TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V.
Headoffice:
Westervoortsedijk 73
NL-6827 AV Arnhem
P.O. Box 2220
NL-6802 CE Arnhem
The Netherlands
Location Leek:
Eiberkamp 10
NL-9351 VT Leek
P.O. Box 37
NL-9350 AA Leek
The Netherlands
info@nl.tuv.com
www.tuv.com/nl
Tel. +31 (0)88 888 7 888
Fax +31 (0)88 888 7 879
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. is a
registered company at the Dutch
Chamber of Commerce under
number 27288788
VAT number: NL815820380B01
IBAN: NL61DEUT0265155096
Version
2021-1
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Certification Report
ePassport configuration of SECORA™ ID S Infineon Applet
Collection - eMRTD V1.1
Sponsor and developer: Infineon Technologies AG
Am Campeon 1-15,
85579 Neubiberg,
Germany
Evaluation facility: Brightsight B.V
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-0075541-CR2
Report version: 1
Project number: 0075541_2
Author(s): Andy Brown
Date: 27 April 2021
Number of pages: 15
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS:
Foreword 3
Recognition of the certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 7
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 7
2.2 Security Policy 8
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 9
2.4 Architectural Information 9
2.5 Documentation 10
2.6 IT Product Testing 10
2.7 Re-used evaluation results 12
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 12
2.9 Results of the Evaluation 12
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 12
3 Security Target 13
4 Definitions 13
5 Bibliography 14
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. has the task of issuing
certificates for IT security products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the
Interior and Kingdom Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TÜV Rheinland
Nederland B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a license is
accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation
of calibration and testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. asserts that the product or
site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that
the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common
Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification
document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation,
the IT product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the certificate
Presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement and SOG-IS logos on the certificate
indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and the SOG-IS
agreement and will be recognised by the participating nations.
International recognition
The CCRA has been signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC. Starting September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide mutual
recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance components
up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification
schemes can be found on: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The European SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) version 3 effective from April
2010 provides mutual recognition of Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation
level for all products. A higher recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (resp. E3-basic) is
provided for products related to specific technical domains. This agreement was initially signed by
Finland, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy
joined the SOGIS-MRA in December 2010. The current list of signatory nations, approved certification
schemes and the list of technical domains for which the higher recognition applies can be found on:
http://www.sogisportal.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the
ePassport configuration of SECORA™ ID S Infineon Applet Collection - eMRTD V1.1. The developer
of the ePassport configuration of SECORA™ ID S Infineon Applet Collection - eMRTD V1.1 is Infineon
Technologies AG located in Neubiberg, Germany and they also act as the sponsor of the evaluation
and certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the
suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their particular requirements.
The TOE consists of the Infineon ePassport configuration of the SECORA™ ID S platform with an
eMRTD application. It is based on the requirements from the ICAO for machine readable travel
documents, i.e. [ICAO-9303-10], [ICAO-9303-11], [TR-03110-1] and [TR-03110-3]. This ePassport
product provides the travel document application containing the related user data as well as data
needed for authentication with BAC, PACE, EAC or AA protocols (including PACE/BAC passwords).
It is a dual-interface product, where the ISO/IEC 14443 Type B [ISO14443] interface is present for the
ePassport functionality while the ISO/IEC 7816 [ISO7816] protocol is supported for the purposes of
eID and eDL applications.
The TOE has been originally evaluated by Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands and was
certified on 27 May 2020. The re-evaluation also took place by Brightsight B.V. and was completed on
27 April 2021 with the approval of the ETR. The re-certification procedure has been conducted in
accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security
[NSCIB].
This second issue of the Certification Report is a result of a “recertification with major changes”.
The major changes are due to a change in the underlying platform which has been recertified in
composition with the hardware. This re-certification has resulted in updates ST, Guidance and ETR for
Composition.
The developer has introduced the following changes to the TOE which do not impact its security
assurance.
 Product version is changed as result of changes introduced in the certified platform.
 A bug is fixed in the certifying platform allowing PACE support for ECC 521 in the applet
 TOE identification data of the underlying certified platform is updated
 Available user NVM for applet is updated in guidance.
 The STARs for the sites are updated.
 Test results showing that the applet is tested on the re-certified platform are provided.
The security evaluation re-used the evaluation results of previously performed evaluations. A full, up to
date vulnerability analysis has been made. For this recertification, no additional testing has been
required.
