BSI-DSZ-CC-1081-2020
for
Trusted Audio Switch with fiber optic (TAS-FO)
version 1.0
from
Rohde & Schwarz Topex S.A.
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.24
BSI-DSZ-CC-1081-2020 (*)
Network Device
Trusted Audio Switch with fiber optic (TAS-FO)
version 1.0
from Rohde & Schwarz Topex S.A.
PP Conformance: None
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408
and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 31 January 2020
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Division
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 only
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1081-2020
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1081-2020 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification......................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication....................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results.......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary....................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE.............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy............................................................................................................13
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................13
5. Architectural Information.............................................................................................16
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................17
7. IT Product Testing.......................................................................................................17
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................19
9. Results of the Evaluation............................................................................................20
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................20
11. Security Target..........................................................................................................20
12. Definitions.................................................................................................................20
13. Bibliography..............................................................................................................22
C. Excerpts from the Criteria..............................................................................................24
D. Annexes.........................................................................................................................25
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1081-2020
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BSI Schedule of Costs3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
6 / 26
BSI-DSZ-CC-1081-2020 Certification Report
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2+ ALC_FLR components.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1081-2020
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Trusted Audio Switch with fiber optic (TAS-FO), version 1.0 has undergone
the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product Trusted Audio Switch with fiber optic (TAS-FO), version 1.0
was conducted by SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH. The evaluation was
completed on 10 January 2020. SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH is an
evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Rohde & Schwarz Topex S.A..
The product was developed by: Rohde & Schwarz Topex S.A.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 31 January
2020 is valid until 30 January 2025. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1081-2020 Certification Report
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product Trusted Audio Switch with fiber optic (TAS-FO), version 1.0 has been included
in the BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
Rohde & Schwarz Topex S.A.
71-73 Nicolae Caramfil Street, 2nd Floor, 1st District
014142 Bucharest
Romania
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1081-2020
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1081-2020 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a Trusted Audio Switch (TAS) as the key element in
securing RED (CLASSIFIED) audio communication by keeping the RED and the BLACK
(UNCLASSIFIED) network separated, while at the same time allowing the CWP (Controller
Working Position) to work in a secure way with both RED and BLACK signals and media.
This is visualized in Figure 1 “TOE Overview “ of the Security Target [6].
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is not based on a certified
Protection Profile.
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 8.1. They are all selected from Common Criteria Part 2. Thus
the TOE is CC Part 2 conformant.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
TSF.VFC
Voice Information Flow Control
Routing of CLASSIFIED / UNCLASSIFIED voice
information from/to SECURE/UNSECURE
domain to/from TAS-FO accessories.
TSF.MNI
Management Interface
Trusted status interface to the user.
TSF.DFC
User Interface Data Flow Control
Filter functionality for incoming and outgoing user
data.
TSF.PRT
Protection of the TSF
Addresses fail security measures.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 9.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 6.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapters 6.5 and 6.6 .
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1081-2020
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Trusted Audio Switch with fiber optic (TAS-FO), version 1.0
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW/
SW
Trusted Audio Switch with
Fiber Optics, TAS-FO V1,
CP2045.16.3
- The Trusted Audio Switch is
delivered as entire device
(packed together with its
accessories).
2 DOC AGD_PRE.1 Preparative
procedures R&S Trusted
Audio Switch TAS-FO;
Rohde & Schwarz
[filename]: RST-
AGD_PRE.1-
2003.1012.02_v14.pdf
[SHA-256]:
59E41F75F8287E58
70B518DF21D9CFA3
F35EB79B0A2B2CD9
FF5DBD70D0D57899
v.1 rev.14,
21.11.2019
Guidance documentation is
delivered in a secure way in
electronic form by signed e-mail
using S-MIME.
3 DOC AGD_OPE.1 Operational
user guidance R&S Trusted
Audio Switch TAS-FO;
Rohde & Schwarz
[filename]: RST- RST-
AGD_OPE.1-
2003.1012.02_v1.5.pdf
[SHA-256]:
0DAFB6DDCCCCA00C
C5E9251F8F6E1644
AE9FC9774F73BE92
755B4846972F883F
v.1 rev.5;
21.11.2019
Guidance documentation is
delivered in a secure way in
electronic form by signed e-mail
using S-MIME.
