Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0386-2006
for
ZKA SECCOS Sig v1.5.3
from
Sagem Orga GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)3018 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)3018 9582-5455, Infoline +49 (0)3018 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-330 V3.31
BSI-DSZ-CC-0386-2006
ZKA SECCOS Sig v1.5.3
from
Sagem Orga GmbH Common Criteria Arrangement
for components up to EAL4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3
(ISO/IEC 15408:2005) extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL4
and smart card specific guidance for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security
Evaluation, Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
Evaluation Results:
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance Package: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL4 augmented by
AVA_MSU.3 (Vulnerability assessment - Analysis and testing for
insecure states)
AVA_VLA.4 (Vulnerability assessment - Highly resistant)
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme
of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, 08. September 2006
The Vice President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Hange L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 228 9582-0 - Fax +49 228 9582-5455 - Infoline +49 228 9582-111
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption
and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2)
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty
of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0386-2006 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
V
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0386-2006
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
VI
BSI-DSZ-CC-0386-2006 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
• BSIG2
• BSI Certification Ordinance3
• BSI Schedule of Costs4
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
• DIN EN 45011 standard
• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), version 2.35
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), version 2.3
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
• Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance
components above EAL4 (AIS 34)
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger
dated 19 May 2006, p. 3730
A-1
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0386-2006
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998. This agreement was signed by the
national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This
agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended to
include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7).
2.2 CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 was signed in May 2000. It includes also the recognition of Protection
Profiles based on the CC. The arrangement was signed by the national bodies
of Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and the United
States. Israel joined the arrangement in November 2000, Sweden in February
2002, Austria in November 2002, Hungary and Turkey in September 2003,
Japan in November 2003, the Czech Republic in September 2004, the Republic
of Singapore in March 2005, India in April 2005.
This evaluation contains the components AVA_MSU.3 (Vulnerability
assessment - Analysis and testing for insecure states) and AVA_VLA.4
(Vulnerability assessment - Highly resistant) that are not mutually recognised in
accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual recognition the EAL4
components of these assurance families are relevant.
A-2
BSI-DSZ-CC-0386-2006 Certification Report
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product ZKA SECCOS Sig v1.5.3 has undergone the certification
procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0341-2006.
The evaluation of the product ZKA SECCOS Sig v1.5.3 was conducted by SRC
Security Research & Consulting GmbH. The SRC Security Research &
Consulting GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor, vendor and distributor is:
Sagem Orga GmbH
Am Hoppenhof 33
33104 Paderborn
Germany
The certification is concluded with
• the comparability check and
• the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on 08. September 2006.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in
the following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the
following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
A-3
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0386-2006
4 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-24.
The product ZKA SECCOS Sig v1.5.3 has been included in the BSI list of the
certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: http://
www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49
228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor7
of
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the above-
mentioned website.
7
Sagem Orga GmbH
Am Hoppenhof 33
33104 Paderborn
Germany
A-4
BSI-DSZ-CC-0386-2006 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
B-1
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0386-2006
Contents of the certification results
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification of the TOE 11
3 Security Policy 12
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 13
5 Architectural Information 13
6 Documentation 14
7 IT Product Testing 14
8 Evaluated Configuration 15
9 Results of the Evaluation 16
10 Comments/Recommendations 18
11 Annexes 19
12 Security Target 19
13 Definitions 19
14 Bibliography 22
B-2
BSI-DSZ-CC-0386-2006 Certification Report
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the smartcard product ZKA SECCOS Sig
v1.5.3 developed by Sagem Orga GmbH. It is a re-evaluation of ZKA SECCOS
Sig v1.5.2 which is certified unter the certification ID BSI-DSZ-341-2006, see
[23] and [24]. The re-evaluation was done mainly due to the addition of new
routines to compute SHA-256 hash values in the Renesas cryptographic library
ACL which was certified under the certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0379-2006, see
[9] and [10].
The TOE is realised as Smartcard Integrated Circuit (IC with contacts) with
Cryptographic Library, Smartcard Embedded Software and the EEPROM part
containing a dedicated Signature Application.
The Smartcard Embedded Software comprises the so-called SECCOS
operating system. This platform provides a fully interoperable ISO 7816
compliant multi-application platform.
The TOE is intended to be used as Secure Signature-Creation Device (SSCD)
for qualified electronic signatures in accordance with the European Directive
1999/93/EC on electronic signatures [13], the German Signature Act [14], the
German Signature Change Act (Signaturänderungsgesetz) [22], and the
German Signature Ordinance [15].
The TOE as SSCD is configured software and hardware used to implement the
Signature-Creation Data (SCD) and to guarantee for the secure usage of the
SCD and comprises the following components:
• Integrated Circuit (IC) AE55C1 (HD65255C1), Version 02 with related
Advanced Cryptographic Library, Version 1.43 incl. module SHA-256 (ACL)
provided by Renesas Technology Corp. certified under BSI-DSZ-CC-0379-
2006, see [9] and [10].