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the ePassport configuration of SECORA™ ID S
Infineon Applet Collection - eMRTD V1.1, the security requirements, and the level of confidence
(evaluation assurance level) at which the product is intended to satisfy the security requirements.
Consumers of the ePassport configuration of SECORA™ ID S Infineon Applet Collection - eMRTD
V1.1 are advised to verify that their own environment is consistent with the security target, and to give
due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR]
1
for this product provides sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets:
- EAL5 augmented (EAL5+) assurance requirements when authentication method PACE, with
or without EAC, is selected. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency
of security measures) and AVA_VAN.5 (Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis).
1
The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not releasable for public review.
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- EAL4 augmented (EAL4+) assurance requirements when authentication method BAC is
selected. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security
measures).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 and [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets
all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will
be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list. It should be noted that the certification results only apply
to the specific version of the product as evaluated.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the ePassport configuration of SECORA™ ID S
Infineon Applet Collection - eMRTD V1.1 from Infineon Technologies AG located in Neubiberg,
Germany.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
IC Hardware Infineon Security Controller IFX_CCI_000003h,
IFX_CCI_000005h, IFX_CCI_000008h, IFX_CCI_00000Ch,
IFX_CCI_000013h, IFX_CCI_000014h, IFX_CCI_000015h,
IFX_CCI_00001Ch, IFX_CCI_00001Dh, IFX_CCI_000021h,
IFX_CCI_000022h H13 including the products from the
second production line and optional software packages:
Flash Loader, Asymmetric Crypto Library, Symmetric
Cryptographic Library, Hardware Support Layer, Hash Crypto
Library, Mifare Compatible Software, and CIPURSE™ Crypto
Library
Identifier: IFX_CCI_000005h is used for the TOE.
HW-Version: H13
FW-Version:
80.100.17.3
IC
Dedicated
Software
ACL (Asymmetric Crypto Library), which is comprised of:
 Base library
 RSA2048/4096
 EC
 Toolbox
V2.07.003
HSL (Hardware Support Library) V03.12.8812
SCL (Symmetric Crypto Library) V02.04.002
MCS Not Used
HCL (Hash Crypto Library) Not Used
IC
Embedded
Software
Embedded OS, SECORA™ID S v1.1 (SLJ52GxxyyyzS)
x = Available interface (C=contact, L=contactless, D=dual-
interface)
x = RSA cryptography (T=2K RSA, A=4K RSA)
yyy = Available user memory in KB
z = Product placement (A=ePassport and eID, B=eDL,
H=ePassport and eID with VHBR)
Note: For platform configurations used for the TOE as listed
in the separate table below
1442
IC
Embedded
Software
eMRTD Applet 1.1
Platform configurations used for the TOE.
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Platform for TOE Description
SLJ52GDTyyyAS eMRTD V1.1 for ePassport and eID
SLJ52GLTyyyAS eMRTD V1.1 for ePassport and eID
SLJ52GCTyyyAS eMRTD V1.1 for eID
SLJ52GDTyyyHS eMRTD V1.1 for ePassport and eID
SLJ52GLTyyyHS eMRTD V1.1 for ePassport and eID
SLJ52GDTyyyBS eMRTD V1.1 for eDL
SLJ52GLTyyyBS eMRTD V1.1 for eDL
SLJ52GCTyyyBS eMRTD V1.1 for eDL
Note: The available user memory indicated with yyy is customer selectable. The maximum memory
size available is yyy=080 indicating 80KB.
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided together with the ePassport
configuration of SECORA™ ID S Infineon Applet Collection - eMRTD V1.1. Details can be found in
section 2.5 of this report.
For a detailed and precise description of the TOE lifecycle refer to the [ST], chapter 2.6.4.
2.2 Security Policy
The TOE has the following features (listed per operating phase):
Personalization phase
 Authentication and secure channel using the certified platform implemented Global Platform
[GP] functionality using SCP03 [GP-AMD-D].
 Configuration of the TOE.
 Create and populate LDS binary files with the user data.
 Configure SM level for biometric data access.
 Write the document Security Object (SOD).
 Initialize the keys required for secure communication.
 Load authentication keys in encrypted form.
 Write the initial CVCA Public Key, CVCA certificate and Current Date.
 Set TOE life cycle to Operational Use Phase where ISD functionality is permanently disabled.
