical (e.g. authentication keys of the MRTD’s chip) and organizational security measures (e.g. control of
materials, personalization procedures) [ICAO-9303]. These security measures include the binding of the
MRTD’s chip to the passport book.
The logical MRTD is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created by the document
signer acting for the issuing State or Organization and the security features of the MRTD’s chip.
The ICAO defines the baseline security methods Passive Authentication and the optional advanced security
methods Basic Access Control to the logical MRTD, Active Authentication of the MRTD’s chip, Extended
Access Control to and the Data Encryption of additional sensitive biometrics as optional security measure in
the ICAO Doc 9303 [ICAO-9303]. The Passive Authentication Mechanism and the Data Encryption are
performed completely and independently of the TOE by the TOE environment.
This security target addresses the protection of the logical MRTD (i) in integrity by write-only-once access
control and by physical means, and (ii) in confidentiality by the Basic Access Control Mechanism. This
security target addresses the Active Authentication but does not address the Extended Access Control, both
optional security mechanisms.
The Basic Access Control is a security feature which is mandatory supported by the TOE. The inspection
system (i) reads optically the MRTD, (ii) authenticates itself as inspection system by means of Document
Basic Access Keys. After successful authentication of the inspection system the MRTD’s chip provides read
access to the logical MRTD by means of private communication (secure messaging) with this inspection
system [ICAO-9303], normative appendix 5.
2.4 TOE LIFE-CYCLE
2.4.1 Actors
Actors Identification
Integrated Circuit (IC) Developer IFX
Embedded Software Developer Thales
Integrated Circuit (IC) Manufacturer IFX
Module manufacturer Thales or IFX
Initializer/Pre-personalizer Thales
Inlay manufacturer Thales or another Inlay manufacturer
Book manufacturer Thales or another printer
Personalization Agent The agent who is acting on the behalf of the issuing State
or Organization and personalize the MRTD for the holder
by activities establishing the identity of the holder with
biographic data.
MRTD Holder The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing
State or Organization personalizes the MRTD.
Table 1: Identification of the actors
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2.4.2 TOE Life Cycle
Remark 1. Initialization & pre-personalization operation could be done on module or on other form factor.
The form factor does not affect the TOE security.
Remark 2. Alternative life cycle: wafer are shipped by IC manufacturer to form factor manufacturer and
initialization /pre-personalization is done in IC Manufacturer site
Remark 3. For initialization/pre-personalization IC flash loader could be used based on the IC manufacturer
recommendation.
Remark 4. Embedding (module inserted in the final form factor) will be done on an audited site if the
Embedding phase (5a) is before the TOE delivery.
Phase
(name)
Phase (card) Actor Comment
Development 1. MRTD
application
Development
Developer
(Thales)
- The development of the MRTD
application is integrated in the
platform MultiApp V4.
-Generation of principal HEX,
mapping description
- Script generation for initialization and
pre-personalization
2 HW Development IC manufacturer
(Infineon)
- Development of IC
Manufacturing 3a Mask
manufacturing
IC manufacturer
(Infineon)
Manufacturing of virgin chip integrated
circuits embedding the Infineon flash
Loader and protected by a dedicated
transport key.
3b (optional)
Initialization /
Pre-personalization
IC manufacturer
(Infineon)
Loading of the Thales software (platform
and applets on top based on script
generated) – For WAFER init process only
4 Module
manufacturing
Module creation
(Thales or Infineon)
IC packaging & testing
5.a Embedding if
not done by
supplier (see 5b
Optional)
Form Factor
manufacturer
(Thales)
Put the module on a dedicated form
factor (Card, Inlay, MFF2, other)
5.b Initialization /
Pre-personalization
Pre-personalizer
(Thales)
Loading of the Gemalto software (platform
and applets on top of it based on script
generated)
5.a Embedding
(Optional)
Form Factor
manufacturer (done
by supplier)
Put the module on a dedicated form
factor (Card, Inlay, MFF2, other)
Personalization 6 Personalization Personalizer - Personalization
Usage 7 Usage Holder - The Issuer is responsible of card
delivery to the end-user
TOE Delivery
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The TOE life cycle is described in terms of the four life cycle phases. (With respect to the [PP-IC-0084], the
TOE life-cycle is additionally subdivided into 7 steps.)
Phase 1 “Development”:
(Step1) The TOE is developed in phase 1. The IC developer develops the integrated circuit, the IC Dedicated
Software and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE components.
(Step2) The software developer uses the guidance documentation for the integrated circuit and the guidance
documentation for relevant parts of the IC Dedicated Software and develops the IC Embedded Software
(operating system), the MRTD application and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE
components.
As a result a flash mask is generated (HEX file) with initialisation and pre-personalisation scripts.
Phase 2 “Manufacturing”:
(Step3) In a first step the IC manufacturer produce virgin chip with IC Identification Data and the flash loader
software. The IC is securely delivered from the IC manufacturer to the MRTD manufacturer.
(Step4) The MRTD manufacturer combines the IC with hardware for the contactless interface in the passport
book
(Step5) The MRTD manufacturer (i) creates the MRTD application and (ii) equips MRTD’s chips with pre-
personalization Data.
The pre-personalized MRTD together with the IC Identifier is securely delivered from the MRTD manufacturer
to the Personalization Agent. The MRTD manufacturer also provides the relevant parts of the guidance
documentation to the Personalization Agent.
Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”:
The personalization of the MRTD includes:
 the survey of the MRTD holder biographical data,
 the enrolment of the MRTD holder biometric reference data (i.e. the digitized portraits and the
optional biometric reference data),
 the printing of the visual readable data onto the physical MRTD,
 the writing the TOE User Data and TSF Data into the logical MRTD,
 the writing the TSF Data into the logical MRTD and configuration of the TSF if necessary.
The step “writing the TOE User Data” is performed by the Personalization Agent and includes but is not limited
to the creation of:
 the digital MRZ data (EF.DG1),
 the digitized portrait (EF.DG2),
 the Document security object (SOD).
The signing of the Document security object by the Document signer [PKI] finalizes the personalization of the
genuine MRTD for the MRTD holder. The personalized MRTD (together with appropriate guidance for TOE
use if necessary) is handed over to the MRTD holder for operational use.
Phase 4 “Operational Use”
The TOE is used as MRTD’s chip by the traveler and the inspection systems in the “Operational Use” phase.
The user data can be read according to the security policy of the Issuing State or Organization and used
according to the security policy of the Issuing State but they can never be modified.
Application note: In this ST, the role of the Personalization Agents is strictly limited to the phase 3
Personalization. In the phase 4 Operational Use updating and addition of the data groups of the MRTD
application is forbidden.
2.4.3 Non-TOE hardware/software/firmware required by the TOE
There is no explicit non-TOE hardware, software or firmware required by the TOE to perform its claimed
security features. The TOE is defined to comprise the chip and the complete operating system and
application. Note, the inlay holding the chip as well as the antenna and the booklet or card (holding the
printed MRZ) are needed to represent a complete MRTD, nevertheless these parts are not inevitable for the
secure operation of the TOE.
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2.4.1 TOE Delivery
The TOE is delivered as a whole package with the Platform MultiApp V4.0.1 with filter set 1.0. There is no
distinction between the delivery of the platform MultiApp v4.0.1 with filter set 1.0 and this TOE. Please refer to
section 2.5.4 on the platform security target [ST-Platform].
Regarding the documentation to be delivered, a part from the one described on section 2.5.4 of the platform
Security Target [ST- Platform], the documentation found on [AGD] accompanies this TOE. The
documentation is delivered in form of electronic documents (*.pdf) by Gemalto’s Technical representative via
a secure file sharing platform download action.
Item type Item Reference/Version Form of delivery
Document
eTravel 2 2 Filter 1 0 Reference
Manual
D1516624B, 27
February 2020
Electronic document via
secure file download
Document
AGD PRE document - eTravel
v2.2 & Digital Identity on MultiApp
v4.0.1 with filter set 1.0
D1433280, Rev 1.2
03/04/2020
Electronic document via
secure file download
Document
AGD OPE document - eTravel
v2.2 & Digital Identity 1.0 on
MultiApp v4.0.1 with filter set 1.0
D1433279, Rev 1.2
05/03/2020
Electronic document via
secure file download
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3. CONFORMANCE CLAIMS
3.1 CC CONFORMANCE CLAIM
This security target claims conformance to
 [CC-1]
 [CC-2]
 [CC-3]
as follows
 Part 2 extended,
 Part 3 conformant.
The
 [CEM] has to be taken into account.
3.2 PP CLAIM,
The MultiApp V4.0.1 BAC security target claims strict conformance to the Protection Profile “Machine
Readable Travel Document with ICAO Application, Basic Access Control ([PP-MRTD-BAC]).
The MultiApp V4.0.1 BAC security target is a composite security target, including the IC security target [ST-
IC]. However the security problem definition, the objectives, and the SFR of the IC are not described in this
document.
3.3 PACKAGE CLAIM
This ST is conforming to assurance package EAL4 augmented with ADV_FSP.5, ADV_INT.2, ADV_TDS.4,
ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_TAT.2, ATE_DPT.3 defined in CC part 3 [CC-3].
3.4 CONFORMANCE STATEMENT
This ST strictly conforms to [PP-MRTD-BAC].
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4. SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION
4.1 INTRODUCTION
4.1.1 Assets
The assets to be protected by the TOE include the User Data on the MRTD’s chip.
Logical MRTD Data
The logical MRTD data consists of the EF.COM, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 (with different security needs) and the
Document Security Object EF.SOD according to LDS [ICAO-9303]. These data are user data of the TOE. The
EF.COM lists the existing elementary files (EF) with the user data. The EF.DG1 to EF.DG13 and EF.DG 16
contain personal data of the MRTD holder. The Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG 14) is used by the
inspection system for the Chip Authentication. The EF.SOD is used by the inspection system for Passive
Authentication of the logical MRTD.
Due to interoperability reasons as the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [9303] the TOE described in this security target
specifies only the BAC mechanisms with resistance against enhanced basic attack potential granting access
to:
 Logical MRTD standard User Data (i.e. Personal Data) of the MRTD holder (EF.DG1, EF.DG2,
EF.DG5 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16),
 Chip Authentication Public Key in EF.DG14,
 Active Authentication Public Key in EF.DG15,
 Document Security Object (SOD) in EF.SOD,
 Common data in EF.COM.
