BİLİŞİM TEKNOLOJİLERİ TEST VE BELGELENDİRME DAİRESİ BAŞKANLIĞI
CCCS CERTIFICATION REPORT
Doküman Kodu: BTBD-03-01-FR-01 Yayın Tarihi: 4.08.2015 Revizyon Tarih/No: 7.04.2023/7
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Certification Report
EAL2 Evaluation of
ARÇELİK A.Ş.
ARCELIK WI-FI IoT CONNECTIVITY SOLUTION v1.0
issued by
Turkish Standards Institution
Common Criteria Certification Scheme
Certificate Number: 21.0.03.0.00.00//TSE-CCCS-88
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CCCS CERTIFICATION REPORT
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS ..........................................................................................................................................................2
DOCUMENT INFORMATION...............................................................................................................................................3
DOCUMENT CHANGE LOG .................................................................................................................................................3
DISCLAIMER ...........................................................................................................................................................................3
FOREWORD .............................................................................................................................................................................4
RECOGNITION OF THE CERTIFICATE............................................................................................................................5
1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ....................................................................................................................................................6
1.1 Brief Description……………………………………………………………………...…...………………......................6
1.2 Major Basic Security and Functional Attributes………………………………………………………………………7
1.3 Threats……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………8
1.4 Organizational Security Policies (OSPs)………………………………………………………………………………..9
1.5 Assumptions………………………………………………………………………………………………………………9
2 CERTIFICATION RESULTS...............................................................................................................................................9
2.1 IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET OF EVALUATION / PP IDENTIFICATION....................................................9
2.2 SECURITY POLICY.....................................................................................................................................................10
2.3 ASSUMPTIONS AND CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE.............................................................................................10
2.4 ARCHITECTURAL INFORMATION........................................................................................................................10
2.5 DOCUMENTATION.....................................................................................................................................................11
2.6 IT PRODUCT TESTING..............................................................................................................................................13
2.7 EVALUATED CONFIGURATION.............................................................................................................................14
2.8 RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION............................................................................................................................17
2.9 EVALUATOR COMMENTS / RECOMMENDATIONS..........................................................................................18
3 SECURITY TARGET..........................................................................................................................................................19
4 GLOSSARY ..........................................................................................................................................................................19
5 BIBLIOGRAPHY.................................................................................................................................................................19
6 ANNEXES .............................................................................................................................................................................21
6.1 TOE SPECIFICATIONS ……………………………………………………………………………………………..21
6.2 TEST ENVIRONMENT……………………………………………………………………………………………….21
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Document Information
Date of Issue 23/06/2023
Approval Date 23/06/2023
Certification Report Number 21.0.03/23-005
Sponsor and Developer Arçelik A.Ş.
Evaluation Facility TÜBİTAK BİLGEM OKTEM
TOE/ PP Name* Arcelik Wi-Fi IoT Connectivity Solution v1.0
Pages 21
Prepared by
Common Criteria Inspection Expert
Merve Hatice KARATAŞ
Common Criteria Inspection Expert Göktuğ İLISU
Common Criteria Candidate
Inspection Expert
Barış UÇAR
Reviewer (Approver) Mehmet Kürşad ÜNAL
The experts whose names and signatures are shown as above prepared and reviewed this report.
Document Change Log
Release Date Pages Affected Remarks/Change Reference
1.0 23/06/2023 All First Release
DISCLAIMER
This certification report and the IT product/PP defined in the associated Common Criteria document has
been evaluated at an accredited and licensed evaluation facility conformance to Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation, version 3.1, revision 5, using Common Methodology for IT Products Evaluation,
version 3.1, revision 5. This certification report and the associated Common Criteria document apply only
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to the identified version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration. Evaluation has been
conducted in accordance with the provisions of the CCCS, and the conclusions of the evaluation facility
in the evaluation report are consistent with the evidence adduced. This report and its associated Common
Criteria document are not an endorsement of the product by the Turkish Standardization Institution, or
any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report and its associated Common Criteria
document, and no warranty is given for the product by the Turkish Standardization Institution, or any
other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report and its associated Common Criteria
document.
