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Huawei EulerOS Version 2.0
Common Criteria Evaluation
Security Target
(Against NIAP PP)
Version 0.9
Status Released
Last update 2017-12-20
Classification Public
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Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 2015. All rights reserved.
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without prior written consent of Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
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and other Huawei trademarks are trademarks of Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
All other trademarks and trade names mentioned in this document are the property of their
respective holders.
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statements, information, and recommendations in this document do not constitute a
warranty of any kind, express or implied.
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Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Address: Huawei Industrial Base
Bantian, Longgang
Shenzhen 518129
People's Republic of China
Website: http://e.huawei.com
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About This Document
Purpose
This document provides description about ST (Security Target).
Change History
Changes between document issues are cumulative. The latest document
issue contains all the changes made in earlier issues.
Date
Revisi
on
Versi
on
Section
Number
Change Description Author
2017-05-
17
0.1 ALL Initial Draft EulerOS team
2017-07-
29
0.2 ALL Apply Typographical
conventions for all SFR
EulerOS team
2017-09-
13
0.3 All RSA 4096 removed;
SSH packets number
specification before rekeying is
removed;
Max ssh packet size changed
to 256KB;
Adjusted based on all TDs
related to ‘PP_OS_v4.1’;
EulerOS team
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2017-09-
18
0.4 ALL Change according to EE’s
feedback in 2017/9/14 22:27:
Openssl updated to 1.0.2k to
support hostname verification;
Uniqueness of counter for
aes128-ctr and aes256-ctr is
briefed in section 6.1.2;
Sensitive persistent data is
collected in section 6.1.3;
Section 6.6.6 is revised, giving
algorithm for certificate
validation.
2017-09-
28
0.5 ALL Explanation of ‘/etc/passwd
NOT being credential file’ in
TSS;
“OCSP stapling” removed;
EulerOS team
2017-10-
10
0.6 ALL Complied TDs are added in
section “Conformance Claims”;
Update section ‘key
destruction’ (FCS_CKM.4)
based on TD0239;
Some config items are
removed from the table in
section “FMT_SMF_EXT.1
Extended: Specification of
Management Functions”;
Authentication method (only
for SSH) added;
Remove rekey condition “1
Gigabyte” in
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.7;
Max packet size in SSH is
changed from 35000 t0 256K
(for SSH2);
EulerOS team
2017-11-
03
0.7 FCS_CKM.4 Add selection of “removal of
power to the memory”.
Section 6.1.1 also revised
accordingly.
EulerOS team
2017-11-
30
0.8 6.4.4 Platform
Integrity and
Code Integrity
Remove ‘IMA-appraisal’ from
boot integrity.
EulerOS team
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FCS_CK.4 Leaving ‘poweroff’ as the only
method for cryptographic key
destruction;
FPT_TST_EXT.1 Addition of ‘codesigning
check’;
2017-12-
20
0.9 TSS-protection
from
implementatio
n weakness
compiler options summarized; EulerOS team
Section 6.4.5 A new subsection ‘3. For
security update’ added.
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Contents
About This Document 4
Contents 7
List of Tables 11
1. Security Target Introduction 12
1.1 Security Target Reference 12
1.2 TOE Reference 12
1.3 TOE Overview 12
1.3.1 TOE Type 13
1.3.2 Major Security Features 13
1.3.3 Non-TOE Hardware/Software/Firmware supported 15
1.3.4 Intended Method of Use 15
1.4 TOE Description 16
1.4.1 Evaluated Configuration 16
1.4.2 TOE boundaries 16
2. CC Conformance Claims 19
3. Security Problem Definition 20
3.1 Threats 20
3.2 Assumptions 20
3.3 Organizational Security Policies 21
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4. Security Objectives 22
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE 22
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment 23
5. Security Requirements 24
5.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements 25
5.1.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS) 26
5.1.2 User Data Protection (FDP) 33
5.1.3 Security Management (FMT) 33
5.1.4 Protection of the TSF (FPT) 36
5.1.5 Audit Data Generation (FAU) 38
5.1.6 Identification and Authentication (FIA) 39
5.1.7 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP) 40
5.2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements 41
5.3 Security Requirements Rationale 43
5.3.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale 43
5.3.2 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale 49
5.3.3 Rationale for Conformance to Protection Profile 49
6 TOE Summary Specification (TSS) 50
6.1 Cryptographic Support 50
6.1.1 Cryptographic Algorithms and Operations 50
6.1.2 Cryptographic network services 56
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6.1.3 Data Protection 61
6.1.4 SFR Summary 62
6.2 User data protection 63
6.2.1 Discretionary Access Control 63
6.2.2 VPN client 66
6.2.3 SFR Summary 67
6.3 Security Management 67
6.3.1 SFR Summary 69
6.4 Protection of the TSF 70
6.4.1 Separation and Domain Isolation 70
6.4.2 Protection of OS Binaries, Audit and Configuration Data 71
6.4.3 Protection from Implementation Weaknesses 71
6.4.4 Platform Integrity and Code Integrity 72
6.4.5 OS and Application Updates 74
6.4.6 SFR summary 79
6.5 Audit 79
6.5.1 Audit event selection 80
6.5.2 Audit trail 80
6.5.3 Audit log access protection 81
6.5.4 SFR summary 81
6.6 Identification and Authentication 81
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6.6.1 PAM-based identification and authentication mechanisms 82
6.6.2 User Identity Changing 83
6.6.3 Authentication Data Management 84
6.6.4 SSH key-based authentication 85
6.6.5 Session locking 85
6.6.6 X.509 Certificate Validation and Generation 85
6.6.7 SFR Summary 87
6.7 Trusted Path/Channels 87
6.7.1 Local trusted path 87
6.7.2 Network-based trusted channel 88
6.7.3 SFR Summary 89
7 Appendix A. SBOP files and rationale. 90
A. Acronyms 107
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List of Tables
Table 1 Security Functional Requirements 26
Table 2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements 42
Table 3 Cryptographic Algorithm Standards supported by EulerOS 53
Table 4 Origin/storage/zeroization of keys 55
Table 5 TLS RFCs implemented in EulerOS 58
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1. Security Target Introduction
This section presents the following information required for a Common
Criteria (CC) evaluation:
● Identifies the Security Target (ST) and the Target of Evaluation (TOE)
● Specifies the security target conventions
● Describes the organization of the security target
1.1 Security Target Reference
Name: EulerOS 2.0 Security Target
Version: 0.9
Publication
Date:
2017-12-20
Author: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
1.2 TOE Reference
Name: EulerOS
Version: 2.0
Build 3.10.0-327.59.59.46.h34.x86_64
Release Date Dec 18 2017
1.3 TOE Overview
The TOE, EulerOS V2.0, is a general purpose, multi-user, multi-tasking Linux
based operating system. It provides a platform for a variety of applications,
including services for cloud environments.
TOE evaluation covers a potentially distributed network of systems running
the evaluated version and its configurations as well as other peer systems
operating within the same management domain.
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The TOE Security Functions (TSFs) consist of functions of EulerOS that run in
kernel mode plus some trusted processes running in user mode. These are
the functions that enforce the security policy as defined in this Security
Target.
The TOE includes standard networking applications, such as sshd(8), which
allow to access the TOE via cryptographically protected communication
channel.
1.3.1 TOE Type
The TOE type is a Linux-based general-purpose operating system, supporting
preemptive multitasking, multiprocessor, and multi-user.
1.3.2 Major Security Features
The primary security features of the TOE include:
● Cryptographic communication: The TOE provides cryptographic
secured communication to either allow remote entities to log into the
TOE or local used to establish secure communications. The SSHv2
protocol is provided to set up interactive session with the TOE. The
TOE provides both the server side and the client side applications.
Using the OpenSSH suite, password-based and public-key-based
authentication are allowed. The TOE provides the capability of
configure a VPN channel for a cryptographically secured
communication with other remote entities. The TOE implements TLS
protocol to enable a trusted network path that is used for client and
server authentication, as well as HTTPS.
● Encrypted user data storage: EulerOS provides data protection
APIs in openssl package (eg, EVP_EncryptInit_ex, EVP_EncryptUpdate,
EVP_EncryptFinal_ex), which applications can use to protect any
persisted data that the developer deems to be sensitive.
● Auditing: The Lightweight Audit Framework (LAF) is designed to be an
audit system making EulerOS compliant with the requirements from
Common Criteria. LAF is able to intercept all system calls as well as
retrieving audit log entries from privileged user space applications.
The subsystem allows to configure the events to be actually audited
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from the set of all events that are possible to be audited, and to
review and search audit logs retrieved.
● Identification and Authentication: Each user accessing the TOE is
identified by a name, and is authenticated based on a password. PAM
(pluggable authentication module) mechanism can be used to define
or configure authentication policy, session management, password
update and so on.
● Data Protection: Discretionary Access Control (DAC)allows owners of
named objects to control the access permissions to these objects. The
owners can permit or deny access by other users based on the
configured permission settings. The DAC mechanism is also used to
ensure that untrusted users cannot tamper with the TOE mechanisms.
● Runtime Protection mechanisms: The TOE provides mechanisms to
prevent, or significantly increase the complexity of, exploitation of
common buffer overflow and similar attacks. These mechanisms are
used for the TSF and are also available to untrusted code. The TOE
implements multiple countermeasures against exploitation of
programming errors. Classical programming errors, such as buffer
overflows, are exploitable using a set of exploitation techniques. The
TOE blocks or significantly increases the challenge to use these
techniques with the following different approaches:
➢ Prevention of code execution on stack. This prevents buffer
overflow attacks which writes executable code (e.g. the
shellcode) into a stack variable and causes the CPU to execute
it.
➢ Address space layout randomization (ASLR), a security
technique also involved in protection from buffer overflow
attacks. In order to prevent an attacker from reliably jumping
to, for example, a particular exploited function in memory,
ASLR randomly arranges the address space positions of key
data areas of a process, including the base of the executable
and the positions of the stack, heap and libraries.
➢ Boot integrity and system integrity. All components in the boot
chain are measured at boot time, and some key system files
are also measured at system uptime. All the measurements
can be verified later by the administrator to see if some files
are compromised. All updated packages are authenticated and
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verified based on their signature to ensure the integrity of the
whole system.
● Security Management: The security management facilities provided
by the TOE are usable by authorized users and/or authorized
administrators to modify the configuration of TSF. The TOE allows
remote management via OpenSSH. Administrative users can log in
remotely and perform the same management tasks as a locally
operating administrator.
● Trusted Path for Communications: EulerOS uses HTTPS, TLS and
SSH to provide a trusted path for communications.
1.3.3 Non-TOE Hardware/Software/Firmware supported
Non-TOE Hardware Identification: The following physical and virtual hardware
platforms, corresponding firmware, and components are supported by the
TOE :
● FusionCube 6000 and 6000C (with TPM chip embedded)
● FusionServer RH2288H V3 Rack Server (with TPM chip embedded)
● FusionServer RH8100 V3 Rack Server (with TPM chip embedded)
● FusionServer X6800 Data Center Server (with TPM chip embedded)
● FusionServer XH628 V3 Server Node (with TPM chip embedded)
● Linux QEMU-KVM-1.5.3 virtual platform (with virtualized TPM chip)
Note: the TPM chip used in evaluation is Infineon SLB9665.
1.3.4 Intended Method of Use
1.3.4.1 General-purpose computing environment
The TOE is a Linux-based multi-user multi-tasking operating system. It may
provide services to several users, local or remote, at the same time. After
successful login, the users gets access to a general computing environment,
allowing launching user applications, issuing user commands at shell level,
creating and accessing files. The TOE provides adequate mechanisms to
separate the users and protect their data. Privileged commands are
restricted to only administrative users.
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The TOE operates in a networked environment with other instantiates of the
TOE as well as other well-behaved peer systems.
It is assumed that responsibility for the safeguarding of the user data
protected by the TOE can be delegated to human users of the TOE if such
users are allowed to log on and spawn processes on their behalf. All user
data is under the control of the TOE. The user data is stored in named
objects, and the TOE can associate a description of the access rights to that
object with each named object.
The TOE enforces controls such that access to data objects can only take
place in accordance with the access restrictions placed on that object by its
owner, and by administrative users. Ownership of named objects may be
transferred under the control of the access control policies implemented by
the TOE.
The TOE enforces discretionary access control policy, in which, access rights
(e.g. read, write, execute) can be assigned to data objects with respect to
subjects identified with their UID, GID and supplemental GIDs. Once a
subject is granted access to an object, the content of that object may be
used freely by the subject to influence other objects accessible to the same
subject.
1.4 TOE Description
1.4.1 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE was evaluated on the following physical platforms:
● FusionServer RH2288H V3 Rack Server (with TPM chip embedded).
Note: the TPM chip used is Infineon SLB9665.
The user needs to follow the instructions defined in the guidance for
reaching evaluated configuration.
1.4.2 TOE boundaries
1.4.2.1 Physical boundary
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The TOE and its documentation (pdf format) are supplied in two forms: DVD
disks, and ISO images distributed via the Huawei Network.
The TOE was evaluated on the following physical platforms:
● FusionServer RH2288H V3 Rack Server (with TPM chip embedded).
The following documentations are provided for the TOE:
● Huawei EulerOS V2.0 Installation Guide, Version 0.2
● Huawei EulerOS V2.0 User Guide, Version 0.2
1.4.2.2 Logical boundary
Conceptually the TOE can be thought of as a collection of the following
security services which the security target describes with increasing detail in
the remainder of this document:
● Cryptographic Support
● User Data Protection
● Security Management
● Protection of the TOE Security Functions
● Security Audit
● Identification and Authentication
● Trusted Path and Channels
The following security functions are included in the TOE:
● Cryptographic support: The TOE provides full-functional cryptography
used in protecting local system/user data and network traffic.
● User data protection: traditional discretionary access control (DAC) is
used to allow owners of local named objects to control the access
permissions to these objects.
● Security Management: The security management facilities provided by
the TOE are only usable by authorized users and/or authorized
administrators to modify the configuration of TSF.
● Protection of the TOE Security Functions: All the resources used by
TSFs in the TOE are protected by access control. All native binaries are
built in a way to avoid buffer overflow, and process address space
layout is randomized to hinder attacks. Secure boot and integrity
verification are used to keep the whole system from contamination.
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● Auditing: the audit subsystem can be configured to intercept all
system calls and the stored audit log is protected by access control
mechanism.
● Identification and Authentication: User must log in to the TOE before
accessing resources on it. PAM is used to define the user password
strength and user login behavior.
● Trusted path/channel: The TOE provides facilities to build trusted
channels for users to access the TOE remotely and securely.
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2. CC Conformance Claims
This TOE and ST are consistent with the following specifications:
● Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part
2: Security functional requirements, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April
2017, extended (Part 2 extended)
● Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part
3: Security assurance requirements Version 3.1, Revision 5 April 2017,
(Part 3 extended)
● General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile, Version 4.1,
March 9, 2016 (GP OS PP)
● Extended Package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version 1.0, February 2,
2016
The security functional requirements and assurance activities have been
modified with the following NIAP Technical Decisions (TDs):
● 0246 – Assurance Activity for FIA_UAU.5.2
● 0244 – FCS_TLSC_EXT - TLS Client Curves Allowed
● 0243 – SSH Key-Based Authentication
● 0239 – Cryptographic Key Destruction in OS PP
● 0208 – Remote Users in OSPP
● 0163 – Update to FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.1 Test 5.4 and FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.1
Test
● 0107 - FCS_CKM - ANSI X9.31-1998, Section 4.1 for Cryptographic Key
Generation.
● 0104 – FMT_SMF and FMT_MOF in OS PP
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3. Security Problem Definition
The security problem definition consists of the threats to security,
organizational security policies, and usage assumptions as they relate to the
TOE. The assumptions, threats, and policies are copied from the General
Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile, Version 4.1, March 9, 2016
(“GP OS PP”).
3.1 Threats
T.NETWORK_ATTACK
An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or elsewhere
on the network infrastructure. Attackers may engage in
communications with applications and services running on or part of
the OS with the intent of compromise. Engagement may consist of
altering existing legitimate communications.
T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP
An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or elsewhere
on the network infrastructure. Attackers may monitor and gain access
to data exchanged between applications and services that are running
on or part of the OS.
T.LOCAL_ATTACK
An attacker may compromise applications running on the OS. The
compromised application may provide maliciously formatted input to
the OS through a variety of channels including unprivileged system
calls and messaging via the file system.