• Smartcard Embedded Software comprising the SECCOS operating system
platform provided by Sagem Orga GmbH
• EEPROM Initialisation Tables with the dedicated Signature Application
provided by Sagem Orga GmbH and including additional applications
The TOE provides the following functions necessary for devices involved in
creating qualified electronic signatures according to the SSCD Type 3
Protection Profile [12]:
• Generation of the SCD and the correspondent Signature-Verification Data
(SVD)
• Creation of qualified electronic signatures
(a) after allowing for the data to be signed (DTBS) to be displayed
correctly where the display function has to be provided by an
appropriate environment
B-3
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0386-2006
(b) using appropriate hash functions that are, according to [16], agreed as
suitable for qualified electronic signatures
(c) after appropriate authentication of the signatory by the TOE
(d) using appropriate cryptographic signature functions that employ
appropriate cryptographic parameters agreed as suitable according to
[16].
To prevent the unauthorised usage of the SCD, the TOE provides user
authentication and access control. The user authenticates himself by supplying
the verification authentication data (VAD) to the TOE which compares the VAD
against the reference authentication data (RAD) securely stored inside the TOE.
The TOE implements IT measures to support a trusted path to a trusted human
interface device that can optionally be connected via a trusted channel with the
TOE.
The TOE does not implement the Signature-Creation Application (SCA) which
presents the data to be signed (DTBS) to the signatory and prepares the DTBS-
representation the signatory wishes to sign for performing the cryptographic
function of the signature. The SCA belongs to the environment of the TOE.
The TOE protects the SCD during the whole life-cycle as to be solely used in
the signature-creation process by the legitimate signatory. The TOE as SSCD
of Type 3 generates the signatory’s SCD oncard and serves for a secure
storage of this data. The initialisation and personalisation of the TOE for the
signatory‘s use in the sense of the Protection Profile [12] include:
• Generation of the SCD/SVD pair
• Personalisation for the signatory by means of the signatory’s verification
authentication data (VAD).
From the structural perspective, the TOE as SSCD comprises the underlying IC
including the related ACL, the SECCOS operating system and the Signature
Application with SCD/SVD generation, SCD storage and use, SVD export, and
the signature-creation functionality. The SCA and the CGA (beside additional
other applications) are part of the immediate environment of the TOE. They may
communicate with the TOE over a trusted channel, a trusted path for the human
interface provided by the SCA, respectively. In case a trusted channel or trusted
path is not established with cryptographic means the TOE shall only be used
within a Trusted Environment.
The TOE as a multi-application smart card implements additional applications
that are not part of the TOE.
The evaluation of the TOE was conducted as a composition evaluation making
use of the platform evaluation results of the CC evaluation of the underlying
semiconductor, the Renesas AE55C1 (HD65255C1) smartcard integrated
circuit version 02 with ACL version 1.43 and additional SHA-256 function
provided by Renesas Technology Corp. and which was evaluated as BSI-DSZ-
CC-0379-2006 ([9] and [10]). The IC was evaluated according to Common
Criteria EAL 4 augmented with a minimum strength level for its security
B-4
BSI-DSZ-CC-0386-2006 Certification Report
functions of SOF-high for specific functionality based on the Protection Profile
BSI-PP-0002 [11] and as outlined in [9] and [10]. This platform evaluation was
performed by T-Systems GEI GmbH.
The IT product ZKA SECCOS Sig v1.5.3 was evaluated by SRC Security
Research & Consulting GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 02. August
2006. The SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH is an evaluation facility
(ITSEF)8
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor, vendor and distributor is
Sagem Orga GmbH
Am Hoppenhof 33
33104 Paderborn
Germany
1.1 Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see Annex C or [1], part
3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level
EAL4 (Evaluation Assurance Level 4 augmented). The following table shows
the augmented assurance components.
Requirement Identifier
EAL4 TOE evaluation: methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
+ AVA_MSU.3 Vulnerability assessment - Analysis and testing for insecure
states
+ AVA_VLA.4 Vulnerability assessment – Highly resistant
Table 1: Assurance components and EAL-augmentation
1.2 Functionality
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) selected in the Security
Target [6] are Common Criteria Part 2 extended as shown in the following
tables.
The following SFRs are taken from the SSCD Type 3 PP [12] and from CC part
2:
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FCS Cryptographic support
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
8
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
B-5
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0386-2006
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation
FDP User data protection
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ETC.1 Export of user data without security
attributes
FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security
attributes
FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection
FDP_SDI.2 Stored data integrity monitoring and action
FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity
FIA Identification and authentication
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FMT Security Management
FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FPT Protection of the TOE Security Functions
FPT_AMT.1 Abstract machine testing
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
FPT_PHP.1 Passive detection of physical attack
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
FTP Trusted Path/Channels
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path
Table 2: SFRs for the TOE taken from CC Part 2
B-6
BSI-DSZ-CC-0386-2006 Certification Report
The following CC part 2 extended SFRs are defined:
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FPT Protection of the TOE Security Functions
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation
Table 3: SFRs for the TOE, CC part 2 extended
Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the ST [6] chapter 5.
