IDL full EAC v2 Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA FQR No: 110 7641 FQR Issue: 5 T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ Legal Notice © OT. All rights reserved. Specifications and information are subject to change without notice. The products described in this document are subject to continuous All trademarks and service marks referred to herein, whether registered or not in specific countries, are the properties of their respective owners. ** Printed versions of this document are uncontrolled ** IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Specifications and information are subject to change without notice. The products described in this document are subject to continuous development and improvement. All trademarks and service marks referred to herein, whether registered or not in specific countries, are the properties ** Printed versions of this document are uncontrolled ** Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - 92700 development and improvement. All trademarks and service marks referred to herein, whether registered or not in specific countries, are the properties T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ Document Management A. Identification Business Unit - Department ID R&D Document type: FQR Document Title: IDL FQR No: 110 FQR Issue: 5 IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Document Management ID R&D FQR IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with P 110 7641 5 Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - PACE and AA T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ Table of contents LIST OF FIGURES LIST OF TABLES 9 1 SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION 1.1 Purpose ................................ 1.2 Objective of the security target 1.3 Security target identification 1.4 TOE technical identification 1.5 IC identification 2 TOE OVERVIEW 2.1 Product overvi 2.2 TOE overview................................ 2.3 TOE usages................................ 2.4 TOE definition 3 OE ARCHITECTURE 3.1 Integrated Circuit 3.2 Low layer ................................ 3.3 Tools modules 3.4 Applicative modules 3.5 Operating System 3.6 Application layer 4 TOE LIFE CYCLE 4.1 Life cycle overview 4.2 Phase 1 “Development” 4.3 Phase 2 “Manufacturing” 4.4 Phase 3 “Personalization of the travel document” 4.5 Phase 4 “Operational Use” IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ Objective of the security target................................................................ Security target identification ................................................................ TOE technical identification................................................................ IC identification................................................................................................ Product overview................................................................................................ ................................................................................................ ................................................................................................ ................................................................................................ Integrated Circuit - NXP P60................................................................ ................................................................................................ ................................................................................................ e modules................................................................ Operating System................................................................................................ Application layer................................................................................................ overview .............................................................................................. Phase 1 “Development”................................................................ Phase 2 “Manufacturing”................................................................ Phase 3 “Personalization of the travel document”................................ Phase 4 “Operational Use” ................................................................ Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - 8 10 ..............................................10 ............................................10 ...............................................11 .................................................12 ...................................13 14 ................................14 ......................................15 ..........................................16 .....................................18 19 .................................................19 ............................................20 .....................................21 ............................................................21 ................................22 .................................22 24 ..............................24 .......................................................26 .....................................................26 ................................................27 ..................................................28 T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 5 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS 5.1 Common Criteria conformance 5.1.1 Overview of the SFR defined in this ST 5.1.2 Overview of the additional protocols 5.1.2.1 Active Authentication 5.1.2.2 Prepersonalization phase 5.1.2.3 PACE CAM................................ 5.2 Protection Profile conformance 5.3 Rationale for the additions 5.4 Non evaluated features 6 SECURITY PROBLEM DEF 6.1 Subjects ................................ 6.1.1 PP EAC with PACE subjects 6.1.2 PP PACE Subjects 6.1.3 Additional Subjects 6.2 Assets ................................ 6.2.1 User data................................ 6.2.2 TSF data................................ 6.3 Threats ................................ 6.3.1 Threats from the PP EAC with PACE 6.3.2 Threats from PP PACE 6.3.3 Threats for AA 6.3.4 Threats for Note 6 6.4 Organisational Security Policies 6.4.1 OSP from PP EAC with PACE 6.4.2 OSP from PP PACE 6.4.3 OSP for AA................................ 6.5 Assumptions ................................ 6.5.1 Assumptions from PP EAC with PACE 6.5.2 Assumptions from PP PACE 6.5.3 Assumptions for Active Authentication 7 SECURITY OBJECTIVES IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS Criteria conformance ................................................................ Overview of the SFR defined in this ST ................................................................ Overview of the additional protocols ................................................................ Active Authentication................................................................................................ Prepersonalization phase................................................................................................ ................................................................................................ Protection Profile conformance ................................................................ Rationale for the additions ................................................................ Non evaluated features................................................................ SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION ................................................................................................ PACE subjects................................................................ PP PACE Subjects................................................................................................ Additional Subjects ................................................................................................ ................................................................................................ ................................................................................................ ................................................................................................ ................................................................................................ Threats from the PP EAC with PACE................................................................ Threats from PP PACE .............................................................................................. ................................................................................................ s for Note 6................................................................................................ Organisational Security Policies ................................................................ OSP from PP EAC with PACE................................................................ OSP from PP PACE................................................................................................ ................................................................................................ ................................................................................................ s from PP EAC with PACE ................................................................ Assumptions from PP PACE................................................................ Assumptions for Active Authentication ................................................................ SECURITY OBJECTIVES Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - 29 ............................................29 .................................... 29 ...................................... 30 ...................................... 30 ................................ 31 ........................................................ 31 ...........................................31 ..................................................32 .......................................................32 33 ..............................................33 ....................................................... 33 ...................................... 35 .................................. 37 .................................................37 .................................................. 37 .................................................... 39 ...............................................41 ......................................... 41 .............................. 42 .......................................... 46 .................................... 46 ...........................................47 ..................................................... 47 .................................... 48 ................................................ 50 .......................................50 ...................................... 50 ...................................................... 51 ................................... 51 53 T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 7.1 Security Objectives for the TOE 7.1.1 SO from PP EAC with PACE 7.1.2 SO from PP PACE 7.1.3 SO for AA................................ 7.1.4 SO for Note 6................................ 7.2 Security objectives for the Operational Environment 7.2.1 OE from PP EAC with PACE 7.2.2 OE from PP PACE 7.2.3 OE for AA................................ 8 EXTENDED REQUIREMENTS 8.1 Extended family FAU_SAS 8.1.1 Extended components FAU_SAS.1 8.2 Extended family FCS_RND 8.2.1 Extended component FCS_RND.1 8.3 Extended family FIA_API 8.3.1 Extended component FIA_API.1 8.4 Extended family FMT_LIM 8.4.1 Extended component FMT_LIM.1 8.4.2 Extended component FMT_LIM.2 8.5 Extended family FPT_EMS 8.5.1 Extended component FPT_EMS.1 9 SECURITY REQUIREMENT 9.1 Security Functional Requirements 9.1.1 Global SFR ................................ 9.1.2 Product configuration SFR 9.1.2.1 SFR for additional code 9.1.2.2 Manufacturing and Personalization 9.1.3 Active Authentication SFR 9.1.4 Chip Authentication SFR 9.1.5 Terminal Authentication SFR 9.1.6 Extended Access Control SFR 9.1.7 PACE SFR ................................ IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Security Objectives for the TOE................................................................ SO from PP EAC with PACE................................................................ SO from PP PACE................................................................................................ ................................................................................................ ................................................................................................ Security objectives for the Operational Environment................................ OE from PP EAC with PACE................................................................ OE from PP PACE................................................................................................ ................................................................................................ REMENTS Extended family FAU_SAS - Audit data storage................................ Extended components FAU_SAS.1................................................................ Extended family FCS_RND - Generation of random numbers ................................ Extended component FCS_RND.1................................................................ Extended family FIA_API – Authentication proof of identity ................................ Extended component FIA_API.1 ................................................................ Extended family FMT_LIM - Limited capabilities and availability Extended component FMT_LIM.1................................................................ Extended component FMT_LIM.2................................................................ Extended family FPT_EMS - TOE Emanation ................................ Extended component FPT_EMS.1................................................................ SECURITY REQUIREMENTS Security Functional Requirements................................................................ ................................................................................................ Product configuration SFR ................................................................ SFR for additional code ................................................................................................ Manufacturing and Personalization ................................................................ Active Authentication SFR................................................................ Chip Authentication SFR................................................................ Terminal Authentication SFR ................................................................ Extended Access Control SFR................................................................ ................................................................................................ Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - ............................................53 ....................................................... 53 ...................................... 54 .................................................. 56 ............................................ 56 ............................................57 ....................................................... 57 ...................................... 58 .................................................. 60 61 .....................................................61 ........................................... 61 ................................61 ............................................ 61 .................................61 .............................................. 61 Limited capabilities and availability...........................62 ............................................ 62 ............................................ 62 .........................................................63 ............................................ 63 64 ........................................64 ................................................ 64 ....................................................... 66 ................................... 66 ................................................ 70 ........................................................ 77 ........................................................... 79 ................................................... 85 ................................................... 88 .................................................. 89 T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 9.1.8 PACE CAM SFR 9.2 Security Assurance Requirements 10 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFIC 10.1 TOE Summary Specification 11 RATIONALES 12 REFERENCES 13 ACRONYMS INDEX 108 IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 ................................................................................................ ssurance Requirements................................................................ TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION TOE Summary Specification ................................................................ Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - .......................................... 96 ........................................98 99 .................................................99 103 104 107 T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ List of Figures Figure 1 - ID-One Native eDoc Overview Figure 2 - Block 1 Overview Figure 4: Smartcard product life- Figure 5 - Advanced Inspection Procedure IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 One Native eDoc Overview -cycle for the TOE Advanced Inspection Procedure Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - 15 15 24 34 T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ List of tables Table 1 - General Identification Table 2 - TOE Technical Identification Table 3 - Chip Identification Table 4 - Block 1 Applications overview Table 5 - OT Cryptographic library Table 6 - Roles identification on the life cycle Table 7 - Subjects identification following life cycle steps Table 8 - Conformance Rationale Table 9 -SFR from the PP 0056 v2 Table 10 – SFR from the PP 0068 v2 (required for the compliance to PP 0056 v2) Table 11 - Additional SFR Table 12- Threats and Security Objectives Table 13 - OSPs and Security Objectives Table 14 - Assumptions and OE – IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 TOE Technical Identification Block 1 Applications overview OT Cryptographic library Roles identification on the life cycle Subjects identification following life cycle steps e Rationale SFR from the PP 0056 v2 SFR from the PP 0068 v2 (required for the compliance to PP 0056 v2) Threats and Security Objectives – coverage OSPs and Security Objectives – Coverage – Coverage Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - 11 12 13 15 20 25 25 29 30 30 30 103 103 103 T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 1 SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION 1.1 Purpose The objective of this document is to present the IDL full EAC v2 product on NXP components from 1.2 Objective of the security target This security target describes the securit PP EAC and PP PACE and adds requirements for prepersonalization and personalization. This security target aims to satisfy the requirements of Common Criteria level defined in §1.3 in defining the security enforcing functions of the Target Of Evaluation and describing the environment in which it operates. The objectives of this Security Target are: - To describe the Target of Evaluation (TOE), its life cycle and to position it in the smart card life cycle. - To describe the security environment of the TOE including the assets to be protected and the threats to be countered by the TOE and by platform active phases. - To describe the security objectives of the TOE and its supporting environment in terms of integrity and confidentiality of sensitive information. It includes protection of the TOE (and its documentation) during the product active phases. - To specify the security requirements which include the TOE functional requirements, the TOE assurance requirements and the security requirements for the - To describe the summary of the TOE functions and assurance measures that meet the TOE security requirements. - To present evidence that this ST is a complete and cohesive set of requirements that the TOE provides on an effective set of IT environment, and that the TOE summary specification addresses the requirements. IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 INTRODUCTION The objective of this document is to present the Public Security Target EAC with NXP components from P60 family. Objective of the security target This security target describes the security needs for IDL full EAC v2 product. The product is and adds requirements for prepersonalization and personalization. This security target aims to satisfy the requirements of Common Criteria level in defining the security enforcing functions of the Target Of Evaluation and describing the environment in which it operates. arget are: To describe the Target of Evaluation (TOE), its life cycle and to position it in the smart To describe the security environment of the TOE including the assets to be protected and the threats to be countered by the TOE and by the operational environment during the platform active phases. To describe the security objectives of the TOE and its supporting environment in terms of integrity and confidentiality of sensitive information. It includes protection of the TOE mentation) during the product active phases. To specify the security requirements which include the TOE functional requirements, the TOE assurance requirements and the security requirements for the environment. To describe the summary of the TOE specification including a description of the security functions and assurance measures that meet the TOE security requirements. To present evidence that this ST is a complete and cohesive set of requirements that the TOE provides on an effective set of IT security countermeasures within the security environment, and that the TOE summary specification addresses the requirements. Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - with PACE and AA of the full EAC v2 product. The product is based on and adds requirements for prepersonalization and personalization. This security target aims to satisfy the requirements of Common Criteria level EAL5 augmented as in defining the security enforcing functions of the Target Of Evaluation and describing To describe the Target of Evaluation (TOE), its life cycle and to position it in the smart To describe the security environment of the TOE including the assets to be protected and the operational environment during the To describe the security objectives of the TOE and its supporting environment in terms of integrity and confidentiality of sensitive information. It includes protection of the TOE To specify the security requirements which include the TOE functional requirements, the environment. specification including a description of the security functions and assurance measures that meet the TOE security requirements. To present evidence that this ST is a complete and cohesive set of requirements that the security countermeasures within the security environment, and that the TOE summary specification addresses the requirements. T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 1.3 Security target identification Title: Security Editor: Oberthur Technologies CC version: 3.1 revision 4 EAL: EAL5 augmented with: - ALC_DVS. - AVA_VAN.5 - PP(s): BSI-CC-PP BSI-CC-PP ST Reference: FQR 110 72 ITSEF: LETI Certification Body: ANSSI Evaluation scheme: FR IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 identification Security target EAC with PACE Oberthur Technologies 3.1 revision 4 augmented with: ALC_DVS.2 AVA_VAN.5 PP-0056 v2 [R13] PP-0068 v2 [R14] FQR 110 7248 Issue 6 Table 1 - General Identification Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 1.4 TOE technical identification Product name: ID- Commercial name of the TOE 1: ID- PACE configuration with AA Commercial name of the TOE 2: ID- configuration with AA IC type ‘6C14 ‘6014 ‘6A15 ‘6019 ‘6A20 Additional code 1 Mandatory generic Identification: ‘C96E449AD06093BB25395B4F2C4F63720C46F52E2D4D91BA00B84B098 6F7A738 Additional code 2 Optional DBI Identification: ‘B765E230D3B932A3930445DF453B50CAA3EC0077C03ABD2F327D8606 532F51C2 Table Nota Bene - The additional code doesn’t depend on the IC and the memory size - The additional code is encrypted with the LSK key - An optional additional code (functional) can be loaded. This additional code, relative to the Digitally Blurred Image process (DBI) is part of the product, but not in the scope of the evaluation. IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 TOE technical identification -One ePass Full EAC v2 -One ePass Full EAC v2 on P60x080 VC/VG PACE configuration with AA -One ePass Full EAC v2 on P60x144 VA IDL configuration with AA 6C14’ (P60D080 VC) 6014’ (P60D080 VG) 6A15’ (P60D144 VA) 6019’ (P60C080 VG) 6A20’ (P60C144 VA) C96E449AD06093BB25395B4F2C4F63720C46F52E2D4D91BA00B84B098 6F7A738’ B765E230D3B932A3930445DF453B50CAA3EC0077C03ABD2F327D8606 532F51C2’ Table 2 - TOE Technical Identification The additional code doesn’t depend on the IC and the memory size The additional code is encrypted with the LSK key An optional additional code (functional) can be loaded. This additional code, relative to the Digitally Blurred Image process (DBI) is part of the product, but not in the scope of the Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - IDL in EAC with IDL in EAC with PACE C96E449AD06093BB25395B4F2C4F63720C46F52E2D4D91BA00B84B098 B765E230D3B932A3930445DF453B50CAA3EC0077C03ABD2F327D8606 An optional additional code (functional) can be loaded. This additional code, relative to the Digitally Blurred Image process (DBI) is part of the product, but not in the scope of the T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 1.5 IC identification IC Reference: NXP P60 chips TOE 1: NXP P60x080/052/040 EAL 6 + AVA_VAN.5 + ALC_DVS.2 + ASE_TSS.2 TOE 2: NXP P60x144/080PVA/PVA (Y) EAL 6 + ALC_FLR.1 Communication protocol: Contact, Contactless and Dual Memory: ROM Chip Manufacturer: NXP Semiconductors Nota Bene TOE 1 and TOE 2 possess the same source NXP chips are driven from the NXP IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 NXP P60 chips NXP P60x080/052/040 PVC/PVG [R19] + AVA_VAN.5 + ALC_DVS.2 + ASE_TSS.2 P60x144/080PVA/PVA (Y) [R18] EAL 6 + ALC_FLR.1 Contact, Contactless and Dual NXP Semiconductors Table 3 - Chip Identification the same source code, which is embedded on the two NXP chips. The two NXP chips are driven from the NXP P60 chip family. Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - is embedded on the two NXP chips. The two T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 2 TOE OVERVIEW 2.1 Product overview The product ID-One Native eDoc and/or contact-less smart card integrated circuits of different form factors. The product can be configured to serve different use cases, during the product. For more information on the The product supports the storage and retrieval of structured information compliant to the Logical Data Structure as specified in [R2] Access Control [R11], Supplementary Access Control Access Control ([R12] and [R13] (compliant to [R9]). It can host four types of applications as mentioned above, namely the Moreover, further configuration may also be do other than those behaviourally defined in the referenced normative documents. This product is embedded on the ICs The ID-One Native eDoc architecture can be viewed as shown in the following pictu Platform layer Application layer Block 1: MRTD - IDL IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 One Native eDoc is a multi-applicative native software, embedd less smart card integrated circuits of different form factors. The product can be configured to serve different use cases, during the Prepersonalization/personalization product. For more information on the product, please refer to complete ST. The product supports the storage and retrieval of structured information compliant to the Logical [R2]. It also provides standard authentication protocols, namely Basic , Supplementary Access Control [R17], Active Authentication [R13]), the Basic Access Protection [R9] and Extended Access Protection It can host four types of applications as mentioned above, namely the IDL, MRTD Moreover, further configuration may also be done to each type of application to serve use cases defined in the referenced normative documents. This product is embedded on the ICs described in §1.5 IC identification. architecture can be viewed as shown in the following pictu NXP P60 Low layer Tools modules Applicative modules Operating System Block 2: eID Block 3: eSign Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - applicative native software, embeddable in contact less smart card integrated circuits of different form factors. The product can be Prepersonalization/personalization phases of the The product supports the storage and retrieval of structured information compliant to the Logical . It also provides standard authentication protocols, namely Basic , Active Authentication [R39], Extended and Extended Access Protection MRTD, eID and eSign. ne to each type of application to serve use cases architecture can be viewed as shown in the following picture: Block 4: Dauth T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ Figure 2.2 TOE overview The TOE described in this security target is the of the Block 1 MRTD - IDL. The block 1 of the ID-One Native eDoc Applications PP MRTD BAC with CA and AA [R11] EAC with AA [R12] EAC with PACE and AA [R13] PACE with CA, PACE_CAM and AA [R14] IDL BAP X EAC and BAP X PACE X PACE and EAC X Table The EAC with PACE and AA TOE is instantiated during the product prepersonalization, using the operating system that creates the MF / DF required for the Block 1: MRTD & IDL MRTD BAC IDL BAP IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Figure 1 - ID-One Native eDoc Overview The TOE described in this security target is the EAC with PACE and AA TOE of the One Native eDoc is composed of the following applications: Targeted EAL EAL4 + ADV_FSP.5 + ADV_INT.2 + ADV_TDS.4 + ALC_DVS.2 + ALC_CMS.5 + ALC_TAT.2 + ATE_DPT.3 EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5 EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5 EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5 EAL4 + ADV_FSP.5 + ADV_INT.2 + ADV_TDS.4 + ALC_DVS.2 + ALC_CMS.5 + ALC_TAT.2 + ATE_DPT.3 EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5 EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5 EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5 Table 4 - Block 1 Applications overview Figure 2 - Block 1 Overview TOE is instantiated during the product prepersonalization, using the that creates the MF / DF required for the EAC with PACE and AA MRTD EAC MRTD EAC & PACE IDL PACE MRTD IDL EAC & PACE IDL BAP & EAC Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - TOE of the product, a subset EAL4 + ADV_FSP.5 + ADV_INT.2 + ADV_TDS.4 + ALC_DVS.2 + EAL4 + ADV_FSP.5 + ADV_INT.2 + ADV_TDS.4 + ALC_DVS.2 + TOE is instantiated during the product prepersonalization, using the AA configuration. MRTD PACE IDL EAC & PACE T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ The TOE life cycle is described in The TOE identification is described in Nota bene The TOE scope encompasses the following features: - Extended Access Control Authentication and Terminal Authentication - Active Authentication - PACE CAM - Prepersonalization phase - Personalization phase Nevertheless, the TOE can embed TOE and subject to an evaluation in other TOEs. 2.3 TOE usages Organisation issues MRDs to be used by the holder to prove his/her identity and claiming associated rights. For instance, it can be used to check identity at customs in an MRD configuration, verifying authenticity of electronic visa stored on the card and correspondence with the holder. In order to pass successfully the control, the holder presents its personal system to first prove his/her identity. The inspection system is under control of an authorised agent and can be either a desktop device such as those present in airports or a portable device to be used on the field. The MRD in context of this security target contains: - Visual (eye readable) biographical data and portrait of the holder printed in the - A separate data summary keydoc) for visual and machine reading using OCR methods in the Machine Readable Zone (keydoc area) - And data elements stored on the TOE’s chip for reading. The authentication of the holder is based on: - The possession of a valid the biographical data page and - The Biometric matching performed on the Inspection system using the reference data stored in the MRD. IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 The TOE life cycle is described in §4 TOE life cycle. The TOE identification is described in §1.4 TOE technical identification. The TOE scope encompasses the following features: Extended Access Control with Password Authenticated Connection Establishment, Chip Authentication and Terminal Authentication Prepersonalization phase (in particular with Additional code loading) embed other secure functionalities, but they are not in the scope of this TOE and subject to an evaluation in other TOEs. to be used by the holder to prove his/her identity and claiming associated t can be used to check identity at customs in an MRD configuration, verifying authenticity of electronic visa stored on the card and correspondence with the holder. In order to pass successfully the control, the holder presents its personal MRD system to first prove his/her identity. The inspection system is under control of an authorised agent and can be either a desktop device such as those present in airports or a portable device to be used curity target contains: Visual (eye readable) biographical data and portrait of the holder printed in the A separate data summary keydoc) for visual and machine reading using OCR methods in the Machine Readable Zone (keydoc area) stored on the TOE’s chip for dual, contact and contact The authentication of the holder is based on: The possession of a valid MRD personalized for a holder with the claimed identity as given on the biographical data page and iometric matching performed on the Inspection system using the reference data stored Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - with Password Authenticated Connection Establishment, Chip other secure functionalities, but they are not in the scope of this to be used by the holder to prove his/her identity and claiming associated t can be used to check identity at customs in an MRD configuration, verifying authenticity of electronic visa stored on the card and correspondence with the holder. MRD to the inspection system to first prove his/her identity. The inspection system is under control of an authorised agent and can be either a desktop device such as those present in airports or a portable device to be used Visual (eye readable) biographical data and portrait of the holder printed in the card A separate data summary keydoc) for visual and machine reading using OCR methods in the contact-less machine personalized for a holder with the claimed identity as given on iometric matching performed on the Inspection system using the reference data stored T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ When holder has been authenticated the issuing Organization can performed extra authentications in order to gain rights required to grant access to some sensi information”… The issuing Organization ensures the authenticity of the data of genuine Organization trusts a genuine MRD The MRD can be viewed as the combination: - A physical MRD in form of paper or plastic with an embedded chip and possibly an antenna. It presents visual readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the holder o The biographical data on the biographical o The printed data in the Machine the device o The printed portrait - A logical MRD as data of the specified by ICAO and extended in presents contact or contact the MRD holder o The digital Machine Readable Zone Data ( o The digitized portraits o The optional biometric reference data of finger(s) or iris image(s) or both o The other data accordi o The Document security object The issuing Organization implements security features of the integrity of the MRD and its data. The identified by the document number. The physical MRD is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on paper, security printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the (e.g. control of materials, personalization procedures). These security measures include the binding of the MRD’s chip to the physical support. The logical MRD is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created by the document signer acting for the issuing Organiz IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 When holder has been authenticated the issuing Organization can performed extra authentications in order to gain rights required to grant access to some sensitive information such as “visa The issuing Organization ensures the authenticity of the data of genuine MRDs MRD of an issuing Organization. can be viewed as the combination: in form of paper or plastic with an embedded chip and possibly an antenna. It presents visual readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the The biographical data on the biographical data page of the Driving Licence Docume The printed data in the Machine-Readable Zone (keydoc)keydoc are The printed portrait as data of the MRD holder stored according to the Logical Data Structure as specified by ICAO and extended in [R7], [R8], [R9] on the contactless integrated circuit. It presents contact or contact-less readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of The digital Machine Readable Zone Data (keydoc data, DG1) The digitized portraits The optional biometric reference data of finger(s) or iris image(s) or both The other data according to LDS (up to DG64) The Document security object The issuing Organization implements security features of the MRD to maintain the authenticity and and its data. The MRD as the physical device and the MRD’s chip is uniquely ed by the document number. is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on paper, security printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the MRD’s chip) and organisational security measures onalization procedures). These security measures include the binding chip to the physical support. is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created by the document signer acting for the issuing Organization and the security features of the Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - When holder has been authenticated the issuing Organization can performed extra authentications tive information such as “visa MRDs. The receiving in form of paper or plastic with an embedded chip and possibly an antenna. It presents visual readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the MRD Driving Licence Document keydoc area that identifies holder stored according to the Logical Data Structure as on the contactless integrated circuit. It adable data including (but not limited to) personal data of The optional biometric reference data of finger(s) or iris image(s) or both to maintain the authenticity and as the physical device and the MRD’s chip is uniquely is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on paper, security chip) and organisational security measures onalization procedures). These security measures include the binding is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created by the ation and the security features of the MRD’s chip. T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 2.4 TOE definition The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the readable documents (MRD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure providing the following features: - Active Authentication - EAC - PACE & PACE CAM. The TOE comprises at least: - Circuitry of the MRD’s chip (the integrated circuit, IC) - IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated Software - IC Embedded Software (operating system) - MRD application - Associated guidance documentation IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the contact, contactless and dual integrated circuit chip of machine documents (MRD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure following features: ircuitry of the MRD’s chip (the integrated circuit, IC) IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated IC Embedded Software (operating system) sociated guidance documentation Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - integrated circuit chip of machine documents (MRD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) and IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated Support T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 3 OE ARCHITECTURE The TOE is a smartcard, composed of various modules and composed of the following components: 3.1 Integrated Circuit - NXP P60 The TOE is embedded on NXP chips, as presented in More information on the chips are given in the related Application layer Block 1: MRTD & IDL Platform layer BAC EAC eDoc Application IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 OE ARCHITECTURE The TOE is a smartcard, composed of various modules and composed of the following components: Figure 3 - TOE architecture NXP P60 The TOE is embedded on NXP chips, as presented in Table 3 - Chip Identification More information on the chips are given in the related security targets. MRTD & IDL Block 2 Resident Application IDL PACE Low layer Tools modules Applicative modules Operating System PACE EAC w PACE IDL BAP IDL BAP & EAC IDL PACE & EAC Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - The TOE is a smartcard, composed of various modules and composed of the following components: Chip Identification. Block 3 Block 4 T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 3.2 Low layer The low layer developed by Oberthur Technologies provides an efficient and easy way features from the applications. Indeed, it is based on services organized according to a multi design which allows applications to use a high level interface completely independent of the chip. The main features of the OS are the foll - EEPROM management including secure data processing, - Other memories management, - Transaction management, - APDU protocol management, - Low level T=0 ; T=1 and T=CL management, - Error processing, - Advanced securities activation. A dedicated cryptographic library has been developed and designed by Oberthur Technologies provide the highest security level and best tuned performances. It provides the following algorithms: Cryptographic Feature SHA1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA RSA CRT from 1024, to 4096 bits (by steps of 256 bits) - signature/verification - key pair generation RSA SFM from 1024 to 4096 bits (by steps of 256 bits) - signature/verification - key pair generation ECC with key sizes from 192 to 521 bits - signature/verification (ECDSA) - key agreement (ECDH) - key pair generation 3DES with 112 bits key size AES with 128, 192, 256 key sizes Random Generator compliant AIS31 Diffie Hellman from 1024 to 2048 - key agreement - key generation Integrated mapping over prime field and Elliptic curves Table IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Oberthur Technologies provides an efficient and easy way features from the applications. Indeed, it is based on services organized according to a multi design which allows applications to use a high level interface completely independent of the chip. The main features of the OS are the following: EEPROM management including secure data processing, Other memories management, Transaction management, APDU protocol management, and T=CL management, Advanced securities activation. brary has been developed and designed by Oberthur Technologies provide the highest security level and best tuned performances. It provides the following algorithms: Embedded 384 and SHA-512 bits CRT from 1024, to 4096 bits (by steps of 256 bits): RSA SFM from 1024 to 4096 bits (by steps of 256 bits): ECC with key sizes from 192 to 521 bits : Random Generator compliant AIS31 Diffie Hellman from 1024 to 2048 : Integrated mapping over prime field and Elliptic curves Table 5 - OT Cryptographic library Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - Oberthur Technologies provides an efficient and easy way to access chip features from the applications. Indeed, it is based on services organized according to a multi-layer design which allows applications to use a high level interface completely independent of the chip. brary has been developed and designed by Oberthur Technologies to provide the highest security level and best tuned performances. It provides the following algorithms: T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ More information is available in complete ST 3.3 Tools modules The tools modules provide IDL full EAC v2 product: - File system compliant with ISO/IEC 7816 recommendations [R2]. - ISO Secure Messaging as specified in - PIN and BIO access rights - Asymmetric Keys Management as storage, signature, verification, D - Symmetric Key management - Access Control for ‘Change MSK’ and ‘PUT KEY’ APDU - Authentication and secure messaging to be used Personalization phases, based on Global Platform standard More information is available in 3.4 Applicative modules The applicative modules provide - Chip Authentication version 1 ephemeral-static Diffie communication and unilateral authentication of the - Terminal Authentication two move challenge-response protocol that provides explicit unilateral authentication of the terminal. - PACE Protocol as specified in protocol that provides secure communication and explicit password the IDL chip and the terminal. - Access Conditions Engine object) with a current context (CHA, Role ID…). documents such as eMRTD, iDL, eID and eSign, the application embeds ROMed access condition rules. - Another applicative module is the Digital Blurred Image (DBI) module. It allows the blurring of a JPG or JPEG2000 file stored in a transparent file. patents owned by Oberthur Technologies. scope of this present certification. More information is available in IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 complete ST. full EAC v2 product: compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-4 and ISO/IEC 7816-9. It is also compliant with ICAO ISO Secure Messaging as specified in [R20] and as described in annex E of N and BIO access rights management as presented in § 2.5 of [R40] and B.6 of Asymmetric Keys Management as storage, signature, verification, DH and generation. Symmetric Key management Access Control for ‘Change MSK’ and ‘PUT KEY’ APDU Authentication and secure messaging to be used during Prepersonalization and Personalization phases, based on Global Platform standard complete ST. Applicative modules The applicative modules provide IDL full EAC v2 product: version 1 as described in [R39] and version 2 as described in static Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol that provides secure communication and unilateral authentication of the IDL chip. Authentication version 1 as described in [R39] and version 2 as described in response protocol that provides explicit unilateral authentication of the s specified in [R17], a password authenticated Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol that provides secure communication and explicit password-based authentication of chip and the terminal. Access Conditions Engine that checks the AC rules attached to an object (file, object) with a current context (CHA, Role ID…). For applications already defined by normative documents such as eMRTD, iDL, eID and eSign, the application embeds ROMed access Another applicative module is the Digital Blurred Image (DBI) module. It allows the blurring of a JPG or JPEG2000 file stored in a transparent file. This feature is the implementation of patents owned by Oberthur Technologies. This module is part of the TO scope of this present certification. complete ST. Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - 9. It is also compliant with ICAO and as described in annex E of [R41]. and B.6 of [R41] H and generation. Prepersonalization and and version 2 as described in [R40], an Hellman key agreement protocol that provides secure and version 2 as described in [R40], a response protocol that provides explicit unilateral authentication of the Hellman key agreement based authentication of checks the AC rules attached to an object (file, key, data For applications already defined by normative documents such as eMRTD, iDL, eID and eSign, the application embeds ROMed access Another applicative module is the Digital Blurred Image (DBI) module. It allows the blurring This feature is the implementation of is part of the TOE and outside the T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 3.5 Operating System This application manages the TOE in pre configure the TOE in the expected way. It i LSK), File management including data reading and writing addressed in clear mode for secure environment or non More information is available in 3.6 Application layer Two kinds of dispatcher are available on the top of the product: the resident application for Personalization Phase and for used during the Use Phase of MRD Applications. The application layer also manages Control, Extended Access Control Authentication. The protocol for Basic Access Control is specified by ICAO terminal has physical access to the MRD’s data page derive an authentication key from the optically read Access Control is based on ISO/IEC 11770 also used to generate session keys that are used to protect the confidentiality (and integrity) of the transmitted data. The inspection system: - Reads the printed data in the - Authenticates itself as inspection system by means of keys derived from After successful 3DES based authentication, the TOE provides read access to data requiring BAC rights by means of a private communication (secure messaging) with the inspection system. The Extended Access Control (EAC) mutual authentication of the TOE and the Inspection system. This step is required to access bi data such as fingerprints and iris stored in ensures a strong secure channel able to provide confidentiality of the biometric data that are read and authentication of the Inspection system retrie comparison. The Extended Access curve cryptography, or with RSA cryptography. IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 This application manages the TOE in pre-personalization and personalization phases in configure the TOE in the expected way. It implements and control access to Key management (MSK, LSK), File management including data reading and writing or additional code loading in clear mode for secure environment or non-sensitive commands, using SCP02 or SCP03 ation is available in complete ST. are available on the top of the product: the resident application for administration during Use Phase and the eDoc the Use Phase of MRD Applications. manages protocols available during Use phase such as Basic Access , Extended Access Control Password Authenticated Connection Establishment rotocol for Basic Access Control is specified by ICAO [R2]. Basic Access Control checks that the terminal has physical access to the MRD’s data page. This is enforced by requiring the terminal to derive an authentication key from the optically read KEYDOC of the MRD. The protocol for Basic Access Control is based on ISO/IEC 11770-2 [R36] key establishment mechanism 6. This protocol is also used to generate session keys that are used to protect the confidentiality (and integrity) of the eads the printed data in the KEYDOC (for MRD), Authenticates itself as inspection system by means of keys derived from After successful 3DES based authentication, the TOE provides read access to data requiring BAC te communication (secure messaging) with the inspection system. (EAC) enhances the latest security features and ensures mutual authentication of the TOE and the Inspection system. This step is required to access bi data such as fingerprints and iris stored in DG7 and DG8. In particular, the authentication steps ensures a strong secure channel able to provide confidentiality of the biometric data that are read and authentication of the Inspection system retrieving the date to perform a Match on Terminal Access Control authentication steps may be performed curve cryptography, or with RSA cryptography. Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - personalization and personalization phases in order to mplements and control access to Key management (MSK, dditional code loading. It can be sing SCP02 or SCP03. are available on the top of the product: the resident application that is used eDoc application that is protocols available during Use phase such as Basic Access Password Authenticated Connection Establishment or Active Basic Access Control checks that the . This is enforced by requiring the terminal to of the MRD. The protocol for Basic key establishment mechanism 6. This protocol is also used to generate session keys that are used to protect the confidentiality (and integrity) of the Authenticates itself as inspection system by means of keys derived from KEYDOC data. After successful 3DES based authentication, the TOE provides read access to data requiring BAC te communication (secure messaging) with the inspection system. ensures a strong and mutual authentication of the TOE and the Inspection system. This step is required to access biometric . In particular, the authentication steps ensures a strong secure channel able to provide confidentiality of the biometric data that are read ving the date to perform a Match on Terminal be performed either with elliptic T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ This application uses the Chip Authentication and then after the The Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) is a security feature that is supported by the TOE. The Inspection System: - Reads the printed data in the itself). - Authenticates itself as Inspection System by means of keys derived from data. After successful 3DES based authentication, the TOE provides read access to data requiring PACE rights by means of a private communication (secure messaging) w Inspection System. The Active Authentication of the TOE is an optional feature that may be implemented. It ensures that the TOE has not been “cloned”, by means of a challenge System and the TOE. For this purpose the chip contains its own Active Authentication RSA or ECC Key pair. A hash representation of Data Group containing the Verification Public Key and attributes (algorithm...) is stored in the Document Security Object (SOD) and therefore authenticated issuer’s digital signature. The corresponding Private Key is stored in the TOE’s secure memory. The TOE supports the loading and generation of the Active Authentication RSA or ECC Key pair. More information is available in IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 This application uses the Chip Authentication and then after the Terminal Authentication. The Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) is a security feature that is supported by the TOE. The Inspection System: Reads the printed data in the KEYDOC (for eMRD) or the CAN (the holder may as well enter it Authenticates itself as Inspection System by means of keys derived from data. After successful 3DES based authentication, the TOE provides read access to data requiring PACE rights by means of a private communication (secure messaging) w The Active Authentication of the TOE is an optional feature that may be implemented. It ensures that the TOE has not been “cloned”, by means of a challenge-response protocol between the Inspection rpose the chip contains its own Active Authentication RSA or ECC Key pair. A hash representation of Data Group containing the Verification Public Key and attributes (algorithm...) is stored in the Document Security Object (SOD) and therefore authenticated issuer’s digital signature. The corresponding Private Key is stored in the TOE’s secure memory. The TOE supports the loading and generation of the Active Authentication RSA or ECC Key pair. More information is available in complete ST. Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - Terminal Authentication. The Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) is a security feature that is supported ) or the CAN (the holder may as well enter it Authenticates itself as Inspection System by means of keys derived from KEYDOC or CAN data. After successful 3DES based authentication, the TOE provides read access to data requiring PACE rights by means of a private communication (secure messaging) with the The Active Authentication of the TOE is an optional feature that may be implemented. It ensures that response protocol between the Inspection rpose the chip contains its own Active Authentication RSA or ECC Key pair. A hash representation of Data Group containing the Verification Public Key and attributes (algorithm...) is stored in the Document Security Object (SOD) and therefore authenticated by the issuer’s digital signature. The corresponding Private Key is stored in the TOE’s secure memory. The TOE supports the loading and generation of the Active Authentication RSA or ECC Key pair. T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 4 TOE LIFE CYCLE 4.1 Life cycle overview Figure Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5 Phase 6 Phase 7 TOE delivery point Card printing Embedding Software development Patch development IC photomask fabrication IC manufacturing Application End of life Application End usage IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Figure 4: Smartcard product life-cycle for the TOE Testing Testing Testing AGD PRE Micromodule Prepersonalization Personalization Software development Patch development photomask fabrication IC database construction IC manufacturing IC testing Smartcard End of life Application Smartcard product Application AGD OPE Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - ALC phase AGD phase USE phase AGD PRE AGD OPE T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ The TOE life-cycle is described in terms of four life life-cycle is additionally subdivided into 7 steps.) Additional codes are identified in § The table below presents the TOE role: Roles Subject IC developer NXP Semiconductors IC manufacturer NXP Semiconductors TOE developer Oberthur Technologies Manufacturer NXP Semiconductors Oberthur Technologies or another agent Prepersonalizer Oberthur Technologies or another agent Personalization Agent Oberthur Technologies or Table 6 - Roles identification on the life cycle The table below presents the subjects following TOE life cycle steps in accordance with the standard smart card life cycle [R10], the Pr coverage: Steps Phase Subject Step 1 Development Oberthur Technologies Step 2 Development NXP Semiconductors Step 3 Manufacturing NXP Semiconductors TOE delivery point Step 4 Manufacturing MRD (Prepersonalizer) Step 5 Manufacturing MRD (Prepersonalizer) Step 6 Personalization Personalization Agent Step 7 Operational Use End user Table 7 - Subjects identification following life cycle steps IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 cycle is described in terms of four life-cycle phases. (With respect to the cycle is additionally subdivided into 7 steps.) Additional codes are identified in §1.5. The table below presents the TOE role: Subject NXP Semiconductors NXP Semiconductors Oberthur Technologies NXP Semiconductors Oberthur Technologies or another agent Oberthur Technologies or another agent Oberthur Technologies or another agent Roles identification on the life cycle The table below presents the subjects following TOE life cycle steps in accordance with the standard , the Protection Profile lifecycle in phases, the TOE delivery point and the Subject Covered by Oberthur Technologies ALC R&D sites NXP Semiconductors IC certification NXP Semiconductors IC certification TOE delivery point MRD Manufacturer (Prepersonalizer) AGD_PRE MRD Manufacturer (Prepersonalizer) AGD_PRE Personalization Agent AGD_PRE End user AGD_OPE Subjects identification following life cycle steps Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - cycle phases. (With respect to the [R10], the TOE The table below presents the subjects following TOE life cycle steps in accordance with the standard ses, the TOE delivery point and the Sites Pessac and Colombes IC certification IC certification T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 4.2 Phase 1 “Development” (Step1) The TOE is developed in phase 1. The IC developer develops the integrated circuit, the IC Dedicated Software and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE components. (Step2) The TOE developer uses the guidance documenta guidance documentation for relevant parts of the IC Dedicated Software and develops the IC Embedded Software (operating system), the associated with these TOE components The manufacturing documentation of the IC including the IC Dedicated Software and the Embedded Software in the non-volatile non manufacturer. The IC Embedded Software in the non application and the guidance documentation is securely delivered to the Manufacturer. 4.3 Phase 2 “Manufacturing” (Step3) In a first step the TOE integrated circuit is produced containing the document’s chip Dedicated Software and the part non-programmable memories (ROM). The IC manufacturer writes the IC Identification Data onto the chip to control the IC as travel document material during the IC manufacturing and the process to the Manufacturer. The IC is securely delivered from the IC manufacture to the Manufacturer. If necessary the IC manufacturer adds the parts of the IC Embedded Software in the non-volatile programmable memories (for instance EEPROM). The IC manufa data in EEPROM and keys (MSK, LSK). (Step4) The Manufacturer combines the IC with hardware for the contact based / contactless interface in the travel document unless the travel document consists of the card (Step5) The Manufacturer (i) adds the IC Embedded Software or part of it and the additional source code in the non-volatile programmable memories if necessary, (ii) creates the e (iii) equips travel document’s chips with pre IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 1 “Development” (Step1) The TOE is developed in phase 1. The IC developer develops the integrated circuit, the IC Dedicated Software and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE components. developer uses the guidance documentation for the integrated circuit and the guidance documentation for relevant parts of the IC Dedicated Software and develops the IC Embedded Software (operating system), the IDL application and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE components. The manufacturing documentation of the IC including the IC Dedicated Software and the Embedded volatile non-programmable memories is securely delivered to the IC manufacturer. The IC Embedded Software in the non-volatile programmable application and the guidance documentation is securely delivered to the Manufacturer. Phase 2 “Manufacturing” (Step3) In a first step the TOE integrated circuit is produced containing the document’s chip Dedicated Software and the parts of the document’s chip Embedded Software in the non programmable memories (ROM). The IC manufacturer writes the IC Identification Data onto the chip to control the IC as travel document material during the IC manufacturing and the rocess to the Manufacturer. The IC is securely delivered from the IC manufacture to the Manufacturer. If necessary the IC manufacturer adds the parts of the IC Embedded Software in the volatile programmable memories (for instance EEPROM). The IC manufacturer data in EEPROM and keys (MSK, LSK). TOE delivery point (Step4) The Manufacturer combines the IC with hardware for the contact based / contactless interface in the travel document unless the travel document consists of the card (Step5) The Manufacturer (i) adds the IC Embedded Software or part of it and the additional source volatile programmable memories if necessary, (ii) creates the e (iii) equips travel document’s chips with pre-personalization Data. Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - (Step1) The TOE is developed in phase 1. The IC developer develops the integrated circuit, the IC Dedicated Software and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE components. tion for the integrated circuit and the guidance documentation for relevant parts of the IC Dedicated Software and develops the IC application and the guidance documentation The manufacturing documentation of the IC including the IC Dedicated Software and the Embedded programmable memories is securely delivered to the IC memories, the eIDL application and the guidance documentation is securely delivered to the Manufacturer. (Step3) In a first step the TOE integrated circuit is produced containing the document’s chip s of the document’s chip Embedded Software in the non-volatile programmable memories (ROM). The IC manufacturer writes the IC Identification Data onto the chip to control the IC as travel document material during the IC manufacturing and the delivery rocess to the Manufacturer. The IC is securely delivered from the IC manufacture to the Manufacturer. If necessary the IC manufacturer adds the parts of the IC Embedded Software in the cturer add initialization (Step4) The Manufacturer combines the IC with hardware for the contact based / contactless interface in the travel document unless the travel document consists of the card only. (Step5) The Manufacturer (i) adds the IC Embedded Software or part of it and the additional source volatile programmable memories if necessary, (ii) creates the eIDL application, and T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ The pre-personalised travel document together with the IC Identifier is securely delivered from the Manufacturer to the Personalization Agent guidance documentation to the Personalization Agent Additional code loading is performed in Prepersonalization phase. [R45]. The additional code loading process is performed by the the Command LOAD SECURE: - Additional code generation - MSK authentication - LSK derivation - Memory area definition - Loading of the additional code - Secure activation of the additional code The additional code loading is performed before the creation of the MF file during Prepersonalization. Identification of the additional code loading is given in Additional code generation The additional code is generated by signed. After generation, it is sent to the MR Loading of the additional code The additional code is loaded in the (initial) TOE by the Prepersonalizer that shall authenticate itself to the TOE beforehand. Upon reception, the (intial) TOE checks it has been generated by Oberthur Technologies (by verifying the signature) before activating it. Identification of the TOE After successful loading and activation of the additional code, the TOE update to reflects the presence of the additional code. 4.4 Phase 3 “Personalization of the travel document” (Step6) The personalization of the travel document includes (i holder’s biographical data, (ii) the enrolment of the travel document holder biometric reference data IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 personalised travel document together with the IC Identifier is securely delivered from the Personalization Agent. The Manufacturer also provides the relevant parts of the Personalization Agent. Additional code loading is performed in Prepersonalization phase. It is compliant to ANSSI Note 6 The additional code loading process is performed by the Prepersonalizer in the following steps, via Additional code generation ading of the additional code Secure activation of the additional code The additional code loading is performed before the creation of the MF file during Identification of the additional code loading is given in Table 2 - TOE Technical Identification generated by Oberthur Technologies: developped, compiled, ciphered and sent to the MRD manufacturer to that it can load it in the (initial) TOE. The additional code is loaded in the (initial) TOE by the Prepersonalizer that shall authenticate itself on reception, the (intial) TOE checks it has been generated by Oberthur Technologies (by verifying the signature) before activating it. After successful loading and activation of the additional code, the TOE update its identification data to reflects the presence of the additional code. Phase 3 “Personalization of the travel document” (Step6) The personalization of the travel document includes (i) the survey of the travel document holder’s biographical data, (ii) the enrolment of the travel document holder biometric reference data Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - personalised travel document together with the IC Identifier is securely delivered from the vides the relevant parts of the It is compliant to ANSSI Note 6 in the following steps, via The additional code loading is performed before the creation of the MF file during TOE Technical Identification. : developped, compiled, ciphered and D manufacturer to that it can load it in the (initial) TOE. The additional code is loaded in the (initial) TOE by the Prepersonalizer that shall authenticate itself on reception, the (intial) TOE checks it has been generated by Oberthur its identification data ) the survey of the travel document holder’s biographical data, (ii) the enrolment of the travel document holder biometric reference data T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ (i.e. the digitized portraits and the optional biometric reference data), (iii) the personalization of the visual readable data onto the physical part of the travel document, (iv) the writing of the TOE User Data and TSF Data into the logical travel document and (v) configuration of the TSF if necessary. The step (iv) is performed by the Personalization Agent (i) the digital KEYDOC data (EF.DG1), (ii security object. The signing of the Document security object by the Document signer finalizes the personalization of the genuine travel document for the travel document holder. The personalised travel document (together with appropriate guidance for TOE use if necessary) is handed over to the travel document holder for operational use. 4.5 Phase 4 “Operational Use” (Step7) The TOE is used as a travel document's chip by the traveller and the inspection systems in the “Operational Use” phase. The user data can be read according to the security policy of the issuing Organisation and can be used according to the security policy o can never be modified. Note that the personalization process and its environment may depend on specific security needs of an issuing Organisation. All production, generation and installation procedures after TOE deliver to the “Operational Use” (phase 4) have to be considered in the product evaluation process under AGD assurance class. Therefore, the Security Target has to outline the split up of P.Manufact, P.Personalization and the related security objectives into delivery. Some production steps, e.g. Step 4 in Phase 2 may also take place in the Phase 3. IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 (i.e. the digitized portraits and the optional biometric reference data), (iii) the personalization of the able data onto the physical part of the travel document, (iv) the writing of the TOE User Data and TSF Data into the logical travel document and (v) configuration of the TSF if necessary. The Personalization Agent and includes but is not limited to the creation of data (EF.DG1), (ii) the digitized portrait (EF.DG6), and (iii) the Document security object. The signing of the Document security object by the Document signer finalizes the he genuine travel document for the travel document holder. The personalised travel document (together with appropriate guidance for TOE use if necessary) is handed over to the travel document holder for operational use. Phase 4 “Operational Use” he TOE is used as a travel document's chip by the traveller and the inspection systems in the “Operational Use” phase. The user data can be read according to the security policy of the issuing Organisation and can be used according to the security policy of the issuing Organization Note that the personalization process and its environment may depend on specific security needs of an issuing Organisation. All production, generation and installation procedures after TOE deliver to the “Operational Use” (phase 4) have to be considered in the product evaluation process under AGD assurance class. Therefore, the Security Target has to outline the split up of P.Manufact, P.Personalization and the related security objectives into aspects relevant before vs. after TOE delivery. Some production steps, e.g. Step 4 in Phase 2 may also take place in the Phase 3. Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - (i.e. the digitized portraits and the optional biometric reference data), (iii) the personalization of the able data onto the physical part of the travel document, (iv) the writing of the TOE User Data and TSF Data into the logical travel document and (v) configuration of the TSF if necessary. The but is not limited to the creation of ), and (iii) the Document security object. The signing of the Document security object by the Document signer finalizes the he genuine travel document for the travel document holder. The personalised travel document (together with appropriate guidance for TOE use if necessary) is handed over to the he TOE is used as a travel document's chip by the traveller and the inspection systems in the “Operational Use” phase. The user data can be read according to the security policy of the issuing Organization but they Note that the personalization process and its environment may depend on specific security needs of an issuing Organisation. All production, generation and installation procedures after TOE delivery up to the “Operational Use” (phase 4) have to be considered in the product evaluation process under AGD assurance class. Therefore, the Security Target has to outline the split up of P.Manufact, aspects relevant before vs. after TOE delivery. Some production steps, e.g. Step 4 in Phase 2 may also take place in the Phase 3. T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 5 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS 5.1 Common Criteria conformance This Security Target (ST) claims conformance to the Common Criteria version [R43] and [R44]. The conformance to the CC is claimed as follows: CC Conformance rationale Part 1 Strict conformance Part 2 Conformance to the extended - FAU_SAS.1 “Audit Storage” - FCS_RND.1 “Quality metric for random numbers” - FMT_LIM.1 “Limited capabilities” - FMT_LIM.2 “Limited availability” - FPT_EMS.1 “TOE Emanation” - FIA_API.1 “Authentication Proof of Identity” Part 3 Strict conformance to Part 3. The product claims conformance to EAL 5, augmented with: - ALC_DVS.2 “Sufficiency of security measures” - AVA_VAN.5 “Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis” 5.1.1 Overview of the SFR defined in this ST SFR are presented in § 9.1 Security Functional Requirements - SFR (/Global) that are global to the product (shared between the various TOE) - SFR (/MP_Add_code) that are dedicated for the patch loading - SFR (/MP) that are dedicated for the Manufacturing and Personalization phases - SFR (/AA) that are dedicated for Active Authentication - SFR (/CA) that are dedicated for Chip Authentication - SFR (/TA) that are dedicated for Terminal Authentication - SFR (/EAC) that are dedicated for Extended Access Control - SFR (/PACE) that are dedicated for Password 1 The rationale for SFR addition is described in the relative PP IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS Common Criteria conformance This Security Target (ST) claims conformance to the Common Criteria version The conformance to the CC is claimed as follows: Conformance rationale Conformance to the extended1 part: “Audit Storage” “Quality metric for random numbers” “Limited capabilities” “Limited availability” “TOE Emanation” “Authentication Proof of Identity” Strict conformance to Part 3. ct claims conformance to EAL 5, augmented with: “Sufficiency of security measures” “Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis” Table 8 - Conformance Rationale Overview of the SFR defined in this ST Security Functional Requirements: SFR (/Global) that are global to the product (shared between the various TOE) SFR (/MP_Add_code) that are dedicated for the patch loading SFR (/MP) that are dedicated for the Manufacturing and Personalization phases icated for Active Authentication SFR (/CA) that are dedicated for Chip Authentication SFR (/TA) that are dedicated for Terminal Authentication SFR (/EAC) that are dedicated for Extended Access Control SFR (/PACE) that are dedicated for Password Authenticated Connection Establishment The rationale for SFR addition is described in the relative PP and in this Security Target Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - 3.1 revision 4 [R42], SFR (/Global) that are global to the product (shared between the various TOE) SFR (/MP) that are dedicated for the Manufacturing and Personalization phases Authenticated Connection Establishment T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ - SFR (/PACE_CAM) that are dedicated for Password Authenticated Connection Establishment with Chip Authentication Mapping The following table presents all the SFR defined in the ST with the generic notation. SFR from the PP FCS_CKM.1/CA; FCS_COP.1/SHA; FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC; FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER; FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC; FIA_UID.1/PACE; FIA_UAU.1/PACE; FIA_UAU.4/PACE; FIA_UAU.5/PACE; FIA_UAU.6/EAC; FIA_API.1; FDP_ACC.1/TRM; FDP_ACF.1/TRM; FMT_SMR.1/PACE; FMT_LIM.1; FMT_LIM.2; FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI; FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD; FMT_MTD.1/DATE; FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ; FMT_MTD.3; FPT_EMS.1 SFR from the PP FAU_SAS.1; FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE ; FCS_CKM.4; FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC ; FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC; FCS_RND.1; FIA_AFL.1/PACE; FIA_UAU.6/PACE; FDP_RIP.1 FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS; FMT_MTD.1/PA; FPT_TST.1; FPT_FLS.1; FP Table 10 – SFR from the PP 0068 v2 (required for the compliance to PP 0056 v2) Section Additional SFR MP FCS_CKM.1/MP FDP_UCT.1/MP FIA_UAU.4/MP FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_READ ; FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_WRITE MP Add code FAU_STG.2/MP_Add_code FCS_COP.1/MP_Add_code FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_READ_Add_code ; FMT_SMR.1/MP_Add_code Active Authentication FCS_COP.1/AA FMT_MOF.1/AA ; PACE CAM FIA_UAU.1/PACE_CAM FIA_UID.1/PACE_CAM; FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_WRITE 5.1.2 Overview of the additional protocols 5.1.2.1 Active Authentication The additional functionality of Active Authentication related on-card generation of RSA and ECC keys. IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 SFR (/PACE_CAM) that are dedicated for Password Authenticated Connection Establishment with Chip Authentication Mapping The following table presents all the SFR defined in the ST with the generic notation. FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC; FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER; FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC; FIA_UID.1/PACE; FIA_UAU.1/PACE; FIA_UAU.4/PACE; FIA_UAU.5/PACE; FIA_UAU.6/EAC; FIA_API.1; FDP_ACC.1/TRM; FDP_ACF.1/TRM; FMT_SMR.1/PACE; FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI; FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD; FMT_MTD.1/DATE; FMT_MTD.1/CAPK; FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ; FMT_MTD.3; FPT_EMS.1 Table 9 -SFR from the PP 0056 v2 FAU_SAS.1; FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE ; FCS_CKM.4; FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC ; FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC; FCS_RND.1; FIA_AFL.1/PACE; FIA_UAU.6/PACE; FDP_RIP.1 ; FDP_UCT.1/TRM; FDP_UIT.1/TRM; FMT_SMF.1; FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA; FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS; FMT_MTD.1/PA; FPT_TST.1; FPT_FLS.1; FPT_PHP.3; FTP_ITC.1/PACE SFR from the PP 0068 v2 (required for the compliance to PP 0056 v2) Additional SFR FCS_CKM.1/MP ; FCS_COP.1/MP ; FDP_ACC.2/MP ; FDP_ACF.1/MP ; FDP_ITC.1/MP FDP_UCT.1/MP ; FDP_UIT.1/MP ; FIA_AFL.1/MP ; FIA_UAU.1/MP ; FIA_UID.1/MP FIA_UAU.4/MP ; FIA_UAU.5/MP ; FMT_MTD.1/MP ; FTP_ITC.1/MP ; FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_READ ; FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_WRITE FAU_STG.2/MP_Add_code ; FTP_ITC.1/MP_Add_code ; FCS_CKM.1/MP_Add_code FCS_COP.1/MP_Add_code ; FDP_UIT.1/MP_Add_code ; FMT_MTD.1/MP_Add_code FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_READ_Add_code ; FMT_SMR.1/MP_Add_code FCS_COP.1/AA ; FDP_DAU.1/AA ; FDP_ITC.1/AA ; FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ ; FMT_MOF.1/AA ; FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE FIA_UAU.1/PACE_CAM ; FIA_UAU.4/PACE_CAM ; FIA_UAU.5/PACE_CAM ; FIA_UAU.6/PACE_CAM FIA_UID.1/PACE_CAM; FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_WRITE Table 11 - Additional SFR Overview of the additional protocols Active Authentication (AA) is based on the ICAO PKI V1.1 and the card generation of RSA and ECC keys. Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - SFR (/PACE_CAM) that are dedicated for Password Authenticated Connection Establishment The following table presents all the SFR defined in the ST with the generic notation. FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC; FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER; FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC; FIA_UID.1/PACE; FIA_UAU.1/PACE; FIA_UAU.4/PACE; FIA_UAU.5/PACE; FIA_UAU.6/EAC; FIA_API.1; FDP_ACC.1/TRM; FDP_ACF.1/TRM; FMT_SMR.1/PACE; FMT_MTD.1/CAPK; ; FDP_UCT.1/TRM; FDP_UIT.1/TRM; FMT_SMF.1; FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA; SFR from the PP 0068 v2 (required for the compliance to PP 0056 v2) ; FDP_ITC.1/MP ; ; FIA_UID.1/MP ; ; FCS_CKM.1/MP_Add_code ; ; FMT_MTD.1/MP_Add_code ; ; FIA_UAU.6/PACE_CAM ; (AA) is based on the ICAO PKI V1.1 and the T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ It implies the following addition to the standard PP: - Additional Threats: § 6.3.3 - Additional Objective: § 7.1.3 - Additional OE: § 7.2.3 OE for AA 5.1.2.2 Prepersonalization phase The prepersonalization phase has been reinforced elements. This functionality is usable in phase 5 and phase 6. Once the product is locked, stated as personalized, it is no more possible to perform this operation. performed: - Additional Threats: § 6.3.4 - Additional Objective: § 7.1.4 The TOE is compliant to the last version (draft) of ANSSI Note 6 5.1.2.3 PACE CAM The additional functionality of Password Authenticated Connection Establishment with Chip Authentication Mapping (PACE CAM) has been added to the TOE. It possesses the same security requirements than the PACE functionality, that means that the same SPD applies to the PACE CAM. Additional SFR has been defined for defining the PACE CAM security functional requirements. 5.2 Protection Profile conformance This security target is based on the following protection profiles: - BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012: “Machine Readable Travel Document with ”ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control with PACE (EAC PP)” - BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011:”Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard Inspection Procedure with PACE” For consistency reasons, editorial modifications have been performed to the security target (according to the standard ISO 18013-3): - BAC replaced by BAP - MRTD replaced by MRD IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 the following addition to the standard PP: 6.3.3 Threats for AA 7.1.3 SO for AA OE for AA Prepersonalization phase The prepersonalization phase has been reinforced in this Security Target, with the following This functionality is usable in phase 5 and phase 6. Once the product is locked, stated as personalized, it is no more possible to perform this operation. The following addition has been 6.3.4 Threats for Note 6 7.1.4 SO for Note 6 The TOE is compliant to the last version (draft) of ANSSI Note 6 [R45]. The additional functionality of Password Authenticated Connection Establishment with Chip Authentication Mapping (PACE CAM) has been added to the TOE. ty requirements than the PACE functionality, that means that the same Additional SFR has been defined for defining the PACE CAM security functional requirements. Protection Profile conformance the following protection profiles: 2012: “Machine Readable Travel Document with ”ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control with PACE (EAC PP)” 2011:”Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard Inspection For consistency reasons, editorial modifications have been performed to the security target (according to the Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - in this Security Target, with the following This functionality is usable in phase 5 and phase 6. Once the product is locked, stated as The following addition has been The additional functionality of Password Authenticated Connection Establishment with Chip ty requirements than the PACE functionality, that means that the same Additional SFR has been defined for defining the PACE CAM security functional requirements. 