National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for the
Apple iOS 9.2 VPN Client on iPhone and iPad devices using
the A7 or A8/A8X processor
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-10714-2016
Dated: March 10, 2016
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
®
TM
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Patrick Mallett, PhD
Ken Stutterheim
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
W. Dean Freeman, CISSP
Anthony Busciglio
Acumen Security, LLC
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary............................................................................................................... 4
2 Identification.......................................................................................................................... 5
3 Architectural Information .................................................................................................... 6
4 Security Policy........................................................................................................................ 7
4.1 Cryptographic Support..................................................................................................................................7
4.2 User Data Protection ......................................................................................................................................7
4.3 Identification and Authentication .................................................................................................................7
4.4 Security Management ....................................................................................................................................8
4.5 Protection of the TSF .....................................................................................................................................8
4.6 Trusted Path/Channels ..................................................................................................................................8
5 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope ................................................................. 9
5.1 Assumptions....................................................................................................................................................9
5.2 Threats.............................................................................................................................................................9
5.3 Clarification of Scope...................................................................................................................................10
6 Documentation..................................................................................................................... 11
7 TOE Evaluated Configuration ........................................................................................... 12
7.1 Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................................................12
8 IT Product Testing............................................................................................................... 13
8.1 Developer Testing .........................................................................................................................................13
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing.......................................................................................................13
9 Results of the Evaluation .................................................................................................... 14
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target .....................................................................................................................14
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation...............................................................................................14
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents............................................................................................................14
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities...............................................................................................15
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity .........................................................................15
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity ..............................................................................................................15
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results..................................................................................................................15
10 Validator Comments & Recommendations ...................................................................... 17
11 Annexes................................................................................................................................. 18
12 Security Target .................................................................................................................... 19
13 Glossary ................................................................................................................................ 20
14 Bibliography......................................................................................................................... 21
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1 Executive Summary
This Validation Report (VR) is intended to assist the end user of this product and any security
certification Agent for that end user in determining the suitability of this Information Technology
(IT) product for their environment. End users should review the Security Target (ST), which is
where specific security claims are made, in conjunction with this VR, which describes how those
security claims were tested and evaluated and any restrictions on the evaluated configuration.
Prospective users should carefully read the Assumptions and Clarification of Scope in Section 5
and the Validator Comments in Section 10, where any restrictions on the evaluated configuration
are highlighted.
This report documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) assessment of the
evaluation of the Apple iOS 9.2 VPN Client on iPhone and iPad devices using the A7 or
A8/A8X processor Target of Evaluation (TOE). It presents the evaluation results, their
justifications, and the conformance results. This VR is not an endorsement of the TOE by any
agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of the TOE is either expressed or implied. This
VR applies only to the specific version and configuration of the product as evaluated and
documented in the ST.
The evaluation was completed by Acumen Security in March 2016. The information in this
report is largely derived from the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test report,
all written by Acumen Security as summarized in the Apple IOS VPN Client Assurance Activity
Report, Version 1.0. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part 2
Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements defined in the Protection
Profile for IPsec Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, Version 1.4, 21 October 2014
[VPNPP].
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 4) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 4), as interpreted by the Assurance Activities contained in
the Protection Profile for IPsec Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, Version 1.4, 21 October
2013. This Validation Report applies only to the specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The
evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria
Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation
technical report are consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes and
reviewed the individual work units documented in the ETR and the Assurance Activities Report
(AAR). The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all of the
functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the Security Target (ST). Based on
these findings, the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory's findings are accurate,
the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing
laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence produced.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of
Standards effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations.
Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs). CCTLs evaluate
products against Protection Profile containing Assurance Activities, which are
interpretation of CEM work units specific to the technology described by the PP.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality
and consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products
desiring a security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product's
evaluation. Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP's
Product Compliance List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
 The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as
evaluated.
 The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances
of the product.
 The conformance result of the evaluation.
 The Protection Profile(s) to which the product is conformant.