The following Security Functional Requirements are defined for the Certification
Generation Application (CGA) in the IT- Environment of the TOE:
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FCS Cryptographic support
FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution
FCS_CKM.3 Cryptographic key access
FDP User data protection
FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity
FTP Trusted Path/Channels
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
Table 4: SFRs for the CGA in the IT-Environment
The following Security Functional Requirements are defined for the Signature
Creation Application (SCA) in the IT- Environment of the TOE:
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FCS Cryptographic support
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation
FDP User data protection
FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity
FTP Trusted Path/Channels
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path
Table 5: SFRs for the SCA in the IT-Environment
Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the ST [6], chapter 5.2.1.
For a detailed overview of the SFRs defined for the underlying IC and ACL refer
to [10], Chapter 5.1.1, 8.4, 8.5 and 8.6.
B-7
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0386-2006
These Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the TOE Security
Functions:
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
Access Control
F.ACS_SIG Security Attribute Based Access Control / ZKA-SigG-Q
Application
F.ADMIN_SIG Administration of the TOE / ZKA-SigG-Q Application
Identification and Authentication
F.PIN_SIG PIN Based User Authentication for the Signatory
Integrity of Stored Data
F.DATA_INT Stored Data Integrity Monitoring and Action
Secure Data Exchange
F.SEC_EXCH Integrity and Confidentiality of Data Exchange
Object Reuse
F.RIP Residual Information Protection
Protection
F.FAIL_PROT Hardware and Software Failure Protection
F.SIDE_CHAN Side Channel Analysis Control
F.SELFTEST Self Test
Cryptographic Operations
F.CRYPTO Cryptographic Support
F.RSA_KEYGEN RSA Key Pair Generation
F.GEN_SIG RSA Generation of Electronic Signatures
Table 6: TOE Security Functions
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6.
For a detailed overview of the TOE Security Functions defined for the
underlying IC and ACL refer to [10].
1.3 Strength of Function
The TOE’s strength of functions is claimed high (SOF-high) for specific
functions as indicated in the Security Target [6], chapter 6.2.
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
For details see chapter 9 of this report.
B-8
BSI-DSZ-CC-0386-2006 Certification Report
1.4 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies
(OSPs) addressed by the evaluated IT product
The threats and Organisational Security Policies (OSPs) which were assumed
for the evaluation and averted by the TOE are specified in the Security Target
[6]:
Name Definition
T.Hack_Phys Physical attacks through the TOE interfaces
T.SCD_Divulg Storing, copying, and releasing of the signature creation data
T.SCD_Derive Derive the signature creation data
T.Sig_Forgery Forgery of the electronic signature
T.Sig_Repud Repudiation of signatures
T.SVD_Forgery Forgery of the signature-verification data
T.DTBS_Forgery Forgery of the DTBS-representation
T.SigF_Misuse Misuse of the signature creation function of the TOE
T.INIT_Aut Authentication for Initialisation Process
T.INIT_Data Loading of Manipulated Initialisation Data
T.PERS_Aut Authentication for Personalisation Process
T.PERS_Data Modification or Disclosure of Personalisation Data
Table 7: Threats for the TOE
Name Definition
P.CSP_Qcert Qualified certificate
P.Qsign Qualified electronic signatures
P.Sigy_SSCD TOE as secure signature creation device
Table 8: OSPs
Note: Only the titles of the threats and OSPs are provided. For more details
please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 3, where also assets and
subjects of the TOE are described.
1.5 Special configuration requirements
The TOE is intended to be used as a secure signature creation device. It is
defined uniquely by the name and version number ZKA SECCOS Sig v1.5.3. Its
implementation representation and its configuration are specified by the
Configuration List [21].
The evaluation results are restricted to chip cards or modules containing the
TOE in combination with other applications that are listed below in table 9. All
applications are listed in the table below. During the evaluation, tests have been
B-9
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0386-2006
performed to demonstrate that the separation mechanism of the SECCOS
Application Layer realises a separation between these additional applications
and the dedicated Signature Application. The additional applications did not
influence the security of the Signature Application.