T.LIMITED_PHYSICAL_ACCESS
An attacker may attempt to access data on the OS while having a
limited amount of time with the physical device.
3.2 Assumptions
A.PLATFORM
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The OS relies upon a trustworthy computing platform for its execution.
This underlying platform is out of scope of this PP.
A.PROPER_USER
The user of the OS is not willfully negligent or hostile, and uses the
software in compliance with the applied enterprise security policy. At
the same time, malicious software could act as the user, so
requirements which confine malicious subjects are still in scope.
A.PROPER_ADMIN
The administrator of the OS is not careless, willfully negligent or hostile,
and administers the OS within compliance of the applied enterprise
security policy.
3.3 Organizational Security Policies
There are no Organizational Security Policies for the protection profile.
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4. Security Objectives
This section defines the security objectives of EulerOS and its supporting
environment. Security objectives, categorized as either TOE security
objectives or objectives by the supporting environment, reflect the stated
intent to counter identified threats, comply with any organizational security
policies identified, or address identified assumptions. All of the identified
threats, organizational policies, and assumptions are addressed under one of
the categories below.
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
Below are the security objectives for EulerOS, which are needed to comply
with the GP OS PP.
O.ACCOUNTABILITY
Conformant OSs ensure that information exists that allows
administrators to discover unintentional issues with the configuration
and operation of the operating system and discover its cause.
Gathering event information and immediately transmitting it to
another system can also enable incident response in the event of
system compromise.
O.INTEGRITY
Conformant OSs ensure the integrity of their update packages. OSs are
seldom if ever shipped without errors, and the ability to deploy patches
and updates with integrity is critical to enterprise network security.
Conformant OSs provide execution environment-based mitigations that
increase the cost to attackers by adding complexity to the task of
compromising systems.
O.MANAGEMENT
To facilitate management by users and the enterprise, conformant
OSes provide consistent and supported interfaces for their security-
relevant configuration and maintenance. This includes the deployment
of applications and application updates through the use of platform-
supported deployment mechanisms and formats, as well as providing
mechanisms for configuration and application execution control.
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O.PROTECTED_STORAGE
To address the issue of loss of confidentiality of credentials in the
event of loss of physical control of the storage medium, conformant
OSs provide data-at-rest protection for credentials. Conformant OSes
also provide access controls which allow users to keep their files
private from other users of the same system.
O.PROTECTED_COMMS
To address both passive (eavesdropping) and active (packet
modification) network attack threats, conformant OSs provide
mechanisms to create trusted channels for CSP and sensitive data.
Both CSP and sensitive data should not be exposed outside of the
platform.
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational
Environment
The TOE is assumed to be complete and self-contained and, as such, is not
dependent upon any other products to perform properly. However, certain
objectives with respect to the general operating environment must be met.
Below are the security objectives for the operational environment as
specified in the protection profile.
OE.PLATFORM
The OS relies on being installed on trusted hardware.
OE.PROPER_USER
The user of the OS is not willfully negligent or hostile, and uses the
software within compliance of the applied enterprise security policy.
Standard user accounts are provisioned in accordance with the least
privilege model. Users requiring higher levels of access should have a
separate account dedicated for that use.
OE.PROPER_ADMIN
The administrator of the OS is not careless, willfully negligent or hostile,
and administers the OS within compliance of the applied enterprise
security policy.
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5. Security Requirements
The section defines the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) and
Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) for the TOE. The requirements in
this section have been drawn from the General Purpose Operating Systems
Protection Profile, Version 4.1, March 9, 2016 (GP OS PP), the Common
Criteria, or are defined in the following section.
Conventions:
Where requirements are drawn from the protection profile, the requirements
are copied verbatim, except for some changes to required identifiers to
match the iteration convention of this document, from that protection profile
and only operations performed in this security target are identified.
The extended requirements, extended component definitions and extended
requirement conventions in this security target are drawn from the
protection profile; the security target reuses the conventions from the
protection profile which include the use of the word “Extended” and the
“_EXT” identifier to denote extended functional requirements. The security
target assumes that the protection profile correctly defines the extended
components and so they are not reproduced in the security target.
The following conventions are used to identify operations:
Refinement: Refinements are identified using bold text (e.g., added
text) for additions and strike-through text (e.g., deleted text) for
deletions.
Selection (denoted by italicized text, bold and in square brackets): is
used to select one or more options provided by the [CC] in stating a
requirement.
Assignment operation (denoted by italicized text in square brackets):
is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter, such as
the length of a password. Showing the value in square brackets
indicates assignment.
Iteration operation: are identified with either a number or element
inside parentheses (e.g. "(1)")
25 / 111
5.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements
Below are the Security Functional Requirements for the TOE.
Requirement
Class
Requirement Component
Security Audit
(FAU)
Audit Data Generation (FAU_GEN.1)
Cryptographic
Support (FCS)
Cryptographic Key Generation for (FCS_CKM.1(1))
Cryptographic Key Establishment (FCS_CKM.2(1))
Cryptographic Key Destruction (FCS_CKM.4)
Cryptographic Operation for Data Encryption/Decryption
(FCS_COP.1(1))
Cryptographic Operation for Data Encryption/Decryption
(FCS_COP.1(SSH))
Cryptographic Operation for Hashing (FCS_COP.1(2))
Cryptographic Operation for Signing (FCS_COP.1(3))
Cryptographic Operation for Keyed Hash Algorithms
(FCS_COP.1(4))
Random Bit Generation (FCS_RBG_EXT.1)
Storage of Sensitive Data (FCS_STO_EXT.1)
TLS Client Protocol (FCS_TLSC_EXT.1)
TLS Client Protocol (FCS_TLSC_EXT.2)
SSH Protocol (FCS_SSH_EXT.1)
SSH Protocol – Client (FCS_SSHC_EXT.1)
SSH Protocol - Server (FCS_SSHS_EXT.1)
User Data
Protection
(FDP)
Access Controls for Protecting User Data
(FDP_ACF_EXT.1)
Information Flow Control (FDP_IFC_EXT.1)
Identification
&
Authenticatio
n (FIA)
Authorization Failure Handling (FIA_AFL.1)
Multiple Authentication Mechanisms (FIA_UAU.5)
X.509 Certification Validation (FIA_X509_EXT.1)
X.509 Certificate Authentication (FIA_X509_EXT.2)
Security
Management
(FMT)
Management of Security Functions Behavior
(FMT_MOF_EXT.1)
Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF_EXT.1
Extended)
Protection of
the TSF (FPT)
Access Controls (FPT_ACF_EXT.1)
Address Space Layout Randomization (FPT_ASLR_EXT.1)
Stack Buffer Overflow Protection (FPT_SBOP_EXT.1)
Boot Integrity (FPT_TST_EXT.1)
Trusted Update (FPT_TUD_EXT.1)
26 / 111
Table 1 Security Functional Requirements
5.1.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS)
FCS_CKM.1(1) Cryptographic Key Generation
FCS_CKM.1.1(1)
The OS shall generate asymmetric cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [selection:
RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 2048-bit or
greater that meet the following: [selection: FIPS PUB 186-4,
“Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.3] ,
ECC schemes using “NIST curves” P-256, P-384 and [selection:
P-521] that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital
Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.4
]
FCS_CKM.2(1) Cryptographic Key Establishment
FCS_CKM.2.1(1)
The OS shall implement functionality to perform cryptographic key
establishment in accordance with a specified cryptographic key
establishment method:
RSA-based key establishment schemes that meets the following: NIST
Special Publication 800-56B, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography”
and [selection:
Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes that meets the
following: NIST Special Publication 800-56A, “Recommendation
for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete
Logarithm Cryptography”
]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction
Trusted Update for Application Software (FPT_TUD_EXT.2)
Trusted
Path/Channels
(FTP)
Trusted Path (FTP_TRP.1)
Trusted Channel Communication (FTP_ITC_EXT.1)
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FCS_CKM.4.1
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with the specified
cryptographic key destruction methods [selection:
- For volatile memory, the destruction shall be executed by a
[selection: removal of power to the memory]
]
FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic Operation - Encryption/Decryption
FCS_COP.1.1(1)
The OS shall perform encryption/decryption services for data in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm [selection:
AES-XTS (as defined in NIST SP 800-38E),
AES-CBC (as defined in NIST SP 800-38A)]
and [selection:
AES Key Wrap (KW) (as defined in NIST SP 800-38F),
AES-GCM (as defined in NIST SP 800-38D)
] and cryptographic key sizes [selection: 128-bit, 256-bit].
FCS_COP.1(SSH) Cryptographic Operation - Encryption/Decryption
Application Note: FCS_COP.1(SSH) corresponds to FCS_COP.1(1) in the
Extended Package for Secure Shell (SSH) protection profile.
FCS_COP.1.1(SSH)
The SSH software shall perform encryption/decryption services for data in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm AES-CTR (as defined in
NIST SP 800-38A) mode and cryptographic key sizes [selection: 128-bit,
256-bit].
FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic Operation - Hashing
FCS_COP.1.1(2)
The OS shall perform cryptographic hashing services in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm SHA-1 and [selection:
SHA-256,
SHA-384,
SHA-512
28 / 111
] and message digest sizes 160 bits and [selection:
256 bits,
384 bits,
512 bits
] that meet the following: FIPS Pub 180-4.
FCS_COP.1(3) Cryptographic Operation - Signing
FCS_COP.1.1(3)
The OS shall perform cryptographic signature services (generation and
verification) in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
[selection:
RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 2048-bit or
greater that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital
Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 4,
ECDSA schemes using “NIST curves” P-256, P-384 and
[selection: P-521] that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4,
“Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 5
].
FCS_COP.1(4) Cryptographic Operation - Keyed-Hash Message
Authentication
FCS_COP.1.1(4)
The OS shall perform keyed-hash message authentication services in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [selection:
SHA-1,
SHA-256,
SHA-384,
SHA-512
] with key sizes [assignment: 512 and 1024 bits] and message digest sizes
[selection: 160 bits, 256 bits, 384 bits, 512 bits] that meet the
following: FIPS Pub 198-1 The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code and
FIPS Pub 180-4 Secure Hash Standard.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation
29 / 111
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1
The OS shall perform all deterministic random bit generation (DRBG) services
in accordance with NIST Special Publication 800-90A using [selection:
Hash_DRBG (any),
HMAC_DRBG (any),
CTR_DRBG (AES)
]
Application Note:
1) The underlying cryptographic primitives for Hash_DRBG and HMAC_DRBG
is SHA-256.
2) The underlying cryptographic primitives for CTR_DRBG is AES-256.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2
The deterministic RBG used by the OS shall be seeded by an entropy source
that accumulates entropy from a [selection:
software-based noise source,
platform-based noise source
] with a minimum of [selection:
128 bits
] of entropy at least equal to the greatest security strength (according to
NIST SP 800-57) of the keys and hashes that it will generate.
FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Sensitive Data
FCS_STO_EXT.1.1
The OS shall implement functionality to encrypt sensitive data stored in non-
volatile storage and provide interfaces to applications to invoke this
functionality.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 TLS Client Protocol
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.1
The OS shall implement TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246) supporting the following cipher
suites:
Mandatory cipher suites: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in
RFC 5246
Optional cipher suites: [selection:
30 / 111
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC
4492,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC
4492,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC
4492,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC
4492,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC
5289,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in
RFC 5289,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC
5289,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in
RFC 5289,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 as defined in RFC
5289,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 as defined in
RFC 5289,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC
5289,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in
RFC 5289,
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246,
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 5246,
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
]
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.2
The OS shall verify that the presented identifier matches the reference
identifier according to RFC 6125.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.3
The OS shall only establish a trusted channel if the peer certificate is valid.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 TLS Client Protocol
31 / 111
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall present the Supported Elliptic Curves Extension in the Client
Hello with the following NIST curves: [selection: secp256r1, secp384r1,
secp521r1] and no other curves.
FCS_SSH_EXT.1 SSH Protocol
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.1
The SSH software shall implement the SSH protocol that complies with RFCs
4251, 4252, 4253, 4254 and [selection: 5647, 5656, 6668] as a
[selection: client, server].
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1 SSH Protocol – Client
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.1
The SSH client shall ensure that the SSH protocol implementation supports
the following authentication methods as described in RFC 4252: public key-
based, and [selection: password-based].
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.2
The SSH client shall ensure that, as described in RFC 4253, packets greater
than [assignment: 256K] bytes in an SSH transport connection are dropped.
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.3
The SSH software shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses
the following encryption algorithms and rejects all other encryption
algorithms: aes128-ctr, aes256-ctr, [selection: aes128-cbc, aes256-cbc,
AEAD_AES_128_GCM, AEAD_AES_256_GCM].
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.4
The SSH client shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses
[selection: ssh-rsa, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256] and [selection: ecdsa-sha2-
nistp384] as its public key algorithm(s) and rejects all other public key
algorithms.
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.5
The SSH client shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses
[selection: hmac-sha1, hmac-sha2-256, hmac-sha2-512] and
32 / 111
[selection: AEAD_AES_128_GCM, AEAD_AES_256_GCM] as its data
integrity MAC algorithm(s) and rejects all other MAC algorithm(s).
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.6
The SSH client shall ensure that [selection: ecdh-sha2-nistp256] and
[selection: ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521] are the only
allowed key exchange methods used for the SSH protocol.
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.7
The SSH server shall ensure that the SSH connection be rekeyed after
[selection: no more than 1 Gigabyte of data has been transmitted,
no more than 1 hour] using that key.
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.8
The SSH client shall ensure that the SSH client authenticates the identity of
the SSH server using a local database associating each host name with its
corresponding public key or [selection: no other methods] as described in
RFC 4251 section 4.1.
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 SSH Protocol - Server
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.1
The SSH server shall ensure that the SSH protocol implementation supports
the following authentication methods as described in RFC 4252: public key-
based, and [selection: password-based].
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.2
The SSH server shall ensure that, as described in RFC 4253, packets greater
than [assignment: 256K] bytes in an SSH transport connection are dropped.
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.3
The SSH server shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses the
following encryption algorithms and rejects all other encryption algorithms:
aes128-ctr, aes256-ctr, [selection: aes128-cbc, aes256-cbc,
AEAD_AES_128_GCM, AEAD_AES_256_GCM].
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.4
The SSH server shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses
[selection: ssh-rsa, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256] and [selection: ecdsa-sha2-
33 / 111
nistp384] as its public key algorithm(s) and rejects all other public key
algorithms.
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.5
The SSH server shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses
[selection: hmac-sha1, hmac-sha2-256, hmac-sha2-512] and
[selection: AEAD_AES_128_GCM, AEAD_AES_256_GCM] as its MAC
algorithm(s) and rejects all other MAC algorithm(s).
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.6
The SSH server shall ensure that [selection: ecdh-sha2-nistp256] and
[selection: ecdh-sha2-nistp384, ecdh-sha2-nistp521] are the only
allowed key exchange methods used for the SSH protocol.
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.7
The SSH server shall ensure that the SSH connection be rekeyed after
[selection: no more than 1 hour] using that key.
5.1.2 User Data Protection (FDP)
FDP_ACF_EXT.1 Access Controls for Protecting User Data
FDP_ACF_EXT.1.1
The OS shall implement access controls which can prohibit unprivileged
users from accessing files and directories owned by other users.
FDP_IFC_EXT.1 Information flow control
FDP_IFC_EXT.1.1
The OS shall [selection:
provide an interface which allows a VPN client to protect all IP
traffic using IPsec
] with the exception of IP traffic required to establish the VPN connection.
5.1.3 Security Management (FMT)
FMT_MOF_EXT.1 Extended: Management of security functions
behavior
34 / 111
FMT_MOF_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall restrict the ability to perform the function indicated in column
3 of the “Management Functions” table in FMT_SMF_EXT.1.1 to the
administrator.