FOREWORD
The Certification Report is drawn up to submit the Certification Commission the results and evaluation
information upon the completion of a Common Criteria evaluation service performed under the Common
Criteria Certification Scheme. Certification Report covers all non-confidential security and technical
information related with a Common Criteria evaluation which is made under the ITCD Common Criteria
Certification Scheme. This report is issued publicly to and made available to all relevant parties for
reference and use.
The Common Criteria Certification Scheme (CCSS) provides an evaluation and certification service to
ensure the reliability of Information Security (IS) products. Evaluation and tests are conducted by a public
or commercial Common Criteria Evaluation Facility (CCTL = Common Criteria Testing Laboratory)
under CCCS’ supervision.
CCEF is a facility, licensed as a result of inspections carried out by CCCS for performing tests and
evaluations which will be the basis for Common Criteria certification. As a prerequisite for such
certification, the CCEF has to fulfill the requirements of the standard ISO/IEC 17025 and should be
accredited by accreditation bodies. The evaluation and tests related with the concerned product have been
performed by TÜBİTAK BİLGEM OKTEM, which is a commercial CCTL.
A Common Criteria Certificate given to a product means that such product meets the security requirements
defined in its security target/PP document that has been approved by the CCCS. The Security Target
document is where requirements defining the scope of evaluation and test activities are set forth. Along
with this certification report, the user of the IT product should also review the security target document in
order to understand any assumptions made in the course of evaluations, the environment where the IT
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product will run, security requirements of the IT product and the level of assurance provided by the
product.
This certification report is associated with the Common Criteria Certificate issued by the CCCS for
Arcelik Wi-Fi IoT Connectivity Solution v1.0 whose evaluation was completed on March 24th
2023 and
whose evaluation technical report was drawn up by TÜBİTAK BİLGEM OKTEM (as CCTL), and with
the Security Target document with version no 0.15 of the relevant product.
The certification report, certificate of product evaluation and security target document are posted on the
ITCD Certified Products List at bilisim.tse.org.tr portal and the Common Criteria Portal (the official web
site of the Common Criteria Project).
RECOGNITION OF THE CERTIFICATE
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo is printed on the certificate to indicate that this
certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA.
The CCRA has been signed by the Turkey in 2003 and provides mutual recognition of certificates based
on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including EAL2. The current list of signatory nations and
approved certification schemes can be found on:
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
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1 - EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Developer of the IT product: Arçelik A.Ş.
Evaluated IT product: Arcelik Wi-Fi IoT Connectivity Solution
IT Product Version: 1.0
Name of IT Security Evaluation Facility: TÜBİTAK BİLGEM OKTEM
Completion date of evaluation: 24/03/2023
Assurance Package: EAL 2
1.1. Brief Description
Arcelik Wi-Fi IoT Connectivity Solution v1.0 (hereinafter TOE) is an IoT device security solution which
provides security functions to implement secure OTA firmware download of Arcelik Wi-Fi IoT Devices
(hereinafter IoT Device and/or Arcelik IoT Device) connectivity and control boards and secure OTA
installation of connectivity board together with secure log storage of Arcelik IoT Devices.
The TOE provides secure OTA firmware update feature to the device users. The user easily updates the
device firmware by following the procedure demonstrated on the mobile application. During the OTA
firmware update process, download and install phases are protected by several cryptographic processes.
Also, the device periodically logs usage data like diagnosis, customer detailed usage, electrical and sensor
data of the device and so on. The Secure Log Storage feature provides the log data to be stored securely
inside and outside (to Arcelik Cloud Server) of the product.
TOE is an Arcelik IoT Devices Security Solution that provides security functions in the form of library
by being embedded on Arcelik IoT Devices electronic board.