Application Name AID (Application
Identifier)
Application name in the card
MF
MF
3F 00 52 4F 4F 54
Signature application
DF_SIG
AB 00 D2 76 00 00 66 01
Zusatzanwendungen
ZA_MF_NEU
A7 00 D2 76 00 00 25 5A 41 02 00
ec-Cash
DF_EC_CASH_NEU
A1 00 D2 76 00 00 25 45 43 02 00
Geldkarte
DF_BOERSE_NEU
A2 00 D2 76 00 00 25 45 50 02 00
A0 00 00 00 59 50 41 43 45 01 00
GA-Maestro
DF_GA_MAESTRO
AC 00 D2 76 00 00 25 47 41 01 00
A0 00 00 00 04 30 60
TAN-Anwendung
DF_TAN
AC 02 D2 76 00 00 25 54 44 01 00
Marktplatz
DF_MARKTPLATZ_NEU
B0 01 D2 76 00 00 25 4D 01 02 00
Fahrschein
DF_FAHRSCHEIN_NEU
B0 00 D2 76 00 00 25 46 53 02 00
HBCI
DF_BANKING_20
A6 00 D2 76 00 00 25 48 42 02 00
Notepad
DF_NOTEPAD
A6 10 D2 76 00 00 25 4E 50 01 00
Table 9: Signature application and optional applications
1.6 Assumptions about the operating environment
The following constraints concerning the operating environment are made in the
Security Target, please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 3.2:
A.CGA Trustworthy certification-generation application
The CGA protects the authenticity of the signatory’s name
and the SVD in the qualified certificate by an advanced
signature of the CSP.
B-10
BSI-DSZ-CC-0386-2006 Certification Report
A.SCA Trustworthy signature creation application
The signatory uses only a trustworthy SCA. The SCA
generates and sends the DTBS-representation of data the
signatory wishes to sign in a form appropriate for signing by
the TOE.
A.INIT_Process Security of the Initialisation Process
The initialisation table and process are handled in a secure
manner.
A.PERS_Process Security of the Personalisation Process
The personalisation data and process are handled in a
secure manner.
1.7 Disclaimers
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
ZKA SECCOS Sig v1.5.3
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type TOE component Remarks Form of Delivery
1 HW /
SW
TOE-IC and
Embedded
Software
Renesas IC AE55C1 (HD65255C1),
Version 02, the ROM mask
SECCOS_5.0_AE55C1_R1.2_SHA256
consisting of the Advanced
Cryptographic Library, Version 1.43
(ACL) with additional SHA-256 function
and the Smartcard Embedded Software
(SECCOS operating system) provided
by Sagem Orga GmbH.
EEPROM Initialisation Table
SDR0O1G0.A_3 (provided by Sagem
Orga GmbH) with the dedicated
Signature Application
Delivery of non-
initialised / initialised
modules or
smartcards.
Delivery of
Initialisation Tables in
electronic form (if
applicable).
B-11
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0386-2006
No Type TOE component Remarks Form of Delivery
2 DOC Administrator
Guide /
Smartcard
Initialisation
Administrator guidance for the Initialiser
for the smartcard initialisation of the
TOE
Version V1.01 [17]
Document in paper /
electronic form
3 DOC Administrator
Guide /
Smartcard
Personalisation
Administrator guidance for the
Personaliser for the smartcard
personalisation of the TOE
Version V1.01 [18]
Document in paper /
electronic form
4 DOC Identification
Data Sheet
Data Sheet with information on the
actual identification data and
configuration of the TOE delivered to
the customer (in particular information
on the relevant Initialisation Table)
Version V1.01, Option BES0/2 [19]
Document in paper /
electronic form
5 DOC Document
„Konzept zur
Personalisierung
von ZKA-
Chipkarten
(insbesondere
Signaturkarten)
des deutschen
Kreditgewerbes
mit dem
Betriebssystem
SECCOS“
Specification describing Initialisation
and Personalisation processes, Version
1.3 [20]
Document in paper /
electronic form
Table 10: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE’s evaluated configuration also contains other applications which have
been listed in table 9 of chapter 1.5.
3 Security Policy
The TOE is the composition of an IC, IC Dedicated Software and Smart Card
Embedded Software and is intended to be used as a secure signature creation
device (SSCD) for the generation of signature creation data (SCD) and the
creation of qualified electronic signatures. The security policy is to provide
protection against
• physical attacks through the TOE interfaces,
• storing, copying, releasing and deriving the signature creation data by an
attacker,
• forgery of the electronic signature, of the signature-verification data, or of the
DTBS-representation,
• repudiation of signatures,
B-12
BSI-DSZ-CC-0386-2006 Certification Report
• misuse of the signature creation function of the TOE.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
4.1 Usage assumptions
The following usage assumptions defined by the Security Target have to be met
(refer to Security Target [6], chapter 3.2):
• The initialisation table and process are handled in a secure manner
(A.INIT_Process).
• The personalisation data and process are handled in a secure manner
(A.PERS_Process).
4.2 Environmental assumptions
The following assumptions about physical and connectivity aspects defined by
the Security Target have to be met (refer to Security Target [6], chapter 3.2):
• The CGA protects the authenticity of the signatory’s name and the SVD in
the qualified certificate by an advanced signature of the CSP (A.CGA).