Operational phase
 Verifying authenticity and integrity as well as securing confidentiality of user data in the
communication channel between the TOE and the connected terminal supporting the
protocols BAC, SAC (PACE) as per [ICAO-9303-11] and EAC as per [TR-03110-1]. PACE
supports Generic Mapping.
 Averting of inconspicuous tracing of the travel document as per [TR-03110-1].
 Self-protection of the TOE security functionality and the data stored inside as per [TR-03110-
1].
 Means to check authenticity of the terminal, Terminal Authentication as per [TR-03110-1]
 Means to prove authenticity of the chip by means of Active Authentication or Chip
Authentication as per [TR-03110-1].
 Chip authentication followed by terminal authentication used as a precondition to provide
access to biometric data known as EAC, as per [TR-03110-1].
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2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. Detailed information on these
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment can be found in section 5 of the [ST].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
Note that the ICAO MRTD infrastructure critically depends on the objectives for the environment to be
met. These are not weaknesses of this particular TOE, but aspects of the ICAO MRTD infrastructure
as a whole.
The environment in which the TOE is personalized must perform proper and safe personalization
according to the guidance and referred ICAO guidelines.
The environment in which the TOE is used must ensure that the inspection system protects the
confidentiality and integrity of the data send and read from the TOE.
2.4 Architectural Information
The TOE consists of the Infineon ePassport configuration of the SECORA™ ID S platform with an
eMRTD application. It is based on the requirements from the ICAO for machine readable travel
documents, i.e. [ICAO-9303-10], [ICAO-9303-11], [TR-03110-1] and [TR-03110-3]. This ePassport
product provides the travel document application containing the related user data as well as data
needed for authentication with BAC, PACE, EAC or AA protocols (including PACE/BAC passwords).
It is a dual-interface product, where the ISO/IEC 14443 Type B [ISO14443] interface is present for the
ePassport functionality while the ISO/IEC 7816 [ISO7816] protocol is supported for the purposes of
eID and eDL applications.
The Security IC is the certified [CERT-HW] Infineon smart card controller (BSI-DSZ-CC-1110-V3-
2020) conforming [PP-0084]. It contains firmware and cryptographic libraries falling under the same
certification identifier. The operating system is the certified Infineon SECORA™ ID S v1.1 Java Card
OS with certification identifier NSCIB-CC-21-175887 [CERT-PLAT], conforming to [PP-JC] which is the
Java Card platform of the TOE. The Java Card platform supports Java Card Classic v3.0.5 [JC-305].
The ePassport functionality is implemented as a Java Card application on this platform.
The logical architecture, originating from the Security Target [ST] can be depicted as in Figure 1. The
grey coloured components are depicting the TOE components. The white coloured components, i.e.
eDL (electronic driver’s license) and eID (electronic identification) applications can be instantiated from
the existing ePassport functionality however no claims are made as part of [ST]. Furthermore, any
Third-party applications are not in scope of the evaluation.
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Logical architecture of the TOE.
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Identifier Version
Infineon Applet Collection eMRTD Administration Guide SLJ52GxxyyyzS
V1.1
1.0, 2020-12-08
Infineon Applet Collection eMRTD Databook SLJ52GxxyyyzS V1.1 1.0, 2020-12-08
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The developer performed extensive testing on FSP, subsystem, module and module interface level.
The tests were performed by the developer through execution of the test scripts using an automated
system. Test tools and scripts were extensively used to verify that the tests return expected values.
Code coverage analysis was used by the developer to verify overall test completeness. Test benches
for the various TOE parts are executed using code coverage measurement and analysis tools to
determine the code coverage (i.e. lines, branches and/or instructions, depending on tool) of each test
bench. Cases with incomplete coverage were analysed. For each tool, the developer investigated and
documented inherent limitations that could lead to coverage being reported as less than 100%. In
such cases the developer provided a “gap” analysis with rationales.
The evaluator evaluated ATE based on code coverage analysis. The evaluator also used an
acceptable alternative approach (as described in the application notes, Section 14.2.2 in [CEM]) and
used analysis of the implementation representation (i.e. inspection of source code) to validate the
rationales provided by the developer. During the re-evaluation the developer provided updated test
results showing that the e-MRTD was tested on the re-certified platform.
During the baseline evaluation the evaluator repeated a selection of developer tests that cover various
aspects of the TOE, as well as areas where the code coverage approach has limitations. Additionally,
the witnessing session was used to sample and check the actual test results. During the re-evaluation
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the developer tests were not repeated, because the test results provided by the developer show that
identical tests were performed as for the base evaluation.