FMT_SMF_EXT.1 Extended: Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following
management functions:
Management Function FMT_SMF_EXT
.1
FMT_MOF_EXT
.1
Enable/disable screen lock M O
Configure screen lock inactivity
timeout
M O
Configure local audit storage
capacity
M X
Configure minimum password
Length
O X
Configure minimum number of
special characters in password
O X
Configure minimum number of
numeric characters in password
O X
Configure minimum number of
uppercase characters in password
O X
35 / 111
Configure minimum number of
lowercase characters in password
O X
Configure remote connection
inactivity timeout
O X
enable/disable unauthenticated
logon
O M
Configure lockout policy for
unsuccessful authentication
attempts through [selection:
timeouts between attempts,
limiting number of attempts
during a time period]
O X
Configure host-based firewall O X
Configure name/address of
audit/logging server to which to
send audit/logging records
O X
Configure audit rules O X
Configure name/address of
network time server
O O
Enable/disable automatic software
update
O O
Configure WiFi interface O O
36 / 111
Enable/disable Bluetooth interface O O
Configure USB interfaces O X
Enable/disable [assignment: list
of other external interfaces] O O
[assignment:none] O O
Application Note: The intent of this requirement is to ensure that the ST is
populated with the management functions that are provided by the TOE. This
enables developers of compliance checklists, including those provided as
operational user guidance, to leverage this table by providing enterprise-
specific values for each evaluated item.
Functions with strikethrough means that the TOE does NOT support the
operation.
5.1.4 Protection of the TSF (FPT)
FPT_ACF_EXT.1 Access controls
FPT_ACF_EXT.1.1
The OS shall implement access controls which prohibit unprivileged users
from modifying:
Kernel and its drivers/modules
Security audit logs
Shared libraries
System executables
System configuration files
[assignment: none]
FPT_ACF_EXT.1.2
The OS shall implement access controls which prohibit unprivileged users
from reading:
Security audit logs
System-wide credential repositories
[assignment: none]
37 / 111
FPT_ASLR_EXT.1 Address Space Layout Randomization
FPT_ASLR_EXT.1.1
The OS shall always randomize process address space memory locations
except for [assignment: none].
FPT_SBOP_EXT.1 Stack Buffer Overflow Protection
FPT_SBOP_EXT.1.1
The OS shall be compiled with stack-based buffer overflow protections
enabled.
FPT_TST_EXT.1 Boot Integrity
FPT_TST_EXT.1.1
The OS shall verify the integrity of the bootchain up through the OS kernel
and [selection:
[assignment: operating system executable code and application
executable code]
] prior to its execution through the use of [selection:
a digital signature using a hardware-protected asymmetric key
]
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted Update
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1
The OS shall provide the ability to check for updates to the OS software itself.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2
The OS shall cryptographically verify updates to itself using a digital
signature prior to installation using schemes specified in FCS_COP.1(3).
FPT_TUD_EXT.2 Trusted Update for Application Software
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.1
The OS shall provide the ability to check for updates to application software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.2
The OS shall cryptographically verify the integrity of updates to applications
using a digital signature specified by FCS_COP.1(3) prior to installation.
38 / 111
5.1.5 Audit Data Generation (FAU)
FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation
FAU_GEN.1.1
The OS shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable
events:
a. Start-up and shut-down of the audit functions;
b. All auditable events for the not specified level of audit; and
c.
o Authentication events (Success/Failure);
o Use of privileged/special rights events (Successful and
unsuccessful security, audit, and configuration changes);
o Privilege or role escalation events (Success/Failure);
o [selection:
File and object events (Successful and unsuccessful
attempts to create, access, delete, modify, modify
permissions),
User and Group management events (Successful and
unsuccessful add, delete, modify, disable),
Audit and log data access events (Success/Failure),
Kernel module loading and unloading events
(Success/Failure),
Administrator or root-level access events
(Success/Failure),
[assignment: none].
]
FAU_GEN.1.2
The OS shall record within each audit record at least the following
information:
a. Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if
applicable), and outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
b. For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of
the functional components included in the PP/ST, [assignment: none].
39 / 111
5.1.6 Identification and Authentication (FIA)
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
FIA_AFL.1.1
The OS shall detect when [selection:
[assignment: an administrator configurable positive integer within
[assignment: greater than or equal to 3]]
] unsuccessful authentication attempts for [selection:
authentication based on user name and password
] occur related to [assignment: the last successful authentication by that
user within 300 seconds].
FIA_AFL.1.2
When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts for an
account has been met, the OS shall: [selection: Account Lockout]
FIA_UAU.5 Multiple Authentication Mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5.1
The OS shall provide the following authentication mechanisms [selection:
authentication based on user name and password,
for use in SSH only SSH public key-based authentication as
specified by the Extended Package for Secure Shell
] to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2
The OS shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the
[assignment: authentication based on username and password is
performed for TOE-originated requests and with credentials stored by the OS,
Remote authentication for SSH based on username and password or public
key-based].
FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation
FIA_X509_EXT.1.1
The OS shall implement functionality to validate certificates in accordance
with the following rules:
RFC 5280 certificate validation and certificate path validation.
40 / 111
The certificate path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate.
The OS shall validate a certificate path by ensuring the presence of the
basicConstraints extension and that the CA flag is set to TRUE for all
CA certificates.
The OS shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using
[selection: a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) as specified in
RFC 5759].
The OS shall validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the
following rules:
o Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code
integrity verification shall have the Code Signing purpose (id-kp 3
with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
o Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server
Authentication purpose (id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the
extendedKeyUsage field.
o Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client
Authentication purpose (id-kp 2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the
extendedKeyUsage field.
o S/MIME certificates presented for email encryption and signature
shall have the Email Protection purpose (id-kp 4 with OID
1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
o OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the
OCSP Signing purpose (id-kp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the
extendedKeyUsage field.
o (Conditional) Server certificates presented for EST shall have the
CMC Registration Authority (RA) purpose (id-kp-cmcRA with OID
1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.28) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
FIA_X509_EXT.1.2
The OS shall only treat a certificate as a CA certificate if the basicConstraints
extension is present and the CA flag is set to TRUE.
FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication
FIA_X509_EXT.2.1
The OS shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support
authentication for TLS and [selection: HTTPS] connections.
5.1.7 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)
41 / 111
FTP_ITC_EXT.1 Trusted channel communication
FTP_ITC_EXT.1.1
The OS shall use [selection:
TLS as conforming to FCS_TLSC_EXT.1,
SSH as conforming to the Extended Package for Secure Shell
] to provide a trusted communication channel between itself and authorized
IT entities supporting the following capabilities: [selection: management
server ] that is logically distinct from other communication channels and
provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel
data from disclosure and detection of modification of the channel data.
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path
FTP_TRP.1.1
The OS shall provide a communication path between itself and [selection:
remote, local] users that is logically distinct from other communication
paths and provides assured identification of its endpoints and protection of
the communicated data from modification and disclosure.
FTP_TRP.1.2
The OS shall permit [selection: the TSF, local users, remote users] to
initiate communication via the trusted path.
FTP_TRP.1.3
The OS shall require use of the trusted path for all remote administrative
actions.
5.2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements
This table below gives the set of SARs from CC part 3 that are required in
evaluations against the General Purpose Operating Systems Protection
Profile.
Requirement Class Requirement Component
Security Target (ASE) ST Introduction (ASE_INT.1)
Conformance Claims (ASE_CCL.1)
Security Objectives (ASE_OBJ.1)
Extended Components Definition
42 / 111
(ASE_ECD.1)
Stated Security Requirements
(ASE_REQ.1)
Security Problem Definition (ASE_SPD.1)
TOE Summary Specification (ASE_TSS.1)
Design (ADV) Basic Functional Specification
(ADV_FSP.1)
Guidance (AGD) Operational User Guidance (AGD_OPE.1)
Preparative Procedures (AGD_PRE.1)
Lifecycle (ALC) Labeling of the TOE (ALC_CMC.1)
TOE CM Coverage (ALC_CMS.1)
Timely Security Updates
(ALC_TSU_EXT.1)
Testing (ATE) Independent Testing – Conformance
(ATE_IND.1)
Vulnerability Assessment
(AVA)
Vulnerability Survey (AVA_VAN.1)
Table 2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements
ALC_TSU_EXT.1 Timely Security Updates
Developer action elements:
ALC_TSU_EXT.1.1D
The developer shall provide a description in the TSS of how timely security
updates are made to the OS.
ALC_TSU_EXT.1.2D
The developer shall provide a description in the TSS of how users are notified
when updates change security properties or the configuration of the product.
Content and presentation elements:
ALC_TSU_EXT.1.1C
The description shall include the process for creating and deploying security
updates for the OS software.
ALC_TSU_EXT.1.2C
43 / 111
The description shall include the mechanisms publicly available for reporting
security issues pertaining to the OS.
Note: The reporting mechanism could include web sites, email addresses, as
well as a means to protect the sensitive nature of the report (e.g., public
keys that could be used to encrypt the details of a proof-of-concept exploit).
Evaluator action elements:
ALC_TSU_EXT.1.1E
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
5.3 Security Requirements Rationale
This section provides a rationale that describes how the Security Target
reproduced the security functional requirements and security assurance
requirements from the protection profile.
EulerOS is a general purpose operating system, and this Security Target is in
compliance with the General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile,
Version 4.1, March 9, 2016 (GP OS PP).
Moreover, as demonstrated in this security target, EulerOS runs on a wide
variety of hardware platforms and so it is a general purpose operating
system.
5.3.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale
For SFRs, at first, all the unconditional requirements in the main body of the
GP OS PP are coped into this ST; then, as elliptic curves are supported for
authentication and key agreement in TLS protocol, the following selection-
based requirement is included, which is defined in the annex B in the GP OS
PP.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 TLS Client Protocol
And because no DTLS is implemented in the TOE, DTLS is not selected in the
component FCS_TLSC_EXT.2, so the selection-based requirement
44 / 111
FCS_DTLS_EXT.1 is not necessary to be satisfied, which is not included in this
ST.
Because “SSH as conforming to the Extended Package for Secure Shell” is
selected for component FTP_ITC_EXT.1 Trusted channel communication, the
requirements from the Extended Package for Secure Shell (SSH) Protection
Profile, Version 1.0, February 19,2016(EP SSH PP) are also drawn into this ST,
which include the following components based on the selection fact:
FCS_COP.1(SSH) Cryptographic Operation - Encryption/Decryption
FCS_SSH_EXT.1 SSH Protocol
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1 SSH Protocol – Client
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 SSH Protocol – Server
Finally, no other optional or objective requirements defined in the Annex of
the GP OS PP is selected in this ST.
Since all the SFRs are drawn from either the GP OS PP or the EP SSH PP, all
dependencies between SFRs are already addressed by the PPs or justified.
Below is the table showing the mapping from protection profile SFRs to
security target SFRs.
PP
PP
Requirement ST Requirement
Operation &
Rationale
GP
OS PP
FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.1
Multiple
selections
which are
allowed by
the PP.
FCS_CKM.1(1) FCS_CKM.1(1)
Multiple
selections
which are
allowed by
the PP.
FCS_CKM.2(1) FCS_CKM.2(1)
A selection
which is
allowed by
the PP.
45 / 111
FCS_CKM.4 FCS_CKM.4
Two
selections
which are
allowed by
the PP.
FCS_COP.1(1) FCS_COP.1(1)
Multiple
selections
which are
allowed by
the PP.
FCS_COP.1(2) FCS_COP.1(2)
Multiple
selections
which are
allowed by
the PP.
FCS_COP.1(3) FCS_COP.1(3)
Multiple
selections
which are
allowed by
the PP.
FCS_COP.1(4) FCS_COP.1(4)
Multiple
selections
which are
allowed by
the PP.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 FCS_RBG_EXT.1
Multiple
selections
which are
allowed by
the PP.
FCS_STO_EXT.1 FCS_STO_EXT.1
Copied from
the PP
without
changes
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 FCS_TLSC_EXT.1
Multiple
selections
which are
allowed by
46 / 111
the PP.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 FCS_TLSC_EXT.2
Copied from
the PP
without
changes.
FDP_ACF_EXT.1 FDP_ACF_EXT.1
Copied from
the PP
without
changes.
FDP_IFC_EXT.1 FDP_IFC_EXT.1
A selection
which is
allowed by
the PP.
FMT_MOF_EXT.1 FMT_MOF_EXT.1
Copied from
the Technical
Decision
#0104
without
changes.
FMT_SMF_EXT.1 FMT_SMF_EXT.1
Refinements,
selections
and
assignments
which are
allowed by
the Technical
Decision
#104.
FPT_ACF_EXT.1 FPT_ACF_EXT.1
Copied from
the PP
without
changes.
FPT_ASLR_EXT.1 FPT_ASLR_EXT.1
Copied from
the PP
without
changes.
FPT_SBOP_EXT.1 FPT_SBOP_EXT.1
Copied from
the PP
47 / 111
without
changes.
FPT_TST_EXT.1 FPT_TST_EXT.1
Multiple
selections
which are
allowed by
the PP.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 FPT_TUD_EXT.1
Copied from
the PP
without
changes.
FPT_TUD_EXT.2 FPT_TUD_EXT.2
Copied from
the PP
without
changes.
FIA_AFL.1 FIA_AFL.1
Two
selections
and an
assignment
which is
allowed by
the PP.
FIA_UAU.5 FIA_UAU.5
Multiple
selections
which are
allowed by
the PP.
FIA_X509_EXT.1 FIA_X509_EXT.1
A selection
which is
allowed by
the PP.
FIA_X509_EXT.2 FIA_X509_EXT.2
A selection
which is
allowed by
the PP.
FTP_ITC_EXT.1 FTP_ITC_EXT.1
Multiple
selections
and an
48 / 111
assignment
which are
allowed by
the PP.
FTP_TRP.1 FTP_TRP.1
Multiple
selections
which are
allowed by
the PP.
EP
SSH
PP
FCS_COP.1(1) FCS_COP.1(SSH)
Multiple
selections
and an
assignment
which are
allowed by
the PP.
FCS_SSH_EXT.1 FCS_SSH_EXT.1
Multiple
selections
and an
assignment
which are
allowed by
the PP.
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1 FCS_SSHC_EXT.1
Multiple
selections
and an
assignment
which are
allowed by
the PP.
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 FCS_SSHS_EXT.1
Multiple
selections
and an
assignment
which are
allowed by
the PP.
49 / 111
5.3.2 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
The statement of security assurance requirements (SARs) found in section
5.2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements, is in strict conformance with the
General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile.
5.3.3 Rationale for Conformance to Protection Profile
This Security Target is in compliance with the General Purpose Operating
Systems Protection Profile, Version 4.1, March 9, 2016 (GP OS PP).
For all of the content incorporated from the protection profile, the
corresponding rationale in that protection profile remains applicable to
demonstrate the correspondence between the TOE security functional
requirements and TOE security objectives. Moreover, as demonstrated in this
security target EulerOS can run on a wide variety of hardware platforms
being only one the evaluated, so it is a general purpose operating system.
50 / 111
6 TOE Summary Specification (TSS)
This section describes security functions of EulerOS. Security Functions (SFs)
in EulerOS satisfy the security functional requirements of the protection
profile. The TOE also includes additional relevant security functions which
are also described in the following sections, as well as a mapping to the
security functional requirements satisfied by the TOE.
This section presents the TOE Security Functions (TSFs) and a mapping of
security functions to Security Functional Requirements (SFRs). The TOE
performs the following security functions:
1) Cryptographic Support
2) User Data Protection
3) Security Management
4) Protection of the TSF
5) Audit
6) Identification and Authentication
7) Trusted Path/Channels
6.1 Cryptographic Support
The TOE offers different cryptographic services in kernel, and provides a
socket interface to user space applications. In addition, it also provides
cryptographic algorithms for general use in user space.
The following subsections cover the different types of cryptographic services
analyzed as part of the evaluation. Additional cryptographic mechanisms are
active in the TOE, which are however not subject to the assessments of this
evaluation.
6.1.1 Cryptographic Algorithms and Operations
1) Random number generation
51 / 111
Deterministic random bit generation (DRBG) is implemented in accordance
with NIST Special Publication 800-90A. All three viable DRBGs (HMAC, Hash
and CTR) defined in the standard are implemented in EulerOS.
