Certification Report
EAL 4+ Evaluation of DefensePro Product Family
Software Version 5.11
Issued by:
Communications Security Establishment Canada
Certification Body
Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme
© Government of Canada, Communications Security Establishment Canada, 2012
Document number: 383-4-168-CR
Version: 1.0
Date: 22 May 2012
Pagination: i to iii, 1 to 9
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DISCLAIMER
The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its
associated certificate, has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility – established
under the Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme (CCS) – using
the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 3, for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 3. This certification report, and its associated certificate,
apply only to the identified version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the CCS, and the
conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation report are consistent with the evidence
adduced. This report, and its associated certificate, are not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Communications Security Establishment Canada, or any other organization that
recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, and no warranty for the
IT product by the Communications Security Establishment Canada, or any other organization
that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, is either expressed
or implied.
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FOREWORD
The Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme (CCS) provides a
third-party evaluation service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology
(IT) security products. Evaluations are performed by a commercial Common Criteria
Evaluation Facility (CCEF) under the oversight of the CCS Certification Body, which is
managed by the Communications Security Establishment Canada.
A CCEF is a commercial facility that has been approved by the CCS Certification Body to
perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such approval is
accreditation to the requirements of ISO/IEC 17025:2005, the General Requirements for the
Competence of Testing and Calibration Laboratories. Accreditation is performed under the
Program for the Accreditation of Laboratories - Canada (PALCAN), administered by the
Standards Council of Canada.
The CCEF that carried out this evaluation is EWA-Canada located in Ottawa, Canada.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, the CCS Certification Body asserts that the
product complies with the security requirements specified in the associated security target. A
security target is a requirements specification document that defines the scope of the
evaluation activities. The consumer of certified IT products should review the security target,
in addition to this certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any assumptions
made during the evaluation, the IT product's intended environment, its security requirements,
and the level of confidence (i.e., the evaluation assurance level) that the product satisfies the
security requirements.
This certification report is associated with the certificate of product evaluation dated 22 May
2012, and the security target identified in Section 4 of this report.
The certification report, certificate of product evaluation and security target are posted on the
CCS Certified Products list (CPL) and the Common Criteria portal (the official website of
the Common Criteria Project).
Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Disclaimer....................................................................................................................................... i
Foreword........................................................................................................................................ii
Executive Summary...................................................................................................................... 1
1 Identification of Target of Evaluation ................................................................................ 2
2 TOE Description ................................................................................................................... 2
3 Evaluated Security Functionality........................................................................................ 2
4 Security Target...................................................................................................................... 2
Common Criteria Conformance.................................................................................................. 3
5 Security Policy....................................................................................................................... 3
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope..................................................................................... 4
5.1 SECURE USAGE ASSUMPTIONS................................................................................... 4
5.2 ENVIRONMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS ............................................................................... 4
5.3 CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE.......................................................................................... 4
6 Evaluated Configuration...................................................................................................... 5
7 Documentation ...................................................................................................................... 5
8 Evaluation Analysis Activities ............................................................................................. 5
9 ITS Product Testing.............................................................................................................. 7
9.1 ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPER TESTS .......................................................................... 7
9.2 INDEPENDENT FUNCTIONAL TESTING ........................................................................ 7
9.3 INDEPENDENT PENETRATION TESTING....................................................................... 8
9.4 CONDUCT OF TESTING ............................................................................................... 8
9.5 TESTING RESULTS...................................................................................................... 8
10 Results of the Evaluation...................................................................................................... 8
11 Acronyms, Abbreviations and Initializations..................................................................... 9
12 References.............................................................................................................................. 9
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Executive Summary
DefensePro Product Family Software Version 5.11 (hereafter referred to as DefensePro),
from Radware Ltd., is the Target of Evaluation for this Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 4
augmented evaluation.
DefensePro is a set of network devices that are deployed inline in the network, providing
real-time network based Intrusion Detection/Prevention System (IDS/IPS) and anti-Denial of
Service (DoS) protections for internal applications and infrastructure. A DefensePro device
collects and analyzes network traffic flowing through the device, and can be configured to
detect a wide set of attacks and suspected intrusion attempts. Detected events are recorded
on the device, and can be configured to trigger reaction mechanisms such as blocking the
suspected traffic and generating alarms.