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE – Trusted Audio Switch with fiber optic (TAS-FO) product code: CP2045.16.3 –
is an electronic device, consisting of hardware and firmware, and additional
documentation.
The delivery of the TOE from the production facility to the customer is described in the
following:
The delivery items are secured during the logistic process from pick-up until delivery with a
transfer security tape that indicates if the package was opened during the process by
showing an “OPENED!” message if the tape was manipulated. The developer included
pictures of broken and unbroken seals in the guidance documentation. A tampered
security label can be easily distinguished from an unbroken security label.
Guidance documentation is delivered in a secure way in electronic form by signed e-mail
using S-MIME, table 2 shows the SHA-256 hash values for both documents.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1081-2020 Certification Report
For the delivery procedure, only special delivery services are used. Those have to provide
certain security measures like a box-trailer or anti-slash-curtains, the driver has to undergo
special training and be available permanently on his mobile phone. Further security
measures are described and applied.
The transport is monitored and tracked during the whole delivery process.
Furthermore the customer is obligated to perform several acceptance checks ensuring the
integrity and authenticity of the delivery. These specific checks are specified in Chapter 5
of Document No. 2 in Table 2, AGD_PRE.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. The TOE implements user data protection based on information
flow control policies addressing the separation of audio data flows. In addition, the TOE
implements policies pertaining to the following security functional classes:
• Security Audit
• Security Management
• Protection of the TSF
Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policies can be found in Chapter
8 of the Security Target [6].
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
• A.Physical_Protection: The TOE and the RED/BLACK Processing Unit are installed
in a physically protected area (operational environment) during operation which is
approved for the highest security level of information handled by the TOE.
◦ OE.Physical_Protection: The operation site shall have physical protection, which
is at least approved for the highest level of information handled in the TOE.
◦ OE.Physical_Access: Only authorized persons shall be given physical access to
the TOE, PU_RED and Recording Storage device.
◦ OE.Installation: The TOE shall be installed and maintained according to the
installation and maintenance guidelines. The installation shall assure that the
status domain of the TOE is visible to the operator and also the Red Lamp
Indicator is visible to the neighboring operators.
◦ OE.Rec: The Recording Storage device connected to the PU_RED shall be
accredited for the highest security classification processed in the system.
◦ The Recording Storage device connected to the PU_RED shall have physical
protection, which is at least approved for the highest level of information handled
in the TOE.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1081-2020
◦ The logical access to the Recording Storage device connected to the PU_RED
shall be protected but also the confidentiality during different life cycles of stored
data (i.e. audio play, secure deletion).
• A.TEMPEST_Zone: The TOE is operated in a TEMPEST zone that allows the use
of commercial of the shelf products for the processing of the highest security levels
of information handled by the TOE.
◦ OE.TEMPEST_Zone: The TOE shall be operated in a TEMPEST facility zone
that allows the use of COTS products for the processing of highest security level
of information handled in the TOE.
• A.TEMPEST_Evaluation: The TOE is evaluated against TEMPEST attacks, which
are out of scope of the CC evaluation.
◦ OE.TEMPEST_Evalutation: The TOE shall be a subject to a TEMPEST
evaluation, which is carried out independent of Common Criteria certification.
• A.Training: All operators are trained in the correct use to the TOE and Processing
Units and follow the operational guidelines.
◦ OE.Training: The operators shall be trained to use the TOE. If the TOE is
controlled via an external user interface, that is not part of the TOE, the
operators shall be trained to check the assured status domain indication at the
TOE.
• A.Authorization: All operators are authorized for all information handled by the TOE
through the minimum level of clearance for the highest security level of information
handled by the TOE.
◦ OE.Authorization: All operators shall have a minimum clearance for the
maximum-security level of information handled in the TOE. Operator activity
shall be monitored and operator shall be accountable for their actions and follow
the work instructions and operational guidance of the TOE.
◦ OE.Rec: The Recording Storage device connected to the PU_RED shall be
accredited for the highest security classification processed in the system.
◦ The Recording Storage device connected to the PU_RED shall have physical
protection, which is at least approved for the highest level of information handled
in the TOE.
◦ The logical access to the Recording Storage device connected to the PU_RED
shall be protected but also the confidentiality during different life cycles of stored
data (i.e. audio play, secure deletion).
• A.Installation: The TOE is installed and maintained according to the installation and
maintenance guidelines.