There are several hardware and software entropy pools in EulerOS,
considering data from external events, such as timing interrupt requests,
disk and network I/O, as well as human input from keyboard and mouse. The
main source of entropy in the system is the CPU cycle counter which
continuously tracks hardware interrupts. Other hardware-dependent entropy
source is the TPM. Each entropy source is independent of the other sources
and does not depend on time. Next table summarized the hardware entropy
bits coming form the evaluated platform:
Evaluated platform CPU interrupts
(/dev/hwrng)
TPM
(/dev/tpm0)
FusionServer RH2288H V3 Rack Server 2044 bits 512 bits
All these entropy sources feed the input pool. The input pool maintains a
maximum internal state of 4096 bits. The current state can be checked at
every moment at:
● /proc/sys/kernel/random/entropy_available
The entropy data is obtained from the entropy sources in a raw format and is
conditioned before using it as input for the DRBG. The entropy data is
hashed (sha-1) as part of the mixing functions in the cryptographically
secure pseudorandom number generator (CSPRNG). In particular the entropy
data (after conditioning, 160bits) together with other data (such as the
nonce) seed the DRBG algorithm. Considering that the NIST requires at least
112 bits for the generation of a random number (using and approved
algorithm (DRBG)), the DRBG seed of the EulerOS is considered valid. Min-
entropy value for the evaluated hardware platform is checked in the testing
report (aka Assurance Activity Report).
The DRGB algorithms have been certified (see certificate number in the table
3), i.e., these algorithms meet the SP 800-90A, including the health-tests
defined this standard (section 11.3).
52 / 111
The TSF defends against tampering of the random number generation (RNG)
/ pseudorandom number generation (PRNG) sources by encapsulating its use
in Kernel Security Device Driver.
2) Other crypto operations
The encryption and decryption operations are performed by independent
kernel modules. Besides, the TSF provides other cryptographic operations
such as hashing and digital signatures. Hashing is used by other algorithms
implemented in EulerOS (the hashed message authentication code, RSA,
DSA, and ECDSA signature services and elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key
agreement, and random bit generation). When EulerOS needs to establish an
RSA-based shared secret key it can act both as a sender or recipient, any
decryption errors which occur during key establishment are presented to the
user at a highly abstracted level, such as a failure to connect.
The table below gives the cryptographic algorithm standards EulerOS
supports:
Cryptographic
Operation
Standard NIST Certs.
Encryption/Decryption FIPS 197 AES
(For CBC, KW, XTS, and GCM
modes)
#5066
Digital signature FIPS 186-4 RSA #2746
Digital signature FIPS 186-4 ECDSA #1312
Hashing FIPS 180-4 SHA-1/SHA-
256/SHA-384/SHA-512
#4126
Keyed-Hash Message
Authentication Code
FIPS 198-2 HMAC #3381
Random number
generation
NIST SP 800-90
CTR_DRBG/Hash_DRBG/HMAC
_DRBG
#1884
ECC Key agreement
Scheme
NIST SP 800-56A #1620
Key Transport Scheme NIST SP 800-56B Tested by the
CC evaluation
lab
53 / 111
Table 3 Cryptographic Algorithm Standards supported by EulerOS
3) Key management
EulerOS kernel provides a Key Retention Service specifically to host and
manage secret and private keys to mitigate tampering or access to sensitive
key materials for user-mode processes. Each key has a type, a serial number,
access control permission, an expiry time and other attributes. Users can
add, request, invalidate and revoke a key using the interfaces provide by the
service. The service includes a background garbage collector; all dead,
revoked and expired keys will be garbage collected after a certain amount of
time has passed. When a key of type trusted or encrypted (which are
regarded as critical) is garbage collected, the RAM area its payload occupies
is overwritten with all zeroes.
Services in user space can maintain some keys on their own, without help of
the kernel facilities. DRBG is initialized when the services start to create
asymmetric and symmetric keys. The table below gives a summary of the
key management of some main services in the TOE:
Servi
ce
Keys Key
generation
Key
Storage
Key
Entry/out
put
Key
Zeroization
EVM Trusted
key
Using SP 800-
90A DRBG
Service's
memory
API
input/outpu
t
parameters
and return
values are
constrained
within the
service
Zeroized when
freeing the
cipher handler
or after
removing the
power supply.
On disk
(sealed
by TPM)
N/A N/A
Evm
key
Using SP 800-
90A DRBG
Service
's
memory
API
input/outpu
t
parameters
and return
Zeroized when
freeing the
cipher handler
after removing
the power
54 / 111
values are
constrained
within the
service
supply
On disk
(after
being
encrypte
d by
trusted
key
using
AES256-
CBC)
N/A N/A
TLS Session
keys
(Symm
etric
keys)
and
HMAC
keys
Key derivation Service's
memory
API
input/outpu
t
parameters
and return
values are
constrained
within the
service
Zeroized when
session ends
(by calling
DestroyContext
(ctx, freeit) or
HMAC_Destroy(
)) or after
removing the
power supply
Private/
public
Asymm
etric
keys
Use SP 800-
90A DRBG and
RSA/DSA/ECDS
A key
generation
mechanism in
the service
Service's
memory
API
input/outpu
t
parameters
and return
values are
constrained
within the
service
Zeroized when
freeing the
cipher handler
or after
removing the
power supply
On disk
(key3.db
,
cert8.db
)
N/A N/A
SSH Session key derivation Service's API Zeroized when
55 / 111
keys
and
HMAC
keys
memory input/outpu
t
parameters
and return
values are
constrained
within the
service
session ends or
after removing
the power
supply
Private/
public
Asymm
etric
keys
Use SP 800-
90A DRBG and
RSA/ECDSA
key generation
mechanism in
the service
Service's
memory
API
input/outpu
t
parameters
and return
values are
constrained
within the
service
Zeroized when
freeing the
cipher handler
or after
removing the
power supply
DM-
crypt
Master
key
SP 800-90A
DRBG
Kernel
memory
API
input/outpu
t
parameters
and return
values are
constrained
within the
kernel
Zeroized when
the file system
is un-mounted
or after
removing the
power supply
[Note: the type
of the key is
‘trusted’]
Table 4 Origin/storage/zeroization of keys
All the keys maintained by the kernel and applications exist in system RAM
and will be removed when the memory lost its power. All keys that exist on
non-volatile memory (e.g. disks) are stored after encryption, which depends
on the application implementation.
4) Hash functions
56 / 111
The TOE implements 4 hashing functions with different sizes (SHA1, SHA256,
SHA384 and SHA512). These functions are implicitly used in other
cryptographic operations (see KHMAC and signature creation and
versification). All 4 hashes can be used for all the associated operations
included in FCS_COP.
6.1.2 Cryptographic network services
The TOE provides cryptographic secured network communication channels,
based on the following main libraries:
● OpenSSH: The OpenSSH application suite provides access to the
command line interface of the TOE. OpenSSH can provide interactive
as well as non-interactive sessions, and the console provided via
OpenSSH provides the same environment as a local console. OpenSSH
implements the SSHv2 protocol. The cryptographic primitives are
provided by OpenSSL;
● Libreswan / Kernel: The Libreswan application suite implements the
IKEv1 and IKEv2 protocols to securely establish the symmetric keys
used for an IPSEC tunnel. These keys are handed to the kernel which
implements the IPSEC protocol.
● OpenSSL: Provides the cryptographic base for the TLS and SSH
protocols.
TLS
The TOE implements TLS protocol to enable a trusted network channel that
is used for client and server authentication, as well as HTTPS. The following
table summarizes the TLS RFCs implemented in EulerOS:
RFC# Name & Link Comment
6101 The Secure Sockets Layer
(SSL) Protocol Version 3
(SSL3)
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc61
01
Requirements for SSL3;
Made obsolete by TLS protocols.
2246 The TLS Protocol Version 1.0
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc22
Requirements for TLS 1.0
57 / 111
46
3268 AES Cipher suites for TLS
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc32
68
Extension to TLS1.0, adding
Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) cipher suites.
3546 Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Extensions
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc35
46
Extension to TLS1.0, adding a
mechanism for negotiating
protocol extensions during
session initialization. Made
obsolete by RFC 4366.
4366 Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Extensions
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc43
66
Extension to TLS1.0 and TLS 1.1,
specifying a set of specific
extensions and a generic
extension mechanism.
4346 The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.1
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc43
46
Requirements for TLS 1.1;
4492 Elliptic Curve Cryptography
(ECC) Cipher Suites for
Transport Layer Security (TLS)
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc44
92
Extensions to TLS 1.1, specifying
the ECC cipher suite.
4681 TLS User Mapping Extension
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc46
81
Extends TLS to include a User
Principal Name during the TLS
handshake.
5246 The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc52
46
Requirements for TLS 1.2;
5289 TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher
Suites with SHA-256/384 and
AES Galois Counter Mode
Extensions to TLS 1.2, adding
SHA-256/384 for hashing and
GCM mode for authenticated
encryption with additional data
58 / 111
(GCM)
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc52
89
(AEAD) cipher.
Table 5 TLS RFCs implemented in EulerOS
EulerOS implements HTTPS as described in RFC 2818
(https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2818) so that applications running on the TOE
can securely connect to external servers using HTTPS protocol.
The complete set of TLS cipher suites implemented in EulerOS, which are
also used in the evaluated configuration, are as follows:
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 5246
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC
5289,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC
5289,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 as defined in RFC
5289,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC
5289,
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246,
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 5246,
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246.
According to these implemented TLS cipher suites, the following asymmetric
cryptographic key generation schemes are used in TLS protocol:
59 / 111
RSA schemes:
The TOE supports the generation of RSA keys for the TLS protocol using
the certutil(1) application; the RSA keys sizes supported include:
a) 2048 bits (default),
b) 3072 bits.
ECC schemes:
The TOE supports the generation of ECDSA keys for the TLS protocol. The
EC key sizes supported are those specified in the curves below:
a) NIST p-256 (256 bits),
b) NIST p-384 (384 bits),
c) NIST p-521 (512 bits).
All the asymmetric cryptographic key generation schemes together with the
key sizes supported also apply to the IKE protocol to generate key pairs.
For key exchange methods, the TOE supports ECDHE_RSA, ECDHE_ECDSA,
and RSA. If RSA-based key exchange scheme is used in TLS, while the TOE
performing the key material decryption, for any errors detected resulting
from error input or error decryption, the API would always report a fixed
error number SECFailure (=-1), and give an ambiguous error information,
revealing no particular error that occurred.
Hostname verification before establishing TLS connection is supported in the
TOE. The TLS client will check if the DNS name (part of Subject Alternative
Name) or the Common Name in the server’s certificate matches the
specified hostname. IP addresses as a reference identifiers are only
supported for LDAP connections. By default, wildcards are supported in the
comparing and they match only in the left-most label. If neither can match,
the server is regarded as a fraud and the client will then give up the
connection; otherwise, the connection can be created as usual. EulerOS
does not provide a general-purpose certificate pinning capability.
SSHv2 Protocol
The TOE also implements SSHv2 protocol to enable users from a remote host
to establish a secure connection and perform a logon to the TOE. The
following table summarizes the SSH RFCs implemented in EulerOS. The
requirements of the relevant standards explain the different implementation
choices such as optional features.
60 / 111
RFC# Name & Link Comment
4253 The Secure Shell (SSH)
Transport Layer Protocol
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rf
c4253
Requirements for SSHv2.
4252 The Secure Shell (SSH)
Authentication Protocol
https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4
252.txt
Requirements for SSH
authentication protocol.
4251 The Secure Shell (SSH)
Protocol Architecture
https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4
251.txt
Requirements for SSH Protocol
Architecture.
4254 The Secure Shell (SSH)
Connection Protocol
https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4
252.txt
Requirements for SSH Connection
Protocol.
According to RFC 4253, the maximum packet size for SSH protocol should be
32768 (32K) bytes or more. The TOE implements SSH protocol using the
OpenSSH facility, which sets the maximum packet size to 262144 (256K)
bytes for SSHv2. For each received packet, the packet length will be checked
after decryption. If the length of a received packet exceeds 256K bytes, the
recipient would terminate.
The TOE supports the following security functions of the SSHv2.0 protocol:
● AS a SSH client or server, the TOE supports two different user
authentication methods, i.e., public key-based and password-based.
● The TOE implements the SSHv2 protocol with the following algorithms:
o Encryption algorithms: only aes128-ctr, aes256-ctr, aes128-cbc,
aes256-cbc, AEAD_AES_128_GCM, AEAD_AES_256_GCM are used.
For aes128-ctr and aes256-ctr, a counter with length
AES_BLOCK_SIZE (=16) bytes is setup. For each cipher operation,
61 / 111
the counter is incremented by one, overflow ignored. This can
make the counter unique.
o MAC algorithms: only hmac-sha1, hmac-sha2-256, hmac-sha2-512
are used.
o Public key algorithms for authentication of host and user: ssh-rsa,
ecdsa-sha2- nistp256, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384. The key sizes for these
algorithms used are as follows:
a) Key sizes for RSA: 2048 bits, 3072 bits;
b) Key sizes for ECDSA and the corresponding curves: NIST p-256
(256 bits), NIST p-384 (384 bits);
o Key exchange methods: ecdh-sha2-nistp256, ecdh-sha2-nistp384,
ecdh-sha2-nistp521.
6.1.3 Data Protection
EulerOS provides data protection APIs in openssl package, which
applications can use to protect any persisted data that the developer deems
to be sensitive. Below are some of the openssl APIs available:
● EVP_EncryptInit, EVP_EncryptUpdate, EVP_EncryptFinal;
● EVP_DecryptInit, EVP_DecryptUpdate, EVP_DecryptFinal;
● EVP_EncryptInit_ex, EVP_EncryptUpdate_ex, EVP_EncryptFinal_ex;
● EVP_DecryptInit_ex, EVP_DecryptUpdate_ex, EVP_DecryptFinal_ex;
The AES CBC encryption algorithm is used by default in the APIs above.
Additional information about EVP API, can be found here.
For protection of data on disks, EulerOS offers an additional layer between
the file systems and the physical block device, which is used to encrypt and
decrypt any data transmitted between the file system and the block device.
This is done by functionality dm_crypt (LUKS extension) using device mapper.
Before mounting an encrypted block device, the owner has to provide a
passphrase. This passphrase is used to decrypt the symmetric master
volume key which is injected into the kernel. Using that master volume key,
the kernel can decrypt (to unlock) the block device and provides access to
data stored on that block device. At this point, the encrypted block device
can be mounted as usual, and written data to the device is encrypted and
read data from the device is decrypted transparently by the kernel using the
master volume key. When the encrypted block device is un-mounted and
62 / 111
locked (i.e. the kernel is informed to discard the master volume key), no user,
including administrative users like the root user, is able to access any data
on it any more. When an administrator would access the raw hardware
hosting the block device, only encrypted data can be read.
For the cryptographic operations for data on encrypted devices, the creator
of the encrypted block device can select the cipher. The master volume key
is obtained from a random number generator and stored on the block device
encrypted with the user's passphrase. A tool, cryptsetup(8), can be used to
erase the storage location of an encrypted master volume key, which implies
that the user owning the passphrase of the affected encrypted session key is
not able to unlock the block device any more.
Besides LUKS-encrypted block device, some other persistent data are
regarded sensitive and then encrypted. All of them are listed in the table
below:
Data Usage Protection Storage
LUKS master
volume key
protect an
encrypted block
device
Encrypted by
default with aes-
xts with key size
256.
Stored in a key
slot of the LUKS
device
User certificate
for SSH
User
authentication
Encrypted with
AES-128-CBC
File id_rsa or
id_dsa in user’s
home directory
EVM key (or
EVM user key)
Protect extended
attribute of a file in
data integrity
verification
Encrypted by
the EVM trusted
key using
AES256-CBC
In file /root/evm-
key
6.1.4 SFR Summary
● FCS_CKM.1(1), FCS_CKM.2(1), FCS_COP.1(1), FCS_COP.1(SSH),
FCS_COP.1(2), FCS_COP.1(3), FCS_COP.1(4), FCS_RBG_EXT.1: the
Cryptographic Algorithm and its Standards used in EulerOS.
● FCS_CKM.4: EulerOS overwrites critical cryptographic keys at garbage
collection time.
63 / 111
● FCS_STO_EXT.1: EulerOS provides crypto APIs (eg, openssl library) for
developers and the cryptsetup(8) tool for system administrators to
encrypt and decrypt sensitive data.
● FCS_TLSC_EXT.1, FCS_TLSC_EXT.2: EulerOS implements TLS to provide
server and mutual authentication, confidentiality and integrity to upper-
layer protocols such as Extensible Authentication Protocol and HTTPS.
● FCS_SSH_EXT.1, FCS_SSHC_EXT.1, FCS_SSHS_EXT.1: EulerOS implements
SSHv2 to provide security network communication channel.