The TOE prevents read access to sensitive User Data
 Sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3, EF.DG4).
A sensitive asset is the following more general one.
Authenticity of the MRTD’s chip
The authenticity of the MRTD’s chip personalized by the issuing State or Organization for the MRTD holder
is used by the traveller to prove his possession of a genuine MRTD.
4.1.2 Subjects
This security target considers the following subjects:
Manufacturer
The generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing the integrated circuit and the MRTD Manufacturer
completing the IC to the MRTD’s chip. The Manufacturer is the default user of the TOE during the Phase 2
Manufacturing. The TOE does not distinguish between the users IC Manufacturer and MRTD Manufacturer
using this role Manufacturer.
Pre-personalization Agent
The pre-personalization agent is the Manufacturer, acting in step 5 pre-personalization. The pre-
personalization agent loads pre-personalization data. He may also load executable code in NVM.
Personalization Agent
The agent is acting on behalf of the issuing State or Organization to personalize the MRTD for the holder by
some or all of the following activities: (i) establishing the identity of the holder for the biographic data in the
MRTD, (ii) enrolling the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger
image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s), (iii) writing these data on the physical and logical MRTD for the
holder as defined for global, international and national interoperability, (iv) writing the initial TSF data and (v)
signing the Document Security Object defined in [ICAO-9303].
Terminal
A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through the contactless interface.
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Inspection system (IS)
A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining an MRTD presented
by the traveller and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveller as MRTD holder. The Basic
Inspection System (BIS) (i) contains a terminal for the contactless communication with the MRTD’s chip, (ii)
implements the terminals part of the Basic Access Control Mechanism and (iii) gets the authorization to read
the logical MRTD under the Basic Access Control by optical reading the MRTD or other parts of the passport
book providing this information. The General Inspection System (GIS) is a Basic Inspection System which
implements additionally the Chip Authentication Mechanism. The Extended Inspection System (EIS) in
addition to the General Inspection System (i) implements the Terminal Authentication Protocol and (ii) is
authorized by the issuing State or Organization through the Document Verifier of the receiving State to read
the sensitive biometric reference data. The security attributes of the EIS are defined of the Inspection System
Certificates.
MRTD Holder
The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization personalized the MRTD.
Traveller
Person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming the identity of the MRTD holder.
Attacker
A threat agent trying (i) to identify and to trace the movement of the MRTD’s chip remotely (i.e. without
knowing or optically reading the printed MRZ data), (ii) to read or to manipulate the logical MRTD without
authorization, or (iii) to forge a genuine MRTD.
Application note: An impostor is attacking the inspection system as TOE IT environment independent on
using a genuine, counterfeit or forged MRTD. Therefore the impostor may use results of successful attacks
against the TOE but the attack itself is not relevant for the TOE.
4.2 ASSUMPTIONS
The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be used or is
intended to be used.
A.MRTD_Manufact MRTD manufacturing on steps 4 to 6
It is assumed that appropriate functionality testing of the MRTD is used. It is assumed that security
procedures are used during all manufacturing and test operations to maintain confidentiality and integrity of
the MRTD and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copy, modification, retention, theft
or unauthorized use).
A.MRTD_Delivery MRTD delivery during steps 4 to 6
Procedures shall guarantee the control of the TOE delivery and storage process and conformance to its
objectives:
 Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery and storage.
 Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in the delivery
process and storage.
 Procedures shall ensure that people dealing with the procedure for delivery have got the required skill.
A.Pers_Agent Personalization of the MRTD’s chip
The Personalization Agent ensures the correctness of (i) the logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD holder,
(ii) the Document Basic Access Keys, (iii) the Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG14) if stored on the
MRTD’s chip, and (iv) the Document Signer Public Key Certificate (if stored on the MRTD’s chip). The
Personalization Agent signs the Document Security Object. The Personalization Agent bears the
Personalization Agent Authentication to authenticate himself to the TOE by symmetric cryptographic
mechanisms.
A.Insp_Sys Inspection Systems for global interoperability
The Inspection System is used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining an MRTD
presented by the traveller and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveller as MRTD holder. The
Basic Inspection System for global interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing Public Key and the
Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organization, and (ii) implements the terminal part of
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the Basic Access Control [ICAO-9303]. The Basic Inspection System reads the logical MRTD under Basic
Access Control and performs the Passive Authentication to verify the logical MRTD.
A.BAC-Keys Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys
The Document Basic Access Control Keys being generated and imported by the issuing State or Organization
have to provide sufficient cryptographic strength. As a consequence of the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [ICAO-9303], the
Document Basic Access Control Keys are derived from a defined subset of the individual printed MRZ data. It
has to be ensured that these data provide sufficient entropy to withstand any attack based on the decision that
the inspection system has to derive Document Access Keys from the printed MRZ data with enhanced basic
attack potential.
4.3 THREATS
This section describes the threats to be averted by the TOE independently or in collaboration with its IT
environment. These threats result from the TOE method of use in the operational environment and the
assets stored in or protected by the TOE.
The TOE in collaboration with its IT environment shall avert the threats as specified below.
T.Chip_ID Identification of MRTD’s chip
Adverse action: An attacker trying to trace the movement of the MRTD by identifying remotely
the MRTD’s chip by establishing or listening to communications through the
contactless communication interface.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically readable
MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page in advance
Asset: Anonymity of user,
T.Skimming Skimming the logical MRTD
Adverse action: An attacker imitates an inspection system trying to establish a communication to read the
logical MRTD or parts of it via the contactless communication channel of the TOE.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically readable MRZ data printed on
the MRTD data page in advance
Asset: confidentiality of logical MRTD data
T.Eavesdropping Eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and inspection system
Adverse action: An attacker is listening to an existing communication between the MRTD’s chip and an
inspection system to gain the logical MRTD or parts of it. The inspection system uses the MRZ
data printed on the MRTD data page but the attacker does not know these data in advance.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically readable MRZ data printed
on the MRTD data page in advance
Asset: confidentiality of logical MRTD data
T.Forgery Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip
Adverse action: An attacker alters fraudulently the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it including
its security related data in order to deceive on an inspection system by means of the
changed MRTD holder’s identity or biometric reference data.
This threat comprises several attack scenarios of MRTD forgery. The attacker may alter the
biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book, in the printed MRZ
and in the digital MRZ to claim another identity of the traveller. The attacker may alter the
printed portrait and the digitized portrait to overcome the visual inspection of the inspection
officer and the automated biometric authentication mechanism by face recognition. The
attacker may alter the biometric reference data to defeat automated biometric authentication
mechanism of the inspection system. The attacker may combine data groups of different
logical MRTDs to create a new forged MRTD, e.g. the attacker writes the digitized portrait
and optional biometric reference finger data read from the logical MRTD of a traveller into
another MRTD’s chip leaving their digital MRZ unchanged to claim the identity of the holder
this MRTD. The attacker may also copy the complete unchanged logical MRTD to another
contactless chip.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate
MRTDs
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Asset: authenticity of logical MRTD data,
T.Counterfeit MRTD’s chip
Adverse action: An attacker with high attack potential produces an unauthorized copy or reproduction of a
genuine MRTD’s chip to be used as part of a counterfeit MRTD. This violates the
authenticity of the MRTD’s chip used for authentication of a traveller by possession of a
MRTD. The attacker may generate a new data set or extract completely or partially the data
from a genuine MRTD’s chip and copy them on another appropriate chip to imitate this
genuine MRTD’s chip.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate
MRTDs
Asset: authenticity of logical MRTD data,
The TOE shall avert the threats as specified below.
T.Abuse-Func Abuse of Functionality
Adverse action: An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in the phase “Operational
Use” in order (i) to manipulate User Data, (ii) to manipulate (explore, bypass, deactivate or
change) security features or functions of the TOE or (iii) to disclose or to manipulate TSF
Data.
This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialization and the personalization
in the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD
Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF
T.Information_Leakage Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip
Adverse action: An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during its usage in order
to disclose confidential TSF data. The information leakage may be inherent in the normal
operation or caused by the attacker.
Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O
characteristics, clock frequency, or by changes in processing time requirements.
This leakage may be interpreted as a covert channel transmission but is more closely
related to measurement of operating parameters which may be derived either from
measurements of the contactless interface (emanation) or direct measurements (by contact
to the chip still available even for a contactless chip) and can then be related to the specific
operation being performed. Examples are the Differential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA)
and the Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Moreover the attacker may try actively to enforce
information leakage by fault injection (e.g. Differential Fault Analysis).
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD
Asset: confidentiality of logical MRTD and TSF data
T.Phys-Tamper Physical Tampering
Adverse action: An attacker may perform physical probing of the MRTD’s chip in order (i) to disclose TSF
Data, or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. An attacker may
physically modify the MRTD’s chip in order to (i) modify security features or functions of the
MRTD’s chip, (ii) modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software, (iii)
modify User Data or (iv) to modify TSF data.
The physical tampering may be focused directly on the disclosure or manipulation of TOE
User Data (e.g. the biometric reference data for the inspection system) or TSF Data (e.g.
authentication key of the MRTD’s chip) or indirectly by preparation of the TOE to following
attack methods by modification of security features (e.g. to enable information leakage
through power analysis). Physical tampering requires direct interaction with the MRTD’s chip
internals. Techniques commonly employed in IC failure analysis and IC reverse engineering
efforts may be used. Before that, the hardware security mechanisms and layout
characteristics need to be identified.
Determination of software design including treatment of User Data and TSF Data may also
be a pre-requisite. The modification may result in the deactivation of a security function.
Changes of circuitry or data can be permanent or temporary.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD
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Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF
T.Malfunction Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
Adverse action: An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software by
applying environmental stress in order to (i) deactivate or modify security features or
functions of the TOE or (ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the MRTD’s
chip Embedded Software.
This may be achieved e.g. by operating the MRTD’s chip outside the normal operating
conditions, exploiting errors in the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software or misusing
administration function. To exploit these vulnerabilities an attacker needs information about
the functional operation.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD
Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF
4.4 ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES
The TOE shall comply with the following Organizational Security Policies (OSP) as security rules,
procedures, practices, or guidelines imposed by an organization upon its operations (see CC part 1, sec.
3.2).
P.Manufact Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip
The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The MRTD Manufacturer
writes the Pre-personalization Data which contains at least the Personalization Agent Key.