2012: “Machine Readable Travel Document with ”ICAO Application”, 2011:”Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard Inspection For consistency reasons, editorial modifications have been performed to the security target (according to the T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ - DG2 replaced by DG6 - DG3 replaced by DG7 - DG4 replaced by DG8 - DG15 replaced by DG13 - State replaced by organization - MRZ replaced by keydoc - Reference to EF.COM for access control rules (which specifies which DG is protected by BAP or EAP) 5.3 Rationale for the additions The rationales are available in the complete ST. 5.4 Non evaluated features Some features may be part of the TOE but are not evaluated as they are not relevant for the TSFs: - Standard and biometric PIN management - DBI The TOE may also contain other applications such as eID, eSign, …..The current evaluation covers combination of application. IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 State replaced by organization MRZ replaced by keydoc Reference to EF.COM for access control rules (which specifies which DG is protected by BAP Rationale for the additions The rationales are available in the complete ST. evaluated features may be part of the TOE but are not evaluated as they are not relevant for the TSFs: Standard and biometric PIN management The TOE may also contain other applications such as eID, eSign, …..The current evaluation covers Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - Reference to EF.COM for access control rules (which specifies which DG is protected by BAP may be part of the TOE but are not evaluated as they are not relevant for the TSFs: The TOE may also contain other applications such as eID, eSign, …..The current evaluation covers any T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 6 SECURITY PROBLEM DEF 6.1 Subjects 6.1.1 PP EAC with PACE Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA) The Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA) enforces the privacy policy of the issuing Organization with respect to the protection of sensitive biometric reference data stored in the The CVCA represents the country specific root of the PKI of Inspection Systems and creates the Document Verifier Certificates within this PKI. The updates of the publi distributed in the form of Country Verifying CA Link Document Verifier The Document Verifier (DV) enforces the privacy policy of the the protection of sensitive biometric reference Systems. The Document Verifier manages the authorization of the Extended Inspection Systems for the sensitive data of the MRD in the limits provided by the the form of the Document Verifier Certificates. Terminal A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE either through the contact interface or through the contactless interface. Inspection System (IS) A technical system used by the border control officer of the MRD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as holder. The Extended Inspection System (i)contains a terminal for the communication with the travel document’s chip, (ii) implements the terminals part of PACE and/or BAC; (iii) gets the authorization to read the logical travel document either under PACE or BAC by optical reading the travel document providing this information. (iv) implements the Terminal Authentication and Chip Authentication Protocolsboth according to [5]and (v) is authorized by the issuing Organization to read the sensitive biometric reference data. Security attributes of the EIS are defined IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION with PACE subjects Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA) The Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA) enforces the privacy policy of the issuing with respect to the protection of sensitive biometric reference data stored in the The CVCA represents the country specific root of the PKI of Inspection Systems and creates the Document Verifier Certificates within this PKI. The updates of the public key of the CVCA are distributed in the form of Country Verifying CA Link-Certificates. The Document Verifier (DV) enforces the privacy policy of the Receiving Organization the protection of sensitive biometric reference data to be handled by the Extended Inspection Systems. The Document Verifier manages the authorization of the Extended Inspection Systems for in the limits provided by the Issuing Organization the Document Verifier Certificates. A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE either through the contact interface or through the contactless interface. A technical system used by the border control officer of the Receiving Organization presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as Extended Inspection System (EIS) performs the Advanced Inspection Procedure and therefore (i)contains a terminal for the communication with the travel document’s chip, (ii) implements the terminals part of PACE and/or BAC; (iii) gets the authorization to read the logical travel document er PACE or BAC by optical reading the travel document providing this information. (iv) implements the Terminal Authentication and Chip Authentication Protocolsboth according to [5]and (v) is authorized by the issuing Organization through the Document Verifier of the to read the sensitive biometric reference data. Security attributes of the EIS are defined Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - The Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA) enforces the privacy policy of the issuing with respect to the protection of sensitive biometric reference data stored in the MRD. The CVCA represents the country specific root of the PKI of Inspection Systems and creates the c key of the CVCA are Receiving Organization with respect to data to be handled by the Extended Inspection Systems. The Document Verifier manages the authorization of the Extended Inspection Systems for Issuing Organizations or Organizations in A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE either through the contact interface Receiving Organization (i) examining an presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as MRD the Advanced Inspection Procedure and therefore (i)contains a terminal for the communication with the travel document’s chip, (ii) implements the terminals part of PACE and/or BAC; (iii) gets the authorization to read the logical travel document er PACE or BAC by optical reading the travel document providing this information. (iv) implements the Terminal Authentication and Chip Authentication Protocolsboth according to [5]and ier of the Receiving to read the sensitive biometric reference data. Security attributes of the EIS are defined T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ by means of the Inspection System Certificates. BAC may only be used if supported by the TOE. If both PACE and BAC are supported by Application note: For definition of Basic Inspection System see PACE PP [7]. Figure Attacker Additionally to the definition from PACE PP [7], chap 3.1 the definition of an attacker is refined as followed: A threat agent trying (i) to manipulate the logical travel document without authorization, IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 by means of the Inspection System Certificates. BAC may only be used if supported by the TOE. If both PACE and BAC are supported by the TOE and the BIS, PACE must be used. Basic Inspection System (BIS) resp. Basic Inspection System with PACE (BIS Figure 5 - Advanced Inspection Procedure Additionally to the definition from PACE PP [7], chap 3.1 the definition of an attacker is refined as followed: A threat agent trying (i) to manipulate the logical travel document without authorization, PACE (KEYDOC/CAN) (conditional) Driving Licence Application Selection Basic Access Control (conditional) Chip Authentication Passive Authentication with SOD Terminal Authentication Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - by means of the Inspection System Certificates. BAC may only be used if supported by the TOE. If (BIS) resp. Basic Inspection System with PACE (BIS-PACE) Additionally to the definition from PACE PP [7], chap 3.1 the definition of an attacker is refined as followed: A threat agent trying (i) to manipulate the logical travel document without authorization, T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ (ii) to read sensitive biometric reference data (i.e. document, or (iv) to trace a travel document. Application Note: An impostor is attacking the inspection system as TOE IT environment independent on using a genuine, counterfeit or forged travel document. T attacks against the TOE but the attack itself is not relevant for the TOE. 6.1.2 PP PACE Subjects Travel document holder (MRD holder) A person for whom the travel document Issuer has perso commensurate with ‘MRD Holder’ in attacker. Travel document presenter (Traveler) A person presenting the travel document to a terminal and claiming t document holder. This external entity is commensurate with ‘Traveller’ in travel document presenter can also be an attacker (s. below). Terminal A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through the contactless/contact interface. The role ‘Terminal’ is the default role for any terminal being recognised by the T being PACE authenticated (‘Terminal’ is used by the travel document presenter). This entity is commensurate with ‘Terminal’ in Basic Inspection System with PACE (BIS A technical system being used by an inspecting authority and verifying the travel document presenteras the travel documentholder (for travel document presenter with the stored biometric data ( BIS-PACE implements the terminal’s part of the PACE protocol and authenticates itself to the travel document using a shared password (PACE password) and supports Passive Authentication. Document Signer (DS) An organisation enforcing the policy of the CSC the travel document for passive authentication. A Document Signer is authorised by the national CSCA IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 (ii) to read sensitive biometric reference data (i.e. EF.DG7, EF.DG8), (iii) to forge a genuine travel document, or (iv) to trace a travel document. An impostor is attacking the inspection system as TOE IT environment independent on using a genuine, counterfeit or forged travel document. Therefore the impostor may use results of successful attacks against the TOE but the attack itself is not relevant for the TOE. Subjects holder) A person for whom the travel document Issuer has personalised the travel document. This entity is Holder’ in [R11]. Please note that a travel document holder can also be an Travel document presenter (Traveler) A person presenting the travel document to a terminal and claiming the identity of the travel document holder. This external entity is commensurate with ‘Traveller’ in [R11] nter can also be an attacker (s. below). A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through the contactless/contact interface. The role ‘Terminal’ is the default role for any terminal being recognised by the T being PACE authenticated (‘Terminal’ is used by the travel document presenter). This entity is commensurate with ‘Terminal’ in [R11]. ic Inspection System with PACE (BIS-PACE) A technical system being used by an inspecting authority and verifying the travel document presenteras the travel documentholder (for IDL: by comparing the real biometric data (face) of the r with the stored biometric data (DG6) of the travel document holder). PACE implements the terminal’s part of the PACE protocol and authenticates itself to the travel document using a shared password (PACE password) and supports Passive Authentication. An organisation enforcing the policy of the CSCA and signing the Document Security Object stored on the travel document for passive authentication. A Document Signer is authorised by the national Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - ), (iii) to forge a genuine travel An impostor is attacking the inspection system as TOE IT environment independent on using a herefore the impostor may use results of successful nalised the travel document. This entity is . Please note that a travel document holder can also be an he identity of the travel [R11]. Please note that a A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through the contactless/contact interface. The role ‘Terminal’ is the default role for any terminal being recognised by the TOE as not being PACE authenticated (‘Terminal’ is used by the travel document presenter). This entity is A technical system being used by an inspecting authority and verifying the travel document : by comparing the real biometric data (face) of the ) of the travel document holder). PACE implements the terminal’s part of the PACE protocol and authenticates itself to the travel document using a shared password (PACE password) and supports Passive Authentication. A and signing the Document Security Object stored on the travel document for passive authentication. A Document Signer is authorised by the national T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ issuing the Document Signer Certificate (CDS), see Personalisation Agent. Country Signing Certification Authority (CSCA) An organisation enforcing the policy of the travel document Issuer with respect to co correctness of user and TSF data stored in the travel document. The CSCA represents the country specific root of the PKI for the travel document and creates the Document Signer Certificates within this PKI. The CSCA also issues the self-signed CS diplomatic means, see [R2]. Personalisation Agent An organisation acting on behalf of the travel document Issuer to personalise the travel document for the travel document holder by some or all of the following activi (i) Establishing the identity of the travel document holder for the biographic data in the travel document (ii) Enrolling the biometric reference data of the travel document holder (iii) Writing a subset of these data on the physical travel document (optical person and storing them in the travel document (electronic personalisation) for the travel document holder as defined in (iv) Writing the document details data (v) Writing the initial TSF data (vi) Signing the Document Security Object defined in Please note that the role ‘Personalisation Agent’ may be distributed among several institutions according to the operational policy of the travel document Issuer. This entity is commensurate with ‘Personalisation agent’ in Application Note Personalization Agent is refered as the Personalizer in the Security Target Manufacturer Generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing integrated circuit and the travel document Manufacturer completing the IC to the travel document. The Manufacturer is the default user of the TOE during the manufacturing life cycle phase. The TOE itself does not distinguish between the IC Manufacturer and travel document Manufacturer using this role This entity is commensurate with ‘Manufacturer’ in Attacker IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 issuing the Document Signer Certificate (CDS), see [R2]. This role is usually delegated to a Country Signing Certification Authority (CSCA) An organisation enforcing the policy of the travel document Issuer with respect to co correctness of user and TSF data stored in the travel document. The CSCA represents the country specific root of the PKI for the travel document and creates the Document Signer Certificates within signed CSCA Certificate (CCSCA) having to be distributed by strictly secure An organisation acting on behalf of the travel document Issuer to personalise the travel document for the travel document holder by some or all of the following activities: Establishing the identity of the travel document holder for the biographic data in the Enrolling the biometric reference data of the travel document holder Writing a subset of these data on the physical travel document (optical person and storing them in the travel document (electronic personalisation) for the travel document holder as defined in [R2] ent details data Writing the initial TSF data Signing the Document Security Object defined in [R2] (in the role of DS). Personalisation Agent’ may be distributed among several institutions according to the operational policy of the travel document Issuer. This entity is commensurate with ‘Personalisation agent’ in [R11]. Personalization Agent is refered as the Personalizer in the Security Target Generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing integrated circuit and the travel document nufacturer completing the IC to the travel document. The Manufacturer is the default user of the TOE during the manufacturing life cycle phase. The TOE itself does not distinguish between the IC Manufacturer and travel document Manufacturer using this role Manufacturer. This entity is commensurate with ‘Manufacturer’ in [R11]. Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - . This role is usually delegated to a An organisation enforcing the policy of the travel document Issuer with respect to confirming correctness of user and TSF data stored in the travel document. The CSCA represents the country specific root of the PKI for the travel document and creates the Document Signer Certificates within ) having to be distributed by strictly secure An organisation acting on behalf of the travel document Issuer to personalise the travel document Establishing the identity of the travel document holder for the biographic data in the Enrolling the biometric reference data of the travel document holder Writing a subset of these data on the physical travel document (optical personalisation) and storing them in the travel document (electronic personalisation) for the travel (in the role of DS). Personalisation Agent’ may be distributed among several institutions Generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing integrated circuit and the travel document nufacturer completing the IC to the travel document. The Manufacturer is the default user of the TOE during the manufacturing life cycle phase. The TOE itself does not distinguish between the IC T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ A threat agent (a person or a process acting on his behalf) trying to undermine the security policy defined by the current PP, especially to change properties of the assets having attacker is assumed to possess an at most high attack potential. Please note that the attacker might ‘capture’ any subject role recognised by the TOE. This external entity is commensurate with ‘Attacker’ in 6.1.3 Additional Subjects IC Developer Developer of the IC. TOE Developer Developer of part of the TOE source code. Prepersonalizer Agent in charge of the Prepersonalization. described in [R11]. 6.2 Assets 6.2.1 User data The assets to be protected by the TOE include the User Data on the travel document’s chip, user data transferred between the TOE and the terminal, and travel document tracing data from the claimed PACE PP [R14], chap 3.1. Logical travel document sensitive User Data Sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG Authenticity of the travel document’s chip The authenticity of the travel document’s chip personalised by the issuing document holder is used by the traveller to prove his possession of a genuine travel document. Due to strict conformance to PACE PP, this ST also includ the primary assets user data stored on the TOE (object 1), user data transferred between the TOE and the terminal connected (object 2), travel document tracing data (object 3), and the secondary IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 A threat agent (a person or a process acting on his behalf) trying to undermine the security policy defined by the current PP, especially to change properties of the assets having to be maintained. The attacker is assumed to possess an at most high attack potential. Please note that the attacker might ‘capture’ any subject role recognised by the TOE. This external entity is commensurate with ‘Attacker’ in [R11]. Additional Subjects Developer of part of the TOE source code. Agent in charge of the Prepersonalization. This agent corresponds to the MRD The assets to be protected by the TOE include the User Data on the travel document’s chip, user data transferred between the TOE and the terminal, and travel document tracing data from the claimed Logical travel document sensitive User Data Sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG7, EF.DG8) Authenticity of the travel document’s chip The authenticity of the travel document’s chip personalised by the issuing Organization document holder is used by the traveller to prove his possession of a genuine travel document. Due to strict conformance to PACE PP, this ST also includes all assets listed in [R14] the primary assets user data stored on the TOE (object 1), user data transferred between the TOE d the terminal connected (object 2), travel document tracing data (object 3), and the secondary Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - A threat agent (a person or a process acting on his behalf) trying to undermine the security policy to be maintained. The Please note that the attacker might ‘capture’ any subject role recognised by the TOE. MRD manufacturer as The assets to be protected by the TOE include the User Data on the travel document’s chip, user data transferred between the TOE and the terminal, and travel document tracing data from the claimed Organization for the travel document holder is used by the traveller to prove his possession of a genuine travel document. [R14], chap 3.1, namely the primary assets user data stored on the TOE (object 1), user data transferred between the TOE d the terminal connected (object 2), travel document tracing data (object 3), and the secondary T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ assets accessibility to the TOE functions and data only for authorised subjects (object 4) Genuineness of the TOE (object 5), TOE intrinsic secret cryptographic cryptographic material (object 7), and travel document communication establishment authorisation data (object 8). They are refined here below for the present TOE. User data stored on the TOE All data (being not authentication data) stored in the context of the e document as defined in [R2] and being allowed to be read out solely by an authenticated terminal acting as Basic Inspection System with PACE (in the sense of User Data CPLC Data Sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG7, EF.DG8) Chip Authentication Public Key and attributes in EF.DG14 Active Authentication Public Key and attributes in EF.DG13 Table Property to be maintained by the current security policy: Confidentiality, Integrity and Authenticity. Though not each data element stored on the TOE repre requires securing their confidentiality: only terminals authenticated according to [4] can get access to the user data stored. They have to be operated according to P.Terminal. User data transferred between the All data (being not authentication data) being transferred in the context of the e the travel document as defined in Basic Inspection System with PACE (in the sense of User data can be received and sent (exchange < Property to be maintained by the current security policy: Confidentiality, Integrity and Authenticity. Though not each data element being transferred represents a secret, the specification [4] anyway requires securing their confidentiality: the secure messaging in encrypt required for all messages according to [4]. IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 assets accessibility to the TOE functions and data only for authorised subjects (object 4) Genuineness of the TOE (object 5), TOE intrinsic secret cryptographic keys (object 6), TOE intrinsic non secret cryptographic material (object 7), and travel document communication establishment authorisation They are refined here below for the present TOE. All data (being not authentication data) stored in the context of the eMRD application of the travel and being allowed to be read out solely by an authenticated terminal acting as Basic Inspection System with PACE (in the sense of [R2]), i.e. for the current TOE: Description Data uniquely identifying the chip. They are considered as user data as they enable to track the holder Sensitive biometric reference data Contain the fingerprint and the iris picture Contain public data enabling to authenticate the chip thanks to a chip authentication Active Authentication Public Key Contain public data enabling to authenticate the chip to an active authentication Table 1: User data stored on the TOE Property to be maintained by the current security policy: Confidentiality, Integrity and Authenticity. Though not each data element stored on the TOE represents a secret, the specification [4] anyway requires securing their confidentiality: only terminals authenticated according to [4] can get access to the user data stored. They have to be operated according to P.Terminal. User data transferred between the TOE and the terminal connected All data (being not authentication data) being transferred in the context of the e the travel document as defined in [R11] between the TOE and an authenticated terminal acting as Basic Inspection System with PACE (in the sense of [R2]). User data can be received and sent (exchange <--> [receive, send]). Property to be maintained by the current security policy: Confidentiality, Integrity and Authenticity. h not each data element being transferred represents a secret, the specification [4] anyway requires securing their confidentiality: the secure messaging in encrypt-then-authenticate mode is required for all messages according to [4]. Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - assets accessibility to the TOE functions and data only for authorised subjects (object 4) Genuineness keys (object 6), TOE intrinsic non secret cryptographic material (object 7), and travel document communication establishment authorisation application of the travel and being allowed to be read out solely by an authenticated terminal r the current TOE: Data uniquely identifying the chip. They are considered as user Contain public data enabling to authenticate the chip thanks Contain public data enabling to authenticate the chip thanks Property to be maintained by the current security policy: Confidentiality, Integrity and Authenticity. sents a secret, the specification [4] anyway requires securing their confidentiality: only terminals authenticated according to [4] can get access to All data (being not authentication data) being transferred in the context of the eMRD application of between the TOE and an authenticated terminal acting as Property to be maintained by the current security policy: Confidentiality, Integrity and Authenticity. h not each data element being transferred represents a secret, the specification [4] anyway authenticate mode is T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ Travel document tracing data Technical information about the current and previous locations of the travel document gathered unnoticeable by the travel document holder recognising the TOE not knowing any PACE password. TOE tracing data can be provided / gathered. Property to be maintained by the current security policy: Unavailability Unavailability represents a prerequisite for anonymity of the travel document holder 6.2.2 TSF data Accessibility to the TOE functions and data only for autho Property of the TOE to restrict access to TSF and TSF only. TSF data Personalisation Agent reference authentication Data Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) Key Session keys for the secure channel Table 2: Accessibility to the TOE functions and data only Property to be maintained by the current security policy: Availability. Genuineness of the TOE Property of the TOE is to be authentic in order to provide claimed security functionality in a proper way. The authenticity of the MRD is used by the traveller to prove his possession of a genuine of the MRD's chip" in [R11]. TSF data TOE_ID Chip Authentication private Key IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Technical information about the current and previous locations of the travel document gathered unnoticeable by the travel document holder recognising the TOE not knowing any PACE password. can be provided / gathered. Property to be maintained by the current security policy: Unavailability Unavailability represents a prerequisite for anonymity of the travel document holder Accessibility to the TOE functions and data only for authorised subjects Property of the TOE to restrict access to TSF and TSF-data stored in the TOE to authorised subjects Description Agent reference Private key enabling to authenticate the Personalisation agent (same as PACE ST) Password Authenticated Connection Master keys used to established a trusted channel between the Basic Inspection Terminal and the travel document (same as PACE ST) Session keys for the secure channel Session keys used to protect the communication in confidentiality and in integrity : Accessibility to the TOE functions and data only for authorised subjects Property to be maintained by the current security policy: Availability. Property of the TOE is to be authentic in order to provide claimed security functionality in a proper MRD's chip personalised by the issuing Organization is used by the traveller to prove his possession of a genuine MRD. This asset also covers "Authenticity Description Data enabling to identify the TOE Chip Authentication private Key Private key the chip uses to perform a chip authentication Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - Technical information about the current and previous locations of the travel document gathered unnoticeable by the travel document holder recognising the TOE not knowing any PACE password. Unavailability represents a prerequisite for anonymity of the travel document holder data stored in the TOE to authorised subjects Private key enabling to authenticate the Personalisation Master keys used to established a trusted channel between Terminal and the travel document Session keys used to protect the communication in for authorised subjects Property of the TOE is to be authentic in order to provide claimed security functionality in a proper Organization for the MRD holder . This asset also covers "Authenticity Private key the chip uses to perform a chip authentication T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ Active Authentication private key Current Date Property to be maintained by the current security policy: TOE internal secret cryptographic keys Permanently or temporarily stored secret cryptographic material used by the TOE in order to enforce its security functionality. TSF data Personalisation Agent reference authentication Data Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) Key Chip Authentication private Key Active Authentication private key Session keys for the secure channel MSK LSK Table 4: TOE internal secret cryptographic keys Property to be maintained by the current security policy: Confidentiality, Integrity. TOE internal non-secret cryptographic material Permanently or temporarily stored non material (Document Security Object SOD containing digital signature enforce its security functionality. TSF data Description TOE_ID Data enabling to identify the TOE and the TOE Configuration Life Cycle State Life Cycle state of the TOE IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Authentication private key Private key the chip uses to perform an active authentication Current date of the travel document Table 3: Genuineness of the TOE Property to be maintained by the current security policy: Availability. TOE internal secret cryptographic keys Permanently or temporarily stored secret cryptographic material used by the TOE in order to enforce Description Personalisation Agent reference Private key enabling to authenticate the Personalisation agent Connection Establishment (PACE) Master keys used to established a trusted channel between the Basic Inspection Terminal and the travel document Chip Authentication private Key Private key the chip uses to perform a chip authentication Active Authentication private key Private key the chip uses to perform an active authentication Session keys used to protect the communication in confidentiality and in integrity Manufacturer Secret Key used to perform the authentication of the personal agent in pre-personalisation phase Loading Secure Key used to load Optional Code personalisation phase : TOE internal secret cryptographic keys Property to be maintained by the current security policy: Confidentiality, Integrity. secret cryptographic material Permanently or temporarily stored non-secret cryptographic (public) keys and other non material (Document Security Object SOD containing digital signature) used by the TOE in order to enforce its security functionality. Description Data enabling to identify the TOE and the TOE Configuration Life Cycle state of the TOE Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - Private key the chip uses to perform an active Permanently or temporarily stored secret cryptographic material used by the TOE in order to enforce Private key enabling to authenticate the Personalisation agent Master keys used to established a trusted channel between the erminal and the travel document Private key the chip uses to perform a chip authentication Private key the chip uses to perform an active authentication Session keys used to protect the communication in confidentiality Manufacturer Secret Key used to perform the authentication of the personalisation phase Loading Secure Key used to load Optional Code in pre- Property to be maintained by the current security policy: Confidentiality, Integrity. secret cryptographic (public) keys and other non-secret ) used by the TOE in order to Data enabling to identify the TOE and the TOE Configuration T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ Public Key CVCA Trust point of the travel document CVCA Certificate All the data related to the CVCA key (expiration date, name,..) stored in persistent memory Current Date Current date of the travel document Table 5: TOE internal non Property to be maintained by the current security policy: Integrity, Authenticity. Travel Document communication establishment authorisation data Restricted-revealable authorization information for a human user being used for verification of the authorisation attempts as authorised user (PACE password). These data are stored in the TOE and are not to be send to it. TSF data Description PACE password (KEYDOC or CAN) Reference information being persistently stored in the TOE and allowing PACE authentication Table 6: Travel Document communication establishment authorisation data Property to be maintained by the current security policy: Confidentiality, Integrity. 6.3 Threats This section describes the threats to be averted by the TOE independently or in coll IT environment. These threats result from the TOE method of use in the operational environment and the assets stored in or protected by the TOE. The TOE in collaboration with its IT environment shall avert the threats as specified below The threats are taken from the PP EAC with PACE, which requires to include also some threats described in the PP PACE. 6.3.1 Threats from the PP T.Read_Sensitive_Data Adverse action IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Trust point of the travel document stored in persistent memory All the data related to the CVCA key (expiration date, name,..) stored in persistent memory Current date of the travel document : TOE internal non-secret cryptographic material Property to be maintained by the current security policy: Integrity, Authenticity. Travel Document communication establishment authorisation data revealable authorization information for a human user being used for verification of the authorisation attempts as authorised user (PACE password). These data are stored in the TOE and are Description Reference information being persistently stored in the TOE and allowing PACE authentication : Travel Document communication establishment authorisation data Property to be maintained by the current security policy: Confidentiality, Integrity. This section describes the threats to be averted by the TOE independently or in coll IT environment. These threats result from the TOE method of use in the operational environment and the assets stored in or protected by the TOE. The TOE in collaboration with its IT environment shall avert the threats as specified below The threats are taken from the PP EAC with PACE, which requires to include also some threats Threats from the PP EAC with PACE Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - stored in persistent memory All the data related to the CVCA key (expiration date, name,..) stored in aphic material revealable authorization information for a human user being used for verification of the authorisation attempts as authorised user (PACE password). These data are stored in the TOE and are Reference information being persistently stored in the TOE and : Travel Document communication establishment authorisation data Property to be maintained by the current security policy: Confidentiality, Integrity. This section describes the threats to be averted by the TOE independently or in collaboration with its IT environment. These threats result from the TOE method of use in the operational environment The TOE in collaboration with its IT environment shall avert the threats as specified below. The threats are taken from the PP EAC with PACE, which requires to include also some threats T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ An attacker tries to gain the sensitive biometric reference data through the communication interface of the Travel Document's chip. The attack T.Read_Sensitive_Data is similar to the threat T.Skimming (cf. [R12]) in respect of the attack path (communication interface) and the motivation (to get data stored on the Travel Document's chip) but differs from those in the asset under the attack (sensitive biometric reference data vs. digital knowing the PACE Password) and therefore the possible attack methods. Note, that the sensitive biometric reference data are stored only on the Travel Doc data whereas the KEYDOC data and the portrait are visually readable on the physical Travel Document as well. Threat agent Having high attack potential, knowing the PACE Password, being in possession of a legitima Document. Asset Confidentiality of logical Travel Document sensitive user data (i.e. biometric reference). T.Counterfeit Adverse action An attacker with high attack potential produces an unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine MRD's chip to be used as part of a counterfeit used for authentication of a traveller by possession of a The attacker may generate a new data set or extract completely or partially the data from a genuine MRD's chip and copy them to another appropriate chip to imitate this genuine Threat agent Having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate Asset Authenticity of user data stored on the TOE 6.3.2 Threats from PP PACE T.Skimming Adverse action IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 An attacker tries to gain the sensitive biometric reference data through the communication interface of the Travel Document's chip. The attack T.Read_Sensitive_Data is similar to the threat T.Skimming ) in respect of the attack path (communication interface) and the motivation (to get data stored on the Travel Document's chip) but differs from those in the asset under the attack (sensitive biometric reference data vs. digital KEYDOC, digitized portrait and other data), the opportunity (i.e. knowing the PACE Password) and therefore the possible attack methods. Note, that the sensitive biometric reference data are stored only on the Travel Document's chip as private sensitive personal data and the portrait are visually readable on the physical Travel Having high attack potential, knowing the PACE Password, being in possession of a legitima Confidentiality of logical Travel Document sensitive user data (i.e. biometric reference). An attacker with high attack potential produces an unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine 's chip to be used as part of a counterfeit MRD. This violates the authenticity of the used for authentication of a traveller by possession of a MRD. The attacker may generate a new data set or extract completely or partially the data from a genuine 's chip and copy them to another appropriate chip to imitate this genuine MRD Having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate MRDs uthenticity of user data stored on the TOE om PP PACE Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - An attacker tries to gain the sensitive biometric reference data through the communication interface of the Travel Document's chip. The attack T.Read_Sensitive_Data is similar to the threat T.Skimming ) in respect of the attack path (communication interface) and the motivation (to get data stored on the Travel Document's chip) but differs from those in the asset under the attack (sensitive , digitized portrait and other data), the opportunity (i.e. knowing the PACE Password) and therefore the possible attack methods. Note, that the sensitive ument's chip as private sensitive personal data and the portrait are visually readable on the physical Travel Having high attack potential, knowing the PACE Password, being in possession of a legitimate Travel Confidentiality of logical Travel Document sensitive user data (i.e. biometric reference). An attacker with high attack potential produces an unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine . This violates the authenticity of the MRD's chip The attacker may generate a new data set or extract completely or partially the data from a genuine MRD's chip. s T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ An attacker imitates an inspection sy transferred between the TOE and the inspecting authority connected via the contactless/contact interface of the TOE. Threat agent Having high attack potential, cannot read and does not know the cor password (PACE password) in advance. Asset Confidentiality of logical travel document data T.Eavesdropping Adverse action An attacker is listening to the communication between the travel document and the authenticated BIS-PACE in order to gain the user data transferred between the TOE and the terminal connected. Threat agent Having high attack potential, cannot read and does not know the correct value of the shared password (PACE password) in advance. Asset Confidentiality of logical travel document data T.Tracing Adverse action An attacker tries to gather TOE tracing data (i.e. to trace the movement of the travel document) unambiguously identifying it remotely by contactless/contact interface of the TOE. Threat agent Having high attack potential, cannot read and does not know the correct value of the shared password (PACE password) in advance. Asset IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 An attacker imitates an inspection system in order to get access to the user data stored on or transferred between the TOE and the inspecting authority connected via the contactless/contact Having high attack potential, cannot read and does not know the correct value of the shared password (PACE password) in advance. Confidentiality of logical travel document data An attacker is listening to the communication between the travel document and the PACE in order to gain the user data transferred between the TOE and the terminal Having high attack potential, cannot read and does not know the correct value of the shared advance. Confidentiality of logical travel document data An attacker tries to gather TOE tracing data (i.e. to trace the movement of the travel document) unambiguously identifying it remotely by establishing or listening to a communication via the contactless/contact interface of the TOE. Having high attack potential, cannot read and does not know the correct value of the shared password (PACE password) in advance. Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - stem in order to get access to the user data stored on or transferred between the TOE and the inspecting authority connected via the contactless/contact rect value of the shared An attacker is listening to the communication between the travel document and the PACE PACE in order to gain the user data transferred between the TOE and the terminal Having high attack potential, cannot read and does not know the correct value of the shared An attacker tries to gather TOE tracing data (i.e. to trace the movement of the travel document) establishing or listening to a communication via the Having high attack potential, cannot read and does not know the correct value of the shared T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ Privacy of the travel document holder T.Abuse-Func Adverse action An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in TOE operational phase in order (i) to manipulate or to disclose the User Data stored in the TOE, (ii) to mani TSF-data stored in the TOE or (iii) to manipulate (bypass, deactivate or modify) soft functionality of the TOE. This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialisation and personalisation in the operational phase after delivery to the Threat agent having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate Asset integrity and authenticity of the travel document, availability of the functionality of the travel document. T.Information_Leakage Adverse action An attacker may exploit information leaking from the TOE during its usage in order to disclose confidential User Data or/and TSF the TOE and the terminal connected operation or caused by the attacker. Threat agent having high attack potential. Asset confidentiality of User Data and TSF Application note: Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O characteristics, clock frequency, or by changes in processing time requirements. This leakage may be interpreted as a covert channel transmission, but is more closely operating parameters which may be derived either from measurements of the contactless interface (emanation) or direct measurements (by contact to the chip still available even for a contactless chip) and can then be related to the Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) and Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Moreover the attacker may try actively to enforce information leakage by fault injection (e.g. Differential Fault Analysis IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 the travel document holder An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in TOE operational phase in order (i) to manipulate or to disclose the User Data stored in the TOE, (ii) to manipulate or to disclose the data stored in the TOE or (iii) to manipulate (bypass, deactivate or modify) soft functionality of the TOE. This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialisation and rational phase after delivery to the MRD holder. having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate MRDs integrity and authenticity of the travel document, availability of the functionality of the travel An attacker may exploit information leaking from the TOE during its usage in order to disclose TSF-data stored on the travel document or/and the TOE and the terminal connected. The information leakage may be inherent in the normal operation or caused by the attacker. confidentiality of User Data and TSF-data of the travel document. Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O characteristics, clock frequency, or by changes in processing time requirements. This leakage may be interpreted as a covert channel transmission, but is more closely related to measurement of operating parameters which may be derived either from measurements of the contactless interface (emanation) or direct measurements (by contact to the chip still available even for a contactless chip) and can then be related to the specific operation being performed. Examples are Differential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) and Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Moreover the attacker may try actively to enforce information leakage by fault injection (e.g. Differential Fault Analysis Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in TOE operational phase in order pulate or to disclose the data stored in the TOE or (iii) to manipulate (bypass, deactivate or modify) soft-coded security functionality of the TOE. This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialisation and MRDs integrity and authenticity of the travel document, availability of the functionality of the travel An attacker may exploit information leaking from the TOE during its usage in order to disclose or/and exchanged between . The information leakage may be inherent in the normal Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O characteristics, clock frequency, or by changes in processing time requirements. This leakage may be related to measurement of operating parameters which may be derived either from measurements of the contactless interface (emanation) or direct measurements (by contact to the chip still available even for a contactless chip) specific operation being performed. Examples are Differential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) and Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Moreover the attacker may try actively to enforce information leakage by fault injection (e.g. Differential Fault Analysis).. T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ T.Phys-Tamper Adverse action An attacker may perform physical probing of the travel document in order (i) to disclose the TSF data, or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the TOE’s Embedded Software. An attacker may physically modify the travel document in order to alter (I) its security functionality (hardware and software part, as well), (ii) the User Data or the TSF Threat agent having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legi Asset integrity and authenticity of the travel document, availability of the functionality of the travel document, confidentiality of User Data and TSF Application note: Physical tampering may be focused directly on the disclosure or manipulation of the user data (e.g. authentication key of the travel document) or indirectly by preparation of the TOE to following attack methods by modification of security features (e.g. to through power analysis). Physical tampering requires a direct interaction with the travel document’s internals. Techniques commonly employed in IC failure analysis and IC reverse engineering efforts may be used. Before that, hardware security mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be identified. Determination of software design including treatment of the user data and the TSF data may also be a pre-requisite. The modification may result in the deactivation of a security fu the biometric reference data for the inspection system) or the TSF data (e.g. T.Forgery Adverse action An attacker fraudulently alters the exchanged between the TOE authenticated BIS-PACE by means of changed travel document holder’s related reference data (like biographic or biometric data). The attacker does it in such a way that the terminal connected perceives these modified data as authentic one. Threat agent having high attack potential. Asset IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 An attacker may perform physical probing of the travel document in order (i) to disclose the TSF data, or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the TOE’s Embedded Software. An attacker may physically modify the travel document in order to alter (I) its security functionality (hardware and software part, as well), (ii) the User Data or the TSF-data stored on the travel document. having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate travel documents integrity and authenticity of the travel document, availability of the functionality of the travel document, confidentiality of User Data and TSF-data of the travel document. Physical tampering may be focused directly on the disclosure or manipulation of the user data (e.g. authentication key of the travel document) or indirectly by preparation of the TOE to following attack methods by modification of security features (e.g. to enable information leakage through power analysis). Physical tampering requires a direct interaction with the travel document’s internals. Techniques commonly employed in IC failure analysis and IC reverse engineering efforts dware security mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be identified. Determination of software design including treatment of the user data and the TSF data requisite. The modification may result in the deactivation of a security fu the biometric reference data for the inspection system) or the TSF data (e.g. An attacker fraudulently alters the User Data or/and TSF-data stored on the travel document and the terminal connected in order to outsmart the PACE PACE by means of changed travel document holder’s related reference data (like biographic or biometric data). The attacker does it in such a way that the terminal connected es these modified data as authentic one. Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - An attacker may perform physical probing of the travel document in order (i) to disclose the TSF- data, or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the TOE’s Embedded Software. An attacker may physically modify the travel document in order to alter (I) its security functionality (hardware and software part, as timate travel documents. integrity and authenticity of the travel document, availability of the functionality of the travel Physical tampering may be focused directly on the disclosure or manipulation of the user data (e.g. authentication key of the travel document) or indirectly by preparation of the TOE enable information leakage through power analysis). Physical tampering requires a direct interaction with the travel document’s internals. Techniques commonly employed in IC failure analysis and IC reverse engineering efforts dware security mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be identified. Determination of software design including treatment of the user data and the TSF data requisite. The modification may result in the deactivation of a security function. data stored on the travel document or/and in order to outsmart the PACE PACE by means of changed travel document holder’s related reference data (like biographic or biometric data). The attacker does it in such a way that the terminal connected T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ integrity of the travel document. T.Malfunction Adverse action An attacker may cause a malfunction the travel document’s hardware and applying environmental stress in order to (i) deactivate or modify security features or functionality of the TOE’ hardware or to (ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the TOE’s Embedded Software. This may be achie operating conditions, exploiting errors in the travel document’s Embedded Software or misusing administrative functions. To exploit these vulnerabilities an attacker needs information about the functional operation. Threat agent having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate travel documents, having information about the functional operation Asset integrity and authenticity of the travel document, availability of the functionality of the travel document, confidentiality of User Data and TSF Application note: A malfunction of the TOE may also be caused using a direct interaction w elements on the chip surface. This is considered as being a manipulation (refer to the threat T.PhysTamper) assuming a detailed knowledge about TOE’s internals. 6.3.3 Threats for AA T.Counterfeit 6.3.4 Threats for Note 6 T.Unauthorized_Load Adverse action: An attacker tries to load an additional code that is not intended to be assembled with the initial TOE, ie the evidence of authenticity or integrity is not correct. Threat agent: having high attack potential possession of a legitimate MRD Asset: Logical MRD data IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 integrity of the travel document. An attacker may cause a malfunction the travel document’s hardware and Embedded Software by applying environmental stress in order to (i) deactivate or modify security features or functionality of the TOE’ hardware or to (ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the TOE’s Embedded Software. This may be achieved e.g. by operating the travel document outside the normal operating conditions, exploiting errors in the travel document’s Embedded Software or misusing administrative functions. To exploit these vulnerabilities an attacker needs information about the having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate travel documents, having information about the functional operation. and authenticity of the travel document, availability of the functionality of the travel document, confidentiality of User Data and TSF-data of the travel document. A malfunction of the TOE may also be caused using a direct interaction w elements on the chip surface. This is considered as being a manipulation (refer to the threat T.PhysTamper) assuming a detailed knowledge about TOE’s internals. Threats for AA Threats for Note 6 An attacker tries to load an additional code that is not intended to be assembled with the initial TOE, ie the evidence of authenticity or integrity is not correct. having high attack potential, knowing the MSK, LSK and derivation data, being in Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - Embedded Software by applying environmental stress in order to (i) deactivate or modify security features or functionality of the TOE’ hardware or to (ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the TOE’s ved e.g. by operating the travel document outside the normal operating conditions, exploiting errors in the travel document’s Embedded Software or misusing administrative functions. To exploit these vulnerabilities an attacker needs information about the having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate travel documents, having and authenticity of the travel document, availability of the functionality of the travel A malfunction of the TOE may also be caused using a direct interaction with elements on the chip surface. This is considered as being a manipulation (refer to the threat An attacker tries to load an additional code that is not intended to be assembled , knowing the MSK, LSK and derivation data, being in T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ T.Bad_Activation Adverse action: An attacker tries to perturbate different than the expected one (initial TOE or perturbated TOE). Threat agent: having high attack potential, knowing the MSK, LSK and derivation data, being in possession of a legitimate MRD load Asset: Logical MRD data T.TOE_Identification_Forgery Adverse action: An attacker tries to perturbate code identification. Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate Asset: TOE_ID Application Note This threat is not applicable in phase 7, as the TOE identific 6.4 Organisational Security Policies The TOE shall comply with the following Organisational Security Policies (OSP) as security rules, procedures, practices, or guidelines imposed by an organisation upon its operations. The OSP are taken from the PP EAC with PACE, which requires to include also some OSP described in the PP PACE. 6.4.1 OSP from PP P.Sensitive_Data The biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG personal data of the MRD holder. The sensitive biometric reference data can be used only by inspection systems which are authorized for this access at the time the inspection system (Extended Inspection Syste Verifiers of the Receiving Organization limits defined by the Document Verifier Certificate. The IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 An attacker tries to perturbate the additional code activation such as the final TOE is different than the expected one (initial TOE or perturbated TOE). having high attack potential, knowing the MSK, LSK and derivation data, being in MRD, being in possession of an additional code that is authorized to be An attacker tries to perturbate the TOE identification and in particular the additional having high attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRD This threat is not applicable in phase 7, as the TOE identification is not possible in phase 7. Organisational Security Policies The TOE shall comply with the following Organisational Security Policies (OSP) as security rules, procedures, practices, or guidelines imposed by an organisation upon its operations. OSP are taken from the PP EAC with PACE, which requires to include also some OSP described in OSP from PP EAC with PACE The biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG7) and iris image(s) (EF.DG8) are sensitive private holder. The sensitive biometric reference data can be used only by inspection systems which are authorized for this access at the time the MRD inspection system (Extended Inspection Systems). The issuing Organization authorizes the Document Receiving Organizations to manage the authorization of inspection systems within the limits defined by the Document Verifier Certificate. The MRD's chip shall protect the confidentialit Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - the additional code activation such as the final TOE is having high attack potential, knowing the MSK, LSK and derivation data, being in in possession of an additional code that is authorized to be the TOE identification and in particular the additional MRD ation is not possible in phase 7. The TOE shall comply with the following Organisational Security Policies (OSP) as security rules, procedures, practices, or guidelines imposed by an organisation upon its operations. OSP are taken from the PP EAC with PACE, which requires to include also some OSP described in ) are sensitive private holder. The sensitive biometric reference data can be used only by MRD is presented to the authorizes the Document s to manage the authorization of inspection systems within the 's chip shall protect the confidentiality T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ and integrity of the sensitive private personal data even during transmission to the Extended Inspection System after Chip Authentication. P.Personalization The issuing Organization guarantees the correctness of the biographi and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and other data of the logical respect to the MRD holder. The personalization of the authorized by the issuing Organization 6.4.2 OSP from PP PACE P.Pre-Operational 1) The travel document Issuer issues the travel document and approves it using the terminals complying with all applicable laws and regulations. 2) The travel document Issuer concerning the travel document holder) and of the TSF 3) The travel document Issuer uses only such TOE’s technical components (IC) which enable traceability of the travel documents in their manufacturing and issuing life cycle phases, i.e. before they are in the operational phase. 4) If the travel document Issuer authorises a Personalisation Agent to personalise the travel document for travel document hold Personalisation Agent acts in accordance with the travel document Issuer’s policy. P.Card_PKI 1) The travel document Issuer shall establish a public key infrastructure for the pas authentication, i.e. for digital signature creation and verification for the travel document. For this aim, he runs a Country Signing Certification Authority (CSCA). The travel document Issuer shall publish the CSCA Certificate (CCSCA) 2) The CSCA shall securely generate, store and use the CSCA key pair. The CSCA shall keep the CSCA Private Key secret and issue a self IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 and integrity of the sensitive private personal data even during transmission to the Extended Inspection System after Chip Authentication. guarantees the correctness of the biographical data, the printed portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and other data of the logical holder. The personalization of the MRD for the holder is performed by an agent ization only. om PP PACE 1) The travel document Issuer issues the travel document and approves it using the terminals complying with all applicable laws and regulations. 2) The travel document Issuer guarantees correctness of the user data (amongst other of those, concerning the travel document holder) and of the TSF-data permanently stored in the TOE. 3) The travel document Issuer uses only such TOE’s technical components (IC) which enable ty of the travel documents in their manufacturing and issuing life cycle phases, i.e. before they are in the operational phase. 4) If the travel document Issuer authorises a Personalisation Agent to personalise the travel document for travel document holders, the travel document Issuer has to ensure that the Personalisation Agent acts in accordance with the travel document Issuer’s policy. 1) The travel document Issuer shall establish a public key infrastructure for the pas authentication, i.e. for digital signature creation and verification for the travel document. For this aim, he runs a Country Signing Certification Authority (CSCA). The travel document Issuer shall publish the CSCA Certificate (CCSCA) all securely generate, store and use the CSCA key pair. The CSCA shall keep the CSCA Private Key secret and issue a self-signed CSCA Certificate (CCSCA) having to be made available to the Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - and integrity of the sensitive private personal data even during transmission to the Extended cal data, the printed portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and other data of the logical MRD with for the holder is performed by an agent 1) The travel document Issuer issues the travel document and approves it using the terminals guarantees correctness of the user data (amongst other of those, data permanently stored in the TOE. 3) The travel document Issuer uses only such TOE’s technical components (IC) which enable ty of the travel documents in their manufacturing and issuing life cycle phases, i.e. before 4) If the travel document Issuer authorises a Personalisation Agent to personalise the travel ers, the travel document Issuer has to ensure that the Personalisation Agent acts in accordance with the travel document Issuer’s policy. 1) The travel document Issuer shall establish a public key infrastructure for the passive authentication, i.e. for digital signature creation and verification for the travel document. For this aim, he runs a Country Signing Certification Authority (CSCA). The travel document Issuer shall all securely generate, store and use the CSCA key pair. The CSCA shall keep the CSCA signed CSCA Certificate (CCSCA) having to be made available to the T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ travel document Issuer by strictly secure means, see Signer Certificates for the Document Signer Public Keys (CDS) and make them available to the travel document Issue. 3) A Document Signer shall: (i) Generate the Document Signer Key Pair (ii) Hand over the Document Signer Public Key to the CSCA for certification (iii) Keep the Document Signer Private Key secret (iv) Securely use the Document Signer Private Key for signing t Objects of travel documents. P.Trustworthy_PKI The CSCA shall ensure that it issues its certificates exclusively to the rightful organisations (DS) and DSs shall ensure that they sign exclusively correct travel document. P.Manufact The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalization Data which contains Key. P.Terminal The Basic Inspection Systems with PACE (BIS 1) The related terminals shall be used by terminal operators and by travel document holder 2) They shall implement the terminal parts of the PACE protocol [R2] and use them in this order. The PACE terminal shall use randomly and (almost) uniformly selected nonces, if required by the protocols (for generating ephemeral keys for Diffie 3) The related terminals need not to use any own credentials IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 travel document Issuer by strictly secure means, see [R17]. The CSCA shall create the Document Signer Certificates for the Document Signer Public Keys (CDS) and make them available to the travel (i) Generate the Document Signer Key Pair (ii) Hand over the Document Signer Public Key to the CSCA for certification (iii) Keep the Document Signer Private Key secret (iv) Securely use the Document Signer Private Key for signing the Document Security Objects of travel documents. The CSCA shall ensure that it issues its certificates exclusively to the rightful organisations (DS) and DSs shall ensure that they sign exclusively correct Document Security Objects to be stored on the The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The personalization Data which contains at least the Personalization Agent The Basic Inspection Systems with PACE (BIS-PACE) shall operate their terminals as follows: 1) The related terminals shall be used by terminal operators and by travel document holder 2) They shall implement the terminal parts of the PACE protocol [R17], of the Passive Authentication and use them in this order. The PACE terminal shall use randomly and (almost) uniformly selected nonces, if required by the protocols (for generating ephemeral keys for Diffie 3) The related terminals need not to use any own credentials Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - . The CSCA shall create the Document Signer Certificates for the Document Signer Public Keys (CDS) and make them available to the travel (ii) Hand over the Document Signer Public Key to the CSCA for certification he Document Security The CSCA shall ensure that it issues its certificates exclusively to the rightful organisations (DS) and Document Security Objects to be stored on the The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The MRD at least the Personalization Agent PACE) shall operate their terminals as follows: 1) The related terminals shall be used by terminal operators and by travel document holders , of the Passive Authentication and use them in this order. The PACE terminal shall use randomly and (almost) uniformly selected nonces, if required by the protocols (for generating ephemeral keys for Diffie-Hellmann) T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 4) They shall also store the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key (in form of CCSCA and CDS) in order to enable and to perform Passive Authentication (determination of authenticity of data groups stored in the travel document, 5) The related terminals and their environment shall ensure confidentiality a data handled by them (e.g. confidentiality of PACE passwords, integrity of PKI certificates, etc.), where it is necessary for a secure operation of the TOE 6.4.3 OSP for AA P.Activ_Auth The terminal implements the Active Authentication 6.5 Assumptions The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment intended to be used. The Assumptions are taken from the PP EAC with PACE, which requires to include also some Assumptions described in the PP PACE. 6.5.1 Assumptions from PP A.Insp_Sys The Extended Inspection System (EIS) for global interoperability: (i) Includes the Country Signing CA Public Key (ii) Implements the terminal part of PACE BAC may only be used if supported by the TOE. If both PACE and BAC are supported by the TOE and the IS, PACE must be used. The performs the Chip Authentication v.1to verify the logical travel document and establishes secure messaging. EIS supports the Terminal Authentication Protocolv.1in order to ensure access control and is authorized by the issuing Organization to read the sensitive biometric reference data. A.Auth_PKI IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 4) They shall also store the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key (in form ) in order to enable and to perform Passive Authentication (determination of authenticity of data groups stored in the travel document, [R2]) 5) The related terminals and their environment shall ensure confidentiality and integrity of respective data handled by them (e.g. confidentiality of PACE passwords, integrity of PKI certificates, etc.), where it is necessary for a secure operation of the TOE Active Authentication protocol as described in [R39] The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be used or is The Assumptions are taken from the PP EAC with PACE, which requires to include also some Assumptions described in the PP PACE. Assumptions from PP EAC with PACE Extended Inspection System (EIS) for global interoperability: Includes the Country Signing CA Public Key Implements the terminal part of PACE [R17] and/or BAC [R11] BAC may only be used if supported by the TOE. If both PACE and BAC are supported by the TOE and the IS, PACE must be used. The EIS reads the logical travel document under PACE or BAC and performs the Chip Authentication v.1to verify the logical travel document and establishes secure messaging. EIS supports the Terminal Authentication Protocolv.1in order to ensure access control d is authorized by the issuing Organization through the Document Verifier of the to read the sensitive biometric reference data. Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - 4) They shall also store the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key (in form ) in order to enable and to perform Passive Authentication (determination of the nd integrity of respective data handled by them (e.g. confidentiality of PACE passwords, integrity of PKI certificates, etc.), [R39]. in which the TOE will be used or is The Assumptions are taken from the PP EAC with PACE, which requires to include also some BAC may only be used if supported by the TOE. If both PACE and BAC are supported by the TOE and EIS reads the logical travel document under PACE or BAC and performs the Chip Authentication v.1to verify the logical travel document and establishes secure messaging. EIS supports the Terminal Authentication Protocolv.1in order to ensure access control through the Document Verifier of the Receiving T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ The issuing and Receiving Organization verifiable certificates of the Extended Access Control. The Country Verifying Certification Authorities, the Document Verifier and Extended Inspection Systems hold authentication key pairs and certificates for their public k Certification Authorities of the Issuing Organization the Document Verifier and the Document Verifiers are signing the certificates of the Exten Inspection Systems of the Receiving Organization Organisations distribute the public keys of their Country Verifying Certification Authority to their travel document’s chip. 6.5.2 Assumptions f A.Passive_Auth The issuing and Receiving Organization passive authentication i.e. digital signature creation and verification for the logical travel document. The issuing Organization runs a Certification Authority (CA) which securely generates, stores and uses the Country Signing CA Key pair. The CA keeps the Country Signing CA Private Key secret and is recommended to distribute the Country Signing CA Public Key to ICAO, all maintaining its integrity. The Document Signer (i) Generates the Document Signer Key Pair (ii) Hands over the Document Signer Public Key to the CA for certification (iii) Keeps the Document Signer Private Key secret (iv) Uses securely the Document Objects of the travel documents. The CA creates the Document Signer Certificates for the Document Signer Public Keys that are distributed to the Receiving Organization Agent ensures that the Document Security Object contains only the hash values of genuine user data according to [R10]. 6.5.3 Assumptions for A.Insp_Sys_AA The Inspection System implements the verifies the authenticity of the MRD’s chip during inspection during Active Authentication. IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Receiving Organizations or Organisations establish a public key infrastructure for card verifiable certificates of the Extended Access Control. The Country Verifying Certification Authorities, the Document Verifier and Extended Inspection Systems hold authentication key pairs and certificates for their public keys encoding the access control rights. The Country Verifying Issuing Organizations or Organisations are signing the certificates of the Document Verifier and the Document Verifiers are signing the certificates of the Exten Receiving Organizations or Organisations. The Issuing Organization Organisations distribute the public keys of their Country Verifying Certification Authority to their Assumptions from PP PACE Receiving Organizations or Organisations establish a public key infrastructure for passive authentication i.e. digital signature creation and verification for the logical travel document. runs a Certification Authority (CA) which securely generates, stores and uses the Country Signing CA Key pair. The CA keeps the Country Signing CA Private Key secret and is recommended to distribute the Country Signing CA Public Key to ICAO, all Receiving Organization Generates the Document Signer Key Pair Hands over the Document Signer Public Key to the CA for certification Keeps the Document Signer Private Key secret Uses securely the Document Signer Private Key for signing the Document Security Objects of the travel documents. The CA creates the Document Signer Certificates for the Document Signer Public Keys that are Receiving Organizations and Organisations. It is assumed that the Personalisation Agent ensures that the Document Security Object contains only the hash values of genuine user data Assumptions for Active Authentication The Inspection System implements the Active Authentication Mechanism. The Inspection System verifies the authenticity of the MRD’s chip during inspection using the signature return Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - lic key infrastructure for card verifiable certificates of the Extended Access Control. The Country Verifying Certification Authorities, the Document Verifier and Extended Inspection Systems hold authentication key pairs and eys encoding the access control rights. The Country Verifying s or Organisations are signing the certificates of the Document Verifier and the Document Verifiers are signing the certificates of the Extended Issuing Organizations or Organisations distribute the public keys of their Country Verifying Certification Authority to their s or Organisations establish a public key infrastructure for passive authentication i.e. digital signature creation and verification for the logical travel document. runs a Certification Authority (CA) which securely generates, stores and uses the Country Signing CA Key pair. The CA keeps the Country Signing CA Private Key secret and is eceiving Organizations Hands over the Document Signer Public Key to the CA for certification Signer Private Key for signing the Document Security The CA creates the Document Signer Certificates for the Document Signer Public Keys that are that the Personalisation Agent ensures that the Document Security Object contains only the hash values of genuine user data The Inspection System using the signature returned by the TOE T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 7 SECURITY OBJECTIVES 7.1 Security Objectives for the TOE This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of identified threats to be countered by the TOE and organisational security The OT are taken from the PP EAC with PAC the PP PACE. 7.1.1 SO from PP E OT.Sens_Data_Conf The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the sensitive biometric re EF.DG8) by granting read access only to authorized Extended Inspection Systems. The authorization of the inspection system is drawn from the Inspection System Certificate used for the successful authentication and shall be a non Certificate in the certificate chain to the Country Verifier Certification Authority of the issuing Organization. The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical transmission to the Extended Inspection System. The confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference data shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential. OT.Chip_Auth_Proof The TOE must support the General Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of the MRD’s chip as issued by the identified issuing defined in [R39]. The authenticity proof provided by the attacks with high attack potential. Application note: The OT.Chip_Auth_Proof implies the travel document’s (i) A unique identity as given by the travel document’s Document Number (ii) A secret to prove its identity by knowledge i.e. a private authentication key as TSF data. The TOE shall protect this TSF data to prevent their misuse. The terminal shall data to verify the authentication attempt of travel document’s chip i.e. a certificate for the Chip IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 SECURITY OBJECTIVES Security Objectives for the TOE This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of identified threats to be countered by the TOE and organisational security policies to be met by the TOE. The OT are taken from the PP EAC with PACE, which requires to include also some OT described in EAC with PACE The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG ) by granting read access only to authorized Extended Inspection Systems. The authorization of the inspection system is drawn from the Inspection System Certificate used for the successful authentication and shall be a non-strict subset of the authorization defined in the Document Verifier Certificate in the certificate chain to the Country Verifier Certification Authority of the issuing . The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRD transmission to the Extended Inspection System. The confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference data shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential. The TOE must support the General Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of the ’s chip as issued by the identified issuing Organization by means of the Chip Authentication as . The authenticity proof provided by the MRD’s chip shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential. The OT.Chip_Auth_Proof implies the travel document’s chip to have: A unique identity as given by the travel document’s Document Number A secret to prove its identity by knowledge i.e. a private authentication key as TSF data. The TOE shall protect this TSF data to prevent their misuse. The terminal shall data to verify the authentication attempt of travel document’s chip i.e. a certificate for the Chip Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of identified threats policies to be met by the TOE. , which requires to include also some OT described in ference data (EF.DG7 and ) by granting read access only to authorized Extended Inspection Systems. The authorization of the inspection system is drawn from the Inspection System Certificate used for the successful rict subset of the authorization defined in the Document Verifier Certificate in the certificate chain to the Country Verifier Certification Authority of the issuing MRD data during their transmission to the Extended Inspection System. The confidentiality of the sensitive biometric The TOE must support the General Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of the by means of the Chip Authentication as ’s chip shall be protected against A secret to prove its identity by knowledge i.e. a private authentication key as TSF data. The TOE shall protect this TSF data to prevent their misuse. The terminal shall have the reference data to verify the authentication attempt of travel document’s chip i.e. a certificate for the Chip T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ Authentication Public Key that matches the Chip Authentication Private Key of the travel document’s chip. This certificate is provided by (i) The Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG1 (ii) The hash value of DG1 7.1.2 SO from PP PACE OT.Data_Int The TOE must ensure integrity of the User Data and the TSF data against unauthorised modification (physical manipulation and unauthorised modifying). The TOE must ensure integrity of the User Data and the TSF and the terminal connected (and Authentication. OT.Data_Auth The TOE must ensure authenticity of the User Data and the TSF verification of their authenticity at the terminal The TOE must ensure authenticity of the User Data and the TSF the TOE and the terminal connected (and represented by PACE authenticated BIS PACE Authentication. It shall happen by enabling such a verification at the termin by the terminal) and by an active verification by the TOE itself (at receiving by the TOE). OT.Data_Conf The TOE must ensure confidentiality of the User Data and the TSF only to the PACE authenticated BIS Data and the TSF-data during their exchange between the TOE an represented by PACE authenticated BIS OT.Tracing The TOE must prevent gathering TOE tracing data by means of unambiguous identifying the travel document remotely through establishing or listening to a communication via the contactless/contact interface of the TOE without knowledge of the correct values of shared passwords (PACE passwords) in advance. OT.Prot_Abuse-Func The TOE must prevent that functions of the TOE, which can be abused in order: (i) To manipulate or to disclose the User Data stored in the TOE IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Authentication Public Key that matches the Chip Authentication Private Key of the travel document’s chip. This certificate is provided by The Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG14) in the LDS defined in [6] The hash value of DG14 in the Document Security Object signed by the Document Signer. rom PP PACE The TOE must ensure integrity of the User Data and the TSF-data stored on it by protecting these data against unauthorised modification (physical manipulation and unauthorised modifying). The TOE must