1.2. Major Basic Security and Functional Attributes
 Secure OTA Firmware Download: This function blocks the installation of unauthorized firmware
by using digital signature verification. The digital signature process for the firmware takes place in
the Arcelik Cloud server and this enables only the firmware that are downloaded from the Arcelik
Cloud server to be installable on the IoT device.
 Secure OTA Firmware Installation: The new OTA images downloaded on the Arcelik IoT device
is stored in the external flash of connectivity board. If the OTA image is for connectivity board TOE
verifies and the installation process starts. If the OTA image is for control board, firmware image is
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transferred from connectivity board to control board via UART or SPI (Refrigerators have SPI, other
IoT devices have UART) line chunk by chunk. The control board is responsible for validating integrity
of the image. After OTA image is validated by control board it is installed and replaces the existing
firmware.
 Secure Log Storage: The Arcelik IoT Devices periodically logs usage data like diagnosis, customer
detailed usage, electrical and sensor data of the appliance and so on. The Secure Log Storage function
provides the log data to be stored and transmitted securely inside and outside (to Arcelik Cloud Server)
of the product. The logged data is generated by different control boards of the IoT device. Generated
log data is imported from control board to TOE. The log data is stored in TOEs external flash until
sent to Cloud Server. The Secure Log Storage Function uses UART or SPI (Refrigerators have SPI,
other IoT devices have UART) connection between control board and connectivity board. TOE has
two different firmware in which one of them for appliances have UART connection and the one for
appliances have SPI connection.
1.3. Threats
Attackers who have knowledge of how the TOE operates and are assumed to possess a basic skill level
and intend to alter TOE configuration settings/ parameters and no physical access to the TOE.
 T.UnverifiedOtaDownload: Attacker could gain unauthorized access to the TOE data by bypassing
the verification requirements and download OTA package to the TOE.
 T.ModifyingOtaImage: Attacker may install a malicious OTA image by intercepting OTA image
installation process which is sent over the network and modifying the OTA image data.
 T.StealModifyUsageLogData: Attacker may steal or modify the usage log data as it is sent outside
of the chip or to the Cloud Server.
 T.UnauthorizedKeyAccess: Attacker may try to access to the cryptographic keys which are used in
authentication, encryption/decryption, and verification functions of TOE.
 T.FirmwareCopyrightInfringement: Attackers may copy the firmware contents like source codes
and assets illegally and infringe product firmware copyrights.
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1.4. Organizational Security Policies (OSPs)
 P.FirmwareUpdateFileGenerationStorage: For ensuring the secure firmware update procedure, the
firmware update image file must be generated and stored securely. The firmware update image file
which is digitally signed using ECDSA algorithm is downloaded by TOE over secure TLS tunnel, so
that it is protected while being transferred via network. The signed firmware update image file is stored
in Arcelik Cloud Server. All firmware update images shall be signed for the target appliance, it shall
not be possible for an incorrectly signed image to execute, for example firmware signed for a different
target appliance. When the OTA request come from end-user, the TOE step into the process and
provide Secure Firmware OTA to the products.
 P.CloudSecureKeyManagement: The private key, which is used for authentication process of
Arcelik Cloud Server and connected product, is generated by Arcelik based on the ECC standard, and
stored securely on the Arcelik Cloud Server. The generation, storage, access control, and destruction
of the cryptographic keys, which are managed from the Arcelik Cloud Server are performed securely
in accordance with Arcelik regulations and policies.
1.5. Assumptions
 A.SecureCloudServer: For secure operation of TOE, The Arcelik Cloud Server which exists in the
operating environment is operated securely.
 A.ProductUniqueIDRegistration: For secure management of each product, a unique identification
is supported by Arcelik to each product while they are producing in the production lines.
 A.ProductDisassemblyAuthorization: The user of the Arcelik IoT Device has not got authorization
for disassemble the product and access the TOE physically.