P.Personalization Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organization only
The issuing State or Organization guarantees the correctness of the biographical data, the printed portrait
and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and other data of the logical MRTD with respect to the
MRTD holder. The personalization of the MRTD for the holder is performed by an agent authorized by the
issuing State or Organization only.
P.Personal_Data Personal data protection policy
The biographical data and their summary printed in the MRZ and stored on the MRTD’s chip (EF.DG1), the
printed portrait and the digitized portrait (EF.DG2), the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3), the
biometric reference data of iris image(s) (EF.DG4)3 and data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG13,
EF.DG16) stored on the MRTD’s chip are personal data of the MRTD holder. These data groups are intended
to be used only with agreement of the MRTD holder by inspection systems to which the MRTD is presented.
The MRTD’s chip shall provide the possibility for the Basic Access Control to allow read access to these data
only for terminals successfully authenticated based on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Keys as
defined in [ICAO-9303].
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5. SECURITY OBJECTIVES
This chapter describes the security objectives for the TOE and the security objectives for the TOE
environment.
5.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE
This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of identified threats to be
countered by the TOE and organizational security policies to be met by the TOE.
OT.AC_Pers Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD
The TOE must ensure that the logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the Document security object
according to LDS [ICAO-9303] and the TSF data can be written by authorized Personalization Agents only.
The logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 and the TSF data may be written only during and cannot be
changed after its personalization. The Document security object can be updated by authorized
Personalization Agents if data in the data groups EF.DG 3 to EF.DG16 are added.
Application note: The OT.AC_Pers implies that
(1) the data of the LDS groups written during personalization for MRTD holder (at least EF.DG1 and
EF.DG2) can not be changed by write access after personalization,
(2) the Personalization Agents may (i) add (fill) data into the LDS data groups not written yet, and (ii)
update and sign the Document Security Object accordingly. The support for adding data in the
“Operational Use” phase is optional.
OT.Data_Int Integrity of personal data
The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip against physical
manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure that the inspection system is able to detect any
modification of the transmitted logical MRTD data.
OT.Data_Conf Confidentiality of personal data
The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16. Read access
to EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 is granted to terminals successfully authenticated as Personalization Agent. Read
access to EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 is granted to terminals successfully authenticated as
Basic Inspection System. The Basic Inspection System shall authenticate itself by means of the Basic Access
Control based on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Key. The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of
the logical MRTD data during their transmission to the Basic Inspection System.
OT.Identification Identification and Authentication of the TOE
The TOE must provide means to store IC Identification and Pre-Personalization Data in its nonvolatile memory.
The IC Identification Data must provide a unique identification of the IC during Phase 2 “Manufacturing” and
Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”. The storage of the Pre-Personalization data includes writing of the
Personalization Agent Key(s). In Phase 4 “Operational Use” the TOE shall identify itself only to a successful
authenticated Basic Inspection System or Personalization Agent.
OT.Activ_Auth_Proof Proof of MRTD’s chip authenticity through AA
The TOE must support the Basic Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of the MRTD’s
chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization by means of the Active Authentication as
defined in [ICAO-9303]. The authenticity proof through AA provided by MRTD’s chip shall be protected
against attacks with high attack potential.
The following TOE security objectives address the protection provided by the MRTD’s chip independent of the
TOE environment.
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func Protection against Abuse of Functionality
After delivery of the TOE to the MRTD Holder, the TOE must prevent the abuse of test and support functions
that may be maliciously used to (i) disclose critical User Data, (ii) manipulate critical User Data of the IC
Embedded Software, (iii) manipulate Soft-coded ICEmbedded Software or (iv) bypass, deactivate, change or
explore security features or functions of the TOE.
Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the capabilities of the Test Features provided
by the IC Dedicated Test Software which are not specified here.
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak Protection against Information Leakage
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The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the
MRTD’s chip
 by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between events found by
measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption, clock, or I/O lines and
 by forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or
 by a physical manipulation of the TOE.
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper Protection against Physical Tampering
The TOE must provide protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the TSF Data, and the
MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. This includes protection against attacks with enhanced-basic attack
potential by means of
 measuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical probing on the chips surface except on pads
being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage and current) or
 measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction between charges (using tools
used in solid-state physics research and IC failure analysis)
 manipulation of the hardware and its security features, as well as
 controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF Data) with a prior
 reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions.
OT.Prot_Malfunction Protection against Malfunctions
The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside the normal operating
conditions where reliability and secure operation has not been proven or tested. This is to prevent errors. The
environmental conditions may include external energy (esp. electromagnetic) fields, voltage (on any contacts),
clock frequency, or temperature.
5.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
Issuing State or Organization
The issuing State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE environment.
OE.MRTD_Manufact Protection of the MRTD Manufacturing
Appropriate functionality testing of the TOE shall be used in step 4 to 6.
During all manufacturing and test operations, security procedures shall be used through phases 4, 5 and 6 to
maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its manufacturing and test data.
OE.MRTD_ Delivery Protection of the MRTD delivery
Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery including the following
objectives:
 non-disclosure of any security relevant information,
 identification of the element under delivery,
 meet confidentiality rules (confidentiality level, transmittal form, reception acknowledgment),
 physical protection to prevent external damage,
 secure storage and handling procedures (including rejected TOE’s),
 traceability of TOE during delivery including the following parameters:
 origin and shipment details,
 reception, reception acknowledgement,
 location material/information.
Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in the delivery process
(including if applicable any non-conformance to the confidentiality convention) and highlight all non-
conformance to this process.
Procedures shall ensure that people (shipping department, carrier, reception department) dealing with the
procedure for delivery have got the required skill, training and knowledge to meet the procedure requirements
and be able to act fully in accordance with the above expectations.
OE.Personalization Personalization of logical MRTD
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The issuing State or Organization must ensure that the Personalization Agents acting on behalf of the issuing
State or Organization (i) establish the correct identity of the holder and create biographical data for the MRTD,
(ii) enroll the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or
the encoded iris image(s) and (iii) personalize the MRTD for the holder together with the defined physical and
logical security measures to protect the confidentiality and integrity of these data.
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature
The issuing State or Organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Country Signing CA Key Pair, (ii)
ensure the secrecy of the Country Signing CA Private Key and sign Document Signer Certificates in a secure
operational environment, and (iii) distribute the Certificate of the Country Signing CA Public Key to receiving
States and Organizations maintaining its authenticity and integrity. The issuing State or Organization must (i)
generate a cryptographic secure Document Signer Key Pair and ensure the secrecy of the Document Signer
Private Keys, (ii) sign Document Security Objects of genuine MRTD in a secure operational environment only
and (iii) distribute the Certificate of the Document Signer Public Key to receiving States and Organizations.
The digital signature in the Document Security Object relates all data in the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 if
stored in the LDS according to [ICAO-9303].
OE.Active_Auth_Sign Active Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to (i)
generate the MRTD’s Active Authentication Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the MRTD’s Active
Authentication Private Key, sign and store the Active Authentication Public Key in the Active Authentication
Public Key data in EF.DG15 and (iii) support inspection systems of receiving States or organizations to verify
the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip used for genuine MRTD by certification of the Active Authentication
Public Key by means of the Document Security Object.
OE.BAC-Keys Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys
The Document Basic Access Control Keys being generated and imported by the issuing State or Organization
have to provide sufficient cryptographic strength. As a consequence of the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [ICAO-9303] the
Document Basic Access Control Keys are derived from a defined subset of the individual printed MRZ data. It
has to be ensured that these data provide sufficient entropy to withstand any attack based on the decision that
the inspection system has to derive Document Basic Access Keys from the printed MRZ data with enhanced
basic attack potential.
Receiving State or Organization
The receiving State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE environment.
OE.Exam_MRTD Examination of the MRTD passport book
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization must examine the MRTD presented by the
traveller to verify its authenticity by means of the physical security measures and to detect any manipulation
of the physical MRTD. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing
Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organization, and (ii) implements the
terminal part of the Basic Access Control [ICAO-9303].
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif Verification by Passive Authentication
The border control officer of the receiving State uses the inspection system to verify the traveller as MRTD
holder. The inspection systems must have successfully verified the signature of Document Security Objects
and the integrity data elements of the logical MRTD before they are used. The receiving States and
Organizations must manage the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key maintaining
their authenticity and availability in all inspection systems.
OE.Active_Auth_Verif Verification by Active Authentication
In addition to the verification by passive authentication, the inspection systems may use the verification by
active authentication, which offers a stronger guaranty of the authenticity of the MRTD.
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD Protection of data from the logical MRTD
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization ensures the confidentiality and integrity of the
data read from the logical MRTD. The receiving State examining the logical MRTD being under Basic Access
Control will use inspection systems which implement the terminal part of the Basic Access Control and use the
secure messaging with fresh generated keys for the protection of the transmitted data (i.e. Basic Inspection
Systems).
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5.3 SECURITY OBJECTIVE RATIONALE
5.3.1 Rationale between objectives and threats, assumptions, OSP
The rationale in this paragraph comes from [PP-MRTD-BAC] §4.3. Additions due to Active Authentication are
shaded.
OT.AC_Pers
OT.Data_Int
OT.Data_Conf
OT.Identification
OT.Activ_Auth_Proof
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfunction
OE.MRTD_Manufact
OE.MRTD_Delivery
OE.Personalization
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
OE.Active_Auth_Sign
OE.BAC-Keys
OE.Exam_MRTD
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif
OE.Active_Auth_Verif
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
T.Chip_ID X X
T.Skimming X X
T.Eavesdropping X X
T.Forgery X X X X X X X X
T.Counterfeit X X X
T.Abuse-Func X X
T.Information_Leakage X
T.Phys-Tamper X
T.Malfunction X
P.Manufact X
P.Personalization X X X
P.Personal_Data X X
A.MRTD_Manufact X
A.MRTD_Delivery X
A.Pers_Agent X
A.Insp_Sys X X
A.BAC-Keys X
Table 2: Security objective rationale
The OSP P.Manufact “Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip” requires a unique identification of the IC by means
of the Initialization Data and the writing of the Pre-personalization Data as being fulfilled by OT.Identification.
The OSP P.Personalization “Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organization only” addresses
the (i) the enrolment of the logical MRTD by the Personalization Agent as described in the security objective
for the TOE environment OE.Personalization “Personalization of logical MRTD”, and (ii) the access control
for the user data and TSF data as described by the security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for
Personalization of logical MRTD”. Note the manufacturer equips the TOE with the Personalization Agent
Key(s) according to OT.Identification “Identification and Authentication of the TOE”. The security objective
OT.AC_Pers limits the management of TSF data and management of TSF to the Personalization Agent.