◦ OE.Installation: The TOE shall be installed and maintained according to the
installation and maintenance guidelines. The installation shall assure that the
status domain of the TOE is visible to the operator and also the Red Lamp
Indicator is visible to the neighboring operators.
◦ OE.Cabling: The Fiber Optic connection between Processing Units and TOE
shall use the appropriate connectors:
▪ PU_RED shall be connected to “SECURE FO” Fiber Optic connector;
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1081-2020 Certification Report
▪ PU_BLACK shall be connected to “UNSECURE FO” Fiber Optic connector.
◦ OE.Rec: The Recording Storage device connected to the PU_RED shall be
accredited for the highest security classification processed in the system.
◦ The Recording Storage device connected to the PU_RED shall have physical
protection, which is at least approved for the highest level of information handled
in the TOE.
◦ The logical access to the Recording Storage device connected to the PU_RED
shall be protected but also the confidentiality during different life cycles of stored
data (i.e. audio play, secure deletion).
• A.Audio_Devices: Appropriate audio devices and associated cables prevent
unacceptable acoustic coupling between:
▪ Earpiece and microphone
▪ Ambient noise and microphone
▪ This does not hold up for the handset.
◦ OE.Audio Devices: Appropriate Audio devices, Headsets or Handset, shall be
used in order to prevent unacceptable acoustic coupling between:
▪ Headset, when receiving CLASSIFIED voice information while transmitting
UNCLASSIFIED voice information.
▪ A neighboring operator and the microphone of the operator, when the
neighboring operator is talking CLASSIFIED information while the operator
transmits UNCLASSIFIED voice information.
◦ To prevent neighboring acoustic coupling, the operator shall ensure that the PTT
is inactive if the TOE is in Unsecure state and External Red Lamp Indicator is
On at the neighbor Operator.
• A.PU: Voice Information from the PU_RED is separated from the PU_BLACK.
Vulnerabilities of the Processing Units or its Connections are not part of the TOE
and its evaluation.
◦ PU_RED communication channels that leave the operational environment are
either encrypted with approved crypto devices or implemented as approved
circuits (SECURE channels). Vulnerabilities of this out of bounds RED
communication channels are not part of the TOE and its evaluation.
◦ OE.PU: The voice information transmitted by the PU_RED shall be strictly
separated (logical or physical) from the voice information transmitted by the
PU_BLACK. All communication channels of the PU_RED that leave the
operational environment either shall be encrypted with approved crypto devices
or implemented as approved circuits (SECURE channels).
• A.RED_PU: The PU_RED is accredited for the highest security classification
processed in the system.
◦ OE.RED_PU: The PU_RED shall be accredited for the highest security
classification processed in the system.
◦ OE.Rec: The Recording Storage device connected to the PU_RED shall be
accredited for the highest security classification processed in the system.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1081-2020
◦ The Recording Storage device connected to the PU_RED shall have physical
protection, which is at least approved for the highest level of information handled
in the TOE.
◦ The logical access to the Recording Storage device connected to the PU_RED
shall be protected but also the confidentiality during different life cycles of stored
data (i.e. audio play, secure deletion).
• A.Video: The TED displays the RED/BLACK video streams provided by the TOE
separated in such a way that it is visible that the TOE is operating in the intended
transfer mode SECURE/UNSECURE.
◦ OE.Video: The Touch Entry Displays that are used to connect to the TOE and
provide separated touch areas are only operated in the SECURE physical
operational environment to assure only accountable personnel is using the TED
and the displays are not manipulated.
• OE.Neighbour_Acoustic_Coupling: Each operator is made unambiguously aware of
the domain status of a neighboring operator by watching the Red Lamp Indicator.
• Operational procedures, not technical solutions, shall regulate concurrent use of
CLASSIFIED and UNCLASSIFIED conversations to prevent acoustic coupling of
CLASSIFIED conversations to be transmitted on UNCLASSIFIED communication
channels.
Please note that some security objectives for the operational environment cover more than
one assumption. In such a case the security objective for the operational environment has
been repeated several times in the first level of the list. For the security objective
OE.Neighbour_Acoustic_Coupling no assumption is given because it is derived from the
Threat T.Acoustic_Coupling.