6.2 User data protection
6.2.1 Discretionary Access Control
The general security policy determines that subjects (i.e., processes) are
allowed only the accesses specified by the policies applicable to the object
the subject requests access to. Further, the ability to propagate access
permissions is limited to those subjects who have that permission, as
determined by the policies applicable to the object the subject requests
access to.
A subject may possess one or more of the following capabilities which
provide the following exemptions from the DAC mechanism:
● CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE: A process with this capability is exempt from all
restrictions of the discretionary access control and can perform any
action desired. For the execution of a file, the permission bit vector of
that file must contain at least one execute bit.
● CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH: A process with this capability overrides all DAC
restrictions regarding read and search on files and directories.
● CAP_CHOWN: A process with this capability is allowed to make arbitrary
changes to a file's UID or GID.
● CAP_CHOWN: Setting permissions and ownership on objects even if the
process' UID does not match the UID of the object.
● CAP_FSETID: Don't clear SUID and SGID permission bits when a file is
modified.
DAC provides the mechanism that allows users to specify and control access
to objects that they own. DAC attributes are assigned to objects at creation
64 / 111
time and remain in effect until the object is destroyed or the object
attributes are changed. DAC attributes exist for all types of named object
known to the TOE. DAC is implemented with permission bits.
The DAC mechanism applies only to named objects which can be used to
store or transmit user data. Other named objects are also covered by the
DAC mechanism but may be supplemented by further restrictions. These
additional restrictions are out of scope for this evaluation. Examples of
objects which are accessible to users that cannot be used to store or
transmit user data include:
● Virtual file systems, which give user space processes an interface to
kernel data structures (such as most of procfs, sysfs, binfmt_misc);
● Process signals;
During creation of objects, the TSF ensures that all residual content is
removed from that object before making it accessible to the subject
requesting the creation.
When data is imported into the TOE (such as when mounting disks created
by other trusted systems), the TOE enforces the permission bits applied to
the file system objects.
6.2.1.1 Permission bits
The TOE supports standard UNIX permission bits to enforce one form of
access control for file system objects in all supported file systems. For each
process, it is bound with one user (denoted as process uid) and several
groups (denoted as several gids), indicating the owner of the process and the
groups the process belongs to. For each file object, there are three
categories of users and three types of access. The three user categories are
the owning user (u), the owning group (g), and other users (o); the three
access types are read (r), write (w) and execute (x).
Each file object has in its metadata a uid for the owning user, a gid for the
owning group, and a 9-bit permission vector. The permission vector contains
three 3-bit subvectors, defining the allowed access types to the object for
the owning user, owning group and other users separately. Each bit in a
subvector corresponds to one of the access types; if a bit in the subvector is
65 / 111
1, it means the object is allowed to be accessed with the corresponding
access type.
The three user categories are given different priorities, which are the owning
user, the owning group, and others in descending order. For access decision,
only the subvector for the user category with the highest priority is checked
against the requested access type. The access decision is made in kernel
space when a process issues an access request to a file object. The decision
is made as follows:
1) Decide the user category of the process to the file object:
i. If the process uid equals to the owning user of the file object, the user
category is owning user; otherwise
ii. For each of the groups the process belongs to, if the gid equals to the
owning group of the file object, the user category is owning group;
otherwise
iii. The user category is other users;
2) Get the subvector in file metadata for the user category;
3) If the bit for the requested access in this subvector is 1, then grant this
access; otherwise deny it;
Besides, there are several special cases for the write access:
● Write access to file systems mounted as read only (e. g. CD-ROM) is
always rejected (the exceptions are character and block device files,
which can still be written to, however the write operations do not modify
the information on the storage media);
● Write access to file system objects marked as immutable is always
rejected.
Besides the 9-bit permission vector, a SAVETXT bit (or sticky bit) is used only
for world-writable temp directories, preventing the removal of files by users
(and the system administrator) other than the owner in the directories.
Each process has an inheritable “umask” attribute which is used to
determine the default access permissions for new objects it creates. It is a
bit mask of the 9-bit permission vector, and specifies the access bits to be
removed from the permission vector for new objects. For example, setting
the umask to “002” ensures that new objects will be writable by the owner
66 / 111
and group, but not by others. The umask is defined by the administrator in
the /etc/login.defs file, or default to 022 if it is not specified explicitly.
6.2.1.2 Access check for file system objects
Access to file system objects is generally governed by the 9-bit permission
vector. Access to a file system object is checked when the object is initially
opened, and is no longer checked for each subsequent access. Changes to
access controls (e.g., revocation) begin to be effective only with the next
attempt to open the object.
6.2.1.3 Access check for IPC objects
The TOE implements the following standard types of IPC mechanisms:
● SYSV Shared Memory
● SYSV and POSIX Message Queues
● SYSV Semaphores
Each of the IPC objects is also bound with a 9-bit permission vector, which
controls access to the IPC object.
There are other IPC objects in the TOE, including UNIX domain socket and
Named Pipes, which are represented as file system objects. The access
control mechanism covering file system objects are also applicable to these
IPC mechanisms.
6.2.1.4 Access check for at and cron jobs queues
at and cron jobs can only be accessed (read/added/modified/deleted) by the
owning user. The TOE maintains at and cron job queues for each user. The
at or cron jobs are started with the UIDs/GIDs of the creator of the job.
The root user can always access every at or cron job queue.
6.2.2 VPN client
EulerOS does not provide a VPN client; however, it provides related APIs in
package libreswan, which can be used to enable VPN clients to protect IP
traffic using the IPsec tunneling protocol. Iptables is a packet filter
67 / 111
implemented as part of the network stack in the OS kernel. The user space
application iptables(1) allows the configuration of the IPTables kernel
components, and then can be used to configure all IP traffic that is routed
through the IPsec tunnel except for:
● IKE traffic used to establish the VPN tunnel;
● IPv4 ARP traffic for resolution of local network layer addresses and to
establish a local address;
● IPv6 NDP traffic for resolution of local network layer addresses and to
establish a local address;
Libreswan implements IPsec in user space. It implements Internet key
exchange (IKE) protocol version 1 and 2 in a user-level daemon. Libreswan
interfaces with the EulerOS kernel using netlink to transfer the encryption
keys. Packet encryption and decryption is done in the kernel.
6.2.3 SFR Summary
● FDP_ACF_EXT.1: EulerOS provides a Discretionary Access Control policy
to limit reading, modification, and execution of objects by non-authorized
users.
● FDP_IFC_EXT.1: EulerOS provides iptables APIs in package libreswan,
allowing VPN clients to protect IP traffic on the VPN tunnel using IPsec
protocol.
6.3 Security Management
The following table lists which activities can be done by a EulerOS user or a
local administrator. A checkmark indicates which entity can invoke the
management function. General users, or programs running on their behalf,
are not able to modify policy or configuration that is set by the privileged
administrator, which results in that the user cannot override the
configuration specified by the administrator.
Management Function FMT_SMF_EXT
.1
FMT_MOF_EXT
.1
68 / 111
Enable/disable screen lock M O
Configure screen lock inactivity
timeout
M O
Configure local audit storage
capacity
M X
Configure minimum password
Length
O X
Configure minimum number of
special characters in password
O X
Configure minimum number of
numeric characters in password
O X
Configure minimum number of
uppercase characters in password
O X
Configure minimum number of
lowercase characters in password
O X
Configure remote connection
inactivity timeout
O X
enable/disable unauthenticated
logon
O M
Configure lockout policy for
unsuccessful authentication
attempts through [selection:
O X
69 / 111
timeouts between attempts,
limiting number of attempts
during a time period]
Configure host-based firewall O X
Configure name/address of
audit/logging server to which to
send audit/logging records
O X
Configure audit rules O X
Configure name/address of
network time server
O O
Enable/disable automatic software
update
O O
Configure WiFi interface O O
Enable/disable Bluetooth interface O O
Configure USB interfaces O X
Enable/disable [assignment: list
of other external interfaces] O O
[assignment:none] O O
6.3.1 SFR Summary
● FMT_MOF_EXT.1: EulerOS provides the user with the capability to
administer the security functions described in the security target. The
70 / 111
mappings to specific functions are described in each applicable section of
the TOE Summary Specification.
6.4 Protection of the TSF
6.4.1 Separation and Domain Isolation
The TSF provides a security domain for its own protection and provides
process isolation. The security domains used within and by the TSF consists
of the following components:
● Hardware
● Kernel-mode software
● Trusted user-mode processes
● User-mode Administrative tools process
The TSF hardware is managed by the TSF kernel-mode software and is not
modifiable by untrusted subjects. The TSF kernel-mode software is
protected (from read and write) by hardware execution state. The TSF
hardware provides a software interrupt instruction that causes a state
change from user mode to kernel mode. The TSF kernel-mode software is
responsible for processing all interrupts, and determines whether or not a
valid kernel-mode call is being made. In addition, the memory protection
mechanism enforced by the hardware ensures that attempts to access
kernel-mode memory from user mode would result in a hardware exception,
which would be handled by kernel-mode software. In this way, the kernel
can ensure that kernel-mode memory cannot be directly accessed by
software not executing in the kernel mode. This results in separation of
kernel space and user space.
The TSF provides process isolation for all user-mode processes through
private virtual address spaces (private process page tables), execution
context (registers, program counters, resource usage registrations), and
security context (process credentials, capabilities, control group information,
security attributes). The data structures defining process address space,
execution context and security context are all stored in protected kernel-
mode memory. All security relevant privileges are considered to enforce
TSF Protection. All user-mode processes share the kernel space (although it
71 / 111
is unable to access kernel space if not permitted by the kernel), and each
user-mode process has its own private memory space. This is the isolation
of memory spaces of different user-mode processes. So, user-mode
processes are isolated from each other.
User-mode administrator tools execute with the security context of the
process running on behalf of the authorized administrator. Administrator
processes are also protected like other user-mode processes, by process
isolation.
The TSF implements cryptographic mechanisms within kernel space; and
the services can be accessed by both kernel- and user-mode components in
order to isolate those functions from the rest of the TSF to limit exposure to
possible errors while protecting those functions from potential tampering
attempts.
6.4.2 Protection of OS Binaries, Audit and Configuration Data
All the files in below directories are owned by the system administrator and
the permission bits are set in a way that only the system administrator is
allowed to modify them:
Kernel images: /boot/
Kernel drivers: /lib/modules/`uname –r`/kernel/
Security audit logs: /var/log/audit/
Shared libraries: /lib, lib64
System executables: /usr/bin, /usr/sbin
System configuration files: /etc/
6.4.3 Protection from Implementation Weaknesses
The user-mode processes in EulerOS implement Address Space Layout
Randomization (ASLR) mechanism in order to load executable code at
unpredictable base addresses. The base address is generated using a
pseudo-random number generator that is seeded by high quality entropy
sources when available which provides 8 or 28 random bits (for 32-bit and
64-bit architecture separately) for memory mapping. The binaries are
compiled with -pie -fPIE option to use ASLR feature.
72 / 111
A stack buffer overrun protection capability (CC_STACKPROTECTOR) is built
in the kernel that will terminate a process after a potential buffer overrun
on the thread’s stack is detected by a failed verification of the canary data
in the stack frame of each function call. All EulerOS executable binaries
developed in C/C++ implement this protection by being complied with the
-fstack-protector-strong option.
Note: If a symbol _stack_chk_fail is found in an ELF executable, this
indicates that the executable is built with -fstack-protector-strong option.
However, this does not hold vice versa. The compiler (GCC) can disable
this option for some invocations if –O option is enabled and it deems that
there is no possibility to overflow the stack (e.g. if there is no array on the
stack). In addition to that, there are other situations where SBOP
protections are not applied. They have been classified in the following
types:
● Type 1: There are not functions in the file at all.
● Type 2: The ELF file does NOT use character arrays on stack.
● Type 3: The stack protection mechanism is disabled by an explicit
attribute 'always_inline’.
● Type 4: The ELF file uses character arrays on stack, but also uses secure
functions to operate on the array.
● Type 5: The ELF file is for a special programming language, which has
special mechanisms to avoid stack smashing.
In Appendix A there is a list of all the files affected as well as the rationale for
each of them that can be one of the previous types.
6.4.4 Platform Integrity and Code Integrity
Integrity of kernel image, kernel modules and system executables is
verified using the Secure Boot mechanism. No special hardware is
needed for Secure Boot.
The trust chain at boot time looks like this:
CRTM -> UEFI -> shim -> GRUB2 -> OS kernel
73 / 111
The first two parts, CRTM and UEFI, are for hardware and firmware, and are
out of the scope of this ST. One or more platform certificates (called PKs)
are integrated into firmware, which are the root of the trust chain above.
There is the following booting stage which covers the trust chain for
system integrity check at boot time.
1. Secure Boot stage for booting integrity
● Pre-booting. Shim is the first-stage of boot loader, containing a self-
signed CA certificate, which is generated with RSA and key size 2048,
and used to verify GRUB2 and OS kernel image. It is signed by one of
the PKs. At this stage, shim is loaded and verified by the firmware using
one PK. If the verification fails, an error message will be prompted and
the boot process gets blocked; otherwise, shim will be launched, and try
to load GRUB2. Actually this pre-booting is out of the scope of this ST.
● Booting stage 2. Once verified and run by firmware, shim tries to load
GRUB2. After loading, shim begins to verify GRUB2 using the self-signed
CA embedded in shim. If the verification of GRUB2 failed, an error will be
reported and the boot process will terminate; otherwise, shim will launch
GRUB2 and the boot process continues.
● Booting stage 3. If launched, GRUB2 will load OS kernel and try to verify
it. Generally, OS kernel is signed by the vendor using the same key as
the one for signing GRUB2. GRUB2 calls back into shim to verify the
signature of the kernel. If the signature cannot be verified, an error will
be shown, and the booting process will be blocked; otherwise, the kernel
will be started.
● Loading kernel modules. There is another certificate integrated in OS
kernel, which is generated with RSA and key size 2048. All kernel
modules are signed by the OS vendor using the private key paired with
the certificate, and will always be verified using the certificate before
being loaded into kernel. Furthermore, the TSF includes a Code Integrity
Verification mechanism, whereby kernel modules will be loaded only if
they are digitally signed by either Huawei or a trusted root certificate
authority recognized by Huawei. This mechanism uses public-key
cryptography technology to verify the digital signature of each kernel
module when it is to be loaded.
When trying to load a kernel module, the TSF compares two hash values
of the module: one is the decrypted version of the value included within
74 / 111
the module file using the public key stored in the certificate; the other is
computed based on the code in the kernel module using cryptographic
libraries in the TSF. If the two hash values match, the kernel module can
then be loaded as usual. If all modules required are verified successfully
by kernel at boot time, the secure boot process can terminate normally,
and the first user process can start then. If the verification fails, the
kernel will report the error message and will stop the booting process.
It is worth noting that module verification is always done when loading
a kernel module, both at boot time and at normal runtime of the system.
If a module fails in verification at normal runtime, the load command
would abort with an error message, and the kernel would NOT be
impacted.
The table below gives a list of protected files for secure boot:
Module /
Applicati
on
Protected Files Protect
ed by
Configura
ble by
System
Manager
shim /boot/efi/EFI/BOOT/:
BOOTX64.EFI, fallback.efi
/boot/efi/EFI/euleros/:
MokManager.efi, shim.efi
UEFI
(certifica
te in DB)
No
GRUB2 /boot/efi/EFI/euleros/:
grubx64.efi, gcdx64.efi
/boot/grub2/**
Shim
(vendor
certificat
e)
No
Kernel /boot/vmlinuz* shim
(vendor
certificat
e)
No
Kernel
modules
/usr/lib/modules/3.10.0-
xxx/kernel/*.ko
Kernel
(vendor
certificat
e)
No
6.4.5 OS and Application Updates
75 / 111
Updates to EulerOS and its applications are delivered as RPM Package
Manager files (.rpm files) from the EulerOS repo. These files has a digital
signature which can be verified by and end-user to check the identity of the
file’s publisher.
1. Signature verification in RPM packages
EulerOS uses the tool rpm(8) to manage all packages, including the kernel
images. Rpm has several modes of operation, including build, query, verify,
install, upgrade, and erase.
A RPM package file is in a binary format, and its key parts include:
● A signature section, which may contain a GPG signature that can be
used to verify that the RPM file has not been modified since it was
created.
● A header section, containing a set of index entries, which map
numbered types to values. This is used for storing internal information
about RPM package files.