Evaluator-defined tests were chosen to supplement the developer’s extensive testing. Six evaluator-
defined tests were performed. During the re-evaluation these tests have not been repeated. The
evaluator analysis shows that the changes that were introduced did not require repeating these tests
and the tests performed during the base evaluation also provided sufficient assurance for the re-
evaluation.
2.6.2 Independent Penetration Testing
The methodical analysis performed was conducted along the following steps:
 When evaluating the evidence in the classes ADV and AGD, potential vulnerabilities for all
eMRTD authentication methods were identified from generating questions to the type of TOE
and the specified behaviour. From the ASE class, no potential vulnerabilities were identified.
 For ADV_IMP a thorough implementation representation review was performed on the TOE
considering all eMRTD authentication methods. During this attack oriented analysis, the
protection against the attack scenarios was analysed using the knowledge gained from all
previous evaluation classes. This resulted in the identification of additional potential
vulnerabilities. This analysis was supported by the attack list in [JIL-AM] and application of
attack potential in [JIL-AAPS].
 All potential vulnerabilities were analysed using the knowledge gained from all evaluation
classes and the public domain. A judgment was made on how to assure that these potential
vulnerabilities are not exploitable. For most of the potential vulnerabilities a penetration test
was defined. Several potential vulnerabilities were found to be not exploitable due to an
impractical attack path.
Potential vulnerabilities were grouped per similarity and addressed by penetration testing aiming at the
weakest case. A total of six tests were performed, one perturbation and five software attacks, which
were applicable for all eMRTD authentication methods provided by the TOE. A total of two weeks test
effort was used. Many of the attack categories were already addressed by the certified platform.
During the re-evaluation the vulnerability analysis was refreshed, although these tests have not been
repeated. The evaluator analysis showed that the changes introduced did not require the tests to be
repeated and the tests performed during the baseline evaluation provided sufficient assurance also for
the re-evaluation.
2.6.3 Test Configuration
The penetration tests were performed on an actual TOE sample in its evaluated configuration of the
baseline evaluation. Some tests were performed in a pre-personalized state while most were
performed in personalized state. Samples were provided in ID-1 form factor with a memory size of
80KB.
2.6.4 Testing Results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e. from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
The algorithmic security level exceeds 100 bits for all evaluated cryptographic functionality as required
for high attack potential (AVA_VAN.5).
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2.7 Re-used evaluation results
This is a re-certification. Documentary evaluation results of the earlier version of the TOE have been
re-used, but vulnerability analysis has been renewed. For this recertification, no additional evaluator
testing was required.
There has been extensive re-use of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the development and
production of the TOE, by use of 5 Site Technical Audit Re-use reports.
No sites have been visited as part of this evaluation.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number ePassport configuration of SECORA™
ID S Infineon Applet Collection - eMRTD V1.1.
2.9 Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the ePassport configuration of
SECORA™ ID S Infineon Applet Collection - eMRTD V1.1, to be CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3
conformant, and to meet the requirements of EAL 5 augmented ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 for
PACE authentication (with or without EAC selected) and EAL 4 augmented ALC_DVS.2 for BAC
authentication. This implies that the product satisfies the security requirements specified in Security
Target [ST].
The Security Target claims ‘strict’ conformance to:
 [PP-0055], if a BIS chooses BAC as authentication method
 [PP-0068], if a BIS chooses PACE as authentication method
 [PP-0056], if a EIS choses PACE as authentication method and additionally uses Extended
Access Control, which consists of two parts (i) the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 (v.1)
and (ii) the Terminal Authentication Protocol Version 1 (v.1) as defined in [TR-03110-1].
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 contains necessary information about the usage of the
TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the countermeasures against
attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the software and the hardware
part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations for the user apart from
following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant details with respect to
the resistance against certain attacks.
In addition all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he
should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from
the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: none.
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3 Security Target
The Security Target, ePassport configuration of SECORA™ ID S Applet Collection - eMRTD V1.1,
v1.3, 12 April 2021 [ST] is included here by reference.