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 7.2 and the guidance
documentation, Table 2 No. 2, AGD_PRE, chapter 6.1.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE – Trusted Audio Switch with fiber optic (TAS-FO) product code: CP2045.16.3 –
is a stand-alone product intended to be used in a wider network structure.
The physical scope comprises the Trusted Audio Switch itself together with its interfaces.
Based on these physical interfaces the TOE is divided into the following four functional
blocks:
1. The audio path, including the Headset Connectors, External Speaker and
Footswitch PTT (digital plus analogical signals), with RED and BLACK concept
separation;
2. the video path, including the HDMI connector, with Red and Black separation;
3. the decision block, which is managing the switching action between RED
(CLASSIFIED) domain and BLACK (UNCLASSIFIED) domain, including the USB
Touch connector and the External Mechanical RED/BLACK Selector Switch;
4. the data filter, where the TOE protects communication with RED and BLACK
Processing Units, including the Gigabit Fiber Optic Interfaces and the trusted filter
block, which is performing deep inspection on the specific Ethernet packets that
transit from one domain to another.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1081-2020 Certification Report
A general overview about the external equipment together with a sketched internal
overview can be taken from the Security Target [6], Figure 1: TOE Overview.
A more detailed view on the TOE is given by the developer in the TOE design
documentation as follows.
All subsystems of the TOE are identified as TSF subsystems and the developer has
distinguished four TSF subsystems (cf. listing above):
• Data Filter Flow Control
• Video Data Flow Control
• Voice Data Flow Control
• State Control
This subsystems are realized as a combination of software and hardware, as follows:
• FPGA configured with logic blocks defined by the developer, supported by logic
blocks provided by the FPGA supplier for generic functions (Ethernet connection,
memory access and video output);
• integrated circuits to drive external interfaces (network, audio, video);
• a microcontroller with firmware written by the developer using libraries provided by
the supplier to drive the USB interface.
Together with the circuit board, which physically supports and connects the hardware
components, and the casing, which makes the external interfaces and LEDs accessible to
the user, these subsystems constitute the TOE.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
The TOE has only one configuration but depending on each test case, the test
environment can differ from one test case to another.
Test Configuration
The test configuration consists of:
1. TAS-FO
2. Compact CWP RB-FO
3. Compact CWP RB-FO
4. 2 x AC/DC power supplies
5. Power source PWR2X – 50WAC
6. Touch Screen Monitor (1024x768)
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7. Touch Screen Monitor (1280x1024)
8. External RED/BLACK switch
9. External RED/BLACK lamp indicator
10.Laptop (with AC Adapter and mouse)
11. Loud Speaker
12.Ethernet Switch
13.Headset
14.Handset
15.Foot Switch PTT
16.Fiber Optic LC-LC 5 m length black color
17.Fiber Optic LC-LC 5 m length red color
18.3 x RJ45 patch cords
The tests of the TOE are carried out in the test environment provided by the developer.
The entire developer test configuration and the test protocols were provided to the
evaluator.
The PC has installed the ORACLE VM Virtual Box program, which has installed an Ubuntu
virtual machine (the Network setting must be set to Bridge). The virtual machine is used to
write/build the test application and to access via ssh the PU_RED and PU_BLACK
terminals.
The Visual Studio Code program (installed on virtual machine) stores the code, which is
written in the C programming language and was developed to test the TOE functionality.
The result application is called x2tas_debug. This application is based on raw sockets and
was developed for testing purposes. The basic concept of low level sockets is to send a
single packet at one time, with all the protocol headers filled in by the program (instead of
the kernel).
The communication between the TOE and the Processing Units (PUs) is made over two
fiber optic channels. The packets exchanged between the TOE and the PUs are 802.3
Ethernet packets without a 802.1Q VLAN tag or IP headers.
The raw sockets can create a header for a packet when the packet is sent. With raw
sockets one can get all the headers i.e. Ethernet, TCP, IP etc. from the network and can
inject packets with custom headers and data into the network directly.
The x2tas_debug application is used to create the Ethernet header. The Ethernet frame
payload has a custom structure based on a proprietary Ethertype. The x2tas_debug
application can be run, depending on each test case, on PU_RED or PU_BLACK or both.
The application sends frames from specific MAC source address (PUs) to specific MAC
destination address (TOEs) with specific Ethertype and payload data (according to the
chosen test case option / ID).