ensure integrity of the User Data and the TSF-data during their exchange between the TOE and the terminal connected (and represented by PACE authenticated BIS-PACE) after the PACE The TOE must ensure authenticity of the User Data and the TSF-data stored on it by enabling verification of their authenticity at the terminal-side. re authenticity of the User Data and the TSF-data during their exchange between the TOE and the terminal connected (and represented by PACE authenticated BIS PACE Authentication. It shall happen by enabling such a verification at the termin by the terminal) and by an active verification by the TOE itself (at receiving by the TOE). The TOE must ensure confidentiality of the User Data and the TSF-data33 by granting read access only to the PACE authenticated BIS-PACE connected.The TOE must ensure confidentiality of the User data during their exchange between the TOE and the terminal connected (and represented by PACE authenticated BIS-PACE) after the PACE Authentication. The TOE must prevent gathering TOE tracing data by means of unambiguous identifying the travel stablishing or listening to a communication via the contactless/contact interface of the TOE without knowledge of the correct values of shared passwords (PACE passwords) The TOE must prevent that functions of the TOE, which may not be used in TOE operational phase, To manipulate or to disclose the User Data stored in the TOE Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - Authentication Public Key that matches the Chip Authentication Private Key of the travel document’s ) in the LDS defined in [6] in the Document Security Object signed by the Document Signer. ored on it by protecting these data against unauthorised modification (physical manipulation and unauthorised modifying). The data during their exchange between the TOE PACE) after the PACE data stored on it by enabling data during their exchange between the TOE and the terminal connected (and represented by PACE authenticated BIS-PACE) after the PACE Authentication. It shall happen by enabling such a verification at the terminal-side (at receiving by the terminal) and by an active verification by the TOE itself (at receiving by the TOE). data33 by granting read access PACE connected.The TOE must ensure confidentiality of the User d the terminal connected (and The TOE must prevent gathering TOE tracing data by means of unambiguous identifying the travel stablishing or listening to a communication via the contactless/contact interface of the TOE without knowledge of the correct values of shared passwords (PACE passwords) may not be used in TOE operational phase, T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ (ii) To manipulate or to disclose the TSF (iii) To manipulate (bypass, deactivate or modify) soft TOE. OT.Prot_Inf_Leak The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential User Data or/and TSF and/or processed by the travel document by: - Measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption, clock, or I/O lines - Forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or - A physical manipulation of the TOE. Application note: This objective pertains to measurements with operation of the TOE or operations enforced by an attacker. OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper The TOE must provide protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the TSF Data, and the MRD's chip Embedded Software by means of: - Measuring through galvanic contacts representing a direct physical probing on the chips surface except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage and current) or - Measuring not using galvanic contacts, but ot electrical charges (using tools used in solid - Manipulation of the hardware and its security features, as well as - Controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Da With a prior - Reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions. OT.Identification The TOE must provide means to store Initialisation Identification and Pre nonvolatile memory. The Initialisation Identification Data must provide a unique identification of the IC during the manufacturing and the card issuing life cycle phases of the travel document. The storage of the PrePersonalization data includes writing of the Person OT.AC_Pers The TOE must ensure that the logical according to LDS [R2] and the TSF data can be written by authorized Personalization Agents only. The IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 To manipulate or to disclose the TSF-data stored in the TOE To manipulate (bypass, deactivate or modify) soft-coded security func The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential User Data or/and TSF and/or processed by the travel document by: Measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption, clock, or I/O Forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or A physical manipulation of the TOE. This objective pertains to measurements with subsequent complex signal processing due to normal operation of the TOE or operations enforced by an attacker. The TOE must provide protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the TSF Data, dded Software by means of: Measuring through galvanic contacts representing a direct physical probing on the chips surface except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage and Measuring not using galvanic contacts, but other types of physical interaction between electrical charges (using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure analysis) Manipulation of the hardware and its security features, as well as Controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF Data) engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions. The TOE must provide means to store Initialisation Identification and Pre-Personalization Data in its memory. The Initialisation Identification Data must provide a unique identification of the IC during the manufacturing and the card issuing life cycle phases of the travel document. The storage of the PrePersonalization data includes writing of the Personalization Agent Key(s). The TOE must ensure that the logical MRD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the Document security object and the TSF data can be written by authorized Personalization Agents only. The Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - coded security functionality of the The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential User Data or/and TSF-data stored time between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption, clock, or I/O subsequent complex signal processing due to normal The TOE must provide protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the TSF Data, Measuring through galvanic contacts representing a direct physical probing on the chips surface except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage and her types of physical interaction between state physics research and IC failure analysis) engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions. Personalization Data in its memory. The Initialisation Identification Data must provide a unique identification of the IC during the manufacturing and the card issuing life cycle phases of the travel document. The alization Agent Key(s). data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the Document security object and the TSF data can be written by authorized Personalization Agents only. The T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ logical MRD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 and the TSF data may be written only during and cannot be changed after its personalization. Application note: The OT.AC_Pers implies that the data of the LDS groups written during personalisation for travel document holder (at least EF.DG1 and EF. personalisation. OT.Prot_Malfunction The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE operating conditions where reliability and secure operation hves not been proven or tested. This is to prevent errors. The environmental conditions may include external energy (esp. electromagnetic) fields, voltage (on any contacts), clock frequency, or temperature. 7.1.3 SO for AA OT.AA_Proof The TOE must support the Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of MRD’s chip as issued by the identified issuing Organization by means of the [R2]. The authenticity proof through AA provided by MRD’s chip shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential. OT.Data_Int_AA The TOE must ensure the integrity of th manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRD data during their transmission to the General Inspection System after 7.1.4 SO for Note 6 OT.Secure_Load_ACode The Loader of the Initial TOE shall check an evidence of authenticity and integrity of the loaded Additional Code. The Loader enforces that only the allowed version of the Additional Code can be loaded on the Initial TOE. The Loader shall forbid the loading of an Additional Code not intended to be assembled with the Initial TOE. During the Load Phase of an Additional Code, the TOE shall remain secure. IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 and the TSF data may be written only during and cannot be changed after its personalization. ies that the data of the LDS groups written during personalisation for travel document holder (at least EF.DG1 and EF.DG6) can not be changed using write access after The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside the normal operating conditions where reliability and secure operation hves not been proven or tested. This is to prevent errors. The environmental conditions may include external energy (esp. electromagnetic) tage (on any contacts), clock frequency, or temperature. The TOE must support the Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of MRD’s chip as issued by the identified issuing Organization by means of the Active Authentication . The authenticity proof through AA provided by MRD’s chip shall be protected against attacks The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRD stored on the MRD's chip against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRD data during their transmission to the General Inspection System after Active Authentication Note 6 The Loader of the Initial TOE shall check an evidence of authenticity and integrity of the loaded Additional Code. The Loader enforces that only the allowed version of the Additional Code can be the Initial TOE. The Loader shall forbid the loading of an Additional Code not intended to be assembled with the Initial TOE. During the Load Phase of an Additional Code, the TOE shall remain secure. Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 and the TSF data may be written only during and cannot be ies that the data of the LDS groups written during personalisation for travel ) can not be changed using write access after must prevent its operation outside the normal operating conditions where reliability and secure operation hves not been proven or tested. This is to prevent errors. The environmental conditions may include external energy (esp. electromagnetic) The TOE must support the Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of MRD’s chip as Active Authentication as defined in . The authenticity proof through AA provided by MRD’s chip shall be protected against attacks e logical MRD stored on the MRD's chip against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRD data Active Authentication. The Loader of the Initial TOE shall check an evidence of authenticity and integrity of the loaded Additional Code. The Loader enforces that only the allowed version of the Additional Code can be the Initial TOE. The Loader shall forbid the loading of an Additional Code not intended to T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ OT.Secure_AC_Activation Activation of the Additional Code and update of the Identification Data shall be performed at the same time in an Atomic way. All the operations needed for the code to be able to operate as in the Final TOE shall be completed before activation. If the Atomic Activation is successful, then the resulting product is the Final TOE, otherwise (in case of interruption or incident which prevents the forming of the Final TOE), the Initial TOE shall remain in its initial state or fail secure. OT.TOE_Identification The Identification Data identifies the Initial TOE and Additional Code. The TOE provides means to store Identification Data in its non Atomic Activation of the Additional Code, the Identification Data of the Final TOE allows identifications of Initial TOE and Additional Code. The user must be able to uniquely identify Initial TOE and Addtitional Code(s) which are embedded in the Systems to verify the authenticity 7.2 Security objectives for the Operational Environment 7.2.1 OE from PP OE.Auth_Key_MRD The issuing Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to: (i) Generate the MRD's Chip Authentication Key Pair (ii) Sign and store the Chip Authentication Public Key in the Chip Authentication Public Key data in EF.DG14 (iii) Support inspection systems of authenticity of the Authentication Public Key by means of the Document Security Object. OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data The issuing Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to limit the access to sensitive biometric reference data of or Organizations. The Country Verifying Certification Authority of the issuing card verifiable Document Verifier Certificates for the authorized Document Verifier only. OE.Exam_MRD IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Activation of the Additional Code and update of the Identification Data shall be performed at the same time in an Atomic way. All the operations needed for the code to be able to operate as in the ed before activation. If the Atomic Activation is successful, then the resulting product is the Final TOE, otherwise (in case of interruption or incident which prevents the forming of the Final TOE), the Initial TOE shall remain The Identification Data identifies the Initial TOE and Additional Code. The TOE provides means to store Identification Data in its non-volatile memory and guarantees the integrity of these dat Atomic Activation of the Additional Code, the Identification Data of the Final TOE allows identifications of Initial TOE and Additional Code. The user must be able to uniquely identify Initial TOE and Addtitional Code(s) which are embedded in the Final TOE. TOE must support the Inspection Systems to verify the authenticity. Security objectives for the Operational Environment EAC with PACE has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to: 's Chip Authentication Key Pair Sign and store the Chip Authentication Public Key in the Chip Authentication Public Key Support inspection systems of Receiving Organizations or organizations to verify the authenticity of the MRD's chip used for genuine MRD by certification of the Chip Authentication Public Key by means of the Document Security Object. establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to limit the access to sensitive biometric reference data of MRD's holders to authorized Receiving Organization or Organizations. The Country Verifying Certification Authority of the issuing Orga card verifiable Document Verifier Certificates for the authorized Document Verifier only. Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - Activation of the Additional Code and update of the Identification Data shall be performed at the same time in an Atomic way. All the operations needed for the code to be able to operate as in the If the Atomic Activation is successful, then the resulting product is the Final TOE, otherwise (in case of interruption or incident which prevents the forming of the Final TOE), the Initial TOE shall remain The Identification Data identifies the Initial TOE and Additional Code. The TOE provides means to volatile memory and guarantees the integrity of these data. After Atomic Activation of the Additional Code, the Identification Data of the Final TOE allows identifications of Initial TOE and Additional Code. The user must be able to uniquely identify Initial Final TOE. TOE must support the Inspection has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to: Sign and store the Chip Authentication Public Key in the Chip Authentication Public Key s or organizations to verify the by certification of the Chip Authentication Public Key by means of the Document Security Object. establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to limit the Receiving Organizations Organization generates card verifiable Document Verifier Certificates for the authorized Document Verifier only. T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ The inspection system of the receiving traveler to verify its authenticity by means manipulation of the physical MRD (i) Includes the Country Signing CA Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing Organization (ii) Implements the terminal part of the PACE Extended Inspection Systems perform additionally to these points the Chip Authentication Protocol to verify the Authenticity of the presented travel document’s chip. OE.Prot_Logical_MRD The inspection system of the receiving data read from the logical MRD communication with the TOE before secure messaging is successfully established based on the Chip Authentication Protocol . OE.Ext_Insp_Systems The Document Verifier of Receiving Organization Systems by creation of Inspection System Certificates for access to sensitive biometric reference data of the logical MRD. The Extended Inspection System authenticates themselves to the access to the sensitive biometric reference data with its private Terminal Authentication Key and its Inspection System Certificate. 7.2.2 OE from PP OE.Legislative_Compliance The travel document Issuer must issue the travel document and approve it using the termin complying with all applicable laws and regulations OE.Pass_Auth_Sign The travel document Issuer has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure as follows: the CSCA acting on behalf and according to the policy of the travel document Issuer mu cryptographically secure CSCA Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the CSCA Private Key and sign Document Signer Certificates in a secure operational environment, and (iii) publish the Certificate of the CSCA Public Key (CCSCA). Hereby au maintained. A Document Signer acting in accordance with the CSCA policy must: IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 The inspection system of the receiving Organization must examine the MRD traveler to verify its authenticity by means of the physical security measures and to detect any MRD. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability: Includes the Country Signing CA Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each Implements the terminal part of the PACE [R17] and/or the Basic Access Control Extended Inspection Systems perform additionally to these points the Chip Authentication Protocol to verify the Authenticity of the presented travel document’s chip. The inspection system of the receiving Organization ensures the confidentiality and integrity of the MRD. The inspection system will prevent eavesdropping to their communication with the TOE before secure messaging is successfully established based on the Chip Receiving Organizations or Organizations authorizes Extended Inspection Systems by creation of Inspection System Certificates for access to sensitive biometric reference data . The Extended Inspection System authenticates themselves to the the sensitive biometric reference data with its private Terminal Authentication Key and its PACE The travel document Issuer must issue the travel document and approve it using the termin complying with all applicable laws and regulations The travel document Issuer has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure as follows: the CSCA acting on behalf and according to the policy of the travel document Issuer mu cryptographically secure CSCA Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the CSCA Private Key and sign Document Signer Certificates in a secure operational environment, and (iii) publish the Certificate of the CSCA Public Key (CCSCA). Hereby authenticity and integrity of these certificates are being A Document Signer acting in accordance with the CSCA policy must: Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - MRD presented by the of the physical security measures and to detect any . The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability: Includes the Country Signing CA Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each and/or the Basic Access Control [R2]. Extended Inspection Systems perform additionally to these points the Chip Authentication Protocol ensures the confidentiality and integrity of the . The inspection system will prevent eavesdropping to their communication with the TOE before secure messaging is successfully established based on the Chip Organizations authorizes Extended Inspection Systems by creation of Inspection System Certificates for access to sensitive biometric reference data . The Extended Inspection System authenticates themselves to the MRD's chip for the sensitive biometric reference data with its private Terminal Authentication Key and its The travel document Issuer must issue the travel document and approve it using the terminals The travel document Issuer has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure as follows: the CSCA acting on behalf and according to the policy of the travel document Issuer must (i) generate a cryptographically secure CSCA Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the CSCA Private Key and sign Document Signer Certificates in a secure operational environment, and (iii) publish the Certificate of thenticity and integrity of these certificates are being T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ (i) generate a cryptographically secure Document Signing Key Pair (ii) ensure the secrecy of the Document Signer Private (iii) hand over the Document Signer Public Key to the CSCA for certification (iv) sign Document Security Objects of genuine travel documents in a secure operational environment only. The digital signature in the Document Security Object relates to all each data group in use according to [6]. The Personalisation Agent has to ensure that the Document Security Object contains only the hash values of genuine user data according to [6]. The CSCA must issue its certificates exclusively to the rightful organisations (DS) and DSs must sign exclusively correct DocumentSecurity Objects to be stored on travel document. OE.Personalization The travel document Issuer must ensure that the Personalisation Agents acting on his behalf: (i) establish the correct identity of the travel document holder and create the biographical data for the travel document (ii) enrol the biometric reference data of the travel document holder (iii) write a subset of these data on the physical travel document (electronic personalisation) for the travel document holder as defined in [6] (iv) write the document details data (v) write the initial TSF data (vi) sign the Document Security Object defined in [6](in the role of OE.Terminal The terminal operators must operate their terminals as follows: 1.) The related terminals (basic inspection systems, cf. above) are used by terminal operators and by travel document holders as defined in [6] 2.) The related terminals i Passive Authentication [4] (by verification of the signature of the Document Security Object) and use them in this order. The PACE terminal uses randomly and (almost) uniformly selected nonces, if required by the protocols (for generating ephemeral keys for Diffie 3.) The related terminals need not to use any own credentials 4.) The related terminals securely store the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key (in for Authentication of the travel document (determination of the authenticity of data groups stored in the travel document, [6]) IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 (i) generate a cryptographically secure Document Signing Key Pair (ii) ensure the secrecy of the Document Signer Private Key (iii) hand over the Document Signer Public Key to the CSCA for certification (iv) sign Document Security Objects of genuine travel documents in a secure operational environment only. The digital signature in the Document Security Object relates to all each data group in use according to [6]. The Personalisation Agent has to ensure that the Document Security Object contains only the hash values of genuine user data according to [6]. The CSCA must issue its certificates exclusively to the rightful organisations (DS) and DSs must sign exclusively correct DocumentSecurity Objects to be The travel document Issuer must ensure that the Personalisation Agents acting on his behalf: the correct identity of the travel document holder and create the biographical data for (ii) enrol the biometric reference data of the travel document holder (iii) write a subset of these data on the physical IDL (optical personalisation) and store them in the travel document (electronic personalisation) for the travel document holder as defined in [6] (iv) write the document details data (vi) sign the Document Security Object defined in [6](in the role of a DS). The terminal operators must operate their terminals as follows: 1.) The related terminals (basic inspection systems, cf. above) are used by terminal operators and by travel document holders as defined in [6] 2.) The related terminals implement the terminal parts of the PACE protocol [4], of the Passive Authentication [4] (by verification of the signature of the Document Security Object) and use them in this order. The PACE terminal uses randomly and (almost) uniformly selected f required by the protocols (for generating ephemeral keys for Diffie 3.) The related terminals need not to use any own credentials 4.) The related terminals securely store the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key (in form of CCSCAand CDS) in order to enable and to perform Passive Authentication of the travel document (determination of the authenticity of data groups stored in the travel document, [6]) Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - (iv) sign Document Security Objects of genuine travel documents in a secure operational environment only. The digital signature in the Document Security Object relates to all hash values for The Personalisation Agent has to ensure that the Document Security Object contains only the hash values of genuine user data according to [6]. The CSCA must issue its certificates exclusively to the rightful organisations (DS) and DSs must sign exclusively correct DocumentSecurity Objects to be The travel document Issuer must ensure that the Personalisation Agents acting on his behalf: the correct identity of the travel document holder and create the biographical data for on) and store them in the travel document (electronic personalisation) for the travel document holder as defined in [6] 1.) The related terminals (basic inspection systems, cf. above) are used by terminal operators mplement the terminal parts of the PACE protocol [4], of the Passive Authentication [4] (by verification of the signature of the Document Security Object) and use them in this order. The PACE terminal uses randomly and (almost) uniformly selected f required by the protocols (for generating ephemeral keys for Diffie-Hellmann) 4.) The related terminals securely store the Country Signing Public Key and the Document m of CCSCAand CDS) in order to enable and to perform Passive Authentication of the travel document (determination of the authenticity of data groups T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 5.) The related terminals and their environment must ensure confidentia respective data handled by them (e.g. confidentiality of the PACE passwords, integrity of PKI certificates, etc.), where it is necessary for a secure operation of the TOE according to the current PP OE.MRD_Holder The travel document holder may reveal, if necessary, his or her verification values of the PACE password to an authorized person or device who definitely act according to respective regulations and are trustworthy. 7.2.3 OE for AA OE.Exam_MRD_AA Aditionally to the OE.Exam_MRD, the inspection systems perform the to verify the Authenticity of the presented MRD’s chip. OE.Prot_Logical_MRD_AA Aditionally to the OE.Prot_Logical_MRD, the inspection syste communication with the TOE before secure messaging is successfully established based on the Authentication Protocol. OE.Activ_Auth_Verif In addition to the verification by passive authentication, the inspection systems may use the verification by Active Authentication MRD. OE.Activ_Auth_Sign The issuing Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to (i) generate the MRD’s Active Authentication Authentication Private Key, sign and store the Authentication Public Key data in EF.DG1 Organizations to verify the authenticity of the MRD’s chip used for genuine MRD by certification of the Active Authentication Public Key by means of IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 5.) The related terminals and their environment must ensure confidentia respective data handled by them (e.g. confidentiality of the PACE passwords, integrity of PKI certificates, etc.), where it is necessary for a secure operation of the TOE according to the holder may reveal, if necessary, his or her verification values of the PACE password to an authorized person or device who definitely act according to respective regulations to the OE.Exam_MRD, the inspection systems perform the Active Authentication to verify the Authenticity of the presented MRD’s chip. Aditionally to the OE.Prot_Logical_MRD, the inspection system prevents eavesdropping to their communication with the TOE before secure messaging is successfully established based on the In addition to the verification by passive authentication, the inspection systems may use the Active Authentication, which offers a stronger guaranty of the authenticity of the ization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to (i) Active Authentication Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the MRD’s Private Key, sign and store the Active Authentication Public Key in the Active Authentication Public Key data in EF.DG13 and (iii) support inspection systems of receiving s to verify the authenticity of the MRD’s chip used for genuine MRD by certification of Public Key by means of the Document Security Object. Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - 5.) The related terminals and their environment must ensure confidentiality and integrity of respective data handled by them (e.g. confidentiality of the PACE passwords, integrity of PKI certificates, etc.), where it is necessary for a secure operation of the TOE according to the holder may reveal, if necessary, his or her verification values of the PACE password to an authorized person or device who definitely act according to respective regulations Active Authentication protocol m prevents eavesdropping to their communication with the TOE before secure messaging is successfully established based on the Active In addition to the verification by passive authentication, the inspection systems may use the , which offers a stronger guaranty of the authenticity of the ization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to (i) Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the MRD’s Active in the Active and (iii) support inspection systems of receiving s to verify the authenticity of the MRD’s chip used for genuine MRD by certification of T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 8 EXTENDED REQUIREMENT 8.1 Extended family FAU_SAS 8.1.1 Extended components FAU_SAS.1 Description: see [R11]. FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorized users] with the capability to store [assignment: list of audit information] in the audit records. Dependencies: No dependencies. Rationale: see [R11] 8.2 Extended family FCS_RND 8.2.1 Extended component FCS_RND.1 Description: see [R11] FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet [assignment: a defined quality metric]. Dependencies: No dependencies. Rationale: See [R11] 8.3 Extended family FIA_API 8.3.1 Extended component FIA_API.1 Description: see [R12] IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 EXTENDED REQUIREMENTS Extended family FAU_SAS - Audit data storage Extended components FAU_SAS.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorized users] with the capability to store [assignment: list of audit information] in the audit records. : No dependencies. Extended family FCS_RND - Generation of random numbers Extended component FCS_RND.1 FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet defined quality metric]. : No dependencies. Extended family FIA_API – Authentication proof of identity Extended component FIA_API.1 Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorized users] with the capability to store Generation of random numbers The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet of identity T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FIA_API.1 Quality metric for random numbers FIA_API.1.1 The TSF shall provide a [assignment: authentication mechanism] to prove the identity of the [assignment: authorized user or role]. Dependencies: No dependencies. Rationale: See [R12] 8.4 Extended family FMT_LIM 8.4.1 Extended component FMT_LIM.1 Description: see [R11] FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced [assignment: Limited capability and availability policy]. Dependencies: (FMT_LIM.2) Rationale: See [R11] 8.4.2 Extended component FMT_LIM.2 Description: See [R11] FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following po Limited capability and availability policy]. Dependencies: (FMT_LIM.1) IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 FIA_API.1 Quality metric for random numbers The TSF shall provide a [assignment: authentication mechanism] to prove the identity of the [assignment: authorized user or role]. : No dependencies. Extended family FMT_LIM - Limited capabilities and availability Extended component FMT_LIM.1 FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in imited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced [assignment: Limited capability and availability policy]. Extended component FMT_LIM.2 FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced [assignment: Limited capability and availability policy]. Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - The TSF shall provide a [assignment: authentication mechanism] to prove the identity of Limited capabilities and availability The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in imited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced [assignment: The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in licy is enforced [assignment: T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ Rationale: See [R11] 8.5 Extended family FPT_EM 8.5.1 Extended component FPT_EMS.1 Description: see [R11] FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of [assignment: specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of types of TSF da types of user data]. FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the following interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data]. Dependencies: No dependencies. Rationale: See [R11] IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Extended family FPT_EMS - TOE Emanation Extended component FPT_EMS.1 FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of [assignment: specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the following interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] ment: list of types of user data]. No dependencies. Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of [assignment: ta] and [assignment: list of The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the following interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 9 SECURITY REQUIREMENT 9.1 Security Functional Requirements This chapter presents the Security Functional Requirements to take into account within the TOE configuration presented in this security target. It is composed of the following elements: - Global SFR that are applicable to all the passports configuration - MP SFR for covering the phase Manufacturing and Personalization described in the Passport Protection Profile and also the coverage of Additional Code. - Active Authentication SFR - CA SFR that cover the Chip Authentication Protocol - TA SFR that cover the Terminal Authentication Protocol (note: Terminal Authentication Protocol is only available with the Extended Access Control) - EAC SFR that cover the Extended Access Control (note: EAC proto and CA, this chapter only contains SFR that can not be strictly applied to one or another) - PACE SFR that cover the Password Authenticated Connection Establishment protocol - PACE CAM that cover the Password Authenticated Connection Authentication Mapping protocol 9.1.1 Global SFR This chapter covers the common SFR that are shared between the different applications that are embedded on the product. FCS_CKM.4/Global Cryptographic key destru FCS_CKM.4.1/Global The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method FCS_RND.1/Global Quality metric for random numbers FCS_RND.1.1/Global The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet 1. The requirement to provide an and 2. The requirement of RGS_B1 for random number generation. IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS Security Functional Requirements This chapter presents the Security Functional Requirements to take into account within the TOE configuration presented in this security target. It is composed of the following elements: that are applicable to all the passports configuration for covering the phase Manufacturing and Personalization described in the Passport Protection Profile and also the coverage of Additional Code. Active Authentication SFR that cover the Active Authentication Protocol that cover the Chip Authentication Protocol that cover the Terminal Authentication Protocol (note: Terminal Authentication Protocol is only available with the Extended Access Control) that cover the Extended Access Control (note: EAC protocol is a combination of TA and CA, this chapter only contains SFR that can not be strictly applied to one or another) that cover the Password Authenticated Connection Establishment protocol that cover the Password Authenticated Connection Establishment with Chip Authentication Mapping protocol This chapter covers the common SFR that are shared between the different applications that are Cryptographic key destruction The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method zeroisation that meets the following: none Quality metric for random numbers The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet an entropy of at least 7.976 bits in each byte, following 2. The requirement of RGS_B1 for random number generation. Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - This chapter presents the Security Functional Requirements to take into account within the TOE configuration presented in this security target. It is composed of the following elements: for covering the phase Manufacturing and Personalization described in the Passport that cover the Active Authentication Protocol that cover the Terminal Authentication Protocol (note: Terminal Authentication col is a combination of TA and CA, this chapter only contains SFR that can not be strictly applied to one or another) that cover the Password Authenticated Connection Establishment protocol Establishment with Chip This chapter covers the common SFR that are shared between the different applications that are The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified none. The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet following AIS 31 [R37] T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FMT_LIM.1/Global Limited capabilities FMT_LIM.1.1/Global The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced Deploying Test Features after 1. User Data to be manipulated 2. TSF data to be disclosed or 3. Software to be reconstructed 4. Substantial information about other attacks FMT_LIM.2/Global Limited availability FMT_LIM.2.1/Global The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced Deploying Test Features after TOE 1. User Data to be manipulated 2. TSF data to be disclosed or 3. Software to be reconstructed 4. Substantial information about other attacks FPT_EMS.1/Global TOE Emanation FPT_EMS.1.1/Global The TOE shall not emit execution in excess of non useful information 1. EF.COM, EF.SOD and EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 FPT_EMS.1.2/Global The TSF shall ensure interface smart card circuit contacts 1. EF.COM, EF.SOD and EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 FPT_FLS.1/Global Failure with preservation of secure state FPT_FLS.1.1/Global The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: 1. Exposure to out-of-range operating 2. Failure detected by TSF according IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Limited capabilities The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced after TOE Delivery does not allow manipulated or manipulated reconstructed about construction of TSF to be gathered Limited availability The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced TOE Delivery does not allow manipulated or manipulated reconstructed about construction of TSF to be gathered TOE Emanation The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations non useful information enabling access to 1. EF.COM, EF.SOD and EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 The TSF shall ensure any unauthorized users are unable to use the following contacts to gain access to 1. EF.COM, EF.SOD and EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 Failure with preservation of secure state The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: operating conditions where therefore a malfunction according to FPT_TST.1. Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - capabilities so that in conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced: which may enable availability so that in conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced: which may enable variations, timing variations during command are unable to use the following The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: malfunction could occur T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FPT_TST.1/Global TSF testing FPT_TST.1.1/Global The TSF shall run a suite of self tests TSF, at the conditions: - At reset - Before any cryptographic - When accessing a DG or any EF - Prior to any use of TSF data - Before execution of any FPT_TST.1.2/Global The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of TSF data. FPT_TST.1.3/Global The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of stored TSF executable code. FPT_PHP.3/Global Resistance to physical attack FPT_PHP.3.1/Global The TSF shall resist responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced. 9.1.2 Product configuration SFR This chapter covers the Manufacturing and Personalization SFR. It also includes additional SFR for the compliance to Note 6. 