• The signatory uses only a trustworthy SCA. The SCA generates and sends
the DTBS-representation of data the signatory wishes to sign in a form
appropriate for signing by the TOE (A.SCA).
Furthermore, the Security Target [6], chapter 3.4 defines three Organisational
Security Policies that state that the CSP uses a trustworthy CGA to generate
the qualified certificate for the SVD generated by the SSCD (P.CSP_Qcert), that
the signatory uses a signature creation system to sign data with a qualified
electronic signature that is based on a qualified certificate and that is created by
an SSCD (P.Qsign), and that the TOE implements the SCD used for signature
creation under sole control of the signatory (P.Sigy_SSCD). Please refer to the
Security Target [6], chapter 3.4 for more detail.
4.3 Clarification of scope
Additional threats that are not countered by the TOE and its evaluated security
functions were not addressed by this product evaluation.
5 Architectural Information
The TOE (ZKA SECCOS Sig v1.5.3) is intended to be used as a secure
signature creation device comprising an integrated circuit (IC) with an operating
system (OS) and a signature application. An overview of the architecture
including a figure of the global architecture of the TOE is given in chapter 2 of
the Security Target [6]. A description and a top level block diagram of the
B-13
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0386-2006
dedicated Signature Application can be found in chapter 2.1.2 of the Security
Target [6]. The TOE is the composition of an IC, IC Dedicated Software and
Smart Card Embedded Software. A top level block diagram of the hardware IC
including an overview of subsystems can be found within the TOE description of
the Security Target of the chip [10].
6 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to
the customer (see also table 10 of this report):
• Administrator Guidance / Smartcard Initialisation - Administrator Guidance
for the Initialiser of the Smartcard Product ZKA SECCOS Sig v1.5.3, Version
V1.01 [17]
• Administrator Guide / Smartcard Personalisation - System Administrator
Guidance for the Personaliser of the Smartcard Product ZKA SECCOS Sig
v1.5.3, Version V1.01 [18]
• Identification Data Sheet - Data Sheet with information on the actual
identification data and configuration of the TOE delivered to the customer (in
particular information on the relevant Initialisation Table), Version V1.01,
Option BES0/2 [19]
• Document "Konzept zur Personalisierung von ZKA-Chipkarten
(insbesondere Signaturkarten) des deutschen Kreditgewerbes mit dem
Betriebssystem SECCOS" - Specification describing Initialisation and
Personalisation processes, Version 1.3 [20]
7 IT Product Testing
The developer tested all TOE Security functions either on real cards or with
emulator tests. All command APDU with valid and invalid inputs were tested as
well as all functions with valid and invalid inputs. Repetition of developer tests
were performed during the independent evaluator tests.
Since many Security Functions can be tested by ISO-7816 APDU command
sequences, the evaluators performed these tests with real cards. This is
considered to be a reasonable approach because the developers tests include
a full coverage of all security functionality with emulator tests. Tests with
emulators were chosen by the evaluators for those security functions where
internal resources of the card needed to be modified or observed during the
test. During their independent testing, the evaluators covered
• the Initialisation and Personalisation commands used by the Initialiser and
Personaliser,
• the APDU commands of SECCOS Application Layer used by TOE’s
Signature Application,
B-14
BSI-DSZ-CC-0386-2006 Certification Report
• Secure Messaging and Access Condition Validation of SECCOS Application
Layer,
• a significant subset of the Microkernel functionality and
• tests of TOE's Signature Application data structures.
Tests were performed on cards in several lifecycle states:
• non-initialised cards
• initialised cards
• personalised cards
• cards in end-usage state
Source code analysis was also performed during the evaluation.
The evaluators also performed tests that verified that the additional applications
do not have a negative influence on the signature application.
The evaluators have tested the TOE systematically against high attack potential
during their penetration testing. The tests included the resistance of the RSA
and Triple-DES Implementation against Side Channel Analysis.
The achieved test results correspond to the expected test results.
As this is a re-evaluation of an already certified product, some correctness and
penetration tests were re-used, however, other tests were re-done and specific
tests were performed for this evaluation.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by the name and version number ZKA SECCOS
Sig v1.5.3.
For the delivery of the TOE different ways are established (for more details
about the TOE life cycle phases please read the Overview of the TOE Life
Cycle explained in the ST [6], chapter 2.2.1):
• The TOE is delivered to the customer in form of a complete initialised
smartcard.
• Alternatively, the TOE is delivered to the customer in form of an initialised
module. In this case, the smartcard finishing process (embedding of the
delivered modules, final card tests) is task of the customer.