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2 -CERTIFICATION RESULTS
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
Certificate Number 21.0.03.0.00.00//TSE-CCCS-88
TOE Name and Version Arcelik Wi-Fi IoT Connectivity Solution v1.0
Security Target Title Arcelik Wi-Fi IoT Connectivity Solution v1.0 Security Target
Security Target Version 0.15
Security Target Date 29/12/2022
Assurance Level EAL 2
Criteria  Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and General Model;
CCMB-2012-09-001, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Part 2: Security Functional Components;
CCMB-2012-09-002, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Part 3: Security Assurance Components;
CCMB-2012-09-003, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
Methodology Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology; CCMB-2012-09-004,
Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017
Protection Profile Conformance None
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Common Criteria Conformance  Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and General Model,
Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Part 2: Security Functional Components,
Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017, conformant
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Part 3: Security Assurance Components,
Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017, conformant
Sponsor and Developer Arçelik A.Ş.
Evaluation Facility TÜBİTAK BİLGEM OKTEM
Certification Scheme TSE CCCS
2.2 Security Policy
 P.FirmwareUpdateFileGenerationStorage: For ensuring the secure firmware update procedure, the
firmware update image file must be generated and stored securely. The firmware update image file
which is digitally signed using ECDSA algorithm is downloaded by TOE over secure TLS tunnel, so
that it is protected while being transferred via network. The signed firmware update image file is stored
in Arcelik Cloud Server. All firmware update images shall be signed for the target appliance, it shall
not be possible for an incorrectly signed image to execute, for example firmware signed for a different
target appliance. When the OTA request come from end-user, the TOE step into the process and
provide Secure Firmware OTA to the products.
 P.CloudSecureKeyManagement: The private key, which is used for authentication process of
Arcelik Cloud Server and connected product, is generated by Arcelik based on the ECC standard, and
stored securely on the Arcelik Cloud Server. The generation, storage, access control, and destruction
of the cryptographic keys, which are managed from the Arcelik Cloud Server are performed securely
in accordance with Arcelik regulations and policies.
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
 A.SecureCloudServer: For secure operation of TOE, The Arcelik Cloud Server which exists in the
operating environment is operated securely.
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 A.ProductUniqueIDRegistration: For secure management of each product, a unique identification
is supported by Arcelik to each product while they are producing in the production lines.
 A.ProductDisassemblyAuthorization: The user of the Arcelik IoT Device has not got authorization
for disassemble the product and access the TOE physically.
2.4 Architectural Information
The physical scope of TOE includes software elements that are used for securing the implementing
securely usage log OTA firmware update and storage. The structure of the TOE can be found in Figure 1
below and identifies its components. Only authenticated and properly encrypted firmware images are
downloaded and installed to the product electronic boards. The usage log data is always stored encrypted
inside the product. Also, the usage log data sent from product to server is encrypted using a secure
authenticated communication channel.
The TOE is a firmware element: connectivity board microcontroller firmware in binary format (*.bin).
The firmware can be updated with a new version in any time whenever it is needed (to add a connectivity
feature or solve a problem or vulnerability) in connectivity board by using secure OTA method. Arcelik
TOE does not have a firmware configuration depends on the product configuration. Firmware solution is
adaptable to any Arcelik product (dishwasher, air conditioner, washing machine, etc..). On the other hand,
there are two types of communication methods are mainly used between TOE and CB (control board).
These are UART (Universal Asynchronous Receiver Transmitter) and SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface).
Firmware solution have two types depends on the communication methods between TOE and CB:
 Safir_batch_v3.10.23 (TOE [UART] – ESP32 FW)
 Safir_batch_v2.10.17 (TOE [SPI] – ESP32 FW)
Figure 1: Infrastructure of TOE
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The TOE operates in electronic board of IoT Device. The device user must use the Arcelik HomeWhiz
mobile application for utilizing connectivity features of IoT device and activating the TOE. In addition to
requiring services from the environment to achieve its main goal, the environment (Arcelik Cloud Server)
also maintains a secure posture so that the application cannot be compromised by factors out of the TSF
Scope of Control. Table 1 identifies the hardware required by TOE.