9.1.2.1 SFR for additional code FAU_STG.2/MP_Add_code FAU_STG.2.1/MP_Add_code The TSF unauthorized deletion. FAU_STG.2.2/MP_Add_code The TSF shall be able to stored audit records in the audit trail. FAU_STG.2.3/MP_Add_code The TSF shal records will be maintained when the following conditions occur: IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 TSF testing The TSF shall run a suite of self tests to demonstrate the correct operation of cryptographic operation DG or any EF data any command The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity Resistance to physical attack The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced. Product configuration SFR the Manufacturing and Personalization SFR. It also includes additional SFR for the SFR for additional code _Add_code Guarantees of audit data availability The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from The TSF shall be able to prevent unauthorized modifications to the stored audit records in the audit trail. The TSF shall ensure that Additional code identification records will be maintained when the following conditions occur: failure and attack Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - te the correct operation of the The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity probing to the TSF by the Manufacturing and Personalization SFR. It also includes additional SFR for the shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorized modifications to the Additional code identification stored audit failure and attack. T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ Application Note: Additional code code is loaded with its integrity information. This integrity information is ve the TOE after the loading, and before the writing of the identification information by calculating the signature and comparing to the expected value. The signature is protected in integrity through the TOE life cycle, at each power on, the card v FCS_CKM.1/MP_Add_code FCS_CKM.1.1/MP_Add_code The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm specified cryptographic key sizes Cryptographic key generation algorithm Calculation of LSK_LOAD, from initial LSK and derivation data entered - AES 128 ECB FCS_COP.1/MP_ENC_Add_code FCS_COP.1.1/MP_ENC_Add_code with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following Cryptographic operation Encryption of the additional code (ciphered with LSK_LOAD) and signature verification FCS_COP.1/MP_MAC_Add_code FCS_COP.1.1/MP_MAC_Add_code with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following Cryptographic operation IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Additional code code is loaded with its integrity information. This integrity information is ve the TOE after the loading, and before the writing of the identification information by calculating the signature and comparing to the expected value. The signature is protected in integrity through the TOE life cycle, at each power on, the card verifies the integrity of this signature. /MP_Add_code Cryptographic key generation The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard] key generation algorithm Key length (bits) Calculation of LSK_LOAD, from initial LSK and derivation data 128 /MP_ENC_Add_code Cryptographic operation MP_ENC_Add_code The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes that meet the following [standard]: Algo Key length (bits) of the additional code (ciphered with LSK_LOAD) and signature verification AES 128 /MP_MAC_Add_code Cryptographic operation /MP_MAC_Add_code The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes that meet the following [standard]: Algo Key length (bits) Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - Additional code code is loaded with its integrity information. This integrity information is verified by the TOE after the loading, and before the writing of the identification information by calculating the signature and comparing to the expected value. The signature is protected in integrity through the The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and [standard]: Key length (bits) Standards None [cryptographic operation] in accordance and cryptographic key sizes Key length Standard [R35] [cryptographic operation] in accordance and cryptographic key sizes Standard T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ Cryptographic operation Secure Messaging MAC FDP_UIT.1/MP_Add_code FDP_UIT.1.1/MP_Add_code The TSF shall enforce the receive user data in a manner protected from FDP_UIT.1.2/MP_Add_code [Editorially user data, whether modification has occurred. Application Note Modification errors should be understood as modification, substitution, unrecoverable ordering change of data and any other integrity error that may cause the additional code to be installed on the card to be different from the one sent by the TOE Developer. This SFR control integrity of data FMT_MTD.1/MP_Add_code FMT_MTD.1.1/MP_Add_code The TSF shall restrict [authorized identified roles]: List of TSF data Activate Additional code Application note The Activation of the additional code modify LSK_LOAD (LSK and Derivation Data) and FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_READ FMT_MTD.1.1/MP_KEY_READ_Add_code [authorized identified roles]: IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Algo Key length (bits) 3DES Retail MAC 112 AES CMAC 128, 192 or 256 /MP_Add_code Data exchange integrity The TSF shall enforce the Prepersonalization access user data in a manner protected from modification errors. [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of modification of some of the pieces of the application sent by Modification errors should be understood as modification, substitution, unrecoverable ordering change of data and any other integrity error that may cause the additional code to be installed on the the one sent by the TOE Developer. control integrity of data import in phase 5, including the additional code but not only. /MP_Add_code Management of TSF data The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection the Authorised role TOE developer of the additional code modify the TOE. This additional code is ciphered with the LSK_LOAD (LSK and Derivation Data) and activated after the authentication of the KEY_READ_Add_code Management of TSF data _Add_code The TSF shall restrict the ability to Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - Standard [R35] , 192 or 256 [R35] access control SFP to The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of by the TOE developer Modification errors should be understood as modification, substitution, unrecoverable ordering change of data and any other integrity error that may cause the additional code to be installed on the code but not only. the [list of TSF data] to the TOE. This additional code is ciphered with the after the authentication of the TOE developer. The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the [data] to T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ TSF Data Authorized Identified roles LSK None FMT_SMR.1/MP_Add_code FMT_SMR.1.1/MP_Add_code The TSF shall maintain the roles 1. TOE developper FMT_SMR.1.2/MP_Add_code The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles. FPT_EMS.1/MP_Add_code FPT_EMS.1.1/MP_Add_code The TOE shall not emit command execution in excess of 1. LSK FPT_EMS.1.2/MP_Add_code The TSF shall ensure following interface smart card circuit 1. LSK FTP_ITC.1/MP_Add_code FTP_ITC.1.1/MP_Add_code The TSF shall provide a communication channel between it another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure. FTP_ITC.1.2/MP_Add_code [Editorially Prepersonalizer to initiate communication via the trusted channel. FTP_ITC.1.3/MP_Add_code The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for: 1. Additional code loading IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Authorized Identified roles /MP_Add_code Security roles The TSF shall maintain the roles The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles. /MP_Add_code TOE Emanation The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during in excess of non useful information enabling access to The TSF shall ensure any unauthorized users are unable to use the circuit contacts to gain access to Inter-TSF trusted channel The TSF shall provide a communication channel between it another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall permit the TOE Developer and to initiate communication via the trusted channel. The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for: Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles. variations, timing variations during are unable to use the The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or TOE Developer and The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for: T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 9.1.2.2 Manufacturing and Personalization FCS_CKM.1/MP Cryptographic key generation FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] sizes [key length] that meet the following Cryptographic key generation algorithm MSK derivation from initial MSK loaded in phase 1 using SHA 256 FCS_COP.1/MP_ENC_3DES Cryptographic operation FCS_COP.1.1/MP_ENC_3DES The TSF shall perform specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following Cryptographic operation Secure Messaging – encryption and decryption FCS_COP.1/MP_ENC_AES FCS_COP.1.1/MP_ENC_AES The TSF shall perform specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following Cryptographic operation Secure Messaging – encryption and decryption IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Personalization Cryptographic key generation The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and specified cryptographic key that meet the following [standard]: Cryptographic key generation algorithm Key length (bits) MSK derivation from initial MSK loaded in phase 1 using SHA 256 256 FCS_COP.1/MP_ENC_3DES Cryptographic operation The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key size that meet the following [standard]: Algo Key length (bits) encryption and 3DES in CBC mode 112 Cryptographic operation The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes that meet the following [standard]: Algo Key length (bits) encryption and AES in CBC mode 128, 192 and 256 Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic and specified cryptographic key Key length Standards None in accordance with a and cryptographic key sizes Key length Standard [R32] in accordance with a and cryptographic key sizes Standard 128, 192 and 256 [R35] T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FCS_COP.1/MP_MAC_3DES FCS_COP.1.1/MP_MAC_3DES The TSF shall perform specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following Cryptographic operation Secure Messaging – MAC FCS_COP.1/MP_MAC_AES FCS_COP.1.1/MP_MAC_AES The TSF shall perform specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following Cryptographic operation Secure Messaging MAC FCS_COP.1/MP_AUTH_3DES FCS_COP.1.1/MP_AUTH_3DES The TSF shall perform specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following Cryptographic operation Card Manufacturer Authentication (MSK) FCS_COP.1/MP_AUTH_AES FCS_COP.1.1/MP_AUTH_AES The TSF shall perform specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 /MP_MAC_3DES Cryptographic operation The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes that meet the following [standard]: Algo Key length (bits) Standard 3DES RMAC 112 [R32] /MP_MAC_AES Cryptographic operation The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes that meet the following [standard]: Algo Key length (bits) Standard AES 128, 192 and 256 [R35] /MP_AUTH_3DES Cryptographic operation The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes that meet the following [standard]: Algo Key length (bits) Standard Authentication (MSK) 3DES 112 [R32] /MP_AUTH_AES Cryptographic operation The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes that meet the following [standard]: Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - in accordance with a and cryptographic key sizes in accordance with a and cryptographic key sizes in accordance with a and cryptographic key sizes Standard [R32] in accordance with a and cryptographic key sizes T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ Cryptographic operation Card Manufacturer Authentication (MSK) FCS_COP.1/MP_SHA Cryptographic operation FCS_COP.1.1/MP_SHA The TSF shall perform specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following Cryptographic operation Hashing FDP_ACC.2/MP Complete access control FDP_ACC.2.1/MP The TSF shall enforce the objects and all operations among FDP_ACC.2.2/MP The TSF shall ensure that all operations between any subject controlled by the TSF and any object controlled by the TSF are covered by an access control SFP. Application Note This SFR enforces access control over code loading but not only. FDP_ACF.1/MP Security attribute based access control FDP_ACF.1.1/MP The TSF shall enforce the the following Prepersonalizer Authentication (AS_AUTH_MSK_STATUS) FDP_ACF.1.2/MP The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: AUTHENTICATE). IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Algo Key length (bits) Card Manufacturer Authentication (MSK) AES 128, 192 and 256 Cryptographic operation The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes that meet the following [standard]: Algo Key length (bits) Standard SHA256 None [R27] Complete access control The TSF shall enforce the Prepersonalization Access Control on and all operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP. The TSF shall ensure that all operations between any subject controlled by the TSF and any object controlled by the TSF are covered by an access control SFP. access control over all the operation performed in phase 5, including Security attribute based access control The TSF shall enforce the Prepersonalization Access Control Prepersonalizer Authentication (AS_AUTH_MSK_STATUS). The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: AS_AUTH_MSK_STATUS= Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - Standard [R35] in accordance with a and cryptographic key sizes on all subjects and all The TSF shall ensure that all operations between any subject controlled by the TSF all the operation performed in phase 5, including additional to objects based on The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among AS_AUTH_MSK_STATUS=TRUE (EXTERNAL T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FDP_ACF.1.3/MP The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: none. FDP_ACF.1.4/MP The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: none. Application Note This SFR enforces access control over but not only. FDP_ITC.1/MP Import of user data without security attributes FDP_ITC.1.1/MP The TSF shall enforce the data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE. FDP_ITC.1.2/MP The TSF shall ignor imported from outside the TOE. FDP_ITC.1.3/MP The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under the SFP from outside the TOE: none Application Note This SFR control import of data in phase 5, including This SFR ensures also the MSK diviersification, which is performs once, at first command, without any security requirements preliminary to this action. FDP_UCT.1/MP Basic data exchange confidentiality FDP_UCT.1.1/MP The TSF shall enforce the a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure Application note For the Additional code loading access This SFR control confidentiality of data IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the . The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following enforces access control over all the operation in phase 5, including additional Import of user data without security attributes The TSF shall enforce the Prepersonalization access control when importing user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE. The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under none. in phase 5, including the additional code but not only. This SFR ensures also the MSK diviersification, which is performs once, at first command, without any security requirements preliminary to this action. Basic data exchange confidentiality The TSF shall enforce the Prepersonalization access control to unauthorised disclosure. For the Additional code loading access control, the LSK_LOAD is used to cipher the data transmitted. control confidentiality of data import in phase 5, including the additional Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional code loading when importing user e any security attributes associated with the user data when The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under code but not only. This SFR ensures also the MSK diviersification, which is performs once, at first command, without any to receive user data in control, the LSK_LOAD is used to cipher the data transmitted. additional code but not only. T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FDP_UIT.1/MP Data exchange integrity FDP_UIT.1.1/MP The TSF shall en data in a manner protected from FDP_UIT.1.2/MP [Editorially refined] whether modification of some pieces of the application sent by the Prepersonalizer FIA_AFL.1/MP Authentication failure handling FIA_AFL.1.1/MP The TSF shall detect when authentication of 1. Prepersonalizer FIA_AFL.1.2/MP When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been the TSF shall forbid any authentication attempt as Personalizer FIA_UAU.1/MP Timing of authentication FIA_UAU.1.1/MP The TSF shall allow before the user is authenticated. FIA_UAU.1.2/MP The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of t FIA_UID.1/MP Timing of identification FIA_UID.1.1/MP The TSF shall allow before the user is identified. FIA_UID.1.2/MP The TSF shall require each user to be other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. FIA_UAU.4/MP_3DES Single FIA_UAU.4.1/MP_3DES The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related 1. Authentication Mechanisms based on IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Data exchange integrity The TSF shall enforce the Prepersonalization Access Control SFP data in a manner protected from modification errors /MP [Editorially refined] The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, of some pieces of the application sent by the Prepersonalizer Authentication failure handling The TSF shall detect when 3 unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been forbid any authentication attempt as Personalizer. Timing of authentication The TSF shall allow GET DATA, SELECT FILE on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated. The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing mediated actions on behalf of that user. Timing of identification The TSF shall allow GET DATA, SELECT FILE on behalf of the user to be performed The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any mediated actions on behalf of that user. Single-use authentication mechanisms The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related 1. Authentication Mechanisms based on 3DES Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - ccess Control SFP to receive user The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, of some pieces of the application sent by the Prepersonalizer has occurred unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met, on behalf of the user to be performed The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing on behalf of the user to be performed successfully identified before allowing any The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FIA_UAU.4/MP_AES Single FIA_UAU.4.1/MP_AES The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to 1. Authentication Mechanisms based on FIA_UAU.5/MP_3DES Multiple authentication mechanisms FIA_UAU.5.1/MP_3DES The TSF shall provide 1. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on to support user authentication. FIA_UAU.5.2/MP_3DES The TSF shall authenticate 1. The TOE accepts the authentication Authentication Mechanism with FIA_UAU.5/MP_AES Multiple authentication mechanisms FIA_UAU.5.1/MP_AES The TSF shall provide 1. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on AES to support user authentication. FIA_UAU.5.2/MP_AES The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the 1. The TOE accepts the authentication Authentication Mechanism with FMT_MTD.1/MP Management of TSF data FMT_MTD.1.1/MP The TSF shall phase 6 to the Prepersonalizer. FTP_ITC.1/MP Inter-TSF trusted channel FTP_ITC.1.1/MP The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure. IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Single-use authentication mechanisms The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to 1. Authentication Mechanisms based on AES Multiple authentication mechanisms The TSF shall provide 1. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on 3DES The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the authentication attempt as Personalization Agent with the Personalization Agent Key Multiple authentication mechanisms The TSF shall provide 1. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on AES The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the authentication attempt as Personalization Agent with Personalization Agent Key Management of TSF data The TSF shall restrict the ability to switch the TOE life cycle from phase 5 to TSF trusted channel The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure. Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to aimed identity according to the Personalization Agent by the Symmetric The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the Personalization Agent by the Symmetric TOE life cycle from phase 5 to The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure. T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FTP_ITC.1.2/MP [Editorially Refined] communication via the trusted channel. FTP_ITC.1.3/MP The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for: 1. Personalization Agent key storage 2. Life cycle transition from Prepersonalization to Personalization phase FMT_MTD.1/MP_INI_ENA Management of TSF data FMT_MTD.1.1/MP_INI_ENA The TSF shall Prepersonalization Data to the Prepersonalizer FMT_MTD.1/MP_INI_DIS FMT_MTD.1.1/MP_INI_DIS The TSF shall Initialization Data to the Personalization Agent FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_READ Management of TSF data FMT_MTD.1.1/MP_KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to identified roles]: TSF Data MSK Personalization Agent Keys FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_WRITE FMT_MTD.1.1/MP_KEY_WRITE identified roles]: TSF Data MSK Personalization Agent Keys IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Refined] The TSF shall permit the Prepersonalizer communication via the trusted channel. The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for: Personalization Agent key storage 2. Life cycle transition from Prepersonalization to Personalization phase INI_ENA Management of TSF data The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Initialization Data and the Prepersonalizer. INI_DIS Management of TSF data The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable read access for users the Personalization Agent. KEY_READ Management of TSF data The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the [data] Authorized Identified roles None None KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the [data] Authorized Identified roles IC manufacturer (created by the developer) None Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - Prepersonalizer to initiate The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for: Initialization Data and to disable read access for users to the [data] to [authorized [data] to [authorized IC manufacturer (created by the developer) T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FAU_SAS.1/MP Audit storage FAU_SAS.1.1/MP The TSF shall provide Identification Data in the audit records. FMT_SMF.1/MP Specification of Management Functions FMT_SMF.1.1/MP The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: 1. Initialization 2. Pre-personalization 3. Personalization FMT_SMR.1/MP Security roles FMT_SMR.1.1/MP The TSF shall maintain the roles 1. Manufacturer FMT_SMR.1.2/MP The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles. FPT_EMS.1/MP TOE Emanation FPT_EMS.1.1/MP The TOE shall not emit execution in excess of non useful informa 1. Prepersonalizer Key 2. Personalization Agent Key 3. MSK FPT_EMS.1.2/MP The TSF shall ensure interface smart card circuit contacts 1. Prepersonalizer Key 2. Personalization Agent Key 3. MSK 9.1.3 Active Authentication SFR IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Audit storage The TSF shall provide the Manufacturer with the capability to store in the audit records. Specification of Management Functions The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: Security roles The TSF shall maintain the roles The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles. TOE Emanation The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during command non useful information enabling access to The TSF shall ensure any unauthorized users are unable to use the following contacts to gain access to Active Authentication SFR Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - with the capability to store the IC The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: variations, timing variations during command are unable to use the following T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FCS_COP.1/AA_DSA Cryptographic operation FCS_COP.1.1/AA_DSA The TSF shall perform specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following Operation Algorithm Digital Signature Creation RSA signature (CRT or SFM) with SHA1, 224, 256, 384, 512 FCS_COP.1/AA_ECDSA Cryptographic operation FCS_COP.1.1/AA_ECDSA The TSF shall perform specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following Operation Algo Digital Signature Creation ECDSA with SHA1, 224, 256, 384, 512 FDP_DAU.1/AA Basic Data Authentication FDP_DAU.1.1/AA The TSF shall provide a capability to generate evidence that can be used as a guarantee of the validity of the TOE FDP_DAU.1.2/AA The TSF shall provide the indicated information. Refinement: Evidence generation and ability of verfying it, constitute the FDP_ITC.1/AA Import of user data without security attributes FDP_ITC.1.1/AA The TSF shall enforce the user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE. IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Cryptographic operation The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes that meet the following [standard]: Key length (bits) RSA signature (CRT or SFM) with SHA1, 224, 256, 384, 512 1024 to 4096 with a step of 256 bits Cryptographic operation The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes that meet the following [standard]: Key length (bits) ECDSA with SHA1, 224, 256, 384, 192 to 521 over prime field curves FDP_DAU.1/AA Basic Data Authentication The TSF shall provide a capability to generate evidence that can be used as a TOE itself. The TSF shall provide any users with the ability to verify evidence of the validity of Evidence generation and ability of verfying it, constitute the Active Authentication FDP_ITC.1/AA Import of user data without security attributes The TSF shall enforce the Active Authentication Access Control user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE. Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - in accordance with a and cryptographic key sizes Standard 4096 with a step [R25] in accordance with a and cryptographic key sizes Standard 192 to 521 over prime [R25] [R26] [R27] [R28] The TSF shall provide a capability to generate evidence that can be used as a with the ability to verify evidence of the validity of Active Authentication protocol. Control SFP when importing T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FDP_ITC.1.2/AA The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when imported from outside the TOE. FDP_ITC.1.3/AA The TSF shall enf the SFP from outside the TOE: none FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ Management of TSF data FMT_MTD.1.1/AA_KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to FPT_EMS.1/AA TOE Emanation FPT_EMS.1.1/AA The TOE shall not emit execution in excess of non useful information 1. Active Authentication: Private Key (AAK FPT_EMS.1.2/AA The TSF shall ensure interface smart card circuit contacts 1. Active Authentication: Private Key (AAK) FMT_MOF.1/AA Management of security functions behaviour FMT_MOF.1.1/AA The TSF shall restrict the ability to Authentication to Personalization Agent FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE Managem FMT_MTD.1.1/AA_KEY_WRITE The TSF shall restrict the ability to Agent. 9.1.4 Chip Authentication SFR IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under none. KEY_READ Management of TSF data The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the AAK to TOE Emanation The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during command non useful information enabling access to 1. Active Authentication: Private Key (AAK) The TSF shall ensure any unauthorized users are unable to use the following contacts to gain access to 1. Active Authentication: Private Key (AAK) FMT_MOF.1/AA Management of security functions behaviour The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable and enable the functions Personalization Agent. KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the AAK Chip Authentication SFR Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when orce the following rules when importing user data controlled under to none. variations, timing variations during command are unable to use the following the functions TSF Active AAK to Personalization T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FIA_API.1/CA Authentication Proof of Identity FIA_API.1.1/CA The TSF shall provide a identity of the TOE. FCS_CKM.1/CA_DH_SM_3DES FCS_CKM.1.1/CA_DH_SM_3DES specified cryptographic key generation algorithm specified cryptographic key sizes Cryptographic key generation algorithm Algorithm based on the Key Diffie protocol compliant to PKCS#3 FCS_CKM.1/CA_DH_SM_AES FCS_CKM.1.1/CA_DH_SM_AES The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm specified cryptographic key sizes Cryptographic key generation algorithm Algorithm based on the Key Diffie protocol compliant to PKCS#3 FCS_CKM.1/CA_ECDH_SM_3DES FCS_CKM.1.1/CA_ECDH_SM_3DES specified cryptographic key generation algorithm specified cryptographic key sizes Cryptographic key generation algorithm Algorithm based on ECDH key derivation protocol compliant to ISO 15946 IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 FIA_API.1/CA Authentication Proof of Identity The TSF shall provide a Chip Authentication protocol according to /CA_DH_SM_3DES Cryptographic key generation /CA_DH_SM_3DES The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard] Cryptographic key generation algorithm Key length (bits) Algorithm based on the Key Diffie-Hellman key derivation 112 /CA_DH_SM_AES Cryptographic key generation The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard] key generation algorithm Key length (bits) Algorithm based on the Key Diffie-Hellman key derivation 128, 192, 256 /CA_ECDH_SM_3DES Cryptographic key generation /CA_ECDH_SM_3DES The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard] key generation algorithm Key length (bits) Algorithm based on ECDH key derivation protocol compliant to 112 Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - protocol according to [R39] to prove the The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and [standard]: Key length (bits) Standards [R2] The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and [standard]: Key length (bits) Standards 128, 192, 256 [R2] The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and [standard]: Key length (bits) Standards [R2] T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FCS_CKM.1/CA_ECDH_SM_AES FCS_CKM.1.1/CA_ECDH_SM_AES specified cryptographic key generation algorithm specified cryptographic key sizes Cryptographic key generation algorithm Algorithm based on ECDH key derivation protocol compliant to ISO 15946 FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA_SM_3DES FCS_COP.1.1/CA_SHA_SM_3DES cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] meet the following [standard]: Cryptographic algorithm Key length (bits) SHA1 None FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA_SM_AES FCS_COP.1.1/CA_SHA_SM_AES cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] meet the following [standard]: Cryptographic algorithm Key length (bits) SHA1 and SHA256 None FCS_COP.1/CA_SYM_SM_3DES FCS_COP.1.1/CA_SYM_SM_3DES accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm key sizes [key length] that meet the following Cryptographic algorithm Key length IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 /CA_ECDH_SM_AES Cryptographic key generation /CA_ECDH_SM_AES The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard] key generation algorithm Key length (bits) Algorithm based on ECDH key derivation protocol compliant to 128, 192, 256 /CA_SHA_SM_3DES Cryptographic key generation /CA_SHA_SM_3DES The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes Key length (bits) Standards None [R27] /CA_SHA_SM_AES Cryptographic key generation The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes Key length (bits) Standards None [R27] /CA_SYM_SM_3DES Cryptographic key generation /CA_SYM_SM_3DES The TSF shall perform SM encryption and accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] that meet the following [standard]: Key length Standards Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and [standard]: Key length (bits) Standards 128, 192, 256 [R2] in accordance with a specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that in accordance with a specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that SM encryption and decryption in [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ (bits) 3DES CBC mode 112 FCS_COP.1/CA_SYM_SM_AES FCS_COP.1.1/CA_SYM_SM_AES with a specified cryptographic algorithm length] that meet the following [standard] Cryptographic algorithm Key length (bits) AES 128, 192 and 256 FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC_SM_3DES FCS_COP.1.1/CA_MAC_SM_3DES accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm key sizes [key length] that meet the following Cryptographic algorithm Key length (bits) 3DES Retail MAC 112 FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC_SM_AES FCS_COP.1.1/CA_MAC_SM_AES accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm key sizes [key length] that meet the following Cryptographic algorithm Key length (bits) AES CMAC 128, 192 and 256 FIA_UAU.1/EAC Timing of authentication FIA_UAU.1.1/EAC The TSF shall allow: IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 (bits) 112 [R27] /CA_SYM_SM_AES Cryptographic key generation The TSF shall perform SM encryption and decryption with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [standard]: Key length (bits) Standards 128, 192 and 256 [R27] /CA_MAC_SM_3DES Cryptographic key generation /CA_MAC_SM_3DES The TSF shall perform SM message authentication code accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] that meet the following [standard]: Key length (bits) Standards 112 [R39] /CA_MAC_SM_AES Cryptographic key generation /CA_MAC_SM_AES The TSF shall perform SM message authentication code accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] that meet the following [standard]: Key length (bits) Standards 128, 192 and 256 [R39] Timing of authentication The TSF shall allow: Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - decryption in accordance cryptographic key sizes [key authentication code in [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic SM message authentication code in [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 1. To establish the communication channel 2. To read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS 3. To identify themselves by selection of the authentication key 4. To carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol 5. To carry out the Terminal Authentication Protocol on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated. FIA_UAU.1.2/EAC The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. FIA_UAU.5/CA_3DES Multiple authentication mechanisms FIA_UAU.5.1/CA_3DES The TSF shall provide 1. Secure Messaging in MAC-ENC mode 2. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on 3DES to support user authentication. FIA_UAU.5.2/CA_3DES The TSF shall 1. After run of the Chip Authentication Protocol the TOE accepts only received commands with correct message authentication code sent by means of secure messaging with key agreed with the terminal by means of the Chip Authentication Mechanism FIA_UAU.5/CA_AES Multiple authentication mechanisms FIA_UAU.5.1/CA_AES The TSF shall provide 1. Secure Messaging in MAC-ENC mode 2. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on AES to support user authentication. FIA_UAU.5.2/CA_AES The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the 1. After run of the Chip Authentication Protocol the TOE accepts only received commands with correct message authentication code sent by terminal by means of the Chip Authentication Mechanism IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 1. To establish the communication channel Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS 3. To identify themselves by selection of the authentication key 4. To carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol 5. To carry out the Terminal Authentication Protocol of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated. The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing mediated actions on behalf of that user. FIA_UAU.5/CA_3DES Multiple authentication mechanisms The TSF shall provide ENC mode 2. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on 3DES The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the After run of the Chip Authentication Protocol the TOE accepts only received commands with correct message authentication code sent by means of secure messaging with key agreed with the y means of the Chip Authentication Mechanism Multiple authentication mechanisms The TSF shall provide ENC mode 2. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on AES The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the After run of the Chip Authentication Protocol the TOE accepts only received commands with correct message authentication code sent by means of secure messaging with key agreed with the terminal by means of the Chip Authentication Mechanism Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing aimed identity according to the After run of the Chip Authentication Protocol the TOE accepts only received commands with correct message authentication code sent by means of secure messaging with key agreed with the The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the After run of the Chip Authentication Protocol the TOE accepts only received commands with means of secure messaging with key agreed with the T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FIA_UAU.6/EAC Re-authenticating The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the co successful run of the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 shall be verified as being sent by the Inspection System. Application note 29: The Password Authenticated Connection Establishment and the Chip Authentication Protocol specified in [6] include secure messaging for all commands exchanged after successful authentication of the Inspection System. The TOE checks by secure messaging in MAC_ENC mode each command based on a corresponding MAC algorithm whether successfully authenticated terminal (see FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC for further details). The TOE does not execute any command with incorrect message authentication code. Therefore the TOE re authenticates the user for each received command and ac the previously authenticated user. FIA_UAU.6/CA Re-authenticating FIA_UAU.6.1/CA The TSF shall re the TOE after successful run of the CA shall be verified as being sent by the inspection system FIA_UID.1/EAC Timing of identification FIA_UID.1.1/EAC The TSF shall allow 1. To establish the communication channel 2. To read the Initialization Data if it is not 3. To carry out th Chip Authentication Protocol 4. To carry out the Terminal Authentication Protocol on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified. FIA_UID.1.2/EAC The TSF shall require other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. FPT_EMS.1/CA TOE Emanation FPT_EMS.1.1/CA The TOE shall not emit execution in excess of non useful information 1. Chip Authentication: Session Keys, Private Key (CAK) IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 authenticating – Re-authenticating of Terminal by the TOE authenticate the user under the conditions each command sent to the TOE after successful run of the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 shall be verified as being sent by the : The Password Authenticated Connection Establishment and the Chip tication Protocol specified in [6] include secure messaging for all commands exchanged after successful authentication of the Inspection System. The TOE checks by secure messaging in MAC_ENC mode each command based on a corresponding MAC algorithm whether it was sent by the successfully authenticated terminal (see FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC for further details). The TOE does not execute any command with incorrect message authentication code. Therefore the TOE re authenticates the user for each received command and accepts only those commands received from the previously authenticated user. authenticating The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each command sent to the CA shall be verified as being sent by the inspection system Timing of identification The TSF shall allow 1. To establish the communication channel 2. To read the Initialization Data if it is not disbled by TSF according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS 3. To carry out th Chip Authentication Protocol 4. To carry out the Terminal Authentication Protocol on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified. The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any mediated actions on behalf of that user. TOE Emanation The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during command non useful information enabling access to 1. Chip Authentication: Session Keys, Private Key (CAK) Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - authenticating of Terminal by the TOE each command sent to the TOE after successful run of the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 shall be verified as being sent by the : The Password Authenticated Connection Establishment and the Chip tication Protocol specified in [6] include secure messaging for all commands exchanged after successful authentication of the Inspection System. The TOE checks by secure messaging in MAC_ENC it was sent by the successfully authenticated terminal (see FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC for further details). The TOE does not execute any command with incorrect message authentication code. Therefore the TOE re- cepts only those commands received from each command sent to the CA shall be verified as being sent by the inspection system disbled by TSF according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS each user to be successfully identified before allowing any variations, timing variations during command T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FPT_EMS.1.2/CA The TSF shall ensure interface smart card circuit contacts 1. Active Authentication: Session Keys, Private Key (CAK) FPT_TST.1/CA TSF testing FPT_TST.1.1/CA The TSF shall run a suite of self tests TSF, at the conditions: - When performing the Chip Authentication FPT_TST.1.2/CA The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of TSF data. FPT_TST.1.3/CA The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of stored TSF executable code. FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_WRITE FMT_MTD.1.1/CA_KEY_WRITE The TSF shall restrict the ability to Agent. FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_READ FMT_MTD.1.1/CA_KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to 9.1.5 Terminal Authentication SFR FCS_COP.1/TA_SHA_RSA FCS_COP.1.1/TA_SHA_RSA The TSF shall cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] meet the following [standard]: Cryptographic algorithm IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 The TSF shall ensure any unauthorized users are unable to use the following contacts to gain access to 1. Active Authentication: Session Keys, Private Key (CAK) TSF testing The TSF shall run a suite of self tests to demonstrate the correct operation of performing the Chip Authentication The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of WRITE Management of TSF data The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the CAK KEY_READ Management of TSF data The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the CAK to Authentication SFR Cryptographic key generation The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes Key length (bits) Standards Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - are unable to use the following to demonstrate the correct operation of the The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of AK to Personalization to none. in accordance with a specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ SHA1, SHA256 and SHA 512 FCS_COP.1/TA_SHA_SM_ECC FCS_COP.1.1/TA_SHA_SM_ECC The TSF shall cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] meet the following [standard]: Cryptographic algorithm SHA1, SHA224, SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 FCS_COP.1/TA_SIG_VER_RSA FCS_COP.1.1/TA_SIG_VER_RSA with a specified cryptographic algorithm length] that meet the following [standard] Cryptographic algorithm Key length (bits) RSA coupled with SHA From 1024 to 4096, with a step of 256 FCS_COP.1/TA_SIG_VER_ECC FCS_COP.1.1/TA_SIG_VER_ECC The TSF shall with a specified cryptographic algorithm length] that meet the following [standard] Cryptographic algorithm Key length (bits) ECC coupled with SHA From 192 to 521 FIA_UAU.4/TA Single-use authentication mechanisms FIA_UAU.4.1/TA The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to 1. Terminal Authentication Protocol IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 None [R27] /TA_SHA_SM_ECC Cryptographic key generation The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes Key length (bits) Standards SHA1, SHA224, SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 None [R27] /TA_SIG_VER_RSA Cryptographic key generation The TSF shall perform digital signature verification with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [standard]: Key length (bits) Standards From 1024 to 4096, with a step of 256 [R39] /TA_SIG_VER_ECC Cryptographic key generation The TSF shall perform digital signature verification with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [standard]: Key length (bits) Standards From 192 to 521 [R39] use authentication mechanisms The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to Protocol Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - in accordance with a specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that Standards digital signature verification in accordance cryptographic key sizes [key Standards [R39] digital signature verification in accordance cryptographic key sizes [key Standards [R39] T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FMT_MTD.1/TA_CVCA_UPD FMT_MTD.1.1/TA_CVCA_UPD The TSF shall 1. Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key 2. Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate to Country Verifying Certification Authority. FMT_MTD.1/TA_DATE Management of TSF data FMT_MTD.1.1/TA_DATE The TSF shall 1. Country Verifying Certification Authority 2. Document Verifier 3. Domestic Extended Inspection System FPT_TST.1/TA TSF testing FPT_TST.1.1/TA The TSF shall run a suite of self tests TSF, at the conditions: - When using the CVCA Root key - When verifying a certificate with an extracted public key µ - When performing a Terminal authentication FPT_TST.1.2/TA The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of TSF data. FPT_TST.1.3/TA The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of stored TSF executable code. FMT_SMR.1/TA Security roles FMT_SMR.1.1/TA The TSF shall maintain the roles 1. Country Verifying Certification Authority 2. Document Verifier 3. Domestic Extended Inspection System 4. Foreign Extended Inspection System FMT_SMR.1.2/TA The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles. IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 TA_CVCA_UPD Management of TSF data The TSF shall restrict the ability to update the 1. Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key ing Certification Authority Certificate Country Verifying Certification Authority. Management of TSF data The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify the Current Date Verifying Certification Authority 3. Domestic Extended Inspection System The TSF shall run a suite of self tests to demonstrate the correct operation of When using the CVCA Root key When verifying a certificate with an extracted public key µ When performing a Terminal authentication The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of Security roles The TSF shall maintain the roles ation Authority Domestic Extended Inspection System Foreign Extended Inspection System The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles. Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - Current Date to to demonstrate the correct operation of the The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FMT_MTD.1/TA_CVCA_INI FMT_MTD.1.1/TA_CVCA_INI The TSF shall 1. Initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key 2. Initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate 3. Initial Current Date to the Personalization Agent 9.1.6 Extended Access Control FMT_MTD.3/EAC Secure TSF data FMT_MTD.3.1/EAC [Editiorally Refined] certificate chain are accepted for Control. Refinement: The Certificate chain is valid if and only if: 1- The digital signature of the Inspection System Certificate can be verified as correct with the public key of the Document Verifier Certificate and the expiration date of the Inspection System Certificate is not before the Current Date of the TOE 2- The digital signature of the Document Verifier Certificate can be verified as correct with the public key in the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority and the expiration date of the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority is not before the Current Date of the TOE and the expiration date of the Document Verifier Certificate is not before the Current Date of the TOE, 3- The digital signature of the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority can be verified as correct with the public key of the Country Verifying Certification Authority known to the TOE. The Inspection System Public Key contained in the Inspection System Certificate in a valid certificate chain is a secure value for the authentication reference data of the Extended Inspection System. The intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorizations contained in th secure value for Terminal Authorization of a successful authenticated Extended Inspection System. FIA_UAU.5/EAC Multiple authentication mechanisms FIA_UAU.5.1/EAC The TSF shall provide 1. Terminal Authentication Protocol IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 TA_CVCA_INI Management of TSF data The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the 1. Initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key 2. Initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate Extended Access Control SFR FMT_MTD.3/EAC Secure TSF data FMT_MTD.3.1/EAC [Editiorally Refined] The TSF shall ensure that only secure values of are accepted for TSF data of the Terminal Authentication Protocol and the Access The Certificate chain is valid if and only if: The digital signature of the Inspection System Certificate can be verified as correct with the public key of the nt Verifier Certificate and the expiration date of the Inspection System Certificate is not before the Current Date The digital signature of the Document Verifier Certificate can be verified as correct with the public key in the f the Country Verifying Certification Authority and the expiration date of the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority is not before the Current Date of the TOE and the expiration date of the Document the Current Date of the TOE, The digital signature of the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority can be verified as correct with the public key of the Country Verifying Certification Authority known to the TOE. tem Public Key contained in the Inspection System Certificate in a valid certificate chain is a secure value for the authentication reference data of the Extended Inspection System. The intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorizations contained in the certificates of a valid certificate chain is a secure value for Terminal Authorization of a successful authenticated Extended Inspection System. FIA_UAU.5/EAC Multiple authentication mechanisms The TSF shall provide 1. Terminal Authentication Protocol Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - The TSF shall ensure that only secure values of the TSF data of the Terminal Authentication Protocol and the Access The digital signature of the Inspection System Certificate can be verified as correct with the public key of the nt Verifier Certificate and the expiration date of the Inspection System Certificate is not before the Current Date The digital signature of the Document Verifier Certificate can be verified as correct with the public key in the f the Country Verifying Certification Authority and the expiration date of the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority is not before the Current Date of the TOE and the expiration date of the Document The digital signature of the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority can be verified as correct with tem Public Key contained in the Inspection System Certificate in a valid certificate chain is a secure e certificates of a valid certificate chain is a secure value for Terminal Authorization of a successful authenticated Extended Inspection System. T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 2. Secure messaging in MAC-ENC mode to support user authentication. FIA_UAU.5.2/EAC The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the 1. 1. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt by means of t Protocol only if the terminal uses the public key presented during the Chip Authentication Protocol and the secure messaging established by the Chip Authentication Mechanism FMT_LIM.1/EAC Limited capabiliti FMT_LIM.1.1/EAC The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow 1. Sensitive User Data (EF.DG7 and EF.DG FMT_LIM.2/EAC Limited availability FMT_LIM.2.1/EAC The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with "Limited capabi Deploying Test Features after TOE 1. Sensitive User Data (EF.DG 9.1.7 PACE SFR FCS_CKM.1/ECDH_PACE_3DES FCS_CKM.1.1/ECDH_PACE_3DES specified cryptographic key generation algorithm specified cryptographic key sizes Cryptographic key generation algorithm DH key derivation protocol compliant to IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 ENC mode The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the 1. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt by means of the Terminal Authentication Protocol only if the terminal uses the public key presented during the Chip Authentication Protocol and the secure messaging established by the Chip Authentication Mechanism FMT_LIM.1/EAC Limited capabilities The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow and EF.DG8) to be disclosed (not available for BA FMT_LIM.2/EAC Limited availability The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced TOE Delivery does not allow (EF.DG7 and EF.DG8) to be disclosed (not available for BA _3DES Cryptographic key generation _3DES The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] zes [key length] that meet the following [standard] Cryptographic key generation algorithm Key length (bits) DH key derivation protocol compliant to PKCS#3 3DES 2 keys Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the he Terminal Authentication Protocol only if the terminal uses the public key presented during the Chip Authentication Protocol The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced: ) to be disclosed (not available for BAP) The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in lities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced: ) to be disclosed (not available for BAP) The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and [standard]: Key length (bits) Standards [R2] T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FCS_CKM.1/ECDH_PACE_AES FCS_CKM.1.1/ECDH_PACE_AES specified cryptographic key generation algorithm specified cryptographic key sizes Cryptographic key generation algorithm DH key derivation protocol compliant to ISO 15946 FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE_3DES FCS_CKM.1.1/DH_PACE_3DES The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm specified cryptographic key sizes Cryptographic key generation algorithm DH key derivation protocol compliant to FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE_AES FCS_CKM.1.1/DH_PACE_AES The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm specified cryptographic key sizes Cryptographic key generation algorithm DH key derivation protocol compliant to ISO 15946 FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC_AES Cryptographic key generation FCS_COP.1.1/PACE_ENC_AES The TSF shall perform in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm key sizes [key length] that meet the following Cryptographic algorithm Key length (bits) AES in CBC mode 128, 192 and 256 IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 _AES Cryptographic key generation The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard] key generation algorithm Key length (bits) DH key derivation protocol compliant to ISO 15946 128, 192 & 256 _3DES Cryptographic key generation The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard] key generation algorithm Key length (bits) DH key derivation protocol compliant to PKCS#3 3DES 2 keys _AES Cryptographic key generation The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard] Cryptographic key generation algorithm Key length (bits) DH key derivation protocol compliant to ISO 15946 128, 192 & 256 FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC_AES Cryptographic key generation The TSF shall perform Secure Messaging – encryption and decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] that meet the following [standard]: Key length (bits) Standards 128, 192 and 256 [R35] Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and [standard]: Key length (bits) Standards [R2] The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and [standard]: Key length (bits) Standards [R2] The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and [standard]: Key length (bits) Standards [R2] encryption and decryption [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC_3DES Cryptographic key generation FCS_COP.1.1/PACE_ENC_3DES The TSF shall perform in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm key sizes [key length] that meet the following Cryptographic algorithm Key length (bits) 3DES in CBC mode 112 FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC_AES Cryptographic key generation FCS_COP.1.1/PACE_MAC_AES The TSF shall perform Code in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm cryptographic key sizes [key length] Cryptographic algorithm Key length (bits) CMAC AES 128, 192 and 256 FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC_3DES Cryptographic key generation FCS_COP.1.1/PACE_MAC_3DES Code in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm cryptographic key sizes [key length] Cryptographic algorithm Key length (bits) Retail MAC with 3DES 112 FDP_ACC.1/TRM Complete access control FDP_ACC.1.1/TRM The TSF shall enforce the User Data and data stored in EF.SOD of the logical travel document IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC_3DES Cryptographic key generation The TSF shall perform Secure Messaging – encryption and decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] that meet the following [standard]: Key length (bits) Standards 112 [R32] FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC_AES Cryptographic key generation The TSF shall perform Secure Messaging – Message Authentication in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] [key length] that meet the following [standard]: Key length (bits) Standards 128, 192 and 256 [R35] FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC_3DES Cryptographic key generation The TSF shall perform Secure Messaging – Message Authentication in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] [key length] that meet the following [standard]: Key length (bits) Standards 112 [R32] FDP_ACC.1/TRM Complete access control The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP on terminals gaining access to the User Data and data stored in EF.SOD of the logical travel document Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - encryption and decryption [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic Message Authentication [cryptographic algorithm] and Message Authentication [cryptographic algorithm] and terminals gaining access to the T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FDP_ACF.1/PACE_EAC Security attribute based access control FDP_ACF.1.1/PACE The TSF shall enforce the 1. Subjects: a. Terminal b. BIS-PACE c. Extended Inspection System 2. Objects: a. Data in EF.DG1to EF.DG6 b. Data in EF.DG7 of the logical c. Data in EF.DG8 of the logical d. All TOE intrinsic secret cryptographic keys stored in the travel document 3. Security attributes: a. PACE Authentication b. Terminal Authentication c. Authorization of the Terminal FDP_ACF.1.2/PACE The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an oper controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: from FDP.ACF.1.1/PACE according to [4] after a successful PACE authentication a required by FIA_UAU.1/PACE FDP_ACF.1.3/PACE The TSF shall explici following additional rules: none. FDP_ACF.1.4/PACE The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: 1. Any terminal being not authenticated as write, to modify, to use any User Data stored on the travel document 2. Terminals not using secure messaging are not allowed to read, to write, to modify, to use any data stored on the travel document 3. Any terminal being not successfully authenticated as Extended Inspection System with the Read access to DG7 (Fingerprint) granted by the relative certificate holder authorization encoding is not allowed to read the data objects 2 4. Any terminal being not successfully authenticated as Extended Inspection System with the Read access to DG8 (Iris) granted by the relative certificate holder authorization encoding is not allowed to read the data objects 2c) of FDP_ACF.1.1/ 5. Nobody is allowed to read the data objects 2d) of FDP_ACF.1.1/ IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Security attribute based access control The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to objects based on the following c. Extended Inspection System DG6 and EF.DG9 to EF.DG24, EF.SOD and EF.COM of the logical MRD of the logical MRD intrinsic secret cryptographic keys stored in the travel document b. Terminal Authentication c. Authorization of the Terminal The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an oper controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: A BIS-PACE is allowed to read data objects according to [4] after a successful PACE authentication a required by The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the . The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following 1. Any terminal being not authenticated as PACE authenticated BIS-PACE is not allowed to read, to write, to modify, to use any User Data stored on the travel document 2. Terminals not using secure messaging are not allowed to read, to write, to modify, to use any data stored on the travel document 3. Any terminal being not successfully authenticated as Extended Inspection System with the Read (Fingerprint) granted by the relative certificate holder authorization encoding is not allowed to read the data objects 2b) of FDP_ACF.1.1/PACE . Any terminal being not successfully authenticated as Extended Inspection System with the Read (Iris) granted by the relative certificate holder authorization encoding is not allowed ) of FDP_ACF.1.1/PACE is allowed to read the data objects 2d) of FDP_ACF.1.1/PACE Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - to objects based on the following 24, EF.SOD and EF.COM of the logical MRD intrinsic secret cryptographic keys stored in the travel document The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among PACE is allowed to read data objects according to [4] after a successful PACE authentication a required by tly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following PACE is not allowed to read, to 2. Terminals not using secure messaging are not allowed to read, to write, to modify, to use any 3. Any terminal being not successfully authenticated as Extended Inspection System with the Read (Fingerprint) granted by the relative certificate holder authorization encoding is not . Any terminal being not successfully authenticated as Extended Inspection System with the Read (Iris) granted by the relative certificate holder authorization encoding is not allowed T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 6. Terminals authenticated as CVCA or as DV are not allowed to read data in the EF.DG EF.DG8 FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection FDP_RIP.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the allocation of the ressource to and deallocation of the resource from following objects: 1. Session Keys (immediately after closing related communication session) 2. The ephemeral private key ephem FDP_UCT.1/TRM Basic data exchange confidentiality FDP_UCT.1.1/TRM The TSF shall enforce the user data in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure. FDP_UIT.1/TRM Data exchange integrity FDP_UIT.1.1/TRM The TSF shall enforce the user data in a manner protected from FDP_UIT.1.2/TRM The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether deletion, insertion and replay has occurred FIA_AFL.1/PACE Authentication failure handling FIA_AFL.1.1/PACE The TSF shall detect when range of acceptable values 0 to 255 consecutive to authentication attempts using the PACE password as shared password FIA_AFL.1.2/PACE [Editorially Refined] attempts has been met, the TSF shall challenge and sending of the TSF response during the PACE authentication attempts. IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 6. Terminals authenticated as CVCA or as DV are not allowed to read data in the EF.DG FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection ure that any previous information content of a resource is made allocation of the ressource to and deallocation of the resource from 1. Session Keys (immediately after closing related communication session) e ephemeral private key ephem-SKSIC- PACE (by having generated a DH shared secret) FDP_UCT.1/TRM Basic data exchange confidentiality - MRD The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to be able to transmit and receive user data in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure. FDP_UIT.1/TRM Data exchange integrity The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to be able to transmit and receive user data in a manner protected from modification, deletion, insertion and replay The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether has occurred FIA_AFL.1/PACE Authentication failure handling The TSF shall detect when an administrator configurable positive integer within range of acceptable values 0 to 255 consecutive unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related tion attempts using the PACE password as shared password [Editorially Refined] When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication , the TSF shall wait for an increasing time between receiving of the terminal enge and sending of the TSF response during the PACE authentication attempts. Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - 6. Terminals authenticated as CVCA or as DV are not allowed to read data in the EF.DG7 and ure that any previous information content of a resource is made allocation of the ressource to and deallocation of the resource from the PACE (by having generated a DH shared secret) transmit and receive transmit and receive modification, deletion, insertion and replay errors The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether modification, an administrator configurable positive integer within unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication wait for an increasing time between receiving of the terminal enge and sending of the TSF response during the PACE authentication attempts. T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FIA_UAU.1/PACE Timing of authentication FIA_UAU.1.1/PACE The TSF shall allow 1. To establish the communication channel 2. Carrying out the PACE Protocol 3. To read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS 4. To identify themselves by selection of the authentication key on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated. FIA_UAU.1.2/PACE The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. FIA_UAU.4/PACE Single-use authentication mechanisms FIA_UAU.4.1/PACE The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to 1. PACE Protocol according to [4] FIA_UAU.5/PACE Multiple authentication mechanisms FIA_UAU.5.1/PACE The TSF shall provide 1. PACE Protocol according to [4] 2. Passive Authentication according to [6] 3. Secure messaging in MAC-ENC mode according to [4] to support user authentication. FIA_UAU.5.2/PACE The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the rules: 1. Having successfully run the PACE protocol the TOE accepts only received commands with correct message authentication code sent by means of secure messaging with the key agreed with the terminal by means of the PACE protocol FIA_UAU.6/PACE Re-authenticating FIA_UAU.6.1/PACE The TSF shall re to the TOE aftter successful run of the PACE protocol shall be verified as being sent by the PACE terminal IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 FIA_UAU.1/PACE Timing of authentication The TSF shall allow 1. To establish the communication channel 2. Carrying out the PACE Protocol according to [4] 3. To read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS 4. To identify themselves by selection of the authentication key on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated. The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing mediated actions on behalf of that user. use authentication mechanisms all prevent reuse of authentication data related to 1. PACE Protocol according to [4] FIA_UAU.5/PACE Multiple authentication mechanisms The TSF shall provide 1. PACE Protocol according to [4] Authentication according to [6] ENC mode according to [4] The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the ACE protocol the TOE accepts only received commands with correct message authentication code sent by means of secure messaging with the key agreed with the terminal by means of the PACE protocol authenticating The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions to the TOE aftter successful run of the PACE protocol shall be verified as being sent by the PACE Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - 3. To read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing all prevent reuse of authentication data related to The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the following ACE protocol the TOE accepts only received commands with correct message authentication code sent by means of secure messaging with the key agreed with the authenticate the user under the conditions each command sent to the TOE aftter successful run of the PACE protocol shall be verified as being sent by the PACE T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FIA_UID.1/PACE Timing of identifi FIA_UID.1.1/PACE The TSF shall allow 1. To establish the communication channel 2. Carrying out the PACE Protocol according to [4] 3. To read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified. FIA_UID.1.2/PACE The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. FMT_MTD.1/PACE_KEY_READ Management of TSF data FMT_MTD.1.1/PACE_KEY_READ 1. PACE passwords to none. FMT_SMR.1/PACE Security roles FMT_SMR.1.1/PACE The TSF shall maintain the roles 1. Terminal 2. PACE authenticated BIS-PACE FMT_SMR.1.2/PACE The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles. FPT_EMS.1/PACE TOE Emanation FPT_EMS.1.1/PACE The TOE shall not emit execution in excess of non useful information 1. PACE: Session Keys (PACE-KMAC, PACE FPT_EMS.1.2/PACE The TSF shall ensure card circuit contacts to gain access to 1. PACE: Session Keys (PACE PACE IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 FIA_UID.1/PACE Timing of identification The TSF shall allow 1. To establish the communication channel 2. Carrying out the PACE Protocol according to [4] 3. To read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified. The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any mediated actions on behalf of that user. TD.1/PACE_KEY_READ Management of TSF data FMT_MTD.1.1/PACE_KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the FMT_SMR.1/PACE Security roles The TSF shall maintain the roles PACE The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles. FPT_EMS.1/PACE TOE Emanation The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during command non useful information enabling access to KMAC, PACE-KENC), Ephemeral Private Key ephem SK The TSF shall ensure any users are unable to use the following interface to gain access to 1. PACE: Session Keys (PACE-KMAC, PACE-KENC), Ephemeral Private Key ephem SK Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - 3. To read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any variations, timing variations during command KENC), Ephemeral Private Key ephem SKSIC-PACE are unable to use the following interface smart KENC), Ephemeral Private Key ephem SKSIC- T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FTP_ITC.1/PACE Inter-TSF trusted channel FTP_ITC.1.1/PACE The TSF shall provide a communication channel between trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure. FTP_ITC.1.2/PACE The TSF shall pe trusted channel. FTP_ITC.1.3/PACE The TSF shall exchange between the TOE and the Terminal FPT_TST.1/PACE TSF testing FPT_TST.1.1/PACE The TSF shall run a suite of self tests to demonstrate the correct operation of self tests at the conditions: - When performing a PACE authentication to demonstrate the correct operation of the FPT_TST.1.2/PACE The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of TSF data. FPT_TST.1.3/PACE The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of stored TSF executable code. FMT_MTD.1/PA Management of TSF data FMT_MTD.1.1/PA The TSF shall restrict the ability to Personalization Agent. 9.1.8 PACE CAM SFR FIA_UAU.1/PACE_CAM Timing of authentication FIA_UAU.1.1/PACE_CAM The TSF shall allow 1. Carrying out the PACE Protocol according to [4] IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 TSF trusted channel The TSF shall provide a communication channel between trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure. The TSF shall permit another trusted IT product to initiate communication via the The TSF shall enforce communication via the trusted channel for exchange between the TOE and the Terminal SF testing The TSF shall run a suite of self tests to demonstrate the correct operation of self performing a PACE authentication to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of FMT_MTD.1/PA Management of TSF data The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Document Security Objects (SOD) SFR FIA_UAU.1/PACE_CAM Timing of authentication The TSF shall allow 1. Carrying out the PACE Protocol according to [4] Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure. rmit another trusted IT product to initiate communication via the communication via the trusted channel for any data The TSF shall run a suite of self tests to demonstrate the correct operation of self The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of Document Security Objects (SOD) to T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated. FIA_UAU.1.2/PACE_CAM The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. FIA_UAU.4/PACE_CAM Single FIA_UAU.4.1/PACE_CAM The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to Aditionally to FIA_UAU.4/PACE 1. PACE CAM Protocol according to [4] FIA_UAU.5/PACE_CAM Multiple authentication mechanisms FIA_UAU.5.1/PACE_CAM The TSF shall provide 1. PACE CAM Protocol according to [4] to support user authentication. FIA_UAU.5.2/PACE_CAM The TSF following rules: The same rules from FIA_UAU.5.2/PACE applies, with the PACE_CAM protocol FIA_UAU.6/PACE_CAM Re FIA_UAU.6.1/PACE_CAM The TSF shall re sent to the TOE aftter successful run of the PACE CAM protocol shall be verified as being sent by the PACE terminal FIA_UID.1/PACE_CAM Timing of identifica FIA_UID.1.1/PACE_CAM The TSF shall allow 1. Carrying out the PACE CAM Protocol according to [4] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified. FIA_UID.1.2/PACE_CAM The TSF shall require each user any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated. The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before mediated actions on behalf of that user. FIA_UAU.4/PACE_CAM Single-use authentication mechanisms The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to CE CAM Protocol according to [4] FIA_UAU.5/PACE_CAM Multiple authentication mechanisms The TSF shall provide 1. PACE CAM Protocol according to [4] The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the The same rules from FIA_UAU.5.2/PACE applies, with the PACE_CAM protocol FIA_UAU.6/PACE_CAM Re-authenticating The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions sent to the TOE aftter successful run of the PACE CAM protocol shall be verified as being sent by FIA_UID.1/PACE_CAM Timing of identification The TSF shall allow additionally to FIA_UID.1/PACE: 1. Carrying out the PACE CAM Protocol according to [4] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified. The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing mediated actions on behalf of that user. Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the authenticate the user under the conditions each command sent to the TOE aftter successful run of the PACE CAM protocol shall be verified as being sent by to be successfully identified before allowing T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FMT_MTD.1/PACE_CAM_KEY_READ Management of TSF data FMT_MTD.1.1/PACE_CAM_KEY_READ 1. PACE CAM Private Key to none. FMT_MTD.1/PACE_CAM_KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data FMT_MTD.1.1/PACE_CAM_KEY_WRITE private key to Personalization Agent 9.2 Security Assurance Requirements The security assurance requirement level is IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 FMT_MTD.1/PACE_CAM_KEY_READ Management of TSF data FMT_MTD.1.1/PACE_CAM_KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the FMT_MTD.1/PACE_CAM_KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data FMT_MTD.1.1/PACE_CAM_KEY_WRITE The TSF shall restrict the ability to write Personalization Agent Security Assurance Requirements The security assurance requirement level is EAL5 augmented with ALC_DVS.2, and AVA.VAN.5 Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - the write the PACE CAM and AVA.VAN.5. T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 10 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFIC 10.1 TOE Summary Specification Access Control in reading This function controls access to read functions and enforces the security policy for data retrieval. Prior to any data retrieval, it authenticates the actor trying to access the data, and checks the access conditions are fulfilled as well as the life cycle state. It ensures that at any time, the following keys are never readable: - PACE keys - Chip Authentication keys - PACE CAM keys - Active Authentication private key - Personalization Agent keys - MSK and LSK - CVCA keys It controls access to the CPLC data as well: - It ensures the CPLC data can be read during the personalization phase - It ensures it can not be readable in free mode at the end of the personalization step Regarding the file structure: In the operational use: - The terminal can read user data EF.CVA, EF.COM only after - When the EAC was successfully performed, the terminal can only read the DG7 & DG8 provided the access rights are sufficient throught a valid secure channe In the personalization phase - The Personalization Agent by the TOE (using its authentication keys) It ensures as well that no other part of the Access Control in writing This function controls access to write functions (in EEPROM) and enforces the security policy for data writing. Prior to any data update, it authenticates the actor, and checks the access conditions fulfilled as well as the life cycle state. This security functionality ensures the application locks can only be written once in personalization phase to be set to “1”. It ensures as well the CPLC data can not be written anymore once the TOE is person is not possible to load an additional code personalization phase.. IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION TOE Summary Specification controls access to read functions and enforces the security policy for data retrieval. Prior to any data retrieval, it authenticates the actor trying to access the data, and checks the access conditions are fulfilled as well as the life cycle state. ures that at any time, the following keys are never readable: keys private key keys It controls access to the CPLC data as well: CPLC data can be read during the personalization phase It ensures it can not be readable in free mode at the end of the personalization step The terminal can read user data (except DG7 & DG8), the Docum EF.COM only after PACE authentication and through a valid secure channel When the EAC was successfully performed, the terminal can only read the DG7 & DG8 provided the access rights are sufficient throught a valid secure channe Personalization Agent can read all the data stored in the TOE after it is authenticated (using its authentication keys) It ensures as well that no other part of the memory can be accessed at anytime This function controls access to write functions (in EEPROM) and enforces the security policy for data writing. Prior to any data update, it authenticates the actor, and checks the access conditions fulfilled as well as the life cycle state. This security functionality ensures the application locks can only be written once in personalization It ensures as well the CPLC data can not be written anymore once the TOE is person is not possible to load an additional code or change the personalizer authentication keys in Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - controls access to read functions and enforces the security policy for data retrieval. Prior to any data retrieval, it authenticates the actor trying to access the data, and checks the access It ensures it can not be readable in free mode at the end of the personalization step , the Document Security Object, through a valid secure channel When the EAC was successfully performed, the terminal can only read the DG7 & DG8 provided the access rights are sufficient throught a valid secure channel can read all the data stored in the TOE after it is authenticated This function controls access to write functions (in EEPROM) and enforces the security policy for data writing. Prior to any data update, it authenticates the actor, and checks the access conditions are This security functionality ensures the application locks can only be written once in personalization It ensures as well the CPLC data can not be written anymore once the TOE is personalized and that it or change the personalizer authentication keys in T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ Regarding the file structure In the operational use: It is not possible to create any files (system or data files). Fur any system files. However - The application data is still accessed internally by the application for its own needs - The root CVCA key files and temporary key files are updated internally by the application according to the authentication mechanism described in In the personalization phase - The Personalization Agent can create and write through a valid secure channel all the data files it needs after it is authenticated by the TOE (using its authentication keys) Active Authentication This security functionality ensures the is activated by the personnalizer). EAC mechanism This security functionality ensures the EAC is cor - It handles the certificate verification - The management of the current date (update and control towards the expiration da incoming certificate) - The signature verification (in the certificate or in th