In order to ensure that the frames are sent / received to / from the TOE the "tcpdump"
packet analyzer is used. “tcpdump” prints out a description of the contents of packets on a
network interface that matches the boolean expression. In the test cases steps are
specified on which processing unit (PU_RED or PU_BLACK) to start the tcpdump capture.
The tcpdump packet analyzer can be run from both sides of the connection between the
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TOE and the PUs either with a specific filter or without any filter option to see all
exchanging packets.
Testing approach
The developer defined several groups of TOE functionality requirements (Hwx/Swx) and
several test cases for all those functional requirements. Each requirement gives a
statement about behaviour of the TOE’s subsystems as hardware or implemented
software under a certain situation.
Each test case includes the purpose, a test pre-condition, the TOE functionality
requirements (HWx/SWx) that would be tested, an acceptance criteria, a step-by-step plan
for the interactive test and expected behaviour of subsystem or module for each step.
To ensure that the security functionality (SFRs) is covered as well by test cases, the
developer also mapped all relevant test cases directly to SFRs.
The developer specified and implemented test cases for each defined TSFI and each
subsystem/module. Thus, all subsystems are covered by several test cases and each
SFR-enforcing module is covered by at least one test case.
Developer Results
All test cases were executed successfully and ended up with the expected result.
7.1. Independent Evaluator Tests
For independent testing the original test environment provided by the developer has been
used. Therefore the test configuration as well as the testing approach was the same as
already reported.
All of the developer tests are interactive. The evaluators repeated all tests which are
important for a correct implementation of the security relevant functionality of the TOE.
As not all of the developer tests are relevant for security aspects of the TOE, the developer
tests have been chosen so that they cover all security functionality requirements and all
subsystems of the TOE. Additionally some not security relevant functional testing and
hardware visual inspection was done. Furthermore a set of 3 independent tests were
developed and executed.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
The TOE is integrated into a standard 1 RU chassis, secured by a Transfer Security Label
covering the rear/left and rear/right chassis screws. The product label should show the
following informations:
• Trusted Audio Switch with Fiber Optic
• TAS-FO V1
• CP2045.16.3
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9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
The evaluation has confirmed:
● for the Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The TOE does not include cryptographic mechanisms. Thus, no such mechanisms were
part of the assessment.
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
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BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
CWP Controller working Position
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
FO Fiber Optic
FPGA Field-Programmable Gate Array
HW Hardware
ID Identifier
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
IP Internet Protocol
LED Light-Emitting Diode
PP Protection Profile
PTT Push To Talk
PU Processing Unit
PU_BLACK Processing Unit Black
PU_RED Processing Unit Red
RU Rack Unit
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
SW Software
TAS Trusted Audio Switch
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TED Touch Entry Device
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
USB Universal Serial Bus
VLAN Virtual LAN
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12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
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[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1081-2020, Version 1.7, Revision 13, 24.09.2019, R&S
Trusted Audio Switch, Rohde & Schwarz Topex S.A.
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.9, 16.12.2019, Evaluation Technical Report
(ETR), SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH, (confidential document)
[8] Configuration list for the TOE, Edition 2, Revision 3, 25.11.2019, ALC_CMS.4
Problem tracking CM coverage R&S Trusted Audio Switch TAS-FO, Rhode &
Schwarz (confidential document)
[9] AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures R&S Trusted Audio Switch TAS-FO; Silvia
Voinea, Rohde & Schwarz; v.1 rev.14; 21.11.2019 filename: RST-AGD_PRE.1-
2003.1012.02_v14.pdf
[10] AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance R&S Trusted Audio Switch TAS-FO; Silvia
Voinea, Rohde & Schwarz; v.1 rev.5; 21.11.2019 filename: RST-AGD_OPE.1-
2003.1012.02_v1.5.pdf
7
specifically
• AIS 1, Version 14, 11.10.2017, Durchführung der Ortsbesichtigung in der Entwicklungsumgebung
des Herstellers
• AIS 14, Version 7, 03.08.2010, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt von Einzelprüfberichten für
Evaluationen nach CC
• AIS 19, Version 9, 03.11.2014, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der Zusammenfassung des
ETR für Evaluationen nach CC
• AIS 23, Version 4, 15.03.2017, Zusammentragen von Nachweisen der Entwickler
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailled definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
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Note: End of report
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