The OSP P.Personal_Data “Personal data protection policy” requires the TOE (i) to support the protection of
the confidentiality of the logical MRTD by means of the Basic Access Control and (ii) enforce the access control
for reading as decided by the issuing State or Organization. This policy is implemented by the security
objectives OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” describing the unconditional protection of the integrity of
the stored data and during transmission. The security objective OT.Data_Conf “Confidentiality of personal
data” describes the protection of the confidentiality.
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The threat T.Chip_ID “Identification of MRTD’s chip” addresses the trace of the MRTD movement by
identifying remotely the MRTD’s chip through the contactless communication interface. This threat is countered
as described by the security objective OT.Identification by Basic Access Control using sufficiently strong
derived keys as required by the security objective for the environment OE.BAC-Keys.
The threat T.Skimming “Skimming digital MRZ data or the digital portrait” and T.Eavesdropping
“Eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and inspection system” address the reading of the logical
MRTD trough the contactless interface or listening the communication between the MRTD’s chip and a
terminal. This threat is countered by the security objective OT.Data_Conf “Confidentiality of personal data”
through Basic Access Control using sufficiently strong derived keys as required by the security objective for
the environment OE.BAC-Keys.
The threat T.Forgery “Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip” addresses the fraudulent alteration of the complete
stored logical MRTD or any part of it. The security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalization
of logical MRTD“ requires the TOE to limit the write access for the logical MRTD to the trustworthy
Personalization Agent (cf. OE.Personalization). The TOE will protect the integrity of the stored logical MRTD
according the security objective OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” and OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
“Protection against Physical Tampering”. The examination of the presented MRTD passport book according
to OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport book” shall ensure that passport book does not
contain a sensitive contactless chip which may present the complete unchanged logical MRTD. The TOE
environment will detect partly forged logical MRTD data by means of digital signature which will be created
according to OE.Pass_Auth_Sign “Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature” and verified by the
inspection system according to OE.Passive_Auth_Verif “Verification by Passive Authentication”. The TOE
environment will also detect partly forged logical MRTD data by means of digital signature which will be created
according to OE.Active_Auth_Sign “Active Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature” and verified by the
inspection system according to OE.Active_Auth_Verif “Verification by Active Authentication”.
The threat T.Counterfeit “MRTD’s chip” addresses the attack of unauthorized copy or reproduction of the
genuine MRTD chip. This attack is thwarted by chip an identification and authenticity proof required by
OT.Activ_Auth_Proof “Proof of MRTD’s chip authenticity through AA” using a authentication key pair to be
generated by the issuing State or Organization. The Active Authentication Key has to be written into
EF.DG15 and signed by means of Documents Security Objects as demanded by OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
“Protection of logical MRTD”. According to OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport book” the
Inspection system should perform the Active Authentication to verify the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip.
The threat T.Abuse-Func “Abuse of Functionality” addresses attacks using the MRTD’s chip as production
material for the MRTD and misuse of the functions for personalization in the operational state after delivery to
MRTD holder to disclose or to manipulate the logical MRTD. This threat is countered by OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
“Protection against Abuse of Functionality”. Additionally this objective is supported by the security objective for
the TOE environment: OE.Personalization “Personalization of logical MRTD” ensuring that the TOE security
functions for the initialization and the personalization are disabled and the security functions for
the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder are enabled according to the intended use of the TOE.
The threats T.Information_Leakage “Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip”,T.Phys-Tamper “Physical
Tampering” and T.Malfunction “Malfunction due to Environmental Stress” are typical for integrated circuits
like smart cards under direct attack with high attack potential. The protection of the TOE against these threats
is addressed by the directly related security objectives OT.Prot_Inf_Leak “Protection against Information
Leakage”, OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering” and OT.Prot_Malfunction
“Protection against Malfunctions”.
The assumption A.MRTD_Manufact “MRTD manufacturing on step 4 to 6” is covered by the security objective
for the TOE environment OE.MRTD_Manufact “Protection of the MRTD Manufacturing” that requires to use
security procedures during all manufacturing steps.
The assumption A.MRTD_Delivery “MRTD delivery during step 4 to 6” is covered by the security objective for
the TOE environment OE.MRTD_ Delivery “Protection of the MRTD delivery” that requires to use security
procedures during delivery steps of the MRTD.
The assumption A.Pers_Agent “Personalization of the MRTD’s chip” is covered by the security objective for
the TOE environment OE.Personalization “Personalization of logical MRTD” including the enrolment, the
protection with digital signature and the storage of the MRTD holder personal data.
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The examination of the MRTD passport book addressed by the assumption A.Insp_Sys “Inspection Systems
for global interoperability” is covered by the security objectives for the TOE environment OE.Exam_MRTD
“Examination of the MRTD passport book”. The security objectives for the TOE environment
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD “Protection of data from the logical MRTD” will require the Basic Inspection System
to implement the Basic Access Control and to protect the logical MRTD data during the transmission and the
internal handling.
The assumption A.BAC-Keys “Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys” is directly covered by the
security objective for the TOE environment OE.BAC-Keys “Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control
Keys” ensuring the sufficient key quality to be provided by the issuing State or Organization.
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6. EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION
This ST uses components defined as extensions to CC part 2. Some of these components are defined in
protection profile [PP-IC-0002], other components are defined in the protection profile [PP-MRTD-BAC].
6.1 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FAU_SAS
To define the security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FAU_SAS) of the Class FAU
(Security Audit) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for the storage of audit
data. It has a more general approach than FAU_GEN, because it does not necessarily require the data to
be generated by the TOE itself and because it does not give specific details of the content of the audit
records.
The family “Audit data storage (FAU_SAS)” is specified as follows.
FAU_SAS Audit data storage
Family behaviour
This family defines functional requirements for the storage of audit data.
Component levelling
FAU_SAS Audit data storage 1
FAU_SAS.1 Requires the TOE to provide the possibility to store audit data.
Management: FAU_SAS.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FAU_SAS.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorized users] with the capability to store
[assignment: list of audit information] in the audit records.
6.2 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FCS_RND
To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FCS_RND) of the Class
FCS (cryptographic support) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for random
number generation used for cryptographic purposes. The component FCS_RND is not limited to generation
of cryptographic keys unlike the component FCS_CKM.1. The similar component FIA_SOS.2 is intended
for non-cryptographic use.
The family “Generation of random numbers (FCS_RND)” is specified as follows.
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FCS_RND Generation of random numbers
Family behaviour
This family defines quality requirements for the generation of random numbers which are intended to be
used for cryptographic purposes.
Component levelling:
FCS_RND Generation of random numbers 1
FCS_RND.1 Generation of random numbers requires that random numbers meet a defined quality
metric.
Management: FCS_RND.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FCS_RND.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet [assignment: a
defined quality metric].
6.3 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FIA_API
To describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FIA_API) of the Class FIA
(Identification and authentication) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for the
proof of the claimed identity for the authentication verification by an external entity where the other families of
the class FIA address the verification of the identity of an external entity.
FIA_API Authentication Proof of Identity
Family behaviour
This family defines functions provided by the TOE to prove their identity and to be verified by an external entity
in the TOE IT environment.
Component levelling:
FIA_API Authentication Proof of Identity 1
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity.
Management: FIA_API.1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
Management of authentication information used to prove the claimed identity.
Audit: There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FIA_API.1.1 The TSF shall provide a [assignment: authentication mechanism] to prove the identity of the
[assignment: authorized user or role].
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6.4 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FMT_LIM
The family FMT_LIM describes the functional requirements for the Test Features of the TOE. The new
functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because this class addresses the management of
functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical mechanism used in the TOE show that no other class is
appropriate to address the specific issues of preventing the abuse of functions by limiting the capabilities of
the functions and by limiting their availability.
The family “Limited capabilities and availability (FMT_LIM)” is specified as follows.
FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability
Family behavior
This family defines requirements that limit the capabilities and availability of functions in a combined manner.
Note that FDP_ACF restricts the access to functions whereas the Limited capability of this family requires the
functions themselves to be designed in a specific manner.
Component leveling:
FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability
1
2
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities requires that the TSF is built to provide only the capabilities
(perform action, gather information) necessary for its genuine purpose.
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability requires that the TSF restrict the use of functions (refer to Limited
capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)). This can be achieved, for instance, by removing or by
disabling functions in a specific phase of the TOE’s life-cycle.
Management: FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FMT_LIM) of the Class FMT
(Security Management) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for the Test Features
of the TOE. The new functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because this class addresses the
management of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical mechanism used in the TOE show that
no other class is appropriate to address the specific issues of preventing the abuse of functions by limiting the
capabilities of the functions and by limiting their availability.
The TOE Functional Requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” is specified as follows.
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction
with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the following policy is enforced [assignment: Limited
capability and availability policy].
The TOE Functional Requirement “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” is specified as follows.
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
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Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction
with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is enforced [assignment: Limited
capability and availability policy].
Application note: The functional requirements FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 assume that there are two types
of mechanisms (limited capabilities and limited availability) which together shall provide protection in order to
enforce the policy. This also allows that
(i) the TSF is provided without restrictions in the product in its user environment but its capabilities are
so limited that the policy is enforced
or conversely
(ii) the TSF is designed with test and support functionality that is removed from, or disabled in, the
product prior to the Operational Use Phase.
The combination of both requirements shall enforce the policy.
6.5 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FPT_EMS
The sensitive family FPT_EMS (TOE Emanation) of the Class FPT (Protection of the TSF) is defined here to
describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE. The TOE shall prevent attacks against the TOE
and other secret data where the attack is based on external observable physical phenomena of the TOE.
Examples of such attacks are evaluation of TOE’s electromagnetic radiation, simple power analysis (SPA),
differential power analysis (DPA), timing attacks, etc. This family describes the functional requirements for the
limitation of intelligible emanations which are not directly addressed by any other component of CC part 2 [CC-
2].
The family “TOE Emanation (FPT_EMS)” is specified as follows.
Family behavior
This family defines requirements to mitigate intelligible emanations.