It can only be performed once the TOE is personalized with the chip authentication keys & Root CVCA key(s) the Personnalization Agent loaded during the personalization p security functionalities ensures the authentication is performed as described in [R4]. This security functionalities ensures the session keys for secure messaging are destroyed at each successful Chip Authentication step. The TOE handles an error counter; after several failure in attempting to strongly authenticate the GIS (the error limit is reached). The TOE also implements countermeasures to protect the TOE; it takes more and more time for the TOE to reply to subsequent wrong GIS PACE mechanism This security functionality ensures the the TOE is personalized with the the correct calculation of the PACE session PACE_CAM mechanism This security functionality ensures the once the TOE is personalized with IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 It is not possible to create any files (system or data files). Furthermore, it is not possible to update application data is still accessed internally by the application for its own needs The root CVCA key files and temporary key files are updated internally by the application according to the authentication mechanism described in [R39] The Personalization Agent can create and write through a valid secure channel all the data files it needs after it is authenticated by the TOE (using its authentication keys) ity functionality ensures the Active Authentication is performed as described in ctivated by the personnalizer). This security functionality ensures the EAC is correctly performed. In particular: es the certificate verification he management of the current date (update and control towards the expiration da he signature verification (in the certificate or in the challenge/response mechanism) It can only be performed once the TOE is personalized with the chip authentication keys & Root CVCA key(s) the Personnalization Agent loaded during the personalization phase. Furthermore, this security functionalities ensures the authentication is performed as described in [R4]. This security functionalities ensures the session keys for secure messaging are destroyed at each successful Chip Authentication step. ndles an error counter; after several failure in attempting to strongly authenticate the GIS (the error limit is reached). The TOE also implements countermeasures to protect the TOE; it takes more and more time for the TOE to reply to subsequent wrong GIS authentication attempts. This security functionality ensures the PACE is correctly performed. It can only be performed once the TOE is personalized with the PACE password. Furthermore, this security functionalities ensures correct calculation of the PACE session keys. This security functionality ensures the PACE_CAM is correctly performed. It can only be performed s personalized with : Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - thermore, it is not possible to update application data is still accessed internally by the application for its own needs The root CVCA key files and temporary key files are updated internally by the application The Personalization Agent can create and write through a valid secure channel all the data files it needs after it is authenticated by the TOE (using its authentication keys) is performed as described in [R39]. (if it he management of the current date (update and control towards the expiration date of the e challenge/response mechanism) It can only be performed once the TOE is personalized with the chip authentication keys & Root CVCA hase. Furthermore, this security functionalities ensures the authentication is performed as described in [R4]. This security functionalities ensures the session keys for secure messaging are destroyed at each ndles an error counter; after several failure in attempting to strongly authenticate the GIS (the error limit is reached). The TOE also implements countermeasures to protect the TOE; it takes authentication attempts. It can only be performed once Furthermore, this security functionalities ensures It can only be performed T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ - the chip authentication mapping (CAM) keys the Personnalization Agent loaded during the personalization phase - the PACE password. Furthermore, this security functionalities ensures the correct calculation of the PACE keys. Personalization This security functionality ensures the TOE, when delivered to the Personnalization an authentication prior to any data exchange. This authentication is based on a symmetric Authentication mechanism based on a Triple DES or AES algorithm. Messaging described in the TSF Secure Messaging. Physical protection This security functionality protects the TOE against physical attacks. Prepersonalization This security functionality ensures the TOE, when delivered to the P demands an authentication prior to any data exchange. This authentication is based on a symmetric Authentication mechanism based on a Triple DES or AES algorithm. initializing the product and loading additional code if nee TSF can use a Secure Messaging described in the TSF Secure Messaging. Safe state management This security functionalities ensures th - an integrity error is detected by F.SELFTESTS - a tearing occurs (during a copy of data in EEPROM) This security functionality ensures that such a case card" or becomes mute. Secure Messaging This security functionality ensures the confidentiality, authenticity & integrity of the channel the TOE and the IFD are using to communicate. After a successful PACE authentication and successful Chip Authentication, a secure channel is established based on Triple DES algorithm, and after a successful Chip Authentication , a secure channel is (re)established based on Symetric algori This security functionality ensures: - No commands were inserted, modified nor deleted within the data flow - The data exchanged remain confidential IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 the chip authentication mapping (CAM) keys the Personnalization Agent loaded during the Furthermore, this security functionalities ensures the correct calculation of the PACE This security functionality ensures the TOE, when delivered to the Personnalization an authentication prior to any data exchange. This authentication is based on a symmetric Authentication mechanism based on a Triple DES or AES algorithm. This TSF can use a Secure Messaging described in the TSF Secure Messaging. This security functionality protects the TOE against physical attacks. This security functionality ensures the TOE, when delivered to the Prepersonnalization Agent, demands an authentication prior to any data exchange. This authentication is based on a symmetric Authentication mechanism based on a Triple DES or AES algorithm. This function is in charge of pre initializing the product and loading additional code if needed. This TSF is conformant with TSF can use a Secure Messaging described in the TSF Secure Messaging. This security functionalities ensures that the TOE gets back to a secure state when an integrity error is detected by F.SELFTESTS a tearing occurs (during a copy of data in EEPROM) This security functionality ensures that such a case occurs, the TOE is either switched in the state "kill This security functionality ensures the confidentiality, authenticity & integrity of the channel the TOE communicate. After a successful PACE authentication and successful Chip Authentication, a secure channel is established based on Triple DES algorithm, and after a successful Chip Authentication , a secure channel is (re)established based on Symetric algorithms (Triple DES, AES128, 192 or 256) This security functionality ensures: No commands were inserted, modified nor deleted within the data flow The data exchanged remain confidential Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - the chip authentication mapping (CAM) keys the Personnalization Agent loaded during the Furthermore, this security functionalities ensures the correct calculation of the PACE_CAM session This security functionality ensures the TOE, when delivered to the Personnalization Agent, demands an authentication prior to any data exchange. This authentication is based on a symmetric This TSF can use a Secure ersonnalization Agent, demands an authentication prior to any data exchange. This authentication is based on a symmetric This function is in charge of pre- This TSF is conformant with [R45]. This k to a secure state when occurs, the TOE is either switched in the state "kill This security functionality ensures the confidentiality, authenticity & integrity of the channel the TOE After a successful PACE authentication and successful Chip Authentication, a secure channel is established based on Triple DES algorithm, and after a successful Chip Authentication , a secure thms (Triple DES, AES128, 192 or 256) T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ - The issuer of the incoming commands and the destinatory of the outgoing d that was authenticated (through PACE or EAC) If an error occurs in the secure messaging layer, the session keys are destroyed. This Secure Messaging can be combined with the Active Authentication. This TSF can provide a GP Secure Messaging ( Personalization. Self tests The TOE performs self tests to verify the integrity - Before the TSF data usage - The additional code integrity - The integrity of keys and sensitive data is ensured IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 The issuer of the incoming commands and the destinatory of the outgoing d that was authenticated (through PACE or EAC) If an error occurs in the secure messaging layer, the session keys are destroyed. This Secure Messaging can be combined with the Active Authentication. This TSF can provide a GP Secure Messaging (SCP02 or SCP03) for the Prepersonalization or to verify the integrity on the TSF data: usage integrity is checked at each POWER ON of the card The integrity of keys and sensitive data is ensured Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - The issuer of the incoming commands and the destinatory of the outgoing data is the one SCP02 or SCP03) for the Prepersonalization or T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 11 RATIONALES Threats Security Objectives T.Read_Sensitive_Data OT.Sens_Data_Conf T.Counterfeit OT.Chip_Auth_Proof OT.Data_Int_AA T.Skimming OT.Data_In T.Eavesdropping OT.Data_ T.Tracing OT.Data_In T.Abuse-Func OT.Prot_Abuse T.Information_Leakage OT.Prot_Inf_Leak T.Phys-Tamper OT.Prot_Phys T.Forgery OT.AC_Pers Tamper, OE.Exam_MRD T.Malfunction OT.Prot_Malfunction T.Unauthorized_Load OT.Secure _Load_ACode T.Bad_Activation OT.Secure _AC_Activation T.TOE_Identification_Forgery OT.TOE_Identification Table 12- Threats and Security Objectives OSP Security Objectives P.Sensitive_Data OT.Sens_Data_Conf P.Personalization OE.Personalization, P.Pre_operational OT.Identification, OT.AC_Pers P.Card_PKI OE.Passive_Auth_Sign P.Trustworthy_PKI OE.Passive_Auth_Sign P.Manufact OT.Identification P.Terminal OE.Exam_MRD, OE P.Activ_Auth OT.AA_Proof Table 13 - OSPs and Security Objectives Assumptions OE A.Insp_Sys OE.Exam_MRD, OE.Prot_Logical_ A.Auth_PKI OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data A.Passive_Auth OE.Passive_Auth_S A.Insp_Sys_AA OE.Exam_MRD_AA Table 14 - Assumptions and OE The other rationales are available in the complete ST IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Security Objectives OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data, OE.Ext_Insp_Systems OT.Chip_Auth_Proof, OE.Auth_Key_MRD, OE.Exam_MRD, OT.AA_Proof, OT.Data_Int_AA, OE.Activ_Auth_Verif OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Auth, OT.Data_Conf, OT.MRD_Holder OT.Data_Conf OT.Data_Int, OE.MRD_Holder OT.Prot_Abuse-Func, OE.Personalization OT.Prot_Inf_Leak OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper OT.AC_Pers, OE.Personalization, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Auth, OT.Prot_Phys , OT.Prot_Abuse-Func, OE.Terminal, OE.Pass_Auth_Sign, Exam_MRD, OE.Exam_MRD_AA OT.Prot_Malfunction OT.Secure _Load_ACode OT.Secure _AC_Activation OT.TOE_Identification Threats and Security Objectives – coverage Objectives OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data, OE.Ext_Insp_Systems , OT.AC_Pers, OT.Identification OT.AC_Pers, OE.Personalization, OE.Legislative_Compliance Passive_Auth_Sign Passive_Auth_Sign E.Terminal OSPs and Security Objectives – Coverage OE.Prot_Logical_MRD OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data, OE.Ext_Insp_Systems Auth_Sign, OE.Exam_MRD _AA, OE.Prot_Logical_MRD_AA Assumptions and OE – Coverage rationales are available in the complete ST. Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - , OT.Prot_Phys- T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 12 REFERENCES MRTD specifications [R1] Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, PKI for Documents Offering ICC Read published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation Organization [R2] ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, part 1 Passports, Sixth Edition, 2006, International Civil Aviation Organization [R3] ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, part 3 Travel Documents, Specifications for electronically enabled offical travel docume biometric identification capabilities (including supplement), ICAO doc 93003, 2008 [R4] Development of a logical data structure technologies Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, Development of a Logical Data Structure 1.7, published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation Organization, LDS 1.7, 2004 [R5] Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine readable travel Access control (EAC) [R6] Annex to Section III Security Standards for Machine Readable Travel Documents Excerpts from ICAO Doc 9303, Part 1 IDL specifications [R7] Information Technology 1:Physical characteristics and basic data set, ISO/IEC 18013 [R8] Information Technology 2: Machine-readable te [R9] Information Technology 3: Access control, authentication and integrity validation, ISO/IEC 18013 Protection Profiles [R10] Smartcard IC Platform Protection [R11] Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”, Basic Access control PP-0055 v1.10 25th march 2009 [R12] Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”, Extended Access control BSI-PP-0056 v1.10 25 [R13] Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control with PACE (EAC PP) [R14] MRTD with PACE – PP [R15] E-passport: adaptation and interpretation of e SGDN/DCSSI/SDR, ref. 10.0.1, February 2007 [R16] Embedded Software for Smart Security Devices, Basic and Extended Configurations, ANSSi-CC-PP-2009/02, 1/12/2009 IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, PKI for Machine Readable Travel Documents Offering ICC Read-Only Access, Version - 1.1, Date published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation Organization ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, part 1 – Passports, Sixth Edition, 2006, International Civil Aviation Organization ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, part 3 – Machine Readable Offical Travel Documents, Specifications for electronically enabled offical travel docume biometric identification capabilities (including supplement), ICAO doc 93003, 2008 Development of a logical data structure – LDS for optional capacity expansion technologies Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, Development of a cal Data Structure – LDS, For Optional Capacity Expansion Technologies, Revision 1.7, published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation Organization, LDS 1.7, 2004-05-18 Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine readable travel documents Access control (EAC) – TR03110 – v1.11 Annex to Section III Security Standards for Machine Readable Travel Documents Excerpts from ICAO Doc 9303, Part 1 - Machine Readable Passports, Fifth Edition n Technology - Personal Identification — ISO Compliant Driving Licence 1:Physical characteristics and basic data set, ISO/IEC 18013-1:2005 Information Technology - Personal Identification — ISO Compliant Driving Licence readable technologies, ISO/IEC 18013-2:2008 Information Technology - Personal Identification — ISO Compliant Driving Licence 3: Access control, authentication and integrity validation, ISO/IEC 18013 Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile v 1.0 - BSI-PP-0035 15/06/2007 Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”, Basic Access control march 2009 Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”, Extended Access control 0 25th march 2009 Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control with PACE (EAC PP) – BSI-PP-0056 V2 – 2012 PP-0068v2 passport: adaptation and interpretation of e-passport Protection Profiles, SI/SDR, ref. 10.0.1, February 2007 Embedded Software for Smart Security Devices, Basic and Extended Configurations, 2009/02, 1/12/2009 Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - Machine Readable Travel - October 01, 2004, published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation Organization – Machine Readable Passports, Sixth Edition, 2006, International Civil Aviation Organization Machine Readable Offical Travel Documents, Specifications for electronically enabled offical travel documents with biometric identification capabilities (including supplement), ICAO doc 93003, 2008 LDS for optional capacity expansion technologies Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, Development of a LDS, For Optional Capacity Expansion Technologies, Revision – 1.7, published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation documents – Extended Annex to Section III Security Standards for Machine Readable Travel Documents Excerpts Machine Readable Passports, Fifth Edition – 2003 ISO Compliant Driving Licence — Part ISO Compliant Driving Licence — Part ISO Compliant Driving Licence — Part 3: Access control, authentication and integrity validation, ISO/IEC 18013-3:2009 0035 15/06/2007 Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”, Basic Access control – BSI- Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”, Extended Access control – Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control passport Protection Profiles, Embedded Software for Smart Security Devices, Basic and Extended Configurations, T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ [R17] Technical Report, Supplemental Access Control for Machine Readable Travel Documents – version v1.01 Chips References [R18] Certification report Controller P60x144/080 [R19] Certification report Controller P60x080/0 Standards [R20] ISO/IEC 7816-4:2013 [R21] Technical Guideline: Elliptic Curve Cryptography according to 2006 [R22] ISO/IEC 15946-1. Information techniques based on elliptic curves [R23] ISO/IEC 15946-2. Information technology techniques based on elliptic curves [R24] ISO/IEC 15946: Information technology techniques based on elliptic curves [R25] ISO/IEC 9796-2:2002 schemes giving messag [R26] PKCS #3: Diffie-Hellman Key Version 1.4 Revised November 1, 1993 [R27] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180 Change Notice to include SHA of Standards and Technology, 2002 August 1 [R28] AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARD X9.62 Financial Services Industry (rDSA), 9 septembre 1998 [R29] Jakob Jonsson and Burt Kaliski. Public cryptography specifications version 2.1. RFC 3447, 2003 [R30] RSA Laboratories. PKCS#1 v2.1: RSA cryptography standard. RSA Laboratories Technical Note, 2002 [R31] ANSI X9.31 - Digital Signat Financial Services Industry (rDSA), 1998. [R32] FIPS 46-3 Data Encryption Standard (DES) [R33] ISO/IEC 9797-1:1999 "Codes d'authentification de message (MAC) Partie 1: Mécanismes utilisant un cryptogramme bloc" [R34] NIST SP 800-90 – Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators (Revised) [R35] FIPS 197 – Advance Encryption Standard (AES) [R36] ISO/IEC 11770-2. Information Technology part 2: Mechanisms using symmetric techniques, 1996 Misc IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Technical Report, Supplemental Access Control for Machine Readable Travel Documents Certification report - BSI-DSZ-CC-0845-V2-2013-MA-02 - NXP Secure Smart Card 144/080PVA/PVA(Y/B) with IC dedicated software FW5.0 Certification report - BSI-DSZ-CC-0837-v2-2014 - NXP Secure Smart Card Controller Controller P60x080/052/040PVC(Y/Z/A)/PVG with IC Dedicated Software :2013 – Organization, security and commands for interchange Technical Guideline: Elliptic Curve Cryptography according to ISO/IEC 1. Information technology – Security techniques techniques based on elliptic curves – Part 1: General, 2002 2. Information technology – Security techniques techniques based on elliptic curves – Part 2: Digital signatures, 2002 ISO/IEC 15946: Information technology — Security techniques techniques based on elliptic curves — Part 3: Key establishment, 2002 2002 - Information technology - Security techniques schemes giving message recovery - Part 2: Mechanisms using a hash Hellman Key-Agreement Standard, An RSA Laboratories Technical Note, Version 1.4 Revised November 1, 1993 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-2 Secure Hash Standard Change Notice to include SHA-224), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2002 August 1 AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARD X9.62-1998: Public Key Cryptography For The Financial Services Industry (rDSA), 9 septembre 1998 b Jonsson and Burt Kaliski. Public-key cryptography standards (PKCS) #1: RSA cryptography specifications version 2.1. RFC 3447, 2003 RSA Laboratories. PKCS#1 v2.1: RSA cryptography standard. RSA Laboratories Technical Digital Signatures Using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry (rDSA), 1998. 3 Data Encryption Standard (DES) 1:1999 "Codes d'authentification de message (MAC) Partie 1: Mécanismes utilisant un cryptogramme bloc" Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators (Revised) Advance Encryption Standard (AES) 2. Information Technology – Security techniques – s using symmetric techniques, 1996 Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - Technical Report, Supplemental Access Control for Machine Readable Travel Documents NXP Secure Smart Card PVA/PVA(Y/B) with IC dedicated software FW5.0 NXP Secure Smart Card Controller 52/040PVC(Y/Z/A)/PVG with IC Dedicated Software Organization, security and commands for interchange ISO/IEC 15946.TR-ECC, BSI Security techniques – Cryptographic Security techniques – Cryptographic Security techniques — Cryptographic Part 3: Key establishment, 2002 Security techniques - Digital signature Part 2: Mechanisms using a hash-function Agreement Standard, An RSA Laboratories Technical Note, 2 Secure Hash Standard (+ 224), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National Institute 1998: Public Key Cryptography For The key cryptography standards (PKCS) #1: RSA RSA Laboratories. PKCS#1 v2.1: RSA cryptography standard. RSA Laboratories Technical ures Using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the 1:1999 "Codes d'authentification de message (MAC) Partie 1: Mécanismes Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic – Key management – T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ [R37] Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema, AIS31: Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 1, 25.09.2001, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Inform [R38] NOTE-10 - Interpretation with e [R39] Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents part 1 Technical Guideline TR [R40] Advanced Security Mechanisms for Technical Guideline TR [R41] Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents part 3 Technical Guideline TR CC [R42] Common Criteria for general model, CCMB [R43] Common Criteria for Information Technology security Evaluation Part 2: Security Functional Components, CCMB 2012 [R44] Common Criteria for Information Technology security Evaluation Part 3: Security Assurance Components, CCMB 2012 [R45] ANSSI-CC note 6 – v0.91 IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema, AIS31: Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 1, 25.09.2001, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik Interpretation with e-passport PP_courtesy translation-draft v0.1 Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents part 1 Technical Guideline TR-03110-1 – version 2.10 March 2012 Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents part 2 Technical Guideline TR-03110-2 – version 2.10 March 2012 Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents part 3 Technical Guideline TR-03110-3 – version 2.10 March 2012 Common Criteria for Information Technology security Evaluation Part 1: Introduction and general model, CCMB-2012-09-001, version 3.1 Revision 4 Final, September 2012 Common Criteria for Information Technology security Evaluation Part 2: Security Functional Components, CCMB-2012-09-002, version 3.1 Revision 4 Final, September Common Criteria for Information Technology security Evaluation Part 3: Security Assurance Components, CCMB-2012-09-003, version 3.1 Revision 4 Final, September v0.91 Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema, AIS31: Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 1, draft v0.1 Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents part 1 – Machine Readable Travel Documents part 2 – Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents part 3 – Information Technology security Evaluation Part 1: Introduction and 001, version 3.1 Revision 4 Final, September 2012 Common Criteria for Information Technology security Evaluation Part 2: Security 002, version 3.1 Revision 4 Final, September Common Criteria for Information Technology security Evaluation Part 3: Security 003, version 3.1 Revision 4 Final, September T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 13 ACRONYMS AA Active Authentication BAC Basic Access Control CC Common Criteria Version 3.1 revision CPLC Card personalization life cycle DF Dedicated File DFA Differential Fault Analysis DG Data Group EAL Evaluation Assurance Level EF Elementary File EFID File Identifier DES Digital encryption standard DH Diffie Hellmann I/0 Input/Output IC Integrated Circuit ICAO International Civil Aviation organization ICC Integrated Circuit Card IFD Interface device LDS Logical Data structure MF Master File MRTD Machine readable Travel Document MRZ Machine readable Zone MSK Manufacturer Secret Key OCR Optical Character Recognition OS Operating System PKI Public Key Infrastructure PP Protection Profile SFI Short File identifier SHA Secure hashing Algorithm SOD Security object Data TOE Target of Evaluation TSF TOE Security function IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Active Authentication Basic Access Control Common Criteria Version 3.1 revision 4 Card personalization life cycle Differential Fault Analysis Evaluation Assurance Level Digital encryption standard International Civil Aviation organization Integrated Circuit Card Logical Data structure Machine readable Travel Document Machine readable Zone Manufacturer Secret Key Optical Character Recognition Public Key Infrastructure Algorithm Security object Data Target of Evaluation TOE Security function Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ INDEX A A.BAC-Keys .................................................... A.Insp_Sys...................................................... A.Insp_Sys_AA................................ A.Insp_Sys_CA ................................ A.MRTD_Delivery ................................ A.MRTD_Manufact................................ A.Pers_Agent................................ Access__Control__in__reading..................... Access__Control__in__writing...................... Active__Authentication................................ Attacker......................................................... Authenticity__of__the__MRTD's__chip B BAC__mechanism................................ F FAU_SAS.1/MP................................ FAU_STG.2/MP_Add_code ........................... FCS_CKM.1/BAC ................................ FCS_CKM.1/CA_DH_SM_3DES...................... FCS_CKM.1/CA_DH_SM_AES ........................ FCS_CKM.1/CA_ECDH_SM_3DES FCS_CKM.1/CA_ECDH_SM_AES .................... FCS_CKM.1/MP ................................ FCS_CKM.1/MP_Add_code........................... FCS_CKM.4/Global ................................ FCS_COP.1/AA_DSA ................................ FCS_COP.1/AA_ECDSA ................................ FCS_COP.1/BAC_AUTH................................ FCS_COP.1/BAC_ENC ................................ FCS_COP.1/BAC_MAC ................................ FCS_COP.1/BAC_SHA ................................ FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC_SM_3DES.................... FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC_SM_AES ...................... FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA_SM_3DES ..................... IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 ....................40 ......................39 ...............................................40 ...............................................40 ..........................................39 ........................................39 .................................................39 .....................71 ......................71 .................................71 .........................34 Authenticity__of__the__MRTD's__chip.......35 ..........................................71 ..............................................59 ...........................52 ............................................61 ......................66 ........................66 FCS_CKM.1/CA_ECDH_SM_3DES..................66 ....................67 .............................................54 ...........................52 ........................................50 ......................................60 ..................................60 ..................................62 ....................................62 ...................................62 ....................................62 ....................68 ......................68 .....................67 FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA_SM_AES FCS_COP.1/CA_SYM_SM_3DES FCS_COP.1/CA_SYM_SM_AES FCS_COP.1/MP_AUTH_3DES FCS_COP.1/MP_AUTH_AES FCS_COP.1/MP_ENC_3DES FCS_COP.1/MP_Enc_Add_code FCS_COP.1/MP_ENC_AES FCS_COP.1/MP_MAC_3DES FCS_COP.1/MP_MAC_Add_code FCS_COP.1/MP_MAC_AES FCS_COP.1/MP_SHA................................ FCS_RND.1/Global ................................ FDP_ACC.1/BAC................................ FDP_ACC.2/MP ................................ FDP_ACF.1/BAC ................................ FDP_ACF.2/MP................................ FDP_DAU.1/AA ................................ FDP_ITC.1/AA................................ FDP_ITC.1/CA................................ FDP_ITC.1/MP................................ FDP_UCT.1/BAC................................ FDP_UCT.1/MP................................ FDP_UIT.1/BAC................................ FDP_UIT.1/CA ................................ FDP_UIT.1/MP ................................ FDP_UIT.1/MP_Add_code FIA_AFL.1/BAC................................ FIA_AFL.1/MP ................................ FIA_API.1/CA................................ FIA_UAU.1/BAC ................................ FIA_UAU.1/CA................................ FIA_UAU.1/MP................................ FIA_UAU.4/BAC ................................ FIA_UAU.4/MP_3DES ................................ FIA_UAU.4/MP_AES ................................ FIA_UAU.5/BAC ................................ FIA_UAU.5/CA_3DES ................................ FIA_UAU.5/MP_3DES ................................ FIA_UAU.5/MP_AES ............................... Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - 92700 FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA_SM_AES....................... 67 FCS_COP.1/CA_SYM_SM_3DES.................... 67 FCS_COP.1/CA_SYM_SM_AES...................... 67 FCS_COP.1/MP_AUTH_3DES........................ 55 FCS_COP.1/MP_AUTH_AES .......................... 55 _3DES........................... 54 FCS_COP.1/MP_Enc_Add_code ................... 52 FCS_COP.1/MP_ENC_AES............................. 54 FCS_COP.1/MP_MAC_3DES ......................... 55 FCS_COP.1/MP_MAC_Add_code ................. 52 FCS_COP.1/MP_MAC_AES............................ 55 ..................................... 56 ........................................ 50 ............................................ 64 ............................................. 56 ............................................ 64 .............................................. 56 ............................................. 60 ................................................ 61 ................................................ 68 ............................................... 56 ...................................... 62, 70 ............................................. 57 ............................................. 63 ............................................... 70 .............................................. 57 FDP_UIT.1/MP_Add_code............................ 53 .............................................. 65 ............................................... 57 ................................................. 66 ............................................ 65 ............................................... 68 .............................................. 57 ............................................ 65 ................................... 58 ..................................... 58 ............................................ 65 .................................... 68 ................................... 58 ............................... 58, 69 T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FIA_UAU.6/BAC................................ FIA_UAU.6/CA ................................ FIA_UID.1/BAC................................ FIA_UID.1/CA................................ FIA_UID.1/MP................................ FMT_LIM.1/BAC ................................ FMT_LIM.1/Global................................ FMT_LIM.2/BAC ................................ FMT_LIM.2/Global................................ FMT_MOF.1/AA................................ FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ.......................... FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE ........................ FMT_MTD.1/BAC_KEY_READ........................ FMT_MTD.1/BAC_KEY_WRITE ...................... FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_READ.......................... FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_WRITE ........................ FMT_MTD.1/MP................................ FMT_MTD.1/MP_Add_code ......................... FMT_MTD.1/MP_INI_DIS.............................. FMT_MTD.1/MP_INI_ENA ............................ FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_READ......................... FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_READ_Add_code FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_WRITE ....................... FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_WRITE_Add_code FMT_SMF.1/MP................................ FMT_SMR.1/BAC................................ FMT_SMR.1/MP ................................ FMT_SMR.1/MP_Add_code.......................... FPT_EMS.1/AA................................ FPT_EMS.1/CA................................ FPT_EMS.1/Global................................ FPT_EMS.1/MP................................ FPT_EMS.1/MP_Add_code ........................... FPT_FLS.1/Global................................ FPT_PHP.3/Global ................................ FPT_TST.1/BAC................................ FPT_TST.1/Global ................................ FTP_ITC.1/MP................................ FTP_ITC.1/MP_Add_code .......................... FTP_ITC.1/PP................................ IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 .............................................65 ...............................................69 ...............................................65 .................................................69 ................................................57 ............................................63 .........................................50 ............................................63 .........................................50 .............................................61 ..........................61 ........................61 ........................63 ......................63 ..........................70 ........................70 ............................................58 .........................53 ..............................59 ............................59 .........................59 FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_READ_Add_code.......53 .......................59 FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_WRITE_Add_code.....53 .............................................59 ...........................................64 ............................................59 ..........................53 ...............................................61 ...............................................69 .........................................51 ..............................................60 ...........................53 ...........................................51 .........................................51 ..............................................63 ....................................51, 69 ..............................................58 ..........................54 ...............................................70 IC_developer................................ Inspection_System................................ Logical__MRTD__data Manufacturer................................ MRTD_Holder ................................ OE.Auth_Key_MRTD................................ OE.BAC-Keys ................................ OE.Exam_MRTD........................... OE.MRTD___Delivery ................................ OE.MRTD_Manufact................................ OE.Pass_Auth_Sign................................ OE.Passive_Auth_Verif OE.Personalization................................ OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD OT.AA_Proof................................ OT.AC_Pers................................ OT.CA_Proof ................................ OT.Data_Conf ................................ OT.Data_Int................................ OT.Data_Int_AA................................ OT.Data_Int_CA................................ OT.Identification................................ OT.Prot_Abuse-Func................................ OT.Prot_Inf_Leak................................ OT.Prot_Malfunction................................ OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper OT.Secure_AC_Activation OT.Secure_Load_ACode OT.TOE_Identification P.Activ_Auth ................................ P.Chip_Auth................................ Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - 92700 I ................................................. 34 ........................................ 33 L .................................. 34 M ................................................ 33 ............................................... 34 O ..................................... 45 ................................................. 44 ...........................31, 44, 45, 46 ................................... 43 ..................................... 43 ....................................... 44 OE.Passive_Auth_Verif ................................. 44 ........................................ 44 OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD................................. 45 ................................................. 42 ................................................... 41 ................................................. 42 ............................................... 41 ................................................... 41 ............................................ 42 ............................................ 42 ........................................... 41 ..................................... 41 .......................................... 41 .................................... 42 .................................. 42 OT.Secure_AC_Activation............................. 43 OT.Secure_Load_ACode ............................... 43 .................................. 43 P ................................................. 39 .................................................. 39 T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ P.Manufact.................................................... P.Personal_Data ................................ P.Personalization................................ Personalisation__Agent__Authentication Personalization_Agent ................................ Physical__protection................................ Prepersonalizer ................................ S Safe__state__management .......................... Secure__Messaging................................ Self__tests..................................................... Software_developer................................ T T.Abuse-Func................................ T.Bad_Activation ................................ T.Chip_ID ....................................................... T.Counterfeit ................................ T.Eavesdropping................................ T.Forgery........................................................ T.Information_Leakage ................................ T.Malfunction................................ T.Phys-Tamper................................ T.Skimming.................................................... T.TOE_Identification_Forgery ....................... T.Unauthorized_load................................ Terminal ........................................................ Traveler.......................................................... IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 ....................38 ............................................38 ...........................................38 Personalisation__Agent__Authentication ....72 ..................................33 .....................................72 .............................................34 ..........................72 .......................................72 .....................72 ......................................34 .................................................36 ...........................................38 .......................36 ...........................................37, 38 ............................................36 ........................36 .................................36 ................................................37 ...............................................37 ....................36 .......................38 .....................................38 ........................33 ..........................34 Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - 92700