● A gzip compressed CPIO archive, containing the actual files to be
installed to the file system.
The GPG signature in the signature section of an RPM file is calculated for
data found in the header and the compressed CPIO archive parts when
building the RPM package. The private key used by the TOE for signing is
generated with RSA algorithm and key size 4096. The related GPG public
key is put to a separate rpm package (gpg-pubkey-381d7ac3-584515cf),
which is exported to the TOE.
A repository is a collection of rpm packages for EulerOS and each EulerOS
installation can access one or more repositories remotely or locally using a
tool yum(8) to get rpm packages for installation or update. A repository is
also called a source of yum. Before a package is released to a yum
repository, it is signed by the maintainer (i.e., Huawei for EulerOS). The
metadata file of a repository (repodata/repomd.xml) is also signed.
There is a configuration file for each yum repository in a EulerOS
installation, in which an option for the yum repository can be enabled,
gpgcheck=1, meaning that GPG verification should be checked for each
76 / 111
RPM file from this repository at installation and update time. To use this
option, the public GPG key should be imported into the system (as stated
above) and specified in the configuration file. At update time, yum will
check if the related public GPG key is valid and has not been revoked, and
each rpm file downloaded from the repository is then verified using the
public GPG key to establish its authenticity.
Updates to EulerOS system and EulerOS applications are delivered through
EulerOS repository, which has a collection of software (OS and applications)
stored in a Huawei’s server (maintainer). EulerOS repository is enabled by
default and it is the only distribution channel available; but the user can
also modify some of the repository options like changing its URL,
enabling/disabling the signature verification or a particular repository
among other options. Additionally, the user can go the the repository URL
(https://devcenter.huawei.com/ict/site-
euleros/euleros/repo/yum/2.0/os/x86_64) to search and download EulerOS
RPM packages on their own will.
Local RPM package files downloaded by the user can be checked to verify
that its signature is valid. The following command can be used by the user
to verify a local RPM package: rpm -K <package name>. This functionality
is performed by default while installing a remote or local RPM package if
Yum’s configuration file has set the options gpgcheck=1 and
localpkg_gpgcheck=1.
2. Check certificate ExtendedKeyUsage
Besides the signature protection in RPM, the extended key usage of the
certificates in kernel, codesigning, is also checked when loading kernel
modules. If the built-in certificate contains the codesigning purpose and
the public key in it matches the signature in the module, the module can
then be allowed to insert into kernel.
3. For security update
Huawei Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT) manages the
receipt, investigation, internal coordination and disclosure of security
vulnerability information related to Huawei offerings and it is the only
window to disclose the vulnerability of Huawei products.
77 / 111
Vulnerability reporters can submit potential vulnerabilities to Huawei PSIRT
by email, and the email addresses are psirt@huawei.com and euler-
security@huawei.com.
At same time, for all software in the TOE, both these developed by Huawei
and all third-party components, a developer community is created to get
feedback from all developers. Developers can report software
bugs/vulnerability through a specified web url
(https://devcenter.huawei.com/usercenter/addDefectTicket?belong=E236S
00P1064T00).
Information in the email is recommended to be encrypted with Huawei’s
public key (key ID 0x7E3C7F69; PGP fingerprint: DC9D 0676 B289 30A1
D12C 765A 6461 9D10 7E3C 7F69):
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: GnuPG v1.4.7 (MingW32)
mQGiBFAbjoIRBADflj1sw9Dacs6y+r/k6Mg6K84LPpYILV4PdxB/yrOk7r2BfOBJmDp7h9Do90qgyGdH/dXCd3L/CMjgw
2Ec+qOqcqpWrMOyIGWrf9li1pNaRQRmgu0TPw7BoYf0HxjoBisIwb7keZjeww+UFIFZrwuuJn6C1T3UYmBT/3DNawV
Y1wCg351RXB1vceSEuo+0bCXFY7Gd/n8EAKGw0IlBdJ7iblr1UzCq3/FxU5oW4H7T+e305pyoETzo11poqnDMyvYx/8
Bl5+Kmr5UQ4nNn91NFSBAkvUThhoeeSduw582N+80Fe/IAiAoR1cG3fiX+6k0vlRuhsNAYF/Kckygx+gWwPCacrbFz
weMuwh8dBbS4aled9OdzSd4gA/0cIjIVkeW/fRBpj7nSXC3Ia5H802YdKzzNYOTjCUcXQSEKXKiWFnp99En/aXqQm1YT
k/VcUCZEZfZm7FocP/MCWCuQWqM41QfdYf7lRVMPKAWZmDBjDC0x5bfu3Emwp8Q5HXXhMES0FxuOIHITkFFtrRVo
dmIoTCOquylJX4M7gbQYUFNJUlQgPFBTSVJUQGh1YXdlaS5jb20+iGAEExECACAFAlAbjoICGwMGCwkIBwMCBBUCCA
MEFgIDAQIeAQIXgAAKCRBkYZ0Qfjx/aXubAJsHzNg5s8jSD6oIHSkKx13BRGVy9wCg2cdPjcFmSb8GmOn5SyGY/ZwC
MXG5AQ0EUBuOggEIAMhXwVDOBGwuTePBNf/i18mJMOJB+5NVp+K2WizuvJfBxvOugsngQuxlUZP/Sto83iH65ofSyp
MnsIa3IK0XzTiuYkFi+Q1vLZJaTEbf6jkGOmG6z5QeEFxpGCG3xEZam/IISllN0U6tIu4mG1YIoGdMIyKY0FRq6Ihv4QXR
J2k8D2Iz5mGK9VHVbyhAdUZsdkL31xlzyl508/sMWveqRaeYnerytvY8oNifgfvSkIjtwUkuftVK4oMR2hPNR2MWDq5aN
8ycnb+Vw+zZMz4xjPjFiOjcxwDhOkndjnCvIj4RFE7YsMy8ThNkwItDETr9tTjOEQAERRhVMB+RpPcp5gcAEQEAAYkBa
AQYEQIACQUCUBuOggIbLgEpCRBkYZ0Qfjx/acBdIAQZAQIABgUCUBuOggAKCRCu4my3gtOIaYNdCACF40rx4TAu4n
ZcXPUBnTqBb0GJXAhWkvNDhgRyILo4Rz1RqnDUIHU+fj6B7eQDcWKswSbNWYsVUlXdW+/vRFwF0huqgPaVQMtvFx
rz1ThKrhdypH/ZJon8dGc1JVmGOmbcnc9ZTbcsNwAC+ViR7SffMsI1sJ3Ki9sLo0W4Uep/+xUDtECYq29GDj2IHuWZUJ
Lcxgbbusj/sloDXCdgn38kgJ06dsm9oEqieimIF9n0GaZE20e/R5/NqMYDtAraIuyiKOXkNXyO6LwiuSuiZo0nYv8D6KT2
MUgaym1EA7Mj8IgpQGHmxk9FQw+2BPbGW7n2917P938N6J0vAdjxaKWAzoAAoNYDJaMuTkmDG3+Og6C2cjJhIkT
BAJ0UhEGMa7U0Y7pPHhGqfJgAFo06+g===xaXR
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
The web url for submitting bugs/vulnerability uses secure communication
channel. The bug/vulnerability submitted will not be open to public until
the patch or update is open to public.
Besides the vulnerabilities collected from the reporters, PSIRT weekly
collect the vulnerability information mainly for third-party components
78 / 111
from various sources, such as open source communities, well-known
vulnerability library like CVE, etc.
Once PSIRT gets the vulnerability related to the TOE, together with the
EulerOS department, they will analyze the severity of the vulnerability, and
the severity is classify into 1 through 5 levels. Next, Huawei will develop a
patch or an update according to the company level specification “SLA of
reaction for vulnerability” which is defined according to the severity level
of the vulnerabilities. If there is a patch or update available from the
community, then Huawei will adopt it other than developing the patch or
update by itself.
Whether the patch or update is self-developed or adopted from the
community, Huawei will test it before formal release. According to our SLA,
usually the window is about 10 days for the TOE to release a patch or
update, while only a few days for severe vulnerability.
The whole process from creating to deploying an update is like this:
79 / 111
6.4.6 SFR summary
● FPT_ACF_EXT.1: EulerOS provides a Discretionary Access Control policy
to limit modification and reading of objects by non-authorized users.
● FPT_ASLR_EXT.1: EulerOS randomizes user-mode process address
spaces to hinder address prediction.
● FPT_SBOP_EXT.1: EulerOS executables are compiled with stack overflow
protection (compiled with the -fstack-protector-all option for native
applications).
● FPT_TST_EXT.1: EulerOS checks the integrity of the boot loader, OS
loader, kernel image, system binaries, and specified application
executable code.
● FPT_TUD_EXT.1, FPT_TUD_EXT.2: EulerOS provides a means to identify
the current version of the kernel, the hardware model, and installed
applications. The update mechanisms of EulerOS can deliver updated OS
kernel and application binaries and let the user confirm that the digital
signatures of updated OS kernel and applications are valid.
6.5 Audit
The Lightweight Audit Framework (LAF) is used in the audit subsystem of
EulerOS, which is compliant with the requirements from Common Criteria.
The EulerOS kernel implements the core of the LAF functionality. It gathers
all audit events, analyzes these events based on the audit rules, collects
related information, and forwards the audit events that are requested to
be audited to the audit daemon executing in user space.
The audit functionality of the Linux kernel is controlled by an audit
management tool in user space, which communicates with the kernel
through a specific netlink channel. This netlink channel is usable only by
applications with the following capabilities:
● CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL: Performing management operations like adding
or deleting audit rules, setting or getting auditing parameters;
● CAP_AUDIT_WRITE: Submitting audit records to the kernel which in turn
forwards the audit records to the audit daemon.
The TOE Audit security functionality includes:
80 / 111
Audit event selection
Audit trail
Audit log overflow protection
Audit log access protection
6.5.1 Audit event selection
LAF is able to intercept all system calls and retrieve audit log entries from
privileged user space applications. The audit subsystem allows selecting
the events to be actually audited from the set of all possibly auditable
events based on a group of audit rules. These audit rules are set in an
audit configuration file (/etc/audit/audit.rules), and will be sent to kernel to
control what to be audited.
An audit management tool (auditctl(8)) is used to load the audit rules from
the audit configuration file and send them to kernel. Generally it is invoked
once at boot time. The audit rules in kernel can also be modified at
runtime.
6.5.2 Audit trail
An audit record consists of one or more lines of text in a format like
“keyword=value”. The following information is contained in all audit
record lines:
● Type: indicates the type of the event, such as SYSCALL, PATH,
USER_LOGIN, or USER_MGMT;
● Timestamp: Date and time when the audit record was generated;
● Audit ID: unique numerical event identifier;
● Login ID (“auid”): the user ID of the user authenticated by the system
(regardless if the user has changed his real and / or effective user ID
afterwards);
● Effective user and group ID: the effective user and group ID of the
process at the time the audit event was generated;
● Event outcom: Success or failure (where appropriate);
● Process ID of the subject that caused the event (PID);
● Hostname or terminal the subject used for performing the operation;
● Information about the intended operation;
81 / 111
The information above is followed by event specific data. For example, for
SYSCALL event records that involve file system objects, multiple text lines
will be generated for a single event, all having the same time stamp and
audit ID to permit easy correlation.
The audit trail is stored in ASCII text. The TOE provides tools for managing
audit trails, which can be used for post-processing of audit data. The tool,
ausearch(8), allows selective extraction of records from the audit trail using
defined selection criteria. It supports the specification of a fine-grained
search pattern where each information component can be searched for,
including combinations of these patterns.
6.5.3 Audit log access protection
Access to audit data (including the configuration files and audit trails) by
normal users is prohibited by the discretionary access control function of
the TOE. The permission is granted only to the system administrator.
6.5.4 SFR summary
● FAU_GEN.1: The TOE audit collection is capable of generating audit
events according to configured audit rules. For each audit event, the
fields recorded are event type, event ID, the date and time, process ID,
user Identifier (auid), event result and other information.
6.6 Identification and Authentication
Each user trying to access a EulerOS instance must have an account on
the system. An account is identified by a unique user name, and the name
will not be re-used during the whole life cycle of the system. To
authenticate a user account, a password is set for it and is saved by
EulerOS after encryption.
All logons are treated essentially in the same manner regardless of their
forms (e.g., log in remotely using the SSH protocol, log in at the local
console) and start with an account name and credentials that must be
provided to the TSF. EulerOS authenticates user accounts based on
username and password.
82 / 111
For a remote login through the OpenSSH server, the administrator is
allowed to enable SSH key-based authentication in addition or instead of
the username/password based authentication. When a user can
successfully authenticate using the SSH key-based authentication based
on a private SSH key in his possession, the TOE grants the user access.
Password-based authentication to EulerOS succeeds when the credential
provided by the user matches the stored protected representation of the
password.Password authentication can be used for interactive logons and
to initiate the “change password” screen.
When the authentication succeeds, the user will be logged onto their
desktop, their screen unlocked, or their authentication factors changed
depending whether the user logged onto the computer, the display was
locked, or the password was to be changed.
6.6.1 PAM-based identification and authentication
mechanisms
EulerOS uses a collection of libraries called the "Pluggable Authentication
Modules" (PAM) that allow the system administrator to choose how PAM-
aware applications authenticate users. The TOE provides PAM modules
that implement all the security functionality to:
● Provide login control and set up login ID, UIDs and GIDs for a subject;
● Ensure the quality of passwords;
● Enforce limits for accounts (such as the number of maximum
concurrent sessions allowed for a user);
● Enforce the change of passwords after a configured time including the
password quality enforcement;
● Enforcement of locking accounts after several successive failed login
attempts;
● Restriction of the use of the root account to some specified terminals;
● Restriction of the use of the su and sudo commands;
It is up to the person or the client application for a remote login to protect
the account’s password safely.
83 / 111
When the login process starts, a banner is shown to the user. If the
authentication is successful, a session starts for the user; otherwise, some
obscured feedback is given. Both failed and successful authentications are
logged and audited.
EulerOS maintains a count for the consecutive failed logon attempts.
When the count gets larger than a number specified in a PAM policy file,
which is 3 by default, EulerOS will lock out the tried account for 300
seconds. EulerOS maintains the number of consecutive failed logon
attempts persistently for the account, and hence the number cannot be
reset by rebooting the computer.
When the user is successfully authenticated and user session starts, the
login process sets the real UID, file system effective UID and login UID as
well as the real GID, effective GID, file system GID and a set of
supplemental GIDs for the user trying to log in, and spawns the initial login
shell as the first process the user can interact with.
6.6.2 User Identity Changing
Users can change their identity (i.e., switch to another identity) using one
of the following commands provided by the TOE:
● su command: The su command is intended for a switch to another
identity that establishes a new login session and spawns a new shell
with the new identity. When invoking su, the user must provide the
credentials associated with the target identity - i.e. when the user
wants to switch to another user ID, it has to provide the password
protecting the account of the target user. In EulerOS, the capability to
login as the root account has been restricted to specified terminals
only. In addition, the use of the su command to switch to root has been
restricted to users belonging to a special group (wheel). Users who
don’t have access to a terminal where root login is allowed or are not
member of that special group will not be able to switch to root account,
even if they would know the authentication information for root.
● sudo command: The sudo command is intended for giving users
permissions to execute commands with another user identity (specified
by -u option). When invoking sudo, the user has to authenticate with
his own credentials.
84 / 111
When switching identities, the real, file system and effective user ID and
real, file system and effective group ID are changed to the one the user
specified in the command (after successful authentication as this user).
6.6.3 Authentication Data Management
Each TOE instance maintains its own set of users with their passwords and
attributes. Although the same human user may have accounts on different
servers interconnected by a network and running an instance of the TOE,
those accounts and their parameter are not synchronized on different TOE
instances. As a result the same user may have different user names,
different user Ids, different passwords and different attributes on different
machines within the networked environment.
Each TOE instance within the network maintains its own administrative
database by making all administrative changes on the local TOE instance.
System administration has to ensure that all machines within the network
are configured in accordance with the requirements defined in this
Security Target.
The file /etc/passwd contains for each user the user’s name, the id of the
user, an indicator whether the password of the user is valid, the principal
group id of the user and other (not security relevant) information. The file
/etc/shadow contains for each user a hash of the user's password, the
userid, the time the password was last changed, the expiration time as
well as the validity period of the password and some other information that
are not subject to the security functions as defined in this Security Target.