Component leveling:
FPT_EMSEC TOE emanation 1
FPT_EMS.1 TOE emanation has two constituents:
FPT_EMS.1.1 Limit of Emissions requires to not emit intelligible emissions enabling access to TSF data or
user data.
FPT_EMS.1.2 Interface Emanation requires to not emit interface emanation enabling access to TSF data or
user data.
Management: FPT_EMS.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FPT_EMS.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
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FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of [assignment: specified
limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of
types of user data].
FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the following interface
[assignment: type of connection] to gain access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data]
and [assignment: list of types of user data].
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7. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
The definition of the subjects “Manufacturer”, “Personalization Agent”, “Basic Inspection System”, and
“Terminal” used in the following chapter is given in section 4.1. Note that all these subjects are acting for
homonymous external entities. All used objects are defined either in section 7 or in the following table. The
operations “write”, “modify”, “read” and “disable read access” are used in accordance with the general linguistic
usage. The operations “store”, “create”, “transmit”, “receive”, “establish communication channel”,
“authenticate” and “re-authenticate” are originally taken from [CC-2]. The operation “load” is synonymous to
“import” used in [CC-2].
Definition of security attributes:
security attribute values meaning
terminal authentication
status
none (any Terminal) default role (i.e. without authorization after start-up)
Basic Inspection
System
Terminal is authenticated as Basic Inspection System
after successful Authentication in accordance with the
definition in rule 2 of FIA_UAU.5.2.
Personalization Agent Terminal is authenticated as Personalization Agent
after successful Authentication in accordance with the
definition in rule 1 of FIA_UAU.5.2.
7.1 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE TOE
This section on security functional requirements for the TOE is divided into sub-section following the main
security functionality.
Refinements in this section are in underline font when the SFR’s refinement is already present in [PP-MRTD-
BAC], and in bold font when the refinement is done in this ST. When the SFR is refined in the [PP-MRTD-BAC]
and additionally refined in this ST then the font is bold and underline.
7.1.1 Class FAU Security Audit
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Audit storage (FAU_SAS.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part
2 extended).
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide the Manufacturer with the capability to store the IC Identification Data
in the audit records.
7.1.2 Class Cryptographic Support (FCS)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations are caused by different cryptographic key generation algorithms to
be implemented and key to be generated by the TOE.
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FCS_CKM.1 /AA Cryptographic key generation for AA
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1
/AA
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic
key generation algorithm [assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm] and
specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the
following: [assignment: list of standards].
iteration algorithm Key size standard
/RSA RSA CRT Key
generation
1024, 1280, 1536 and 2048
bits
none (generation of random numbers and
Miller- Rabin primality testing)
/ECC ECC Key
generation
160, 192, 224, 256, 320, 384,
512, and 521 bits
None
Table 3: FCS_CKM.1/AA refinement
FCS_CKM.1 /Session Cryptographic key generation – Generation of Document Basic Access Keys by
the TOE
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1
/Session
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key
generation algorithm Document Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm and specified
cryptographic key sizes 112 bits that meet the following: [ICAO-9303], normative appendix 5
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key
destruction method Secure erasing of the value that meets the following: none.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” as specified below (Common
Criteria Part 2). The iterations are caused by different cryptographic algorithms to be implemented by the TOE.
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FCS_COP.1/SHA Cryptographic operation – Hash for Key Derivation by MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/
SHA
The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
SHA-1, SHA-256, and SHA-512 and cryptographic key sizes none that meet the following:
FIPS 180-2.
FCS_COP.1/ENC Cryptographic operation –Encryption / Decryption TDES
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/
ENC
The TSF shall perform secure messaging (BAC) – encryption and decryption in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm Triple-DES in CBC mode and cryptographic key
sizes 112 bits that meet the following: FIPS 46-3 [FIPS46-3] and [ICAO-9303]; normative
appendix 5, A5.3.
FCS_COP.1/AUTH Cryptographic operation – Authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/
AUTH
The TSF shall perform symmetric authentication – encryption and decryption in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm Triple-DES and cryptographic key sizes 112 bits
that meet the following: FIPS 46-3 [FIPS46-3].
FCS_COP.1/MAC Cryptographic operation – Retail MAC
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/
MAC
The TSF shall perform secure messaging – message authentication code in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm Retail MAC and cryptographic key sizes 112 bits
that meet the following: ISO 9797 (MAC algorithm 3, block cipher DES, Sequence Message
Counter, padding mode 2).
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FCS_COP.1/AA Cryptographic operation – Active Authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]: fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1/AA
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction: not fulfilled, see application note.
FCS_COP.1.1
/AA
The TSF shall perform digital signature creation in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm Table 4 algorithm and cryptographic key sizes Table 4
Key size that meet the following: Table 4 List of standards.
iteration algorithm Key size List of standards
/AA_RSA RSA 1024, 1280, 1536, 2048, 3072,
and 4096 bits
ISO9796-2
/AA_ECDSA ECDSA 160, 192, 224, 256, 320, 384, 512
and 521
[TR-ECC]
Table 4: FCS_COP.1/AA refinements
Application note:
 The dependency of FCS_COP.1/AA on FCS_CKM.4 is not fulfilled as these are permanent keys used
on the card during its life-time.
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet RGS [RGS-
B1], and X931 with seed entropy at least 128 bits.
7.1.3 Class FIA Identification and Authentication
Application note: Table 5 provides an overview on the authentication mechanisms used.
Name SFR for the TOE Algorithms and key sizes according to [ICAO-9303]
normative appendix 5
Basic Access Control
Authentication Mechanism
FIA_UAU.4 and
FIA_UAU.6
Triple-DES, 112 bit keys (cf. FCS_COP.1/ENC) and
Retail-MAC, 112 bit keys (cf. FCS_COP.1/MAC)
Active Authentication
Protocol
FIA_API.1/AA
and FIA_UAU.4
ECDSA, 160, 192, 224, 256, 320, 384, and 521 bits (cf.
FCS_COP.1/ ECDSA_AA) and RSA CRT, 1024, 1536,
and 2048 bits (cf. FCS_COP.1/RSA_AA)
Symmetric Authentication
Mechanism for
Personalization Agents
FIA_UAU.4 Triple-DES with 112 bit keys (cf. FCS_COP.1/AUTH)
Table 5: Overview on authentication SFR
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The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of identification (FIA_UID.1)” as specified below (Common
Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow
1. to read the Initialization Data in Phase 2 “Manufacturing”,
2. to read the random identifier in Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”,
3. to read the random identifier in Phase 4 “Operational Use”
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-
mediated actions on behalf of that user.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of authentication (FIA_UAU.1)” as specified below (Common
Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow
1. to read the Initialization Data in Phase 2 “Manufacturing”,
2. to read the random identifier in Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”,
3. to read the random identifier in Phase 4 “Operational Use”
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other
TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
The TOE shall meet the requirements of “Single-use authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.4)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms - Single-use authentication of the
Terminal by the TOE
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FIA_UAU.4.1 The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism,
2. Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Multiple authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.5)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FIA_UAU.5.1 The TSF shall provide
1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism,
2. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES.
to support user authentication.
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FIA_UAU.5.2 The TSF shall authenticate any user’s claimed identity according to the following rules:
1. TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Pre-personalization Agent by the
Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with the Pre-personalization Agent Key.
2. TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalization Agent by one of the
following mechanism(s) the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with the
Personalization Agent Key.
3. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Basic Inspection System only by means
of the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with the Document Basic
Access Keys.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Re-authenticating (FIA_UAU.6)” as specified below (Common Criteria
Part 2).
FIA_UAU.6 Re-authenticating – Re-authenticating of Terminal by the TOE
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FIA_UAU.6.1 The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each command sent to the
TOE during a BAC mechanism based communication after successful authentication of the
terminal with Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Authentication failure handling (FIA_AFL.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when Table 6: column 1 unsuccessful authentication attempts occur
related to Table 6: column 2.
FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met, the TSF
shall Table 6: column 3.
Number of unsuccessful
authentication attempts
Specified Authentication events Actions
3 Unsuccessful Mutual
Authentication Command with
Initial Supplier Key KISK
Initial Supplier Key blocked
1 Unsuccessful Basic Access Control
authentication attempt
Exponentially increasing time delay
before new authentication attempt is
possible
Table 6: FIA_AFL.1 refinement
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Authentication Proof of Identity (FIA_API.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
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FIA_API.1/AA Authentication Proof of Identity – Active Authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FIA_API.1.1/AA The TSF shall provide an Active Authentication Protocol according to [ICAO-9303] to
prove the identity of the TOE.
Application note: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the Active Authentication Mechanism specified
in [ICAO-9303]. The terminal generates a secret then verifies whether the MRTD’s chip was able or not to
sign it properly using its Active Authentication private key corresponding to the Active Authentication public
key (EF.DG15).
7.1.4 Class FDP User Data Protection
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)” as specified below (Common
Criteria Part 2).
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control – Basic Access Control
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP on terminals gaining write, read and
modification access to data in the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical
MRTD.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP to objects based on the following:
1. Subjects:
a. Personalization Agent,
b. Basic Inspection System
c. Terminal,
2. Objects:
a. data EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD.
b. data in EF.COM,
c. data in EF.SOD,
3. Security attributes:
a. authentication status of terminals,
FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled
subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
1. the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write and to read the
data of the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
2. the successfully authenticated Basic Inspection System is allowed to read the data in
EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD.
FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional
rules:
1. Any terminal is not allowed to modify any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical
MRTD,
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2. Any terminal is not allowed to read any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD.
3. The Basic Inspection System is not allowed to read the data in EF.DG3 and EF.DG4.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Basic data exchange confidentiality (FDP_UCT.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality - MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FDP_UCT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP to be able to transmit and receive
user data in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Data exchange integrity (FDP_UIT.1)” as specified below (Common
Criteria Part 2).
FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity - MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
FDP_UIT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP to be able to transmit and receive
user data in a manner protected from modification, deletion, insertion and replay errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2 The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether modification, deletion,
insertion and replay has occurred.
7.1.5 Class FMT Security Management
Application note: The SFR FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1 provide basic requirements to the management
of the TSF data.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No Dependencies
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
1. Initialization,
2. Pre-personalization,
3. Personalization.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security roles (FMT_SMR.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
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FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles
1. Manufacturer,
2. Pre-personalization Agent,
3. Personalization Agent,
4. Basic Inspection System.
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” as specified below (Common
Criteria Part 2 extended).