• ZKA SECCOS Sig v1.5.3 may as well be delivered as not-initialised modules
or smartcards, for details see chapter 1.2 of the Security Target [6],
however, the TOE is defined as the initialised smartcard. In this case,
initialisation outside the development and production environment Sagem
Orga GmbH in Flintbek, Germany is outside the scope of this certification
and the assumption A.INIT_Process applies.
B-15
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0386-2006
The form of the delivery of the TOE does not concern the security features of
the TOE. However, the initialisation process at Sagem Orga GmbH in Flintbek,
Germany is considered as well within the framework of the CC evaluation of the
Sagem Orga GmbH product. The responsibility for the delivery of the
personalised TOE to the end-user is up to the Card Issuer.
The development of the TOE is done in Sagem Orga GmbH Paderborn;
production and if necessary initialisation of the TOE takes place at Sagem Orga
GmbH Flintbek. Regarding the development and production environment of the
underlying IC please refer to Annex A of [9].
The evaluation results are restricted to chip cards containing the TOE with
applications that have been inspected during the evaluation process and that
are listed in table 7 of this report. See also chapter 1.5 of this report.
9 Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), [8] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as
relevant for the TOE.
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components identical
with EAL4. For components beyond EAL4 the methodology was defined in co-
ordination with the Certification Body [4, AIS 34]).
As the evaluation of the TOE was conducted as a composition evaluation, the
ETR [8] includes also the evaluation results of the composite evaluation
activities in accordance with CC Supporting Document, ETR-lite for
Composition: Annex A Composite smart card evaluation [4, AIS 36].
The ETR [8] builds up on the ETR-lite for Composition documents of the
evaluations of the underlying Renesas AE55C1 (HD65255C1) smartcard
integrated circuit version 02 with related Advanced Cryptographic Library
version 1.43 incl. module SHA-256 (ACL) provided by Renesas Technology
Corp. ([9] and [10]). The ETR-lite for Composition documents were provided by
the ITSEF T-Systems GEI GmbH according to CC Supporting Document, ETR-
lite for Composition ([4, AIS 36]).
For smart card specific methodology the scheme interpretations AIS 25, AIS 26
and AIS 36 (see [4]) were used. For specific methodology on random number
generator evaluation the scheme interpretations AIS 20 and AIS 31 (see [4])
were used.
B-16
BSI-DSZ-CC-0386-2006 Certification Report
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL4
augmented and the class ASE for the Security Target evaluation) are
summarised in the following table.
Assurance classes and components Verdict
Security Target evaluation CC Class ASE PASS
TOE description ASE_DES.1 PASS
Security environment ASE_ENV.1 PASS
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
PP claims ASE_PPC.1 PASS
IT security requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements ASE_SRE.1 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Configuration management CC Class ACM PASS
Partial CM automation ACM_AUT.1 PASS
Generation support and acceptance procedures ACM_CAP.4 PASS
Problem tracking CM coverage ACM_SCP.2 PASS
Delivery and operation CC Class ADO PASS
Detection of modification ADO_DEL.2 PASS
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures ADO_IGS.1 PASS
Development CC Class ADV PASS
Fully defined external interfaces ADV_FSP.2 PASS
Security enforcing high-level design ADV_HLD.2 PASS
Implementation of the TSF ADV_IMP.1 PASS
Descriptive low-level design ADV_LLD.1 PASS
Informal correspondence demonstration ADV_RCR.1 PASS
Informal TOE security policy model ADV_SPM.1 PASS
Guidance documents CC Class AGD PASS
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM.1 PASS
User guidance AGD_USR.1 PASS
Life cycle support CC Class ALC PASS
Identification of security measures ALC_DVS.1 PASS
Developer defined life-cycle model ALC_LCD.1 PASS
Well-defined development tools ALC_TAT.1 PASS
Tests CC Class ATE PASS
Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS
B-17
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0386-2006
Assurance classes and components Verdict
Testing: high-level design ATE_DPT.1 PASS
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
Independent testing – sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
Vulnerability assessment CC Class AVA PASS
Analysis and testing for insecure states AVA_MSU.3 PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_SOF.1 PASS
Highly resistant AVA_VLA.4 PASS
Table 11: Verdicts for the assurance components
As this certification was a re-certification of ZKA SECCOS Sig v1.5.2 where
new routines to compute SHA-256 hash values were added in the Renesas
cryptographic library ACL, emphasis was put on Tests and Vulnerability
Assessment in this certification.
The evaluation has shown that
• Security Functional Requirements specified for the TOE are Common
Criteria Part 2 extended
• the assurance of the TOE is Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL4
augmented by AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4,
• the TOE fulfils the claimed strength of function SOF-high for the security
functions F.ADMIN_SIG, F.PIN_SIG, F.CRYPTO, F.RSA_KEYGEN,
F.GEN_SIG as outlined in chapter 1.3. The underlying hardware had been
successfully assessed by T-Systems GEI GmbH.