Users are allowed to change their passwords by using the passwd
command. This command is able to read and modify the contents of
/etc/shadow for the user’s password entry, which would ordinarily be
inaccessible to a non-privileged user process. Users are also warned to
change their passwords at login time if the password will expire soon, and
are prevented from logging in if the password has expired.
Note, only file /etc/shadow is regarded as the system-wide credential file.
File /etc/passwd contains mappings between user name and uid in the
whole system, but the most sensitive info (password) is put in file
/etc/shadow. Hence, file /etc/passwd is world-readable in the TOE, just as
in all other UNIX/LINUX releases, leaving very limited info in it to attackers.
85 / 111
Therefore, file /etc/passwd has little special meaning to the whole system,
and then, is NOT regarded as a system-wide credential file.
6.6.4 SSH key-based authentication
In addition to the PAM-based authentication, the OpenSSH server is able to
perform a key-based authentication. When a user wants to log in, instead
of providing a password, the user applies his SSH key. After a successful
verification, the OpenSSH server considers the user as authenticated and
performs the PAM-based operations as outlined above.
To establish a key-based authentication, a user first has to generate an
RSA or ECDSA key pair. The private part of the key pair remains on the
client side, and should be protected safely (the same way as protecting
the local user password). The public part is copied to the server into the
file .ssh/authorized_keys which resides in the home directory of the
account to login. When the login operation is performed, the SSHv2
protocol tries to perform the "publickey" authentication using the private
key on the client side and the public key found on the server side.
6.6.5 Session locking
The TOE uses the screen(1) application which locks the current session of
the user either after an administrator-specified time of inactivity or upon
the user's request.
To unlock the session, the user must supply his password. Screen uses
PAM to validate the password and allows the user to access his session
after a successful validation.
6.6.6 X.509 Certificate Validation and Generation
Every component in EulerOS that uses X.509 certificates is responsible for
performing certificate validation. For example, server certification has to
be validated when creating a SSL/TLS connection to a remote server.
EulerOS contains a repository of public CA certificates and will select a
certificate based on criteria such as entity name for the communication
partner, any extended key usage constraints, and cryptographic
algorithms associated with the certificate. EulerOS component will use the
86 / 111
same kinds of information along with a certification path and certificate
trust lists as part of deciding to accept the certificate.
Following steps are needed to validate a supplied certificate:
● First, build a certificate chain starting from the supplied certificate and
ending in the root CA. This is done by looking up the certificate of the
issuer of the current certificate. If a certificate is found which is its own
issuer, it is assumed to be the root CA. To find an issuer’s certificate,
all certificates whose subject name matches the issuer name of the
current certificate are tested. The relevant authority key identifier
components of the current certificate (if present) must match the
subject key identifier (if present) and issuer and serial number of the
candidate issuer, in addition the keyUsage extension of the candidate
issuer (if present) must permit certificate signing. The lookup first
excludes all untrusted or revoked certificates, then search in the
trusted certificates. The root CA is always looked up in the trusted
certificate list: if the certificate to verify is a root certificate then an
exact match must be found in the trusted list. CRL mechanism can be
used to check the revocation status of a certificate.
● Second, check every untrusted certificate's extensions for consistency
with the supplied purpose. The supplied or "leaf" certificate must have
extensions compatible with the supplied purpose and all other
certificates must also be valid CA certificates.
● Third, check the trust settings on the root CA. The root CA should be
trusted for the supplied purpose. For compatibility, a certificate with no
trust settings is considered to be valid for all purposes.
● Last, check the validity of the certificate chain. The validity period is
checked against the current system time and the notBefore and
notAfter dates in the certificate. The certificate signatures are also
checked at this point.
If all operations above complete successfully, then the supplied certificate
is considered valid; otherwise it is regarded as invalid.
If certificate validation fails, or if EulerOS is not able to check the
validation status for a certificate, EulerOS will not establish a trusted
network channel by default; the user can select to bypass the certificate
87 / 111
validation using some options. E.g., option --no-check-certificate can lead
wget to ignore server certificate.
Certification validation for system updates and integrity verification is
enabled by default. However, the administrator can bypass the results of a
failed certificate validation using special option for rpm (--nosignature) or
yum (--nogpgcheck), although this is not recommended.
When a certificate enrollment request needs to generate, EulerOS will
prompt the user to input information bound to the request (including
common name), information about the cryptographic algorithms used for
the request, any certification extensions, and information about the client
requesting the certificate.
6.6.7 SFR Summary
● FIA_AFL.1: After the number of consecutive failed authentication
attempts for a user account has been surpassed, EulerOS can lockout the
user account according to the configuration file.
● FIA_UAU.5: EulerOS provides authentication using a username and
password.
● FIA_X509_EXT.1: EulerOS validates X.509 certificates according to RFC
5280 and provides CRL mechanism for applications to check certificate
revocation status.
● FIA_X509_EXT.2: EulerOS uses X.509 certificates for TLS and HTTPS.
6.7 Trusted Path/Channels
EulerOS provides trusted network channels to communicate with
supporting IT infrastructure or applications:
● Using TLS (HTTPS) for certificate enrollment; CRL checking;
authentication to network resources such as web (HTTPS).
● SSH is for user log in.
6.7.1 Local trusted path
88 / 111
EulerOS provides the mechanism for the administrator to specify the
interval of inactivity after which an active session will be terminated by
force. Before a user tries to log on to EulerOS from a local console, he can
invoke the real login process by pressing the key sequence (Alt+SysRq+K),
which is called Secure Attention Key (SAK). The SAK is captured by the TSF
and cannot be intercepted or altered by any user process. On receiving
the key sequence, the kernel will kill all processes which have opened the
console, and the trusted login process will then be restarted by the init
process, and then the user can login to the system securely. In this way, it
can be assured that the login prompt the user can see on the console is
actually from the system login process, not from some trojan programs.
6.7.2 Network-based trusted channel
SSH
EulerOS provides the Secure Shell Protocol Version 2 (SSH v2.0) to allow
users establish a secure connection from a remote host and perform a
logon to the TOE.
The protocol is implemented in OpenSSH application suite. The protocol
works in the client-server model, which means that the connection is
established by the SSH client trying to connect to the SSH server. The SSH
client initiates the connection setup process and uses public key
cryptography to verify the identity of the SSH server. After the setup
phase, the SSH protocol uses strong symmetric encryption (e.g. AES) and
hashing algorithms to ensure the privacy and integrity of the data that is
exchanged between the client and server.
TLS
EulerOS also uses Transport Layer Security protocol (successor to SSL) to
provide a trusted communication channel between itself and authorized IT
entities. The Transport Layer Security protocol aims primarily to
provide privacy and data integrity between two communicating computer
applications. Secured by TLS, connections between a client and a server
have one or more of the following properties:
89 / 111
● The connection is private (or secure) because symmetric
cryptography is used to encrypt the data transmitted. The keys for this
symmetric encryption are generated uniquely for each connection
based on a shared secret negotiated at the start of the session. The
server and client negotiate the details about which encryption
algorithm and which cryptographic key to use before the first byte of
application data is transmitted through the connection. The
negotiation of the shared secret is both secure (the negotiated secret
is unavailable to eavesdroppers and cannot be obtained, even by an
attacker who places themselves in the middle of the connection) and
reliable (no attacker can modify the communications during the
negotiation without being detected).
● The identity of the communicating parties can
be authenticated using public-key cryptography. This authentication
can be optional, but is generally required for at least one of the both
parties (typically the server).
● The connection ensures integrity of each message transmitted by
including an authentication code in the message to prevent
undetected loss or alteration of the data during transmission.
6.7.3 SFR Summary
● FTP_ITC_EXT.1: EulerOS provides trusted network channels, which
protect data in transit from disclosure, provide data integrity and
endpoint identification that is used by TLS, HTTPS and SSH for network-
based authentication and certification validation.
● FTP_TRP.1: EulerOS provide a local trusted path service using SAK and a
network-based trusted channel built on the network protocols described
in this section.
90 / 111
7 Appendix A. SBOP files and
rationale.
The rationales provided for each file are classified as the following types:
● Type 1: There are not functions in the file at all.
● Type 2: The ELF file does NOT use character arrays on stack.
● Type 3: The stack protection mechanism is disabled by an explicit
attribute 'always_inline’.
● Type 4: The ELF file uses character arrays on stack, but also uses secure
functions to operate on the array.
● Type 5: The ELF file is for a special programming language, which has
special mechanisms to avoid stack smashing.
FILE Type
/lib/audit/sotruss-lib.so:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/gconv/CP1125.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/T.61.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/ISO8859-10.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/EBCDIC-FI-SE-A.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM5347.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/VISCII.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM4899.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/CP1251.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/ISO_6937.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/CP771.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/CP1256.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/EBCDIC-DK-NO.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/INIS-CYRILLIC.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/EBCDIC-ES.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM277.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM1133.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM863.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM1142.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM1143.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM1008_420.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/CP932.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM1157.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/EUC-KR.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/SHIFT_JISX0213.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/MACINTOSH.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM1155.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/INIS.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/EBCDIC-FI-SE.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM932.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
91 / 111
/lib/gconv/SAMI-WS2.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/ISO8859-7.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM278.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/ISO-2022-CN-EXT.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM275.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/JOHAB.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM1161.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/ISO_10367-BOX.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM4909.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM1047.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IEC_P27-1.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/libGB.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/EBCDIC-ES-A.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/GREEK7-OLD.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/libCNS.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/ISO_5428.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/EUC-JP.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/HP-ROMAN8.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM1008.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM1164.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/BRF.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/MIK.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM290.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM1148.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/CP737.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM1364.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM1026.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/MAC-UK.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/EBCDIC-UK.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM9448.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/CP1252.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM424.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM437.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM868.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/TIS-620.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM943.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/EBCDIC-IT.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/HP-GREEK8.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/GBBIG5.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/EBCDIC-AT-DE.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM860.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/RK1048.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/ISO8859-6.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM9066.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM1129.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/GEORGIAN-ACADEMY.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/ISO8859-4.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM852.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/ISO-IR-197.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/KOI8-T.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM864.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM901.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM4517.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM869.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/ISO8859-11.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/LATIN-GREEK-1.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
92 / 111
/lib/gconv/IBM420.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM905.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/CP770.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/ISO8859-13.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/EBCDIC-US.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/CP1254.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM880.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/libKSC.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/ISO_6937-2.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/HP-THAI8.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/ISO_11548-1.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM1122.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/INIS-8.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM866.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/UTF-16.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM297.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/CSN_369103.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM1146.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/CP775.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM939.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/HP-ROMAN9.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM256.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/NATS-DANO.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/ISO8859-9.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM1162.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM935.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/ISO8859-16.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/CP774.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/EBCDIC-AT-DE-A.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM875.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM857.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM1147.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM865.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM423.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/KOI8-R.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/EUC-JP-MS.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM922.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM1156.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/ISO8859-14.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/CP1253.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM1160.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/ISO_5427-EXT.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM851.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM16804.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/LATIN-GREEK.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/ISO8859-5.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/CP1255.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM871.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/GEORGIAN-PS.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM903.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM1167.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM1158.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM1046.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/ARMSCII-8.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM1153.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/CP773.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
93 / 111
/lib/gconv/IBM870.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/MAC-CENTRALEUROPE.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM284.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/GOST_19768-74.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM1154.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM855.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM856.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM921.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/KOI-8.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/CWI.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM1163.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM500.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/CP10007.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/ANSI_X3.110.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/TCVN5712-1.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM1371.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM1132.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM9030.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/libJIS.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM930.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/CP772.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/CP1258.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/PT154.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/BIG5HKSCS.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/EUC-JISX0213.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/EBCDIC-PT.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM891.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM1141.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/ISO8859-2.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM862.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM933.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/UTF-7.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM1166.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/EBCDIC-IS-FRISS.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM1123.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/EBCDIC-FR.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM1112.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/UHC.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM1124.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/UTF-32.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/UNICODE.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/EBCDIC-CA-FR.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/ISO_5427.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM902.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/GBK.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/BIG5.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/CP1250.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM1130.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM861.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM1399.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM1144.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/NATS-SEFI.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/MAC-SAMI.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/CP1257.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM937.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM1140.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
94 / 111
/lib/gconv/KOI8-RU.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/EUC-CN.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/HP-TURKISH8.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM866NAV.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM4971.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM037.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/KOI8-U.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/ECMA-CYRILLIC.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM850.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/libISOIR165.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/ISO-2022-KR.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/ISO_2033.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM1097.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/ASMO_449.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM874.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/ISO-2022-CN.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/ISO8859-3.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/ISO8859-1.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/ISO8859-8.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM12712.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM274.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/GB18030.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM280.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/EBCDIC-DK-NO-A.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/ISO-2022-JP-3.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM1137.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM918.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM273.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM1390.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/ISO8859-15.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/TSCII.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM1388.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM1145.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/ISO-IR-209.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/EBCDIC-ES-S.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM285.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/ISO8859-9E.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM1004.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/EUC-TW.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/GBGBK.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/ISO646.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/ISIRI-3342.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/SJIS.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM904.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/DEC-MCS.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/GREEK-CCITT.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM038.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM1025.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/libJISX0213.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/GREEK7.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM1149.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/MAC-IS.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM281.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/ISO-2022-JP.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/gconv/IBM803.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib/grub/i386-pc/iso9660.module:FAIL No array on stack
95 / 111
/lib/grub/i386-pc/cat.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/hdparm.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/backtrace.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/exfat.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/usbserial_usbdebug.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/linux16.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/play.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/pxeboot.image:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/gcry_sha256.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/mdraid1x.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/sleep_test.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/part_amiga.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/ufs2.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/video_cirrus.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/usbserial_pl2303.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/squash4.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/xnu.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/memdisk.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/tga.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/ntldr.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/ata.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/testload.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/part_msdos.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/cbtable.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/lsapm.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/cpio.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/affs.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/bsd.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/bitmap_scale.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/usb_keyboard.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/file.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/cmp.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/diskboot.image:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/progress.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/pxechain.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/part_apple.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/usbserial_ftdi.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/test_blockarg.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/part_plan.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/macbless.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/search_label.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/kernel.exec:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/trig.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/zfsinfo.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/multiboot2.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/spkmodem.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/extcmd.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/elf.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/search_fs_file.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/pcidump.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/part_dfly.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/raid6rec.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/gcry_rsa.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/read.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/minix.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/tftp.module:FAIL No array on stack
96 / 111
/lib/grub/i386-pc/disk.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/vga.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/setpci.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/video.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/gcry_idea.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/cmdline_cat_test.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/legacycfg.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/minix3.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/plan9.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/biosdisk.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/bfs.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/gettext.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/gfxterm_menu.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/cmosdump.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/password.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/lzma_decompress.image:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/luks.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/cmostest.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/gcry_md5.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/tr.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/part_sunpc.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/lsacpi.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/syslinuxcfg.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/part_sun.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/romfs.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/xfs.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/time.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/search.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/macho.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/videoinfo.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/ahci.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/iorw.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/minicmd.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/cbfs.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/help.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/setjmp_test.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/adler32.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/ntfs.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/cryptodisk.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/pxe.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/video_colors.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/ldm.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/gptsync.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/archelp.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/gcry_dsa.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/odc.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/cbls.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/bufio.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/gdb.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/sendkey.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/blocklist.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/lnxboot.image:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/memrw.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/offsetio.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/nilfs2.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/png.module:FAIL No array on stack
97 / 111
/lib/grub/i386-pc/video_bochs.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/msdospart.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/gcry_rmd160.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/minix2_be.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/probe.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/verify.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/cpio_be.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/boot_hybrid.image:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/true.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/gcry_arcfour.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/nativedisk.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/datehook.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-