EWA-Canada is the CCEF that conducted the evaluation. This evaluation was completed on
1 May 2012 and was carried out in accordance with the rules of the Canadian Common
Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme (CCS).
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target, which identifies assumptions
made during the evaluation, the intended environment for DefensePro, the security
requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) to which it is asserted
that the product satisfies its security requirements. Consumers are advised to verify that their
operating environment is consistent with that specified in the security target, and to give due
consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification
report.
The results documented in the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR)1
for this product provide
sufficient evidence that it meets the EAL 4 augmented assurance requirements for the
evaluated security functionality. The evaluation was conducted using the Common
Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 3, for
conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 3. The following augmentation is claimed: ALC_FLR.3 – Systematic
Flaw Remediation.
DefensePro is conformant with the U.S. Government Protection Profile Intrusion Detection
System for Basic Robustness Environments, Version 1.7, July 25, 2007.
Communications Security Establishment Canada, as the CCS Certification Body, declares
that the DefensePro evaluation meets all the conditions of the Arrangement on the
Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the CCS
Certified Products List (CPL) and the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the
Common Criteria Project).
1
The ETR is a CCS document that contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the evaluator, and
is not releasable for public review.
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1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 4 augmented
evaluation is DefensePro Product Family Software Version 5.11 (hereafter referred to as
DefensePro), from Radware Ltd.
2 TOE Description
DefensePro is a set of network devices that are deployed inline in the network, providing
real-time network based Intrusion Detection/Prevention System (IDS/IPS) and anti-Denial of
Service (DoS) protections for internal applications and infrastructure. A DefensePro device
collects and analyzes network traffic flowing through the device, and can be configured to
detect a wide set of attacks and suspected intrusion attempts. Detected events are recorded
on the device, and can be configured to trigger reaction mechanisms such as blocking the
suspected traffic and generating alarms.
A detailed description of the DefensePro architecture is found in Section 1 of the Security
Target (ST).
3 Evaluated Security Functionality
The complete list of evaluated security functionality for DefensePro is identified in Section 7
of the ST.
4 Security Target
The ST associated with this Certification Report is identified by the following nomenclature:
Title: DefensePro Product Family Software Version 5.11 Security Target
Version: 0.4
Date: 26 Feb 2012
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Common Criteria Conformance
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology
Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 3, for conformance to the Common Criteria for
Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 3.
DefensePro is:
a. Common Criteria Part 2 extended; with functional requirements based upon functional
components in Part 2, except for the following explicitly stated requirements defined in
the ST:
 IDS_SDC.1 - System data collection;
 IDS_ANL.1 - Analyser analysis;
 IDS_RCT.1 - Analyser react;
 IDS_RDR.1 - Restricted data review;
 IDS_STG.1 - Guarantees of System data availability; and
 IDS_STG.2 - Prevention of System data loss.
b. Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, with security assurance requirements based only
upon assurance components in Part 3; and
c. Common Criteria EAL 4 augmented, containing all security assurance requirements in
the EAL 4 package, as well as the following: ALC_FLR.3 – Systematic Flaw
Remediation
d. DefensePro is conformant with the U.S. Government Protection Profile Intrusion
Detection System for Basic Robustness Environments, Version 1.7, July 25, 2007.
5 Security Policy
DefensePro implements a role-based access control policy to control user access to the
system, as well as an information flow control policy to control information entering the
system; details of these security policies can be found in Section 7 of the ST.
In addition, DefensePro implements policies pertaining to security audit, intrusion detection,
identification and authentication, and security management. Further details on these security
policies may be found in Section 7 of the ST.
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Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
Consumers of DefensePro should consider assumptions about usage and environmental
settings as requirements for the product’s installation and its operating environment. This
will ensure the proper and secure operation of the TOE.
5.1 Secure Usage Assumptions
The following Secure Usage Assumptions are listed in the ST:
 The TOE will be managed in a manner that allows it to appropriately address changes
in the IT System the TOE monitors.
 The TOE can only be accessed by authorized users.