 The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Apple iOS 9.2 VPN Client on iPhone and iPad devices using the A7 or A8/A8X
processor
Protection Profile Protection Profile for IPsec Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, Version 1.4, 21
October 2013
Security Target Apple IOS VPN Client Security Target Security Target
Evaluation Technical
Report
VID 10714 Common Criteria VPNPP Assurance Activity Report, version 1.0
CC Version Version 3.1, Revision 4
Conformance Result CC Part 2 Extended and CC Part 3 Conformant
Sponsor Apple Inc.
Developer Apple Inc.
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Acumen Security
Montgomery Village, MD
CCEVS Validators Patrick Mallett, Ken Stutterheim
Table 1 Identification
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3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
The TOE is a VPN client on a mobile operating system. The TOE is the VPN Client software
only. The Apple iOS operating system has been separately validated (VID10695). The mobile
operating system and hardware platforms are part of the TOE environment. When deployed, the
TOE provides a tunnel to a VPN Gateway. The evaluated version of the TOE is version 9.2.
The Operating System on which the TOE is running is Apple iOS version 9.2. This is the same
version of iOS which has undergone Common Criteria evaluation against the Protection Profile
for Mobile Device Fundamentals Version 2.0. Each TOE platform contains two cryptographic
modules; the Apple iOS CoreCrypto Kernel Module v6.0 and the Apple iOS CoreCrypto Module
v6.0. These provide all TOE required cryptographic services.
Note: The TOE is the VPN Client software only. The Apple iOS operating system has been
separately validated (VID10695).
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4 Security Policy
The TOE is comprised of several security features, as identified below.
 Cryptography Support
 User Data Protection
 Identification and Authentication
 Security Management
 Protection of the TSF
 Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE provides the security functionality required by [VPNPP].
4.1 Cryptographic Support
The TOE provides IPsec VPN functionality for clients wishing to securely communicate with
remote parties over unsecured networks. The TOE supports IPsec sessions established using
IKEv2. The VPN tunnels are configured and controlled by Network Extension Framework,
which is a part of the host operating system’s Core OS Layer.
Each TOE platform contains two cryptographic modules; the Apple iOS CoreCrypto Kernel
Module v6.0 and the Apple iOS CoreCrypto Module v6.0. These provide all TOE required
cryptographic services including cryptographic key generation, key storage, AES encryption and
decryption, cryptographic signature services, cryptographic hashing, keyed-hash message
authentication and random bit generation. The CAVP algorithm certificates for each algorithm
can be found in the table below.
Algorithm Apple iOS CoreCrypto Kernel Module Apple iOS CoreCrypto Module
AES Certificate #3745, 3744, 3743 Certificate #3723, 3721, 3719
SHS Certificate #3103, 3102, 3100 Certificate #3021, 3020, 3019
HMAC Certificate #2449, 2448, 2447 Certificate #2435, 2434, 2432
RSA Certificate #1925, 1924, 1923, Certificate #1911, 1910, 1908
ECDSA Certificate #798, 797, 796 Certificate #784, 783, 781
DRBG Certificate #1024, 1023, 1022 Certificate #1011, 1010, 1008
NIST SP 800-56A CVL N/A Certificate #690, 689, 687
Table 2 CAVP Algorithm Certificates
4.2 User Data Protection
The TOE zeroizes all memory used to store packet contents upon reallocation for another
purpose.
4.3 Identification and Authentication
All validation of X.509 certificates is performed by the iOS platform that the TOE is running on.
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4.4 Security Management
The TOE provides the ability to manage all security functionality required by the Protection
Profile via the use of configuration files (profiles).
4.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE platform performs cryptographic self-tests at startup which ensures the TOE’s ability
to properly operate. The TOE platform also verifies all software updates via digital signature.
4.6 Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE is an IPsec VPN client. The TOE has the ability to establish IKEv2/IPsec protected
communications with VPN gateways.
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5 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope
5.1 Assumptions
The specific conditions listed in the following subsections are assumed to exist in the TOE’s
environment. These assumptions include both practical realities in the development of the TOE
security requirements and the essential environmental conditions on the use of the TOE.
Assumption Assumption Definition
A.NO_TOE_BYPASS Information cannot flow onto the network to which the VPN
client's host is connected without passing through the TOE.