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to ZKA SECCOS Sig v1.5.3 as
outlined in chapter 8 of this report and that is produced and initialised in an
environment that was subject to an audit in the cause of the evaluation.
The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification or assurance continuity of the
modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the
evaluation of the modified product does not reveal any security deficiencies.
10 Comments/Recommendations
The operational documentation (refer to chapter 6 of this report) contains
necessary information about the secure usage of the TOE. Additionally, for
secure usage of the TOE the fulfilment of the assumptions about the
environment in the Security Target [6] and the Security Target as a whole has to
be taken into account. Therefore a user/administrator has to follow the guidance
in these documents.
B-18
BSI-DSZ-CC-0386-2006 Certification Report
The TOE is a multi-application card. Only those applications listed in table 9
shall be used within the evaluated configuration.
Furthermore an appropriate protection during packaging, finishing, and
personalisation must be ensured up to delivery to the end-user to prevent any
possible copy, modification, retention, theft, or unauthorised use of the TOE and
of its manufacturing and test data (the assumption A.Process-Card from the ST
of the hardware platform [10]).
11 Annexes
None.
12 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the security target [7] of the target of evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document. It is a sanitized version of the
complete security target [6] used for the evaluation performed.
13 Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
ACL Advanced Cryptographic Library
AID Application identifier
AIS Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit, interface standard for smart cards,
see ISO/IEC 7816 part 3
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security
CEM Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation
CGA Certification generation application
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CSP Certification-service-provider
DES Data Encryption Standard, symmetric crypto algorithm
DTBS Data to be signed
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EEPROM Electrically erasable programmable read-only memory; EEPROM
is a special type of PROM that can be erased by exposing it to an
electrical charge
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
B-19
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0386-2006
EU European Union
HW Hardware
IC Integrated Circuit
ISO International Organization for Standardization
IT Information Technology
OS Operating System
OSP Organisational Security Policy
PIN Personal identification number
PP Protection Profile
PROM Programmable read-only memory, a memory chip on which data
can be written only once
RAD Reference authentication data
RSA Asymmetric crypto algorithm by R. L. Rivest, A. Shamir, L.
Adleman
SCA Signature creation application
SCD Signature creation data
SECCOS Secure Chip Card Operating System
SF Security Function
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SigG (German) Signaturgesetz
SigV (German) Signaturverordnung
SOF Strength of Function
SSCD Secure signature creation device
ST Security Target
SVD Signature verification data
SW Software
TOE Target of Evaluation
TRNG True Random Number Generator (a term used and introduced in
AIS31)
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
VAD Verification authentication data
ZKA Zentraler Kreditausschuss
B-20
BSI-DSZ-CC-0386-2006 Certification Report
13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
B-21
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0386-2006
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
14 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.3, August 2005
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Evaluation Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE, specifically
- AIS 20, Version 1, 2 Dec. 1999 Functionality classes and
evaluation methodology for deterministic random number
generators
- AIS 25, Version 2, 29 July 2002 for: CC Supporting Document, -
The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits, Version 1.2, July
2002
- AIS 26, Version 2, 6 August 2002 for: CC Supporting Document, -
Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 1.1, July
2002
- AIS 31, Version 1, 25 Sept. 2001 for: Functionality classes and
evaluation methodology of physical random number generators
- AIS 32, Version 1, 02 July 2001, Übernahme international
abgestimmter CC-Interpretationen ins deutsche Zertifizierungs-
schema.
- AIS 34, Version 1.00, 1 June 2004, Evaluation Methodology for
CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+
- AIS 36, Version 1, 29 July 2002 for:
CC Supporting Document, ETR-lite for Composition, Version 1.1,
July 2002 and
CC Supporting Document, ETR-lite for Composition: Annex A
Composite smartcard evaluation, Version 1.2 March 2002
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
B-22
BSI-DSZ-CC-0386-2006 Certification Report
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-0386-2006, Version V1.00, 07 June 2006,
Security Target – ZKA SECCOS Sig v1.5.3, Sagem Orga GmbH
(confidential document)
[7] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0386-2006, Version V1.01, 21 June 2006,
Sagem Orga GmbH; ZKA SECCOS Sig v1.5.3; ST-Lite (sanitized public
document)
[8] Evaluation Technical Report (ETR); BSI-DSZ-CC-0386-2006; Version:
2.3; 02.08.06; Product: ZKA SECCOS Sig v1.5.3 (confidential document)
[9] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0379-2006 for Renesas AE55C1
(HD65255C1) smartcard integrated circuit version 02 with ACL version
1.43 and additional SHA-256 function from Renesas Technology Corp.,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, 15.05.2006
[10] Security Target BSI-DSZ-0379-2006, Revision 5.0, 7 April, 2006,
AE55C1 (HD65255C1) Version 02 with ACL version 1.43 Smartcard
Security Target, Public Version, Renesas Technology Corp.