4 Definitions
This list of Acronyms and the glossary of terms contains elements that are not already defined by the
CC or CEM:
AA Active Authentication
BAC Basic Access Control
CA Chip Authentication
CVCA Country Verifying Certificate Authority
EAC Extended Access Control
eDL Electronic Driver’s Licence
eID Electronic Identification
eMRTD Electronic Machine Readable Travel Document
IC Integrated Circuit
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
ISD Issuer Security Domain
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
LDS Logical Data Structure
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT security
PACE Password Authentication Connection Establishment
PP Protection Profile
SAC Supplemental Access Control
SM Secure Messaging
SOD Security Object
TA Terminal Authentication
TOE Target of Evaluation
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®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report:
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and III,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5, April 2017.
[CERT-HW] Certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-1110-V3-2020, Infineon Security Controller
IFX_CCI_000003h, IFX_CCI_000005h, IFX_CCI_000008h, IFX_CCI_00000Ch,
IFX_CCI_000013h, IFX_CCI_000014h, IFX_CCI_000015h, IFX_CCI_00001Ch,
IFX_CCI_00001Dh, IFX_CCI_000021h, IFX_CCI_000022h H13 and including
optional software packages and dedicated firmware in several versions, 13 May
2020.
[CERT-PLAT] Certificate, CC-21-175887, SECORA™ ID S v1.1 (SLJ52GxxyyyzS), EAL6
augmented with ALC_FLR.1, 05 March 2021.
[ETR-COMP] ETR for Composite Evaluation SECORA™ ID S v1.1, 19-RPT-630, Version 7.0, 02
March 2021.
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report Infineon “ePassport configuration of SECORA™ ID S
Infineon Applet Collection - eMRTD V1.1” EAL4+ for BAC, EAL5+ for EAC-PACE
and EAL5+ for PACE, 20-RPT-050, version 6.0, 16 April 2021.
[GP-AMD-D] Global Platform Card Technology, Secure Channel Protocol 03, Card Specification
v2.2 – Amendment D, Version 1.0, April 2009, GlobalPlatform, Inc.
[GP] Global Platform Card Specification, v2.3.1, March 2018, GlobalPlatform, Inc.
[ICAO-9303-10] ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, Seventh Edition, 2015,
Part 10: Logical Data Structure (LDS) for Storage of Biometrics and Other Data in
the Contactless Integrated Circuit (IC), ICAO
[ICAO-9303-11] ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, Seventh Edition, 2015,
Part 11: Security Mechanisms for MRTDs.
[ISO14443] ISO/IEC 14443 Proximity Cards - Part 3: Initialization and anti-collision - ISO/IEC
14443- 3:2011.
ISO/IEC 14443 Proximity Cards - Part 4: Transmission protocol - ISO/IEC 14443-
2:2008.
[ISO7816] ISO/IEC 7816-4: Part 4: Identification cards - Integrated circuit cards -
Organization, security and commands for interchange, ISO, November 2006.
[JC-305] Java Card Platform, Classic Edition 3.0.5 JCRE, JCAPI and JCVM specifications.
[JIL-AAPS] JIL Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 3.1, June 2020.
[JIL-AM] Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.4, January 2020
(sensitive with controlled distribution).
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.5, 28
March 2019.
[PP-0055] Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO Application”,
Basic Access Control, registered under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0055, version
1.1, 25 March 2009.
[PP-0056] Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with ICAO Application,
Extended Access Control with PACE (EAC PP), registered under the reference
BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012, Version 1.3.2, 05 December 2012.
Page: 15/15 of report number: NSCIB-CC-0075541-CR2, dated 27 April 2021
®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
[PP-0068] Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard Inspection
Procedure with PACE, registered under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-MA-01,
Version 1.0.1, 22 July 2014.
[PP-0084] Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages Version 1.0,
registered under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014, 13 January 2014.
[PP-JC] Java Card Protection Profile – Open Configuration, Oracle, registered under the
reference ANSSI-CCPP-2010/03-M01, v3.0, May 2012.
[ST-PLAT] SECORA™ ID S v1.1 (SLJ52GxxyyyzS) Security Target, Rev. 1.9, 27 January
2021.
[ST] Security Target, ePassport configuration of SECORA™ ID S Applet Collection -
eMRTD V1.1, v1.3, 12 April 2021.
[TR-03110-1] Technical Guideline TR-03110, Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine
Readable Travel Documents and eIDAS Token - Part 1 - eMRTD with
BAC/PACEv2 and EACv1, Version 2.20, 26 February 2015.
[TR-03110-3] Technical Guideline TR-03110, Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine
Readable Travel Documents and eIDAS Token - Part 3: Common Specifications,
Version 2.21, 21 December 2016.
(This is the end of this report).