 The authorized administrators are not careless, willfully negligent, or hostile, and will
follow and abide by the instructions provided by the TOE documentation.
5.2 Environmental Assumptions
The following Environmental Assumptions are listed in the ST:
 The TOE hardware and software critical to security policy enforcement will be
protected from unauthorized physical modification.
 The processing resources of the TOE will be located within controlled access
facilities, which will prevent unauthorized physical access.
 The TOE has access to all the IT System data it needs to perform its functions.
 The TOE is scalable to the IT Systems it monitors.
5.3 Clarification of Scope
DefensePro offers protection against inadvertent or casual attempts to breach system security
by unsophisticated attackers possessing enhanced-basic attack potential. DefensePro is not
intended for situations which involve determined attempts by hostile or well-funded attackers
using sophisticated attack techniques.
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6 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration for DefensePro comprises:
DefensePro version 5.11.01 (build 39) software, running on one of the following supported
Radware models:
• DefensePro DP-x412-NL-D-OZ device (2U with DME)
• DefensePro DP-x016-NL-Q devices (1U)
• DefensePro DP-x016-NL-D-Q devices (2U)
• DefensePro DP-x016-NL-D-QF devices (2U with DME)
The publication entitled DefensePro Product Family Common Criteria Evaluated
Configuration Addendum, Software Version 5.11.01, v0.3 describes the procedures
necessary to install and operate DefensePro in its evaluated configuration.
7 Documentation
The Radware Ltd. documents provided to the consumer are as follows:
a. DefensePro Product Family Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Addendum,
Software Version 5.11.01, v0.3;
b. DefensePro User Guide Software Version 5.11, RDWR-DP-V0511_UG1101; and
c. Radware Installation and Maintenance Guide, RDWR_IG_1101.
8 Evaluation Analysis Activities
The evaluation analysis activities involved a structured evaluation of DefensePro, including
the following areas:
Development: The evaluators analyzed the DefensePro functional specification, design
documentation, and a subset of the implementation representation; they determined that the
design accurately describes the TOE security functionality (TSF) interfaces and the TSF
subsystems and modules, and how the TSF implements the security functional requirements
(SFRs). The evaluators analyzed the DefensePro security architectural description and
determined that the initialization process is secure and that the security functions are
protected against tamper and bypass, and that security domains are maintained. The
evaluators also independently verified that the correspondence mappings between the design
documents are correct.
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Guidance Documents: The evaluators examined the DefensePro preparative user guidance
and operational user guidance and determined that it sufficiently and unambiguously
describes how to securely transform the TOE into its evaluated configuration and how to use
and administer the product. The evaluators examined and tested the preparative and
operational guidance, and determined that they are complete and sufficiently detailed to
result in a secure configuration.
Life-cycle support: An analysis of the DefensePro configuration management system and
associated documentation was performed. The evaluators found that the DefensePro
configuration items were clearly marked and could be modified and controlled by automated
tools. The developer’s configuration management system was observed during a site visit,
and it was found to be mature and well-developed and operated in accordance with the CM
plan. The evaluators confirmed that the access control measures as described in the CM plan
are effective in preventing unauthorized access to the configuration items.
The evaluators examined the delivery documentation and determined that it described all of
the procedures required to maintain the integrity of DefensePro during distribution to the
consumer.
The evaluators examined the development security procedures during a site visit and
determined that they detailed sufficient security measures for the development environment
to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the DefensePro design and implementation. The
evaluators determined that the developer has used a documented model of the TOE life-cycle
and well-defined development tools that yield consistent and predictable results.
The evaluators reviewed the flaw remediation procedures used by Radware Ltd. for
DefensePro. During a site visit, the evaluators also examined the evidence generated by
adherence to the procedures. The evaluators concluded that the procedures are adequate to
track and correct security flaws, and distribute the flaw information and corrections to
consumers of the product.
Vulnerability Assessment: The evaluators conducted an independent vulnerability analysis
of DefensePro. Additionally, the evaluators conducted a review of public domain
vulnerability databases and a focused search of all evaluation deliverables. The evaluators
identified potential vulnerabilities for testing applicable to DefensePro in its operational
environment.