Category Specifications
Connectivity Board MPU
Dual-core Xtensa LX6 MCU with 448KB of RAM for booting,
520KB SRAM, and 4MB of external flash
Table 1: Hardware Required by TOE
The external entities of the TOE operational environment can be divided into three group: Arcelik Cloud
Server, mobile device (mobile application) and the appliance user. Figure 2 shows the external entities of
the TOE operational environment.
 Arcelik Cloud Server
Arcelik Cloud Server is implemented by Arcelik and running on AWS EC2 machines. It communicates
with the mobile device and Arcelik IoT Device via secure MQTT. It carries out an application layer TLS
handshake with both sides and transmits the messages as encrypted with that TLS session to make sure
these messages are secured. Moreover, the usage data and machine state information are also encrypted
with that TLS session and sent from the appliance to the cloud server.
 Mobile Device
HomeWhiz mobile application runs on the mobile device. This application reads the machine state data
from the cloud and sends user control commands to the cloud as required. The command to start the
firmware update process is also issued from this device. As mentioned before, the connection between the
mobile device and Arcelik cloud server is encrypted.
 Appliance User
This refers to the user who uses an Arcelik IoT Device, connects it to the Arcelik Cloud Server using
mobile application running on a mobile device. If necessary, upgrades the firmware of the appliance to
take advantage of a variety of new features the appliance can provide. The users do not directly call the
TOE but install new firmware to appliance and use mobile applications using IoT device functions.
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 Control Board
Control board is the board that has a firmware run appliance with the required features in defined states
and it is different from appliance to appliance. Control board communicates with the connectivity board
via UART or SPI interface. Control board generates user data collected from the internal sensors of the
appliance and sends them to the TOE periodically or at the end of each operation cycle.
Figure 2: External Entities of the TOE Operational Environment
2.5 Documentation
Document Name Version Release Date
Arcelik Wi-Fi IoT Connectivity Solution v1.0 Security Target v0.15 29/12/2022
Arcelik Wi-Fi IoT Connectivity Solution v1.0 Guidance and
Preparative Procedures Document
v0.5 05/01/2023
2.6 IT Product Testing
During the evaluation, all evaluation evidences of TOE were delivered and transferred compeletely to
CCTL by the developer. All the delivered evaluation evidences which include software, documents, etc.
are mapped to the assurance families and the evaluation evidences has been established. The evaluation
results are available at the final Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) of Arcelik Wi-Fi IoT Connectivity
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Solution v1.0. It is concluded that the TOE supports EAL 2. There exist 19 assurance families which are
all evaluated with the methods detailed in the ETR.
 Developer Testing: Developer has prepared TOE Test Document according to the TOE Functional
Specification documentation, TOE design documentation which includes TSF subsystems and its
iteractions. All SFR-Enforcing TSFIs have been tested by developer. Developer has conducted 9
functional tests in total.
 Evaluator Testing: Evaluator has conducted 9 developer tests. Additionally, evaluator has prepared
4 independent tests. TOE has passed all functional tests to demonstrate that its security functions work
as it is defined in the ST.