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction
with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow,
1. User Data to be disclosed or manipulated,
2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
3. software to be reconstructed and
4. substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable
other attacks
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction
with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
1. User Data to be disclosed or manipulated,
2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
3. software to be reconstructed and
4. substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable
other attacks.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1)” as specified below (Common
Criteria Part 2). The iterations address different management functions and different TSF data.
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FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Management of TSF data – Writing of Initialization Data and Pre-personalization
Data
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1/
INI_ENA
The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data
to the Manufacturer.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Management of TSF data – Disabling of Read Access to Initialization Data and
Pre-personalization Data
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1/
INI_DIS
The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable read access for users to the Initialization Data to
the Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data – Key Write
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1/
KEY_WRITE
The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Document Basic Access Keys to the
Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/AAK Management of TSF data – Active Authentication Private Key
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1/
AAK
The TSF shall restrict the ability to create and load the Active Authentication Private Key to
the Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ Management of TSF data – Key Read
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1/
KEY_READ
The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the
1. Document Basic Access Keys,
2. Active Authentication Private Key
3. Pre_personalization Agent Keys, and
4. Personalization Agent Keys
to none.
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7.1.6 Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions
The TOE shall prevent inherent and forced illicit information leakage for User Data and TSF Data. The
security functional requirement FPT_EMS.1 addresses the inherent leakage. With respect to the forced
leakage they have to be considered in combination with the security functional requirements “Failure with
preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)” and “TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)” on the one hand and “Resistance
to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” on the other. The SFRs “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)”, “Limited
availability (FMT_LIM.2)” and “Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” together with the SAR “Security
architecture description” (ADV_ARC.1) prevent bypassing, deactivation and manipulation of the security
features or misuse of TOE functions.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “TOE Emanation (FPT_EMS.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria
Part 2 extended):
FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: Dependencies.
FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit electromagnetic and current emissions in excess of intelligible
threshold enabling access to Personalization Agent Key(s), Document Basic Access
Keys, Active Authenticate Private Keys, EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1, EF.DG2, and
EF.DG6 to EF.DG16.
FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure any users are unable to use the following interface smart card circuit
contacts to gain access to Personalization Agent Key(s), Document Basic Access Keys,
Active Authenticate Private Keys, EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1, EF.DG2, and EF.DG6 to
EF.DG16.
The following security functional requirements address the protection against forced illicit information leakage
including physical manipulation.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: Dependencies.
FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur:
1. Exposure to out-of-range operating conditions where therefore a malfunction could
occur,
2. failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.1.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part
2).
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: Dependencies.
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests Conditions under which self test should occur to
demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of TSF data.
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of stored TSF
executable code.
Conditions under which self test should occur Description of the self test
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During initial start-up RNG live test, sensor test, FA detection, Integrity Check of
NVM ES
Periodically RNG monitoring, FA detection
After cryptographic computation FA detection
Before any use or update of TSF data FA detection, Integrity Check of related TSF data
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: Dependencies.
FPT_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing to the TSF by responding
automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.
7.2 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE TOE
The SAR for the evaluation of the TOE and its development and operating environment are those taken from
the Evaluation Assurance Level 4 (EAL4) and augmented by taking the following component: ALC_DVS.2.
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7.3 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE
7.3.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale
The rationale in this paragraph comes from [PP-MRTD-BAC] §6.3.1. Additions due to Active Authentication
are shaded.
OT.AC_Pers
OT.Data_Int
OT.Data_Conf
OT.Identification
OT.Activ_Auth_Proof
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfunction
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
FAU_SAS.1 X
FCS_CKM.1 X X X
FCS_CKM.4 X X
FCS_COP.1/SHA X X X
FCS_COP.1/ENC X X X
FCS_COP.1/AUTH X X
FCS_COP.1/MAC X X X
FCS_COP.1/AA/AA_RSA X
FCS_COP.1/AA/AA_ECD
SA
X
FCS_RND.1 X X X
FIA_UID.1 X X
FIA_AFL.1 X X
FIA_UAU.1 X X
FIA_UAU.4 X X X
FIA_UAU.5 X X X
FIA_UAU.6 X X X
FIA_API.1/AA X
FDP_ACC.1 X X X
FDP_ACF.1 X X X
FDP_UCT.1 X X X
FDP_UIT.1 X X X
FMT_SMF.1 X X X
FMT_SMR.1 X X X
FMT_LIM.1 X
FMT_LIM.2 X
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA X
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS X
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE X X X
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ X X X
FMT_MTD.1/AAK X X X
FPT_EMS.1 X X
FPT_TST.1 X X
FPT_FLS.1 X X X
FPT_PHP.3 X X X
Table 7: Security functional requirement rationale
The security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD” addresses the
access control of the writing the logical MRTD. The write access to the logical MRTD data are defined by the
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SFR FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 as follows: only the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is
allowed to write the data of the groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD only once.
The authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent shall be performed by TSF according to SRF
FIA_UAU.4 and FIA_UAU.5. The Personalization Agent can be authenticated either by using the BAC
mechanism (FCS_CKM.1, FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_RND.1 (for key generation), and FCS_COP.1/ENC as
well as FCS_COP.1/MAC) with the personalization key or for reasons of interoperability with the [19] by
using the symmetric authentication mechanism (FCS_COP.1/AUTH).
In case of using the BAC mechanism the SFR FIA_UAU.6 describes the re-authentication and FDP_UCT.1
and FDP_UIT.1 the protection of the transmitted data by means of secure messaging implemented by the
cryptographic functions according to FCS_CKM.1, FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_RND.1 (for key generation), and
FCS_COP.1/ENC as well as FCS_COP.1/MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode.
The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including Personalization Agent) and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the
TSF management functions (including Personalization) setting the Document Basic Access Keys according
to the SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE as authentication reference data. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
prevents read access to the secret key of the Personalization Agent Keys and ensure together with the SFR
FCS_CKM.4, FPT_EMS.1, FPT_FLS.1 and FPT_PHP.3 the confidentially of these keys.
The security objective OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” requires the TOE to protect the integrity of the
logical MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The write
access to the logical MRTD data is defined by the SFR FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 in the same way: only
the Personalization Agent is allowed to write the data of the groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD
(FDP_ACF.1.2, rule 1) and terminals are not allowed to modify any of the data groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16
of the logical MRTD (cf. FDP_ACF.1.4). The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including Personalization
Agent) and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions (including Personalization). The
authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent shall be performed by TSF according to SRF
FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.5 and FIA_UAU.6 using either FCS_COP.1/ENC and FCS_COP.1/MAC or
FCS_COP.1/AUTH.
The security objective OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” requires the TOE to ensure that the
inspection system is able to detect any modification of the transmitted logical MRTD data by means of the
BAC mechanism. The SFR FIA_UAU.6, FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1 requires the protection of the
transmitted data by means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_RND.1 (for key generation), and FCS_COP.1/ENC and
FCS_COP.1/MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode.
The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE requires the Personalization Agent to establish the Document Basic
Access Keys in a way that they cannot be read by anyone in accordance to FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ.
The SFR FMT_MTD.1/AAK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ requires that the Active Authentication Key cannot
be written unauthorized or read afterwards.
The security objective OT.Data_Conf “Confidentiality of personal data” requires the TOE to ensure the
confidentiality of the logical MRTD data groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16. The SFR FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1
allow only those actions before identification respective authentication which do not violate OT.Data_Conf. In
case of failed authentication attempts FIA_AFL.1 enforces additional waiting time prolonging the necessary
amount of time for facilitating a brute force attack. The read access to the logical MRTD data is defined by
the FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1.2: the successful authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to read
the data of the logical MRTD (EF.DG1 to EF.DG16). The successful authenticated Basic Inspection System
is allowed to read the data of the logical MRTD (EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16). The SFR
FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including Personalization Agent and Basic Inspection System) and the SFR
FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions (including Personalization for the key management for the
Document Basic Access Keys).
The SFR FIA_UAU.4 prevents reuse of authentication data to strengthen the authentication of the user. The
SFR FIA_UAU.5 enforces the TOE to accept the authentication attempt as Basic Inspection System only by
means of the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with the Document Basic Access Keys.
Moreover, the SFR FIA_UAU.6 requests secure messaging after successful authentication of the terminal
with Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism which includes the protection of the transmitted data in
ENC_MAC_Mode by means of the cryptographic functions according to FCS_COP.1/ENC and
FCS_COP.1/MAC (cf. the SFR FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1). (for key generation), and FCS_COP.1/ENC
and FCS_COP.1/MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode. The SFR FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/SHA
and
FCS_RND.1 establish the key management for the secure messaging keys. The SFR
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE addresses the key management and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ prevents reading
of the Document Basic Access Keys.
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Note, neither the security objective OT.Data_Conf nor the SFR FIA_UAU.5 requires the Personalization
Agent to use the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism or secure messaging.
The SFR FMT_MTD.1/AAK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ requires that the Active Authentication Key cannot
be written unauthorized or read afterwards.
The security objective OT.Identification “Identification and Authentication of the TOE” address the storage
of the IC Identification Data uniquely identifying the MRTD’s chip in its non-volatile memory. This will be
ensured by TSF according to SFR FAU_SAS.1.
Furthermore, the TOE shall identify itself only to a successful authenticated Basic Inspection System in
Phase 4 “Operational Use”. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA allows only the Manufacturer to write
Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data (including the Personalization Agent key). The SFR
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS allows the Personalization Agent to disable Initialization Data if their usage in the
phase 4 “Operational Use” violates the security objective OT.Identification. The SFR FIA_UID.1 and
FIA_UAU.1 do not allow reading of any data uniquely identifying the MRTD’s chip before successful
authentication of the Basic Inspection Terminal and will stop communication after unsuccessful
authentication attempt. In case of failed authentication attempts FIA_AFL.1 enforces additional waiting time
prolonging the necessary amount of time for facilitating a brute force attack.
The security objective OT.Activ_Auth_Proof “Proof of MRTD’s chip authenticity through AA” addresses the
verification of the chip's authenticity. This done by the SFR FIA_API.1/AA which authenticates the chip, using
cryptographic operations covered by the SFR FCS_COP/AA/AA_RSA and FCS_COP/AA/AA_ECDSA.
The Active Authentication Protocol is performed using a TOE internally stored confidential private key as
required by FMT_MTD.1/AAK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ.