A.PHYSICAL Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and
the data it contains, is assumed to be provided by the
environment.
A.TRUSTED_CONFIG Personnel configuring the TOE and its operational environment
will follow the applicable security configuration guidance.
Table 3 Assumptions
5.2 Threats
The following table lists the threats addressed by the TOE and the IT Environment. The
assumed level of expertise of the attacker for all the threats identified below is Enhanced-Basic.
Threat Threat Definition
T.TSF_CONFIGURATION Failure to allow configuration of the TSF may prevent its users
from being able to adequately implement their particular
security policy, leading to a compromise of user information.
T.TSF_FAILURE Security mechanisms of the TOE may fail, leading to a
compromise of the TSF.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS A user may gain unauthorized access to the TOE data and TOE
executable code. A malicious user, process, or external IT
entity may masquerade as an authorized entity in order to gain
unauthorized access to data or TOE resources. A malicious
user, process, or external IT entity may misrepresent itself as
the TOE to obtain identification and authentication data.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_UPDATE A malicious party attempts to supply the end user with an
update to the product that may compromise the security
features of the TOE.
T.USER_DATA_REUSE User data may be inadvertently sent to a destination not
intended by the original sender because it is not rendered
inaccessible after it is done being used.
Table 4 Threats
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5.3 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarifying. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this
evaluation. Note that:
 As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets
the security claims made, with a certain level of assurance. The level of assurance for this
evaluation is defined within the Protection Profile for IPsec Virtual Private Network
(VPN) Clients, Version 1.4, 21 October 2013 [VPNPP].
 Consistent with the expectations of the Protection Profile, this evaluation did not
specifically search for, nor seriously attempt to counter, vulnerabilities that were not
“obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an
“obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding
of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
 The evaluation of security functionality of the product was limited to the functionality
specified in the claimed PPs. Any additional security related functional capabilities
included in the product were not covered by this evaluation.
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6 Documentation
The following documents were provided by the vendor with the TOE for evaluation:
 Apple IOS VPN Client Security Target [ST], version 1.0;
 Apple iOS VPN Client Guidance Documentation [AGD], version 1.0
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7 TOE Evaluated Configuration
7.1 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is a VPN client on a mobile operating system. The TOE is the VPN Client software
only. The Apple iOS operating system has been separately validated (VID10695). The mobile
operating system and hardware platforms are part of the TOE environment. When deployed, the
TOE provides a tunnel to a VPN Gateway. The evaluated version of the TOE is version 9.2.
As evaluated, the TOE software runs on the following devices,
Device Model Operating System Processor
iPhone 6 A1522 (GSM)
A1522 (CDMA)
A1524
Apple iOS9.2 Apple A8
iPhone 6 Plus A1549 (GSM)
A1549 (CDMA)
A1586
Apple iOS9.2 Apple A8
iPhone 5s A1533 (GSM)
A1533 (CDMA)
A1453
A1457
A1530
Apple iOS9.2 Apple A7
iPad mini 3 WiFi only
WiFi + cellular
Apple iOS9.2 Apple A7
iPad Air 2 WiFi only
WiFi + cellular
Apple iOS9.2 Apple A8X
iPad mini 2 WiFi only
WiFi + cellular
Apple iOS9.2 Apple A7
iPad Air WiFi only
WiFi + cellular
Apple iOS9.2 Apple A7
Table 5 Hardware Devices
In the evaluated configuration, the device must be “supervised” and enrolled to an MDM
platform capable of configuring and publishing the necessary Configuration Profile payload to
the device.
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8 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the evaluation team. It is derived
from information contained in Evaluation Test Report for the Apple iOS 9.2 VPN Client on
iPhone and iPad devices using the A7 or A8/A8X processor, which is not publically available.
The Assurance Activities Report provides an overview of testing and the prescribed assurance
activities.
8.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the Assurance Activities for this product.
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according the vendor-provided guidance documentation
and ran the tests specified in the Protection Profile for IPsec Virtual Private Network (VPN)
Clients, Version 1.4, 21 October 2013 [VPNPP]. The Independent Testing activity is
documented in the Assurance Activities Report, which is publically available, and is not
duplicated here.