Test
ID
Test TSFI SF SFR
BT_01 OTA Download/
Install Interface Test
OTA Download,
OTA Install
Secure OTA
Firmware Download,
Secure OTA
Firmware Installation
FCS_CKM.3
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1
FDP_IFC.1 – HSM
FDP_IFF.1 – HSM
FDP_ITC.2
FMT_MSA.1 – HSM
FMT_MSA.3 – HSM
FMT_SMF.1
FPT_TDC.1
FPT_ITC.1 – HSM
FPT_ITC.1 – CLOUD
FTP_ITC.1 – HSM
FTP_TRP.1
FPT_ITI.1
BT_02 Signup Test with
Wrong Wi-Fi
Password
OTA Install Secure OTA
Firmware Download,
Secure OTA Firmware
Installation
FCS_CKM.3
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1
FDP_IFC.1 – HSM
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FDP_IFF.1 – HSM
FDP_ITC.2
FMT_MSA.1 – HSM
FMT_MSA.3 – HSM
FMT_SMF.1
FPT_TDC.1
FPT_ITC.1 – HSM
FPT_ITC.1 – CLOUD
FTP_ITC.1 – HSM
FTP_TRP.1
BT_03 Power Failure Test
During Update
OTA Install,
Diagnostic Data
Secure OTA
Firmware Download,
Secure OTA Firmware
Installation
Secure Log Storage
FAU_STG.1
FCS_CKM.3
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1
FDP_ETC.2
FDP_IFC.1 – CLOUD
FDP_IFC.1 – HSM
FDP_IFC.1 – CB
FDP_IFF.1 – CLOUD
FDP_IFF.1 – CB
FDP_ITC.1
FDP_ITC.2
FDP_UIT.1
FMT_MSA.1 – CLOUD
FMT_MSA.1 – HSM
FMT_MSA.1 – CB
FMT_MSA.3 – CLOUD
FMT_MSA.3 – HSM
FMT_MSA.3 – CB
FMT_SMF.1
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FPT_TDC.1
FPT_ITC.1 – HSM
FTP_ITC.1 – HSM
FTP_ITC.1 – CB
FTP_TRP.1
BT_04 Control Test of
Server Connection
Addresses
OTA Download Secure OTA
Firmware Download,
Secure OTA Firmware
Installation
FCS_CKM.3
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1
FDP_IFC.1 – HSM
FDP_IFF.1 – HSM
FDP_ITC.2
FMT_MSA.1 – HSM
FMT_MSA.3 – HSM
FMT_SMF.1
FPT_TDC.1
FPT_ITC.1 – HSM
FPT_ITC.1 – CLOUD
FTP_ITC.1 – HSM
FTP_TRP.1
Table 2: Independent Tests
 Penetration Tests: TOE has been tested against common threats and other threats surfaced by
vulnerability analysis. As a result, 4 penetration tests have been conducted. TOE proved that it is
resistant to “Attacker with Basic Attack Potential”.
2.7 Evaluated Configuration
Evaluated TOE configuration is composed of:
 Arcelik Wi-Fi IoT Connectivity Solution v1.0
Also as consistent with the minimum Hardware/ Software/ OS requirements for the TOE, the test
environment presented at the ETR is composed of software and hardware.
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Hardware Software
DUT: The Device Under Test (including the TOE) Windows 10 64-bit
5V energy source to power the DUT Firmware Test Package v0.1 (provided by Arcelik)
ESP-Prog USB-TTL adaptor to transfer device
logs to the PC (Logging Device)
Tera Term v4.106
Custom cable to connect the Logging Device to
TOE
esptool.exe v4.4
An Android mobile phone with HomeWhiz
application installed
HomeWhiz v2.8.0.5 for Android
A Wi-Fi modem with active internet connection
A desktop or laptop PC with at least 8GB RAM
and 2GB free disk space
Table 3: Software and Hardware Requirements of Test Environment
Figure 3: TOE Test Topology
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2.8 Results of the Evaluation
The table below provides a complete list of the Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE. These
requirements consist of the Evaluation Assurance Level 2 (EAL 2) components as specified in Part 3 of
the Common Criteria.
Class Heading Class Family Description Result
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description PASS
ADV_FSP.2 Complete functional specification PASS
ADV_TDS.1 Basic modular design PASS
AGD:
Guidance Documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance PASS
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures PASS
ALC:
Lifecycle Support
ALC_CMC.2 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
PASS
ALC_CMS.2 Problem tracking CM coverage PASS
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures PASS
ASE:
Security Target
evaluation
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims PASS
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition PASS
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction PASS
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives PASS
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements PASS
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition PASS
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification PASS
ATE:
Tests
ATE_COV.1 Analysis of coverage PASS
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing PASS
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample PASS
AVA: Vulnerability
Analysis
AVA_VAN.2 Focused vulnerability analysis PASS
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2.9 Evaluator Comments / Recommendations
Potential purchasers of the TOE should review the intended operational environment and ensure that they
are comfortable with the stated security objectives for the operational environment and it can be suitably
addressed.