All these evaluation activities resulted in PASS verdicts.
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9 ITS Product Testing
Testing at EAL 4 consists of the following three steps: assessing developer tests, performing
independent functional tests, and performing penetration tests.
9.1 Assessment of Developer Tests
The evaluators verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities by examining
their test evidence, and reviewing their test results, as documented in the ETR2
.
The evaluators analyzed the developer’s test coverage and depth analysis and found them to
be complete and accurate. The correspondence between the tests identified in the developer’s
test documentation and the functional specification, TOE design and security architecture
description was complete.
9.2 Independent Functional Testing
During this evaluation, the evaluator developed independent functional tests by examining
design and guidance documentation, examining the developer's test documentation,
executing a sample of the developer's test cases, and creating test cases that augmented the
developer tests.
All testing was planned and documented to a sufficient level of detail to allow repeatability
of the testing procedures and results. Resulting from this test coverage approach is the
following list of EWA-Canada test goals:
a. Repeat of Developer's Tests: The objective of this test goal is to repeat a subset of the
developer's tests;
b. Initialization: The objective of this test goal is to provide the procedures for determining
the system configuration in order to ensure that the TOE that is tested is correct;
c. Identification and Authentication: The objective of this test goal is to ensure that the
identification and authentication requirements have been met;
d. Audit: The objective of this test goal is to ensure that the audit data is recorded and can
be viewed;
2
The ETR is a CCS document that contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the evaluator, and
is not releasable for public review.
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e. Users and Roles: The objective of this test goal is to ensure the users and roles
functionality is correct; and
f. IDS/IPS functionality: The objective of this test goal is to exercise the TOE's IDS/IPS
functionality to ensure that the security claims may not be inadvertently compromised.
9.3 Independent Penetration Testing
Subsequent to the independent review of public domain vulnerability databases and a
focused review of all evaluation deliverables, limited independent evaluator penetration
testing was conducted. The penetration tests focused on:
a. Fail safe. This test attempts to compromise the TOE by forcing a failure state;
b. Vision client timeout. This test confirms that the timeout for an administration session
can be changed to prevent unauthorized access; and
c. Leakage Verification. In this test case the TOE is monitored for information leakage
during start-up and shutdown.
The independent penetration testing did not uncover any exploitable vulnerabilities in the
intended operating environment.
9.4 Conduct of Testing
DefensePro was subjected to a comprehensive suite of formally documented, independent
functional and penetration tests. The testing took place at the Information Technology
Security Evaluation and Test (ITSET) Facility at EWA-Canada. The CCS Certification
Body witnessed a portion of the independent testing. The detailed testing activities, including
configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed results are documented
in a separate Test Results document.
9.5 Testing Results
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests yielded the expected results,
giving assurance that DefensePro behaves as specified in its ST, functional specification,
TOE design and security architecture description.
10 Results of the Evaluation
This evaluation has provided the basis for an EAL 4+ level of assurance. The overall verdict
for the evaluation is PASS. These results are supported by evidence in the ETR.
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11 Acronyms, Abbreviations and Initializations
Acronym/Abbreviation/
Initialization
Description
CCEF Common Criteria Evaluation Facility
CCS Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and
Certification Scheme
CPL Certified Products list
CM Configuration Management
DME DoS Mitigation Engine
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IDS Intrusion Detection System
IPS Intrusion Prevention System
IT Information Technology
ITSET Information Technology Security Evaluation
and Testing
PALCAN Program for the Accreditation of Laboratories
- Canada
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
12 References
This section lists all documentation used as source material for this report:
a. CCS Publication #4, Technical Oversight, Version 1.8, October 2010.
b. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 3, July 2009.
c. Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM,
Version 3.1 Revision 3, July 2009.
d. U.S. Government Protection Profile Intrusion Detection System for Basic Robustness
Environments, Version 1.7, July 25, 2007.
e. DefensePro Product Family Software Version 5.11 Security Target, v0.4, 26 Feb
2012.
f. Evaluation Technical Report for EAL 4+ Common Criteria Evaluation of Radware
Ltd. DefensePro version 5.11.01, v1.3, 1 May 2012.