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary documents: the Detailed Test Report (DTR) and the
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and summarized in the Apple IOS VPN Client Assurance
Activity Report, Version 1.0. The reader of this document can assume that activities and work
units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version
3.1 rev 4 and CEM version 3.1 rev 4. The evaluation determined the Apple iOS 9.2 VPN Client
on iPhone and iPad devices using the A7 or A8/A8X processor to be Part 2 extended, and meets
the SARs contained in the PP. Additionally the evaluator performed the Assurance Activities
specified in the VPNPP.
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of
security requirements claimed to be met by the Apple iOS 9.2 VPN Client on iPhone and iPad
devices using the A7 or A8/A8X processor that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and
product security function descriptions that support the requirements. Additionally the evaluator
performed an assessment of the Assurance Activities specified in the Protection Profile for IPsec
Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, Version 1.4, 21 October 2013 [VPNPP].
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation
The evaluation team assessed the design documentation and found it adequate to aid in
understanding how the TSF provides the security functions. The design documentation consists
of a functional specification contained in the Security Target's TOE Summary Specification.
Additionally the evaluator performed the Assurance Activities specified in the VPNPP related to
the examination of the information contained in the TOE Summary Specification.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents
The evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the
operational TOE. Additionally, the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator
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guidance in describing how to securely administer the TOE. The guides were assessed during the
design and testing phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete. Additionally the
evaluator performed the Assurance Activities specified in the VPNPP related to the examination
of the information contained in the operational guidance documents.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by
the evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities
The evaluation team found that the TOE was identified. Additionally, the team verified that both
the TOE and its supporting documentation are consistently reference the same version and use
the same nomenclature. The evaluation team also verified that the vendor website identified the
TOE version accurately.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity
The evaluation team ran the set of tests specified by the Assurance Activities in the VPNPP and
recorded the results in a Test Report, summarized in the Evaluation Technical Report and
Assurance Activities Report.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence was
provided by the evaluation team to show that the evaluation activities addressed the test activities
in the VPNPP, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity
The evaluation team performed a public search for vulnerabilities, performed vulnerability
testing and did not discover any issues with the TOE.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation addressed the
vulnerability analysis Assurance Activities in the VPNPP, and that the conclusion reached by the
evaluation team was justified.
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team's assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team's test activities also demonstrated the
accuracy of the claims in the ST.
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The validation team's assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team performed the Assurance Activities in the VPNPP, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
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10 Validator Comments & Recommendations
The validators suggest that the consumer pay special attention to the evaluated configuration of
the device(s) and the specific functionality defined within the Security Target. The functionality
evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements specified in the Security
Target. Only the functionality implemented by the security functional requirements within the
Security Target was evaluated. Other functionality included in the product was not assessed as
part of this evaluation.
The product contains more functionality than was covered by the evaluation. All other
functionality provided by the devices needs to be assessed separately and no further conclusions
can be drawn about their effectiveness.
During evaluation several vulnerabilities were identified in the evaluated version of the TOE
platform (outside of the TOE boundary). These vulnerabilities were addressed in iOS version
9.2.1. Per Policy Letter #22, TOE administrators are encouraged to deploy the latest patched
version of the evaluated Operating System.
Note that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the device being managed with a mobile
device management solution.
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11 Annexes
Not applicable.
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12 Security Target
Please see the Apple IOS VPN Client Security Target [ST], version 1.0 March 2016.
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13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
 Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
 Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
 Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using
the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more TOEs that may be evaluated.
 Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
 Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
 Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an
IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
 Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue
of a Common Criteria certificate.
 Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
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14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 1: Introduction
and general model, Version 3.1 Revision 4.
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 2: Security
functional requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 4.
3. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 3: Security
assurance requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 4.
4. Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 4.
5. Apple IOS VPN Client Security Target [ST], version 1.0 March 2016
6. Protection Profile for IPsec Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, Version 1.4, 21
October 2013
7. Apple IOS VPN Client Assurance Activity Report, Version 1.0
8. Apple iOS VPN Client Guidance Documentation, March 2016, Version 1.0