pc/legacy_password_test.module:FAIL
No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/minix3_be.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/crypto.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/fshelp.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/ufs1_be.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/freedos.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/zfs.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/all_video.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/crc64.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/terminfo.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/udf.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/date.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/diskfilter.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-
pc/videotest_checksum.module:FAIL
No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/gcry_camellia.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/configfile.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/mdraid09.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/blscfg.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/gfxterm.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/gcry_des.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/boot.image:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/aout.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/tar.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/efiemu.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/halt.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/afs.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/test.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/gcry_whirlpool.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/font.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/gcry_seed.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/cdboot.image:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/video_fb.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/echo.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/ext2.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/hfsplus.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/ehci.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/hfs.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/serial.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/part_gpt.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/gcry_rfc2268.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/minix_be.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/signature_test.module:FAIL No array on stack
98 / 111
/lib/grub/i386-pc/newc.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/cbtime.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/drivemap.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/usb.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/ls.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/gcry_rijndael.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/gcry_md4.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/part_dvh.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/terminal.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/cpuid.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/lvm.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/keystatus.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/hfspluscomp.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/normal.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/gcry_blowfish.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/uhci.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/priority_queue.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/net.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/jfs.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/lzopio.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/gzio.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/raid5rec.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/exfctest.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/mmap.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/gcry_twofish.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/usbtest.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/vga_text.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-
pc/gfxterm_background.module:FAIL
No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/hello.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/xnu_uuid.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/setjmp.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/pbkdf2.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/pata.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/fat.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/gfxmenu.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/acpi.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/pbkdf2_test.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/lsmmap.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/linux.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/part_acorn.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/btrfs.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/boot.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/pci.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/scsi.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/gcry_cast5.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/at_keyboard.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/functional_test.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/password_pbkdf2.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/datetime.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/gcry_crc.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/dm_nv.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/sfs.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/chain.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/relocator.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/reboot.module:FAIL No array on stack
99 / 111
/lib/grub/i386-pc/http.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/ohci.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/geli.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/hexdump.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/videotest.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/parttool.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/gcry_serpent.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/gcry_tiger.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/keylayouts.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/usbms.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/morse.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/minix2.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/gcry_sha512.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/vbe.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/jpeg.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/lspci.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/ntfscomp.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/hashsum.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/mpi.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/testspeed.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/xnu_uuid_test.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/reiserfs.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/div_test.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/mdraid09_be.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/cs5536.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/gcry_sha1.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/cbmemc.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/eval.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/xzio.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/sleep.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/mda_text.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/loadenv.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/bitmap.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/ufs1.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/regexp.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/zfscrypt.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/search_fs_uuid.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/truecrypt.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/loopback.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/part_bsd.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/procfs.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/usbserial_common.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/grub/i386-pc/multiboot.module:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/i686/nosegneg/libpthread-2.17.so:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/i686/nosegneg/librt-2.17.so:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/i686/nosegneg/libthread_db-1.0.so:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/i686/nosegneg/libc-2.17.so:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/i686/nosegneg/libm-2.17.so:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/ld-2.17.so:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/libanl-2.17.so:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/libBrokenLocale-2.17.so:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/libc-2.17.so:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/libcidn-2.17.so:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/libcrypt-2.17.so:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/libdl-2.17.so:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/libgcc_s-4.8.5-20150702.so.1:FAIL No array on stack
100 / 111
/lib/libm-2.17.so:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/libmemusage.so:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/libnsl-2.17.so:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/libnss_compat-2.17.so:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/libnss_db-2.17.so:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/libnss_dns-2.17.so:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/libnss_files-2.17.so:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/libnss_hesiod-2.17.so:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/libnss_nis-2.17.so:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/libnss_nisplus-2.17.so:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/libpcprofile.so:FAIL No character array on stack
/lib/libpthread-2.17.so:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/librt-2.17.so:FAIL No character array on stack
/lib/libSegFault.so:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/libthread_db-1.0.so:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/libutil-2.17.so:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/modules/3.10.0-
327.53.58.73.h3.x86_64/vdso/vdso32-
syscall.so:FAIL
No array on stack
/lib/modules/3.10.0-
327.53.58.73.h3.x86_64/vdso/vdso.so:FAIL
No array on stack
/lib/modules/3.10.0-
327.53.58.73.h3.x86_64/vdso/vdso32-
int80.so:FAIL
No array on stack
/lib/modules/3.10.0-
327.53.58.73.h3.x86_64/vdso/vdso32-
sysenter.so:FAIL
No array on stack
/lib/rtkaio/i686/nosegneg/librtkaio-2.17.so:FAIL No array on stack
/lib/rtkaio/librtkaio-2.17.so:FAIL No array on stack
/lib64/audit/sotruss-lib.so:FAIL No array on stack
/lib64/gconv/CP1125.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/T.61.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/ISO8859-10.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/EBCDIC-FI-SE-A.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM5347.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/VISCII.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM4899.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/CP1251.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/ISO_6937.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/CP771.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/CP1256.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/EBCDIC-DK-NO.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/INIS-CYRILLIC.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/EBCDIC-ES.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM277.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM1133.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM863.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM1142.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM1143.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM1008_420.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/CP932.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM1157.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/EUC-KR.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/SHIFT_JISX0213.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/MACINTOSH.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM1155.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
101 / 111
/lib64/gconv/INIS.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/EBCDIC-FI-SE.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM932.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/SAMI-WS2.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/ISO8859-7.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM278.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/ISO-2022-CN-EXT.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM275.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/JOHAB.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM1161.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/ISO_10367-BOX.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM4909.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM1047.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IEC_P27-1.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/libGB.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/EBCDIC-ES-A.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/GREEK7-OLD.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/libCNS.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/ISO_5428.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/EUC-JP.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/HP-ROMAN8.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM1008.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM1164.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/BRF.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/MIK.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM290.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM1148.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/CP737.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM1364.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM1026.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/MAC-UK.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/EBCDIC-UK.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM9448.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/CP1252.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM424.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM437.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM868.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/TIS-620.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM943.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/EBCDIC-IT.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/HP-GREEK8.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/GBBIG5.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/EBCDIC-AT-DE.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM860.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/RK1048.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/ISO8859-6.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM9066.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM1129.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/GEORGIAN-ACADEMY.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/ISO8859-4.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM852.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/ISO-IR-197.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/KOI8-T.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM864.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM901.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM4517.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
102 / 111
/lib64/gconv/IBM869.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/ISO8859-11.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/LATIN-GREEK-1.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM420.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM905.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/CP770.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/ISO8859-13.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/EBCDIC-US.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/CP1254.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM880.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/libKSC.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/ISO_6937-2.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/HP-THAI8.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/ISO_11548-1.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM1122.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/INIS-8.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM866.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/UTF-16.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM297.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/CSN_369103.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM1146.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/CP775.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM939.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/HP-ROMAN9.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM256.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/NATS-DANO.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/ISO8859-9.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM1162.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM935.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/ISO8859-16.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/CP774.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/EBCDIC-AT-DE-A.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM875.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM857.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM1147.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM865.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM423.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/KOI8-R.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/EUC-JP-MS.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM922.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM1156.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/ISO8859-14.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/CP1253.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM1160.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/ISO_5427-EXT.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM851.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM16804.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/LATIN-GREEK.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/ISO8859-5.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/CP1255.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM871.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/GEORGIAN-PS.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM903.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM1167.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM1158.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM1046.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
103 / 111
/lib64/gconv/ARMSCII-8.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM1153.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/CP773.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM870.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/MAC-CENTRALEUROPE.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM284.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/GOST_19768-74.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM1154.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM855.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM856.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM921.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/KOI-8.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/CWI.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM1163.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM500.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/CP10007.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/ANSI_X3.110.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/TCVN5712-1.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM1371.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM1132.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM9030.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/libJIS.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM930.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/CP772.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/CP1258.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/PT154.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/BIG5HKSCS.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/EUC-JISX0213.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/EBCDIC-PT.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM891.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM1141.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/ISO8859-2.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM862.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM933.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/UTF-7.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM1166.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/EBCDIC-IS-FRISS.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM1123.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/EBCDIC-FR.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM1112.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/UHC.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM1124.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/UTF-32.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/UNICODE.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/EBCDIC-CA-FR.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/ISO_5427.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM902.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/GBK.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/BIG5.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/CP1250.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM1130.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM861.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM1399.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM1144.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/NATS-SEFI.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/MAC-SAMI.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
104 / 111
/lib64/gconv/CP1257.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM937.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM1140.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/KOI8-RU.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/EUC-CN.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/HP-TURKISH8.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM866NAV.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM4971.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM037.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/KOI8-U.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/ECMA-CYRILLIC.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM850.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/libISOIR165.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/ISO-2022-KR.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/ISO_2033.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM1097.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/ASMO_449.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM874.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/ISO-2022-CN.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/ISO8859-3.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/ISO8859-1.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/ISO8859-8.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM12712.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM274.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/GB18030.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM280.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/EBCDIC-DK-NO-A.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/ISO-2022-JP-3.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM1137.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM918.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM273.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM1390.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/ISO8859-15.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/TSCII.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM1388.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM1145.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/ISO-IR-209.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/EBCDIC-ES-S.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM285.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/ISO8859-9E.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM1004.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/EUC-TW.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/GBGBK.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/ISO646.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/ISIRI-3342.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/SJIS.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM904.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/DEC-MCS.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/GREEK-CCITT.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM038.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM1025.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/libJISX0213.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/GREEK7.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM1149.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/MAC-IS.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM281.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
105 / 111
/lib64/gconv/ISO-2022-JP.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gconv/IBM803.so:FAIL Special attribute: __attribute ((always_inline))
/lib64/gettext/hostname:FAIL No array on stack
/lib64/ld-2.17.so:FAIL No array on stack
/lib64/libanl-2.17.so:FAIL No character array on stack
/lib64/libBrokenLocale-2.17.so:FAIL No array on stack
/lib64/libc-2.17.so:FAIL No array on stack
/lib64/libcidn-2.17.so:FAIL No array on stack
/lib64/libcrypt-2.17.so:FAIL No character array on stack
/lib64/libdl-2.17.so:FAIL No character array on stack
/lib64/libgcc_s-4.8.5-20150702.so.1:FAIL No array on stack
/lib64/libGLESv2.so.2.0.0:FAIL No character array on stack
/lib64/libgraphite2.so.3.0.1:FAIL No array on stack
/lib64/libicudata.so.50.1.2:FAIL No character array on stack
/lib64/libiptc.so.0.0.0:FAIL
Containing char array, but protected using fgets()
or incoming data len is always checked
/lib64/libjson.so.0.1.0:FAIL Long char array for printing integers, safe.
/lib64/libm-2.17.so:FAIL No array on stack
/lib64/libmemusage.so:FAIL No array on stack
/lib64/libnsl-2.17.so:FAIL No array on stack
/lib64/libnss_compat-2.17.so:FAIL No array on stack
/lib64/libnss_db-2.17.so:FAIL No array on stack
/lib64/libnss_dns-2.17.so:FAIL No array on stack
/lib64/libnss_files-2.17.so:FAIL No array on stack
/lib64/libnss_hesiod-2.17.so:FAIL No array on stack
/lib64/libnss_nis-2.17.so:FAIL No array on stack
/lib64/libnss_nisplus-2.17.so:FAIL No array on stack
/lib64/libpcprofile.so:FAIL No array on stack
/lib64/libpthread-2.17.so:FAIL No array on stack
/lib64/librt-2.17.so:FAIL No array on stack
/lib64/libSegFault.so:FAIL No array on stack
/lib64/libthread_db-1.0.so:FAIL No array on stack
/lib64/libungif.so.4.1.6:FAIL No character array on stack
/lib64/libutil-2.17.so:FAIL No array on stack
/lib64/rtkaio/librtkaio-2.17.so:FAIL No character array on stack
/usr/bin/checksctp:FAIL No character array on stack
/usr/bin/clibrary:FAIL No array on stack
/usr/bin/clibrary2:FAIL No array on stack
/usr/bin/gencat:FAIL No character array on stack
/usr/bin/getconf:FAIL No array on stack
/usr/bin/getent:FAIL No array on stack
/usr/bin/gjs-console:FAIL character array is protected by fgets()
/usr/bin/iconv:FAIL No character array on stack
/usr/bin/ldns-chaos:FAIL No character array on stack
/usr/bin/ldns-key2ds:FAIL No character array on stack
/usr/bin/ldns-read-zone:FAIL No array on stack
/usr/bin/ldns-update:FAIL No array on stack
/usr/bin/locale:FAIL No array on stack
/usr/bin/localedef:FAIL No array on stack
/usr/bin/makedb:FAIL No character array on stack
/usr/bin/mkrfc2734:FAIL No character array on stack
/usr/bin/msgcat:FAIL No array on stack
/usr/bin/msgcomm:FAIL No array on stack
/usr/bin/msgconv:FAIL No array on stack
/usr/bin/msgen:FAIL No array on stack
/usr/bin/msgexec:FAIL No array on stack
106 / 111
/usr/bin/msguniq:FAIL No array on stack
/usr/bin/pldd:FAIL No array on stack
/usr/bin/ppdhtml:FAIL No array on stack
/usr/bin/ppdi:FAIL No array on stack
/usr/bin/ppdpo:FAIL No array on stack
/usr/bin/rpcgen:FAIL No array on stack
/usr/bin/rpmdumpheader:FAIL No character array on stack
/usr/bin/sdp_long_message:FAIL No array on stack
/usr/bin/sprof:FAIL No array on stack
/usr/bin/xsetmode:FAIL No array on stack
/usr/sbin/build-locale-archive:FAIL No array on stack
/usr/sbin/capsh:FAIL Character assay on stack, protected by fgets()
/usr/sbin/dump_mem_compress:FAIL No character array on stack
/usr/sbin/dump_mem_imag:FAIL No character array on stack
/usr/sbin/dump_mem_uncompress:FAIL No character array on stack
/usr/sbin/glibc_post_upgrade.i686:FAIL
Character array on stack is used as data array,
protected by length check
/usr/sbin/glibc_post_upgrade.x86_64:FAIL No array on stack
/usr/sbin/iconvconfig:FAIL No array on stack
/usr/sbin/iconvconfig.i686:FAIL No array on stack
/usr/sbin/iconvconfig.x86_64:FAIL No array on stack
/usr/sbin/ldconfig:FAIL No array on stack
/usr/sbin/load_policy:FAIL No array on stack
/usr/sbin/lockdev:FAIL
Character array on stack are protected by length
limit (MAXPATHLEN+1)
/usr/sbin/mem_show:FAIL No character array on stack
/usr/sbin/mklost+found:FAIL
Character array on stack is protected by length
check.
/usr/sbin/nologin:FAIL
Character array on stack are protected by length
check (red())
/usr/sbin/parse_err:FAIL No array on stack
/usr/sbin/setcap:FAIL
Character array on stack are protected by length
limit (far more tahn needed)
/usr/sbin/sln:FAIL No character array on stack
/usr/sbin/tickadj:FAIL No array on stack
/usr/sbin/zdump:FAIL No array on stack
/usr/sbin/zic:FAIL No array on stack
107 / 111
A. Acronyms
Acrony
m
Meaning
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
ANSI American National Standards Institute
API Application Programming Interface
ASLR Address Space Layout Randomization
CEM Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology
Security - Evaluation Methodology, CCMB-2012-09-004, Version
3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
CESG Communications-Electronics Security Group
CMC Certificate Management over CMS
CMS Cryptographic Message Syntax
CN Common Names
CRL Certificate Revocation List
CSA Computer Security Act
108 / 111
DAC Discretionary Access Control
DEP Data Execution Prevention
DES Data Encryption Standard
DHE Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral
DNS Domain Name System
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
DSS Digital Signature Standard
DT Date/Time Vector
DTLS Datagram Transport Layer Security
EAP Extensible Authentication Protocol
ECDHE Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EST Enrollment over Secure Transport
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards
HMAC Hash-based Message Authentication Code
109 / 111
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
HTTPS Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force
IP Internet Protocol
IPA Identity, Policy, and Audit
ISO International Organization for Standardization
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
LUKS Linux Unified Key Setup
NFC Near Field Communication
NIAP National Information Assurance Partnership
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NSS Network Security Services
OCSP Online Certificate Status Protocol
OID Object Identifier
110 / 111
OMB Office of Management and Budget
OS Operating System
PII Personally Identifiable Information
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PP Protection Profile
RBG Random Bit Generator
RFC Request for Comment
RNG Random Number Generator
RNGVS Random Number Generator Validation System
SAN Subject Alternative Name
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SIP Session Initiation Protocol
S/MIME Secure/Multi-purpose Internet Mail Extensions
111 / 111
SSSD System Security Services Daemon
SWID Software Identification
TLS Transport Layer Security
URI Uniform Resource Identifier
URL Uniform Resource Locator
USB Universal Serial Bus
XCCDF eXtensible Configuration Checklist Description Format
XOR Exclusive OR