3 SECURITY TARGET
The security target associated with this Certification Report is identified by the following terminology:
Title: Arcelik Wi-Fi IoT Connectivity Solution v1.0 Security Target
Version: v0.15
Date of Document: December 29, 2022
This Security Target describes the TOE, intended IT environment, security objectives, security
requirements (for the TOE and IT environment), TOE security functions and all necessary rationale.
4 GLOSSARY
AWS EC2: Amazon Web Services Elastic Compute Cloud
BİLGEM: Bilişim ve Bilgi Güvenliği İleri Teknolojiler Araştırma Merkezi
CCCS: Common Criteria Certification Scheme
CCMB: Common Criteria Management Board
CCRA: Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CKM: Cryptographic Key Management
COP: Cryptographic Operation
EAL: Evaluation Assurance Level
ECDSA: Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
FAU: Function of Audit
FTP: Function of Trusted Path
STG: Storage
HSM: Hardware Security Module
IFC: Information Flow Control
IoT: Internet of Things
ITC: Inter TSF Confidentiality
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ITCD: Information Technologies Test and Certification Department
MSA: Management of Security Attributes
OKTEM: Ortak Kriterler Test Merkezi
OSP: Organisational Security Policy
OTA: Over the Air
SAR: Security Assurance Requirements
SFR: Security Functional Requirements
SHA: Secure Hash Algorithm
SMF: Specification of Management Functions
ST: Security Target
TLS: Transport Layer Security
TOE: Target of Evaluation
TDC: TSF Data Consistency
TSF: TOE Security Functionality
TSFI: TSF Interface
TÜBİTAK: Türkiye Bilimsel ve Teknolojik Araştırma Kurumu
UART: Universal Asynchronous Receiver Transmitter
5 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM, Version 3.1
Revision 5, April 2017
[3] DTR 87 TR 01 of Arcelik W-Fi IoT Connectivity Solution v1.0, Rel. Date: March 24, 2023
[4] Arcelik W-Fi IoT Connectivity Solution v1.0 Security Target, Version 0.15,
Rel. Date: December 29, 2022.
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6 ANNEXES
6.1 TOE SPECIFICATIONS
TOE: Arcelik W-Fi IoT Connectivity Solution v1.0
TOE Hash (SHA256):
Modules SHA-256
Safir_batch_v3.10.23
(TOE [UART] – ESP32 FW)
F8807AE09DD3BDB873CC90F125513C6FC54F03EEA10623DCE8948
0D64B4158C3
Safir_batch_v2.10.17
(TOE [SPI] – ESP32 FW)
AD443B681CC8C181B4CBFFE02D4398AE001A70A4EF47001AC197
4716FDF57AEA
6.2 TEST ENVIRONMENT
Test Software/ Hardware Name Purpose of Use Analysis
1 esptool.exe v4.4
Software installation to TOE
and reading of memory parts
Application for programming
ESP device family and
sending commands
2 HomeWhiz v2.8.0.5 (Android)
Communication with TOE
and necessary corporations
Application based on
Android platform
3 HomeWhiz v3.1.13 (ios)
Communication with TOE
and necessary corporations
Application based on ios
platform
4 PuTTy v0.78
Serial communication with
TOE and log monitoring
Serial communication
monitoring application
5 Suricata IDS v6.0.8
Viewing connections to the
wireless hotspot
Attack detection application
6
Samsung Galaxy Tab S2 Android
7.0
Running the HomeWhiz
application
Tablet with Android operating
system and providing Wi-Fi
connection
7 ESP-Prog USB-TTL adapter
Serial communication via
USB
USB-TTL converter adapter