[11] Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile (SSVG-PP), Version 1.0, July
2001; registered and certified by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI) under the reference BSI-PP-0002-2001
[12] Protection Profile - Secure Signature Creation Device (SSCD-PP) Type
3, Version 1.05, EAL 4+ BSI-PP-0006-2002T, 03.04.2002
[13] Directive 1999/93/ec of the European parliament and of the council of 13
December 1999 on a Community framework for electronic signatures
[14] (German) Gesetz über Rahmenbedingungen für elektronische
Signaturen und zur Änderung weiterer Vorschriften vom 16. Mai 2001
(BGBI. I S.876 ff)
[15] Verordnung zur elektronischen Signatur; Bundesgesetzblatt Nr. 509, S.
3074; 16.11.2001
[16] Geeignete Algorithmen zur Erfüllung der Anforderungen nach §17 Abs.1
bis 3 SigG vom 22. Mai 2001 in Verbindung mit Anlage 1 Anschnitt I Nr.
2 SigV vom 22. Nov. 2001; Bundesanzeiger Nr. 58, S. 1913-1915,
23.03.2006, Bundesnetzagentur
[17] Administrator Guidance for the Initialiser of the Smartcard Product ZKA
SECCOS Sig v1.5.3 - ZKA SECCOS Sig v1.5.3, Version V1.01, Sagem
Orga GmbH, 07.07.2006
[18] System Administrator Guidance for the Personaliser of the Smartcard
Product ZKA SECCOS Sig v1.5.3 - ZKA SECCOS Sig v1.5.3, Version
V1.01, Sagem Orga GmbH, 07.07.2006
[19] ZKA SECCOS Sig v1.5.3, Data Sheet, Version V1.01, Option BES0/2,
Sagem Orga GmbH, 07.07.2006
B-23
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0386-2006
[20] Konzept zur Personalisierung von ZKA-Chipkarten (insbesondere
Signaturkarten) des deutschen Kreditgewerbes mit dem Betriebssystem
SECCOS, Version 1.3, 29.12.2004
[21] Configuration List - ZKA SECCOS Sig v1.5.3, Version V1.01, Sagem
Orga GmbH, 07.07.2006 (confidential document)
[22] (German) Erstes Gesetz zur Änderung des Signaturgesetzes vom 4.
Januar 2005
[23] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0341-2006 for ZKA SECCOS Sig
v1.5.2 from Sagem Orga GmbH, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik, 13. June 2006
[24] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0341-2006, Version V1.00, 25 April 2006,
Sagem Orga GmbH; ZKA SECCOS Sig v1.5.2; ST-Lite (sanitized public
document)
B-24
BSI-DSZ-CC-0386-2006 Certification Report
C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements
that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result
is presented with respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3
(assurance requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of
requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
a) CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the
functional requirements are based only upon functional components in
CC Part 2.
b) CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the
functional requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
a) CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the
assurance requirements are based only upon assurance components in
CC Part 3.
b) CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the
assurance requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part
3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect
to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
a) Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-
defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) include all components in the
packages listed as part of the conformance result.
b) Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-
defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all
components in the packages listed as part of the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect
to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
a) PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of
the conformance result.“
D-1
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0386-2006
CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are
shown in Table 1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
ACM: Configuration management CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
ADV: Development TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
Development security (ALC_DVS)
ALC: Life cycle support Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
Coverage (ATE_COV)
ATE: Tests Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
D-2
BSI-DSZ-CC-0386-2006 Certification Report
Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that
balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of
acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate
concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of
maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are
included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful
and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and
components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and
STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a
hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families.
Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component
where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation
assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance.
They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more
assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is
accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component
from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth)
and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no
more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance
dependencies of every component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other
combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the
addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already
included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another
hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an
EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be
augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component”
is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it
the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of
the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended
with explicitly stated assurance requirements.
D-3
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0386-2006
Assurance Class Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
D-4
BSI-DSZ-CC-0386-2006 Certification Report
Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but
the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where
independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has
been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer,
including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the
guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could
be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE,
and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a
manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection
against identified threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of
design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the
part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such
it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the
absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a
situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the
developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from
positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of
existing sound development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough
investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-
engineering.”
D-5
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0386-2006
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other
resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically
feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in
conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-
specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security
engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported
by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a
TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5
assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5
requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of
specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development
and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable
costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to
produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant
risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for
application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets
justifies the additional costs.”
D-6
BSI-DSZ-CC-0386-2006 Certification Report
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies
the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with
tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal
analysis.“
D-7
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0386-2006
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted,
it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept
of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their
security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical
analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required
to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE
security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of
the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to
violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover
flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the
ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised
capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of
all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance
level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified
vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found
useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by
the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the
TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a
low (for AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for
AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant)
attack potential.”
D-8