The security objective OT.Prot_Abuse-Func “Protection against Abuse of Functionality” is ensured by the
SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 which prevent misuse of test functionality of the TOE or other features
which may not be used after TOE Delivery.
The security objective OT.Prot_Inf_Leak “Protection against Information Leakage” requires the TOE to
protect confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the MRTD’s chip against disclosure
 by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between events
found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption, clock, or I/O lines,
which is addressed by the SFR FPT_EMS.1,
 by forcing a malfunction of the TOE, which is addressed by the SFR FPT_FLS.1 and FPT_TST.1,
and/or
 by a physical manipulation of the TOE, which is addressed by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.
The security objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering” is covered by the
SFR FPT_PHP.3.
The security objective OT.Prot_Malfunction “Protection against Malfunctions” is covered by (i) the SFR
FPT_TST.1 which requires self tests to demonstrate the correct operation and tests of authorized users to
verify the integrity of TSF data and TSF code, and (ii) the SFR FPT_FLS.1 which requires a secure state in
case of detected failure or operating conditions possibly causing a malfunction.
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7.3.2 Dependency Rationale
The rationale in this paragraph comes from [PP-MRTD-BAC] §6.3.2. Additions due to Active Authentication
are shaded.
SFR Dependencies Support of the dependencies
FAU_SAS.1 No dependencies
FCS_CKM.1/Session [FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1],
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/ENC, FCS_COP.1/MAC,
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/AA [FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1],
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/AA
justification 5 for non-satisfied
dependencies,
FCS_CKM.4 [FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2, or
FCS_CKM.1]
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_COP.1/SHA [FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2, or
FCS_CKM.1],
FCS_CKM.4
justification 1 for non-satisfied
dependencies,
FCS_COP.1/ENC FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2, or
FCS_CKM.1],
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/AUTH FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2, or
FCS_CKM.1],
FCS_CKM.4
justification 2 for non-satisfied
dependencies,
FCS_COP.1/MAC FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2, or
FCS_CKM.1],
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/AA FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2, or
FCS_CKM.1],
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_RND.1 No dependencies
FIA_AFL.1 FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UID.1 No dependencies
FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1
FIA_UAU.4 No dependencies
FIA_UAU.5 No dependencies
FIA_UAU.6 No dependencies
FIA_API.1/AA No dependencies
FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACC.1,
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACC.1,
justification 3 for non-satisfied
dependencies,
FDP_UCT.1 [FTP_ITC.1, or FTP_TRP.1],
[FDP_IFC.1 or FDP_ACC.1]
justification 4 for non-satisfied
dependencies,
FDP_ACC.1
FDP_UIT.1 [FTP_ITC.1, or FTP_TRP.1],
[FDP_IFC.1 or FDP_ACC.1]
justification 4 for non-satisfied
dependencies,
FDP_ACC.1
FMT_SMF.1 No dependencies
FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1
FMT_LIM.1 FMT_LIM.2 FMT_LIM.2
FMT_LIM.2 FMT_LIM.1 FMT_LIM.1
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1
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SFR Dependencies Support of the dependencies
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1
FPT_EMS.1 No dependencies
FPT_TST.1 No dependencies
FPT_FLS.1 No dependencies
FPT_PHP.3 No dependencies
Table 8: Security functional requirement dependencies
Justification for non-satisfied dependencies between the SFR for TOE:
1. The hash algorithm required by the SFR FCS_COP.1/SHA does not need any key material. Therefore
neither a key generation (FCS_CKM.1), nor an import (FDP_ITC.1/2) is necessary.
2. The SFR FCS_COP.1/AUTH uses the symmetric Personalization Key permanently stored during the
Pre-Personalization process (cf. FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA) by the manufacturer. Thus there is neither the
necessity to generate or import a key during the addressed TOE lifecycle by the means of FCS_CKM.1
or FDP_ITC. Since the key is permanently stored within the TOE there is no need for FCS_CKM.4,
too.
3. The access control TSF according to FDP_ACF.1 uses security attributes which are defined during
the personalization and are fixed over the whole life time of the TOE. No management of these security
attribute (i.e. SFR FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.3) is necessary here.
4. The SFR FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1 require the use secure messaging between the MRTD and the
BIS. There is no need for SFR FTP_ITC.1, e.g. to require this communication channel to be logically
distinct from other communication channels since there is only one channel. Since the TOE does not
provide a direct human interface a trusted path as required by FTP_TRP.1 is not applicable here.
5. The SFR FCS_COP.1/AA uses the asymmetric Key permanently stored during the Personalization
process. Since the key is permanently stored within the TOE there is no need for FCS_CKM.4.
7.3.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
Cf [PP-MRTD-BAC] §6.3.3 or also explain:
7.3.4 Security Requirements – Mutual support and internal consistency
Cf [PP-MRTD-BAC] §6.3.4
Component Dependencies required by
CC Part 3 or ASE_ECD
Dependency fulfilled by
TOE security assurance requirements (only additional to EAL4)
ALC_DVS.2 no dependencies -
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8. TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION
8.1 TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONS
TOE Security Functions are provided by the MultiApp V4.0.1 embedded software (including the optional NVM
ES) and by the chip.
8.1.1 TSFs provided by the MultiApp V4.0.1 Software
SF Description
SF.REL Protection of data
SF.AC Access control
SF.SYM_AUTH Symmetric authentication
SF.SM Secure messaging
SF.AA Active Authentication
Table 9: Security Functions provided by the MultiApp V4.0.1 Software
The SF.REL function provides the protection of data on the TOE. It encompasses:
 physical protection of the TOE as defined in FPT_PHP.3, FPT_EMS.1 , FPT_FLS.1,
 the test mechanisms as defined in FPT_TST.1,
 protection against misuse of tests as defined in FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2,
The SF.AC function provides the access control of the TOE. It encompasses:
 the access control by the terminal as defined in FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1,
 the access control to specific data as defined in FAU_SAS.1, FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA,
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ,
 the role management as defined in FMT_SRM.1,
 the management functions linked to the different states of the TOE as defined in FMT_SMF.1
The SF.SYM_AUTH function provides the symmetric authentication functions to the TOE. It encompasses:
 the identification and authentication as defined in FIA_AFL.1, FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UAU.4,
FIA_UAU.5, and FIA_UAU.6,
The SF.SM function provides the secure messaging of the TOE. It encompasses:
 the secure transfer of data through SM as defined in FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1,
 the cryptographic mechanisms used for the authentication and the SM, as defined in
FCS_CKM.1/Session, FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_COP.1/ENC, FCS_COP.1/AUTH,
FCS_COP.1/MAC, FIA_AFL.1 and FCS_RND.1. Some cryptographic mechanisms are used for both
authentication and secure messaging. For convenience, they are grouped in this function.
 the erasure of session keys as defined in FCS_CKM.4
The SF.AA function provides the active authentication. It encompasses:
 the AA protocol itself as defined in FIA_API.1/AA,
 the AA cryptographic algorithm as defined in FCS_COP.1/AA,
 the generation and input of AA keys, as defined in FCS_CKM.1 and FMT_MTD.1/AAK, .
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8.1.2 TSFs provided by the SLE78 (M7892 G12)
The evaluation is a composite evaluation and uses the results of the CC evaluation provided by [CR-IC]. The
IC and its primary embedded software have been evaluated at level EAL 6+.
SF Description
SF_DPM Device Phase Management
SF_PS Protection against Snooping
SF_PMA Protection against Modification Attacks
SF_PLA Protection against Logical Attacks
SF_CS Cryptographic Support
Table 10: Security Functions provided by the Infineon M7892 G12
These SF are described in [ST-IC].
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9. ACRONYMS AND GLOSSARY
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Acr. Term Definition
AA Active
Authentication
Security mechanism defined in [PKI] option by which means the MTRD’s chip
proves and the inspection system verifies the identity and authenticity of the
MTRD’s chip as part of a genuine MRTD issued by a known State of
organization.
Application
note [PP-
MRTD-EAC]
Optional informative part of the PP containing additional supporting information
that is considered relevant or useful for the construction, evaluation, or use of
the TOE (cf. CC part 1, section B.2.7).
Audit records Write-only-once non-volatile memory area of the MRTDs chip to store the
Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data.
Authenticity Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the MRTD’s chip were
created by the issuing State or Organization
BAC Basic Access
Control
Security mechanism defined in [PKI] by which means the MTRD’s chip proves
and the inspection system protect their communication by means of secure
messaging with Basic Access Keys (see there).
BIS Basic
Inspection
System
An inspection system which implements the terminals part of the Basic Access
Control Mechanism and authenticates themselves to the MRTD’s chip using
the Document Basic Access Keys drawn form printed MRZ data for reading the
logical MRTD.
Biographical
data (biodata)
The personalized details of the bearer of the document appearing as text in the
visual and machine readable zones on the biographical data page of a passport
book or on a travel card or visa. [SS]
Biometric
Reference Data
Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD holder in the MRTD’s chip
as (i) digital portrait and (ii) optional biometric reference data.
Counterfeit An unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine security document made by
whatever means. [SS]
CSCA Country
Signing
Certification
Authority
Self-signed certificate of the Country Signing CA Public Key (KPuCSCA) issued
by CSCA stored in the inspection system.
CPLCDCard Production
Life Cycle Data
The TOE identification is provided by the Card Production Life Cycle Data
(CPLCD) of the TOE, located in OTP and in EEPROM. These data are available
by executing a dedicated command
CVCA Country
Verifying
Certification
Authority
The Country Verifying Certification Authority enforces the privacy policy of the
issuing Country or Organization with respect to the protection of sensitive
biometric reference data stored in the MRTD. The CVCA represents the country
specific root of the PKI of Inspection Systems.
DH Diffie-Hellman
Key Agreement
Algorithm
Algorithm for Chip Authentication protocol
DV Document
Verifier
The Document Verifier enforces the privacy policy of the receiving Country with
respect to the protection of sensitive biometric reference data to be handled by
the Extended Inspection Systems. The DV manages the authorization of the
Extended Inspection Systems for the sensitive data of the MRTD in the limits
provided by the Issuing State or Organization in form of the Document Verifier
Certificates.
EC-DH Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman
Key Agreement
Algorithm
Algorithm for Chip Authentication protocol
Document
Basic Access
Keys
Pair of symmetric Triple-DES keys used for secure messaging with encryption
(key KENC) and message authentication (key KMAC) of data transmitted between
the MRTD’s chip and the inspection system [PKI]. It is drawn from the printed
MRZ of the passport book to authenticate an entity able to read the printed MRZ
of the passport book.
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SOD Document
Security Object
A RFC3369 CMS Signed Data Structure, signed by the Document Signer (DS).
Carries the hash values of the LDS Data Groups. It is stored in the MRTD’s
chip. It may carry the Document Signer Certificate (CDS). [PKI]
Eavesdropper A threat agent with moderate attack potential reading the communication
between the MRTD’s chip and the inspection system to gain the data on the
MRTD’s chip.
Enrolment The process of collecting biometric samples from a person and the subsequent
preparation and storage of biometric reference templates representing that
person's identity. [BIO]
EAC Extended
Access Control
Security mechanism identified in [PKI] by which means the MTRD’s chip (i)
verifies the authentication of the inspection systems authorized to read the
optional biometric reference data, (ii) controls the access to the optional
biometric reference data and (iii) protects
the confidentiality and integrity of the optional biometric reference data during
their transmission to the inspection system by secure messaging. The
Personalization Agent may use the same mechanism to authenticate
themselves with Personalization Agent Authentication Private Key and to get
write and read access to the logical MRTD and TSF data.
EIS Extended
Inspection
System
The EIS in addition to the General Inspection System (GIS) (i) implements the
Terminal Authentication Protocol and (ii) is authorized by the issuing State or
Organization through the Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the
sensitive biometric reference data.
Forgery Fraudulent alteration of any part of the genuine document, e.g. changes to the
biographical data or the portrait. [SS]
GIS General
Inspection
System
The GIS is a Basic Inspection System (BIS) which implements additional the
Chip Authentication Mechanism.
Global
Interoperability
The capability of inspection systems (either manual or automated) in different
States throughout the world to exchange data, to process data received from
systems in other States, and to utilize that data in inspection operations in their
respective States. Global interoperability is a major objective of the
standardized specifications for placement of both eye-readable and machine
readable data in all MRTDs. [BIO]
IC Dedicated
Support
Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which provides functions
after TOE Delivery. The usage of parts of the IC Dedicated Software might be
restricted to certain phases.
IC Dedicated
Test Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which is used to test the
TOE before TOE Delivery but which does not provide any functionality
thereafter.
Impostor A person who applies for and obtains a document by assuming a false name
and identity, or a person who alters his or her physical appearance to represent
himself or herself as another person for the purpose of using that person’s
document. [SS]
Improperly A person who travels, or attempts to travel with: (a) an expired travel
Documented
person
document or an invalid visa; (b) a counterfeit, forged or altered travel document
or visa; (c) someone else’s travel document or visa; or (d) no travel document or
visa, if required. [BIO]
Initialisation
Data
Any data defined by the TOE Manufacturer and injected into the non-volatile
memory by the Integrated Circuits manufacturer (Phase 2). These data are for
instance used for traceability and for IC identification as MRTD’s material (IC
identification data).
Inspection The act of a State examining an MRTD presented to it by a traveller (the MRTD
holder) and verifying its authenticity. [BIO]
IS Inspection
system
A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i)
examining an MRTD presented by the traveller and verifying its authenticity and
(ii) verifying the traveller as MRTD holder.
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IC Integrated
circuit
Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing and/or
memory functions. The MRTD’s chip is a integrated circuit.
Integrity Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the MRTD’s chip have not
been altered from that created by the issuing State or Organization
Issuing
Organization
Organization authorized to issue an official travel document (e.g. the United
Nations Organization, issuer of the Laissez-passer). [ICAO-9303]
Issuing State The Country issuing the MRTD. [ICAO-9303]
LDS Logical Data
Structure
The collection of groupings of Data Elements stored in the optional capacity
expansion technology [ICAO-9303]. The capacity expansion technology used is
the MRTD’s chip.
Logical MRTD Data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS)
as specified by ICAO on the contactless integrated circuit. It presents contactless
readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the MRTD holder
(1) the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1), (2)
the digitized portraits (EF.DG2), (3) the biometric reference data of finger(s)
(EF.DG3) or iris image(s) (EF.DG4) or both and (4) the other data according to
LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16).
Logical travel
document
Data stored according to the Logical Data Structure as specified by ICAO in the
contactless integrated circuit including (but not limited to) (1) data contained in
the machine-readable zone (mandatory), (2) digitized photographic image
(mandatory) and (3) fingerprint image(s) and/or iris image(s) (optional).
MRTD Machine
readable travel
document
Official document issued by a State or Organization which is used by the holder
for international travel (e.g. passport, visa, official document of identity) and
which contains mandatory visual (eye readable) data and a separate mandatory
data summary, intended for global use, reflecting essential data elements
capable of being machine read. [ICAO-9303]
MRV Machine
readable visa
A visa or, where appropriate, an entry clearance (hereinafter collectively
referred to as visas) conforming to the specifications contained herein,
formulated to improve facilitation and enhance security for the visa holder.
Contains mandatory visual (eye readable) data and a separate mandatory data
summary capable of being machine read. The MRV is normally a label which is
attached to a visa page in a passport. [ICAO-9303]
MRZ Machine
Readable Zone
Fixed dimensional area located on the front of the MRTD or MRP Data Page or,
in the case of the TD1, the back of the MRTD, containing mandatory and
optional data for machine reading using OCR methods. [ICAO-9303]
Machine-
verifiable
biometrics
feature
A unique physical personal identification feature (e.g. an iris pattern, fingerprint
or facial characteristics) stored on a travel document in a form that can be read
and verified by machine. [SS]
MRTD
administrator
The Issuing State or Organization which is allowed to perform administrative
commands (update data of the MRTD application, invalidation of the
application) in the phase 4 Operational Use.
MRTD
application
Non-executable data defining the functionality of the operating system on the
IC as the MRTD’s chip. It includes:
-the file structure implementing the LDS [ICAO-9303],
the definition of the User Data, but does not include the User Data itself (i.e.
content of EF.DG1 to EF.DG14 and EF.DG16),
- the TSF Data including the definition the authentication data but except the
authentication data itself.
MRTD Basic
Access Control
Mutual authentication protocol followed by secure messaging between the
inspection system and the MRTD’s chip based on MRZ information as key seed
and access condition to data stored on MRTD’s chip according to LDS.
MRTD holder The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization
personalized the MRTD.
MRTD’s Chip A contactless integrated circuit chip complying with ISO/IEC 14443 and ICAOT,
[10], p. 14. programmed according to the Logical Data Structure as specified
by ICAOT, [10], p. 14.
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MRTD’s chip
Embedded
Software
Software embedded in a MRTD’s chip and not being developed by the IC
Designer. The MRTD’s chip Embedded Software is designed in Phase 1 and
embedded into the MRTD’s chip in Phase 2 of the TOE life-cycle.
Optional
biometric
reference data
Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD holder in the MRTD’s chip
as (i) encoded finger image(s) (EF.DG3) or (ii) encoded iris image(s) (EF.DG4)
or (iii) both. Note that the European commission decided to use only finger print
and not to use iris images as optional biometric reference data.
Passive
authentication
verification of the digital signature of the Document Security Object
comparison the hash values of the read LDS data fields with the hash values
contained in the Document Security Object.
Personalization The process by which the portrait, signature and biographical data are applied
to the document. [SS]
Personalization
Agent
The agent acting on the behalf of the issuing State or organisation to
personalize the MRTD for the holder by (i) establishing the identity the holder
for the biographic data in the MRTD, (ii) enrolling the biometric reference data
of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) or (ii) the
encoded iris image(s) and (iii) writing these data on the physical and logical
MRTD for the holder.
Personalization
Agent
Authentication
Information
TSF data used for authentication proof and verification of the Personalization
Agent.
Personalization
Agent
Authentication
Key
Symmetric cryptographic key used (i) by the Personalization Agent to prove
their identity and get access to the logical MRTD according to the SFR
FIA_UAU.4/BT FIA_UAU.6/BT and FIA_API.1/SYM_PT and (ii) by the MRTD’s
chip to verify the authentication attempt of a terminal as Personalization Agent
according to the SFR FIA_UAU.4/MRTD, FIA_UAU.5/MRTD and
FIA_UAU.6/MRTD.
Physical travel
document
Travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip using secure printing to
present data including (but not limited to):
biographical data,
data of the machine-readable zone,
photographic image and
other data.
Pre-
personalization
Data
Any data that is injected into the non-volatile memory of the TOE by the MRTD
Manufacturer (Phase 2) for traceability of non-personalized MRTD’s and/or to
secure shipment within or between life cycle phases 2 and 3. It contains (but is
not limited to) the Personalization Agent Key Pair.
Pre –
personalized
MRTD’s chip
MRTD’s chip equipped with pre-personalization data.
PIS Primary
Inspection
System
A inspection system that contains a terminal for the contactless communication
with the MRTD’s chip and does not implement the terminals part of the Basic
Access Control Mechanism.
Receiving StateThe Country to which the MRTD holder is applying for entry. [ICAO-9303]
reference data Data enrolled for a known identity and used by the verifier to check the
verification data provided by an entity to prove this identity in an authentication
attempt.
secondary
image
A repeat image of the holder’s portrait reproduced elsewhere in the document
by whatever means. [SS]
secure
messaging in
encrypted
mode
Secure messaging using encryption and message authentication code
according to ISO/IEC 7816-4
Skimming Imitation of the inspection system to read the logical MRTD or parts of it via the
contactless communication channel of the TOE without knowledge of the
printed MRZ data.
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travel
document
A passport or other official document of identity issued by a State or
organization, which may be used by the rightful holder for international travel.
[BIO]
traveller Person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming the identity
of the MRTD holder.
TSF data Data created by and for the TOE, that might affect the operation of the TOE
(CC part 1 [1 ]).
Unpersonalized
MRTD
MRTD material prepared to produce an personalized MRTD containing an
initialised and pre-personalized MRTD’s chip.
User data Data created by and for the user, that does not affect the operation of the TSF
(CC part 1 [1 ]).
Verification The process of comparing a submitted biometric sample against the biometric
reference template of a single enrolee whose identity is being claimed, to
determine whether it matches the enrolee’s template. [BIO]
verification data Data provided by an entity in an authentication attempt to prove their identity to
the verifier. The verifier checks whether the verification data match the
reference data known for the claimed identity.